JOSE LINO LUNA vs.

EULOGIO RODRIGUEZ
G.R. No. 13744. November 29, 1918

Facts: An election for the office of governor of the Province of Rizal was held on the 6th day of
June, 1916. At said election Jose Lino Luna, Eulogio Rodriguez and Servando de los Angeles
were candidates for said office. The election was closed, the votes cast were counted, and a
return was made by the inspectors of said municipalities to the provincial board of Canvassers,
who, after a canvass, proclaimed Eulogio Rodriguez, having received a plurality of said votes, as
duly elected governor of said province. Jose Lino Luna presented a protest in the CFI and a new
trial was ordered. Additional evidence was adduced. Judge McMahon found that the inspectors
in Binangonan did not close the polls at 6 o’clock p.m., and that a large number of persons
voted after that time. The judge then directed that the total vote of Rodriguez be reduced,
without ascertaining how many had been cast for Rodriguez and how many for Luna.

Issue: Whether or not the ballots cast after the hour fixed for closing were valid.

Held: The ballots were valid. The law provides that “at all elections, the polls shall be open from
seven o’clock in the morning until six o’clock in the afternoon.” The polls should be open and
closed in strict accord with said provisions. Voters who do not appear and offer to vote within
the hours designated by the law should not be permitted to vote if the time for closing the polls
has arrived. Upon the other hand, if the voter is prevented, during the voting hours, from
voting, and is not permitted to vote by reason of the failure of the inspectors to do their duty,
then, certainly, in the absence of some fraud, neither such votes nor the entire vote of the
precinct should be annulled simply because some votes were cast after the regular hours. The
ballot of the innocent voter should not be annulled and he should not be deprived of his
participation in the affairs of his government when he was guilty of no illegal act or fraud. The
election inspectors should be held to comply strictly with the law. If they violate the law, they
should be punished and not the innocent voter.

KABATAAN PARTY LIST, et. al., Petitioners,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
G.R. No. 221318 December 16, 2015

TOPIC: Biometrics validation

FACTS:

RA 10367 mandates the COMELEC to implement a

mandatory biometricsregistration system for new voters in order to establish a clean, complete,
permanent, and updated list of voters through the adoption of biometric technology.

1
 RA 10367 likewise directs that “registered voters whose biometrics have not been
captured shall submit themselves for validation.” “Voters who fail to submit for validation on or
before the last day of filing of application for registration for purposes of the May 2016
elections shall be deactivated x x x.”

COMELEC issued Resolution No. 9721 as amended by Resolutions No. 9863 and 10013.
Among others, the said Resolution provides that: “the registration records of voters
without biometrics data who failed to submit for validation on or before the last day of filing of
applications for registration for the purpose of the May 9, 2016 National and Local Elections
shall be deactivated.

Herein petitioners filed the instant petition with application for temporary restraining
order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary mandatory injunction (WPI) assailing the
constitutionality of the biometrics validation requirement imposed under RA 10367, as well as
COMELEC Resolution Nos. 9721, 9863, and 10013, all related thereto.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the statutory requirement of biometrics validation is an unconstitutional

requirement of literacy and property.
2. Whether or not biometrics validation passes the strict scrutiny test.
3. Whether or not Resolution No. 9863 which fixed the deadline for validation on October 31,
2015 violates Section 8 of RA 8189.

HELD:

FIRST ISSUE: No.

The Court held that biometrics validation is not a “qualification” to the exercise of the
right of suffrage, but a mere aspect of the registration procedure, of which the State has the
right to reasonably regulate.

The Court reiterated their ruling in several cases that registration regulates the
exercise of the right of suffrage. It is not a qualification for such right. The process
of registration is a procedural limitation on the right to vote.

Thus, although one is deemed to be a “qualified elector,” he must nonetheless still

comply with the registration procedure in order to vote.

