The Indigenous Territory and Natural Par PDF

Committee on the Implementation of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples of
the International Law Association (ILA)
Case study
The Indigenous Territory and Natural Park TIPNIS in Bolivia*
(Leading researchers: Alexandra Tomaselli and Rainer Hofmann;
Contributor: Ebun Abolarin)
ABSTRACT
Bolivia is the only country to have “ratified” the UNDRIP, implementing it as domestic law
with Law No.3760 of 2007. The Territorio Indígena y Parque Nacional Isiboro-Secure
(TIPNIS) is a recognized National Park, a demarked Indigenous Communitarian Native Land,
and home to approximately 60-70 indigenous communities. The construction of a highway that
crosses the TIPNIS in the middle began in June 2011. The project was approved without any
prior consultation to the affected indigenous peoples, and after two indigenous protest marches,
a contested consultation process was organized in mid-2012. However, the results were highly
contested. The completion of the highway received green light in August 2017. No
compensation or redress mechanisms for the affected indigenous communities have been ever
foreseen. Indigenous peoples’ lawsuits in domestic courts have been all declared inadmissible.
Hence, this case concerns, inter alia, the following indigenous land-related issues: (present)
land dispossession; noncompliance with indigenous land demarcation; and non-provision of
mechanisms for prevention and/or redress in cases of land dispossession (UNDRIP arts. 8.1,
10, 26 and 28; ILO Convention arts.14-16). Additionally, it concerns indigenous rights to
consultation (ILO Convention arts.6 and 16, UNDRIP arts.19 and 32.2, 2009 Bolivian
Constitution art.30.2, nos.6, 15 and 16, and other domestic laws) and to free, prior, and
informed consent (UNDRIP arts. 10, 19 and 32.2, 2009 Bolivian Constitution art.30.2, no.15
and art.403.1, and other domestic laws).
________________________
* The first version of this report was drafted in early 2016. This is a revised version, which was updated by the
leading researchers in April 2019.
1
Introduction to the Bolivian context and to the domestic protection of indigenous rights
A large proportion of the Bolivian population is indigenous, or of indigenous origin. According
to the 2001 census, 65.8% of Bolivians above 15 years (3,229,239 out of 4,904,161) self-
identified as indigenous. 1 Among them, the two largest indigenous peoples were Quechua
(50%) and Aymara (41.2%), followed by the Chiquitano (Besiro, Napeca, Paunaca and
Moncoca: 3.6%), Guaraní (Ava, Izoceño and Simba: 2.5%) and Mojeño (Trinitario, Javeriano,
Loretano and Ignaciano: 1.5%). Indigenous peoples live predominately in the Western-Andean
departments (departamentos; La Paz, Cochabamba, Oruro, Potosí and Chuquisaca – up to 90%
in Potosí). In the Eastern ones (Santa Cruz, Tarija, Beni, and Pando), they represent a
considerable portion of the population (40%) in Santa Cruz. 2 Many indigenous peoples have
migrated internally in search of job opportunities and eventually settled down particularly in
the departments of Santa Cruz, Cochabamba, and La Paz. 3
According to the 2012 census, the number of people above 15 years old and self-
identifying as indigenous (or Afro-Bolivian) oddly decreased to 40.6% (i.e., approx. 2.8 million
on a total population of 10,027,254). 4 However, only 69% of the total population replied to the
question of whether or not they belong to an “indigenous nation or people”, while the remaining
31% of the population did not provide any answer. 5 A large majority of those who self-
identified as indigenous (85%) come from or were based in the highlands, while only 6% were
registered in the lowlands. 6
Despite the high number of indigenous peoples living in Bolivia, they have long
suffered from discrimination and marginalization. Since it is not the purpose of this case study
to analyze the historical relationship between indigenous peoples and the other Bolivian rulers
of creole descent here the most salient events will be just briefly recalled. 7
1
Ramiro Molina Barrios, Milenka Figueroa and Isabel Quisbert, “Los pueblos indígenas de Bolivia:
diagnóstico sociodemográfico a partir del censo del 2001”, Comisión Económica para América Latina y el
Caribe (CEPAL), Santiago de Chile, 2005, p.32, and pp.41-42.
2
Ibid., p.44.
3
Ibid., p.55 and ff.
4
I.e., 2,806,592 of 6,916,732 provided an answer to this question. Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE),
“BOLIVIA. Características de población y vivienda Censo Nacional de Población y Vivienda 2012”, 31 July
2013, p.31. Notably, all Bolivians have the right to cultural self-identification as according to art.21.1 of the
(new) Constitution of 2009.
5
Ibid., p.31. This may be due to the attitude of Bolivian indigenous peoples to self-identify more immediately
along class-lines (although they acknowledge ethnicity). Rickard Lalander, “Ethnic rights and the dilemma
of extractive development in plurinational Bolivia”, The International Journal of Human Rights, 21(4), 2017,
pp.464-481, p.477.
6
Leonardo Tamburini, “Bolivia (2014)”, in International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA), The
Indigenous World 2014, IWGIA, Copenhagen, 2014, pp.167-175, p.170.
7
For an overview on the indigenous movements in Bolivia since the 1950s and the affirmation of their rights
starting from the 1990s, and particularly from 2005 onwards, see Yashar Deborah J., Contesting Citizenship
in Latin America. The Rise of Indigenous Movements and the Postliberal Challenge, Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge, New York, 2005, pp.152-223; Donna Van Lee Cott, From Movements to Parties in Latin
America. The Evolution of Ethnic Politics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, New York, 2005, pp.49-
98; and Nancy Grey Postero, Now We Are Citizens, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 2007. On the
Constitunet Assembly, see Almut Schilling-Vacaflor, “Bolivia’s New Constitution: Towards Participatory
Democracy and Political Pluralism?”, in European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies 90,
2011, pp.3-22, and Almut Schilling-Vacaflor and René Kuppe, “Plurinational Constitutionalism: A New Era
of Indigenous-State Relations?”, in Detlef Nolte and Almut Schilling-Vacaflor (eds.), New Constitutionalism
in Latin America: Promises and Practices, Aldershot, Ashgate, 2012, pp.347-370.
2
Broadly speaking, one may say that the relationship between indigenous and non-
indigenous Bolivians started to change significantly after the 1990 March for Territory and
Dignity”. 8 This march was a turning point, particularly for the indigenous peoples of the
lowlands. 9 In the following years, the Aymara vice-president Victor Hugo Cardenas under the
government of Sanchez de Lozada (1993-1997) initiated a wave of fundamental legal reforms
vis-à-vis indigenous rights. 10 They also reformed the 1967 Constitution in 1994. Among the
main amendments, art.1 defined Bolivia for the first time as a “multi-ethnic and pluricultural
state”; and art.171 recognized the socio-economic and cultural rights of indigenous peoples
and a form of collective property, namely the Tierras Comunitarias de Origen (TCO) – a way
to establish indigenous territories in the lowlands. The access to the recognition and
establishment of these Tierras Comunitarias de Origen (TCOs) was further regulated by the
Law on the National Institute of Land Reform (Law No. 1715/1996, arts.3.3 and 41.1.5) and
put under the coordination of the National Institute for Agrarian Reform (Instituto Nacional de
Reforma Agraria – INRA, arts.13-18). The TCO was then converted into Territorio Indígena
Campesino Originario (TIOC) by the new Bolivian Constitution of 2009 (see below). 11 In
practice, however, more than half of the TCOs/TIOCs in the Amazon region (58.2%) suffer
from territorial discontinuity, which de facto denies the exercise of indigenous peoples’ land
rights within these territories. 12
The neoliberal crisis, the well-known 2000 Cochabamba Water Wars and the 2003 Gas
War contributed (directly or indirectly) to the election of President Morales in 2005, the set-up
of the Constituent Assembly and the subsequent overall reform of Bolivia (the so-called,
“Proceso de Cambio”). 13 After some turbulent years, the new Bolivian Constitution
8
Another six marches followed between 1994 and 2009. The seventh march took place in June 2010. Its core
claim was to revise the draft Autonomy Law. The eighth and ninth marches, instead, regarded the indigenous
territory Territorio Indígena y Parque Nacional Isiboro-Secure (TIPNIS).
9
Kitula Libermann and Armando Godínez (eds.), Territorio y dignidad: Pueblos indígenas y medio ambiente
en Bolivia, Nueva Sociedad, Caracas, 1992, p.59.
10
In chronological order: the Environmental Law (Law No. 1333/1992); the constitutional reform of 1994; the
Popular Participation Law (Law No. 1551/1994); the Forest Law (Law No. 1700/1996); the Law on the
National Institute of Land Reform (Instituto Nacional de Reforma Agraria – INRA; Law No. 1715/1996);
and the (second) Municipality Law (Law No. 2028/1999). Willem Assies, “Pueblos Indígenas y Reforma del
Estado en América Latina”, in Willem Assies, Gemma van der Haar and André Hoekema (eds.), El reto de
la diversidad: Pueblos indígenas y reforma del Estado en América Latina, El Colegio de Michoacán,
Zamora-Michoacán, 1999, pp.21-55, p.35.
11
The Supreme Decree (Decreto Supremo) No. 727, adopted on 6 December 2010, further regulated the
conversion process from TCO to TIOC, of which the Agrarian Reform National Institute is in charge (art. 1).
Nevertheless, there have been many delays and problems in such conversion process since the Agrarian
Reform National Institute need to be provided with a number of documents. Erbol, “El cambio de nombre
de TCO a TIOC significará otro trámite”, Erbol Comunicaciones Periódico Digital, 12.04.2011 [on file with
authors].
12
Gonzalo Colque and Juan Pablo Chumacero, Informe 2010: Territorios Indígena Originario Campesinos en
Bolivia Entre la Loma Santa y la Pachamama, Fundación Tierra, La Paz, 2011, p.108.
13
Xavier Albó, “Bolivia: Avances y tropezones hacia un nuevo país plurinacional e Intercultural”, in Salvador
Martí i Puig (ed.), Pueblos Indígenas y Política en América Latina: El reconocimiento de sus derechos y el
impacto de sus demandas a inicios del siglo XXI (Fundació CIDOB, Barcelona, 2007), pp.335-359, pp.344-
349.
3
(Constitución Política del Estado – CPE) was finally adopted by referendum in February 2009
with 61.43% of votes in favour. 14
The new Constitution of 2009 is very long and – in some of its parts – rather detailed.
Art.1 defines Bolivia as a social unitary State based on “plurinational” and collective law; it is
free, independent, sovereign, democratic, intercultural, decentralized, and with autonomies,
and is based on political, economic, legal, cultural, and linguistic pluralism. 15
The Constitution of 2009 calls indigenous peoples “Peasant Native Indigenous Nations
and Peoples (Naciones y Pueblos Indígena Originario Campesinos), 16 and defines them as
“human collectives that share a cultural identity, language, historical tradition, institutions,
territoriality and world-vision (cosmovisión) and whose existence is prior to the Spanish
colonizing invasion” (art.30.1). 17
The list of constitutional indigenous rights is – in appearance – very comprehensive.
Art.2 states their right to self-determination, which “consists of their right to autonomy, self-
government, culture, the recognition of their own institutions and the consolidation of their
territorial entities in conformity with the Constitution and other domestic laws”. 18 In particular,
this article acknowledges the pre-existence and pre-colonial territorial dominion of indigenous
peoples, thus recalling their unfair subjugation over the centuries. Art.5.1 affirms that the
official languages of Bolivia are Castilian and the 36 indigenous languages listed therein: 19 two
of indigenous peoples of the highlands (Aymara and Quechua) and another 34 of the lowlands.
This article also requires that the central and autonomous regional governments use at least two
different languages, hence one or more indigenous languages in addition to Castilian (art.5.2).
14
Taylor Matthew, “Evo Morales hails ‘new Bolivia’ as constitution is approved”, The Guardian, 26.01.2009,
at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/jan/26/bolivia [Last access 25.04.2019]. This article also well
summarized the main clashes that happened prior the adoption of the Constitution.
15
Authors’ translation of art.1: “Bolivia se constituye en un Estado Unitario Social de Derecho Plurinacional
Comunitario, libre, independiente, soberano, democrático, intercultural, descentralizado y con autonomías.
Bolivia se funda en la pluralidad y el pluralismo político, económico, jurídico, cultural y lingüístico, dentro
del proceso integrador del país.”
16
The choice of this composed definition was taken during the Constituent Assembly since many members
claimed that different sectors of the population self-identified with one or more of these adjectives. Gonzalo
Colque and Carlos Sotomayor, Nuestros Derechos en la Constitución, Fundación Tierra, La Paz, 2010, p.13.
However, as recently underlined by Fontana, this is rather a narrative of the “plurinational ‘imagined
community’” contingent strategy of the last years. Lorenza Fontana, “The ‘indigenous native peasant’ trinity:
imagining a plurinational community in Evo Morales’ Bolivia”, 32(3) Environment and Planning D: Society
and Space 2014, pp.518-534, p.530. In this text, the expressions “peasant native indigenous nations”,
“peasant native indigenous peoples”, and “indigenous peoples will be used as synonyms (only) for practical
purposes.
17
Authors’ translation of art.30.1: “Es nación y pueblo indígena originario campesino toda la colectividad
humana que comparta identidad cultural, idioma, tradición histórica, instituciones, territorialidad y
cosmovisión, cuya existencia es anterior a la invasión colonial española.”
18
Authors’ translation of art.2: “Dada la existencia precolonial de las naciones y pueblos indígena originario
campesinos y su dominio ancestral sobre sus territorios, se garantiza su libre determinación en el marco de
la unidad del Estado, que consiste en su derecho a la autonomía, al autogobierno, a su cultura, al
