ARLIE RUSSELL H O C H SC H ILD

THE COMMERCIALIZATION Notes from

OF INTIMATE LIFE H om e a n d Work

UNIVERSITY OF
CA LIFO RN IA PRESS
Berkeley
Los Angeles
London
5 THE C A P A C ITY T O FEEL

An image on tin" movie* m u r n , a passage in a h ook, ilie look in .in eye i an

move us deeply. But what in us is m oved? I low <loes culture* h elp d«i the
moving? I low* d o soc iologists u n d erstan d the i ole culuuc* plavsr Ill tills ess. o
I look at what *o» iologists and psve h o a n a h sts have to sav h e lo ie p io p o sin g
in tliis and the follow in g lout essay a mm inlogic al wav ol seein g le«*ling.
By "em o tio n ,” I sh ou ld say. I m r.m the awatemess «>f hodilv co o p eratio n
with an idea, thou gh t, ot attitu de and the label attach ed to that aw.uettess.
Bv “feeling.” I m ean a m ildei e m o tio n . So \ e ^ basic ate em o tio n and feel­
ing to out social lives that it is rem a rk a b le how little attention sociologists
have paid to them . Whs w ould that he? It 's not bee a m e the p e o p le we studv
do not take* as real the “ lac t“ that they feel. Not is it b ecau se a p e rso n 's job,
sex. age. ethnic b a ck g ro u n d , ot relig io u s e x p e rie n c e is know n to Im* u n re ­
lated to how he* o r she* feels in eettain situations. It is not. in o th er words,
because we lack evidence*. And it is not Iv c a u s e soc iologists in th eir work
have com pletely ig n o re d how ac tots feel. b ib lio g ra p h y . e x p e rim e n ta l social
psvchology, and qualitative so cio lo g y g e n e ra lly touch on the co n cep ts o f
emotion and feelin g in the p ro cess of e x p la in in g why p e o p le d o what they
do and think what tlicv think. W hat we h a v e n ’t d o n e is pm feelin g s front
and center and think out a so cio lo g ical wav of seein g them .
Perhaps the m ain reaso n whv not is that, as sociologists, we arc* m em b ers
of the same society as the p e o p le we study. Wc sh are th eir feelin g s an d val­
ues. T heir culture divides th in kin g from fe e lin g an d d efin es th in k in g — co g­
nition, intellect— as su p e rio r to fe e lin g , an d so d o cs ou rs. Sign ifican tly the
terms “em otion al" an d “se n tim e n ta l” have co m e to c o n n o te excessive o r
degenerate form s o f fe e lin g . T h ro u g h the prism o f o u r rationalist cu ltu re,
then, wc are led to see e m o tio n as a il im p e d im e n t to gettin g things clone
and to seeing the w orld as it really is.
But even if we d o d iscred it e m o tio n as a d im en sio n o f e x p e r ie n c e — an d
1 do not— why w ould sociologists ig n o re it w hen they study plenty o f o th er
discredited things?1 I b elieve the answ er lies in the d isc ip lin e ’s attem pt to be
recognized ;is a “ real sc ie n c e .” an attem p t d atin g b ack to the naive asp ira­
tion o f Auguste C o m te, the so-called la th e r o l sociology, to m ake so cio logy

75
76 A FEELIN G FU L SELF

a s o c ia l p h y sic s. F o r th is m is g u id e d q u e s t p e r m its u s to s t u d y o n ly th e most

o b je c tiv e a n d m e a s u r a b le a sp e c ts o f so c ia l life . T h is c o in c id e s w ith th e val­
u e s o f th e tra d itio n a l “ m a le ” c u ltu r e , to w h ic h a c a d e m ic w o m e n h ave, by
e x c lu s io n , b e e n so m e w h a t le ss e x p o s e d . B u t i f w e a r c to b r in g so cio lo g)’
c lo s e r to reality , w e w ill d o it v e ry p o o r ly i f w e c lo s e a n e y e to fe e lin g . We
m u st o p e n th e o th e r e y e a n d th in k a b o u t w h a t w e s e c .