Thus, unless it is shown that a registration requirement rises to the level of a literacy,
property or other substantive requirement as contemplated by the Framers of the Constitution
-that is, one which propagates a socio-economic standard which is bereft of any rational basis

2
to a person’s ability to intelligently cast his vote and to further the public good -the same
cannot be struck down as unconstitutional, as in this case.

SECOND ISSUE: Yes.

In applying strict scrutiny, the focus is on the presence of compelling, rather than
substantial, governmental interest and on the absence of less restrictive means for achieving
that interest, and the burden befalls upon the State to prove the same.

Presence of compelling state interest

Respondents have shown that the biometrics validation requirement under RA

10367 advances a compelling state interest. It was precisely designed to facilitate the conduct
of orderly, honest, and credible elections by containing -if not eliminating, the perennial
problem of having flying voters, as well as dead and multiple registrants. The foregoing
consideration is unquestionably a compelling state interest.

Biometrics validation is the least restrictive means for achieving the above-said interest

Section 6 of Resolution No. 9721 sets the procedure for biometrics validation, whereby
the registered voter is only required to: (a) personally appear before the Office of
the Election Officer; (b) present a competent evidence of identity; and (c) have his photo,
signature, and fingerprints recorded.

Moreover, RA 10367 and Resolution No. 9721 did not mandate registeredvoters to
submit themselves to validation every time there is an election. In fact, it only required the
voter to undergo the validation process one (1) time, which shall remain effective in succeeding
elections, provided that he remains an active voter.

Lastly, the failure to validate did not preclude deactivated voters from exercising their
right to vote in the succeeding elections. To rectify such status, they could still apply for
reactivation.

THIRD ISSUE: No.

Section 8 of RA 8189 provides that:

System of Continuing Registration of Voters. – x x x No registration shall, however, be

conducted during the period starting one hundred twenty (120) days before a
regular election and ninety (90) days before a special election.

The Court held that the 120-and 90-day periods stated therein refer to the prohibitive
period beyond which voter registration may no longer be conducted. The subject provision
does not mandate COMELEC to conduct voter registration up to such time; rather, it only

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provides a period which may not be reduced, but may be extended depending on the
administrative necessities and other exigencies.

G.R. No. 206794 November 26, 2013

BANKERS ASSOSICATION OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. COMELEC

Facts:
This was a petition for the issuance of a status quo to enjoin the implementation of the Money
Ban Resolution issued by COMELEC. The said ban prohibits the withdrawal of cash, encashment
of checks and conversion of any monetary instrument into cash from May 8 to 13, 2013
exceeding One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) or its equivalent in any foreign
currency, per day in banks, finance companies, quasi-banks, pawnshops, remittance companies
and institutions performing similar functions. However, all other non-cash transactions are not
covered. For this purpose, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas and other financial agencies of the
government are hereby deputized to implement with utmost dispatch and ensure strict
compliance with this resolution without violating the provisions of Republic Act No. 1405 , as
amended, and Republic Act No. 6426.

Issue:
Whether or the COMELEC’s resolution was exercised in excess of its duty.

Held:
The Court held to dismiss the case, as it became moot and academic. The Court has issued a
Status Quo Ante on May 10, 2013, thus the Money Ban Resolution was not in force during the
most critical period of the elections. In addition, nothing in the exceptions of “moot and
academic” principle relates to the case at bar. The Court considers it significant that the BSP
and the Monetary Board continue to possess full and sufficient authority to address the
COMELEC’s concerns and to limit banking transactions to legitimate purposes without need for
any formal COMELEC resolution if and when the need arises. Likewise, the Congress should take
note of the Money Ban Resolution and the evil it sought to prevent in application of its plenary
power for future elections, thus rendering unnecessary further action on the merits of the
assailed Money Ban Resolution at this point.

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SULIGUIN v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 166046 (March 23, 2006)

EN BANC The COMELEC has the discretion to liberally construe its rules and, at the same time,
suspend the rules or any portion thereof in the interest of justice. Disputes in the outcome of
elections involve public interest; as such, technicalities and procedural barriers should not be
allowed to stand if they constitute an obstacle to the determination of the true will of the
electorate in the choice of their elective officials. Laws governing such disputes must be
liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in the choice of public officials may not
be defeated by mere technical objections.

