Safety Science xxx (2011) xxx–xxx

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Safety Science
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Lightning protection scenarios of communication tower sites; human hazards

and equipment damage
Chandima Gomes a,⇑, Arturo Galvan Diego b
a
Centre of Excellence on Lightning Protection, Universiti Putra Malaysia, Malaysia
b
Instituto de Investigaciones Eléctricas, Cuernavaca Morelos, Mexico

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: This paper provides comprehensive analysis on the lightning protection scenarios in 48 communication
Received 18 February 2011 and broadcasting towers situated in similar isokeraunic contours in Sri Lanka at 79°–81° East and 5°–10°
Accepted 14 May 2011 North. The investigation has been conducted to study the hazardous environment created on the tower
Available online xxxx
and in the neighbourhood in the event of a lightning strike to the tower. The results show that a direct
strike to an antenna structure in a metallic tower is rare irrespective of the presence of an air-termination
Keywords: or a down conductor. However, side flashing or arcing to antenna structures is highly possible once the
Lightning
air-termination and/or down conductor is installed and attempts are made to insulate the system from
Protection
Safety
the tower. The outcome also shows that equipotential bonding of the grounding system, a distributed
Communication grounding network including a ring conductor and a suitable system of surge protective devices play a
Tower much vital role in lightning protection of equipment and safety of people compared to the effects of sim-
Guidelines ply achieving a low grounding resistance. However, in the absence of such integrated, distributed and
Grounding equipotentialized grounding system, a high value of ground resistance will sharply increase the possibil-
ity of accidents and damage. Considering the observations of the investigations into account we have
designed a concrete embedded grounding system for tower sites at problematic locations. Finally, the
scenarios for safety management at telecommunication tower sites have been discussed.
Ó 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction
In most parts of the world, communication towers are all-metal
structures, which make them prime targets of lightning that may
come within their vicinity. During the last few decades, a large
number of lightning related accidents and damages have been re-
ported in many countries in connection with communication and
broadcasting tower sites (Kithil, 2006; Eriksson and Meal, 1984;
Pierce, 1971). In a tower environment, lightning related hazards
may occur at various stages of a lightning strike.
a. The attachment process: A lightning step leader may attach
with an antenna structure, aviation warning light or signal/
power cable in the tower, in which case the object which
is subjected to the lightning attachment may be severely
damaged. There can also be secondary effects, as the item
struck by lightning may be detached from the tower or frag-
mented, giving rise to falling parts that will cause damage to
the objects underneath or injuries to the staff at ground
level. The lightning current will most probably enter the
⇑ Corresponding author. Tel.: +60 102777895.
E-mail address: chandima.gomes@gmail.com (C. Gomes).
cables connected to the object struck, and flow into the sig-
nal feeding devices or power panels in the base transmission
station (BTS) causing many other hazards to both equipment
and staff.
b. Passage of lightning current to ground level: As the lightning
current flow to the ground level through any possible path,
melting or burning of materials and side flashing to nearby
objects or antenna structures in the tower itself, may occur
depending on the resistance and impedance of the path
taken by the current. The lightning current, which usually
shows a rapidly varying double exponential waveform with
sub-microsecond to microsecond scale rise time, gives rise
to a large electromagnetic field in the proximity which
may induce large voltage impulses in the nearby electrical
systems. Such voltage pulses may also damage the
equipment.
c. Once the lightning current reach the ground level, a low
impedance path should be provided to that to be dissipated
into mother earth within a very short period. In the absence
of such path the current may take surface routes in the form
of arcs and/or enter into electrical networks through the
electrical grounding system (or even by insulation break-
down between the path of the lightning current and the

0925-7535/$ - see front matter Ó 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.ssci.2011.05.006