THREE IM AGES O F SELF

M u c h o f s o c ia l s c ie n c e se e m s to b e b a s e d o n tw o im a g e s o f th e s e lf, w hich,
lik e a ll su c h im a g e s, fo c u s a tte n tio n o n c e r t a in a s p e c t s o f life a n d away
fr o m o th e rs. T h e first im a g e is o f th e conscious, co gtiitive self. A c c o r d in g to
th is im a g e , w e consciously w a n t s o m e th in g ( e .g ., m o n e y o r sta tu s) a n d con­
sc io u sly c a lc u la te th e m e rits o f v a r io u s m e a n s o f g e t t in g it. F o r e x a m p le ,
E r v in g G ofT m an ta k es u s in to th e w o rld o f th e p r e s e n t e d s e lf, a n d m ore
p a rtic u la rly in to th e w o rld o f r a tio n a l c a lc u la t io n s th a t le a d u s to make
e a c h p r e s e n ta tio n . It is a w o rld o f E v e r y m a n a s C o n M a n , a w o rld o f
im p re ssio n s m a n a g e d a n d m a n ip u la te d to w a rd th e e n d o f a n a d v a n ta g e o u s
se lf-p o rtra it. C o n s id e r G o ff m a n ’s q u o t e fr o m W illa rd W a lle r : “ It h as been
r e p o r te d by m a n y o b s e iv e r s th at a g irl w h o is c a lle d to th e t e le p h o n e in the
d o r m ito r ie s w ill o fte n a llo w h e r s e lf to b e c a lle d s e v e r a l tim e s , in o r d e r to
g ive all th e o t h e r g irls a m p le o p p o r tu n it y to h e a r h e r p a g e d .” 2 GofTm an
sh ow s us h o w m u c h m o re w e c a lc u la te th a n w e th in k w e d o , b u t h e neglects
h o w m u c h m o re w e a lso fe e l in so c ia lly a r r a n g e d w ays tita n w e th in k w c do.
W e a re n o t sh o w n , fo r e x a m p le , h o w a so c ia lly in d u c e d fe e lin g , lik e anxiety
o r fe a r, m a y le a d a g irl in th e d o r m to c o m p u ls iv e ly c a lc u la t e h e r advan­
ta g es. S u c h c a lc u la tio n is s u re ly n o t a c o n s ta n t fe a t u r e o f t h e co n sc io u sn e ss
o f e v e ry o n e . O u tsid e rs a n d s u b o r d in a te s m a y h e m o r e c o n c e r n e d about
lo o k in g , sm ilin g , o r ta lk in g in ju s t th e t ig h t w ay th a n a r e k in g s a n d queen s,
w h o se p re se n ta tio n o f s e lf rests p e a c e fu lly u p o n u n q u e s t io n e d h ere d ita ry
title.
L ik e m a n y im a g es, this o n e is n o t w ro n g , b u t it is o n ly p a r tly u s e fu l in its
c h o ic e o f w h a t to h ig h lig h t. It im p lie s th at w e c le a r ly k n o w w h a t w c want,
a n d it e m p h a siz e s th e h a v in g o f a g o a l (n o t th e d o u b t o r t r iu m p h attached
to it) a n d th e izs/’ o f a m e a n s (n o t th e g u ilt, a p p r e h e n s io n , o r g le e attached
to its u s e ). T h o s e w h o p o sit a m o d e l o f a ra tio n a l s e lf g e n e r a lly d o n ’t deny
th at a c to rs fe e l. B u t th ey im p ly th at little is lo st w h e n fe e lin g s a r c ig n o re d or
tid ily b u n c h e d u n d e r th e term s “ e n d s ” a n d “ m e a n s .”
T h e s e c o n d im a g e , in d e b te d to S ig m u n d F r e u d , is th at o f d ie unconscious,
em otional self. H e r e w e a re g u id e d by u n c o n s c io u s m o tiv a tio n s a n d d o or
th in k th in g s w h o se m e a n in g s a r e b e tte r u n d e r s t o o d b y e x p e r t s th an our­
se lv e s. T h e s e lf is sa id to b e “ d r iv e n ” o r “ p r o m p t e d ” b y a lim ite d n u m b e r o f
“ in s tin c ts ," “ im p u ls e s ," o r “ n e e d s ” to a c h ie v e , a ffilia te , o r d o a n y n u m b e r of
 THE C A P A C I T Y T O FEEL 77

things that surface m erely as ends o r m eans. Philip Slater, for exam ple,
explores the world o f unconscious affect, focusing on the subterranean
channels through which energy em erges into behavior, nearly bypassing the
actor’s consciousness of feelin g altogether.3
This image, like that o f the conscious cognitive actor, docs not deny affec­
tive consciousness. Im ages deny nothing. Rather a focus on conscious think­
ing, as with G oflinan, and a focus on unconscious prom ptings, as with Freud
and Slater, allow conscious feeling to fall into a no-man V ian d in between.
So we need a third im age— that Of the .sentient self, a self that is capable offeel­
ings and m ean'o f being so. M ore than a bloodless calculator or blind expresser
of uncontrolled em otions, the sentient self is aware of feeling as well as o f
the many cultural guideposts that sh ape it. In everyday life we are often
aware o f indicating to ourselves our subjective states (“ I feel anxious
today"), which in turn stand out against a taken-for-granted background
stream o f experience (“ I’m not usually this anxious"), further, we select and
apply to these states a variety of labels (e.g., anxiety, malaise, uptightness)
from among the em otion vocabularies available to us at a given time and
place in the world.
F.very sociological study foc uses on a range of variation. In the study o f
the sentient self, we distinguish between one and another em otional state
given the em otional vocabulary we have at hand. We explore what we expect
to feel and wanted to feel. With clinical insight, we sometimes link these to
unconscious goings-on beneath the conscious tip o f the iceberg.
But we keep an eye out foi patterns in the very' terms we apply to em o­
tional states and the “standing," so to speak, o f each term. We can describe
ourselves as “apathetic." But how bad is it to be apathetic? Is it always a prob­
lem? Is it ever norm al or average? As G ordon Allport and H. S. O dbert
observe, certain terms cam e into use in English only after the eighteenth
century (e.g., depression, ennui, chagrin, apathy), and the m odem sense o f
some older terms has becom e m ore subjective (e.g., constraint, em barrass­
ment, disappointm ent). Such labels are not, as they note, “univocal svmlxds
corresponding through the ages to fixed varieties o f human disposition."1 In
addition, feelin gs— as people describe them to themselves and others—
may vary in social way's. Ju st as certain behaviors (e.g., suicide, hom icide,
delinquency) are unevenly distributed across layers o f society and the
stream o f time, so too we need to ask whether and why the various em otions,
such as jo y or depression, unfold in ways that reflect larger social patterns.
But arc we not caught in a pecu liar em barrassm ent by the elusiveness o f
our subject matter? For o n e thing, feelings relate to acts in many ways. So
feelings are by no m eans a neat, clear predictor o f actions. For exam ple,
William Kephart asked co llege students, “ If a boy o r girl had all the other
qualities you desire, would you m arry this person if you were not in love with
him /her?" A total o f 64 percent o f the m en, but only 24 percent o f the
78 A FE E LIN G FU L SELF

w o m e n , sa id “ n o ." F o r m e n a n d w o m e n , fe e lin g in lo ve a p p e a rs to have a