reconocimiento de sus instituciones y a la consolidación de sus entidades territoriales, conforme a esta
Constitución y la ley.”
19
Aymara, Araona, Baure, Bésiro, Canichana, Cavineño, Cayubaba, Chácobo, Chimán, Ese Ejja, Guaraní,
Guarasu’we, Guarayu, Itonama, Leco, Machajuyaikallawaya, Machineri, Maropa, Mojeño-Trinitario,
Mojeño-Ignaciano, Moré, Mosetén, Movima, Pacawara, Puquina, Quechua, Sirionó, Tacana, Tapiete,
Toromona, Uru-Chipaya, Weenhayek, Yaminawa, Yuki, Yuracaré and Zamuco.
4
Chapters 3, 5 and 6 of the Constitution contains a long list of human rights, and chapter
4 (title II, part I [arts.30-32]) specifies the rights of indigenous peoples. Inter alia, these articles
recognize indigenous peoples’ rights to their cultural identity, religious beliefs, spirituality,
practices and customs, and world-vision (art.30.2 no.2); again, to self-determination (art.30.2
no.4); to collective ownership of lands and territories (art.30.2, no.6); to collective intellectual
property rights (art.30.2, no.11); to intercultural and bilingual education (art.30. no.12); to
exercise their own political, legal, and economic systems (art.30.2, no.14); to consultation
whenever an administrative or legislative measure is likely to affect them (art.30.2, no.15); to
benefit-sharing from the exploitation of natural resources (art.30.2, no.16); and to participation
within state bodies (art.30.2, no.18).
Other constitutional provisions recognize the system of (peasant native) indigenous
jurisdiction (arts.190-192). In particular, art.190.1, affirms the right of indigenous peoples to
exercise their own jurisdictional functions and competences through their authorities and to
apply their own principles, cultural values, norms and procedures. These functions have to be
coordinated with the ordinary justice system via a law on jurisdictional separation (Deslinde
Jurisdiccional; art.192.3) which was adopted soon after the Constitution. Arts.289-296 and
303-304 give shape to the new forms of indigenous (territorial) autonomies. 20
Between 2009 and 2010, a number of relevant norms were prepared and adopted to
execute the constitutional provisions. 21 However, after the adoption of the Law on Linguistic
Rights and Policies No.269/2012 (Ley General de Derechos y Políticas Lingüísticas), 22 no
further relevant act on indigenous rights has been enacted, 23 most probably due to the clashes
20
On the system of indigenous autonomies in Bolivia, see, in chronological order: Alexandra Tomaselli,
“Autonomía Indígena Originaria Campesina in Bolivia: Realizing the indigenous autonomy?”, 1 European
Diversity and Autonomy Papers (EDAP) 2012, at http://www.eurac.edu/edap [Last access 25.04.2019];
Alexandra Tomaselli, “(Peasant Farmer Native) Indigenous Autonomies in Bolivia: Developments and
Shortcomings (2009-2012)”, in Marc Becker (ed.), Cases of Exclusion and Mobilization of Race and
Ethnicities in Latin America, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, Newcastle upon Tyne, 2013, pp.130-173;
Jason Tockman and John Cameron, “Indigenous Autonomy and the Contradictions of Plurinationalism in
Bolivia”, 56(3) Latin American Politics and Society 2014, pp.46-69; Alexandra Tomaselli, Indigenous
Peoples and their Right to Political Participation. International Law Standards and their application in Latin
America, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2016, pp.352-376; Jason Tockman, “The Hegemony of Representation:
Democracy and Indigenous Self-government in Bolivia”, Journal of Politics in Latin America, 9(2), 2017,
pp. 121-138; and Jonathan Alderman, “Indigenous autonomy and the legacy of neoliberal decentralization
in plurinational Bolivia”, Latin American and Caribbean Ethnic Studies, 13(1), 2018, pp.1-21.
21
Inter alia, the Law on the Plurinational Electoral Organ No.18/2010 (Ley del Órgano Electoral
Plurinacional); the Law on Judicial Body No.25/2010 (Ley del Órgano Judicial); the Electoral Law
No.26/2010 (Ley del Régimen Electoral) preceded by the Transitory Electoral Law No. 4021/2009 (Ley de
Regimen Electoral Transitorio) to allow administrative elections in April 2010; the Law on the Plurinational
Constitutional Court No.27/2010 (Ley del Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional); the Autonomy Law
No.31/2010 (Ley Marco de Autonomías y Descentralización); the Law Against Racism and All Forms of
Discrimination No.45/2010; (Ley Contra el Racismo y Toda Forma de Discriminación); the Law on the
Rights of Mother Earth No.71/2010 (Ley de Derechos de la Madre Tierra); and the Law on Jurisdictional
Separation No.73/2010 (Ley de Deslinde Jurisdiccional).
22
Art.6 of this Law notably recognized “collective linguistic rights”, which include education in the mother
tongue; use of the official languages with public authorities (therefore, in Spanish plus an indigenous
language spoken by the majority of people living in a region as according to art.5.2 Const. and art.8 of this
law); to retake indigenous toponymy; intellectual property rights over works in indigenous languages; and
develop their own education institutions. Lastly, art.13.2 states that university programmes shall be
established to teach all official languages, therefore also the indigenous ones.
23
Tamburini, “Bolivia (2014)”, op.cit., p.173. On this, see Grace I. Deheza, “Bolivia 2011: Gobernando con el
Conflicto”, 32(1) Revista de Ciencia Política (Santiago SciELO) 2012, pp.31-48, p.45.
5
and the contested consultation on the TIPNIS. In general, the Government has always led the
legislative initiative. 24
The TIPNIS case and applicable law(s)
The Isiboro-Secure Indigenous Territory and National Park (Territorio Indígena y Parque
Nacional Isiboro-Secure – TIPNIS) is home to more than 60 indigenous communities (ca.
4,100 indigenous inhabitants in total). 25 The larger communities are of the Mojeño, Yuracaré
and Chimane peoples. 26 However, it is inhabited also by other “colonists”, also indigenous, but
who moved in later for agriculture purposes. 27 This territory was declared a National Park in
1965 by Supreme Decree (Decreto Supremo) No.07401 of 22 November 1965 (art.1), and,
during the 1990s, it was recognized as an “Indigenous Communitarian Native Land” (Tierra
Comunitaria de Origen – TCO) by Supreme Decree No.22610 of 24 September of 1990. In
2005, territorial demarcation was finally secured. 28 However, in 2006, the construction of a (at
least) 360km highway 29 from the town of Villa Tunari to Ignacio de Moxos was officially
planned in order to link the city of Cochabamba with the Amazonian department of Beni –
which lacks roads and communication routes – 30 but crossing the TIPNIS in the middle. This
route would connect Beni with the Cochabamba tropics, which house many coca fields 31 as
well as a number of hydrocarbons sectors that are still to be explored and potentially
exploited. 32 (See a diagram of the highway’s route in the Annex).
From the outset, the TIPNIS indigenous organization (Fundación Construir, Sub-
Central del Territorio y Parque Nacional Isiboro Sécure) demanded that the government
abandon or modify the project since it would negatively affect both the indigenous peoples and
24
On this, see Grace I. Deheza, “Bolivia 2011: Gobernando con el Conflicto”, 32(1) Revista de Ciencia Política
(Santiago SciELO) 2012, pp.31-48, p.45. Indeed, after 2012, the majority of the legislative acts are Supreme
Decrees, which are adopted by the executive. See infra.
25
Gaya Makaran and Pabel López, Recolonización en Bolivia. Neonacionalismo extractivista y Resistencia
comunitaria, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México & Bajo Tierra Ediciones, Mexico City, 2018,
p.209; Nicole Fabricant and Nancy Postero, “Performing Indigeneity in Bolivia: The Struggle Over the
TIPNIS”, in Cecilie Vindal Ødegaard and Juan Javier Rivera Andía (eds.), Indigenous Life Projects and
Extractivism, Approaches to Social Inequality and Difference, Palgrave Macmillan & Cham (open access),
pp 245-276, doi 10.1007/978-3-319-93435-8_10, p. 246.
26
José Aylwin, “Bolivia: Desarrollo o Buen Vivir. El Caso del TIPNIS”, in Salvador Martí i Puig, Claire
Wright, José Aylwin and Nancy Yáñez, (eds.), Entre el desarrollo y el buen vivir. Recursos naturales y
conflictos en los territorios indígenas, Libros de la Catarata, Madrid, 2013, pp.168-200, p.184.
27
According to Makaran and López, also about 20,000 Quechua families and other families coming from the
Beni department live in the TIPNIS. Makaran and López, Recolonización en Bolivia. Neonacionalismo
extractivista y Resistencia comunitaria, op.cit., p. 210.
28
Aylwin, “Bolivia: Desarrollo o Buen Vivir. El Caso del TIPNIS”, op.cit., p.185
29
Other sources speak of a highway of 602km. Lalander, “Ethnic rights and the dilemma of extractive
development in plurinational Bolivia”, op.cit., p.473
30
Aylwin, “Bolivia: Desarrollo o Buen Vivir. El Caso del TIPNIS”, op.cit., p.187.
31
Daniela Sanchez-Lopez, “Reshaping notions of citizenship: the TIPNIS indigenous movement in Bolivia”,
2(1) Development Studies Research 2015, pp.20-32, p.23.
32
Rickard Lalander, “Ethnic rights and the dilemma of extractive development in plurinational Bolivia”, op.cit.,
p.474.
6
the environment. 33 Indeed, art.6 of the Supreme Decree No.22610/1990 establishing the
indigenous territory of TIPNIS required that all kinds of construction and “development
works”, in particular roads or pipelines, be first subject to an environmental impact assessment
study to be approved by the competent Ministry together with the indigenous organizations of
the region. 34
Financing from a Brazilian bank (Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e
Social – BaNDES) was authorized by Law No.5/2010. 35 It thus secured the realization of this
project, which was then awarded to the Brazilian construction company OAS
Empreendimentos. 36 The involvement of Brazil was due to the highway being a part of an
umbrella project connecting the country with the Pacific Ocean (Iniciativa para la Integración
Regional de Suramerica– IIRSA). 37 Construction began in June 2011 under the second
mandate of President Evo Morales. 38
As mentioned above, the Constitution reaffirmed the concept of indigenous collective
lands such as TIPNIS (the above-mentioned Tierras Comunitarias de Origen – TCO) and
transformed them into TIOCs Territorio Indígena Campesino Originario (arts.269.1, 394 and
403; and Transitory Disposition No.7). Art.403.1 provides the TIOC with substantial
protection, thereby recognizing its integrity, and including the indigenous rights to: land;
exclusive use and exploitation of renewable natural resources in accordance with national law;
“informed and prior consultation” and to benefit-sharing from the exploitation of non-
renewable natural resources located on their territories; application of their own customary law
to be administered by their own representative structures; and the definition of their own
development purposes according to their cultural criteria and principles on harmonious
cohabitation with nature. 39
33
VV.AA., “Derechos Humanos de los Pueblos Indígenas que habitan en el Territorio Indígena y Parque
Nacional Isiboro Sécure-TIPNIS”, 14.03.2013, Report presented before the Inter-American Commission of
Human Rights, pp.3-4, at
http://www.dplf.org/sites/default/files/informe_cidh_tipnis_resumen_final_14_03_13.pdf [Last access
25.04.2019].
34
Authors’ translation of art.6 of Supreme Decree (Decreto Supremo) No.22610 of 24 September of 1990:
“Toda construcción y obras de desarrollo, particularmente, de vías camineras y poliductos, que se realicen
en el Territorio Indígena Parque Nacional Isiboro-Sécure, debe contar, previamente, con un pormenorizado
estudio de impacto ambiental, debidamente aprobado por el Ministerio de Asuntos Campesinos y
Agropecuarios, con la participación de la organización indígena de la región. Las obras que estén en ejecución
deberán ser paralizadas hasta contar con su respectivo estudio de impacto ambiental. Asimismo, todo
proyecto o estudio a realizarse deberá ser consultado y coordinado con la organización indígena de la región.”
35
Ley de Aprobación del Protocolo entre el Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia y la República Federativa del
Brasil, sobre el Financiamiento del Proyecto de la Carretera “Villa Tunari-San Ignacio de Moxos”, No.5,
7 April 2010.
36
Indigenous World 2012, IWGIA, Copenhagen, 2012, pp.166-174, p.166; Aylwin, “Bolivia: Desarrollo o
Buen Vivir. El Caso del TIPNIS”, op.cit., p.187.
37
Aylwin, “Bolivia: Desarrollo o Buen Vivir. El Caso del TIPNIS”, op.cit., p.187; Federación Internacional de
los Derechos Humanos (FIDH) and Asamblea Permanente de Derechos Humanos de Bolivia (APDHB),
“Bolivia: Informe de Verificación de la Consulta Realizada en el Territorio Indígena Parque Nacional
Isiboro-Sécure”, April 2013, Paris, p. 4, at https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/bolivia609esp2013.pdf [Last
access 08.04.2019].
38
Tamburini, “Bolivia (2012)”, op.cit., p.166.
39
Authors’ translations of art.403.1: “Se reconoce la integralidad del territorio indígena originario campesino,
que incluye el derecho a la tierra, al uso y aprovechamiento exclusivo de los recursos naturales renovables
en las condiciones determinadas por la ley; a la consulta previa e informada y a la participación en los
7
At the international level, Bolivia acceded to or ratified all core human rights treaties
as well as ILO Convention No.169, “Convention concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in
Independent Countries” (ILO Convention 169) soon after its adoption in 1991, with Law
No.1257 of 1991. Most importantly, Bolivia is the first and only State that “ratified” and
transposed the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) into domestic
legislation by Law No.3760 enacted on 7 November 2007 (roughly a month and a half
following its adoption by UN General Assembly) thus – in principle – granting binding force
to the provisions included therein. 40 Finally, Bolivia is among the States that voted for the
adoption of the American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (ADRIP) in June
2016. Although this document is – legally speaking – not binding, it is a very advanced and
innovative catalogue of indigenous rights. 41
Notwithstanding these constitutional and international guarantees, the TIPNIS case has
been eventually governed by a number of contradicting domestic laws and decrees, as will be
explained below.
The development of the case

