REPUBLIC VS DRUGMAKER’S LAB (GR NO.
190837 MARCH 5, 2014) nature its applicability needs nothing further than its bare issuance, for it gives no real
Republic of the Philippines vs Drugmaker’s Laboratories Inc.
GR No. 190837 March 5, 2014
Facts: The FDA was created pursuant to RA 3720, otherwise known as the “Food, Drug and
Cosmetics Act” primarily in order to establish safety or efficacy standards and quality measure
of foods, drugs and devices and cosmetics products. On March 15, 1989, the Department of
Health, thru then Secretary Alfredo RA Bengzon issued AO 67 s. 1989, entitled Revised Rules
and Regulations on Registration of Pharmaceutical products. Among others, it required drug
manufacturers to register certain drug and medicine products with FDA before they may
release the same to the market for sale. In this relation, a satisfactory
bioavailability/bioequivalence (BA/BE) test is needed for a manufacturer to secure a CPR for
these products. However, the implementation of the BA/BE testing requirement was put on
hold because there was no local facility capable of conducting the same. The issuance of
circulars no. 1 s. of 1997 resumed the FDA’s implementation of the BA/BE testing requirement
with the establishment of BA/BE testing facilities in the country. Thereafter, the FDA issued
circular no. 8 s. of 1997 which provided additional implementation details concerning the
BA/BE testing requirement on drug products.
Issue: Whether or not the circular issued by FDA are valid.
Held: Yes. Administrative agencies may exercise quasi-legislative or rule-making power only if
there exist a law which delegates these powers to them. Accordingly, the rules so promulgated
must be within the confines of the granting statutes and must not involve discretion as to what
the law shall be, but merely the authority to fix the details in the execution or enforcement of
the policy set out in the law itself, so as to conform with the doctrine of separation of powers
and as an adjunct, the doctrine of non-delegability of legislative powers.
An administrative regulation may be classified as a legislative rule, an interpretative rule or a
contingent rule. Legislative rules are in the nature of subordinate legislation a d designed to
implement a primary legislation by providing the details thereof. They usually implement
existing law, imposing general, extra-statutory obligations pursuant to authority properly
delegated by the congress amd effect a change in existing law or policy which affect individual
rights and obligations. Meanwhile, interpretative rules are intended to interpret, clarify or
explain existing statutory regulations under which the administrative body operates. Their
purpose or objective is merely to construe the statue being administered and purpory to do no
more than interpret the statute. Simply, they try to say what the statute means and refer to no
single person or party in particular but concern all those belonging to the same class which may
be covered by the said rules. Finally, contingent rules are those issued by an administrative
authority based on the existence of certain facts or things upon which the enforcement of the
law depends.
In general, an administrative regulation needs to comply with the requirements laid down by
EO 292 s. of 1988 otherwise known as the administrative code of 1987 on prior notice, hearing
and publication in order to be valid and binding except when the same is merely an
interpretative rule. This is because when an administrative rule is merely intepretative in
consequence more than what the law itself has already prescribed. When, on the other hand,
the administrative rule goes beyond merely providing for the means that ca facilitate or render
least cumbersome the implementation of the law but substantially increases the burden of
those governed, it behooves the agency to accord at least to those directly affected a chance to
be heard, and thereafter to be duly informed before that new issuance is given the force and
effect of law.
A careful scrutiny of the foregoing issuances would reveal that A0 67 is actually the rule that
originally introduced the BA/BE testing requirement as a component of applications for the
issuamce of CPR covering certain pharmaceutical products as such, it is considered an
administrative regulation – a legislative rule to be exact – issued by the Secretary of Health in
consonance with the express authority granted to him by RA 3720 to implement the statutory
mandate that all drugs and devices should first be registered with the FDA prior to their
manufacture and sale. Considering that neither party contested the validity of its issuance, the
court deems that AO 67 complied with the requirements of prior hearing, notice and
publication pursuant to the presumption of regularity accorded tl the govt in the exercise of its
official duties.
On the other hand, circulars no. 1 and 8 s. of 1997 cannot be considered as administrative
regulations because they do not: a.) implement a primary legislation by providing the details
thereof; b.) Interpret, clarify or explain existing statutory regulation under which FDA operates
and/or; c.) Ascertain the existence of certain facts or things upon which the enforcement of RA
3720 depends. In fact, the only purpose of these is for FDA to administer and supervise the
implementation of the provisions of AO 67 s. of 1989 including those covering the BA/BE
testing requirement consistent with and pursuant to RA 3720. Therefore, the FDA has sufficient
authority to issue the said circulars and since theu would not affect the substantive rights of the
parties that they seek to govern – as they are not, strictly speaking, administrative regulations
in the first place – no prior hearing, consultation and publication are needed for their validity.
Administrative Agencies; Administrative agencies may exercise quasi-legislative or rule-
making powers only if there exists a law which delegates these powers to them.—Administrative
agencies may exercise quasi-legislative or rule-making powers only if there exists a law which
delegates these powers to them. Accordingly, the rules so promulgated must be within the
confines of the granting statute and must involve no discretion as to what the law shall be, but
merely the authority to fix the details in the execution or enforcement of the policy set out in
the law itself, so as to conform with the doctrine of separation of powers and, as an adjunct, the
doctrine of non-delegability of legislative power.
Administrative Law; An administrative regulation may be classified as a legislative rule, an
interpretative rule, or a contingent rule.—An administrative regulation may be classified as a
legislative rule, an interpretative rule, or a contingent rule. Legislative rules are in the nature
of subordinate legislation and designed to implement a primary legislation by providing the
details thereof. They usually implement existing law, imposing general, extra-statutory
obligations pursuant to authority properly delegated by Congress and effect a change in
existing law or policy which affects individual rights and obligations.
Meanwhile, interpretative rules are intended to interpret, clarify or explain existing statutory
regulations under which the administrative body operates. Their purpose or objective is merely
to construe the statute being administered and purport to do no more than interpret the
statute. Simply, they try to say what the statute means and refer to no single person or party in
particular but concern all those belonging to the same class which may be covered by the said
rules. Finally, contingent rules are those issued by an administrative authority based on the
existence of
______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
154certain facts or things upon which the enforcement of the law depends.
Same; When an administrative rule is merely interpretative in nature, its applicability
needs nothing further than its bare issuance, for it gives no real consequence more than what the
law itself has already prescribed.—In general, an administrative regulation needs to comply
with the requirements laid down by Executive Order No. 292, s. 1987, otherwise known as the
“Administrative Code of 1987,” on prior notice, hearing, and publication in order to be valid and
binding, except when the same is merely an interpretative rule. This is because “[w]hen an
administrative rule is merely interpretative in nature, its applicability needs nothing further
than its bare issuance, for it gives no real consequence more than what the law itself has
already prescribed. When, on the other hand, the administrative rule goes beyond merely
providing for the means that can facilitate or render least cumbersome the implementation of
the law but substantially increases the burden of those governed, it behooves the agency to
accord at least to those directly affected a chance to be heard, and thereafter to be duly
informed, before that new issuance is given the force and effect of law.”
Same; Pharmaceutical Products; Republic Act (RA) 3720, as amended by Executive Order
No. 175, s. 1987 prohibits, inter alia, the manufacture and sale of pharmaceutical products
without obtaining the proper Certificates of Product Registration (CPR) from the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA).—It is undisputed that RA 3720, as amended by Executive Order No. 175,
s. 1987 prohibits, inter alia, the manufacture and sale of pharmaceutical products without
obtaining the proper CPR from the FDA. In this regard, the FDA has been deputized by the same
law to accept applications for registration of pharmaceuticals and, after due course, grant or
reject such applications. To this end, the said law expressly authorized the Secretary of Health,
upon the recommendation of the FDA Director, to issue rules and regulations that pertain to the
registration of pharmaceutical products.
Philippine Consumers Foundation, Inc. vs. Sec. of Education, Culture and Sports, G.R. No.
78385 August 31, 1987
Posted by Pius Morados on November 13, 2011
(Admin Law, quasi-legislative power,)
Facts: The DECS, as recommended by the Task Force on Private Higher Education and through
respondent Secretary issued Dep Order No. 37, a modification of a previous Department Order,
authorizing the 10% to 15% increase in school fees. Petitioner opposed and alleged in a
petition that said order was issued without any legal basis arguing that authority of DECS to
regulate school fees does not always include the power to increase the same.
Sec. 57 (3) of BP Blg. 232 (The Education Act of 1982), vests the DECS with the power to
regulate the educational system; and Sec. 70 of the same act grants the DECS the power to issue
rules which are likewise necessary to discharge its functions and duties under the law.
The respondent Secretary maintains that the increase in tuition and other school fees is urgent
and necessary.
Issue: WON the fixing of school fees through department order by DECS is a valid delegation of
legislative power.
Held: Yes. Power granted to the educational department to regulate the educational system
includes the power to prescribe school fees. In the absence of a statue stating otherwise, this
power include the power to prescribe school fees. No other government agency has been
vested with the authority to fix school fees and as such, the power should be considered lodged
with the DECS.
PHILIPPINE CONSUMERS FOUNDATION, INC., petitioner, vs. THE SECRETARY OF EDUCATION,
CULTURE AND SPORTS, respondent.
Administrative Law; Schools; Tuition Fees; Power granted to the education department to
regulate the educational system of the country includes the power to prescribe school fees;
Authority to fix school fees considered lodged with the Department of Education.—ln the absence
of a statute stating otherwise, this power includes the power to prescribe schools fees. No other
government agency has been vested with the authority to fix school fees and as such, the power
should be considered lodged with the DECS if it is to properly and effectively discharge its
functions and duties under the law.
Same; Same; Same; Constitutional Law; Due process, denial of, not a case of; Function of
prescribing rates by an administrative agency may be either a legislative or an adjudicative
function; DECS Department Order prescribing the maximum school fees that may be
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5G.R. No. 72301.
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VOL. 153, AUGUST 31, 1987 623
Philippine Consumers Foundation, Inc. vs. Secretary of Education, Culture and
Sports
charged by all private schools is in the exercise of DECS legislative function, and prior notice
and hearing not essential to the validity of its issuance.—The function of prescribing rates by an
administrative agency may be either a legislative or an adjudicative function. If it were a
legislative function, the grant of prior notice and hearing to the affected parties is not a
requirement of due process. As regards rates prescribed by an administrative agency in the
exercise of its quasi-judicial function, prior notice and hearing are essential to the validity of
such rates. When the rules and/or rates laid down by an administrative agency are meant to
apply to all enterprises of a given kind throughout the country, they may partake of a legislative
character. Where the rules and the rates imposed apply exclusively to a particular party, based
upon a finding of fact, then its function is quasi-judicial in character. Is Department Order No.