Please cite this article in press as: Gomes, C., Diego, A.G. Lightning protection scenarios of communication tower sites; human hazards and equipment
damage. Safety Sci. (2011), doi:10.1016/j.ssci.2011.05.006
2 C. Gomes, A.G. Diego / Safety Science xxx (2011) xxx–xxx
electrical system). Such cases may lead to severe injuries or
even death of the staff in the site and also cause heavy
equipment damage and triggering of fire/explosions, etc.
In the literature we find several studies done with regard to
such hazards (Zhou et al., 2009a,b; Rizk, 1994; Pavanello et al.,
2004; Rachidi et al., 2001; Rakov, 2001; Melander, 1984). Most of
these researches have theoretical approaches to the issues that
they address. Even in very practical issues such as the increased
lightning damage in the buildings neighbouring towers have not
yet studied with a sizable database of in situ observations. Further-
more, the analysis of grounding systems at locations with space
restrictions has not been done in detail either theoretically or
experimentally. The general concepts of protection of structures
and equipment against lightning have been covered in IEC
62305:2006 (2006), NFPA 780:2008 (2008), IEEE C62.41:1991
(1999) and AS/NZS 1768:2007 (2007), etc. The telecommunication
standards ITU-T REC K.20:2003 (2003), ITU-T REC K.21:2005
(2005), ITU-T REC K.56:2003 (2003), ITU-T REC K.27:1996 (1996)
and ITU-T REC K.31:1993 (1993), provide the guidelines for pro-
tecting telecommunication related equipment and stations.
In this study, we analyze the lightning related environment in
tall communication and broadcasting towers, giving special atten-
tion to the grounding systems of such sites, which are in most
cases situated in space restricted locations. The results can be ex-
tended to radar masts, power transmission towers and many other
metal structures with comparatively small horizontal span. The pa-
per first discusses the lightning protection systems and lightning
accidents pertinent to 48 tower related sites in Sri Lanka; a tropical
oceanic country (79°–81° East and 5°–10° North). Based on our
observations we make a comprehensive list of recommendations
for the installation of lightning protection scheme at a tower site
and also discuss a concrete encased steel reinforcement system
that can be used as a suitable grounding system for sites with very
high soil resistivity.
2. Methodology
Forty-eight communication tower sites in Sri Lanka have been
investigated during the 5-year period from 2003 to 2008. In this
investigation we have;
 Checked the nature and installation features of
1. Air-termination system.
2. Current path to ground level.
3. Grounding system.
 Taken quantitative measurements of
1. Ground resistance of the system.
2. Average soil resistivity of the site.
 Collected confirmed lightning related damage records for the
previous 1–3 years.
The ground resistance was measured with a three-pole digital
earth resistance meter (KYORITSU MODEL4105A), under dry earth
conditions. The information to calculate soil resistivity of the
ground was obtained by taking measurements from a four-pole
ground resistivity meter (MEGER DET5/4R), under the same dry
conditions. The continuity check of metallic parts (especially that
of the grounding system) has been done with digital multi-meter
(Fluke-115 or Fluke-85).
The ground resistance was taken twice (in V directions, wher-
ever it is possible) at each location, where a conductor intended
for grounding, enters the earth. Information for the calculation of
soil resistivity was taken by taking measurements at three random
places of the site within about 10 m from the tower.
Please cite this article in press as: Gomes, C., Diego, A.G. Lightning protection scenarios of communication tower sites; human hazards and equipment
damage. Safety Sci. (2011), doi:10.1016/j.ssci.2011.05.006
The materials used for various parts of the lightning protection
system, and layout of the grounding system have been determined
by the site-engineer-provided data and visual observations.
The installation of air-terminations and upper parts of down
conductors have been observed from the ground level or from loca-
tions at few meters above ground level by binoculars (Nikon 8X42
WP Trailblazer ATB).
3. Observations
3.1. Types of towers
The 48 towers inspected in this study are all-metal (made of
metal re-bars making a steel lattice that stands on concrete plat-
forms), self supported structures (no guy wires except in four tow-
ers) with heights range from 40 m to 100 m. All the towers are
either square or triangular cross-sectioned (having four legs or
three legs) and except for the four which are guy wired, they are
tapered over the entire height (i.e. legs are inclines to the vertical).
The tubular or X/I/L cross sectioned re-bars are typically made of
painted galvanized steel and have cross sectional area over
150 mm2. In general, these towers are certified by a civil engineer
for its mechanical stability. The towers are either used for signal
transmission in telecommunication or for broadcasting. A foot of
the base of a tower is shown in Fig. 1.
The sites have been selected so that they are situated in areas of
similar contours of isokeraunic level (annual thunder days). The
contour map issued by the Sri Lanka Meteorology Department is
based on 30 year data (from 1970 to 1999) has assigned the level
120–140 days per year to the contours, however, it is said that
the data has been collected during the peak periods (March/April
and October/November) and normalized to 1 year. Despite the fact
that this data interpretation is erroneous, the region can be treated
as a high lightning density zone.
3.2. Lightning protection components
3.2.1. Air termination
In this paper we use the term ‘‘air termination’’ to refer any
metallic object (typically a rod) that specifically installed at the
top of the tower to intercept with lightning stepped leader. A sum-
mary of the observations on the air termination is given below.
 Metal rod that covers all antenna structures in the tower within
a cone of vortex angle 45°: 18.
Fig. 1. A foot of the base of a tower made of X cross-sectioned painted re-bars made
of galvanized steel and the copper grounding tapes. The base plates are installed on
buried concrete platforms. In some cases the base plates have been installed on
concrete platforms of 30–100 cm height.
 C. Gomes, A.G. Diego / Safety Science xxx (2011) xxx–xxx
 Metal rod that does not cover all antenna structures in the
tower within a cone of vortex angle 45°: 06.
