Case # 1:

CULILI v. EASTERN TELECOMMUNICATIONS (ETPI)

FACTS:
Nelson Culili was employed as a Technician, and was promoted to Senior Technician after
15 years. In 1998, due to business troubles and losses, ETPI implemented a two-phased Right-
Sizing Program: reduction of ETPI’s workforce, then a company-wide reorganization (transfer,
merger, absorption or abolition of departments). ETPI offered a Special Retirement Program to
employees who have been in service for at least 15 years. Of all the employees who qualified,
only Culili rejected the offer. The functions of Culili’s unit were absorbed by another department,
and his position was abolished (and was eventually absorbed by another employee) due to
redundancy. Culili wrote to the union president in protest. He was informed of his termination
from employment through a letter from the ETPI AVP. This letter was similar to the memo shown
to Culili by the union president weeks before Culili was dismissed.
Culili claims that ETPI contracted out the services he used to perform to a labor-only contractor,
which not only proved that his functions had not become unnecessary, but which also violated
the CBA + LC. In addition, neither he nor the DOLE were formally notified of his termination. He
found out about it when he was handed a copy of the letter, after he was barred from entering
ETPI’s premises. ETPI already decided to dismiss him even prior to the AVP’s letter, as evidenced
by an earlier version of the letter.
ETPI denied hiring outside contractors to perform Culili’s work. It also denied singling Culili
out for termination. The abolition of Culili’s department and the absorption of its functions by
another department were in line with the Right-Sizing Program’s goals. Since Culili did not avail
of the Special Retirement Program and his position was subsequently declared redundant, ETPI
had no choice but to terminate Culili. Because there was no more work for him, it was constrained
to serve a final notice of termination, which Culili ignored.

Culili filed a complaint for ULP, illegal dismissal, and money claims before the LA.

LA – ETPI GUILTY OF ILLEGAL DISMISSAL AND ULP (AFFIRMED BY NLRC)

CA – VALID DISMISSAL, NO ULP
ISSUE #1:
WON Culili’s dismissal can be considered as ULP. NO. However, ETPI has to pay nominal damages
for non-compliance with statutory due process, in addition to the mandatory separation pay [LC
283].

RATIO
Article 247. Concept of unfair labor practice and procedure for prosecution thereof. --
Unfair labor practices violate the constitutional right of workers and employees to self-
organization, are inimical to the legitimate interest of both labor and management, including
their right to bargain collectively and otherwise deal with each other in an atmosphere of freedom
and mutual respect, disrupt industrial peace and hinder the promotion of healthy and stable
labor-management relations.
ULP refers to ‘acts that violate the workers' right to organize.’ The prohibited acts are related to
the workers' right to self-organization and to the observance of a CBA. An employer may only be
held liable for unfair labor practice if it can be shown that his acts affect in whatever manner the
right of his employees to self-organize.
There is no showing that ETPI, in implementing its Right-Sizing Program, was motivated
by ill will, bad faith or malice, or that it was aimed at interfering with its employees’ right to self-
organization. In fact, ETPI negotiated and consulted with the SEBA before implementing the
program. By imputing bad faith to ETPI’s actuations, Culili has the burden of proof to present
substantial evidence to support the allegation of ULP. Culili failed to discharge this burden and
his bare allegations deserve no credit.

ISSUE #2: Whether or not there was a valid cause for ETPI to terminate the petitioner’s
employment.
RATIO:
 Yes. Article 283 of the Labor Code authorizes the employer to terminate the employment
of any employee due to redundancy to prevent losses or the closing or cessation of operation of
the establishment or undertaking
There is redundancy when the service capability of the workforce is greater than what is
reasonably required to meet the demands of the business enterprise. This Court has been
consistent in holding that the determination of whether or not an employee’s services are still
needed or sustainable properly belongs to the employer.
However, an employer cannot simply declare that it has become overmanned and dismiss
its employees without producing adequate proof to sustain its claim of redundancy. Among the
requisites of a valid redundancy program are: (1) the good faith of the employer in abolishing the
redundant position; and (2) fair and reasonable criteria in ascertaining what positions are to be
declared redundant, such as but not limited to: preferred status, efficiency, and seniority.
In the case at bar, ETPI was upfront with its employees about its plan to implement a
Right-Sizing Program. ETPI patiently negotiated with ETEU’s officers to make them understand
ETPI’s business dilemma and its need to reduce its workforce and streamline its organization.
This evidently rules out bad faith on the part of ETPI. In deciding which positions to retain and
which to abolish, ETPI chose on the basis of efficiency, economy, versatility and flexibility. ETPI
also submitted its old and new tables of organization and sufficiently described how limited the
functions of the abolished position of a Senior Technician were and how it decided on whom to
absorb these functions.
Case #2:
GALAXIE STEEL WORKERS UNION (GSWU-NAFLU-KMU), et al. v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION, GALAXIE STEEL CORPORATION and RICARDO CHENG 504 SCRA 692 (2006)

FACTS:

On account of serious business losses which occurred in 1997 up to mid-1999 totaling around
P127, 000,000.00, Galaxie Steel Workers Union decided to close down its business operations. It
thereafter filed a written notice with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) informing
the latter of its intended closure and the consequent termination of its employees effective
August 31, 1999. It posted the notice of closure on the corporate bulletin board.

On September 8, 1999, Galaxie Steel Workers Union and Galaxie employees filed a complaint for
illegal dismissal, unfair labor practice, and money claims against Galaxie. The Labor Arbiter, NLRC
and the Court of Appeals were unanimous in ruling that Galaxie’s closure or cessation of business
operations was due to serious business losses or financial reverses, and not because of any
alleged anti-union position.

The workers’ union and employees contend that Galaxie did not serve written notices of the
closure of business operations upon them, it having merely posted a notice on the company
bulletin board.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not [Galaxie] is guilty of unfair labor practice in closing its business operations
shortly after petitioner union filed for certification election.

2. Whether or not the written notice posted by [Galaxie] on the company bulletin board
sufficiently complies with the notice requirement under Article 283 of the Labor Code.

HELD: NO.

1. Petitioners failed to present concrete evidence supporting their claim of unfair labor practice.
Unfair labor practice refers to acts that violate the workers’ right to organize, and are defined in
Articles 248 and 261 of the Labor Code.
The prohibited acts relate to the workers’ right to self-organization and to the observance of
Collective Bargaining Agreement without which relation the acts, no matter how unfair, are not
deemed unfair labor practices.

In this case, the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC, and the Court of Appeals were unanimous in ruling that
Galaxie’s closure or cessation of business operations was due to serious business losses or
financial reverses, and not because of any alleged anti-union position.

2. The requirement of the Labor Code that notice shall be served on the workers is not complied
with by the mere posting of the notice on the bulletin board.

The mere posting on the company bulletin board does not meet the requirement under Article
283 of ―serving a written notice on the workers. The purpose of the written notice is to inform
the employees of the specific date of termination or closure of business operations, and must be
served upon them at least one month before the date of effectivity to give them sufficient time
to make the necessary arrangements. In order to meet the foregoing purpose, service of the
written notice must be made individually upon each and every employee of the company.
Case #3:
Sterling Products International Inc. v Sol
FACTS:
Loreta C. Sol charged the herein petitioners Sterling Products International and its Radio
Director V. San Pedro with having committed an unfair labor practice act. She alleged in her
complaint that she has been a regular Radio Monitor of respondents-petitioners; that in 1960
filed a complaint against the said firm for underpayment, money equivalent of her vacation leave
from 1952 to 1959, and Christmas bonus for 1959 = this previous complaint resulted in her
dismissal without just cause
Petitioners’ answer: alleged that complainant is an independent contractor whose
services were retained by petitioners to submit reports of radio monitoring work performed
outside of their (petitioners') office and that she was dismissed because her services were no
longer required.
ISSUE # 1: WON Sterling committed an unfair labor practice
RATIO:
NO, The term unfair labor practice has been defined as any of those acts listed in See. 4
of the Act. The respondent Sol has never been found to commit any of the acts mentioned in
paragraph (a) of Sec. 4. Respondent Sol was not connected with any labor organization, nor has
she ever attempted to join a labor organization, or to assist, or contribute to a labor organization.
The company cannot, therefore, be considered as having committed an unfair labor practic
ISSUE # 2: WON the termination of Sol's services is valid because she is an independent
contractor
RATIO:
No, she is not an independent contractor but an employee of Sterling. Sol was directed to
listen to certain broadcasts, directing her, in the instructions given her, when to listen and what
to listen, petitioners herein naming the stations to be listened to, the hours of broadcasts, and
the days when listening was to be done. Respondent Sol had to follow these directions. The mere
fact that while performing the duties assigned to her she was not under the supervision of the
petitioners does not render her a contractor, because what she has to do, the hours that she has
to work and the report that she has to submit all — these are according to instructions given by
the employer. It is not correct to say, therefore, that she was an independent contractor, for an
independent contractor is one who does not receive instructions as to what to do, how to do,
without specific instructions.
Finally, the very act of respondent Sol in demanding vacation leave, Christmas bonus and
additional wages shows that she considered herself an employee. A contractor is not entitled to
a vacation leave or to a bonus nor to a minimum wage. This act of hers in demanding these
privileges are inconsistent with the claim that she was an independent contractor.
Case # 4 and 18:
CENTRAL AZUCARERA DE BAIS EMPLOYEES UNION-NFL [CABEU-NFL] vs. CENTRAL AZUCARERA
DE BAIS, INC. [CAB]
FACTS:
Respondent CAB is a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the
Philippines. CABEU-NFL is a duly registered labor union and a certified bargaining agent of the
CAB rank-and-file employees.
CABEU-NFL sent CAB a proposed CBA, seeking the increase of their benefits. CAB,
however, did not agree to grant additional and separate Christmas bonuses. The collective
bargaining negotiations resulted in a deadlock. CABEU-NFL filed a Notice of Strike.
CABEU-NFL aggressively asserts that CAB is guilty of unfair labor practice on the ground
of its refusal to bargain collectively and its failure to resume negotiations with CABEU-NFL. They
claim to be the duly certified bargaining agent of the CAB rank-and-file employees and that such
subsequent CBA with CABELA constitutes an act of unfair labor practice prohibited under Article
248 (g) of the Labor Code.