37 issued by the DECS in the exercise of its legislative function? We believe so. The assailed
Department Order prescribes the maximum school fees that may be charged by all private
schools in the country for schoolyear 1987 to 1988. This being so, prior notice and hearing are
not essential to the validity of its issuance.
Same; Same; Same; Absence of showing of clear and convincing evidence of arbitrariness by
DECS in issuing the department order; The Task Force report created by the DECS as the basis for
its decision to allow an increase in tuition fees was made judiciously.—This observation
notwithstanding, there is a failure on the part of the petitioner to show clear and convincing
evidence of such arbitrariness. As the record of the case discloses, the DECS is not without any
justification for the issuance of the questioned Department Order. It would be reasonable to
assume that the report of the Task Force created by the DECS, on which it based its decision to
allow an increase in school fees, was made judiciously. Moreover, upon the instance of the
petitioner, as it so admits in its Petition, the DECS had actually reduced the original rates of
15% to 20% down to 10% to 15%, accordingly. Under the circumstances peculiar to this case,
We cannot consider the assailed Department Order arbitrary.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Presumption that official duty has been regularly
performed; Burden of proof is on the party assailing the regularity of official proceedings which
was not successfully disputed.—Under the Rules of Court, it is presumed that official duty has
been regularly performed. In the absence of proof to the contrary, that presumption prevails.
This being so, the burden of proof is
624
6 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
24
Philippine Consumers Foundation, Inc. vs. Secretary of Education, Culture and
Sports
on the party assailing the regularity of official proceedings. In the case at bar, the
petitioner has not successfully disputed the presumption.
Same; Same; Same; Supreme Court does not give its judicial imprimature to future
increases in school fees, which must not be unreasonable and arbitrary.—This Court, however,
does not go to the extent of saying that it gives its judicial imprimatur to future increases in
school fees. The increases must not be unreasonable and arbitrary so as to amount to an
outrageous exercise of government authority and power. In such an eventuality, this Court will
not hesitate to exercise the power of judicial review in its capacity as the ultimate guardian of
the Constitution.
Taxicab Operators vs. Board of Transportation
G.R. No. L-59234. September 30, 1982.
Facts:
Petitioners who are taxicab operators assail the constitutionality of Memorandum Circular No.
77-42 issued by the Board of Transportation (BOT) providing for the phasing out and
replacement of old and dilapidated taxicabs; as well as Implementing Circular No. 52 issued
pursuant thereto by the Bureau of Land Transportation (BLT) instructing personnel of the BLT
within the National Capital Region to implement the said BOT Circular, and formulating a
schedule of phase-out of vehicles to be allowed and accepted for registration as public
conveyances.
Petitioners allege that the questioned Circulars did not afford them procedural and substantive
due process, equal protection of the law, and protection against arbitrary and unreasonable
classification and standard. Among others, they question the issuance of the Circulars without
first calling them to a conference or requiring them to submit position papers or other
documents enforceability thereof only in Metro Manila; and their being applicable only to
taxicabs and not to other transportation services.
Issues:
Whether or not the constitutional guarantee of due process was denied to the taxicab operators
and/or other persons affected by the assailed Circular No. 52.
Held:
The Supreme Court held that there was no denial of due process since calling the taxicab
operators or persons who may be affected by the questioned Circulars to a conference or
requiring them to submit position papers or other documents is only one of the options open to
the BOT which is given wide discretionary authority under P.D. No. 101; and fixing a six- year
ceiling for a car to be operated as taxicab is a reasonable standard adopted to apply to all
vehicles affected uniformly, fairly, and justly.
The Court also ruled that neither has the equal protection clause been violated by initially
enforcing the Circulars only in Metro Manila since it is of common knowledge that taxicabs in
this city, compared to those of other places, are subjected to heavier traffic pressure and more
constant use, thus making for a substantial distinction; nor by non-application of the Circulars
to other transportation services because the said Circulars satisfy the criteria required under
the equal protection clause, which is the uniform operation by legal means so that all persons
under identical or similar circumstances would be accorded the same treatment both in
privilege conferred and the liabilities imposed.
It is clear from the provision of Section 2 of P.D. 101 aforequoted, that the leeway accorded the
Board gives it a wide range of choice in gathering necessary information or data in the
formulation of any policy, plan or program. It is not mandatory that it should first call a
conference or require the submission of position papers or other documents from operators or
persons who maybe affected, this being only one of the options open to the Board, which is
given wide discretionary authority. Petitioners cannot justifiably claim, therefore, that they
were deprived of procedural due process. Neither can they state with certainty that public
respondents had not availed of other sources of inquiry prior to issuing the challenged
Circulars. Operators of public conveyances are not the only primary sources of the data and
information that may be desired by the BOT.
TAXICAB OPERATORS OF METRO MANILA, INC., FELICISIMO CABIGAO and ACE
TRANSPORTATION CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. THE BOARD OF TRANSPORTATION and
THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF LAND TRANSPORTATION, respondents.
Public Utility; Due process; The BOT need not first summon taxicab operators to a
conference on public hearing before issuing circulars phasing-out more than 6-year old
taxicabs.—It is clear from the provision aforequoted, however, that the leeway accorded the
Board gives it a wide range of choice in gathering necessary information or data in the
formulation of any policy, plan or program. It is not mandatory that it should first call a
conference or require the submission of position papers or other documents from operators or
persons who may be affected, this being only one of the options open to the Board, which is
given wide discretionary authority. Petitioners cannot justifiably claim, therefore, that they
were deprived of procedural due process. Neither can they state with certainty that public
respondents had not availed of other sources of inquiry prior to issu-
________________
 *EN BANC
598
5 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
98
Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc. vs. Board of Transportation
ing the challenged Circulars. Operators of public conveyances are not the only primary
sources of the data and information that may be desired by the BOT.
Same; Same; Same.—Dispensing with a public hearing prior to the issuance of the
Circulars is neither violative of procedural due process.
Same; Same; Constitutional Law; Fixing by BOT of the lifetime ceiling of six (6) years to
taxicab is not unreasonable or arbitrary.—Petitioners further take the position that fixing the
ceiling at six (6) years is arbitrary and oppressive because the roadwor-thiness of taxicabs
depends upon their kind of maintenance and the use to which they are subjected, and,
therefore, their actual physical condition should be taken into consideration at the time of
registration. As public respondents contend, however, it is impractical to subject every taxicab
to constant and recurring evaluation, not to speak of the fact that it can open the door to the
adoption of multiple standards, possible collusion, and even graft and corruption. A reasonable
standard must be adopted to apply to all vehicles affected uniformly, fairly, and justly. The span
of six years supplies that reasonable standard. The product of experience shows that by that
time taxis have fully depreciated, their cost recovered, and a fair return on investment
obtained. They are also generally dilapidated and no longer fit for safe and comfortable service
to the public specially considering that they are in continuous operation practically 24 hours
everyday in three shifts of eight hours per shift. With that standard of reasonableness and
absence of arbitrariness, the requirement of due process has been met.
Same; Same; Same; Fixing lifetime of taxicab to six (6) years in Metro Manila due to heavier
traffic, safety and comfort of riding public is based on reasonable standards.—The Board's reason
for enforcing the Circular initially in Metro Manila is that taxicabs in this city, compared to
those of other places, are subjected to heavier traffic pressure and more constant use. This is of
common knowledge. Considering that traffic conditions are not the same in every city, a
substantial distinction exists so that infringement of the equal protection clause can hardly be
successfully claimed. As enunciated in the preambular clauses of the challenged BOT Circular,
the overriding consideration is the safety and comfort of the riding public from the dangers
possed by old and dilapidated taxis. The State, in the exercise of its police power, can prescribe
regulations to promote
599
VOL. 117, SEPTEMBER 30, 1982 599
Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc. vs. Board of Transportation
the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare of the people. It can
prohibit all things hurtful to comfort, safety and welfare of society. It may also regulate
property rights.
Same; Same; Same; Non-applicability of phase-out rule on taxis to other vehicles not
violative of equal protection clause.—In so far as the non-application of the assailed Circulars to
other transportation services is concerned, it need only be recalled that the equal protection
clause does not imply that the same treatment be accorded all and sundry. It applies to things
or persons identically or similarly situated, It permits of classification of the object of subject of
the law provided classification is reasonable or based on substantial distinction, which make
for real differences, and that it must apply equally to each member of the class. What is
required under the equal protection clause is the uniform operation by legal means so that all
persons under identical or similar circumstance would be accorded the same treatment both in
privilege conferred and the liabilities imposed. The challenged Circulars satisfy the foregoing
criteria.
Title : HOLY SPIRIT HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. vs SECRETARY
MICHAEL DEFENSOR
Citation : G.R. No. 163980
August 3, 2006
Ponente : TINGA, J.:
Facts :
A number of presidential issuances prior to the passage of R.A. No. 9207, authorized
the creation and development of what is now known as the National Government Center (NGC).
On March 5, 1972, former President Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1826,
reserving a parcel of land in Constitution Hills, Quezon City, covering a little over 440 hectares
as a national government site to be known as the NGC.
On August 11, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 137,
excluding 150 of the 440 hectares of the reserved site from the coverage of Proclamation No.
1826 and authorizing instead the disposition of the excluded portion by direct sale to the bona
fide residents therein.
In view of the rapid increase in population density in the portion excluded by
Proclamation No. 137 from the coverage of Proclamation No. 1826, former President Fidel
Ramos issued Proclamation No. 248 on September 7, 1993, authorizing the vertical
development of the excluded portion to maximize the number of families who can effectively
become beneficiaries of the government’s socialized housing program.
On May 14, 2003, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed into law R.A. No. 9207.
Petitioner Holy Spirit Homeowners Association, Inc. (Association) is a homeowners association
from the West Side of the NGC. It is represented by its president, Nestorio F. Apolinario, Jr., who
is a co-petitioner in his own personal capacity and on behalf of the association. The instant
petition for prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, with prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction, seeks to
prevent respondents from enforcing the implementing rules and regulations (IRR) of Republic
Act No. 9207, otherwise known as the "National Government Center (NGC) Housing and Land
Utilization Act of 2003."
Issue :
Whether or not in issuing the questioned IRR of R.A. No. 9207, the Committee was not
exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial function and should be declared null and void
for being arbitrary, capricious and whimsical.
Held:
Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rule-making powers and quasi-
judicial or administrative adjudicatory powers. Quasi-legislative or rule-making power is the
power to make rules and regulations which results in delegated legislation that is within the
confines of the granting statute and the doctrine of non-delegability and separability of powers.