 ESE rod of which the physical height covers all antenna struc-
tures in the tower within a cone of vortex angle 45°: 13.
 ESE rod of which the physical height does not cover all antenna
structures in the tower within a cone of vortex angle 45°: 08.
 Other types of air-termination of which the physical height
cover all antenna structures in the tower within a cone of vortex
angle 45° (lightning prevention type): 01.
 No air termination: 02.
The vortex angle 45° has been taken as a general reference.
3.2.2. Down conductors
The term ‘‘down conductor’’ is used to refer any metallic part (in
the form of wire or tape) that is specifically installed to drive light-
ning current from top of the tower to ground level.
 Single copper tape strapped to one of the tower legs: 33.
 Single copper tape taken from the middle of the tower (typically
strapped to the ladder): 3.
 Two copper tapes strapped to tower legs: 02.
 Insulted down conductor (and insulated air-termination) that is
isolated from the tower material: 04.
 No down conductor:0 6.
The term ‘‘insulated down conductor’’ is referred to a metallic
pipe or tape which is covered by an insulating material for the
deliberate purpose of electrically isolating the conductor from
the metals of the tower. The conducting tapes which may be elec-
trically isolated (continuously or at some locations) due to the
painting of the tower (an in the absence of metal screws that fixing
the tape to the tower) are not considered as ‘‘insulated down con-
ductors’’. In these cases the air-termination was fixed directly to
the tower by metal screws.
3.2.3. Grounding system
The term ‘‘grounding system’’ is used to refer any metallic part
that is specifically installed to connect the down conductors or
metallic parts of the tower to mother earth.
 Only the down conductors are grounded: 04.
 The down conductors and the four legs are grounded and inte-
grated: 39.
 The down conductors and the four legs are grounded but not
integrated: 05.
The ground resistance of the grounding system was in the fol-
lowing ranges (note that in the cases of non-integrated grounding
of down conductors and tower footing, the following values refer
to the grounding system of the down conductors). In all the infor-
mation given in this section (values) the marginal cases have been
included in the lower range.
 0–2 O: 04.
 2–10 O: 22.
 10–20 O: 09.
 20–100 O: 06.
 100–1000 O: 02.
 Resistance could not be measured due to inaccessibility: 03.
 Resistance could not be measured due to lack of soil: 02.
In three of the cases where resistance could not be measured,
the down conductor has been extended for about 20–60 m below
the tower foot level (tower is on a solid rock) and dumped in an
inaccessible location. In the other two cases the down conductors
were inserted into a bore drilled in the rock and the cavity has been
Please cite this article in press as: Gomes, C., Diego, A.G. Lightning protection scenarios of communication tower sites; human hazards and equipment
damage. Safety Sci. (2011), doi:10.1016/j.ssci.2011.05.006
3
filled with a cement-like material. Investigators could not acquire
any information regarding the depth of the bore, electrode
arrangement or the materials used. The ground soil resistivity
had the following variation,
 0–15 O m: 07.
 15–100 O m: 20.
 100–1000 O m: 12.
 1000–10,000 O m: 04.
 Resistivity could not be measured due to inaccessibility or lack
of soil: 05.
3.2.4. Grounding system configuration
In the 04 cases of only the down conductors are grounded (all
four cases had one down conductor); a deep driven copper tube
has been integrated with three radials that runs for 3–4 m from
the deep driven rod (at a depth of about 0.5 m). The four towers,
belong to the same company, are situated in areas where soil resis-
tivity was in the ranges 0–15 O m (two sites) and 15–100 O m
(three sites). The ground resistance in the four cases was in the
range 2–10 O.
In the 39 cases where four legs are grounded and integrated; in
35 cases the four legs have been interconnected by a ring conduc-
tor. The ring conductor was connected to either radials or deep dri-
ven rods/plates. The 06 cases of no down conductors and the 04
cases of resistivity in the range 1000–10,000 O m come under this
category. The ground resistance in 32 cases was below 20 O while
only in three cases (where soil resistivity is in the range 1000–
10,000 O m) the value was in 20–100 O range. At the other four
sites (out of 39), the tower footings and down conductor were sep-
arately connected into a deep driven rods (at an inspection pit).
The resistance in the four cases was below 10 O.
In the five cases that the tower footing and the down conductor
related grounding systems are not integrated, the grounding resis-
tance of down conductor and that of tower footing are given in Ta-
ble 1 (note that in 01 case the four legs have been separately
grounded so that the average value of the four systems is given.
In the other four cases the four legs have been interconnected
above surface level and grounded at one point).
4. Information and discussion
4.1. Damage to equipment installed on the tower
There were eight instances (on six towers), when damage has
been detected and recorded in antenna structures (melted or
ripped-off material) during a period of 3–5 years prior to the time
of inspection; once in five towers and three times in one tower.
Summary of observations is given in Table 2.
It is interesting to note that in all cases the damaged structure
was within the cone of protection with a vortex angle of 45°. How-
ever close analysis revealed that it is only in one case (the last case
indicated in the table) the possibility of direct strike to the dam-
aged structure is justified. In the other cases there are strong evi-
dences to conclude that the damaged objects have been
subjected to arcing from the down conductor.
One of the authors of this paper is a consultant to the tower
owners, hence had the authority to demand the removal of the
insulated down conductors at the four towers including the sites
where the damage has been reported. The inspection of these
down conductors revealed that the insulation has been ripped off
in all four cases, in the sections of the cable mostly towards the
top end of the tower. The marks of burning and insulation ripping
off reveal that the arcing has been taken place at many points along
the conductor. Many of these arcing incidents have gone unnoticed
either due to the sparking into the tower (no damage to equip-
4 C. Gomes, A.G. Diego / Safety Science xxx (2011) xxx–xxx