G.R. No. 166046 March 23, 2006

MARGARITO C. SULIGUIN, Petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE MUNICIPAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF NAGCARLAN,
LAGUNA, and ECELSON C. SUMAGUE, Respondents.

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court seeking to reverse
the Resolution1 of the Commission on Elections (Comelec) En Banc in SPC No. 04-209 dated
November 18, 2004 which denied petitioner Margarito Suliguin’s motion for reconsideration of
the July 21, 2004 Resolution2 of the Comelec’s First Division. The Comelec nullified his
proclamation as the 8th Sangguniang Bayan member of Nagcarlan, Laguna.

The antecedents are as follows:

Petitioner Margarito Suliguin was one of the candidates for the Sangguniang Bayan of
Nagcarlan, Laguna during the May 10, 2004 elections. At around 6:00 p.m. on said date,
respondent Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBOC) convened to canvass the votes for all the
candidates. Petitioner received 6,605 votes while respondent Ecelson Sumague received 6,647
votes. However, in the Statement of Votes (SOV) covering Precincts 1A to 19A, Sumague
appears to have received only 644 votes when, in fact, he received 844 votes. The MBOC failed
to notice the discrepancy and proclaimed the winning candidates at around 7:00 p.m. of May
13, 2004. Petitioner was proclaimed as the 8th Sangguniang Bayan member of Nagcarlan,
Laguna, garnering a total of 6,605 votes.3

Thereafter, Sumague requested for a recomputation of the votes received by him and Suliguin
in a Letter4 dated May 15, 2004, it appearing that there was a mistake in adding the figures in
the Certificate of Canvass of votes. He pointed out that he officially garnered 6,647 votes, as
against petitioner’s 6,605 votes.

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The MBOC summoned petitioner and respondent Sumague to a conference. Upon review, the
MBOC discovered that it had, indeed, failed to credit respondent Sumague his 200 votes from
Precincts 1A to 19A, and that with his 6,647 votes, he should have been proclaimed as the 8th
Sangguniang Bayan member of Nagcarlan, Laguna, instead of petitioner Suliguin.

On May 26, 2004, the MBOC filed before the Comelec a "Petition to Correct Entries Made in the
Statement of Votes" for Councilor. The error was attributed to extreme physical and mental
fatigue which the members of the board experienced during the election and the canvassing of
votes.

In the meantime, on June 9, 2004, petitioner took his oath of office before Judge Renato B.
Bercades.5

On July 21, 2004, the Comelec (First Division) issued a Resolution6 granting the petition of the
MBOC. The Commission nullified the proclamation of petitioner Suliguin as the 8th Sangguniang
Bayan member of Nagcarlan, Laguna during the May 10, 2004 National and Local Elections "for
being based on an erroneous computation of votes." It then ordered the MBOC of Nagcarlan,
Laguna to reconvene and effect the necessary corrections in the SOV, and forthwith proclaim
Sumague as the 8th duly elected Sangguniang Bayan member of Nagcarlan, Laguna. 7

Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the resolution but the Comelec En Banc denied the
motion on November 18, 2004; hence, this petition. Petitioner alleges that respondent
Commission committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
ruling against him. In support of his petition, he alleges that:

4.1 THE "PETITION TO CORRECT ENTRIES MADE IN THE STATEMENT OF VOTES FOR COUNCILOR,
NAGCARLAN, LAGUNA" WAS UNDISPUTEDLY FILED OUT OF TIME, and

4.2 "THE PETITION TO CORRECT ENTRIES MADE IN THE STATEMENT OF VOTES FOR COUNCILOR,
NAGCARLAN, LAGUNA" WAS FILED BY THE MUNICIPAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS IN DEFIANCE OF
EXISTING COMELEC RULES AND REGULATIONS AND WAS OBVIOUSLY BIAS IN FAVOR OF
PRIVATE RESPONDENT CANDICATE ECELSON C. SUMAGUE.8