In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by an
administrative agency, a party need not exhaust administrative remedies before going to court.
This principle, however, applies only where the act of the administrative agency concerned was
performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial function, and not when the assailed act pertained to its
rule-making or quasi-legislative power.
The assailed IRR was issued pursuant to the quasi-legislative power of the Committee
expressly authorized by R.A. No. 9207. The petition rests mainly on the theory that the assailed
IRR issued by the Committee is invalid on the ground that it is not germane to the object and
purpose of the statute it seeks to implement. Where what is assailed is the validity or
constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by the administrative agency in the performance
of its quasi-legislative function, the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the same.
Since the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the assailed IRR
issued by the Committee in the exercise of its quasi-legislative power, the judicial course to
assail its validity must follow the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Although the Supreme Court,
Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such
concurrence does not give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum.
HOLY SPIRIT HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. and NESTORIO F. APOLINARIO, in his
personal capacity and as President of Holy Spirit Homeowners Association, Inc., petitioners, vs.
SECRETARY MICHAEL DEFENSOR, in his capacity as Chairman of the Housing and Urban
Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC), ATTY. EDGARDO PAMINTUAN, in his capacity as
General Manager of the National Housing Authority (NHA), MR. PERCIVAL CHAVEZ, in his
capacity as Chairman of the Presidential Commission for the Urban Poor (PCUP), MAYOR
FELICIANO BELMONTE, in his capacity as Mayor of Quezon City, SECRETARY ELISEA GOZUN, in
her capacity as Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
and SECRETARY FLORENTE SORIQUEZ, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Public
Works and Highways (DPWH) as ex-officio members of the NATIONAL GOVERNMENT CENTER
ADMINISTRATION COMMITTEE, respondents.
National Government Center (NGC); Judicial Review; Locus Standi; An association has the
legal standing to institute the petition, whether or not it is the duly recognized association of
homeowners in the National Government Center (NGC) where it is shown that the individual
members of the association are residents of the NGC.—“Legal standing” or locus standi has been
defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or
will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged…. The gist
of the question of standing is whether a party alleges “such personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues
upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.” Petitioner
association has the legal standing to institute the instant petition, whether or not it is the duly
recognized association of homeowners in the NGC. There is no dispute that the individual
members of petitioner association are
_______________
* EN BANC.
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5 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
82
Holy Spirit Homeowners Association, Inc. vs. Defensor
residents of the NGC. As such they are covered and stand to be either benefited or injured
by the enforcement of the IRR, particularly as regards the selection process of beneficiaries and
lot allocation to qualified beneficiaries. Thus, petitioner association may assail those provisions
in the IRR which it believes to be unfavorable to the rights of its members. Contrary to the
OSG’s allegation that the failure of petitioner association and its members to qualify as
beneficiaries effectively bars them from questioning the provisions of the IRR, such
circumstance precisely operates to confer on them the legal personality to assail the IRR.
Administrative Law; Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rule-making
powers and quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory powers.—Administrative agencies
possess quasi-legislative or rule-making powers and quasi-judicial or administrative
adjudicatory powers. Quasi-legislative or rule-making power is the power to make rules and
regulations which results in delegated legislation that is within the confines of the granting
statute and the doctrine of non-delegability and separability of powers.
Same; Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies; The principle of exhaustion of administrative
agencies applies only where the act of the administrative agency concerned was performed
pursuant to its quasi-judicial function, and not when the assailed act pertained to its rule-making
or quasi-legislative power.—In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or
regulation issued by an administrative agency, a party need not exhaust administrative
remedies before going to court. This principle, however, applies only where the act of the
administrative agency concerned was performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial function, and not
when the assailed act pertained to its rule-making or quasi-legislative power.
Same; Jurisdictions; Where what is assailed is the validity or constitutionality of a rule or
regulation issued by the administrative agency in the performance of its quasi-legislative function,
the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the same.—The assailed IRR was issued
pursuant to the quasi-legislative power of the Committee expressly authorized by R.A. No.
9207. The petition rests mainly on the theory that the assailed IRR issued by the Committee is
invalid on the ground that it is not germane to the object and purpose of the statute it seeks to
implement. Where what is assailed is the validity
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Holy Spirit Homeowners Association, Inc. vs. Defensor
or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by the administrative agency in the
performance of its quasi-legislative function, the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon
the same.
National Government Center (NGC); Hierarchy of Courts; Since the regular courts have
jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the assailed Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR)
issued by the National Government Center Administration Committee (Committee) in the exercise
of its quasi-legislative power, the judicial course to assail its validity must follow the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts—a direct invocation of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to issue writs
of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction should be
allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set
out in the petition.—Since the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the
assailed IRR issued by the Committee in the exercise of its quasi-legislative power, the judicial
course to assail its validity must follow the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Although the
Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to
issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction,
such concurrence does not give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum.
True, this Court has the full discretionary power to take cognizance of the petition filed directly
with it if compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues raised, so warrant. A
direct invocation of the Court’s original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only
when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the
petition. In Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Melicor, 455 SCRA 460 (2005), the Court said that it will
not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the
appropriate courts, and exceptional and compelling circumstances, such as cases of national
interest and of serious implications, justify the availment of the extraordinary remedy of writ of
certiorari, calling for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction.
Courts; Hierarchy of Courts; The Supreme Court’s power to evaluate the validity of an
implementing rule or regulation is generally appellate in nature.—A perusal, however, of the
petition for prohibition shows no compelling, special or important reasons to warrant the
Court’s taking cognizance of the petition in the first
584
5 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
84
Holy Spirit Homeowners Association, Inc. vs. Defensor
instance. Petitioner also failed to state any reason that precludes the lower courts from
passing upon the validity of the questioned IRR. Moreover, as provided in Section 5, Article VIII
of the Constitution, the Court’s power to evaluate the validity of an implementing rule or
regulation is generally appellate in nature. Thus, following the doctrine of hierarchy of courts,
the instant petition should have been initially filed with the Regional Trial Court.
Prohibition; Prohibition lies against judicial or ministerial functions, but not against
legislative or quasi-legislative functions; Where the principal relief sought is to invalidate the
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR), petitioners’ remedy is an ordinary action for its
nullification, an action which properly falls under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court.—A
petition for prohibition is also not the proper remedy to assail an IRR issued in the exercise of a
quasi-legislative function. Prohibition is an extraordinary writ directed against any tribunal,
corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial
functions, ordering said entity or person to desist from further proceedings when said
proceedings are without or in excess of said entity’s or person’s jurisdiction, or are
accompanied with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Prohibition lies against judicial or
ministerial functions, but not against legislative or quasi-legislative functions. Generally, the
purpose of a writ of prohibition is to keep a lower court within the limits of its jurisdiction in
order to maintain the administration of justice in orderly channels. Prohibition is the proper
remedy to afford relief against usurpation of jurisdiction or power by an inferior court, or
when, in the exercise of jurisdiction in handling matters clearly within its cognizance the
inferior court transgresses the bounds prescribed to it by the law, or where there is no
adequate remedy available in the ordinary course of law by which such relief can be obtained.
Where the principal relief sought is to invalidate an IRR, petitioners’ remedy is an ordinary
action for its nullification, an action which properly falls under the jurisdiction of the Regional
Trial Court. In any case, petitioners’ allegation that “respondents are performing or threatening
to perform functions without or in excess of their jurisdiction” may appropriately be enjoined
by the trial court through a writ of injunction or a temporary restraining order.585
VOL. 497, AUGUST 3, 2006 585
Holy Spirit Homeowners Association, Inc. vs. Defensor
Courts; Procedural Rules and Technicalities; The Supreme Court will not shirk from its duty
to rule on the merits of this petition to facilitate the speedy resolution of this case—in proper
cases, procedural rules may be relaxed or suspended in the interest of substantial justice, and the
power of the Court to except a particular case from its rules whenever the purposes of justice
require it cannot be questioned.—In a number of petitions, the Court adequately resolved them
on other grounds without adjudicating on the constitutionality issue when there were no
compelling reasons to pass upon the same. In like manner, the instant petition may be
dismissed based on the foregoing procedural grounds. Yet, the Court will not shirk from its duty
to rule on the merits of this petition to facilitate the speedy resolution of this case. In proper
cases, procedural rules may be relaxed or suspended in the interest of substantial justice. And
the power of the Court to except a particular case from its rules whenever the purposes of
justice require it cannot be questioned.
Republic Act No. 9207; The government’s policy to set aside public property aims to benefit
not only the urban poor but also the local government and various government institutions
devoted to socioeconomic, charitable, educational and religious purposes.—Petitioners’
interpretation is also not supported by the policy of R.A. No. 9207 and the prior proclamations
establishing the NGC. The government’s policy to set aside public property aims to benefit not
only the urban poor but also the local government and various government institutions
devoted to socioeconomic, charitable, educational and religious purposes. Thus, although
Proclamation No. 137 authorized the sale of lots to bona fide residents in the NGC, only a third
of the entire area of the NGC was declared open for disposition subject to the condition that
those portions being used or earmarked for public or quasi-public purposes would be excluded
from the housing program for NGC residents. The same policy of rational and optimal land use
can be read in Proclamation No. 248 issued by then President Ramos. Although the
proclamation recognized the rapid increase in the population density in the NGC, it did not
allocate additional property within the NGC for urban poor housing but instead authorized the
vertical development of the same 150 hectares identified previously by Proclamation No. 137
since the distribution of individual lots would not adequately provide for the housing needs of
all the bona fideresidents in the NGC.586
5 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
86
Holy Spirit Homeowners Association, Inc. vs. Defensor
Same; Where a rule or regulation has a provision not expressly stated or contained in the
statute being implemented, that provision does not necessarily contradict the statute—all that is
required is that the regulation should be germane to the objects and purposes of the law; that the
regulation be not in contradiction to but in conformity with the standards prescribed by the law;
Implicit in the authority of the Committee and the statute’s objective of urban poor housing is the
power of the Committee to formulate the manner by which the reserved property may be
allocated to the beneficiaries.—Where a rule or regulation has a provision not expressly stated
or contained in the statute being implemented, that provision does not necessarily contradict
the statute. A legislative rule is in the nature of subordinate legislation, designed to implement
a primary legislation by providing the details thereof. All that is required is that the regulation
should be germane to the objects and purposes of the law; that the regulation be not in
contradiction to but in conformity with the standards prescribed by the law. In Section 5 of R.A.