Table 1 The typical values of R and L per unit length of a copper conduc-
The ground resistance of the down conductor termination and tower footing of the tor having cross sectional dimensions as per the IEC 62305-3
cases where the two systems are non-integrated. Three cases out of the five are
related to the towers with insulated down conductors (Cases 1, 2 and 3).
(2006), assuming them to be flat, are 3  104 O/m and 1.5 lH/m
respectively. Hence at a height of about 50 m;
Ground resistance of the ground Ground resistance of the ground
termination of down conductor (O) termination of tower footing (O)
di
1 2 17 IR ¼ 0:75 kV and L ¼ 3:75 MV
dt
2 9 24
3 7 5
4 11 32
Therefore, irrespective of the resistance, the inductance alone will
5 8 13 contribute to a very high potential difference between the down
conductor and the tower or antenna structures which are essen-
tially at ground potential.
ment) or the limitations of visibility at ground level to figure out To prevent spark-over through insulation breakdown, such con-
damages to antenna structures. In one of the cases of investigation, dition requires, for an example, either
we could obtain the photographs of the damaged parts of the insu-
lated cables before it has been removed. Hence, we could clearly a. 11.25 cm thick insulation covering of cross-linked polyethyl-
figure out the arcing marks. Fig. 2 depicts several photographs of ene (assuming 1.2/50 ls voltage impulse) or
this case. The tower is 95 m tall and the majority of insulation b. 2 m of air-separation even at level IV protection according to
damage of the down conductor could be seen from a height of the following equation given in IEC 62305-3 (2006).
about 40 m onwards. Note that there are number of picturing of
the insulation material (Fig. 2c) could be seen in abundance in all
kc
down conductors, which could be detected only at close range. In s ¼ ki l
km
line with the insulation breakdown of cables, there are burning
marks on the tower which could not be properly photographed
where s is the minimum separation, ki the factor depends on le-
at higher levels due to practical constraints. Fig. 3 shows such an
vel of protection (0.04 in this case which is corresponding to le-
incident at about 5 m, close to a point at which cable sheaths of sig-
vel iii/iv), kc the factor depends on the number of down
nal wires are grounded. Note that the down conductor is placed
conductors (one in this case), km the unity for air and l is the dis-
along with the cable bunch. Similar arcing related to insulated
tance from the possible flash over point to the nearest equipo-
down conductors have been reported elsewhere (by personal
tential plane (ground plane in this case).
communication).
The isolation (or insulation) provided for the down conductor or
Let us consider a lightning strike with peak current 50 kA and
for the air-termination in any of the commercially available prod-
maximum current derivative 50 kA/ls striking the air termination
ucts (or installations) was much lower than such values obtained
of the tower. If we assume the peak current and peak current deriv-
above. It is well understood that implementation of such insula-
ative occur at the same time (an assumption that has no impact on
tion/isolation has many practical constraints, thus, it is not com-
the result as we show latter), the potential at a given height with
mercially viable. Therefore, the five cases of damage to the
respect to ground is given by
antenna structures of the three towers with insulated down con-
di ductor is justified as due to the flash over from the down conduc-
V ¼ IR þ L tor. The splitting of insulation in the insulated down conductors of
dt
other two towers also shows that there may be sparking to the
where R is the resistance of the conductor and L is the inductance. tower or antenna structures. However, the damage in such cases