d iffe r e n t tie to th e act o f m a n n in g .5
T h e r e is a n o th e r q u e stio n , too: W h at i f w e th in k w e a re in love at one
p o in t, b u t la te r lo o k b a c k a n d d e c la re that w e w e re ju s t in fa tu a te d ? O r what
i f w e th in k w e ’ re in lo ve, b u t th e b e lo v e d a n d o u r th e ra p ist d o n ’t agree? All
this is n o re a so n to fle e to o th e r q u estio n s th at rest o n m o re so lid sociolog­
ical g r o u n d . This is sociological ground. It ’s as so lid as so c io lo g ic a l g ro u n d ever
re a lly gets. I f w e w an t to p re te n d that w e k n o w w h at th e a c to r ’s emotion
“ re a lly is" (e .g ., “ It’s re a lly d e p re ssio n ") a n d call w h at a p e rso n thinks it is
“ b ia s” (“ I ’m tire d ” ), th en p a rt o f o u r in te lle c tu a l d o m a in m ust still be pre­
cisely tills “ b ia s.” F o r in rid d in g o u rse lv es o f th e a c t o r ’s ow n codification of
fe e lin g , a n d o f his o r h e r ig n o ra n c e o r lin g u istic h ab its, w e rid ourselves of
p a rt o f w h at is so cial a b o u t e m o tio n . We e lim in a te fro m th e start what wc
can th en claim we d o n o t fin d , a so c io lo g y o f fe e lin g a n d e m o tio n . We are
th en le ft with in fe re n c e s a b o u t instinct o r m o tivatio n o n o n e sid e and cog­
n itio n o n the oth er, b eca u se we h a v e n ’t p o se d o u r q u e stio n in a way dial
w o u ld le ad to a n y th in g else.
I f we start in stead with the id ea o f a s e lf c a p a b le o f fe e lin g , a sen tien t self,
w e then take an interest in a p e rso n ’s ouni d efin itio n o f his o r h e r feeling. Wc
learn fro m this how th e in d ivid u al uses an “ e m o tio n v o c a b u la ry " and what
so cial situ ation s o r ru les call fe e lin g s fo rth o r tu ck th em u n d er. T h e image
o f a sen tien t s e lf d o c s n o t im p ly that th e re a re n o u n c o n sc io u s fo rces lead­
in g u s ’to fe e l as wc d o . It d o e s n o t im p ly that b e in g e m o tio n a l o r em otion­
less in c e rta in situation s is “ g o o d ” o r “ b a d ," “sick " o r “ h ealth y.” It is often
“ ratio n al," in the la rg e r sen se o f b e in g ad ap tive, to feel a n d v ery maladaptive
not to fe e l. T h e bu siness e x e c u tiv e w h o felt te rro r at th e sig h t, sm ell, or
w ord o f n earb y sm o k e in the n earb y W orld T ra d e C e n te r a n d fled en d ed up
l>etter o f f than co-w orkers w h o tragically d id n ’t fe e l a fra id e n o u g h .
In The Theory o f Social an d Economic O rganization W eb er posits a m odel of
social actio n b ased o n a m isg u id ed set o f c a te g o rie s — e m o tio n -fre e rational
actio n an d e m o tio n al irratio n al a c tio n /’ H e re W eb er c o n fu se s irrationality
as it re fe rs to th in k in g an d d o in g with irra tio n a lity as it re fe rs to feeling. He
im p lie s that e m o tio n an d fe e lin g a re not p ositively re q u ire d fo r individuals
both to really g rasp w h at's g o in g on a n d to p u rsu e a ratio n al course of
a c tio n . H e im p lies, too, that institution s d o n ’t n e e d p e o p le w h o listen well
to th e ir fe e lin g s an d those o f o th e rs in o r d e r to ad ap t to th e ir environm ent
a n d act ration ally. W eber th o u gh t e m o tio n s im p o rta n t, a n d d ep lo red a
“ ra tio n a listic b ias" that m ig h t g ro w o u t o f wrh at h e m e a n t m erely as a
m e th o d o lo g ic a l d evice. B u t I d o n o t g et the sen se that h e saw how very nec­
essary' e m o tio n s w ere to m a k in g th in gs ru n . T a k e his e x a m p le o f a theoreti­
c a lly p o site d c o u rse o f ratio n al actio n o n th e stock m ark et. H e treats devia­
tio n s fro m ratio n a l b eh a v io r as so m e th in g th e so cio lo g ist m igh t exp lain in
term s o f “ irra tio n a l e m o tio n s” (e.g., p a n ic ). B u t, in th e rea lm o f em otion,
 T H E C A P A C I T Y T O F EEL 79

the difference betw een the n o rm al stock m ark et an d the su d d en d ep re ssio n

in stocks is the d iffe re n c e b etw een sto ck b ro k ers in a state o f elatio n an d
stockbrokers in a state o f despair. It is h ig h ly q u estio n ab le w h e th e r e m o tio n
enters into the life o f sto ck b ro k ers o n ly w h en th ere is p an ic o r that e m o tio n
makes people act o n ly in irratio n al ways.
Surely em otion an d sen tim en t a re acu ve in gred ien ts in rational behavior as
well. A normal day at the sto ck m ark et w ou ld am p ly show that fe e lin g s o f
excitement, anxiety, o r g le e a re all p art o f a g o o d , ration al d a y ’s w ork.
Weber mistakes actual em o tio n lessn ess fo r the p revailin g n o rm o f affective
neutrality wc su p pose sto ck b ro k ers to h ave a d o p te d fo r them selves. T h e
image o f the sentient self, o n th e o th e r h an d , gu id es o u r eye n o t o n ly to
exceptional waves o f e m o tio n , as in stock m arket pan ics, relig io u s tran ces,
and riotous crowds, but also to norm al emotions in the office, factory, sch o o l,
and home.

