People vs Vera

undue delagation of power; equal protection of the law

Caption: PEOPLE VS VERA

G.R. No. L-45685 65 Phil 56 November 16, 1937
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS and HONGKONG & SHANGHAI
BANKING CORPORATION, petitioners,
vs.
JOSE O. VERA, Judge . of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and MARIANO CU
UNJIENG, respondents.

Facts:
Mariano Cu Unjieng was convicted by the trial court in Manila. He filed for reconsideration
and four motions for new trial but all were denied. He then elevated to the Supreme Court and
the Supreme Court remanded the appeal to the lower court for a new trial. While awaiting new
trial, he appealed for probation alleging that the he is innocent of the crime he was convicted
of. The Judge of the Manila CFI directed the appeal to the Insular Probation Office. The IPO
denied the application. However, Judge Vera upon another request by petitioner allowed the
petition to be set for hearing. The City Prosecutor countered alleging that Vera has no power
to place Cu Unjieng under probation because it is in violation of Sec. 11 Act No. 4221 which
provides that the act of Legislature granting provincial boards the power to provide a system
of probation to convicted person. Nowhere in the law is stated that the law is applicable to a
city like Manila because it is only indicated therein that only provinces are covered. And even
if Manila is covered by the law it is unconstitutional because Sec 1 Art 3 of the Constitution
provides equal protection of laws. The said law provides absolute discretion to provincial
boards and this also constitutes undue delegation of power. Further, the said probation law
may be an encroachment of the power of the executive to provide pardon because providing
probation, in effect, is granting freedom, as in pardon.

Issues:

1. Whether or not Act No. 4221 constituted an undue delegation of legislative power
2. Whether or not the said act denies the equal protection of the laws

Discussions:

1. An act of the legislature is incomplete and hence invalid if it does not lay down any rule or
definite standard by which the administrative officer or board may be guided in the exercise
of the discretionary powers delegated to it. The probation Act does not, by the force of any
of its provisions, fix and impose upon the provincial boards any standard or guide in the
exercise of their discretionary power. What is granted, as mentioned by Justice Cardozo in
the recent case of Schecter, supra, is a “roving commission” which enables the provincial
boards to exercise arbitrary discretion. By section 11 if the Act, the legislature does not
 seemingly on its own authority extend the benefits of the Probation Act to the provinces
but in reality leaves the entire matter for the various provincial boards to determine.
2. The equal protection of laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws. The classification
of equal protection, to be reasonable, must be based on substantial distinctions which make
real differences; it must be germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be limited to
existing conditions only, and must apply equally to each member of the class.

Rulings:

1. The Court concludes that section 11 of Act No. 4221 constitutes an improper and unlawful
delegation of legislative authority to the provincial boards and is, for this reason,
unconstitutional and void. There is no set standard provided by Congress on how provincial
boards must act in carrying out a system of probation. The provincial boards are given
absolute discretion which is violative of the constitution and the doctrine of the non
delegation of power. Further, it is a violation of equity so protected by the constitution.
The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows: This Act
shall apply only in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have provided
for the salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than those now provided for
provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be appointed by the Secretary of Justice and
shall be subject to the direction of the Probation Office.

The provincial boards of the various provinces are to determine for themselves, whether the
Probation Law shall apply to their provinces or not at all. The applicability and application of
the Probation Act are entirely placed in the hands of the provincial boards. If the provincial
board does not wish to have the Act applied in its province, all that it has to do is to decline to
appropriate the needed amount for the salary of a probation officer.

2. It is also contended that the Probation Act violates the provisions of our Bill of Rights
which prohibits the denial to any person of the equal protection of the laws. The resultant
inequality may be said to flow from the unwarranted delegation of legislative power,
although perhaps this is not necessarily the result in every case. Adopting the example
given by one of the counsel for the petitioners in the course of his oral argument, one
province may appropriate the necessary fund to defray the salary of a probation officer,
while another province may refuse or fail to do so. In such a case, the Probation Act would
be in operation in the former province but not in the latter. This means that a person
otherwise coming within the purview of the law would be liable to enjoy the benefits of
probation in one province while another person similarly situated in another province
would be denied those same benefits. This is obnoxious discrimination. Contrariwise, it is
also possible for all the provincial boards to appropriate the necessary funds for the salaries
of the probation officers in their respective provinces, in which case no inequality would
result for the obvious reason that probation would be in operation in each and every
province by the affirmative action of appropriation by all the provincial boards.