The indigenous peoples that live within the Territorio Indígena y Parque Nacional Isiboro-
Secure (TIPNIS) on the highway construction route were never consulted, and thus, their
consent was never obtained before starting the project. 42 This pushed the Amazonian peoples
to their eighth and ninth march in 2011 and 2012, respectively. The former (VIII Marcha en
defensa del TIPNIS, por la Vida, la Dignidad, y los Derechos de los Pueblos Indígenas) started
in August 2011, 43 headed by one of the main indigenous organizations of the lowlands –
CIDOB (Confederación Indígena del Oriente, Chaco y Amazonía de Bolivia or later
Confederación de Pueblos Indígenas de Bolivia / Confederation of [lowlands] indigenous
peoples of Bolivia) and the TIPNIS organizations, and supported by the highland indigenous
organization CONAMAQ (Consejo Nacional de Ayllus y Marcas del Qullasuyu / National
Council of [indigenous] Ayllus and Markas Qullasuyu). The core claims regarded the
interruption of the highway construction and the safeguarding of the Park. They also proposed
an alternative route. 44
beneficios por la explotación de los recursos naturales no renovables que se encuentran en sus territorios; la
facultad de aplicar sus normas propias, administrados por sus estructuras de representación y la definición
de su desarrollo de acuerdo a sus criterios culturales y principios de convivencia armónica con la naturaleza.
Los territorios indígena originario campesinos podrán estar compuestos por comunidades.”
40
Ley N.3760 del 07 Noviembre 2007, Gaceta N° 3039 del 08 Noviembre 2007.
41
E.g., it affirms that indigenous rights are of collective nature (art.6), it points at gender equality (art.7), and
refers also to the rights of those indigenous peoples living in voluntary isolation (art.26). Moreover, the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights has declared that it may be used for interpreting other Inter-
American instruments. Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, “CIDH celebra aprobación de la
Declaración Americana sobre los Derechos de los Pueblos Indígenas”, 22 June 2016, at
www.oas.org/es/cidh/prensa/comunicados/2016/082.asp [Last access 25.04.2019].
42
Aylwin, “Bolivia: Desarrollo o Buen Vivir. El Caso del TIPNIS”, op.cit., p.188.
43
Ibid.; Tamburini, “Bolivia (2012)”, op.cit., p.167. For an overview on the march, see Fundación Tierra,
Marcha indígena por el TIPNIS. La Lucha en defensa de Los territorio, La Paz, 2012, at
http://www.ftierra.org/index.php/publicacion/libro/56-marcha-indigena-por-el-tipnis-la-lucha-en-defensa-
de-los-territorios [Last access 25.04.2019].
44
Tamburini, “Bolivia (2012)”, op.cit., p.167; Sarela Paz Patiño, “El Conflicto del Territorio Indígena Parque
Nacional Isiboror Sécure (TIPNIS) y sus Consecuencias para el Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia”, UNDP
8
After violent clashes between the protesters and the police (which were also denounced
by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights) 45 the march reached La Paz on 19
October 2011. 46 Morales relented and a few days later adopted the so-called “Short Law” (Ley
Corta, Law No.180/2011), 47 which recognized the “intangibility” of the TIPNIS Park (art.1.3)
and stated that no highways would cross the park including that of Villa Tunari-San Ignacio de
Moxos (art.3). It also provided that any act likely to alter the intangibility of the park should be
reversed (art.4). This, however, would have adversely affected the communities, whose
subsistence means were based on the use of some of the park’s natural resources. 48 This was
then clarified by art.3 of Supreme Decree 1146/2012 adopted on 24 February 2012. 49
On 10 February 2012, a law regarding the consultation on the TIPNIS case (Law
No.222) was also adopted. 50 According to this law, the Mojeño-Trinitarias, Chimanes, and
Yuracarés indigenous communities living in the park were to be consulted (art.3) in order to
decide whether the Park should be definitively considered intangible (art.4).
The adoption of this law was highly contested by indigenous organizations: it appeared
to be the government’s last resort to continue constructing the highway. 51 In fact, the project
regarded the completion of three stretches, the second of which was to go through the TIPNIS
Park. The Bolivian Minister of Public Works (Vladimir Sánchez) and the Minister of the
Presidency (Juan Ramón Quintana) ensured that the work on the other two parts had continued
during early 2012, but not for the second contested stretch in accordance with Law No.180. 52
However, complications arising from clauses in the contract with the Brazilian construction
company OAS Empreendimentos and the Brazilian bank (Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento
Econômico e Social – BaNDES) that provided the loan necessary for the construction bound
the government to also construct this second stretch. 53 Hence, in May, the government
Bolivia, Proyecto e Fortalecimiento Democrático, Fundación Boliviana para la Democracia