THINKING ABO U T FEELIN G

We need a so cio logical way o f u n d ersta n d in g em o tio n . T h e th in k in g we
need is scattered a ro u n d the so cial scien ces an d tu cked into vario u s
approaches to the links b etw een social stru ctu re and e m o tio n .7 In the first
approach (associated with the im a g e o f the co n sciou s, cogn itive s e lf), the
social context and th in k in g a b o u t e m o tio n a rc lin ked , but a focu s o n c o n ­
scious feeling is m issing. In the se co n d a p p ro a c h (associated with the im age
of the unconscious s e lf), u n co n scio u s em o tio n al p h e n o m e n a an d so cial
structure arc linked but again co n scio u s fe e lin g is om itted. In the third
approach, the relation b etw een se n tie n c e an d iLs labels is analyzed, but the
social context d isap pears f rom view.8
The first app roach to the so c io lo g y o f em o tio n is to study what an d how
people think about e m o tio n a n d fe e lin g . T h is is the co n cern o f attrib u tion
theorists who study a c to rs’ id eas a b o u t the causes o f beh avior." E x p e r i­
mental psychologists have stu d ied how- actors use these ideas in th e ir attri­
butions o f causality. T h e a n th ro p o lo g ist R o b ert Levy also e xe m p lifie s this
focus. Am ong T ahitians, h e notes, the e m o tio n al resp o n se to the loss o f
someone clear is attrib u ted to “ illn e ss.” T h e y link ro m an tic love with
extreme jealo u sy an d c o n sid e r both “ crazy” — ab n o rm al an d b a d .10 In a
somewhat related way A lan B lu m an d P e te r M cH u gh fo cu s not o n em o tio n
but on motive. A m otive is, fo r th em , a way o f conceiving o f social action. To the
radical eth n o m cih o d o lo gist, the “ way o f c o n c e iv in g o f so cial a ctio n " is n o
small matter, since they b elieve th a t’s all so cial ac tion is ." E ven if we a ccep t
this view o f social actio n , we n e ed to know the a c to r ’s view o f his o r h e r
inner affective life — se n tie n c e — in o rd e r to learn the assu m ption s o n w hich
he or she is basing e x p la n a tio n s fo r things. Kor e x a m p le , in the study o f sex
roles it would be in terestin g to e x p lo r e sex d iffe re n c e s in the m otives peo-
80 A F E E L IN C F U L SELF

p ie g iv e fo r w h y th e y d o w h a t th e y d o . “ I q u it g r a d u a t e sc h o o l Ijccause I fell
in lo v e w ith y o u r fa t h e r " w as, th ro u g h th e lq b o s , a c o m m o n an d acceptable
t h in g f o r a m id d le -c la ss w o m a n to say, w h ile its c o u n t e r p a r t fo r tnen ("I quit
g r a d u a t e s c h o o l b e c a u s e I fe ll in lo ve w ith y o u r m o t h e r " ) was not. Today a
w o m a n sa y in g th is w o u ld b e q u e s tio n e d , d o u b t e d , a n d pu t o n the spot, and
so w o u ld a m a n .
T h e s e c o n d a p p r o a c h , c o r r e s p o n d in g to th e u n c o n sc io u s emotional
s e lf, ta k e s u s to I re n d a n d th e a p p lic a t io n s o f h is th o u g h t to social science.
W h ile w o rk b y su c h d iv e rse th e o rists as Jo h n D o lla rd , J o h n -Seeley, Philip
S la t e r , G e o f fr e y G o r e r , M a rg a re t M e a d , Ki k F .rik so n , a n d Bronislaw
M a lin o w sk i p r o v id e s e n r ic h in g in te g r a tio n s o f w h at a r e — o r w e re — fairly
d iffe r e n t ia t e d fie ld s (p sy c h o a n a ly sis a n d sot lo lo g y , sa v ), it still often glosses
o v e r th e se n tie n t s e lf .lv 'Phis tcM ilts in stu d ie s w ith a sim u lta n e o u s focus on
tlu* u n c o n s c io u s a n d th e so c ia l, w ith c o n st io n s fe e lin g e d g e d out now by
tw o sid e s r a t h e r th a n o n e . D o lla id , fo r e x a m p le , u ses th e em otion word
“ fr u s t r a tio n " to r e fe r to o b s e r v a b le b rh a vio r le s u lt in g fro m situations in
w h ic h e x p e c t e d acts a r c p r e v e n te d fro m o c c u i i m g .1' B e tw e e n inducing sit­
u a tio n a n d c o n s e q u e n t b e h a v io r, D o lla rd g iv e s o n ly a c a su a l glan ce at the
in d iv id u a l's c o n s c io u s e x p e r ie n c e o f f r u s tra tio n , a n d at h e r o r his response
to th at e x p e r ie n c e . T h e “ it" o f fr u s tr a tio n th at g e ts d isp la c e d from one
issu e to a n o th e r, th e “ it" th at is so c ia llv c a u s e d a n d in tu rn c au ses behavior,
re m a in s m y ste rio u sly o u t o f view . W e le a r n m o r e f ro m D o lla rd on the situ­
a tio n a l sid e th a n o n th e r e s p o n s e sid e . H is r e s e a r c h n o n e th e le ss suggests
h o w a g g r e s s io n — o n c e w e m a k e c le a r w h at it fcrls lik e to th e aggressive per­
s o n — c a n b e “ d is p la c e d ." (T h is is th e c e n t r a l c o n c e r n o f th e section of his
essa y c a lle d “ F e e lin g a n d th e P o litic s o f A im " a n d o f th e essay “ Love and
G o ld " in p a rt 4 .)
T ile th ird a p p r o a c h , b a se d o n th e im a g e of th e se n tie n t self, leads us to
m a p th e in n e r w o rld o f fe e lin g a g a in st th e c u ltu ra l w o rld o f labels. This is
d o n e e it h e r by h o ld in g e x p e r ie n c e c o n sta n t a n d e x a m in in g variations in
la b e lin g , o r by h o ld in g la b e ls c o n sta n t a n d e x a m in in g v a ria tio n in experi­
e n c e , o r by lo o k in g at th e in te r r e la tio n s h ip , h o ld in g n e ith e r constant.11 An
e x a m p le o f th e last a p p r o a c h is R o b e r t L e v y 's stu d y o f w h at b e called trans-
s c lie m a tic e x p e r ie n c e a n d c u ltu ra l s c h e m a a m o n g T a h itia n s .'In a list o f 301
w o rd s d e s c r ib in g fe e lin g in th e m issio n a ry d ic tio n a ry , 4 7 r e fe rre d to angry
fe e lin g s a n d 2 7 to p le a s u r a b le states. T o th e W e stern e y e , so m e feelings
(e .g ., a n g e r, s h a m e , fe a r) w e re w e ll d is c r im in a te d , w h ile o th e rs (e.g., lone­
lin e ss, d e p r e s s io n , g u ilt) w e re p o o rly d is c r im in a te d .
In th e stu d y o f s e x d iffe r e n c e s w c m ig h t d e t e r m in e w h e th e r an d how the
s a m e la b e ls r e f e r to d iffe r e n t e x p e r ie n c e s f o r m e n a n d w o m e n . F o r exam­
p le , K e p h a r t fo u n d th a t c o lle g e w o m e n r e p o r t e d m o r e “ in fatu atio n s" than
d id c o lle g e m e n . H e re a s o n e d th at fo r w o m e n lo o k in g b a c k , “ love affairs are
r e la te d to in fa tu a tio n s . . . a n d a r c r e m e m b e r e d m e re ly as p a ssin g fancies."1-
 THE C A P A C I T Y T O FEEL 81