Table 2
The details of cases where tower-installed equipment were damaged due to lightning.

No. of No. of times Air termination Down conductor Grounding system

towers damaged
01 03 ESE rod isolated from the tower Insulated conductor electrically isolated from Integrated to the grounding of
the body of the tower thefooting
Physical height covers the damaged structure Ground resistance: 7 O
at 45° vortex angle
02 01 each ESE rod isolated from the tower Insulated conductor electrically isolated from Integrated to the grounding of the
the body of the tower footing
Physical height covers the damaged structure Ground resistance: 8 O
at 45° vortex angle
Ground resistance: 5 O
01 01 Copper rod Copper tape strapped to one leg of the tower Integrated to the grounding of the
footing
Height covers the damaged structure at 45° Ground resistance: 68 O
vortex angle
01 01 Copper rod Copper tape strapped to one leg of the tower Integrated to the grounding of the
footing
Height covers the damaged structure at 45° Resistance could not be measured due
vortex angle to lack of soil
01 01 ESE rod Copper tape strapped to one leg of the tower Integrated to the grounding of the
footing
Physical height covers the damaged structure Resistance could not be measured due
at 45° vortex angle to inaccessibility

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damage. Safety Sci. (2011), doi:10.1016/j.ssci.2011.05.006
 C. Gomes, A.G. Diego / Safety Science xxx (2011) xxx–xxx 5

Fig. 2. Insulation breakdown of the insulated down conductor installed in a 95 m tower. (a) A large part of the insulation of the cable has been ripped off at a height of about
45 m. (b) Melting of the insulation material of the cable. Such marks are observable in the entire upper part of the cable. (c) Puctures that cannot be observed at ground level
even with the aid of binoculars. (d) The down conductor is grounded separately from the tower foot ground.

may be either negligible or beyond the detection from ground
level.
In the two cases of copper-rod/copper tape; the damaged struc-
tures were within 1 m of the down conductor and about 15–20 m
below the top. There are several antenna structures on the other
sides of the tower and also above the damaged object. The down
conductors were supported to the tower leg by PVC straps in one
case and by PVC holders in the other case. The copper tape was
loosely in contact with the tower at many places; however, the
thick painting of the tower may have prevented the tape from get-
ting into an electrical contact with the tower. As per the informa-
tion from the site engineers the damage to the antenna structures,
which were in the form of punctures, were in the sides facing the
down conductor (it is very unlikely to have a direct strikes to the
sides of an antenna). These were the evidence to justify that the
damages were due to arcing from the down conductors.
The last case, in the Table 2, depicts no evidence for arcing from
the down conductor. The antenna structure was on a side opposite
to that of the down conductor and the damage is on the outward
surface of the antenna. In such geometry, the damage due to arcing