No. 9207, the Committee is granted the power to administer, formulate guidelines and policies,
and implement the disposition of the areas covered by the law. Implicit in this authority and the
statute’s objective of urban poor housing is the power of the Committee to formulate the
manner by which the reserved property may be allocated to the beneficiaries. Under this broad
power, the Committee is mandated to fill in the details such as the qualifications of
beneficiaries, the selling price of the lots, the terms and conditions governing the sale and other
key particulars necessary to implement the objective of the law. These details are purposely
omitted from the statute and their determination is left to the discretion of the Committee
because the latter possesses special knowledge and technical expertise over these matters.
Same; The Committee’s authority to fix the selling price of the lots may be likened to the
rate-fixing power of administrative agencies, and in case of a delegation of rate-fixing power, the
only standard which the legislature is required to prescribe for the guidance of the administrative
authority is that the rate be reasonable and just.—The Committee’s authority to fix the selling
price of the lots may be likened to the rate-fixing power of administrative agencies. In case of a
delegation of rate-fixing power, the only standard which the legislature is required to prescribe
for the guidance of the administrative authority is that the rate be reasonable and just.
However, it has
587
VOL. 497, AUGUST 3, 2006 587
Holy Spirit Homeowners Association, Inc. vs. Defensor
been held that even in the absence of an express requirement as to reasonableness, this
standard may be implied. In this regard, petitioners do not even claim that the selling price of
the lots is unreasonable.
Same; There is nothing objectionable about prescribing a period within which the parties
must execute the contract to sell. This condition can ordinarily be found in a contract to sell and is
not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.—The provision on the
price escalation clause as a penalty imposed to a beneficiary who fails to execute a contract to
sell within the prescribed period is also within the Committee’s authority to formulate
guidelines and policies to implement R.A. No. 9207. The Committee has the power to lay down
the terms and conditions governing the disposition of said lots, provided that these are
reasonable and just. There is nothing objectionable about prescribing a period within which the
parties must execute the contract to sell. This condition can ordinarily be found in a contract to
sell and is not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.
Same; In subordinate legislation, as long as the passage of the rule or regulation had the
benefit of a hearing, the procedural due process requirement is deemed complied with.—
Petitioners also suggest that the adoption of the assailed IRR suffers from a procedural flaw.
According to them the IRR was adopted and concurred in by several representatives of people’s
organizations contrary to the express mandate of R.A. No. 9207 that only two representatives
from duly recognized peoples’ organizations must compose the NGCAC which promulgated the
assailed IRR. It is worth noting that petitioner association is not a duly recognized people’s
organization. In subordinate legislation, as long as the passage of the rule or regulation had the
benefit of a hearing, the procedural due process requirement is deemed complied with. That
there is observance of more than the minimum requirements of due process in the adoption of
the questioned IRR is not a ground to invalidate the same.
G.R. No. 157299, June 19, 2006
Petitioner: The Public Schools District Supervisors Association (PSDSA), with its officers and
members
Respondents: Hon. Edilberto C. De Jesus, Department Secretary, DepEd, and The Department
Of Budget And Management
Doctrine: The power of administrative officials to promulgate rules in the implementation of a
statute is necessarily limited to what is provided for in the legislative enactment. The
implementing rules and regulations of a law cannot extend the law or expand its coverage, as
the power to amend or repeal a statute is vested in the legislature.
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
SUMMARY:
RA 9155
 enacted to change the governance of DepEd due to the evolutio of learning process
 Enacted to improve the managemebt of DepEd
 retained the position of the petitioners as district supervisors with limited responsibilities:
1. providing professional and instructional advice and support to the school heads and
teachers/facilitators of schools and learning centers in the district or cluster thereof;
2. curricula supervision; and
3. performing such other functions as may be assigned by proper authorities.
PSDSA
 originally has the admin supervision over the elem and public high schools over their
jurisdiction (with respect to both affairs/admin of the schools and curriculum)
 contend that the IRR implemented by DepEd expanded and modified the provisions of RA
9155, particularly:
1. limiting the admin supervision of the district supervisors (petitioners); and
2. the donations, gifts (sec 6.2(11) of IRR) was a modification of RA 9155 as such report
must be reported to them as district supervisors and not only to division superintendent
(rulling is the last part of the digest)
FACTS
 Ever since DepEd was founded, its management had been so centralized in the Manila office.
Schools in the national, regional, and division levels merely followed and implemented the
orders and memoranda issued by the Education Secretary. Due to the evolution of the
learning process and the onset of information technology, there was a need for a radical
change in the governance of the DepEd. Thus, a study on how to improve the management of
the Department was conducted, and one of the proposals was the abolition of the office of
the district supervisor.
 Then Senator Tessie Aquino-Oreta, the Chairman of the Committee on Education, authored
Senate Bill No. 2191, the thrust of which was to change the existing management style and
focus on the schools where the teaching-learning process occurs. The bill was intended to
 highlight shared governance in the different levels in the DECS hierarchy and establish
authority, accountability, and responsibility for achieving higher learning outcomes.
 RA 9155 (Governance of Basic Education Act of 2001) became a law in accordance with Sec.
27(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. Under the law, each regional office shall have a director, an
assistant director, and an office staff for program promotion and support, planning,
administrative and fiscal services.
 The office of the schools district supervisor has been retained under the law. Each district is
headed by a school district supervisor and an office staff for program promotion. However,
the responsibilities of the schools district supervisor were limited.
 The schools district supervisors have no administrative, management, control or
supervisory functions over the schools and learning centers within their respective districts.
 Under Sec. 14 of the law, the DepEd Secretary is mandated to “promulgate the implementing
rules and regulations within 90 days after the approval of the Act, provided that the
principle of shared governance shall be fully implemented within 2 years” after such
approval.
 Before the DepEd could issue the appropriate implementing rules and regulations, PSDSA
sought the legal assistance of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) National Committee
on Legal Aid to make representations for the resolution of the following administrative
issues:
1. Restoration of the functions, duties, responsibilities, benefits, prerogatives, and position
level of Public Schools District Supervisors.
2. Upgrading of Salary Grade level of Public Schools District Supervisors from Salary Grade
Level 19 to Salary Grade Level 24 under DBM Circular No. 36, otherwise known as the
Compensation and Position Classification Rules and Regulation.
 PSDSA thus requested the DepEd Secretary to call an immediate consultation with the
district supervisors nationwide through a convention, and their valid inputs be considered
in formulating the rules and regulations to be urged by the DepEd. However, the Secretary
failed to reply.
 DepEd Secretary Edilberto C. De Jesus thereafter issued DECS Office Order No. 1 which
constitutes the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 9155.
 PSDSA led a petition for prohibition and mandamus with SC.
Contentions of the PETITIONERS (PSDSA):
 IRR of RA 9155 expanded and modified provisions which are diametrically opposed
to the letter and spirit of the subject law. They argue that the said law should be read in
harmony with the existing educational laws.
 The act of the DepEd in removing the petitioners’ administrative supervision over
elementary schools and its principals within his/her district and converting his/her
administrative function to that of performing staff for the division is a gross violation of RA
9155;
 Ultimately, petitioners allege that by the implementation of the IRR they are stripped of
their administrative functions.
Contentions of the Private RESPONDENT (SolGen):
 7(D) of R.A. No. 9155 shows that the district supervisor has limited responsibilities, and that
the power to exercise administrative supervision over the ESPs is not covered by any of
those responsibilities. The Education Secretary is the disciplining authority in the DepEd,
with the regional directors acting as the disciplining authority in their respective regions.
 As to petitioners’ gripe that the IRR deleted district supervisors from among those school
heads who should report when “[a]ccepting donations, gifts, bequests, and grants x x x” the
OSG avers that this reportorial function is “directory” and merely for “convenience.”
ISSUE: Whether the IRR extended RA 9155. – NO
RULING:
Administrative bodies are allowed to implement policies.
 It must be stressed that the power of administrative officials to promulgate rules in the
implementation of a statute is necessarily limited to what is provided for in the legislative
enactment. The implementing rules and regulations of a law cannot extend the law or
expand its coverage, as the power to amend or repeal a statute is vested in the legislature.
 It bears stressing, however, that administrative bodies are allowed under their power of
subordinate legislation to implement the broad policies laid down in a statute by “filling in”
the details. All that is required is that the regulation be germane to the objectives and
purposes of the law; that the regulation does not contradict but conforms with the standards
prescribed by law.
 Moreover, as a matter of policy, this Court accords great respect to the decisions and/or
actions of administrative authorities not only because of the doctrine of separation of
powers but also for their presumed knowledgeability and expertise in the enforcement of
laws and regulations entrusted to their jurisdiction. The rationale for this rule relates not
only to the emergence of the multifarious needs of a modern or modernizing society and the
establishment of diverse administrative agencies for addressing and satisfying those needs;
it also relates to the accumulation of experience and growth of specialized capabilities by
the administrative agency charged with implementing a particular statute.
Disposition: IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition for prohibition is PARTIALLY
GRANTED. Joint Circular No. 1, Series of 2003 is declared valid, except Section 6.2(11), Rule VI
thereof which provides that “donations or grants shall be reported only to the division
superintendents.” Such donations or grants must also be reported to the appropriate school
district supervisors, as mandated by Republic Act No. 9155. Petitioners’ prayer for the issuance
of a writ of mandamus is DENIED for lack of merit. No costs. SO ORDERED.
OTHER ISSUES:
Whether the IRR for RA 9155 is a valid exercise of quasi-legislative power of DepEd. – PARTLY
YES(except Sec. 2(11), Rule VI regarding the reporting of donation)
Definition of Administrative supervision
 Administrative supervision means “overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see
that their subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fails or neglects to fulfill
them, the former may take such action or steps as prescribed by law to make them perform
their duties.
Senate deliberations showed the intent to divest from the district supervisor any
administrative supervision
 As gleaned from the Senate deliberations on Senate Bill No. 2191, the district supervisors
were divested of any administrative supervision over elementary and public high schools.
Senator Aquino-Oreta’s comment:
“Mr. President, may I just explain. There are two school supervisors. One is for the academic
function and the other is for the administrative function. As such, if these two supervisors will
 dictate to the principals, then our thrust in reducing the level of bureaucracy might not bemet.
Also, the thrust of this governance bill really is to flesh out the importance of the school as the
heart of education here. In that heart, we have the teacher, the student, and the school head.
What we are trying to do here is to bring to the forefront the school itself. In fact, right now,
there is a move in the DECS to do away with the school supervisor in charge of administrative
and leave that function to the principal. If the principal, the school head will be dictated upon
by these two school supervisors, we might not be able to achieve what we want to do here
putting to the forefront the school itself. Meaning, putting to the forefront the school head, the
teacher, and the student.”
x x x
“But precisely, Mr. President, we are not doing that, we are not taking them out. What we are
saying is for the school supervisor to focus on the curriculum because in the administration of
the affairs of the school, we are saying that the principal knows best how to administer or how
to run the school better. And so, we are saying here that school supervisors will be there
contrary to the view of that ADB study. We will maintain them, but the focus of the school
supervisors will be on the curriculum of the schools.”