Petitioner argues that pursuant to Sections 35,9 36(c) and (f)10 of Comelec Resolution No. 6669
(General Instructions for Municipal/City/Provincial and District Boards of Canvassers in
Connection with the May 10, 2004 Elections), the MBOC should not have entertained the letter-
request of respondent Sumague as it was filed only on May 17, 2004, or four (4) days after the
canvassing of votes was terminated and after he (petitioner) was proclaimed winner as the 8th
Sangguniang Bayan member of Nagcarlan, Laguna. Furthermore, respondent Sumague never
entered any objection during the proceedings of the canvassing of votes. The MBOC itself filed
the "Petition to Correct Entries Made in the Statement of Votes" before the Comelec only on
May 26, 2004, 13 days after the canvassing of votes was terminated. Petitioner maintains that
the Comelec should have denied the petition, since according to the Revised Comelec Rules, it
should have been filed not later than five (5) days following the date of the proclamation.

6
Petitioner likewise questions the personality of the MBOC itself to file the petition before the
Comelec. He further argues that upon the proclamation of the winning candidates in the
election, the MBOC adjourns sine die and becomes functus officio.

The issue is whether or not respondent Comelec erred in granting the petition of the MBOC to
nullify petitioner’s proclamation as the 8th member of the Sangguniang Bayan in Nagcarlan,
Laguna.

The petition is bereft of merit.

In an election case, the Comelec is mandated to ascertain by all means within its command who
the real candidate elected by the electorate is. The Court frowns upon any interpretation of the
law or the rules that would hinder in any way not only the free and intelligent casting of the
votes in an election but also the correct ascertainment of the results.11 In the case at bar, the
simple mathematical procedure of adding the total number of votes garnered by respondent
Sumague as appearing in the Statement of Votes submitted to the Comelec would readily
reveal the result that he has forty-two (42) votes more than petitioner. Such result would, in
effect, dislodge petitioner from said post, and entitle respondent Sumague to occupy the eighth
and last seat of the Sangguniang Bayan of Nagcarlan, Laguna. Petitioner himself never disputed
the discrepancy in the total number of votes garnered by respondent Sumague, and instead
questioned the personality of the MBOC to file the petition and insisted that such petition was
not filed on time.

Sections 312 and 413 of Rule 1 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure explicitly provide that such
rules may be "liberally construed" in the interest of justice. Indeed, the Comelec has the
discretion to liberally construe its rules and, at the same time, suspend the rules or any portion
thereof in the interest of justice.14 Disputes in the outcome of elections involve public interest;
as such, technicalities and procedural barriers should not be allowed to stand if they constitute
an obstacle to the determination of the true will of the electorate in the choice of their elective
officials. Laws governing such disputes must be liberally construed to the end that the will of
the people in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by mere technical objections. 15

What is involved in the present petition is the correction of a manifest error in reflecting the
actual total number of votes for a particular candidate. Section 32, subparagraph 5 of Comelec
Resolution No. 6669 includes mistake in the addition of the votes of any candidate as a
manifest error.16 As correctly cited by the Comelec,17 a manifest clerical error is "one that is
visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding and is apparent from the papers to the eye of
the appraiser and collector, and does not include an error which may, by evidence dehors the
record be shown to have been committed."