Multipartidaria, UNDP, La Paz, 2011, pp.4-5.
45
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, “IACHR Urges Bolivia to Guarantee Protesters' Physical
Integrity and Security”, 17 October 2011, at
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/media_center/PReleases/2011/108.asp [Last access 08.04.2019]. See also the
full report by the Bolivian Ombudsman Defensoría del Pueblo Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia, Informe
Defensorial Respecto a la Violación de los Derechos Humanos en la Marcha Indígena, November 2011, La
Paz, at https://tipnisboliviaorg.files.wordpress.com/2018/11/inf-ddhh-dp-00496-2011.pdf [Last access
08.04.2019].
46
47
Ley de Protección del Territorio Indígena y Parque Nacional Isiboro Sécure TIPNIS, Law No.180 of 24
October 2011. This Law was called “short” because it is composed of 5 articles only.
48
49
Decreto Supremo No.1146 of 24 February 2012. Art.3 ensures that the TIPNIS indigenous peoples can make
use of renewable natural resources.
50
Ley de Consulta a los Pueblos Indígenas del Territorio Indígena y Parque Nacional Isiboro Sécure – TIPNIS,
Law No.222 of 10 February 2012.
51
El Día, “La Cidob exige anular Ley 222”, El Día, 22.03.2012,
http://eldia.com.bo/index.php?cat=1&pla=3&id_articulo=87586 [Last access 25.04.2019].
52
Pagína Siete/Noticias Bolivia, “El Gobierno insiste en que no hay contrato para el tramo II”, Pagína
Siete/Noticias Bolivia, 02.04.2012 [on file with authors]. .
53
Miguel A. Melendres, “Gobierno boliviano teme ser enjuiciado si brasileña OAS no construye el tramo II”,
Pagína Siete/Eju, 04/04/2012, at http://eju.tv/2012/04/gobierno-boliviano-teme-ser-enjuiciado-si-brasilea-
oas-no-construye-el-tramo-ii [Last access 25.04.2019].
9
rescinded the contract with OAS Empreendimentos by alleging that it was not complying with
the constructions of the first and third stretches. 54
In March 2012, some deputies from both the main parties Movement for Socialism
(Movimiento al Socialismo – MAS), the ruling party of President Morales) and the Movement
without Fear (Movimiento Sin Miedo – MSM) went before the Constitutional Court to claim
the unconstitutionality of a number of articles of both Laws Nos.180 and 222 and, in particular,
of the “intangibility” of TIPNIS Park (art.1, Law No.180). 55
In the meantime, it was announced that the consultation would take place between 10
May and 10 June 2012. 56 A ninth march, this time against this consultation, was organized by
the abovementioned indigenous organization CIDOB, 57 and departed from the city of La
Trinidad on 27 April 2012. 58 Intense negotiations followed and a few ministers were sent to
speak with the protesters, 59 some of them reaching ambiguous agreements with alleged
community leaders. 60 During the same period, police officers began a strike to demand a salary
increase. This protest spread from La Paz to nearly all the other Bolivian cities. 61 At the gates
of La Paz, at the end of June, 62 the ninth indigenous march stopped to await the resolution of
this strike. 63 However, the government negotiated with the police sector and reached an
agreement on the same day in which the march finally entered La Paz. 64 Despite public
support, 65 the march was suppressed by the police and could not reach the central square (Plaza
Murillo, where the government palace is located). After a week of vain attempts, the protesters
decided to return to their villages and organize a “resistance”. 66 Road and river blocks were set
up to prevent the entrance of the consultation teams of the Ministry of Hydrocarbons and
Energy. 67
In mid-June 2012, the Constitutional Court ruled on the abovementioned claims of
unconstitutionality filed by MAS and MSM (Decision No.0300/2012). The court eventually
found both laws constitutional, although it declared only the conditional constitutionality of the
54
Federación Internacional de los Derechos Humanos (FIDH) and Asamblea Permanente de Derechos
Humanos de Bolivia (APDHB), “Bolivia: Informe de Verificación de la Consulta Realizada en el Territorio
Indígena Parque Nacional Isiboro-Sécure”, op.cit., p.4.
55
(Plurinational) Constitutional Court, Decision (Sentencia Constitucional) No.0300/2012 (TIPNIS),
18.06.2012, Files Nos.00157-2012-01-AIA and 00188-2 012-01-AIA (merged cases).
56
Correo del Sur, “La Consulta ya Tiene Fecha y Presupuesto”, 21.03.2012, Correo del Sur [on file with
authors]; Iván Paredes, “Consulta empieza en mayo y costará Bs 10 millones”, La Razón, 21.03.2012, at
http://www.la-razon.com/nacional/Consulta-empieza-costara-Bs-millones_0_1581441887.html [Last access
25.04.2019].
57
El Día, “La Cidob exige anular Ley 222”, op.cit.
58
Indigenous World 2013, IWGIA, Copenhagen, 2013, pp.150-159, p.152; Martín Mendoza-Botelho, “Bolivia
2012: Entre Buenas y Malas Noticas”, 33(1) Revista de Ciencia Política (Santiago SciELO) 2013, pp.35-54,
p.41.
59
60
Ibid., p.155.
61
Ibid., p.153.
62
Mendoza-Botelho, “Bolivia 2012: Entre Buenas y Malas Noticas”, op.cit., p.41.
63
64
Ibid., p.154.
65
Mendoza-Botelho, “Bolivia 2012: Entre Buenas y Malas Noticas”, op.cit., p.41.
66
67
Ibid., p.155.
10
second phrase of art.1 of the Law No.222 regarding the criteria for operating the consultation,68
and added that a prior agreement (proceso de concertación) on the consultation’s priorities
should be discussed among the parties. 69
Notwithstanding this ruling, the Government proceeded with the planned consultation,
which was thus delayed and started in late July. 70 Meanwhile, the office of the abovementioned
indigenous organization CIDOB was occupied and “taken over” by a new, self-voted, and
“government-friendly” Council in August 2012. 71
The frustration of the indigenous peoples caused one of the leaders of TIPNIS Park
(Fernando Vargas) to file an Amparo proceeding against the Government before the
Chuiquisaca Court, for violation of their constitutional rights by both Laws No.180 and 222.72
The Chuiquisaca Court declined its territorial competence on the case and submitted it to the
Court of La Paz. 73 This court found the case inadmissible, contesting the legitimacy of the
locus standi of the Mr. Vargas to present an Amparo proceeding and adding that the indigenous
groups should have opted for another proceeding (Acción de Libertad), 74 which is also a kind
of Amparo proceeding but specifically regarding the right to freedom included in arts.125-127
of the Constitution. The Beni Departmental Court eventually declined this proceeding in July
2013 for lack of competence. 75 No further action has yet followed (April 2019). 76
The government’s consultation teams (brigadas de consulta) entered the TIPNIS Park
and met with a few communities in late 2012. The consultation was then declared concluded
on 7 December 2012. 77 The official data declared that 58 out of 69 communities living in the
68
(Plurinational) Constitutional Court, Decision (Sentencia Constitucional) No.0300/2012, op.cit., “Por tanto”
(conclusions) No.2.
69
Ibid., “Por tanto” (conclusions) No.5.
70
Plurinational Electoral Body (Órgano Electoral Plurinacional), Supreme Electoral Court (Tribunal Supremo
Electoral, Servicio Intercultural De Fortalecimiento Democrático (SIFDE)), “Dossier: Consulta Del Tipnis
y Rol del OEP/TSE Consulta del TIPNIS en cifras”, March 2012, p.1.
71
Nancy Postero, The Indigenous State: Race, Politics, and Performance in Plurinational Bolivia, Oakland,
University of California Press, 2017, DOI: http://doi.org/10.1525/luminos.31, p.126 and p. 154. See also
72
Agencia de Noticias Fides (ANF), “Presentan Amparo Constitucional contra continuidad de consulta en
TIPNIS”, La Patria, 26.07.2012, at http://lapatriaenlinea.com/index.php?t=presentan-amparo-
constitucional-contra-continuidad-de-consulta-en-tipnis&nota=114279 [Last access 25.04.2019].
73
ANF, “Tribunal de Chuquisaca rechaza pronunciarse sobre amparo de indígenas del Tipnis”, La Razón,
26.07.2012 [on file with authors].
74
Paulo Cuiza, “Justicia paceña rechaza amparo para frenar consulta en el TIPNIS”, La Razón, 04.08.2012, at
http://www.la-razon.com/nacional/Justicia-rechaza-amparo-consulta-TIPNIS_0_1663033744.html [Last
access 25.04.2019].
75
La Razón/Agencia de Noticias Fides, “Tribunal de Justicia niega acción de libertad a dirigentes indígenas
del TIPNIS”, 17.07.2013, La Razón, at http://www.la-razon.com/nacional/Tribunal-Justicia-dirigentes-
indigenas-TIPNIS_0_1871212938.html [Last access 25.04.2019].
76
For a summary of all the lawsuits brought before domestic courts and found inadmissible until mid-2013,
see Sonia Maldonado, “A los habitantes del Tipnis solo les queda el Supremo Recurso de la Rebelión”,
21.05.2013, Centro de Documentación e Información Bolivia,-CEDIB, at
https://cedib.org/post_type_titulares/a-los-habitantes-del-tipnis-solo-les-queda-el-supremo-recurso-de-la-
rebelion-fobomade-17-5-13 [Last access 25.04.2019].
77
Iván Paredes, “Consulta cierra con la promesa de fondos para la ‘vía ecológica’”, La Razón, 08.12.2012, at
http://www.la-razon.com/nacional/Consulta-cierra-promesa-fondos-ecologica_0_1738626180.html [Last
access 25.04.2019].
11
TIPNIS Park were consulted, 11 refused to be consulted, and that 94.8% of the votes (i.e., 55
out of 58) were in favor of the construction. 78
At the same time, in November 2012, the government contracted two Bolivian
companies to continue the works on the three stretches i.e., Asociacion de Mantenimiento Vial
I (AMVI) and Empresa Boliviana de Construcción (EBC). 79
CIDOB and other Mojeño leaders tried to invite the (then) UN Special Rapporteur on
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples James Anaya to analyze this consultation process but he was
denied a visa to enter Bolivia. The leaders called upon human rights organizations to investigate
the consultation. 80 Eventually, an Inter-Institutional Commission composed by a representative
from the Catholic Church, the Bolivian Permanent Human Rights Assembly (Asamblea
Permanente de los Derechos Humanos de Bolivia – APDHB) and the NGO International
Human Rights Federation (Federación International de Derechos Humanos – FIDH) was set
up and visited 35 of the 58 communities that were consulted between 29 November and 14
December 2012. 81 Out of these 35 communities, 19 had also been reached by the government’s
consultation teams but 16 of them had refused to meet them and one provided contradictory
information. 82 Additionally, only 3 communities out of the 36 visited by the organizations
confirmed their vote in favor of the construction of the highway, while 30 opposed it, and
another 3 asked for additional studies and for a revision of the project’s route. 83 These numbers
were in clear contrast with the official data.
In their final report, these organizations declared that some communities had not
received any information on the project and its impact, while the information received by other
communities was contradictory, particularly vis-à-vis the use of renewable natural resources or
the type of highway to be constructed. 84 Moreover, indigenous land uses and customs or
meeting places were not taken into consideration during the consultations and there were
attempts by the ministry’s consultation teams to bribe or threaten many indigenous
78
Ministry of Public Works, Services and Housing and Ministry of Environmnet and Waters, “Informe Final
del proceso de Consulta Previa, Libre e Informada a los pueblos Moxeño-Trinitario, Yuracaré y Chimane del
Territorio Indígena y Parque Nacional Isiboro Sécure (TIPNIS) 2012”, La Paz, 2012, pp.268 and 300-307,
at https://tipnisboliviaorg.files.wordpress.com/2018/11/inf-consu-min-00047-2012.pdf [Last access
25.04.2019].
79
80
Ministry of Public Works, Services and Housing and Ministry of Environmnet and Waters, “Informe Final
del proceso de Consulta Previa, Libre e Informada a los pueblos Moxeño-Trinitario, Yuracaré y Chimane del
Territorio Indígena y Parque Nacional Isiboro Sécure (TIPNIS) 2012”, op.cit., p.156.
81
Ibid., p.157; Asamblea Permanente de los Derechos Humanos de Bolivia (APDHB) and Federación
Internacional de los Derechos Humanos (FIDH), “Resumen. Verificación de la consulta en el TIPNIS”, April
2013, p.4, at http://www.cedib.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/Resumen_FIDH_TIPNIS_final.pdf [Last
access 25.04.2019].
82
Asamblea Permanente de los Derechos Humanos de Bolivia (APDHB) and Federación Internacional de los
Derechos Humanos (FIDH), “Resumen. Verificación de la consulta en el TIPNIS”, op.cit., p.6.
83
Ibid., p.9. See also the Organizations Press Release of 17 December 2012, Asamblea Permanente de los
Derechos Humanos de Bolivia (APDHB) and Federación Internacional de los Derechos Humanos (FIDH),
“Resumen de Informe Visita a las Comunidades del TIPNIS”, at http://www.la-razon.com/nacional/Informe-
Iglesia-Catolica-APDHB-TIPNIS_LRZFIL20121217_0003.pdf [Last access 25.04.2019].
84
I.e., the communities were told that the highway would have been an “ecological” project. Asamblea
Permanente de los Derechos Humanos de Bolivia (APDHB) and Federación Internacional de los Derechos
Humanos (FIDH), “Resumen. Verificación de la consulta en el TIPNIS”, op.cit., p.8.
12
individuals. 85 The two organizations concluded that there had been no good faith and no
climate of mutual trust in the consultation process. 86
In mid-January 2013, some TIPNIS indigenous representatives requested a hearing of
a general nature to present information to the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights
on the human rights situation of the indigenous peoples of TIPNIS as per art.66 of the Rules of
Procedure of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. This hearing was held on the
following 15 March with the additional presence of representatives of the Bolivian government
and other indigenous representatives and organizations. 87 However, no further action has yet
followed (April 2019). 88
On 27 June 2013, Bolivian Vice-President Álvaro García Linera (surprisingly)
repudiated the construction of the highway through the TIPNIS Park during one of the
presentations series called “La Patria Grande” held in Argentina. He affirmed that if the
highway ever is constructed, it would only be in 20, 50 or 100 years. 89
85
Ibid., p.9. See also the Organizations Press Release of 17 December 2012, Asamblea Permanente de los
Derechos Humanos de Bolivia (APDHB) and Federación Internacional de los Derechos Humanos (FIDH),
“Resumen de Informe Visita a las Comunidades del TIPNIS”, op.cit.
86
Asamblea Permanente de los Derechos Humanos de Bolivia (APDHB) and Federación Internacional de los
Derechos Humanos (FIDH), “Resumen. Verificación de la consulta en el TIPNIS”, op.cit., pp.7-10.
87
See Inter-American Commission of Human Rights, “Situación de derechos humanos de los pueblos indígenas
que habitan en el Territorio Indígena del Parque Nacional Isiboro Sécure (TIPNIS) en Bolivia”, Session
(Sesión) No.147, 15 March 2013, at
http://www.oas.org/es/cidh/audiencias/TopicsList.aspx?Lang=es&Topic=17 [Last access 25.04.2019].
88
There is currently no pending case regarding the rights of the TIPNIS’ indigenous peoples before the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights (on the admissibility stage) and therefore not under consideration