Statutory Construction
 It is a settled rule of statutory construction that the express mention of one person, thing,
act, or consequence excludes all others. This rule is expressed in the familiar maxim
expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
 Where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by
interpretation or construction, be extended to others. The rule proceeds from the premise
that the legislature would not have made specified enumerations in a statute had the
intention been not to restrict its meaning and to confine its terms to those expressly
mentioned.
 Congress enumerated the duties and responsibilities of a district supervisor. Congress
would not have made specific enumerations in a statute if it had the intention not to restrict
or limit its meaning and confine its terms only to those expressly enumerated. Courts may
not, in the guise of interpretation, enlarge the scope of a statute and include situations not
provided nor intended by Congress.
The submission of the OSG, that the schools district
supervisors have the administrative supervision over school heads, is more in accord with
the law, to wit:
Section 7 of RA 9155, on School District Level, pertinently provides that “a school district shall
have a school district supervisor and an office staff for program promotion,” and that the
schools district supervisor shall be responsible for: (1) “(p)roviding professional and
instructional advice and support to the school heads and teachers/facilitators of schools and
learning centers in the district [or] cluster thereof”; (2) “(c)urricula supervision”; and, (3)
“(p)erforming such other functions as may be assigned by the proper authorities.”
 A perusal of Section 7 shows that the District Supervisor has limited responsibilities, and
that the power to exercise administrative supervision over the ESPs is not covered by
responsibility nos. 1 and 2. Neither is that power covered by the directive that the District
Supervisor shall have an office staff for program promotion. The only logical conclusion,
therefore, that can be derived from the aforesaid enumeration of responsibilities is that the
District Supervisor may only exercise administrative supervision over ESPs when such
function is assigned by proper authorities. And, since the DepEd Secretary specifically
declared through the IRR of RA 9155, that the District Supervisor shall not exercise
administrative supervision over the ESPs, unless otherwise authorized, petitioners cannot
complain against the said declaration. On this score, it is settled that the intent of the statute
is the law.
 Needless to say, Section 7, on Division Level, further provides that the School Division
Superintendent shall have authority, accountability and responsibility for, among others,
“(s)upervising the operation of all public and private elementary, secondary and integrated
schools, and learning centers.” To claim, therefore, that the District Supervisor has
administrative supervision over the ESPs would also violate the above-quoted provision.”
District supervisors are retained in RA 9155 but with limited responsibilities
 However, as already stated, the Senate resolved to maintain the positions of district
supervisors but limited their responsibilities only to those enumerated in Section 7(D) of
R.A. No. 9155 to conform to the basic thrust and objectives of the law.
 Far from strengthening the office of the district supervisors as a mid-head field office of the
DepEd, the law limited the authority and responsibility attached to such position. While it is
true that the district supervisor is given a support staff for program promotion, it cannot
thereby be implied that he/she likewise has administrative supervision over ESPs and SSPs.
Such a construction has no basis in law and in fact. Indeed, such a construction of the statute
defeats the very purpose of the law.
 It is a basic precept that the intent of the legislature is the controlling factor in the
interpretation of the statute.
Sections 4.3 of Rule IV, and Sections 5.1 and 5.2 of Rule V of the IRR are valid.
 The provisions merely reiterate and implement the related provisions of R.A. No.
9155. Under the law, a division superintendent has the authority and responsibility to hire,
place, and evaluate all division supervisors and district supervisors as well as all employees
in the division, both teaching and non-teaching personnel, including school heads.
 A school head is a person responsible for the administrative and instructional supervision of
the schools or cluster of schools. The division superintendent, on the other hand, supervises
the operation of all public and private elementary, secondary, and integrated schools and
learning centers.
 The Court likewise declares that the last paragraph of Section 4.3 of the IRR, stating that the
regional director shall continue exercising disciplinary authority over the teaching
personnel insofar as the latter are covered by specific and exclusive disciplinary provisions
under R.A. No. 4670 (“Magna Carta for Public School Teachers”) does not contravene R.A.
No. 9155. Indeed, the IRR merely reiterates the DECS Rules of Procedure, DECS Order No.
33. nd pursuant to Section 7, Chapter II, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code.
Section 6.2(11) of the IRR is invalid.
 However, Section 6.2(11), Rule VI of the IRR provides that:
(11) Accepting donations, gifts, bequests, and grants in accordance with existing laws and
policy of the Department for the purpose of upgrading teachers’/learning facilitators’
competencies, improving and expanding school facilities, and providing instructional materials
and equipment. Such donations or grants must be reported to the division superintendents.
 We agree with petitioners’ contention that, under the law, donations and grants must be
reported to the appropriate district supervisors and not only to the division
superintendents.
 The use in the law of the word “must” is an expression of the mandatory nature of the
reporting of donations and grants to district supervisors. The reason for the provision is that
such grants and donations which are intended to upgrade teachings/learning facilitators’
competencies, improve and expand school facilities, and provide instructional materials and
equipment will assist the school district supervisors in the performance of their duties and
responsibilities under Section 7(D) of R.A. No. 9155, and submit appropriate
recommendations to the proper administrative officers.
 Atty. Augusto Toledo was appointed by then Comelec Chairman Ramon Felipe as Manager of
Statutes; Statutory Construction; The power of administrative officials to promulgate rules
in the implementation of a statute is necessarily limited to what is provided for in the legislative the Education and Information Department of the Comelec on May 1986, at which time Toledo
enactment; The implementing rules and regulations of a law cannot extend the law or expand its
was already more than 57 years old. Toledo’s appointment papers and his oath of office were
coverage, as the power to amend or repeal a statute is vested in the legislature.—It must be
stressed that the power of administrative officials to promulgate rules in the implementation of endorsed by the Comelec to the CSC on June 1986 for approval and attestation. However, no
a statute is necessarily limited to what is provided for in the legislative enactment. The
prior request for exemption from the provisions of Section 22, Rule III of the CSRPAP—which
implementing rules and regulations of a law cannot extend the law or expand its coverage, as
the power to amend or repeal a statute is vested in the legislature. It bears stressing, however, prohibits the appointment of persons 57 years old or above into government service without
that administrative bodies are allowed under their power of subordinate legislation to
prior CSC approval—was secured. Petitioner then reported for work.
implement the broad policies laid down in a statute by “filling in” the details. All that is required
is that the regulation be germane to the objectives and purposes of the law; that the regulation Comelec, upon discovery of the lack of authority required under CSRPAP, and CSC Memo
does not contradict but conforms with the standards prescribed by law. Moreover, as a matter
Circular 5 issued Resolution No. 2066, which declared void from the beginning Toledo’s
of policy, this Court accords great respect to the decisions and/or actions of administrative
authorities not only because of the doctrine of separation of powers but also for their presumed appointment. Petitioner appealed to CSC, which considered him a de facto officer and his
knowledgeability and expertise in the enforcement of laws and regulations entrusted
appointment voidable, and moved for reconsideration but was denied, hence the present
57
petition for certiorari.
VOL. 491, JUNE 16, 2006 57
Public Schools District Supervisors Association (PSDSA) vs. De Jesus Issue:
to their jurisdiction. The rationale for this rule relates not only to the emergence of the W/N CSRPAP provision is valid
multifarious needs of a modern or modernizing society and the establishment of diverse
administrative agencies for addressing and satisfying those needs; it also relates to the
accumulation of experience and growth of specialized capabilities by the administrative agency Held:
charged with implementing a particular statute. No. The Civil Service Act of 959 (RA 2260), which established the CSC, contained no provision
Same; Same; It is settled rule of statutory construction that the express mention of one
person, thing, act, or consequence excludes all others.—It is a settled rule of statutory prohibiting appointment or reinstatement into government service of any person already 57
construction that the express mention of one person, thing, act, or consequence excludes all years old. Sec 5 Rule 6 of the Revised Civil Service Rules, which prohibits such, was purely the
others. This rule is expressed in the familiar maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Where a
creation of CSC.
statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or
construction, be extended to others. The rule proceeds from the premise that the legislature Marcos’s PD 807 (Civil Service Decree), which established a new CSC and superseded RA
would not have made specified enumerations in a statute had the intention been not to restrict
2260, also provided that rules and regulations shall become effective only 30 days after
its meaning and to confine its terms to those expressly mentioned.
Same; Same; The intent of the legislature is the controlling factor in the interpretation of publication in the OG or in any newspaper of general circulation. The new CSC adopted the
the statute; Courts may not, in the guise of interpretation, enlarge the scope of a statute and
CSRPAP . No provision re prohibition of appointment of 57 year old made in PD 807;
include situations not provided nor intended by Congress.—It is a basic precept that the intent of
the legislature is the controlling factor in the interpretation of the statute. The particular words, prohibition was purely created by CSC.
clauses, and phrases should not be studied as detached and isolated expression, but the whole
The provision cannot be valid, being entirely a CSC creation, it has no basis in the law which it
and every part of the statute must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in
order to produce a harmonious whole. Besides, Congress enumerated the duties and was meant to implement. It cannot be justified as a valid exercise of its function of
responsibilities of a district supervisor. Congress would not have made specific enumerations
promulgating rules and regulations for that function, to repeat, may legitimately be exercised
in a statute if it had the intention not to restrict or limit its meaning and confine its terms only
to those expressly enumerated. Courts may not, in the guise of interpretation, enlarge the scope only for the purpose of carrying the provisions of the law into effect; and since there is no
of a statute and include situations not provided nor intended by Congress.
prohibition or restriction on the employment of 57-year old persons in the statute—or any
provision respecting age as a factor in employment—there was nothing to carry into effect
TOLEDO V CSC and COMELEC
through an implementing rule on the matter. The power vested in the CSC was to implement
Facts:
the law or put it into effect, not to add to it; to carry the law into effect or execution, not to
supply perceived omissions in it.
Additionally, the CSRPAP cannot be considered effective as of the time of the application to
Toledo of a provision thereof, for the reason that said rules were never published as required
by both RA 2260 and PD 807. The argument that it was a “mere reiteration of existing law” and
“circularized” cannot stand as formerly discussed.
Also, Toledo’s separation from service was through no fault of his own. Petition granted.
AUGUSTO TOLEDO, petitioner, vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, respondents.