The MBOC sought relief from the Comelec to reflect the true winner elected by the voting
public, to occupy the eighth position as member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Nagcarlan,
Laguna. In Carlos v. Angeles,18 the Court had the occasion to declare:

7
In this jurisdiction, an election means "the choice or selection of candidates to public office by
popular vote" through the use of the ballot, and the elected officials of which are determined
through the will of the electorate. "An election is the embodiment of the popular will, the
expression of the sovereign power of the people." "Specifically, the term ‘election,’ in the
context of the Constitution, may refer to the conduct of the polls, including the listing of voters,
the holding of the electoral campaign, and the casting and counting of votes." The winner is the
candidate who has obtained a majority or plurality of valid votes cast in the election. "Sound
policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who receive the highest number of
votes cast in the election for that office. For, in all republican forms of government the basic
idea is that no one can be declared elected and no measure can de declared carried unless he
or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the election."19

We quote, with approval, the ruling of the Comelec (First Division) granting the petition of the
MBOC:

A careful perusal of the records show that there was, indeed, an honest error committed by
petitioner MBOC in the computation of votes for candidate Ecelson Sumague which resulted in
the erroneous proclamation of respondent as one of the winners for the said office.

"A manifest clerical error is one that is visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding and is
apparent from the papers to the eye of the appraiser and collector, and does not include an
error which may, by evidence dehors the record be shown to have been committed."

The contention of respondent that the instant petition should be dismissed for being filed out
of time cannot be given merit because his proclamation was flawed. It must be stressed that "a
proclamation based on faulty tabulation of votes is flawed, and a petition to correct errors in
tabulation under Section 7, Rule 27 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, even if filed out of
time, may be considered, so as not to thwart the proper determination and resolution of the
case on substantial grounds and to prevent a stamp of validity on a palpably void proclamation
based on an erroneous tabulation of votes."

Furthermore, "where the proclamation is flawed because it was based on a clerical error or
mathematical mistake in the addition of votes and not through the legitimate will of the
electorate, there can be no valid proclamation to speak of and the same can be challenged
even after the candidate has assumed office."

There is no showing that petitioner MBOC acted with manifest bias and committed a grave
abuse of discretion. "Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise
of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility which must be so patent
and gross as to amount to an invasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law." Petitioner MBOC is merely doing its function
that is mandated by law – to canvass votes in the election returns submitted to it in due form,
adding or compiling the votes cast for each candidate as shown in the face of such returns and

8
eventually proclaim the winning candidates. Respondent miserably failed to prove that
petitioner exhibited manifest bias thereby thwarting his chances of winning the last slot for
Sangguniang Bayan Member. "Absent a strong showing to the contrary, the court must accept
the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty and strong evidence is
necessary to rebut this presumption."

Likewise, it cannot be said that petitioner MBOC violated the sanctity of the ballots. Unlike the
Board of Election Inspectors which counts the votes from the precinct levels, the MBOC
computes the votes as appeared in the election returns.

Finally, a subsequent annulment of the proclamation of the respondent does not constitute a
clear violation of his right. In the first place, there is no valid proclamation to speak of. He was
not elected by a majority or plurality of voters. His alleged right was based on an erroneous
proclamation. By any mathematical formulation, the respondent cannot be construed to have
obtained such plurality of votes; otherwise, it would be sheer absurdity to proclaim a
repudiated candidate as the choice of the voters. "Where a proclamation is null and void, the
proclamation is no proclamation at all and the proclaimed candidate’s assumption of office
cannot deprive the COMELEC of the power to make such declaration a nullity." Respondent also
cannot claim that he was denied of his right to due process of law since he was given the
opportunity to be heard. He was duly notified by petitioner MBOC of the erroneous
computation which resulted in his proclamation and was afforded the opportunity to be heard
by this Commission.

"The COMELEC exercises immediate supervision and control over the members of the Boards of
Election Inspectors and Canvassers. Its statutory power of supervision and control includes the
power to revise, reverse or set aside the action of the boards, as well as to do what boards
should have done, even if questions relative thereto have not been elevated to it by an
aggrieved party, for such power includes the authority to initiate motu proprio or by itself steps
or actions that may be required pursuant to law."20

Petitioner posits that the Comelec’s reliance in the ruling of this Court in Bince, Jr. v.
Commission on Elections21 is misplaced since, unlike the present petition, petitioner therein
was an affected candidate who filed his petition on time.