of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Another case is the trial against the policemen, as well as the
former Government Minister Marcos Farfán, the former police chief Alberto Zapata, and other police
authorities for their acts of violence during the march in September 2011. This trial began in late 2014 and
is known as the “Chaparina case”. Página Siete/Agencia de Noticias Fides (ANF), “Fiscalía amplía
imputación a 14 policías en caso Chaparina”, 07.11.2014, at
http://www.paginasiete.bo/sociedad/2014/11/7/fiscalia-amplia-imputacion-policias-caso-chaparina-
37530.html [Last access 25.04.2019]. The case was dismissed in early 2015 by the Committee of Public
Prosecutors in charge of it, and the lawyer representing the indigenous protesters claimed that she aimed at
exhausting all the legal remedies in order to eventually submit it to the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights. Agencias, “Caso Chaparina: excluyen a los principales acusados”, Los Tiempos, 08.04.2015,
[on file with authors]. Neither in this case, however, is the case yet (officially) under scrutiny for its
admissibility. See Inter-American Commission on Human, Decisions, Admissibility Reports, at
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/decisions/admissibilities.asp [Last access 25.04.2019]. The Inter-American
Commission analyzed the reply from the State to the indigenous petitioners’ allegations regarding the public
hearing held in March 2015. Erbol Digital, “CIDOB espera informe de la CIDH sobre caso Chaparina”, Erbol
Digital, 05.11.2015,
https://www.erbol.com.bo/noticia/indigenas/05112015/cidob_espera_informe_de_la_cidh_sobre_caso_cha
parina [Last access 24.04.2019]. However, no further action has followed and the victims and their relatives
are still awaiting a due process. ANF, “TIPNIS: pasaron 7 años de la represión y no hay culpables”, Página
Siete, 26.09.2018, at https://www.paginasiete.bo/nacional/2018/9/26/tipnis-pasaron-anos-de-la-represion-
no-hay-culpables-195051.html [Last access 25.04.2019].
89
Página Siete, “El Vicepresidente descarta carretera por el TIPNIS”, Página Siete, 04.01.2014, at
http://www.paginasiete.bo/nacional/2014/1/4/vicepresidente-descarta-carretera-tipnis-10441.html [Last
access 25.04.2019]; and Página Siete Digital/La Paz, “El Gobierno hará la vía Villa Tunari-Cobija con parte
del crédito chino”, Página Siete, 19.10.2015, at http://www.paginasiete.bo/economia/2015/10/19/gobierno-
hara-villa-tunari-cobija-parte-credito-chino-74015.html [Last access 25.04.2019]; on the surprise and
concern this statement provoked, also at government level, see Rickard Lalander, “Ethnic rights and the
dilemma of extractive development in plurinational Bolivia”, op.cit., p.474.
13
The general elections of October 2014 likely influenced and silenced the whole debate
vis-à-vis the TIPNIS. Vice-President Garcia Linera declared in mid-2014 that there was a need
for further societal discussion about the TIPNIS, 90 while President Morales has stated that the
indigenous peoples’ opposition also affects the construction of other highways in Beni, 91 in a
probable attempt to discredit the TIPNIS indigenous peoples.
In August 2014, some communities in the TIPNIS denounced the renewed use of tear
gas by police in their territories. 92 Vice President Linera traveled in that same month to the
indigenous communities of Chimanes in the Moxos province of the department of Beni and
argued that the highway was necessary to reach the local people, bring them medicines, and
provide them with other facilities. The Vice President accused “some NGOs” and the American
funds of supporting a TIPNIS boycott and asked the Chimanes communities to support the
construction of the highway. During the same visit, the staff of the Vice President distributed
food, medicine, and school materials, 93 which undermine the credibility of his good faith.
In late 2014, the indigenous authorities of the TIPNIS announced that they are exploring
the possibility of becoming a municipality-based AIOC, 94 most probably to try to stop the
development of the highway.
In the 2015 departmental elections, the MAS candidate won in Beni in runoff voting
with a very narrow percentage of votes and in a highly contested atmosphere. This newly
appointed governor of Beni, Álex Ferrier, by a supposed coincidence, supports the highway
project, as does the new governor of Cochabamba, who also belongs to the MAS party. 95 Thus,
both the new governors support the projects. Moreover, President Morales himself announced
in his political agenda for the November 2014 elections his intention to continue construction
of the highway in the 2015-2020 period. 96 Finally, a Supreme Decree adopted in May 2015,
No.2366/2015 (see below), allows for the development of hydrocarbon activities on the whole
of Bolivian territory, including protected areas such as the TIPNIS.
90
ANF, “García Linera pide debate para carretera por el TIPNIS”, 25.07.2014, La Opinión, at
http://www.opinion.com.bo/opinion/articulos/2014/0725/noticias.php?id=134097 [Last access 25.04.2019].
91
El Día, “Evo dice que marcha del TIPNIS afectó la construcción de dos carreteras”, El Día, 21.03.2014, at
http://www.eldia.com.bo/index.php?cat=148&pla=3&id_articulo=141241 [Last access 25.04.2019].
92
Página Siete/Erbol, “Denuncian que la Policía gasifica a los indígenas del Sécure”, 23.08.2014, Página Siete,
at http://www.paginasiete.bo/sociedad/2014/8/23/denuncian-policia-gasifica-indigenas-secure-30211.html
[Last access 25.04.2019].
93
Página Siete/Agencia de Noticias Fides, “Vice pide apoyo para construir vía por el TIPNIS”, 29.10.2014,
Página Siete, at http://www.paginasiete.bo/nacional/2014/10/29/vice-pide-apoyo-para-construir-tipnis-
36667.html [Last access 25.04.2019].
94
Página Siete/Erbol, “El Tipnis pide municipio autónomo indígena”, 10.12.2014, Página Siete, at
http://www.paginasiete.bo/sociedad/2014/12/10/tipnis-pide-municipio-autonomo-indigena-40786.html
95
The construction of the highway has been always widely supported by the majority of the ruling political
party MAS. Beatriz Layme, “El MAS persiste en construir una carretera por el TIPNIS”, Página Siete,
01.09.2014, at http://www.paginasiete.bo/nacional/2014/9/1/persiste-construir-carretera-tipnis-30977.html
96
Página Siete/ANF, “Carretera por el TIPNIS, en la mira del oficialismo”, 12.05.2015, Página Siete, at
http://www.paginasiete.bo/nacional/2015/5/12/carretera-tipnis-mira-oficialismo-56312.html [Last access
25.04.2019].
14
In June 2015, Morales openly affirmed that the highway would definitely be built. 97
This declaration re-launched the public debate on this issue. A few days later, the Secretary of
Indigenous Development for the government of the Beni department (Cándido Neri)
announced plans to carry out another consultation on the highway’s construction in the TIPNIS
Park. Conversely, the (abovementioned recently elected) governor Álex Ferrier stated that a
group of Venezuelan engineers (Fuerza Binacional de Ingeniería Social Bolivia Venezuela,
FBIS-BV) had started working on how to finish highway construction through the TIPNIS.
After another few days, the (national) Minister of Public Works, Milton Claros, declared that,
in any case, art.1.3 of the abovementioned “Short Law” (Ley Corta, Law No.180/2011) sealed
the “intangibility” of the TIPNIS Park, and that therefore the construction was blocked, and the
project leaders should consider alternative routes. 98 A few weeks later, Vice-President García
Linera announced the adoption of a law that would render null and void the “intangible”
character of the TIPNIS Park. 99 Government officials finally announced in October 2015 that
the road would be constructed using part of a 7,000 million dollar credit line granted by China
to Bolivia, since Bolivia “lost” its credit with the above-mentioned Brazilian bank (Banco
Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social – BaNDES) following the indigenous
marches. 100 This, as mentioned above, was however untrue, since it was a decision of the
government to rescind the contract with BaNDES. 101
In January 2016, the TIPNIS indigenous organization Fundación Construir, Sub-
Central del Territorio y Parque Nacional Isiboro Sécure started to campaign against the
referendum on 21 February 2016 regarding the amendment of art.168 of the Constitution on
the potential third reelection of President Morales, as a symbolic act against his administration
and his attitude vis-à-vis the TIPNIS issue. 102 Eventually, the no vote won with a narrow
majority (51.3% against the 48.7 of yes votes). 103 However, this result was nullified by the
(Plurinational) Constitutional Court in late 2017: 104 it ruled that limiting the number of time a
person can stand for an elective office would deny art.23 of the American Convention on the
97
Página Siete Digital/La Paz, “Evo anuncia que ‘camino Villa Tunari San Ignacio de Moxos se realiza’”,
Página Siete, 04.06.2015, at http://www.paginasiete.bo/nacional/2015/6/4/anuncia-camino-villa-tunari-
ignacio-moxos-realiza-58865.html [Last access 25.04.2019].
98
ANF/La Paz, “Gobierno dice que una ley paraliza vía por el TIPNIS”, Página Siete, 11.06.2015, at
http://www.paginasiete.bo/nacional/2015/6/28/vice-anuncia-discutira-anule-intangibilidad-tipnis-
61511.html [Last access 25.04.2019].
99
ANF/La Paz, “El Vice anuncia que se discutirá una ley que anule la ‘intangibilidad’ del TIPNIS”, Página
Siete, 28.06.2015, at http://www.paginasiete.bo/nacional/2015/6/28/vice-anuncia-discutira-anule-
intangibilidad-tipnis-61511.html [Last access 25.04.2019].
100
Página Siete Digital/La Paz, “El Gobierno hará la vía Villa Tunari-Cobija con parte del crédito chino”, op.cit.
101
102
Wendy Pinto, “En el TIPNIS inician campaña por el No”, Página Siete, 05.01.2016, at
http://www.paginasiete.bo/nacional/2016/1/5/tipnis-inician-campana-82393.html [Last access 25.04.2019].
As to the referendum, according to art.168 of the Constitution, the mandate of the President lasts for 5 years
and he or she may be reelected only once for a continuous term. Morales was first elected in 2005, but they
restarted counting the election after the adoption of the Constitution in 2009. He was reelected in late 2014.
Thus, this referendum would secure him a third mandate from 2019 to 2024.
103
Indigenous World 2018, IWGIA, Copenhagen, 2018, pp.175-183, pp.175-176.
104
(Plurinational) Constitutional Court, Decision (Sentencia Constitucional) No.0084/2017, 28.11.2017, File
(Expediente) No. 20960-2017-42-AIA.
15
“Right to Participate in Government”. 105 In principle, this means that President Morales (and
the Vice President García Linera) could stand again for the 2019 presidential elections,
although this is not exempt to internal legal debate. 106 Needless to say, this ruling fueled further
tensions and malcontent among the whole population. 107
While the highway project silently proceeded, Law No.969 on the “Protection, Integral
and Sustainable Development of TIPNIS” was suddenly adopted in August 2017. 108 This law
was enacted in a very short time, after a very brief parliamentary “debate”, and without a
required technical report. 109 Its adoption was officially justified by an alleged request of the
TIPNIS indigenous leaders, who denied they ever submitted it. 110 Notwithstanding its
promising title and apparently neutral language, it abrogates the previous Law No.180 on the
“intangibility” of the TIPNIS park (see above) and gives green light to the construction of the
highway thereby legitimizing all the (many) stretches that have been already built.111
Moreover, its article 10 allows the exploitation of both renewable and non-renewable resources
within the Park.
The adoption of this law was followed by significant protests. 112 Driven by frustration,
and having tried in vain all the internal remedies (see above), TIPNIS indigenous leaders
applied to the so-called “International Tribunal for the Rights of Nature”, a non-State actor but
a very active and well-known body in international fora dealing with environmental law. 113 A
delegation (“commission”) of it visited the TIPNIS in August 2018,114 and adopted a decision
105
Article 23 (Right to Participate in Government) of the American Convention on Human Rights states: “1.
Every citizen shall enjoy the following rights and opportunities: a. to take part in the conduct of public affairs,
directly or through freely chosen representatives; b. to vote and to be elected in genuine periodic elections,
which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and by secret ballot that guarantees the free expression of the
will of the voters; and c. to have access, under general conditions of equality, to the public service of his
country. 2. The law may regulate the exercise of the rights and opportunities referred to in the preceding
paragraph only on the basis of age, nationality, residence, language, education, civil and mental capacity, or
sentencing by a competent court in criminal proceedings.”
106
Inter alia, see the opinion of the Professor of Constitutional Law José Antonio Rivera, “La Sentencia
0084/2017 no habilita a la reelección del Presidente”, Los Tiempos, at
http://www.lostiempos.com/actualidad/opinion/20181108/columna/sentencia-00842017-no-habilita-
reeleccion-del-presidente [Last access 24.04.2019].
107
108
Ley No 969 del 13 de Agosto de 2017, Ley de Proteccion, Desarrollo Integral y Sustentable del Territorio
Indigena y Parque Nacional Isiboro Secure – TIPNIS.
109
Makaran and López, Recolonización en Bolivia. Neonacionalismo extractivista y Resistencia comunitaria,
op.cit., p. 273 and ff.
110
111
E.g., article 9 states that highways can be constructed within TIPNIS but in a participatory way with
indigenous peoples. The Villa Tunari-San Ignacio de Moxos highway would have thus been “legitimized”
by the highly contested consultation of 2012 in accordance to article 1 of the same law. See also Tamburini,
“Bolivia (2018)”, op.cit., p.180. The team of the independent newspaper Página Siete visited the TIPNIS in
August 2017 and showed how the construction of the highway has been always going on. Beatriz Layme,
“La construcción de la vía avanza y el Gobierno habla de un “plan intermodal”, Página Siete, 27.08.2018, at
https://www.paginasiete.bo/nacional/2018/8/27/la-construccion-de-la-via-avanza-el-gobierno-habla-de-un-
plan-intermodal-191891.html [Last access 25.04.2019].
112
113
The International Tribunal for the Rights of Nature belongs to the international network “Global Alliance for
the Rights of Nature”. See at http://therightsofnature.org/rights-of-nature-tribunal [Last access 25.04.2019].
114
One of the members of this “commission” is the very well-known Professor Alberto Acosta. Página Siete,
“Tribunal internacional visitará el TIPNIS”, Página Siete, 28.07.2018, at
https://www.paginasiete.bo/nacional/2018/7/28/tribunal-internacional-visitara-el-tipnis-188699.html; and
Página Siete Digital, “Luego de cinco horas de retención, colonos permiten salir a miembros de comisión
16
in January 2019 thereby condemning the whole project and asking the Tribunal to urge the
Bolivian State to repeal Law No.969. 115
Other legal developments