ISSUE: Whether or not CAB has committed an unfair labor practice.

HELD:
No. The disassociation of more than 90% of rank-and-file workers from CABEU-NFL, it was
constrained to negotiate and conclude in good faith a new CBA with CABELA, the newly
established union by workers who disassociated from CABEU-NFL. CAB emphasizes that it
declined further negotiations with CABEU-NFL in good faith because to continue with it would
serve no practical purpose. Considering that the NCMB has yet to resolve CAB’s query in its letter-
response, CAB was left without any choice but accede to the demands of CABELA. Such actions
of CAB are nowhere tantamount to anti-unionism, the evil sought to be punished in cases of
unfair labor practices.
Furthermore, basic is the principle that good faith is presumed and he who alleges bad
faith has the duty to prove the same. By imputing bad faith to the actuations of CAB, CABEU-NFL
has the burden of proof to present substantial evidence to support the allegation of unfair labor
practice.
Case # 5:
CALTEX FILIPINO MANAGERS AND SUPERVISORS ASSOCIATION vs. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS, CALTEX (PHILIPPINES), INC., W.E. MENEFEE and B.F. EDWARDS

FACTS:
Petitioner is a labor organization of Filipino managers supervisors in Caltex Inc. After the
Association was registered as a labor organization, it sent a letter to the Company informing the
latter of the former's registration and sought for the recognition of the Association as the duly
authorized bargaining agency for managers and supervisors in the Company. The Company
countered that the managerial employees are not qualified for membership in a labor
organization.
The Association filed a notice to strike due to refusal to bargain in good faith and to act
on demands.
Later, they filed a ULP case because the Company manifested their antagonism to it; that
its President issued a statement of policy designed to discourage employees and supervisors from
joining labor organizations; that the Company refused to bargain; that the steps taken by the
Company sought to destroy the Association or discourage its members from continuing their
union membership. The Association was forced to file a strike notice.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is liable for unfair labor practice.

HELD: Yes. Under Sec. 14(c) of RA No. 875, the parties themselves are required "to participate
fully and promptly in such meetings and conferences as the (Conciliation) Service may
undertake." In this case, the parties agreed to meet and yet, notwithstanding this definite
agreement, the Company sent no representatives. Admittedly the certification election
proceeding for the Cebu Supervisors Union in the Company had been pending for six (6) years
already.
The company issued a statement of policy which conveyed in unequivocal terms to all
employees the following message:
 We sincerely believe that good employee relations can be maintained and essential
employee needs fulfilled through sound management administration without the
necessity of employee organization and representations. We respect an employee's right
to present his grievances, regardless of whether or not he is represented by a labor
organization.
An employee reading the foregoing would at once gain impression that there was no need
to join the Association.
After the settlement of strike, the Company preferred non-members of the Association in
promotions to higher positions and humiliated active unionists by either promoting junior
supervisors over them or by reduction of their authority compared to that assigned to them
before the strike, or otherwise downgrading their positions.
We perceive in this particular action of the Company its anti-union posture and attitude.
The Court finds the Company B.F. Edwards and W.E. Menefee guilty of unfair labor practices and
they are therefore ordered to cease and desist from the same.
Case # 6 and 9:

REPUBLIC SAVINGS BANK vs. CIR

FACTS: The Bank had in its employ the respondents which was discharged for having written and
published "a patently libelous letter . . . tending to cause the dishonor, discredit or contempt not
only of officers and employees of this bank, but also of your employer, the bank itself."
The letter referred to was a letter-charge which the respondents had written to the bank
president, demanding his resignation on the grounds of immorality, nepotism in the appointment
and favoritism as well as discrimination in the promotion of bank employees. And copies were
also given to the chairman of the board of directors of the Bank, and the Governor of the Central
Bank.
At the instance of the respondents, prosecutor A. Tirona filed a complaint in the CIR=,
alleging that the Bank's conduct violated section 4(a) (5) of the Industrial Peace Act which makes
it an unfair labor practice for an employer "to dismiss, discharge or otherwise prejudice or
discriminate against an employee for having filed charges or for having given or being about to
give testimony under this Act."

ISSUES:
1. WON there is unfair labor practice when respondents (employees) were discharged for
having written and published a libelous letter against the bank president.
2. WON the discharged of the respondents based on the libelous letter constitute illegal
dismissal.

RULING:
1. YES
Assuming that the latter acted in their individual capacities when they wrote the letter-
charge they were nonetheless protected for they were engaged in concerted activity, in the
exercise of their right of self-organization that includes concerted activity for mutual aid and
protection, interference with which constitutes an unfair labor practice under section 4(a)(1).
For, as has been aptly stated, the joining in protests or demands, even by a small group of
employees, if in furtherance of their interests as such is a concerted activity protected by the
Industrial Peace Act. It is not necessary that union activity be involved or that collective
bargaining be contemplated.
Indeed, when the respondents complained against nepotism, favoritism and other
management practices, they were acting within an area marked out by the Act as a proper sphere
of collective bargaining.
2. YES
What the Bank should have done was to refer the letter-charge to the grievance
committee. This was its duty, failing which it committed an unfair labor practice under the
Industrial Peace Act. For collective bargaining does not end with the execution of an agreement.
It is a continuous process. The duty to bargain imposes on the parties during the term of their
agreement the mutual obligation "to meet and confer promptly and expeditiously and in good
faith . . . for the purpose of adjusting any grievances or question arising under such
agreement" and a violation of this obligation is an unfair labor practice.
Case # 7:
Hacienda Fatima v. National Federation

Facts:
The petitioner disfavored the fact that the private respondent employees have formed a
union. When the union became the collective bargaining representative in the certification
election, the petitioner refused to sit down to negotiate a CBA. In the course of a labor dispute
between the petitioner and respondent union, the union members were not given work for more
than one month. In protest, complainants staged a strike which was however settled upon the
signing of a Memorandum of Agreement. A conciliation meeting was conducted wherein Luisa
Rombo, Ramona Rombo, Bobong Abrega, and Boboy Silva were not considered by the company
as employees, and thus may not be members of the union. It was also agreed that a number of
other employees will be reinstated. When respondents again reneged on its commitment,
complainants filed the present complaint. It is alleged by the petitioners that the above
employees are mere seasonal employees.

The NLRC held that there was illegal dismissal and this was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

Issue:
1. W/N the petitioner is guilty of unfair labor practice
2. W/N the employees are illegally terminated

RULING:
1. The NLRC also found herein petitioners guilty of unfair labor practice. It ruled as follows:

Indeed, from respondents refusal to bargain, to their acts of economic inducements resulting in
the promotion of those who withdrew from the union, the use of armed guards to prevent the
organizers to come in, and the dismissal of union officials and members, one cannot but
conclude that respondents did not want a union in their hacienda clear interference in the right
of the workers to self-organization.

We uphold the CAs affirmation of the above findings. Indeed, factual findings of labor
officials, who are deemed to have acquired expertise in matters within their respective
jurisdictions, are generally accorded not only respect but even finality. Their findings are binding
on the Supreme Court. Verily, their conclusions are accorded great weight upon appeal,
especially when supported by substantial evidence. Consequently, the Court is not duty-bound
to delve into the accuracy of their factual findings, in the absence of a clear showing that these
were arbitrary and bereft of any rational basis.
2. Yes, they are regular and not seasonal employees. For them to be excluded as regulars, it is
not enough that they perform work that is seasonal in nature but they also are employed for the
duration of one season. The evidence only proved the first but not the second requirement.