The argument of petitioner does not persuade. The Court, in Bince, Jr. v. Commission on
Elections,22 declared that:

Assuming for the sake of argument that the petition was filed out of time, this incident alone
will not thwart the proper determination and resolution of the instant case on substantial
grounds. Adherence to a technicality that would put a stamp of validity on a palpably void
proclamation, with the inevitable result of frustrating the people’s will cannot be
countenanced. In Benito v. COMELEC, we categorically declared that:

9
x x x Adjudication of cases on substantive merits and not on technicalities has been consistently
observed by this Court. In the case of Juliano vs. Court of Appeals (20 SCRA 808) cited in
Duremdes v. Commission on Elections (178 SCRA 746), this Court had the occasion to declare
that:

Well-settled is the doctrine that election contests involve public interest, and technicalities and
procedural barriers should not be allowed to stand if they constitute an obstacle to the
determination of the true will of the electorate in the choice of their elective officials. And also
settled is the rule that laws governing election contests must be liberally construed to the end
that the will of the people in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by mere
technical objections (Gardiner v. Romulo, 26 Phil. 521; Galang v. Miranda, 35 Phil. 269;
Jalandoni v. Sarcon, G.R. No. L-6496, January 27, 1962; Macasunding v. Macalañang, G.R. No. L-
22779, March 31, 1965; Cauton v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. L-25467, April 27, 1967).
In an election case, the court has an imperative duty to ascertain by all means within its
command who is the real candidate elected by the electorate. (Ibasco v. Ilao, G.R. No. L-17512,
December 29, 1960). x x x (Juliano vs. Court of Appeals, supra, pp. 818-819). (Italics ours)

In the later case of Rodriguez v. Commission on Elections (119 SCRA 465), this doctrine was
reiterated and the Court went on to state that:

Since the early case of Gardiner v. Romulo (26 Phil. 521), this Court has made it clear that it
frowns upon any interpretation of the law or the rules that would hinder in any way not only
the free and intelligent casting of the votes in an election but also the correct ascertainment of
the results. This bent or disposition continues to the present. (Id., at p. 474).

The same principle still holds true today. Technicalities of the legal rules enunciated in the
election laws should not frustrate the determination of the popular will.

Undoubtedly therefore, the only issue that remains unresolved is the allowance of the
correction of what are purely mathematical and/or mechanical errors in the addition of the
votes received by both candidates. It does not involve the opening of ballot boxes; neither does
it involve the examination and/or appreciation of ballots. The correction sought by private
respondent and respondent MBCs of Tayug and San Manuel is correction of manifest mistakes
in mathematical addition. Certainly, this only calls for a mere clerical act of reflecting the true
and correct votes received by the candidates by the MBCs involved. In this case, the manifest
errors sought to be corrected involve the proper and diligent addition of the votes in the
municipalities of Tayug and San Manuel, Pangasinan.23

The Court made a similar pronouncement in Tatlonghari v. Commission on Elections,24 to wit:

The argument is devoid of merit. For one thing, records indicate that respondent’s assumption
of office was effected by a clerical error or simple mathematical mistake in the addition of votes
and not through the legitimate will of the electorate. Thus, respondent’s proclamation was
flawed right from the very beginning. Having been based on a faulty tabulation, there can be no

10
valid proclamation to speak of insofar as respondent Castillo is concerned. As this Court once
said:

"x x x Time and again, this Court has given its imprimatur on the principle that Comelec is with
authority to annul any canvass and proclamation which was illegally made. The fact that a
candidate proclaimed has assumed office, we have said, is no bar to the exercise of such power.
It, of course, may not be availed of where there has been a valid proclamation. Since private
respondent’s petition before the Comelec is precisely directed at the annulment of the canvass
and proclamation, we perceive that inquiry into this issue is within the area allocated by the
Constitution and law to Comelec.

xxx

"We have but to reiterate the oft-cited rule that the validity of a proclamation may be
challenged even after the irregularly proclaimed candidate has assumed office.