In 2014, new laws on consultation, land, forest, mining, and hydrocarbons were announced. 116
In particular, the draft law on consultation (Anteproyecto de Ley de consulta previa, libre e
informada), which was extensively discussed and strongly contested by the main indigenous
organizations, was officially presented by the Ministry of the Government and “submitted” to
President Morales in May 2014. 117 However, work on all these laws probably came to a halt
due to the general elections of 12 October 2014 and the TIPNIS conflict. No further discussion
has followed about none of these laws (April 2019), and a number of other Supreme Decrees
(i.e., those enacted by the executive), were enacted, as follows.
The Law on Mining and Metallurgy (Law No.535/14) 118 reaffirms the indigenous
peoples’ right to consultation included in arts.30.15 and 403 of the Constitution, but it widely
limits its application only to final mining projects approved as from the law’s enactment,
leaving out prospective and exploratory mining projects as well as the other mining projects
approved prior to the law’s adoption (May 2014; see art.207 of this law). This suggests an
undue limitation to the right to consultation of indigenous peoples in the mining sector.
The Hydrocarbons Law No.3058/2005 (Ley de Hidrocarburos) regulates the right to
consultation of indigenous peoples in the hydrocarbon sector. The following Supreme Decree
No.29033 of 2007 119 regulated the requirements of consultations. It incorporated the core
international principles on this right, such as the provision and distribution of detailed
information, the use of indigenous languages, and the guarantee of good faith. Its art.8
additionally stated that the outcomes of the consultation shall be respected and considered as
fundamental criteria for the execution of any hydrocarbon activity, work, or project. The
consultation procedure was also detailed. However, Supreme Decree No.2298 of 18 March
2015 substantially changed this legislative framework by decreasing the number of possible
meetings and replies on the part of indigenous peoples, and, most importantly, by introducing
the possibility for the administration to opt out of the consultation procedure (see arts.2, 3, 19
and 20 of this law).
internacional”, Página Siete, 19.08.2018, at https://www.paginasiete.bo/nacional/2018/8/19/luego-de-cinco-