Civil Service Law; RA 2260; The provision on 57 yr. old persons in the Revised Civil Service
Rules under RA 2260 cannot be accorded validity. It is entirely a creation of the Civil Service
Commission, having no basis in the law itself which it was meant to implement.—In any event, the
provision on 57-year old persons in the Revised Civil Service Rules (under said RA 2260)
cannot be accorded validity. As already pointed out, it is entirely a creation of the Civil Service
Commission, having no basis in the law itself which it was meant to implement. It cannot be
related to or connected with any specific provision of the law which it is meant to carry into
effect, such as a requirement, for instance, that age should be reckoned as a factor in the
employment or reinstatement of an individual, or a direction that there be a determination of
some point in a person's life at which he becomes unemployable, or employable only under
specific conditions. It was therefore an authorized act of legislation on the part of the Civil
Service Commission. It cannot be justified as a valid exercise of its function of promulgating
rules and regulations for that function, to repeat, may legitimately be exercised only for the
purpose of carrying the provisions of the law into effect; and since there is no prohibition or
restriction on the employment of 57-year old persons in the statute—or any provision
respecting age as a factor in employment—there was nothing to carry into effect through an
implementing rule on the matter.
Same; Same; Administrative Regulations; Administrative regulations cannot amend an act
of Congress.—The power vested in the Civil Service Commission was to implement the law or
put it into effect, not to add to it; to carry the law into effect or execution, not to supply
perceived omissions in it. "By its administrative regulations, of course, the law itself can not be
extended; said regulations 'cannot amend an act of Congress.'" (Teoxon v. Members of the
Board of Administrators, Philippine Veterans Administration, 33 SCRA 585, 589 [1970], citing
Santos v. Estenzo, 109 Phil. 4191960]; see also, Animos v. Philippine Veterans Affairs Office,
174 SCRA 214, 223-224 [1989] in turn citing Teoxon).
_______________
*EN BANC.
508
5 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
08
Toledo vs. Civil Service Commission
Same; Same; Sec. 22, Rule III of the Civil Service Rules on Personal Actions and Policies
(CSRPAP); The enactment of Sec. 22, Rule III of the CSRPAP relative to 57 yr. old persons, was also
an act of supererogation on the part of the Civil Service Commission since the rule has no relation
to or connection with any provision of the law supposed to be carried into effect.—The
considerations just expounded also conduce to the conclusion of the invalidity of Section 22,
Rule III of the CSRPAP. The enactment of said section, relative to 57-year old persons, was also
an act of supererogation on the part of the Civil Service Commission since the rule has no
relation to or connection with any provision of the law supposed to be carried into effect. The
section was an addition to or extension of the law, not merely a mode of carrying it into effect.
Same; Same; Same; Assuming that the rule is valid, it cannot be construed as applying to
employees over whom neither the President nor the Chief Justice exercises supervision.—
Assuming without conceding that the rule regarding employment of 57-year old persons is
valid and enforceable, it can only apply, according to its express terms, to employees under the
supervision of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, or of the President of the Philippines,
these two being the only officials mentioned as having to give consent to the employment of
said persons. It cannot be construed as applying to employees over whom neither the President
nor the Chief Justice exercises supervision, such as the Senate or the House of Representatives,
or the COMELEC or other Constitutional Commissions.
PEOPLE VS. MACEREN
Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department
must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of
carrying into effect its general provisions. By such regulations, the law itself cannot be
extended. An administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress.
FACTS:
The respondents were charged with violating Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1 which
penalizes electro fishing in fresh water fisheries. This was promulgated by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries under the old Fisheries
Law and the law creating the Fisheries Commission. The municipal court quashed the
complaint and held that the law does not clearly prohibit electro fishing, hence the executive
and judicial departments cannot consider the same. On appeal, the CFI affirmed the dismissal.
Hence, this appeal to the SC.
ISSUE: Whether the administrative order penalizing electro fishing is valid?
HELD:
NO. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries
exceeded their authority in issuing the administrative order. The old Fisheries Law does not
expressly prohibit electro fishing. As electro fishing is not banned under that law, the Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries are powerless to
penalize it. Had the lawmaking body intended to punish electro fishing, a penal provision to
that effect could have been easily embodied in the old Fisheries Law. The lawmaking body
cannot delegate to an executive official the power to declare what acts should constitute an
offense. It can authorize the issuance of regulations and the imposition of the penalty provided
for in the law itself. Where the legislature has delegated to executive or administrative officers
and boards authority to promulgate rules to carry out an express legislative purpose, the rules
of administrative officers and boards, which have the effect of extending, or which conflict with
the authority granting statute, do not represent a valid precise of the rule-making power.
PEOPLE v MACEREN
79 SCRA 450
AQUINO; October 18, 1977
FACTS
- Section 11 of the Fisheries Law prohibits "the use of any obnoxious or poisonous substance"
in fishing.
- The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, upon the recommendation of the
Commissioner of Fisheries, promulgated Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84 (62 O.G. 1224),
prohibiting electro fishing in all Philippine waters.
- Jose Buenaventura, Godofredo Reyes, Benjamin Reyes, Nazario Aquino and Carlito del Rosario
were charged with having violated Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1. It was alleged that
they engaged in electro fishing.
- Upon motion of the accused, the municipal court dismissed the case. CFI affirmed. The lower
court held that electro fishing cannot be penalized because electric current is not an obnoxious
or poisonous substance as contemplated in section II of the Fisheries Law. The lower court
further held that, since the law does not clearly prohibit electro fishing, the executive and
judicial departments cannot consider it unlawful.
ISSUE/S
1. WON the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources exceeded his authority in issuing
Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84
HELD
1. YES.
Ratio The rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or
proceeding to carry into effect the law as it his been enacted. The power cannot be extended to
amending or expanding the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the
statute
Reasoning The Fisheries Law does not expressly prohibit electro fishing. As electro fishing is
not banned under that law, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the
Commissioner of Fisheries are powerless to penalize it. Had the lawmaking body intended to
punish electro fishing, a penal provision to that effect could have been easily embodied in the
old Fisheries Law. Nowhere in the said law is electro fishing specifically punished.
Administrative agents are clothed with rule-making powers because the lawmaking body finds
it impracticable, if not impossible, to anticipate and provide for the multifarious and complex
situations that may be encountered in enforcing the law. All that is required is that the
regulation should be germane to the defects and purposes of the law and that it should conform
to the standards that the law prescribes
Disposition Decision affirmed
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, vs. HON. MAXIMO A. MACEREN, CFI, Sta.
Cruz, Laguna, JOSE BUENAVENTURA, GODOFREDO REYES, BENJAMIN REYES, NAZARIO
AQUINO and CARLITO DEL ROSARIO, accused-appellees.
Filling; Jurisdiction; Appeals; An offense punishable with a fine up to P500.00 falls under the
concurrent jurisdiction of a provincial capital town court and the Court of First Instance. The
order of the former is directly appealable to the Supreme Court.—It is obvious that the crime of
electro fishing, which is punishable with a fine up to P500, falls within the concurrent original
jurisdiction of the inferior courts and the Court of First Instance. And since the instant case was
filed in the municipal court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna, a provincial capital, the order of dismissal
rendered by that municipal court was directly appealable to this Court, not the Court of First
Instance of Laguna. It results that the Court of First Instance of Laguna had no appellate
jurisdiction over the case. Its order affirming the municipal court’s order of dismissal is void for
lack of jurisdiction. This appeal shall be treated as a direct appeal from the municipal court to
this Court.
Fishing; Administrative law; Fishery Adm. Order No. 84 penalizing electro fishing is null and
void because the Fishery Laws under which it was issued (Act 4003 and R.A. 3512) did not
expressly prohibit electro fishing.—We are of the opinion that the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries exceeded their authority in issuing
Fisheries Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1 and that those orders are not warranted
under the Fisheries Law, Act No. 4003, and under the law creating the Fisheries Law does not
expressly prohibit electro fishing. As electro fishing is not banned under that law, the Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries are powerless to
penalize it. In other words, Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1, in penalizing electro
fishing, are devoid of any legal basis.
_______________
*SECOND DIVISION.
451
VOL. 79, OCTOBER 18, 1977 451
People vs. Maceren
Same; Same; Lawmaking body cannot delegate to administrative official the power to
declare what act constitute a criminal offense.—The law making body cannot delegate to an
executive official the power to declare what acts should constitute a criminal offense. It can
authorize the issuance of regulations and the imposition of the penalty provided for in the law
itself.
Same; Same; Electro fishing is now punishable by virtue of P.D. 704.—However, at present,
there is no more doubt that electro fishing is punishable under the Fisheries Law and that it
cannot be penalized merely by executive regulation because Presidential Decree No. 704, which
is a revision and consolidation of all laws and decrees affecting fishing and fisheries and which
was promulgated on May 16, 1975 (71 O.G. 4269), expressly punishes electro fishing in fresh
water and salt water areas.
 Same; Same; An administrative regulation must be in harmony with law; it must not amend
an act of the legislature.—Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a
particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the
sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provision. By such relations, of course, the law
itself cannot be extended. (U.S. vs. Tupasi Molina, supra). An administrative agency cannot
amend an act of Congress. x x x The rule-making power must be confined to details for
regulating the mode or proceeding to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted. The
power cannot be extended to amending or expanding the statutory requirements or to embrace
matters not covered by the statute. Rules that subvert the statute cannot be sanctioned.
Same; Same; In a prosecution for violation of an administrative order it must clearly appear
that the order falls within the scope of the authority conferred by law.—A penal statute is strictly
construed. While an administrative agency has the right to make rules and regulations to carry
into effect a law already enacted, that power should not be confused with the power to enact a
criminal statute. An administrative agency can have only the administrative or policing powers
expressly or by necessary implication conferred upon it. x x x In a prosecution for a violation of
an administrative order, it must clearly appear that the order is one which falls within the
scope of the authority conferred upon the administrative body, and the order will be
scrutinized with special care.
Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. v. Torres
G.R. No. 101279 August 6, 1992
Griño-Aquino, J.
FACTS:
As a result of published stories regarding the abuses suffered by Filipino housemaids
employed in Hong Kong, then DOLE Secretary Ruben Torres issued Department Order No. 16,
Series of 1991, temporarily suspending the recruitment by private employment agencies of
Filipino domestic helpers going to Hong Kong. The DOLE itself, through the POEA took over the
business of deploying such Hong Kong-bound workers. The POEA Administrator also issued
Memorandum Circular No. 37, Series of 1991, on the processing of employment contracts of
domestic workers for Hong Kong.