xxx

"It is, indeed, true that, after proclamation, the usual remedy of any party aggrieved in an
election is to be found in an election protest. But that is so only on the assumption that there
has been a valid proclamation. Where as in the case at bar the proclamation itself is illegal, the
assumption of office cannot in any way affect the basic issues." (Aguam v. Commission on
Elections, 23 SCRA 883 [1968]; cited in Agbayani v. Commission on Elections, 186 SCRA 484
[1990]).25

Thus, the Comelec was correct in annulling the proclamation of petitioner for being based on an
erroneous computation of votes. As the Court declared in Espidol v. Commission on
Elections,26 where the proclamation is null and void, the proclaimed candidate’s assumption of
office cannot deprive the Commission the power to declare such proclamation a nullity. We
emphasized that a defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office.27

In fine, the Comelec did not commit grave abuse of discretion in annulling the proclamation of
petitioner. In a special civil action for certiorari, the burden is on the part of petitioner to prove
not merely reversible error, but grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the public respondent issuing the impugned order. Grave abuse of
discretion means a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough, it must be so grave as when the power is
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and
must be so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual
refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. 28

To the credit of the MBOC, when it realized that it made a mistake in computing the total
number of votes for respondent Sumague, it took swift action and called the attention of the
Comelec by filing the Petition to Correct Entries Made in the Statement of Votes for Councilor.

11
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Resolutions of the Commission on Elections in SPC No.
04-209 dated July 21, 2004 and November 18, 2004 are AFFIRMED. The Status Quo Order
issued by the Court dated January 11, 2005 is LIFTED.

SO ORDERED.

LORETTA P. DELA LLANA, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and RIZALINO F. PABLO, JR., respondents.

DECISION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

At bar is a petition for certiorari1 with prayer for a temporary restraining order seeking to set
aside the Resolution2dated February 19, 2002 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En
Banc in EPC Case No. 2001-6. The assailed Resolution affirmed the September 5, 2001
Resolution3 of the COMELEC First Division (1) granting the petition of respondent Rizalino F.
Pablo, Jr. for correction of manifest errors in the Statement of Votes cast in Precinct No. 92-A-1
at Castillejos, Zambales; and (2) annulling the proclamation of herein petitioner Loretta P. Dela
Llana as third member of the Provincial Board, First District of same province, due to the
erroneous and/or incomplete canvass of election returns.

The antecedent facts are:

In the May 14, 2001 elections, petitioner Loretta Dela Llana and respondent Rizalino Pablo, Jr.
were among the candidates for Provincial Board Member, First District of Zambales. The First
District, which comprised the municipalities of Subic, Castillejos and San Marcelino, is allotted
three (3) seats in the Provincial Board.

On May 18, 2001, the Provincial Board of Canvassers proclaimed the three (3) winning
candidates. Included was herein petitioner, being the third duly elected member of the
Provincial Board. They obtained the following votes:

1. Jose de Jesus Gutierrez, Sr. 22,926

2. Wilfredo Viloria Felarca 14,458
3. Loreta Panlilio Dela Llana 14,1174

Respondent ranked fourth, having garnered a total of 14,093 votes,5 or 24 votes less than that
obtained by petitioner.

12
Contesting the election and proclamation of petitioner, respondent, on May 25, 2001, initially
filed with the Electoral Contest Adjudication Department, COMELEC, an election
protest6 docketed as EPC Case No. 2001-6. Respondent alleged that when the Municipal Board
of Canvassers for the Municipality of Castillejos (MBC-Castillejos) canvassed the election returns
from various precincts, the 42 votes he obtained in Precinct No. 29-A-1 was altered and
reduced to only 4. Thus, he lost 38 votes. This 4 votes appeared in the Statement of Votes by
Precinct (Statement No. 21147137 ). When the Zambales Provincial Board of Canvassers
canvassed the Certificates of Canvass of Votes from the three municipalities in the First District,
respondent’s total votes were recorded only as 14,093, instead of 14,131 (14,093 + 38) votes.
The missing 38 votes, if counted in his favor, would have been sufficient to have him
proclaimed the third member of the Provincial Board of the First District of Zambales.