horas-de-retencion-colonos-permiten-salir-miembros-de-comision-internacional-191105.html [Last access
to both 25.04.2019].
115
International Tribunal for the Rights of Nature, “Report of the Commission of the International Rights of
Nature Tribunal on the case of the Isiboro Sécure Indigenous Territory and National Park (TIPNIS -
Bolivia)”, 16 January 2019, p.22, at https://therightsofnature.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/Report-
TIPNIS-Commission-final-pdf.pdf [Last access 25.04.2019].
116
Tamburini, “Bolivia (2014)”, op.cit., p.167 and p.174, note 1.
117
Los Tiempos, “Ley de Consulta Previa va a Congreso”, Los Tiempos, 13.05.2014 [on file with authors]. On
the pros and cons of this draft law see next section 5.3.2.1, and also Ruben Pinto Vargas, “Análisis del
anteproyecto de Ley de Consulta Previa, Libre e Informada”, Foro Boliviano sobre Medio Ambiente y
Desarrollo, 12.11.2013 [on file with authors].
118
Ley de Minería y Metalúrgia, Law No.535 enacted on 28 May 2014.
119
Decreto Supremo No.29033, 16.02.2007, Reglamento de Consulta y Participación para Actividades
Hidrocarburiferas.
17
In addition to the abovementioned Supreme Decree No.2298/2015 on the mining sector,
two other Supreme Decrees that indirectly or directly affect the right to consultation of
indigenous peoples were subsequently adopted. 120 First, Supreme Decree No.2195/2014
regulates the monetary compensation for socio-environmental impacts caused by hydrocarbon
activities that take place on indigenous territories (TIOC): it fixes such compensation between
0.3 and 1.5% of the total benefits, but only if identified during the consultation (art.3).
Therefore, indigenous peoples that ignore this requirement, or do not insist on it, risk losing
such monetary compensation, which additionally appears to be rather low. Second, and most
importantly, the abovementioned Supreme Decree No.2366/2015 permits the development of
hydrocarbon activities on the whole of Bolivian territory, including protected areas. 121
Analysis of the case and concluding remarks