The ruling in Mercado v. NLRC is not applicable since in that case, the workers were merely
required to perform phases of agricultural work for a definite period of time, after which, their
services are available to other employers. The management's sudden change of assignment reeks
of bad faith, it is likewise guilty of ULP.
Case # 8

THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO. LTD., EMPLOYEES ASSN. vs. INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO.
LTD.
FACTS:
The Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd., Employees Association-NATU, FGU Insurance Group
Workers & Employees Association-NATU, and Insular Life Building Employees Association-NATU
(referred as UNIONS) entered into separate collective bargaining agreements with the Insular
Life Assurance Co., Ltd. and the FGU Insurance Group (as the COMPANIES).
The Unions jointly submitted proposals to the Companies for a modified renewal of their
respective collective bargaining contracts which were about to expire. Thereafter, negotiations
were conducted but these were snagged by a deadlock on the issue of union shop, as a result of
which the Unions filed a notice of strike for "deadlock on collective bargaining." Upon several
conciliation conferences, the Companies insisted that the Unions first drop their demand for
union security, promising money benefits if this was done, as a result the demand for union shop
was dropped. Then parties negotiated on the labor demands but with no satisfactory result due
to a stalemate on the matter of salary increases. Forthwith the Unions voted to declare a strike
in protest against what they considered the Companies' unfair labor practices
Meanwhile, eighty-seven unionists were reclassified as supervisors without salary increase
nor in responsibility so that these employees will be deemed resigned from the Unions.
Moreover, the Companies sent to each strikers a letter which states “However, if any of you
would like to come back to work voluntarily, you may: 1. Advise the nearest police officer or
security guard of your intention to do so; 2. Take your meals within the office; 3. Make a choice
whether to go home at the end of the day or to sleep nights at the office where comfortable cots
have been prepared; 4. Enjoy free coffee and occasional movies; 5. Be paid overtime for work
performed in excess of eight hours; and 6. Be sure arrangements will be made for your families.
The decision to make is yours — whether you still believe in the motives of the strike or in the
fairness of the Management.”
The Unions continued to strike. So, some management men tried to break thru the Unions'
picket lines causing injuries. The Companies then filed criminal charges against the strikers before
the City Fiscal's Office of Manila and again sent individually to the strikers a letter quoting “If you
are still interested in continuing in the employ of the Group Companies, and if there are no
criminal charges pending against you, we are giving you until 2 June 1958 to report for work at
the home office. If by this date you have not yet reported, we may be forced to obtain your
replacement.” Consequently, the striking employees decided to call off their strike and to report
back to work. However, before readmitting the strikers, the Companies required them not only
to secure clearances from the City Fiscal's Office of Manila but also to be screened by a
management committee, and readmitted only some but adamantly refused readmission to 34
officials and members of the Unions who were most active in the strike, on the ground that they
committed "acts inimical to the interest of the respondents," without however stating the
specific acts allegedly committed.

ISSUES:
1. WON the Companies committed unfair labor practice when it sent individual letters to
the strikers.
2. WON the dismissal of the 34 employees is illegal thus constitute unfair labor practice.
3.
RULING:
1. YES
The said letters were directed to the striking employees individually — by registered special
delivery mail at that — without being coursed through the Unions which were representing the
employees in the collective bargaining. Citing NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., “the act of an
employer in notifying absent employees individually during a strike following unproductive efforts
at collective bargaining that the plant would be operated the next day and that their jobs were
open for them should they want to come in has been held to be an unfair labor practice, as an
active interference with the right of collective bargaining through dealing with the employees
individually instead of through their collective bargaining representatives.”
Besides, the letters should not be considered by themselves alone but should be read in the
light of the preceding and subsequent circumstances surrounding them. The letters should be
interpreted according to the "totality of conduct doctrine,"... whereby the culpability of an
employer's remarks were to be evaluated not only on the basis of their implicit implications, but
were to be appraised against the background of and in conjunction with collateral circumstances.
Thus, the facts of the case constitute unfair labor practice.

2. YES
It is noteworthy that — perhaps in an anticipatory effort to exculpate themselves from
charges of discrimination in the readmission of strikers returning to work — the respondents
delegated the power to readmit to a committee. Needless to say, the mere act of placing in the
hands of employees hostile to the strikers the power of reinstatement, is a form of discrimination
in rehiring.
Case # 10:
G.R. No. 171664 March 6, 2013
BANKARD, INC., Petitioner, vs.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION- FIRST DIVISION,
PAULO BUENCONSEJO,BANKARD EMPLOYEES UNION-AWATU, Respondents.

Doctrine: Contracting out of services is an exercise of business judgment or management

prerogative. Absent any proof that management acted in a malicious or arbitrary manner, the
Court will not interfere with the exercise of judgment by an employer.

The Facts:
First, respondent Bankard Employees Union-AWATU (Union) filed before the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) its first Notice of Strike (NOS) alleging commission of
unfair labor practices by petitioner Bankard, Inc. (Bankard), to wit: 1) job contractualization; 2)
outsourcing/contracting-out jobs; 3) manpower rationalizing program; and 4) discrimination.
Secondly, the Union declared a CBA bargaining deadlock and filed its second NOS alleging
bargaining in bad faith on the part of Bankard.
As regards the first issue, it was Bankard’s position that job contractualization or
outsourcing or contracting-out of jobs was a legitimate exercise of management prerogative and
did not constitute unfair labor practice. The Union contended that the number of regular
employees had been reduced substantially through the management scheme of freeze-hiring
policy on positions vacated by regular employees on the basis of cost-cutting measures and the
introduction of a more drastic formula of streamlining its regular employees through the MRP.
As to the second issue, Bankard denied that there was bad faith on its part in bargaining
with the Union, because Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) was entered into between
Bankard and the Union. The Union averred that Bankard’s proposals were way below their
demands, showing that the management had no intention of reaching an agreement.
NLRC issued its Resolution16 declaring that the management committed acts considered as unfair
labor practice (ULP) under Article 248(c) of the Labor Code and that the issue of bargaining in bad
faith was rendered moot and academic by virtue of the finalization and signing of the CBA.
The CA dismissed the petition, finding that the NLRC ruling was supported by substantial
evidence.
Issue: Whether or not Bankard committed acts considered as ULP.
Ruling. Baby no no!
In this case, the Union claims that Bankard, in implementing its MRP which eventually
reduced the number of employees, clearly violated Article 248(c) of the Labor Code which states
that:
Art. 248. Unfair labor practices of employers. – It shall be unlawful for an employer to
commit any of the following unfair labor practice: (c) To contract out services or functions being
performed by union members when such will interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the
exercise of their rights to self-organization;
Nothing in the records strongly proves that Bankard intended its program, the MRP, as
a tool to drastically and deliberately reduce union membership. There was no proof that the
program was meant to encourage the employees to disassociate themselves from the Union
or to restrain them from joining any union or organization. There was no showing that it was
intentionally implemented to stunt the growth of the Union or that Bankard discriminated, or
in any way singled out the union members who had availed of the retirement package under
the MRP. The MRP was implemented as a valid cost-cutting measure, well within the ambit of
the so-called management prerogatives.
Contracting out of services is an exercise of business judgment or management
prerogative. Absent any proof that management acted in a malicious or arbitrary manner, the
Court will not interfere with the exercise of judgment by an employer. Bankard merely validly
exercised its management prerogative. Not shown to have acted maliciously or arbitrarily, no
act of ULP can be imputed against it.
Case # 11:
ALABANG COUNTRY CLUB, INC, - versus - NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
FACTS:
Petitioner Alabang Country Clubis a domestic non-profit corporation. Respondent Alabang
Country Club Independent Employees Union (Union) is the exclusive bargaining agent of the
Clubs rank-and-file employees. In April 1996, respondents Christopher Pizarro, Michael Braza,
and Nolasco Castueras were elected Union President, Vice-President, and Treasurer,
respectively.
On June 21, 1999, the Club and the Union entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement
(CBA), which provided for a Union shop and maintenance of membership shop. CBA included a
security clause stating that all regular rank-and-file employees, who are members or
subsequently become members of the UNION shall maintain their membership in good standing
as a condition for their continued employment. Section 4 of the same CBA provided grounds for
dismissal of an employee which included malversation of union funds.
Subsequently, in July 2001, an election was held and a new set of officers was elected.
Soon thereafter, the new officers conducted an audit of the Union funds. They discovered some
irregularly recorded entries, unaccounted expenses and disbursements, and uncollected loans
from the Union funds. The Union notified respondents Pizarro, Braza, and Castueras of the audit
results and asked them to explain the discrepancies in writing.
Thereafter, on October 6, 2001, in a meeting called by the Union, respondents Pizarro,
Braza, and Castueras explained their side. Despite their explanations, respondents Pizarro,
Braza, and Castueras were expelled from the Union, and were furnished individual letters of
expulsion for malversation of Union funds.
In a letter the Union, invoking the Security Clause of the CBA, demanded that the Club
dismiss respondents Pizarro, Braza, and Castueras in view of their expulsion from the Union. The
Club required the three respondents to show cause in writing within 48 hours from notice why
they should not be dismissed. Pizarro and Castueras submitted their respective written
explanations on October 20, 2001, while Braza submitted his explanation the following day.
The Clubs general manager called respondents Pizarro, Braza, and Castueras for an informal
conference inquiring about the charges against them. Said respondents gave their explanation
and asserted that the Union funds allegedly malversed by them were even over the total amount
collected during their tenure. They claimed the charges are baseless. The general manager
announced he would conduct a formal investigation.
Nonetheless, after weighing the verbal and written explanations of the three
respondents, the Club concluded that said respondents failed to refute the validity of their
expulsion from the Union. Thus, it was constrained to terminate the employment of said
respondents. Respondents received their notices of termination from the Club .
Respondents Pizarro, Braza, and Castueras challenged their dismissal from the Club in an
illegal dismissal complaint filed with the NLRC. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of the Club, and
found that there was justifiable cause in terminating said respondents. The NLRC rendered a
Decision declaring the dismissal of the complainants illegal. The NLRC ruled that there was no
justifiable cause for the termination of respondents Pizarro, Braza, and Castueras.
According to the NLRC, said respondents expulsion from the Union was illegal since the
DOLE had not yet made any definitive ruling on their liability regarding the administration of
the Unions funds.
The Club then filed a motion for reconsideration which the NLRC denied. CA upheld the
NLRC ruling.