PASEI filed a petition for prohibition to annul the aforementioned DOLE and POEA circulars
and to prohibit their implementation on the grounds that DOLE and POEA acted with grave
abuse of discretion and/or in excess of their rule-making authority in issuing said circulars;
that the assailed DOLE and POEA circulars are contrary to the Constitution, are unreasonable,
unfair and oppressive; and that the requirements of publication and filing with the Office of the
National Administrative Register were not complied with.
HELD:
The second and first grounds are unmeritorious. Article 36 of the Labor Code grants
the Labor Secretary the power to restrict and regulate recruitment and placement activities. It
reads: “The Secretary of Labor shall have the power to restrict and regulate the recruitment
and placement activities of all agencies within the coverage of this title [Regulation of
Recruitment and Placement Activities] and is hereby authorized to issue orders and
promulgate rules and regulations to carry out the objectives and implement the provisions of
this title.” On the other hand, the scope of the regulatory authority of the POEA, which was
created by Executive Order No. 797 to take over the functions of the Overseas Employment
Development Board, the National Seamen Board, and the overseas employment functions of the
Bureau of Employment Services, is broad and far-ranging for among the functions inherited by
the POEA from the defunct Bureau of Employment Services was the power and duty to
establish and maintain a registration and/or licensing system to regulate private sector
participation in the recruitment and placement of workers, locally and overseas; it assumed
from the defunct Overseas Employment Development Board the power and duty to recruit and
place workers for overseas employment of Filipino contract workers on a government to
government arrangement and in such other sectors as policy may dictate; and from the
National Seamen Board, the POEA took over to regulate and supervise the activities of agents or
representatives of shipping companies in the hiring of seamen for overseas employment; and
secure the best possible terms of employment for contract seamen workers and secure
compliance therewith.
Said administrative issuances merely restricted the scope or area of PASEI’s business
operations by excluding therefrom recruitment and deployment of domestic helpers for Hong
Kong till after the establishment of the “mechanisms” that will enhance the protection of
Filipino domestic helpers going to Hong Kong. In fine, other than the recruitment and
deployment of Filipino domestic helpers for Hong Kong, PASEI may still deploy other class of
Filipino workers either for Hong Kong and other countries and all other classes of Filipino
workers for other countries. Said administrative issuances, are intended to curtail, if not to end,
rampant violations of the rule against excessive collections of placement and documentation
fees, travel fees and other charges committed by private employment agencies recruiting and
deploying domestic helpers to Hong Kong. They are reasonable, valid and justified under the
general welfare clause of the Constitution, since the recruitment and deployment business, as it
is conducted today, is affected with public interest.
Nevertheless, they are legally invalid, defective and unenforceable for lack of power
publication and filing in the Office of the National Administrative Register. As announced in
Tañada vs. Tuvera,
“All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be
published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days
after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders
promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever
the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly
conferred by the Constitution: Administrative rules and regulations must also
be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant
to a valid delegation.
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is,
regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and the public, need
not be published. Neither is publication required of the so-called letter of
instructions issued by the administrative superiors concerning the rules or
guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their
duties.”
 Actions; When a party has locus standi.—First, on the challenge of intervenors AMADER, VOL. 225, AUGUST 19, 1993 419
et al., that petitioners lack locus standi,we need only reiterate that the “proper-party”
requirement is satisfied if it is alleged that petitioners and intervenors have sustained or are in Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. vs. Torres
danger of sustaining immediate injury resulting from the acts or measures complained of. in view of the complexity of the legal issue involved, the Court resolves not to grant
Petitioners PASEI and PEEPA allege that their member agencies, which enjoy protection against attorney’s fees.
competition by new licensees pursuant to LOI 1190, will suffer irreparable injury with the
repeal of LOI 1190 by EO 450, considering further that there is no additional demand for
Filipino workers abroad. Hence, any gain made by the new agencies on the supposed exclusive PESIGAN VS ANGELES
preserve of existing agencies necessarily results in the latter’s loss. FACTS:
_______________
Petitioners Anselmo and Marcelino Pesigan, carabao dealers, transported in a 10-wheeler truck
*EN BANC. in April 1982, 26 carabaos and a calf, from Camarines Sur to Batangas. Despite the health
418 certificate, permit to transport, and certificate of inspection issued to them by the provincial
veterinarian, provincial commander and constabulary command, respectively, while
4 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED petitioners were negotiating the town of Basud, Camarines Norte, the carabaos were
18 confiscated by private respondents, Police Station Commander Lt. Zanarosa, and provincial
Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. vs. Torres veterinarian Dr. Miranda. The confiscation was based on Executive Order 626-A which
prohibited the transport of carabaos from one province to another. Pursuant to EO 626-A, Dr
Labor Law; Recruitment; Statutes; Letter of Instruction 1190 is a mere administrative
Miranda distributed the carabaos to 25 farmers of Basud. Petitioners filed for recovery of the
issuance. It is not a law for licensing of recruitment agencies.—As we view it, LOI 1190 simply
carabaos and damages, against private respondent Judge Angeles who heard the case in Daet
imposes a presidential review of the authority of the Minister of Labor and Employment to
and later transferred to Caloocan City, and dismissed the case for lack of cause of action.
grant licenses, hence, directed to him alone. Since this is undoubtedly an administrative action,
LOI 1190 should properly be treated as an administrative issuance. Unlike Presidential Decrees
ISSUE:
which by usage have gained acceptance as laws promulgated by the President, Letters of
Whether or not EO 626-A be enforced before its publication in the Official Gazette.
Instruction are presumed to be mere administrative issuances except when the conditions set
out in Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile exist. Consequently, to be considered part of the law of the land,
HELD:
petitioners must establish that LOI 1190 was issued in response to “a grave emergency or a
threat or imminence thereof, or whenever the interim Batasan Pambansa or the regular
Said executive order should not be enforced against the Pesigans on April 2, 1982 because, as
National Assembly fails or is unable to act adequately on any matter.” The conspicuous absence
already noted, it is a penal regulation published more than two months later in the Official
of any of these conditions fortifies the opinion that LOI 1190 cannot be any more than a mere
Gazette dated June 14, 1982. It became effective only fifteen days thereafter as provided in
administrative issuance.
article 2 of the Civil Code and section 11 of the Revised Administrative Code.
Same; Same; Same; Letter of Instruction 1190 did not amend or repeal Article 25 of the
Labor Code but merely added a tier for administrative review on licensing of recruitment
The word "laws" in article 2 (article 1 of the old Civil Code) includes circulars and regulations
agencies.—There is nothing in the LOI which repeals or runs counter to Art. 25 of the Labor
which prescribe penalties. Publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of the
Code, as amended. Instead, contrary to the perception of petitioners, LOI 1190 does not actually
regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby.
ban the grant of licenses nor bar the entry of new licensees since anybody could still apply for
license with the Minister of Labor and Employment, although the grant thereof is subject to the
ANSELMO L. PESIGAN and MARCELINO L. PESIGAN, petitioners, vs. JUDGE DOMINGO MEDINA
prior authority of the President. In fact, the LOI did not modify the rule-making power of the
ANGELES, Regional Trial Court, Caloocan City Branch 129, acting for REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
Minister of Labor and Employment under the Labor Code; it only added another tier of review.
of Camarines Norte, now presided over by JUDGE NICANOR ORIÑO, Daet Branch 40; DRA.
Same; Same; Same; Administrative Law; President Corazon Aquino’s E.O. 450 repealed
BELLA S. MIRANDA, ARNULFO V. ZENAROSA, ET AL., respondents.
Letter of Instruction 1190 of President Ferdinand Marcos both being mere administrative
Appeals; R.A. 5440 superseded Rule 42 of the Rules of Court.—The Pesigans appealed to
directives rather than statutes.—Petitioners also contend that EO 450 cannot repeal LOI 1190
this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and section 25 of the Interim Rules and pursuant
for Congress has not delegated that power to the President. We do not agree. There is no need
to Republic Act No. 5440, a 1968 law which superseded Rule 42 of the Rules of Court.
for legislative delegation of power to the President to revoke the LOI by way of an EO in view of
Statutes; Criminal Law; An Executive Order (Exec. Order No. 626-A dated Oct. 25, 1980),
our finding that LOI 1190 is a mere administrative directive, hence, may be repealed, altered or
prohibiting and penalizing transportation of carabaos from one province to another cannot be
modified by EO 450, and DO 9 must consequently be upheld.
enforced before its publication in the Official Gazette.—We hold that the said executive order
Attorneys; Award of attorney’s fee may be denied a winning party where issues are so
should not be enforced against the Pesigans on April 2, 1982 because, as already noted, it is
complex.—Of the three (3) groups of intervenors, only AMADER, et al., pray for attorney’s fees
a penal regulationpublished more than two months later in the Official Gazette dated June 14,
claiming that they were compelled to hire counsel to enforce and protect their rights. However,
419
1982. It became effective only fifteen days thereafter as provided in article 2 of the Civil Code
and section 11 of the Revised Administrative Code.
Same; Same; Same.—That ruling applies to a violation of Executive Order No. 626-A
because its confiscation and forfeiture provision or sanction makes it a penal statute. Justice and
fairness dictate that the public must be informed of that provision by means of publication in
the Gazette before violators of the executive order can be bound thereby.
_______________
*SECOND DIVISION.
175
VOL. 129, APRIL 30, 1984 175
Pesigan vs. Angeles
Same; Same; Same.—Indeed, the practice has always been to publish executive orders in
the Gazette. Section 551 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that even bureau
“regulations and orders shall become effective only when approved by the Department Head
and published in the Official Gazette or otherwise publicly promulgated”. (See Commissioner of
Civil Service vs. Cruz, 122 Phil. 1015.)
Damages; Public Officers; The public officers who confiscated the carabaos acted in good
faith enforcing Exec. Order 626-A. The carabaos, however, have to be returned.—It results that
they have a cause of action for the recovery of the carabaos. The summary confiscation was not
in order. The recipients of the carabaos should return them to the Pesigans. However, they
cannot transport the carabaos to Batangas because they are now bound by the said executive
order. Neither can they recover damages. Doctor Miranda and Zenarosa acted in good faith in
ordering the forfeiture and dispersal of the carabaos.
CASE DIGEST: LA SUERTE CIGAR & CIGARETTE FACTORY, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondents. (G.R. No. 125346;
November 11, 2014)
FACTS:
These cases involve the taxability of stemmed leaf tobacco imported and locally purchased by
cigarette manufacturers for use as raw material in the manufacture of their cigarettes. Under
the Tax Code, if it is to be exported or to be used in the manufacture of cigars, cigarettes, or
other tobacco products on which the excise tax will eventually be paid on the finished product.