Please cite this article in press as: Gomes, C., Diego, A.G. Lightning protection scenarios of communication tower sites; human hazards and equipment
damage. Safety Sci. (2011), doi:10.1016/j.ssci.2011.05.006
6 C. Gomes, A.G. Diego / Safety Science xxx (2011) xxx–xxx
Damage to the
cable insulation
Arcing marks on
the tower
Fig. 3. Arcing from insulated down conductor to the tower.
from the down conductor is highly unlikely. However, the possibil-
ity of a side flash from the air-termination or from another part of
the tower cannot be discarded.
The observations show that the ground resistance, the integra-
tion of down conductor to the grounding system of tower legs or
the coverage of the air-termination has no significance to the pos-
sibility of arcing from down conductor to the objects in the tower.
Interestingly, there was no damage to tower-installed objects in
the following cases
a. Towers with no air-termination.
b. Towers of which air-termination does not cover all the
equipment installed on the tower, within a cone of protec-
tion with 45° vortex angle.
c. Towers with no down conductors.
Most often the antenna structures are attached to the tower re-
bars about 5 m below the towers of height above 40 m. Hence the
chances of the antenna structures covered by a suitable protective
angle either by the air termination or the top of the tower itself are
high. However our investigation does not provide indication to
make definite conclusions on the significance of air-termination
for lightning protection of metal towers. In the only case in which
we have justifiable evidence for a lightning strike to an antenna,
the damaged object was within a protected cone subtended by
an angle of 45°.
4.2. Damage and injuries at ground level
In the 48 sites that we have investigated, there were 102 occa-
sions of damage to the equipment in the base transceiver station
(BTS) at 27 tower site and 13 cases of personal injuries at 08 sites.
The exact nature of damages is highly complicated to analyze.
Basically, the effects are in the form of damage to the electronic
cards of the transceivers (TRXs) in the BTS at the tower site. In most
cases of visible damage the burn marks are close to the power in-
put ports of the card which indicates that the transient has entered
from the power side. In several cases, there were multiple damages
in a single occasion.
The personal injuries were in the form of temporary paralysis
due to step potential or electric shock. In 09 cases, the victims were
standing close to the tower and the descriptions indicate that they
have been subjected to step potential. In the other four cases, the
victims were inside the station (brick buildings in all four cases)
and are in contact with the equipment cabinets or wire shields.
The five sites where the grounding was achieved (or tried to
achieve) either by using chemical-filled bores on the rock/small
Please cite this article in press as: Gomes, C., Diego, A.G. Lightning protection scenarios of communication tower sites; human hazards and equipment
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amount of localized chunk of soil available in the site or by extend-
ing a copper tape for a long distance until a mass of water or soil is
reached, have the largest number of damages and personal inju-
ries. Altogether in these five sites, there were 42 occasions of dam-
age to equipment and five personal injuries (all were step potential
related injuries).
Interestingly, the damage record and the grounding resistance
at the sites, excluding the above 5, has a not-very-significant corre-
lation as over 50% of the cases the resistance was below 10 O. On
the other hand there were three sites with ground resistance be-
tween 70 O and 100 O and one site with resistance 180 O which
have not encountered any damage to the electronics during a per-
iod of operation over 3 years. On the other hand, sites not having
integrated grounding system with distributed electrodes and a ring
conductor most often recorded damages; despite a comprehensive
SPD system in one case.
Among the sites that have recorded damage, in 21 cases there
were no surge protection devices (SPDs) installed at the time of
accident. In the other 06 cases there were either limited applica-
tions of SPDs or erroneous installations.
The limited applications of SPDs include;
a. SPD only at the power entrance.
b. No SPDs for the data lines.
c. Inappropriate specifications of the installed SPDs.
Erroneous installation includes;
a. More than one point connected to external ground.
b. Routing the grounding wire/tape in the same cable tray with
other signal lines.
In five sites, we observed the following erroneous installation of
grounding connection, recommended by the same electrical engi-
neering company, which is depicted in Fig. 4. A typical bulkhead
at a tower site before the cable installation is shown in Fig. 5.
The main ground bar in the building is routed via cable trays
and connected to the bulkhead which is installed at the entrance
of cable bunch into the BTS (outside of the wall), The above
arrangement has been justified by the consultants to the client
by stating that it is a requirement of single point grounding. In
all five cases equipment damage has been reported and in three
sites there were more than one occasion of damage.
In most of the cases, the bulkhead is installed about 2.5–3.0 m
above ground level. Hence, even if the bulkhead is connected to
the grounding grid right beneath it, potentials in the range of
20 kV may build up at the bulkhead with respect to the grounding
grid. With non-distributed grounding system with sizable ground-
ing resistance, voltages over 100 kV can be developed between the
grounded parts of the equipment in the BTS and the power lines of
which the neutral is grounded at a distant substation. In such con-
dition, in the absence of SPDs for equipotentialization, arcing is
very possible from ground to line/neutral. Even when there are
SPDs, they will be frequently stressed, thus probability of SPD fail-
ure or late activation of SPDs is high. In the case of arcing from
ground to line/neutral or in the operation of a SPD the transient
current will flow along the grounding wire inducing voltage pulses
in the signal lines which are running along with it. Such voltages
may have sufficient energy to destroy sophisticated parts of the
electronics.
The personal injury record shows a recognizable pattern. In the
nine cases of step potential related injuries the sites had no ring
conductor and the grounding resistance was either high (above
70 O) or the resistance could not be measured due to the reasons
mentioned earlier. Note that at a tower site the direction of the po-
tential gradient in the surrounding soil (or rock) is modified by the
arrangement of the grounding system, thus a person need not be
 C. Gomes, A.G. Diego / Safety Science xxx (2011) xxx–xxx
BTS
Cable bunch from
the tower
Grounding wire that
runs along the cable
Cable tray tray together with
Bulkhead signal wires
Main ground bar
Fig. 4. Erroneous installation of grounding path for the main ground bar.
standing along a radial direction (away from the tower) to be sub-
jected to step potential. Therefore, unless there is a ring conductor
and a rather low grounding resistance it will be difficult to prevent
a person being subjected to step potential at a tower site.
The four cases of electric shock have happened at the sites de-
scribed in Fig. 4. As it was described previously in the event of a
lightning strike to the tower, the potential at the grounding bar
of such sites may increase to 20–30 kV which is sufficient to drive
an electric shock in a human body. Such shock may result momen-
tary paralysis causing the victim to fall unconscious. Such accident
may lead the victim even to death depending on the fall. In one of
the cases the victim has been thrown almost onto a bare 230 V ter-
minal which was opened for repairing purpose during the time of
the accident.
4.3. Model design
The investigators were asked to provide a solution for the
grounding at two sites where there were no soil to be found in
the proximity of the towers. The towers were on a hard rock in
each case and the access to the nearest large mass of soil required
a metal extension of nearly 400 m. There was a recommendation
by another consultant to extend three parallel copper tapes from
the tower site to this location; and the recommendation has been
put on a hold due to the high cost and more importantly the pos-
sibility of theft of copper (the client has not considered the techni-
cal limitations of the recommendation).
By considering our observations in the investigations described
in this study, and the experience that has been gathered during the
professional careers, we designed the following grounding
arrangement for the sites (Fig. 6). We suggest that the model de-
sign is suitable for any site where the soil resistivity is very high
or there is no easy access to a large mass of soil in the near vicinity.
Bulkhead
Cable tray
Grounding of the
bulkhead
Fig. 5. A typical bulkhead (before the cables are installed).
Please cite this article in press as: Gomes, C., Diego, A.G. Lightning protection scenarios of communication tower sites; human hazards and equipment
damage. Safety Sci. (2011), doi:10.1016/j.ssci.2011.05.006
7
The main features of the above design has been listed out below
a. The site is encircled by a concrete beam of cross-sectional
dimensions 40 cm  30 cm. A gutter is made at the top
with walls of height 6 cm and width 6 cm. In areas of
elongated dry periods and also in areas where mosquito
problem prevails, we recommend a concrete lid of suitable
thickness to cover the gutter. The perimeter of the con-
crete beam is recommended to be about 80 m or more.
It may have any convenient shape that does not contain
sharp corners (in the above case a rectangular shape with
curved corners). The concrete beam is reinforced with six
steel bars of cross-sectional diameter 1.5–2.0 cm. The
extension of the steel bars (usually, each bar is 4–5 m
long) is done by thermo-welding. The six parallel bars
are interconnected at intervals of 1–2 m by steel wires of
cross-sectional diameter of about 5 mm. The connection
is again achieved by thermo-welding.
b. The waste water of the residential worker/s (water from
body and cloth washing; without bio-wastes to prevent
bad odour with time) is diverted to the gutter on the con-
crete beam by PVC drain pipes of suitable cross sectional
dimensions. We also recommend harvesting rainwater by
installing rain gutters to the roof of the building and collect-
ing the water in a 1000 l PVC container. Such collected water
can be released in a controlled manner to the gutter during
the absence of residential workers or at a site that has no
residential workers. A water outflow is made at a point as
far as possible from the water feed by reducing the height
of a segment (of about 20 cm) of the outward gutter wall
to 5 cm.
c. To facilitate vehicle movement in and out of the tower site,
the concrete beam is made into a hump at the entrance to
the site. However, the steel reinforcement continues through
the hump as well, so that the steel bars make a complete
ring conductor.
d. The legs of the tower, foundation of the building, main
grounding bar of the power system, bulkhead and any other
metal part (electrically floating) should be connected to the
grounding network which in turn is connected to the steel
reinforcement of concrete beam at several places. The
grounding network is made of galvanized steel tapes of cross
sectional dimensions 25 mm  2 mm. They are covered by a
10 cm layer of concrete beam tapered at the edges to avoid
physical accidents to the workers. The bulkhead should be
connected to the grounding grid right below that. The bulk-
head should be a galvanized steel plate of thickness 3 mm
and suitable cross sectional area. All connections should be
done by galvanized steel.
e. All the shielding layers and metal sheaths of the cable bunch
and the cable tray should be terminated at the bulkhead.
There should be no electrical connection between the metal
parts inside the building and the bulkhead (except via the
external grounding system).
f. A Class I arrester (typically a current handling capacity of
50 kA per phase for the 10/350 ls impulse) is recommended
at the main grounding bar. Power feeders to all sophisticated
equipment are routed through a Class III arresters (typically
a current handling capacity of 10 kA per phase for the 8/
20 ls impulse with voltage protection level of less than
0.6 kV for the 3 kA, 6 kV combinational wave form.)
g. Data lines that feed signals into sophisticated equipment or
ports are recommended to be connected via suitable SPDs.
The specifications of the SPDs are decided on case by case.
The grounding of such SPDs is integrated with the power
grounding.
8 C. Gomes, A.G. Diego / Safety Science xxx (2011) xxx–xxx