ISSUE: Whether the three respondents were illegally dismissed.

HELD: NO.
Another cause for termination is dismissal from employment due to the enforcement of
the union security clause in the CBA. Here, Art. II of the CBA on Union security contains the
provisions on the Union shop and maintenance of membership shop. Termination of
employment by virtue of a union security clause embodied in a CBA is recognized and accepted
in our jurisdiction. This practice strengthens the union and prevents disunity.
 In terminating the employment of an employee by enforcing the union security clause,
the employer needs only to determine and prove that: (1) the union security clause is
applicable; (2) the union is requesting for the enforcement of the union security provision in
the CBA; and (3) there is sufficient evidence to support the unions decision to expel the
employee from the union. These requisites constitute just cause for terminating an employee
based on the CBAs union security provision.
The language of Art. II of the CBA that the Union members must maintain their
membership in good standing as a condition sine qua non for their continued employment with
the Club is unequivocal. It is also clear that upon demand by the Union and after due process, the
Club shall terminate the employment of a regular rank-and-file employee who may be found
liable for a number of offenses, one of which is malversation of Union funds.
The three respondents were expelled from and by the Union after due investigation for acts of
dishonesty and malversation of Union funds. In accordance with the CBA, the Union properly
requested the Club, letterto enforce the Union security provision in their CBA and terminate said
respondents. Then, in compliance with the Unions request, the Club reviewed the documents
submitted by the Union, requested said respondents to submit written explanations, and
thereafter afforded them reasonable opportunity to present their side. After it had determined
that there was sufficient evidence that said respondents malversed Union funds, the Club
dismissed them from their employment conformably with Sec. 4(f) of the CBA.
Considering the foregoing circumstances, we are constrained to rule that there is sufficient
cause for the three respondents termination from employment. We rule that the Club
substantially complied with the due process requirements before it dismissed the three
respondents.
The three respondents were notified that their dismissal was being requested by the Union, and
their explanations were heard. Then, the Club, through its President, conferred with said
respondents during the last week of October 2001. The three respondents were dismissed only
after the Club reviewed and considered the documents submitted by the Union vis--vis the
written explanations submitted by said respondents. Under these circumstances, we find that
the Club had afforded the three respondents a reasonable opportunity to be heard and defend
themselves.
Case # 12:
DEL MONTE PHILIPPINES, INC. and WARFREDO C. BALANDRA vs. MARIANO SALDIVAR, NENA
TIMBAL, VIRGINIO VICERA, ALFREDO AMONCIO and NAZARIO S. COLASTE

Facts:
The Associated Labor Union (ALU) is the exclusive bargaining agent of plantation workers
of petitioner Del Monte Philippines, Inc. (Del Monte) in Bukidnon. Respondent Nena Timbal is
also a member of ALU. Del Monte and ALU entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA)
with an effective term of five (5) years from 1 September 1988 to 31 August 1993.
Timbal, along with four other employees were charged by ALU for disloyalty to the union,
particularly for encouraging defections to a rival union, the National Federation of Labor (NFL).
Allegedly, Nena Timbal personally recruited other bonafide members of the ALU to attend NFL
seminars and has actually attended these seminars together with the other ALU members. The
matter was referred to a body within the ALU organization, ominously named Disloyalty Board.
The charge against Timbal was supported by an affidavit executed on 23 March 1993 by Gemma
Artajo, also an employee of Del Monte.
Timbal filed an Answer before the Disloyalty Board, denying the allegations in the
complaint and the averments in Artajos Affidavit. Nevertheless, the ALU Disloyalty Board
concluded that Timbal was guilty of acts or conduct inimical to the interests of ALU. It found that
the acts imputed to Timbal were partisan activities, prohibited since the freedom period had not
yet commenced as of that time. Thus, the Disloyalty Board recommended the expulsion of Timbal
from membership in ALU, and likewise her dismissal from Del Monte in accordance with the
Union Security Clause in the existing CBA between ALU and Del Monte. The Regional Vice
President of ALU adopted the recommendations of the Disloyalty Board and affirmed by the ALU
National President the expulsion of Timbal. Timbal and her co-employees were terminated upon
demand of ALU pursuant to Sections 4 and 5 of Article III of the current Collective Bargaining
Agreement.
Timbal and her co-employees filed separate complaints against Del Monte for illegal
dismissal, unfair labor practice and damages. The Labor Arbiter affirmed that all five were illegally
dismissed and ordered Del Monte to reinstate complainants, including Timbal, to their former
positions and to pay their full backwages and other allowances, though the other claims and
charges were dismissed for want of basis. The NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter and ruled that all
the complainants were validly dismissed. On review, the Court of Appeals ruled that only Timbal
was illegally dismissed.

Issues:
1. or not Del Monte Philippines is guilty of unfair labor practice.
2. Whether or not Timbal was illegally dismissed.

Held:
1. No.
It bears elaboration that Timbal’s dismissal is not predicated on any of the just or
authorized causes for dismissal under Book Six, Title I of the Labor Code but on the union
security clause in the CBA between Del Monte and ALU. Stipulations in the CBA authorizing
the dismissal of employees are of equal import as the statutory provisions on dismissal under
the Labor Code, since a CBA is the law between the company and the union and compliance
therewith is mandated by the express policy to give protection to labor. The CBA, which
covers all regular hourly paid employees at the pineapple plantation in Bukidnon stipulates
that all present and subsequent employees shall be required to become a member of ALU as
a condition of continued employment. A CBA provision for a closed-shop is a valid form of
union security and it is not a restriction on the right or freedom of association guaranteed by
the Constitution.
Timbal’s expulsion from ALU was premised on the ground of disloyalty to the union, which
under Section 4(3), Article II of the CBA, also stands as a ground for her dismissal from Del
Monte to wit: that loss of membership in the union shall not be a ground for dismissal by the
company except where loss of membership is due to disloyalty to ALU in accordance with its
Constitution and By-Laws as duly registered with the Department of Labor and Employment.
Indeed, Section 5, Article II of the CBA enjoins Del Monte to dismiss from employment those
employees expelled from ALU for disloyalty, albeit with the qualification in accordance with
law.
2. Yes
Even if the dismissal of an employee is conditioned not on the grounds for termination
under the Labor Code, but pursuant to the provisions of a CBA, it still is necessary to observe
substantive due process in order to validate the dismissal. As applied to the Labor Code,
adherence to substantive due process is a requisite for a valid determination that just or
authorized causes existed to justify the dismissal. As applied to the dismissals grounded on
violations of the CBA, observance of substantial due process is indispensable in establishing
the presence of the cause or causes for dismissal as provided for in the CBA. The dismissal for
cause of employees must be justified by substantial evidence, as appreciated by an impartial
trier of facts. None of the trier of facts below the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC and the Court of
Appeals saw fit to accord credence to Piqueros testimony.
The Disloyalty Board may have appreciated Piqueros testimony in its own finding that
Timbal was guilty, yet the said board cannot be considered as a wholly neutral or
dispassionate tribunal since it was constituted by the very organization that stood as the
offended party in the disloyalty charge. Without impugning the integrity of ALU and the
mechanisms it has employed for the internal discipline of its members, we nonetheless hold
that in order that the dismissal of an employee may be validated by this Court, it is necessary
that the grounds for dismissal are justified by substantial evidence as duly appreciated by an
impartial trier of facts. The existence of Piqueros testimony was appreciated only by the
Disloyalty Board, but not by any of the impartial tribunals which heard Timbals case. The
appreciation of such testimony by the Disloyalty Board without any similar affirmation or
concurrence by the NLRC-RAB, the NLRC, or the Court of Appeals, cannot satisfy the
substantive due process requirement as a means of upholding Timbals dismissal.
All told, we see no error on the part of the Court of Appeals when it held that Timbal was
illegally dismissed.
Case # 13:
BPI vs. BPI-EU Davao Chapter

Facts:
On March 23, 2000, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas approved the Articles of Merger
executed on January 20, 2000 by and between BPI, herein petitioner, and FEBTC. [5] This Article
and Plan of Merger was approved by the Securities and Exchange Commission on April 7, 2000.[6]

Respondent BPI Employees Union-Davao Chapter - Federation of Unions in BPI Unibank

(hereinafter the Union, for brevity) is the exclusive bargaining agent of BPIs rank and file
employees in Davao City. The former FEBTC rank-and-file employees in Davao City did not belong
to any labor union at the time of the merger. Prior to the effectivity of the merger, or on March
31, 2000, respondent Union invited said FEBTC employees to a meeting regarding the Union
Shop Clause (Article II, Section 2) of the existing CBA between petitioner BPI and respondent
Union.

The parties both advert to certain provisions of the existing CBA, which are quoted
below:

Section 2. Union Shop - New employees falling within the bargaining unit
as defined in Article I of this Agreement, who may hereafter be regularly
employed by the Bank shall, within thirty (30) days after they become regular
employees, join the Union as a condition of their continued employment. It is
understood that membership in good standing in the Union is a condition of their
continued employment with the Bank.[8] (Emphases supplied.)

Respondent Union then sent notices to the former FEBTC employees who refused to join,
as well as those who retracted their membership, and called them to a hearing regarding the
matter. When these former FEBTC employees refused to attend the hearing, the president of
the Union requested BPI to implement the Union Shop Clause of the CBA and to terminate their
employment pursuant thereto.