Because women are the u p h o ld e rs o f the m o n o gam ou s ideal, he reaso n ed ,

they tend to rrlabrlo r tr-trmnnbrr past love as “ m ere in fatu atio n .”
Associated, then, with the first im age o f the con sciou s cognitive se lf and
the second im age o f the u n co n scio u s em otion al self, wc have two lines o f
inquiry that tend to bypass co n scio u s feelin g. But starting from an im age o f
the sentient self, we have a line o f in q u iry that relates feelin gs to a rich array
of cultural u n d erstan d in g o f them . We can d evelo p this line o f in q u iry in
the direction o f depth psych ology (draw ing from D ollard, Krikson, Freu d ,
and Chodorow) and in a co gn itive d irection (draw ing from Blum and
McHugh). Sociologists have also p o in ted to the social causes and co n se­
quences o f a great variety ol em otion s an d sen tim en ts.1,1 O n the causal side,
authors such as the historian H erb ert M oller and the p h ilo so p h er C. S.
l.ewis in their studies o f love deal with the g ran d historical picture, w hile
others, such as F.dward G ross an d A n th o n y Ston e in their study o f em b ar­
rassment, deal with the im m ediate in teraction al settin g.17 O n the con se­
quence side, som e writers such as the an th ropologist G e o rg e Foster in his
classic study o f envv analyze the custom s and institutions that fu nction to
avert envy by devaluing, h id in g, o r sym bolically sh aring the envied o b je ct.,M
For Foster, inequality naturally causes envy, which is then averted through
various social custom s. In an eq u ally classic essay on jealousy, Kingsley Davis
questions the naturalness ol sexu al jealousy. R ejecting the position o f the
family historian F.dward Wcstei m arch, that ad u ltery “ naturally" arouses jeal­
ousy, which in turn causes m onogam y. Davis suggests that the cause o f je a l­
ousy lies in the exp ectatio n s set up by the institution o f m onogam y, which
then make adultery aro u se jealousy. 1 le focuses on the jealousy o f m en over
their wives, who are co n ceived o f as property. Fins property can be b or­
rowed or lent without jealousy, as o ccu rs in som e traditional societies. It is
only when their p roperty is stolen o r trespassed upon that m en get je a lo u s .19
Tlius, feelings take on th eir m e a n in g and full ch aracter only in relation
toa specific time and place in the w orld. A nd each context has a norm ative,
an expressive, and a political d im en sio n .
The normative d im en sio n o f a co n text refers to o u r sense o f what feels
appropriate or right. It points o u r attention to the relation betw een feelin g
and feeling rules. S o we m ight say, "T h is situation m akes me happy, but I
shouldn’t feel this h ap py." B o th feelin g s and feelin g ru les are socially
induced, as is the poten tial co n flict betw een the two. T h e expressive d im en ­
sion o f any context has to do with the relation betw een a p e rso n ’s feelin gs
and other p e o p le ’s u n d ersta n d in g o f and resp on se to those feelings, that is,
with the issue o f co m m u n icatio n . H ere w e’ re d ealin g not with d ie w ron g­
ness o f feelings, but with the in fe rre d truth o r falseness o f them . T h e polit­
ical dimension co n cern s the relation betw een a p e rso n ’s feelin gs an d the
target o f those feelin gs. It fo cu ses o n the aim in g o f affect at those h ig h e r o r
lower, more o r less po w erfu l, than oneself. T h e first dim ension tells us ab ou t
82 A F E E L IN G F U L SELF

ju d g m e n t s o n fe e lin g , th e s e c o n d a b o u t c o m m u n ic a tio n o f feelin g , and the