La Suerte was assessed by the BIR for excise tax deficiency amounting to more than 34 million
pesos. La Suerte protested invoking the Tax Code which allows the sale of stemmed leaf tobacco
as raw material by one manufacturer directly to another without payment of the excise tax.
However, the CIR insisted that stemmed leaf tobacco is subject to excise tax "unless there is an
express grant of exemption from [the] payment of tax."
La Suerte petitioned for review before the CTA which cancelled the assessment. The CIR
appealed to the CA which reversed the CTA. The CIR invoked a revenue regulation (RR) which
limits the exemption from payment of specific tax on stemmed leaf tobacco to sales
transactions between manufacturers classified as L-7 permittees.
ISSUES:
[1] Is stemmed leaf tobacco subject to excise (specific) tax?
[2] Is purchase of stemmed leaf tobacco from manufacturers who are not classified as L-7
permittees subject to tax?
[3] Is the RR valid?
[4] Is the possessor or owner, or importer or exporter, of stemmed leaf tobacco liable for the
payment of specific tax if such tobacco product is removed from the place of production
without payment of said tax?
[5] Does the imposition of excise tax on stemmed leaf tobacco under Section 141 of the 1986
Tax Code constitute double taxation, considering they are paying the specific tax on the raw
material and on the finished product in which the raw material was a part?
HELD:
[1] Yes, excise taxes on domestic products shall be paid by the manufacturer or producer
before[the] removal [of those products] from the place of production." "It does not matter to
what use the article[s] subject to tax is put; the excise taxes are still due, even though the
articles are removed merely for storage in someother place and are not actually sold or
consumed.
When tobacco is harvested and processed either by hand or by machine, all itsproducts become
subject to specific tax. Section 141 reveals the legislative policy to tax all forms of manufactured
tobacco — in contrast to raw tobacco leaves — including tobacco refuse or all other tobacco
which has been cut, split, twisted, or pressed and is capable of being smoked without further
industrial processing.
Stemmed leaf tobacco is subject to the specific tax under Section 141(b). It is a partially
prepared tobacco. The removal of the stem or midrib from the leaf tobacco makes the resulting
stemmed leaf tobacco a prepared or partially prepared tobacco.
Despite the differing definitions for "stemmed leaf tobacco" under revenue regulations, the
onus of proving that stemmed leaf tobacco is not subject to the specific tax lies with the
cigarette manufacturers. Taxation is the rule, exemption is the exception.
[2] Stemmed leaf tobacco transferred in bulk between cigarette manufacturers are exempt
from excise tax under the Tax Code vis-a-vis RRs.
Section 137 authorizes a tax exemption subject to the following: (1) that the stemmed leaf
tobacco is sold in bulk as raw material by one manufacturer directly to another; and (2) that
the sale or transfer has complied with the conditions prescribed by the Department of Finance.
The conditions under which stemmed leaf tobacco may be transferred from one factory to
another without prepayment of specific tax are as follows: (a) The transfer shall be under an
official L-7 invoice on which shall be entered the exact weight of the tobacco at the time of its
removal; (b) Entry shall be made in the L-7 register in the place provided on the page for
removals; and (c) Corresponding debit entry shall bemade in the L-7 register book of the
factory receiving the tobacco under the heading, "Refuse, etc.,received from the other factory,"
showing the date of receipt, assessment and invoice numbers, name and address of the
consignor, formin which received, and the weight of the tobacco.
[3] Yes, valid. Under Section 3(h) of RR No. 17-67, entities that were issued by the Bureau of
Internal Revenue with an L-7 permit refer to "manufacturers of tobacco products." Hence, the
transferor and transferee of the stemmed leaf tobacco must be an L-7 tobacco manufacturer.
The reason behind the tax exemption of stemmed leaf tobacco transferred between two L-7
manufacturers is that the same had already been previously-taxed when acquired by the L-7
manufacturer from dealers of tobacco. There is no new product when stemmed leaf tobacco is
transferred between two L-7 permit holders. Thus, there can be no excise tax that will attach.
The regulation, therefore, is reasonable and does not create a new statutory right.
Moreover, although delegation is not allowed as a rule, the power to fill in the details and
manner as to the enforcement and administration of a law may be delegated to various
specialized administrative agencies.
[4] Importation of stemmed leaf tobacco not included in the exemption. The transaction
contemplated in Section 137 does not include importation of stemmed leaf tobacco for the
reason that the law uses the word "sold" to describe the transaction of transferring the raw
materials from one manufacturer to another.
[5] In this case, there is no double taxation in the prohibited sense because the specific tax is
imposed by explicit provisions of the Tax Code on two different articles or products: (1) on the
stemmed leaf tobacco; and (2) on cigar or cigarette.
Taxation; Words and Phrases; Statutes; The words “or to tobacco for domestic sale or
factory use” in Act. 2613 refer not merely to leaf tobacco but also to cigars and cigarettes as the
subjects of tobacco inspection fees.—Prior to the amendment of said Act, Sec. 6 and 7 thereof,
already covered the inspection of leaf tobacco, partially manufactured tobacco for local sale and
leaf tobacco and its products for export. If the intention of Congress was to apply the
amendment to those items already covered by Act 2613, then the word “leaf” should have been
easily included to modify the term “tobacco”. The omission of the word “leaf” is a clear
indication that Congress intended to include within the purview of the law a new item; namely,
_______________
*SECOND DIVISION.
30
3 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
0 law although not binding upon courts must be given weight as the construction come from the
La Suerte Cigar and Cigarette Factory vs. Court of Tax Appeals
manufactured tobacco products for domestic sale and imported tobacco for factory use.
Same; Same; Same; An internal administrative memorandum or circular issued by the BIR
which constitutes a mere legal opinion on how the law (concerning collection of tobacco
inspection fees) should be construed does not need to be published in the Official Gazette.—As
herein earlier mentioned, the word “leaf”, although used to modify the term “tobacco” only in
the Explanatory Note to then House Bill No. 735 was omitted when the Bill was signed into law
(RA 31). However when General Circular No. V-27 dated October 29, 1946 was issued by then
Collector of Internal Revenue Bibiano L. Meer to implement the provisions of Sections 6, 7 and
14 of Act 2613 (Tobacco Inspection Law), the word “leaf” was erroneously included therein,
causing damage to the financial stability of the Government as the inspection fees due on cigars
and cigarettes for domestic sale and imported leaf and partially manufactured tobacco for
factory use were not collected for more than twenty (20) years. Such error was only discovered
when an Assistant Chief of the Tobacco Inspection Service of the BIR appeared in a public
hearing of the Joint Legislative-Executive Tax Commission. As a result thereof, the Philippine
Tobacco Board, a policy making body of the National Government on Tobacco Authority,
adopted Resolution No. 2-67 interpreting the phrase “tobacco for domestic sale” as referring to
wholesale disposal of tobacco products by cigar and cigarettes factories to its dealers while the
phrase “tobacco for factory use” meant “imported leaf tobacco” intended for use by cigar and
cigarette factories in the manufacture of tobacco products. The approval of this Resolution on
May 31, 1967 prompted respondent Commissioner to promulgate Memorandum Circular No.
30-67 which was approved by then Secretary of Finance Eduardo Z. Romualdez and the
effectivity of which is specifically dated September 1, 1967 and not contingent on its
publication in the Official Gazette.
Same; Same; Same; Same.—Thus, the assailed Revenue Memorandum Circular was issued
to rectify the error in General Circular No. V-27 and to interpret the phrase “tobacco for
domestic sale or factory use” with the view of arresting huge losses of tobacco inspection fees
which were not collected and imposed since the said Circular (No. V-27) took effect.
Furthermore, the questioned Revenue Memorandum Circular was also issued to apprise those
concerned of the construction and interpretation which should be accorded to Act
31
VOL. 134, JANUARY 17, 1985 31
La Suerte Cigar and Cigarette Factory vs. Court of Tax Appeals
No. 2613, as amended, and which respondent is duty bound to enforce. It is an opinion on
how the law should be construed and there was no attempt whatsoever to enlarge or restrict
the meaning of the law.
Same; Same; Same; Same.—As admitted by counsel for petitioners, the latter were each
furnished with a copy of the Revenue Memorandum Circular in question and the purpose of the
law, that is to inform or notify those who may be affected, has been substantially complied with.
Since it was further admitted by petitioners that said Memorandum is but a “Memorandum
Circular for purposes of the internal administration of the BIR and not a regulation within the
contemplation of Sections 4 and 338 of the NIRC and Section 79(b) of the Revised
Administrative Code”, said circular needs no publication in the Official Gazette as erroneously
argued by the petitioners.
Same; Same; Same; Same.—When an administrative agency renders an opinion by means
of a circular or Memorandum, it merely interprets a pre-existing law, and no publication is
necessary for its validity. Construction by an executive branch of government of a particular
branch of the government called upon to implement the law. The promulgation of Revenue
Memorandum Circular No. 30-67 being in accordance with the Revised Administrative Code,
having been issued by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue with the approval of the Secretary
(now Minister) of Finance for the implementation of the Tobacco Inspection Law, has therefore
the force and effect of law.
Same; Tobacco inspection fees are national taxes and may be collected without need of
prior inspection of the tobacco or cigarettes concerned.—Tobacco Inspection fees are
undoubtedly National Internal Revenue taxes, they being one of the miscellaneous taxes
provided for under the Tax Code. Section 228 (formerly Section 302) of Chapter VII of the Code
specifically provides for the collection and manner of payment of the said inspection fees. It is
within the power and duty of the Commissioner to collect the same, even without inspection,
should tobacco products be removed clandestinely or surreptitiously from the establishment of
the wholesaler, manufacturer or redrying plant and from the customs custody in case of
imported leaf tobacco. Errors, omissions or flaws committed by BIR inspectors and
representatives while in the performance of their duties
32
3 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
2
La Suerte Cigar and Cigarette Factory vs. Court of Tax Appeals
cannot be set up as estoppel nor estop the Government from collecting a tax legally due.
Tobacco inspection fees are levied and collected for purposes of regulation and control and also
as a source of revenue since fifty percentum (50%) of said fees shall accrue to the Tobacco
Inspection Fee Fund created by Sec. 12 of Act No. 2613, as amended and the other fifty
percentum, to the Cultural Center of the Philippines. (Sec. 88, Chapter VII, NIRC).
Same; There is evidence found by the CTA that the tobacco and cigarettes in question were
in fact inspected prior to affixing of strip stamp.—The CTA held that the foregoing belie
petitioners’ assertions that no actual inspection was conducted to justify the collection of the
tobacco inspection fees. The findings of the Tax Court are duly supported by evidence. We find
no cogent reason to disturb the same. They are therefore binding on this Court.