After two months of management inaction on the request, respondent Union informed
petitioner BPI of its decision to refer the issue of the implementation of the Union Shop Clause
of the CBA to the Grievance Committee. However, the issue remained unresolved at this level
and so it was subsequently submitted for voluntary arbitration by the parties.

Issue(s):
Whether or not the former FEBTC employees that were absorbed by petitioner upon the
merger between FEBTC and BPI should be covered by the Union Shop Clause found in the
existing CBA between petitioner and respondent Union.

Yes, all employees in the bargaining unit covered by a Union Shop Clause in their CBA
with management are subject to its terms. However, under law and jurisprudence, the
following kinds of employees are exempted from its coverage, namely, employees who at the
time the union shop agreement takes effect are bona fide members of a religious organization
which prohibits its members from joining labor unions on religious grounds; employees already
in the service and already members of a union other than the majority at the time the union
shop agreement took effect; confidential employees who are excluded from the rank and file
bargaining unit; and employees excluded from the union shop by express terms of the
agreement.

Indeed, the situation of the former FEBTC employees in this case clearly does not fall
within the first three exceptions to the application of the Union Shop Clause discussed
earlier. No allegation or evidence of religious exemption or prior membership in another union
or engagement as a confidential employee was presented by both parties. The sole category
therefore in which petitioner may prove its claim is the fourth recognized exception or whether
the former FEBTC employees are excluded by the express terms of the existing CBA between
petitioner and respondent.

No Substantial Distinction Under the CBA Between Regular

Employees Hired After Probationary Status and Regular
Employees Hired After the Merger

Verily, we agree with the Court of Appeals that there are no substantial differences
between a newly hired non-regular employee who was regularized weeks or months after his
hiring and a new employee who was absorbed from another bank as a regular employee pursuant
to a merger, for purposes of applying the Union Shop Clause. Both employees were
hired/employed only after the CBA was signed. At the time they are being required to join the
Union, they are both already regular rank and file employees of BPI. They belong to the same
bargaining unit being represented by the Union. They both enjoy benefits that the Union was
able to secure for them under the CBA. When they both entered the employ of BPI, the CBA and
the Union Shop Clause therein were already in effect and neither of them had the opportunity to
express their preference for unionism or not. We see no cogent reason why the Union Shop
Clause should not be applied equally to these two types of new employees, for they are
undeniably similarly situated.

The effect or consequence of BPIs so-called absorption of former FEBTC employees

should be limited to what they actually agreed to, i.e. recognition of the FEBTC employees years
of service, salary rate and other benefits with their previous employer. The effect should not be
stretched so far as to exempt former FEBTC employees from the existing CBA terms, company
policies and rules which apply to employees similarly situated. If the Union Shop Clause is valid
as to other new regular BPI employees, there is no reason why the same clause would be a
violation of the absorbed employees freedom of association.
Right of an Employee not to Join a Union is not Absolute and Must Give Way to the Collective
Good of All Members of the Bargaining Unit (note: relevant to ULP topic)

However, Victoriano is consistent with Juat since they both affirm that the right to refrain from
joining a union is not absolute. The relevant portion of Victoriano is quoted below:

The right to refrain from joining labor organizations recognized by

Section 3 of the Industrial Peace Act is, however, limited. The legal protection
granted to such right to refrain from joining is withdrawn by operation of law,
where a labor union and an employer have agreed on a closed shop, by virtue of
which the employer may employ only member of the collective bargaining
union, and the employees must continue to be members of the union for the
duration of the contract in order to keep their jobs. Thus Section 4 (a) (4) of the
Industrial Peace Act, before its amendment by Republic Act No. 3350, provides
that although it would be an unfair labor practice for an employer "to
discriminate in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition
of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor
organization" the employer is, however, not precluded "from making an
agreement with a labor organization to require as a condition of employment
membership therein, if such labor organization is the representative of the
employees." By virtue, therefore, of a closed shop agreement, before the
enactment of Republic Act No. 3350, if any person, regardless of his religious
beliefs, wishes to be employed or to keep his employment, he must become a
member of the collective bargaining union. Hence, the right of said employee not
to join the labor union is curtailed and withdrawn.
Case # 14

G.R. No. 170112 April 30, 2008

DEL PILAR ACADEMY, EDUARDO ESPEJO and ELISEO OCAMPO, JR., petitioners, vs. DEL PILAR
ACADEMY EMPLOYEES UNION, respondents.

Doctrine:
The employee's acceptance of benefits resulting from a collective bargaining agreement
justifies the deduction of agency fees from his pay and the union's entitlement thereto. In this
aspect, the legal basis of the union's right to agency fees is neither contractual nor statutory, but
quasi-contractual, deriving from the established principle that non-union employees may not
unjustly enrich themselves by benefiting from employment conditions negotiated by the
bargaining union.

Facts:
Respondent Del Pilar Academy Employees Union (the UNION) is the certified collective
bargaining representative of teaching and non-teaching personnel of petitioner Del Pilar
Academy (DEL PILAR), an educational institution operating in Imus, Cavite.
The UNION and DEL PILAR entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA)3granting
salary increase and other benefits to the teaching and non-teaching staff.
The UNION then assessed agency fees from non-union employees, and requested DEL PILAR to
deduct said assessment from the employees’ salaries and wages. DEL PILAR, however, refused to
effect deductions claiming that the non-union employees were not amenable to it.
The UNION negotiated for the renewal of the CBA. DEL PILAR, however, refused to renew
the same unless the provision regarding entitlement to two (2) months summer vacation leave
with pay will be amended. The UNION objected to the proposal claiming diminution of benefits.
The UNION requested DEL PILAR to submit the case for voluntary arbitration, but the
latter allegedly refused, prompting the UNION to file a case for unfair labor practice with the
Labor Arbiter against DEL PILAR.
 DEL PILAR denied committing unfair labor practices against the UNION. It justified the
non-deduction of the agency fees by the absence of individual check off authorization from the
non-union employees.

Issue:
Whether or not the UNION is entitled to collect agency fees from non-union members,
and if so, whether an individual written authorization is necessary for a valid check off.

Held: YES. Union is entitled to agency fees.

NO. No need for individual authorization.
The collection of agency fees in an amount equivalent to union dues and fees, from
employees who are not union members, is recognized by Article 248(e) of the Labor Code, thus:
Employees of an appropriate collective bargaining unit who are not members of the
recognized collective bargaining agent may be assessed reasonable fees equivalent to the
dues and other fees paid by the recognized collective bargaining agent, if such non-union
members accept the benefits under the collective bargaining agreement. Provided, That
the individual authorization required under Article 241, paragraph (o) of this Code shall
not apply to the non-members of recognized collective bargaining agent.
The grant of annual salary increase is not the only provision in the CBA that benefited the non-
union employees. The UNION negotiated for other benefits, namely, limitations on teaching
assignments to 23 hours per week, additional compensation for overload units or teaching
assignments in excess of the 23 hour per week limit, and payment of longevity pay. It also
negotiated for entitlement to summer vacation leave with pay for two (2) months for teaching
staff who have rendered six (6) consecutive semesters of service. For the non-teaching personnel,
the UNION worked for their entitlement to fifteen (15) days leave with pay. 13 These provisions
in the CBA surely benefited the non-union employees, justifying the collection of, and the
UNION’s entitlement to, agency fees.
No requirement of written authorization from the non-union employees is needed to effect a
valid check off. Article 248(e) makes it explicit that Article 241(o), requiring written authorization
is inapplicable to non-union members, especially in this case where the non-union employees
receive several benefits under the CBA.
As explained by this Court in Holy Cross of Davao College, Inc. v. Hon. Joaquin. The employee's
acceptance of benefits resulting from a collective bargaining agreement justifies the deduction
of agency fees from his pay and the union's entitlement thereto. In this aspect, the legal basis
of the union's right to agency fees is neither contractual nor statutory, but quasi-contractual,
deriving from the established principle that non-union employees may not unjustly enrich
themselves by benefiting from employment conditions negotiated by the bargaining union.
Case # 15:
NORMA MABEZA, vs. NLRC
Facts:
Petitioner Norma Mabeza filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before the NLRC. She alleged that
she and her co-employees at the Hotel Supreme were asked by the hotel's management to sign
an instrument attesting to the latter's compliance with minimum wage and other labor standard
provisions of law, to which she signed but refused to swear to the veracity and contents affidavit
before a prosecutor as instructed by management. Subsequently, she was ordered by the hotel
management to turn over the keys to her living quarters and to remove her belongings from the
hotel premises. She thereafter filed a leave of absence from her job which was denied by
management. When she attempted to return to work, the same was denied.Respondent claimed
that petitioner’s abandonment of her job and and loss of confidence are sufficient cause for her
termination.

Issue:
1. W/N the dismissal is legal.
2. W/N the dismissal constitutes ULP.