Galvanized steel tape covered in 10 cm concrete layer (tapered at edges)

1000 litre PVC container to harvest rainwater

PVC drain pipe to carry waste water/rain water to the gutter in the concrete slab and
also rain water from rain gutters of the building to the PVC container

BTS Cabin for

residential
workers

Cable bunch
Tower in a metal tray Bulkhead Main
grounding bar
Water B
outflow A

B A
Hump to facilitate
vehicle movement Concrete beam

15 cm
6 cm
3m
6 cm
B-B

30 cm

Reinforcement steel bars

40 cm
A-A

Fig. 6. The model grounding arrangement designed for the a tower site with extremely high ground resistivity.

h. The building is provided with only Mobile phones or CDMA
connections (no wired phones).
i. The transformer that feeds the building is asked to maintain
a good grounding system (from the electricity supplier). In
some problematic sites isolation transformers are recom-
mended to be installed at the site. The transferring of high
potentials into the neighbourhood that is supplied power
from the same transformer should be taken care of by the
power company.
j. Suitable air termination conductor is suggested for towers
where the tower top (tip) does not provide adequate cover-
age for the antenna structures. The angle of protection
should be addressed with further investigation of the mat-
ter. A separate down conductor is not recommended. Air-
terminations or down conductors insulated from the tower
are strongly condemned.
k. A suitable rainwater draining system is suggested to prevent
flooding inside the site in the event of heavy rain.
l. A warning sign has been placed at all sides of the site
demanding the people not to be outside the beam (at close
range) in the presence of a thunder storm.
Note that the entire grounding system and connecting paths are
made of galvanized steel, instead of copper. Such selection reduces
the cost of metal by about 75% and also prevents galvanic corrosive
effect between many iron or steel parts of the site and the ground-
ing network.
At many of the sites that we have visited in South Asia (over 200
sites), a concrete beam has been laid around the site, on which a pro-
tective fence is built up to prevent undesired trespassing. Therefore,
the concrete beam that we have recommended (although it is larger
in dimensions than what has been observed at the sites) is not only
useful for the grounding purpose alone. A fence can be easily built up
on the beam without affecting its electrical purpose.
The suggested design has been implemented at two on-the-rock
sites in 2007 and found to be accident and damage free for the last
3 years.
4.4. Safety management
The lightning safety of equipment and operational staff at a
communication tower site, is a special issue that has not been
addresses, so far, in safety guidelines such as Occupational
Safety Hazard Association (OSHA) (Zwetsloot et al., 2011;
Zwetsloot, 2000) or any other safety guidelines, except for a
very recently published article on the field guidelines for surge
protection that can be applied to such cases (Gomes, 2011).
Requirement of strategy on lightning safety is further enhanced