th ird a b o u t th e a im in g o f fe e lin g . It is th e im a g e o f th e sen tien t self that
d raw s o u r e y e to th e se th re e a sp ects o f fe e lin g s .
F e e lin g ru le s d e fin e w h at w e im a g in e w c s h o u ld a n d s h o u ld n ’t feel and
w o u ld lik e to fe e l o v e r a r a n g e o f c irc u m sta n c e s; th e y sh o w how wc judge
fe e lin g . F e e lin g ru les d iffe r fro m e x p r e s s io n ru le s. A fe e lin g rule governs
h o w w e fe e l w h e re a s an e x p re ss io n r u le g o v e rn s h o w w e e x p re ss feeling. Wc
c a n th in k o f fe e lin g ru le s as th e u n d e r s id e o f fr a m in g r u le s — rules govern­
in g h o w it is w e see situ ation s. T o g e th e r, fr a m in g a n d fe e lin g determ ine how
it is w e d e e p ly grasp th e situ atio n b e fo r e us. F e e lin g ru le s are also often
d e e p ly in te rn a liz e d , th o u g h this is o b v io u sly less th e d is c fo r children, the
in sa n e , a n d th e tra u m a tize d th an fo r n o r m a l, e m o tio n a lly healthy adults.
I e x p lo r e fe e lin g ru le s in th e n e x t essay (“ W o rk in g o n F e e lin g "), bullet
m e fle sh o u t th e g e n e r a l id e a h e re . W h e n w e ju d g e a fe e lin g as inappropri­
a te, w e a c tu ally a p p ly o n e o f th re e m e a s u r in g ro d s w e can sec as types o(
a p p ro p ria te n e ss: (a) clin ica l a p p ro p r ia te n e s s r e fe r s to w hat is expectable for
n o rm a l, h e a lth y p e rso n s (th e p e rso n m a y th in k h e r / h is a n g e r “healthy”
e v e n i f it’s m o ra lly w r o n g ); (b) m oral a p p r o p r ia te n e s s re fe rs to what is
m o ra lly le g itim a te (th e p e rso n ca n g et fu rio u s at a h e lp le ss ch ild , but this
m a y b e m o ra lly in a p p ro p r ia te ) ; (c) social-situ ational a p p ro p ria te n e ss refen
to w h at is c a lle d fo r by th e n o rm s sp e c ific to th e situ a tio n (e .g ., to feel effer­
v escen t at a party) - T h e s e th re e types o f a p p r o p r ia te n e s s c o rre sp o n d to the
ro le s o f tile c lin ic ia n , th e m in ister, a n d th e e tiq u e tte e x p e r t , a n d in practice
th ese th re e sen ses o f the term o fte n — th o u g h n o t a lw a y s— rein fo rce or fuse
w ith e a c h oth er.
L e t ’s take th e e x a m p le o f envy, th e fe e lin g o f w a n tin g w h at another has.
S o c ie tie s g e n e ra te en vy w h e n th e y c re a te w in n e rs a n d lo sers, an d devalue
lo sers fo r b e in g lo se rs.1’" W h ile th e m o ra l in ju n c tio n a g a in st envy applies to
w in n e rs a n d lo sers a lik e , en vy is u n e q u a lly d istrib u te d a m o n g winners and
lo sers. M o re o f th o se w h o fe e l th ey a re lo se rs o r th in k o th e rs th in k they arc
lo se rs fe e l envy. S o the so c ia lly in d u c e d fe e lin g (“ I e n v y y o u ” ) and the
so c ia lly e sta b lish e d ru le (“ I s h o u ld n 't e n v y y o u ” ) a r e at o d d s. T h is disjunc­
t iv e m ig h t b e stro n g e st fo r th e re lig io u s p o o r ( fo r w h o m b o th envy and the
p r o h ib itio n a g a in st it a re fo ste re d ) a n d w e a k est fo r th e irre v e re n t rich (for
w h o m b o th m ig h t b e less). I say “ m ig h t" b e c a u s e th e u ltim a te situation is
alw ays u n iq u e to th e in d iv id u a l.1' 1
T h e d is c r e p a n c y b etw een so c ia lly in d u c e d fe e lin g s o f en vy a n d envy rules
m a y re su lt in a n u m b e r o f so cia l c u sto m s a n d in stitu tio n a l arrangements
w h ic h h a n d le this d isc re p a n c y . T h e a n t h r o p o lo g is t G e o r g e F o ster suggests
th at th e e x p e r ie n c e o f e n v y is a re su lt o f (a) n o tio n s a b o u t the limited or
u n lim ite d s u p p ly o f d e s ir e d “ g o o d s ” (m o n ey , lo v e , h o n o r, security), (b)
d ie ir d is tr ib u tio n , a n d (c) th e p r in c ip le o f e q u iv a le n c e (th e tendency to
e q u a liz e g o o d s ) .1'2 H e su g g e sts se v e ra l so c ia l d e v ic e s th a t d e a l with envy—
 T H E C A P A C I T Y T O F EEL 83

concealing o r d en y in g p ossession o f that w h ich is co veted a n d truly o r sym ­

bolically sh arin g it. T h e g re a t a n d rec e n tly in crea se d e x tre m e s o f w ealth in
the United States, th e e th ic o f “ e q u a l o p p o rtu n ity ," an d in d iv id u alism
together create a g e n e ra l su scep tib ility to envy. Surely, the w id esp read p o p ­
ularity o f T V gam e show s an d “ in a rrv a m illio n a ire " show's— p ro g ra m s that
convey the idea “so m e o n e like m e can get rich q u ic k "— a re a fo rm o f sym ­
bolic sharing. But how, w'e can w o n d er, d o in divid u als pick u p w h e re c u ltu re
leaves off?
Just as feelin gs a re lin k ed to ru les in a n o rm ative c o n tex t, so fe e lin g s a re
linked to exp ressio n s in a c o n te x t o f e x p re ssio n . Just its wfc a p p ra ise o u r
experience in a co n text o f ru les, so too d o we ju d g e the e m o tio n al e x p re s ­
sions o f others in an e x p re ssio n c o n te x t. In m a p p in g ru le to fe e lin g , the
actor ju d ges w h eth er a fe e lin g is a p p ro p ria te in the clin ical, m o ral, o r situ­
ational sense. In m a p p in g expression to fe e lin g , we ju d g e w’h e th e r th e e x p re s­
sion is true o r false, partly o r fu lly m ean t. We try to tell w h e th e r it c o rre ­
sponds to a “ real" su b jective e x p e r ie n c e . W hen I sm ile at yo u , I o ffe r a sign
of my inner feelin g: say, lik in g . W hen yo u see m e sm ile, in a flash , you m ake
an inference, c o rrect o r not (“ D oes sh e really like m e o r is sh e ju s t b e in g
polite? Is this e xp ressio n fa k e o r r e a l? "). Q u ite a p art fro m th e ju d g m e n t
about the a p p ro p ria te n e ss o f m y lik in g o r yo u rs, th ere is th e task o f in fe r­
ring from my sm ile w hat it is 1 re a lly fe e l.
The many sm all d e c isio n s that lead us to d isco u n t o r take serio u sly an
expression rest on a variety o f fa cto rs: o u r style o f in te rp re tin g , o u r kn ow l­
edge o f a n o th e r’s sm ilin g h ab its, o u r k n o w le d g e o f even ts p rio r to the
encounter, an d so o n . 'These e le m e n ts also o p e ra te w ithin a la rg e r so cial
context in w hich so m e e x p re ss io n s a re by cu sto m scarce an d o th e rs a b u n ­
dant. T h e g e n era l “ m a rk e t" o f e x p re ss io n s thus in flu e n c e s the v alu e wrc
impute to a p a rticu la r sm ile as w ell as th e p ro b a b ility o f p e rc e iv in g it as tru e
or false.
Wc can see e m o tio n a l e x p re ss io n s as a m e d iu m o f e x c h a n g e . T h e tran s­
lation between e x p re ssio n a n d e x p e r ie n c e ca n b e seen as a n a lo g o u s to the
translation betw een a p a p e r d o lla r bill a n d w hat it sym b o lizes.23 L ik e p a p e r
money, m any sm iles a n d fro w n s a re in c irc u la tio n . T h e y a re sy m b o lic with
reference to certain ta k e n -fo r-g ra n te d a g re e m e n ts as to w h ich g e stu re g o e s
with which m e a n in g in w h ich c o n te x t. L ik e m o n ey, e x p re ss io n s w o rk o n a
basis o f trust that this e x p re s s io n (e .g ., a c le n c h e d fist) c o rre s p o n d s to that
range o f in n er e x p e r ie n c e (e .g ., a n g e r, e x u b e r a n t b ra v a d o ). S o o u r trust in
a gesture rests on a p u b lic trust in th e g e n e r a l valid ity o f su c h e x p re ss io n s,
their general link to in n e r e x p e r ie n c e .
The m ore b u re a u c ra tiz e d o u r so ciety, th e m o re sta n d a rd iz e d , c o m m o d i­
fied, and d e p e rso n a liz e d a re p u b lic display's o f fe e lin g , a n d th e m o re d is­
counting w'e d o. T h e “ h av e a n ic e d a y ” b u tto n s, th e w a ite r’s “ h o p e y o u e n jo y
your m eal,” the r e c e p tio n is t’s s m ile — all th e se a re so a b u n d a n t th at w e
84 A F E E L IN G F U L SELF