Ruling:
1.NO. Respondent’s claim that petitioner "abandoned" her job were not enough to
constitute just cause to sanction the termination of her services under Article 283 of the Labor
Code. For abandonment to arise, there must be concurrence of two things: 1) lack of intention
to work; and 2) the presence of overt acts signifying the employee's intention not to work.
In the instant case, the fact that she made this attempt clearly indicates not an intention to
abandon but an intention to return to work after the period of her leave of absence, had it been
granted, shall have expired. Furthermore, while absence from work for a prolonged period may
suggest abandonment in certain instances, mere absence of one or two days would not be
enough to sustain such a claim.
 2. YES. The act of compelling employees to sign an instrument indicating that the
employer observed labor standards provisions of law when he might have not, together with the
act of terminating or coercing those who refuse to cooperate with the employer's scheme
constitutes unfair labor practice. The first act clearly preempts the right of the hotel's workers to
seek better terms and conditions of employment through concerted action.
This actuation . . . is analogous to the situation envisaged in paragraph (f) of Article 248
of the Labor Code" 24 which distinctly makes it an unfair labor practice "to dismiss, discharge or
otherwise prejudice or discriminate against an employee for having given or being about to give
testimony" 25 under the Labor Code. For in not giving positive testimony in favor of her employer,
petitioner had reserved not only her right to dispute the claim and proffer evidence in support
thereof but also to work for better terms and conditions of employment.
Case #16:
SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION EMPLOYEES UNION-PTGWO vs. HON. JESUS G. BERSAMIRA

Facts:
SanMig contracted the services of Lipercon and D'Rite, which were duly licensed by the
DOLE as independent contractors. In said contracts, it was expressly understood and agreed that
the workers employed by the contractors were to be paid by the latter and that none of them
were to be deemed employees or agents of SanMig. There was to be no employer-employee
relation between the contractors and/or its workers, on the one hand, and SanMig on the other.
Petitioner Union is the duly authorized representative of the monthly paid rank-and-file
employees of SanMig with whom the latter executed a CBA. The Union advised SanMig that some
Lipercon and D'Rite workers had signed up for union membership and sought the regularization
of their employment with SMC.
On the ground that it had failed to receive any favorable response from SanMig, the Union
filed a notice of strike for unfair labor practice, CBA violations, and union busting. On the other
hand, SanMig denies the existence of any employer-employee relationship and consequently of
any labor dispute between itself and the Union.
Issue:
1. W/N there exist an Unfair Labor Practice.
Ruling:
1.YES. SanMig, resists that Union demand on the ground that there is no employer-
employee relationship between it and those workers and because the demand violates the terms
of their CBA. Obvious then is that representation and association, for the purpose of negotiating
the conditions of employment are also involved. In fact, the injunction sought by SanMig was
precisely also to prevent such representation. Again, the matter of representation falls within the
scope of a labor dispute. Neither can it be denied that the controversy below is directly connected
with the labor dispute already taken cognizance of by the NCMB-DOLE.
As the case is indisputably linked with a labor dispute, jurisdiction belongs to the labor tribunals.
As explicitly provided for in Article 217 of the Labor Code, prior to its amendment by R.A. No.
6715 on 21 March 1989, since the suit below was instituted on 6 March 1989, Labor Arbiters have
original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases involving all workers
including "1. unfair labor practice cases; 2. those that workers may file involving wages, hours of
work and other terms and conditions of employment; ... and 5. cases arising from any violation
of Article 265 of this Code, including questions involving the legality of striker and lockouts. ..."
Article 217 lays down the plain command of the law.
Case # 17:
General Milling Corporation vs. CA
Facts:
In its two plants located at Cebu City and Lapu-Lapu City, petitioner General Milling
Corporation (GMC) employed 190 workers. They were all members of private respondent
General Milling Corporation Independent Labor Union (union, for brevity), a duly certified
bargaining agent.
On April 28, 1989, GMC and the union concluded a collective bargaining agreement (CBA)
which included the issue of representation effective for a term of three years. The CBA was
effective for three years retroactive to December 1, 1988. Hence, it would expire on November
30, 1991.
On November 29, 1991, a day before the expiration of the CBA, the union sent GMC a
proposed CBA, with a request that a counter-proposal be submitted within ten (10) days.
As early as October 1991, however, GMC had received collective and individual letters from
workers who stated that they had withdrawn from their union membership, on grounds of
religious affiliation and personal differences. Believing that the union no longer had standing to
negotiate a CBA, GMC did not send any counter-proposal.
On December 16, 1991, GMC wrote a letter to the unions officers, Rito Mangubat and Victor
Lastimoso. The letter stated that it felt there was no basis to negotiate with a union which no
longer existed, but that management was nonetheless always willing to dialogue with them on
matters of common concern and was open to suggestions on how the company may improve its
operations.
In answer, the union officers wrote a letter dated December 19, 1991 disclaiming any
massive disaffiliation or resignation from the union and submitted a manifesto, signed by its
members, stating that they had not withdrawn from the union.

Issue:
(1) finding GMC guilty of unfair labor practice for violating the duty to bargain collectively
and/or interfering with the right of its employees to self-organization.
 (2) imposing upon GMC the draft CBA proposed by the union for two years to begin from
the expiration of the original CBA.

Held: 1. Yes(Duty to bargain), Under Article 252 abovecited, both parties are required to perform
their mutual obligation to meet and convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith for the
purpose of negotiating an agreement. The union lived up to this obligation when it presented
proposals for a new CBA to GMC within three (3) years from the effectivity of the original CBA.
But GMC failed in its duty under Article 252. What it did was to devise a flimsy excuse, by
questioning the existence of the union and the status of its
(Interfering) The CA found that the letters between February to June 1993 by 13 union
members signifying their resignation from the union clearly indicated that GMC exerted pressure
on its employees. The records show that GMC presented these letters to prove that the union no
longer enjoyed the support of the workers. The fact that the resignations of the union members
occurred during the pendency of the case before the labor arbiter shows GMCs desperate
attempts to cast doubt on the legitimate status of the union. We agree with the CAs conclusion
that the ill-timed letters of resignation from the union members indicate that GMC had interfered
with the right of its employees to self-organization. Thus, we hold that the appellate court did
not commit grave abuse of discretion in finding GMC guilty of unfair labor practice for interfering
with the right of its employees to self-organization.

2. No. The general rule is that when a CBA already exists, its provision shall continue to
govern the relationship between the parties, until a new one is agreed upon. The rule necessarily
presupposes that all other things are equal. That is, that neither party is guilty of bad faith.
However, when one of the parties abuses this grace period by purposely delaying the bargaining
process, a departure from the general rule is warranted.
Case #19 ST. JOHN COLLEGES, INC., VS. ST. JOHN ACADEMY FACULTY AND EMPLOYEES UNION

G.R. No. 167892 October 27, 2006

FACTS:

Petitioner St. John Colleges, Inc. (SJCI) is a domestic corporation which owns and operates the St.
John’s Academy (later renamed St. John Colleges) in Calamba, Laguna. Prior to 1998, the
Academy offered a secondary course only. The high school then employed about 80 teaching and
non-teaching personnel who were members of the St. John Academy Faculty & Employees Union
(Union).

The CBA between SJCI and the Union was set to expire on May 31, 1997. During the ensuing
collective bargaining negotiations, SJCI rejected all the proposals of the Union for an increase in
worker’s benefits.

This resulted to a bargaining deadlock which led to the holding of a valid strike by the Union on
November 10, 1997.In order to end the strike, SJCI and the Union, through the efforts of the
NCMB, agreed to refer the labor dispute to the Secretary of Labor and Employment (SOLE) for
assumption of jurisdiction.

After which, the strike ended and classes resumed. Subsequently, the SOLE issued an Order
assuming jurisdiction over the labor dispute pursuant to Article 263 of the Labor Code. The
parties were required to submit their respective position papers.

Pending resolution of the labor dispute before the SOLE, the Board of Directors of SJCI approved
on February 22, 1998 a resolution recommending the closure of the high school which was
approved by the stockholders on even date.

Thereafter, SJCI informed the DOLE, DECS, parents, students and the Union of the impending
closure of the high school. Subsequently, some teaching and non-teaching personnel of the high
school agreed to the closure. Some 51 employees had received their separation compensation
package while 25 employees refused to accept the same.

Instead, these employees conducted a protest action within the perimeter of the high school.
The Union filed a notice of strike. Thereafter SJCI filed a petition to declare the strike illegal before
the NLRC. It claimed that the strike was conducted in violation of the procedural requirements
for holding a valid strike under the Labor Code.

Subsequently, the 25 employees filed a complaint for unfair labor practice (ULP), illegal dismissal
and non-payment of monetary benefits against SJCI before the NLRC, alleging that the closure of
the high school was done in bad faith in order to get rid of the Union and render useless any
decision of the SOLE on the CBA deadlocked issues.

The Labor Arbiter dismissed the Union’s complaint for ULP and illegal dismissal while granting
SJCI’s petition to declare the strike illegal coupled with a declaration of loss of employment status
of the 25 Union members involved in the strike.

The Union filed a manifestation to maintain the status quo on March 30, 1998 praying that SJCI
be enjoined from closing the high school.

It claimed that the decision of SJCI to close the high school violated the SOLE’s assumption order
and the agreement of the parties not to take any retaliatory action against the other.

For its part, SJCI filed a motion to dismiss with entry of appearance on October 14, 1998 claiming
that the closure of the high school rendered the CBA deadlocked issues moot.

The SOLE denied SJCI’s motions to dismiss and certified the CBA deadlock case to the NLRC. After
the favorable decision of the Labor Arbiter, SJCI resolved to reopen the high school for school
year 1999-2000.

However, it did not restore the high school teaching and non-teaching employees it earlier
terminated. That same school year SJCI opened an elementary and college department.