Please cite this article in press as: Gomes, C., Diego, A.G. Lightning protection scenarios of communication tower sites; human hazards and equipment
damage. Safety Sci. (2011), doi:10.1016/j.ssci.2011.05.006
 C. Gomes, A.G. Diego / Safety Science xxx (2011) xxx–xxx
in the cases of tower related sites situated in regions of high
isokeraunic level, locations of elevated altitudes (on rocks and
mountains) and built on the grounds of high soil resistivity.
Safety management of such workplaces, which are usually iso-
lated from normal workplace environment, should be planned
carefully taking into account several significant issues listed
below.
a. The staff members are in regular contact with electrical
devices: As the BTS usually equipped with many electrical
devices which need regular operational attention, the work-
ers have a high probability of being in contact with such
devices or metallic components during a thunderstorm
which expose him/her for touch potential hazards.
b. The resident site officer may be in isolation: In many of the
remote tower sites a single or dual operational staff is
found permanently housed for operational and mainte-
nance purposes. Such personnel may sometimes have face
to face contact with fellow staff only in few days (or some-
times few weeks). This monotonous life-style may have
psychological impact on the person in following safety
guidelines (Kouabenan and Cadet, 2005; Culyer, 2007;
Baker et al., 2009).
c. Need for stepping out of the safety guidelines to attend
breakdowns: A thunderstorm environment greatly enhances
the probability of equipment, connection or power failures
in or outside the station. Due to the demand of uninter-
rupted service, the worker may be compelled (or his duty-
bound mentality) attend repairing or inspection work even
during the lightning period, which expose him into a severe
risk of being subjected to lightning effects.
d. Social and cultural concepts: Depending on the region social
and cultural perceptions on safety may differs in a broad
range. Especially in a third word perspective, the adherence
to the pre-issued safety guidelines may be considered as a
non-serious matter. Furthermore, even at engineer’s level
sometimes, long standing social beliefs on natural phenom-
ena such as lightning persist. Some of these beliefs may lead
to disastrous situations under hazardous conditions (Koua-
benan, 2009; Chew, 1988; Dake, 1991; Baram, 2009; Mearns
and Yul, 2009).
Planning the management of lightning at a communication
tower site should be done together with overall safety planning
and the lightning safety procedures should be integrated with
the master safety guidelines. A stepwise guidance for addressing
the lightning safety issue is given below. Note that these guidelines
should be incorporated with a master safety plan.
a. Design and implement the total lightning protection to the
system (both structural and surge) appropriate to the site,
before the commencement of the operation.
b. Provide training on lightning safety and routinely mainte-
nance to the resident site officer/worker, before he/she is
posted for the job. The training should be repeated annually
if the same personnel continue to work at the site.
c. Conduct periodic tests to ensure the ‘‘good operational con-
dition’ of the lightning protection components; Measure-
ment of earth resistance, checking the continuity of tapes
and cables, faulty-free condition of SPDs, status of circuit
breakers (usually MCCBs) connected in series with SPDs,
etc. the tests should be carried out at least twice a year, pref-
erably prior to the acute lightning seasons. The inspection
and testing procedures are specified in above mentioned
standards (IEC 62305 1-4, 2006; NFPA 780:2008, 2008; IEEE
Please cite this article in press as: Gomes, C., Diego, A.G. Lightning protection scenarios of communication tower sites; human hazards and equipment
damage. Safety Sci. (2011), doi:10.1016/j.ssci.2011.05.006
9
C62.41:1991 (1999); AS/NZS 1768:2007, 2007; ITU-T REC
K.20:2003, 2003; ITU-T REC K.21:2005, 2005; ITU-T REC
K.56:2003, 2003; ITU-T REC K.27:1996, 1996; ITU-T REC
K.31:1993, 1993.)
d. In case that the grounding is achieved only through equi-
potential bonding (without achieving a low earth resis-
tance) adequate number of warning signs should be
displayed for the resident staff ordering not to leave the
safe area and for the neighbouring public not to reach
proximity of the site boundaries in the event of a thunder-
storm. The local legislation and civil regulations should be
referred to verify the conditions under which such public
warning can be issued.
e. A guideline should be issued on the protocol of attending to
repairing operations under thunderstorm conditions. The
protocol should be prepared by a telecommunication statu-
tory body considering both the safety concerns and the ser-
vice priorities (Baker et al., 2009; Aven, 2009). Hence in this
study we refrain from dictating such a protocol.
f. The residential site officer should maintain a log register on
damage records in which a special chapter should be allo-
cated for lightning related effects. The log register should
be audited every year to determine the adequacy of light-
ning protection and plan any rectification or augmentation
needed.
5. Conclusions
This study leads us to the following conclusions
a. We do not have strong evidence to make any conclusive
remarks regarding the necessity of an additional air-termi-
nation for the protection against lightning strikes.
b. There are no evidences for the requirement of a separate
down conductor for all-metal towers. The tower re-bars
seem sufficient of providing safe passage to lightning
current.
c. As per the clear evidence of damage to tower related equip-
ment from insulated down conductors we strongly recom-
mend the authorities to develop standards that rejects the
usage of insulated down conductors for metal towers.
d. The tower premises should be provided with distributed and
integrated grounding system incorporated with a properly
coordinated system of surge protective devices.
e. With the analysis done and the data collected, we propose
methodologies in designing the best suited grounding sys-
tem, for a given tower site. Our analysis show that at tower
sites on extremely high resistive grounds; rocks and sandy
soil, the transient equipotentialization is more suitable for
the safety of people and protection of equipment instead
of attempting to achieve low ground resistance.
f. As per this result we propose a model grounding system,
made of steel reinforced concrete, for a tower site on a solid
rock with no soil in the near vicinity.
g. We also addressed the other erroneous engineering prac-
tices; technical negligence or lack of technical commit-
ments; that adversely affect tower site related equipment
under lightning conditions. The most observed such mal-
practices are the inappropriate cable routing, multiple
grounding references, inadequate surge protection systems
and lapses in routinely maintenance. Several case studies
are presented in this regard and remedial measures are also
proposed.
h. The safety management of a tower site is also discussed
under the risk scenarios and safety guidelines needed to be
implemented. It has been shown that the present safety
10 C. Gomes, A.G. Diego / Safety Science xxx (2011) xxx–xxx

guidelines have not addressed the lightning safety issues of
tower sites and it was emphasized for the implementation
of such safety measures.
Acknowledgements
The authors would like to acknowledge the Department of
Electrical & Electronics Engineering, Universiti Putra Malaysia
and Department of Physics, University of Colombo for placing
excellent research facilities to complete the work and also National
Science Foundation, Sri Lanka for the Grant No. RG/2004/E/01.
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Please cite this article in press as: Gomes, C., Diego, A.G. Lightning protection scenarios of communication tower sites; human hazards and equipment
damage. Safety Sci. (2011), doi:10.1016/j.ssci.2011.05.006