a lm o s t c e a s e to im a g in e th a t th e y c o r r e s p o n d to a n y th in g real. Still, such

c o m m e r c ia liz e d n ic e n e ss is e n o r m o u s ly im p o r ta n t as a fo rm o f needed reas­
s u r a n c e th a t in th e m id st o f m a n y s tr a n g e r s w c a r c s a fe ly o u t o f harm’s way.
L ik e th e a ra b le so il o n d ie e a rth , p u b lic g o o d w ill is life-sustaining, needs
m a in te n a n c e , a n d is v u ln e r a b le to e ro s io n .
In a c o m m e rc ia liz e d society, p o sitiv e e x p r e s s io n is m o re “inflated" than
e x p r e s s io n , say, o f envy, a n g e r, o r re se n tm e n t. T h e r e a r e m o re phony dollars
in c irc u la tio n . S o a slig h t e x p re ss io n o f a n g e r is tru sted to correspond to felt
a n g e r in a w ay n o t g e n e ra lly tru e fo r a n e x p r e s s io n o f lik in g . Expressions of
a n g e r a re m o re “ se rio u s" a n d m o re lik e ly to b e s e n s e d as “ tru e."24
W ith in th e g e n e r a l m a rk e t o f e x p r e s s io n s , th e r e a re particu lar markets
a sso c ia te d w ith re g io n a l s u b p o p u la tio n s o r strata . W ith in the expression
m a rk e t fo r a n g e r in so u th e rn Italy, fo r e x a m p le , a n g e r is “ ch eaper" than it
is a m o n g M a in e Y a n k e e s.25 M o reo ve r, se x -ro le so c ia liz a tio n m ay render an
g c r e x p r e s s io n s m o re s c a rc e a n d “ s e r io u s " fo r w o m e n than for men.
D a p h n e B u g e n ta l a n d h e r c o a u th o r s sh o w th a t, c o m p a re d with men,
w o m e n a rc m o re lik ely to sm ile w h ile a n g r y o r fr u s tr a te d .26 In his study of
fa c ia l e x p re ssio n s, d ie p sy c h o lo g ist P a u l E c k m a n fo u n d w om en more likely
to m ask (q u ick ly c o v e r u p ) a n g e r, w h ile m e n m o re o fte n m ask fear.27 A study
o f a ffe c t d isp la y in c h ild r e n ’s sto rie s m ig h t sh o w g irls to be portrayed as
m o re e x p re ssiv e o f fe a r th a n o f a n g e r, w h ile fo r b o ys th e o pposite is proba­
b ly tru e. In a n y ca se , th e tra n sla tio n fro m o u t e r e x p r e s s io n to inner feeling
a n d r ic e versa is set ag ain st d iffe re n t e x p e c ta tio n s a b o u t a n g e r expression in
w o m e n fro m th o se fo r m e n .
F e e lin g s a r c lin k e d n o t o n ly to ru le s (in n o r m a tiv e contexts) and to
e x p re ss io n s (in e x p re ss io n c o n te x ts ), bu t a lso to sa n c tio n s (in political con­
te x ts). H e re w e ca n e x p lo r e th e r e la tio n b e tw e e n p o w e r ® 1 a n d sanction, on
o n e h a n d , a n d th e ta rg e t o f fe e lin g a n d e x p r e s s io n , o n th e other. Whereas
th e first two levels d e a l w ith c o n sc io u s fe e lin g a n d th o u g h t (the sentient
a n d c o g n itiv e s e lf) , this th ird level d e a ls w ith w iia t is o fte n unconscious
fe e lin g .
T h e re la tio n b etw een sa n c tio n a n d fe e lin g v a rie s fo r d ifferen t feelings.
In s o fa r as a n g e r is d e fle c te d at all fro m its “ r ig h t fu l" ta rg e t, fo r example.it
te n d s to b e d e fle c te d “ d o w n ” in to re la tiv e p o w e r v a c u u m s. So anger is most
lik e ly to b e a im e d at p e o p le w ith less p o w e r a n d le ast lik ely to be aimed at
p e o p le w ith m o re pow er. A n g e r ru n s in c h a n n e ls o f least resistance. The
p a tte rn is c le a re st in th e ca se o f th e expression o f a n g e r, but I think in a
m ild e r w ay it is th e re a lso fo r th e v e ry e x p e r ie n c e o f a n g e r.
T h is g e n e r a l p a ttern p a ra lle ls d ie h ie r a r c h y o f jo k i n g observed by Rose
C o se r. A n a ly z in g c o n v e rsa tio n s in w h ic h h u m o r o c c u r r e d during three
m o n d is o f s ta ff m e e tin g s at a m e n ta l h o sp ita l, C o s e r c o n c lu d e d , “Those who
w’e re o f h ig h e r statu s p o siu o n s m o re fr e q u e n d y to o k th e iniuative to use
 TMC C AP AC I T Y TO F f t l BA