The NLRC rendered judgment reversing the decision of the Labor Arbiter. It found SJCI guilty of
ULP and illegal dismissal and ordered it to reinstate the 25 employees to their former positions
without loss of seniority rights and other benefits, and with full back wages.

It also required SJCI to pay moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, and two (2) months
summer/vacation pay.

Moreover, it ruled that the mass actions conducted by the 25 employees on May 4, 1998 could
not be considered as a strike since, by then, the employer-employee relationship had already
been terminated due to the closure of the high school.

On appeal the CA affirmed the decision of the NLRC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of ULP and illegal dismissal.

HELD:

YES, SJCI is liable for ULP and illegal dismissal.

Under Article 283 of the Labor Code, the following requisites must concur for a valid closure of
the business:

(1) Serving a written notice on the workers at least one (1) month before the intended date
thereof;

(2) Serving a notice with the DOLE one month before the taking effect of the closure;

(3) Payment of separation pay equivalent to one (1) month or at least one half (1/2) month pay
for every year of service, whichever is higher, with a fraction of at least six (6) months to be
considered as a whole year; and

(4) Cessation of the operation must be bona fide.

It is not disputed that the first two requisites were satisfied. The third requisite would have been
satisfied were it not for the refusal of the herein private respondents to accept the separation
compensation package.

The instant case, thus, revolves around the fourth requisite, i.e., whether SJCI closed the high
school in good faith.

In sum, the SC held that the timing of, and the reasons for the closure of the high school and its
reopening after only one year from the time it was closed down, show that the closure was done
in bad faith for the purpose of circumventing the Union’s right to collective bargaining and its
members’ right to security of tenure.

FIRST: As to the timing of and reason for closure of the high school.

(a) SJCI contended that it was forced to close down the high school due to alleged difficult labor
problems that it encountered while dealing with the Union since 1995, specifically, the Union’s
illegal demands in violation of R.A. 6728.

Under R.A. 6728, the income from tuition fee increase is to be used as follows:

(a) 70% of the tuition fee shall go to the payment of salaries, wages, allowances, and other
benefits of teaching and non- teaching personnel, and;

(b) 20% of the tuition fee increase shall go to the improvement or modernization of the buildings,
equipment, and other facilities as well as payment of the cost of operations.

The alleged illegality and excessiveness of the Union’s demands were not sufficiently proved by
SJCI. The alleged illegality or excessiveness of the Union’s demands were the issues to be resolved
by the SOLE after the parties agreed to refer the said labor dispute to the latter for assumption
of jurisdiction.

The SOLE certified the case to the NLRC, which rendered a decision finding that there was
insufficient evidence to determine the reasonableness of the Union’s proposals.

At any rate, even assuming that the Union’s demands were illegal or excessive, the important
and crucial point is that these alleged illegal or excessive demands did not justify the closure of
the high school and do not, in anyway, establish SJCI’s good faith.

The Labor Code does not authorize the employer to close down the establishment on the ground
of illegal or excessive demands of the Union.

Instead, aside from the remedy of submitting the dispute for voluntary or compulsory arbitration,
the employer may file a complaint for ULP against the Union for bargaining in bad faith.

If found guilty, this gives rise to civil and criminal liabilities and allows the employer to implement
a lock out, but not the closure of the establishment resulting to the permanent loss of
employment of the whole workforce.

(b) SJCI also contended that the Union unduly endangered the safety and well-being of the
students who joined the valid strike held on November, thus it closed down the high school on
March 31, 1998.

SJCI provided no evidence to substantiate these claims except for its self-serving statements in
its position paper before the Labor Arbiter and pictures belatedly attached to the instant petition
before this Court.

However, the pictures were never authenticated and, on its face, only show that some students
watched the Union members while they conducted their protest actions. It is the employer
carries the burden of proof to establish that the closure of the business was done in good faith.

In the instant case, SJCI had the burden of proving that, indeed, the closure of the school was
necessary to uphold the safety and well-being of the students.

SJCI presented no evidence to show that the protest actions turned violent; that the parents did
not give their consent to their children who allegedly joined the protest actions; that the Union
did not take the necessary steps to protect some of the students who allegedly joined the same;
or that the Union forced or pressured the said students to join the protest actions

Even assuming arguendo that the safety and well-being of some of the students who allegedly
joined the protest actions were compromised, still, the closure was done in bad faith because it
was done long after the strike had ended. Thus, there is no more danger to the students’ well-
being posed by the strike to speak of.

Furthermore, if SJCI was after the interests of the students, then it should not have closed the
school because the parents and the students were vehemently opposed to the same.

SECOND: As to the timing and reason for the reopening of the school. SJCI next contends that
the subsequent reopening of the high school after only one year from its closure did not show
that the previous decision to close the high school was tainted with bad faith because the
reopening was done due to the clamor of the high school’s former students and their parents.

The contention was untenable.

First, the fact that after one year from the time it closed its high school, SJCI opened a college
and elementary department, and reopened its high school department showed that it never
intended to cease operating as an educational institution.

Second, there is evidence on record contesting the alleged reason of SJCI for reopening the high
school, i.e., that its former students and their parents allegedly clamored for the reopening of
the high school.

Finally, when SJCI reopened its high school, it did not rehire the Union members; evidently, the
closure had achieved its purpose, that is, to get rid of the Union members.
Case # 20:
Arellano Universty v. CA

Facts:
The Arellano University Employees and Workers Union is the exclusive bargaining
representative of about 380 rank-and-file employees of Arellano University. The union filed with
the NCMB a Notice of Strike charging the University with Unfair Labor Practice ULP. After several
controversies and petitions, a strike was staged.
Upon the lifting of the strike, the University filed a Petition to Declare the Strike Illegal before the
NLRC. The NLRC issued a Resolution holding that the University was not guilty of
ULP. Consequently, the strike was declared illegal. All the employees who participated in the
illegal strike were thereafter declared to have lost their employment status.

Issue:
W/N an employee is deemed to have lost his employment by mere participation in an
illegal strike.

Ruling:
No. Under Art. 264 of the LC, an ordinary striking worker may not be declared to have lost
his employment status by mere participation in an illegal strike. There must be proof that he
knowingly participated in the commission of illegal acts during the strike. While the University
adduced photographs showing strikers picketing outside the university premises, it failed to
identify who they were. It thus failed to meet the substantiality of evidence test applicable in
dismissal cases.
However, with respect to the union officers, as already discussed, their mere participation in the
illegal strike warrants their dismissal.
Hence, an employee cannot be outrightly dismissed by mere participation in illegal strike.

Case # 21:
ROYAL UNDERGARMENT CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, ROYAL UNDERGARMENT WORKERS UNION (PTGWO) and ANTONIO
CRUZ, respondents.

Facts:
Antonio Cruz was employed by Royal Undergarment Corporation (RUC) as an electrician.
He was elected president of the Royal Undergarment Workers Union (RUWU), a legitimate labor
organization which became affiliated with the Philippine Transport and General Workers
Organization (PTGWO). The RUWU-PTGWO, represented by the National Secretary of PTGWO
and Cruz as RUWU President, sent proposals to RUC for the purpose of collective bargaining. RUC,
thru its personnel manager, terminated the services of respondent Cruz allegedly on the basis of
the latter's "record and after careful analysis and deliberation." Respondent's wife, Felicidad
Cruz, who was also an employee of RUC, was likewise terminated. Thus, RUWU called a strike.
RUWU-PTGWO and petitioner corporation entered into a Return-to-Work Agreement
thru the conciliation efforts of the Department of Labor. The records do not disclose the results
of the consent election. Subsequently however, Cruz and his wife were both re-employed and
reinstated by RUC, thereby indicating the victory of RUWU-PTGWO in the consent election.
RUWU-PTGWO and RUC entered into a collective bargaining agreement which contained a
grievance procedure for the settlement of disputes. Such grievance procedure was applied on
several occasions involving suspensions of union members-employees through the help and
active participation of respondent Cruz as union president. The PTGWO urged its member-unions
to stage a nationwide strike. Thus, respondent Cruz campaigned among the members of RUWU
to join the strike.
The general manager of RUC placed Cruz on preventive suspension for threatening "the
lives of four employees" and for having 'been reported under the influence of liquor," both acts
being "contrary to rules and regulations." Upon the request of Cruz and PTGWO, RUC conducted
a conference which was in the nature of an investigation of the incident. RUC dismissed Cruz for
being under the influence of liquor and for having threatened the lives of four of his co-
employees.
 Cruz filed a complaint for unfair labor practice against RUC with the Court of Industrial
Relations. The respondent industrial court, while affirming the findings of the healing examiner,
rendered a decision. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari with the RUC.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the corporation is guilty of unfair labor practice.
2. Whether or not Antonio Cruz was illegally dismissed.