This case involves a variety of actors. Apart from the two main ones (the indigenous peoples
of TIPNIS and their representative organizations on the one hand, and the Bolivian State on
the other), the other actors involved are the coca grower colonists of TIPNIS (who live in the
so called “Polígono 7”, 122 and tend to expand their activities within the Park), 123 oil and gas
companies such as REPSOL and Petroandina SAM, which were granted 30-year concessions
in these areas for exploration and exploitation projects, other environmental NGOs and also
another indigenous organization (Consejo Indígena del Sur, CONISUR), that is apparently
made up of indigenous coca farmers and other people from the Cochabamba region. 124 In
particular, the CONISUR has repeatedly requested the construction of the highway, 125 and thus
justified the adoption of the following Law No.222, 126 thereby creating tensions among
indigenous peoples themselves. 127 Close to the northern border, there are also logging
120
Supreme Decree No.2195 of 26 November 2014 (no title), and Supreme Decree No.2366 of 20 May 2015
(no title).
121
This is the case, e.g., of the national reserve “Reserva Nacional de Flora y Fauna Tariquía”, whose more than
half of its territory has been recently granted oil exploration licenses. María Carballo, “Semejanzas entre
Tariquía y el TIPNIS, dos reservas invadidas por el Gobierno”, 27.03.2019, Página Siete, at
https://www.paginasiete.bo/nacional/2019/3/27/semejanzas-entre-tariquia-el-tipnis-dos-reservas-invadidas-
por-el-gobierno-213305.html [Last access 25.04.2019].
122
op.cit., p. 233.
123
op.cit., p. 213, and map No.2 at p.214.
124
op.cit., p.24, table 1; Lorenza B. Fontana and Jean Grugel, “The Politics of Indigenous Participation Through
‘Free, Prior and Informed Consent’: Reflections from the Bolivian Case”, 77 World Development 2016,
pp.249-261, p.253.
125
Jesús Alanoca, “Corregidores piden quitar la intangibilidad al Tipnis”, El Deber, 28.06.2015 [on file with
authors]; Erbol La Paz, “Conisur pide anular una ley que protege al TIPNIS”, 13.06.2015, Página Siete, at
http://www.paginasiete.bo/nacional/2015/6/13/conisur-pide-anular-protege-tipnis-59827.html [Last access
25.04.2019].
126
op.cit., p. 216.
127
Such tension is particularly visible during the abovementioned public hearing held before the Inter-American
Commission of Human Rights of 15 March 2013.See Inter-American Commission of Human Rights,
“Situación de derechos humanos de los pueblos indígenas que habitan en el Territorio Indígena del Parque
Nacional Isiboro Sécure (TIPNIS) en Bolivia”, Session (Sesión) No.147, op.cit.
18
companies in the East, and a number of cattle ranches owned by families settled there from
Beni. 128
As mentioned, Bolivia is the only country that have “ratified” the UNDRIP,
implementing it as domestic law with Law No.3760 of 2007. It also ratified the ILO Convention
169 in 1991, and supported the adoption of the ADRIP in 2016. In the light of the two former
international standards, this case concerns the following land-related issues: (present) land
dispossession; noncompliance with indigenous land demarcation; missing provision of a
mechanism for prevention and redress in case of land dispossession (UNDRIP arts. 8.1, 10, 26
and 28; ILO Convention 169 arts.14-16), and the related rights to consultation (ILO Convention
169 arts.6 and 16, UNDRIP arts.19 and 32.2, 2009 Bolivian Constitution art.30.2, nos.6, 15
and 16, and other domestic laws) and to free, prior, and informed consent (UNDRIP arts. 10,
19 and 32.2, 2009 Bolivian Constitution art.30.2, no.15 and art.403.1, and other domestic laws).
In particular, the TIPNIS case has resulted in the clearest misapplication of indigenous peoples’
right to consultation and to land in “the” one country that apparently has (or should have) the
best legal framework for protecting these specific and other rights. In other words, this is a case
in which all the legal guarantees were in place, but they were neither implemented nor
respected.
Looking at the pros and cons of the highway’s construction, the ones in favor are that
such a road would link the Beni department – which is truly isolated – with the rest of the
country; it would also allow better connections with Brazil; and it would imply economic
growth and “development” by allowing access to the market and access to water and sanitation,
education and medical services to all of the local population. Conversely, similar experiences
of road-opening in other parts of the Amazonian rainforest have had devastating effects both
on the environment and on the affected indigenous communities (e.g., loss of traditional and
sacred lands, access to traditional subsistence means, pollution, deforestation, etc.). 129 The
TIPNIS Park, apart from having been declared an indigenous territory after many years of
claims, is home to high biodiversity and risks being deforested by up to 65%. 130
The pros of granting better basic rights to the population are certainly undeniable.
Indeed, not all the indigenous marchers were against the “development” of the area in the
above-mentioned terms or the construction of the highway per se. 131 What is really surprising
in this case, apart from the disrespect of all the guarantees of (essentially) indigenous rights to
land and consultation both at the domestic and international levels, is why this road has been
planned to cross right through the middle of the Park. Alternatives to this road were suggested
over the years. In particular, the suggestion of constructing a railroad along the Park borders
128
op.cit., p. 211.
129
op.cit., p.24, table 1; Nancy Postero, The Indigenous State: Race, Politics, and Performance in Plurinational
Bolivia, op.cit., p.104.
130
p.24, table 1. On the Bolivian biodiversity, see Convention on Biological Diversity, “Bolivia (Plurinational
State of) - Country Profile”, “Biodiversity Facts”, at
https://www.cbd.int/countries/profile/default.shtml?country=bo#facts [Last access 25.04.2019]
131
Postero, The Indigenous State: Race, Politics, and Performance in Plurinational Bolivia, op.cit., p.123;
op.cit., pp. 221-222.
19
appeared to be very feasible. 132 The insistence on cutting the TIPNIS in two sadly suggests that
the main reason behind this project is (truly) to connect the coca fields, 133 or to open a secure
road to exploit new hydrocarbons resources. 134
Indeed, this appears to be one of those case in which the law could have played “the”
major role in solving a land-related issue. As mentioned, indigenous peoples enjoy
constitutional and other domestic protection of their rights to land and consultation, despite a
number of antinomies between ordinary laws and constitutional standards, as discussed above.
Moreover, Bolivia should respect its international obligations and therefore the guarantees
provided for by ILO Convention 169 and the UNDRIP, both of which are legally binding in
that country. In this case, no compensation or redress mechanism has been provided. As
mentioned, all the lawsuits brought before domestic courts by indigenous peoples have so far
been declared inadmissible. According to art.40 of the UNDRIP, “Indigenous peoples have the
right to access to and prompt decision through just and fair procedures for the resolution of
conflicts and disputes with States or other parties”. Art.12 of ILO Convention 169 provides
them with access to legal proceedings for the protection of rights contained therein. Besides
these (additional) procedural possibilities, the UN – as an institution which should contribute
to preventing and solving disputes between States and indigenous peoples, as stated in art.42
of the UNDRIP – should take a more active role in seeking to overcome those disputes that
relate to the interpretation and application of the provisions of international legal instruments
such as UNDRIP or ILO Convention 169, which have been developed under the UN’s aegis.
It remains to be seen if one or more cases will be considered by the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights and the Inter-American Court.
In conclusion, the lesson to be learnt from this case is the “old truism” that permeates
the entire discipline of human rights law: The adoption of a number of laws, including
elaborated international standards such as the ones contained in the UNDRIP, or the more
recent ADRIP, does not suffice in the face of strong and (allegedly) “compelling” economic
interests. The Bolivian authorities have completely ignored – if not indirectly promoted – this
lack of implementation. However, indigenous protesters will not surrender. Before the conflict
exploded, it would have been advisable to propose a compromise solution, such as a
construction of the road along the border of the Park. This would have allowed Bolivia to
respect its own national and international obligations, avoid further internal social tensions,
132
Página Siete, “Vargas plantea una vía férrea en lugar de camino por el TIPNIS”, 27.08.2014, Página Siete,
at http://www.paginasiete.bo/sociedad/2014/8/27/vargas-plantea-ferrea-lugar-camino-tipnis-30569.html
133
On this, see also Daniela Sanchez-Lopez, “Reshaping notions of citizenship: the TIPNIS indigenous
movement in Bolivia”, op.cit., p.24, table 1; Valentín Muiba, “¿Contribuye al Desarrollo Nacional la
carretera por el TIPNIS?”, in Fundación Tierra, Marcha indígena por el TIPNIS. La Lucha en defensa de Los
territorio, pp. 196-197, p.197; and Postero, The Indigenous State: Race, Politics, and Performance in
Plurinational Bolivia, op.cit., p.129.
134
Rickard Lalander, “Ethnic rights and the dilemma of extractive development in plurinational Bolivia”, op.cit.,
p.474. Indeed, Schilling-Vacaflor has recently pointed out that neither the consultations carried out with coca
peasants are complied with fairly: surprisingly, the outcomes of these processes resulted even weaker that
those made with indigenous peoples. This further suggests that the Bolivian (neo-)extractivist agenda is
concerned only with obtaining revenues to finance state-led policies and it has thus totally abandoned its
initial participatory and pluralist aspirations. Almut Schilling-Vacaflor, “‘If the company belongs to you,
how can you be against it?’ Limiting participation and taming dissent in neo-extractivist Bolivia”, 44(3) The
Journal of Peasant Studies 2017, pp. 658-676, at 673-674.
20
and therefore further delays, and thereby ensure a more expedited construction of the highway
without crossing an indigenous territory and a natural park that is so rich in biodiversity. This
solution could have met all (or the majority of) the parties’ expectations: the construction of
infrastructure in an area that really lacks it; respect for the land rights of the TIPNIS indigenous
peoples; and the conservation of a priceless cradle of biodiversity. Now, it remains to be seen
what the International Tribunal for the Rights of Nature will say and whether Bolivia will ever
take into consideration its opinion. Otherwise, as the Fabricant and Postero have put it,
“TIPNIS made clear that the Bolivian state is willing to sacrifice lowland [indigenous] peoples
to a model of development based on natural resource extraction”, and that Bolivia was a “new
revolutionary indigenous state […] at its heart, [but is] not that different from all other states:
willing to use its sovereign power to enforce control”. 135
135
Fabricant and Postero, “Performing Indigeneity in Bolivia: The Struggle Over the TIPNIS”, op.cit., p.270.
21
Annex – maps of the highway Villa Tunari-San Ignacio de Moxos
1) Trajectory of the highway’s construction
Source: Wendy Pinto, “La vía Villa Tunari-Isinuta tiene un avance del 67%”, Página Siete,
04.07.2015, at http://www.paginasiete.bo/nacional/2015/7/4/villa-tunari-isinuta-tiene-avance-
62110.html [Last access 25.04.2019].
2) Alternative trajectory to avoid crossing the TIPNIS Park in the middle (alternative route in
black)
Source: Página Siete, “Gobierno dice que debe ser impulsada la carretera por TIPNIS”, Página Siete,
26.11.2015, at http://www.paginasiete.bo/nacional/2015/11/26/gobierno-dice-debe-impulsada-
carretera-tipnis-78222.html [Last access 25.04.2019].
22

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Committee on the Implementation of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples of

the International Law Association (ILA)

The TIPNIS case and applicable law(s)

The development of the case

Bolivia, Proyecto e Fortalecimiento Democrático, Fundación Boliviana para la Democracia

Other legal developments

internacional”, Página Siete, 19.08.2018, at https://www.paginasiete.bo/nacional/2018/8/19/luego-de-cinco-

Analysis of the case and concluding remarks

1) Trajectory of the highway’s construction

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