humor. M o r e Mgnilit.uit. still, the butt of the joke. if h r was p r e se n t , was

never in .t liigliei au thority | m >s h i o i i th an t h r initialoi Insofar as jokes with
.1 "hult“ ate a b e n i g n i o \ e i foi hostility, they trflrc t the pattern in this w.n
(o n t t a t nvisr, m o t e positive f e e l i n g s tern! to r u n u p the »•»« iopolilii al lull
(eg., kissing the h a n d nl t h r p o p e . b n w m g t i e f o i r t h r i p i r n i . s h a k i n g
hands with the p t r s t d e i t l ) I J m le i the g o w i t i a m e of soc t.dlv o i g a t i i / r d fear,
there is hnth the d o w 'iiw an l t r i i d r m \ of n r g a tiv fe e lin g s a n d the u p w . u d
trmlrnis of p o st t n e o n e s to\s.ud p n w e i l u l p a i r n t a l I n u r e s . ' W hrn drflurtrd,
align and r e s e n t m e n t t e n d to get d e l l r i ted d o w n llut. n e e d le s s tn sav. not
all angel is delle« ted d o w n R e v o lu t i o n s n n p l Id e o lo gie s that • lia lle n g e llit
elite and ignite the m asse s g i a b h o l d Still, i i i i h h alxiu t \ m e n < an « i i l l u i r ,
at least, trams 0111 « b a n i i e l s of identifu atioii u p a n d o m disd a in a m i a n g e i
down. \m l the p o w e i f u l t a i l b u l l e i th e m se lv e s (via d o o r m e n a n d s e i i r
taiies) against r \ f n >\me to hostilitv, a hulln di al p o w r i l r %6 p e o p l e |rs» o f t r n
enjoy. While a n g e l « a n be a i m e d u p, a n d the mle against envy s u s p e n d e d ,
as m the t a s r of i e v o l u t i o n , u is a s t o n i s h i n g hois t a i r l s this has imc Hired hi
the lh u led States l i n e a m o n g the dis|M»v\rssrd the etnotion.il asj>ei t of
"false-i onss lousnevs" — /er/tng < o n t r n t with an u n ju s tb dealt fate — 1« m o r e
the tulr than the r v e p t i o n Whs - I loss d o e * the mass tn r d i a ot the |x ilm
cal appaiatus " o i g a m / e " a n d channel dbcoritcnt a n d inhibit challenge?
Sutcls we base to u n d e r s t a n d the politic «■( aim to k n o w
This up- and d ow n stieain pattern h.is rn o itn o u s consequences for d ir
emotional worlds wc inhabit I hose neat the Ixittotu of jxiwer literaM hies
tend to bcui a d isp rop ortio n ate am ount of displaced anget A woman, for
example, receives not onh h ri husband s frustiation displaced from the
office to home, hut also the a lig n of other wom en who ate sim ilarly d iv
placed U |h ii' i . It a wom an lakes her anger down (to « h ild irn ) and i k i . i m o i i -
allv actovs (to other w om en lie . In thr same token, hccum rs thr I r s s |h »w-
erful target of lx»th m en 's and w o m en ’s anger I h r least jx iw n fu l lie<o m r
the tatgets of a wide variety of h« >still t\ In a sense, dies becom e the (nmfdatnt
daks of socirts. For those on the Ixittom rungs of ttie jxditiral ladder, the
world more often feels a ‘wo/u/ place
(nntrariwisc. pose* t fid p eo p le not otilv get a disproportionate am ount o f
money and prestige, they also ctijov m ote em otion al rewards. For the
dwellers at the cop. the ssotid m ore often feels like a .Viugn place. The m ore
hierarchies one i> at the top o f (class, race, g e n d e r?, the m ore this is p ro lx
ablv tntc. O ne reason p eo p le want jxnvcr. honor, and glorv is prccisch
because they want protection from hostility and c x jx m ire tc» awe and liking.
Tims, powerful and pow erless p eo p le enjoy d ifferen t em otional as well as
social and physical worlds.
All this lias im plications for the study o f gender. We m ight quite seriously
examine the proverbial case o f the bo ss who blow's up at the worker, the
86 A FEELINGFUL SELF

worker who blow's up at his wife, the wife who gets angry at her children,
and the children who kick the dog. The very first task would be to explore
the conscious feelings o f people at each juncture in this series o f emotional
waterfalls. The second task would be to determine what anger seems lobe
“displaced" and what not. Who, wc can ask, gets how angry at whom and for
what? When a slightly burned chicken draws a raging response from the
husband, and when a child's small miscalculation about continence draws a
storm of reaction from the mother, we can make a guess about displaced
anger, the idea being that each is “really" angry or “also" angry at something
else. But in order to develop such a guess, we would need to inspect the btuk-
gmunri exficctntums Of both the people in the “anger-chain" and the sociolo­
gists studying them.
The “social" goes far deeper than our current images o f self lead us to
suppose. Social roles and relations do not simply reflect patterns of thought
and action, leaving the realm o f emotion and feeling untouched, timeless,
and universal. No, there are social patterns to feeling itself. Our task, as soci­
ologists, is to invent both a magnifying glass and a pair o f binoculars that
permit us to trace the many links between a world that shapes people’s feel­
ing and people who can feel.