Held:
1. Yes.
The Court of Industrial Relations found from the surrounding circumstances of the case, a
valid and sufficient basis for the charge of unfair labor practice against the company. On the part
of the company there appears to be an attitude of antipathy towards Antonio Cruz. We have on
record the undisputed facts that private respondent, as president of RUWU, was known for his
aggressive and militant union activities; that he and his wife had been previously dismissed on
the ground of active participation in union affairs; that they were reemployed only pursuant to
the express terms of the Return-to-Work Agreement executed by petitioner corporation and
RUWU when the latter won in the consent election; that respondent Cruz was dismissed again
for the second time in the course of his campaign among RUWU members to join the nationwide
strike of PTGWO in which RUWU is a member union. The incident was simply blown into such
proportion so as to provide a supposed valid cause for Cruz’ dismissal. In the light of the initial
attitude of the company earlier discussed, the inducing cause directly contributing to Cruz’
dismissal is the company's antipathy to Antonio Cruz’ union activity and not his misconduct.
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 875, known as the The Industrial Peace Act, as amended,
provides that employees shall have the right to self-organization and to form, join or assist labor
organizations of their own choosing for the purpose of collective bargaining through
representatives of their own choosing and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining and other mutual aid or protection. Hence, it shall be unfair labor practice
for an employer to discriminate in regard to tenure of employment or any term or condition of
employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization (Section 4 (a)(4),
R.A. No. 875).

2. Yes.
Based on the totality of evidence as found by the CIR supports the conclusion that respondent
Cruz has been unjustly dismissed by reason of his union activities. The charge by petitioner
against respondent Cruz for being under the influence of liquor on a certain date and for having
threatened the lives of his co-employees is too flimsy to merit serious consideration.
It has previously been indicated that an employer may treat freely with an employee and is
not obliged to support his actions with a reason or purpose. However, where the attendant
circumstances, the history of the employer's past conduct and like considerations, coupled with
an intimate connection between the employer's action and the union affiliations or activities of
the particular employee or employees taken as a whole raise a suspicion as to the motivation for
the employer's action, the failure of the employer to ascribe a valid reason therefor may justify
an inference that his unexplained conduct in respect of the particular employee or employees
was inspired by the latter's union membership or activities.
Case # 22:

NATIONAL LABOR UNION vs. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, EVERLASTING

MANUFACTURING, ANG WO LONG and BENITO S. ESTANISLAO
FACTS: Petitioner charged respondent Everlasting Manufacturing of ULP. After the conclusion of
their CBA, respondent company began hiring 24 new workers. On the pretext of selling and
closing its business, and without any justifiable reason respondent company dismissed and/or
locked out all the members of complainant.
Respondent company continued with its business operations by availing of the services
of the above-mentioned 24 new workers who are non-union members, using the same premises,
business name, machineries, tool and implements, same officials and supervisors. Respondent
failed and refused and continues to fail and refuse to reinstate them to their jobs.
Respondent contended that the establishment was no longer owned by Estanislao but by Ang
Wo Long who purchased the same and that the new owner is not duty bound to respect whatever
agreement has been entered into by the former owner and the workers.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent has committed an unfair labor practice.

HELD: Yes.
The evidence on record shows that some eight days before the sale, Ang Wo Long filed
an application for the registration of 'Everlasting Manufacturing' as a firm name or business name
and that the corresponding certificate of registration was issued to him by said office the same
day that the collective bargaining contract with the union was executed.
Contrary to his claim, respondent Ang Wo Long was already taking an active hand in the
operation of the business establishment after it was sold to him, and that the 21 complaining
employees since then were already working for him as new owner. The respondent Ang Wo Long
did not show any just cause for dispensing with the services of all the 21 union members. "The
conclusion becomes inescapable that he (Mr. Ang) dismissed the complainants in order to break
the union and do away with the existing CBA which it has obtained only after a strike and
bargaining negotiations.”
The person found guilty of unfair labor practice did not show up at the reopened hearings
and as far as the records before US show, had disappeared. The concatenation of circumstances
clearly indicates the participation of both Mr. Estanislao and Mr. Ang in the unfair labor practice.
The face of these known facts would be tantamount to sanctioning a deception and
conspiracy to defraud the workers of their rights already obtained in the contract.
Case #23:
Geronimo Quadra v. CA
Facts:
While being the Chief Legal Officer of PCSO, Quadra was in active participation to the
labor organizations of both rank-and-file and supervisory employees. Meanwhile, PCSO charged
Quadra administratively before the CSC on the ground of neglect of duty, misconduct and
conduct prejudicial to the service. The CSC found Quadra guilty on the charges and recommended
his dismissal. Quadra with the unions file a complaint for illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice
before the CIR against PCSO and its officers. CIR found that the dismissal was illegal as it
constitutes unfair labor practice and ordered the reinstatement of Quadra. PCSO heeded to the
order and filed a petition for certiorari before the SC. During the pendency of the case, Quadra
filed a claim for moral and exemplary damages before the CIR. Since the CIR was abolished and
NLRC was constituted, the latter granted moral and exemplary damages to Quadra. On appeal,
CA reversed the decision.

Issue:
W/N an award to moral and exemplary damages to an illegally dismissed employee where
dismissal constitutes unfair labor practice is proper.

Ruling:
Yes. A dismissed employee is entitled to moral damages when the dismissal is attended
by bad faith or fraud or constitutes an act oppressive to labor, or is done in a manner contrary to
good morals, good customs or public policy. Exemplary damages may be awarded if the dismissal
is effected in a wanton, oppressive or malevolent manner.
It appears from the facts that petitioner was deliberately dismissed from the service by reason
of his active involvement in the activities of the union groups of both the rank and file and the
supervisory employees of PCSO, which unions he himself organized and headed.
PCSO may not impute to the Civil Service Commission the responsibility for petitioners illegal
dismissal as it was respondent PCSO that first filed the administrative charge against him. As
found by the CIR, petitioners dismissal constituted unfair labor practice. It was done to interfere
with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization.
Hence, it is proper to award moral and exemplary damages to illegally dismissed employees as
their dismissal was tainted with unfair labor practice like the dismissal of Quadra.
Case # 24:
CLLC E.G. GOCHANGCO WORKERS UNION petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION (NLRC), and e.g. GOCHANGCO, INC., respondents.

FACTS:
Petitioner union is a local chapter of the Central Luzon Labor Congress (CLLC), a legitimate
labor federation duly registered with the Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE), while the
individual petitioners are former employees of private respondent who were officers and
members of the petitioner union.
Sometime in January 1980, the majority of the rank and file employees of respondent firm
organized the e.g. Gochangco Workers Union as an affiliate of the CLLC. The union filed a petition
for certification election. The MOLE Region 111 office set the hearing for the petition on February
27,1980.
The CLLC national president wrote the general manager of respondent firm informing him
of the organization of the union and requesting for a labor management conference to normalize
employer-employee relations. The union sent a written notice to respondent firm requesting
permission for certain member officers and members of the union to attend the hearing of the
petition for certification election.
On February 28, 1980, private respondent preventively suspended the union officers and
members who attended the hearing. The common ground alleged by private respondent for its
action was "abandonment of work on February 27, 1980." On the same date, all the gate passes
of all the above-mentioned employees to Clark Air Base were confiscated by a Base guard.
Claiming that private respondent instigated the confiscation of their gate passes to
prevent them from performing their duties and that respondent firm did not pay them their
overtime pay, , petitioner union and its members filed a complaint for constructive lockout and
unfair labor practice against private respondent.
While private respondent filed an application for clearance to dismiss said employees.
The services of nine (9) more union members, were terminated by private respondent on the
ground that its contract with the U.S. Air Force had expired.
 Labor Arbiter denied respondent's application for clearance. NLRC set aside the LA
decision. Hence this petition.

ISSUE 1:
WON respondent company is guilty of an unfair labor practice.

HELD: Yes.
It is no coincidence that at the time said respondent issued its suspension and termination
orders, the petitioners were in the midst of a certification election preliminary to a labor
management conference. It was within the legal right of the petitioners to do so, and in which
management may not as a rule interfere. It is a brazen interference as well with the employees
right to self-organization, contrary to the prohibition of the Labor Code against unfair labor
practices.
Furthermore, the company suspended the petitioners on the ground of "abandonment of
work" on February 27, 1980, the date on which, apparently, the pre-election conference had
been scheduled. There is a clear effort by management to punish the petitioners for their union
activities.
As a consequence of such a suspension, the Clark Air Base guards confiscated the employees'
gate passes, and banned them from the base premise. Those passes would not have been
confiscated had not management ordered the suspension.

ISSUE 2:
WON petitioners were illegally dismissed.

HELD: YES.
Court was not persuaded by the respondent firm's argument that final termination should
be effected as the contract has expired." Petitioners were regular employees and as such, their
tenure did not end with the expiration of the contract. We quote:
 The records show that petitioners employees whose employment did not terminate with
the expiration of private respondent's contract with the U.S. Air Force. As regular employees, the
petitioners' tenure are secure, and their dismissal must be premised on a just cause.
We find none here. There is no merit in the claim that the petitioners' terms were coterminous
with the duration of the contract. There is nothing in the records that would show that the
petitioners were parties to that contract. It appears furthermore that the petitioners were in the
employ of the respondent company long before that contract was concluded. But even if
dismissal were warranted, the same nonetheless faces our disapproval in the absence of a proper
clearance then required under the Labor Code. It is true that efforts were undertaken to seek
such a clearance, yet there is no showing that it was issued. That still taints the dismissal with the
vice of illegality.
The Court likewise rejects the claims of an alleged waiver by the petitioners of their
economic demands, in the light of an alleged order issued by Labor Arbiter with another case(s)
involving the same parties Labor Arbiter Aquino's resolution refers to other cases and not the
instant unfair labor practice controversy. In any event, we have held that unfair labor practice
cases are not, in view of the public interest involved, subject to compromises.