Petitioner, in her answer with counter-protest,8 denied respondent’s allegations. By way of

special and affirmative defenses, petitioner alleged inter alia that respondent, "who was then
an incumbent member of the Provincial Board of Zambales, has exercised his influence in all the
precincts in San Marcelino, Zambales, thereby crediting him with more votes than he actually
received." Petitioner thus prayed that "the results in all the precincts numbering 77 in San
Marcelino must likewise be put under protest."

In reply,9 respondent maintained that petitioner’s allegations and counter-protest are based on
mere speculation, devoid of any proof.

The case, which was assigned to the First Division, was set for hearing on July 16, 2001 to
determine "the issue of accuracy of the entries in the Statement of Votes in the questioned
Precinct No. 29-A-1."10

At the start of the hearing on July 16, 2001,11 the COMELEC First Division, through
Commissioner Resurreccion Z. Borra, declared that it is treating the case as one for correction
of manifest errors committed in the Statement of Votes of Castillejos, Zambales; and that
petitioner’s counter-protest is still "premature considering that it is not yet clear as to who
between the parties really won in the elections in view of the pending petitions filed before the
COMELEC, to wit: 1) the subject petition for correction of manifest errors; and 2) the petition
for the canvass of 5 uncanvassed precincts in Subic, Zambales pending before the Second
Division, docketed as SPC No. 01-264."12

The presentation of evidence then followed. Zosimo Remo, COMELEC Document Examiner,
presented a copy of the Election Returns (ER) for Precinct No. 29-A-1 with Serial No. 58040069.
The counsel of both parties examined the ER showing that the actual number of votes garnered
by respondent is 41. Then, Vilma Villegas, COMELEC Records Officer, presented the Statement
of Votes (SOV) with Serial No. 2114713 where Precinct No. 29-A-1 was entered. Again, the
parties’ counsel examined the SOV which revealed that the votes credited to respondent in that
precinct is only 4, instead of 41, or 37 votes less than what was actually garnered by him. Also
presented during the hearing was the Certificate of Canvass of Votes and Proclamation (COCVP)

13
of the winning candidates which disclosed that respondent garnered a total of 14,117 votes in
the First District of Zambales.

After the marking of exhibits presented during the July 16, 2001 hearing, the First Division
allowed the parties "to make their final manifestations," and for "counsel for both parties to
submit the case for resolution."13

In its Resolution14 dated September 5, 2001, the COMELEC First Division, a) granted
respondent’s petition for the correction of manifest errors; b) directed the Municipal Board of
Canvassers of Subic, Zambales to reconvene and effect the necessary corrections in the
Statement of Votes by Precinct to reflect therein the actual number of votes obtained by
respondent in Precinct No. 29-A-1; c) annulled petitioner’s proclamation, being based on an
erroneous and/or incomplete canvass of election returns; and d) ordered petitioner to
immediately vacate her post as the third member of the Provincial Board, First District of
Zambales, and to cease and desist from discharging the duties and functions of that office.

In the same Resolution, the First Division denied, for being premature, respondent’s prayer that
he be proclaimed the winning candidate for the questioned position. This is because of the fact
that a petition for the canvass of the 5 uncanvassed precincts in Subic, Zambales, docketed as
SPC No. 01-264, is still pending resolution before the Second Division, and it is not yet clear who
between the parties really won in the May 14, 2001 elections.

Surprisingly, despite the fact that petitioner actively participated in the July 16, 2001 hearing,
she filed a motion for reconsideration15 of the September 5, 2001 Resolution, contending that
the First Division has no authority/jurisdiction to convert motu proprio respondent’s petition
into one for correction of manifest errors. She claimed that the First Division acted with grave
abuse of discretion.

In an Order16 dated September 19, 2001, the First Division certified and elevated the entire
records of the case to the COMELEC En Banc.

On February 19, 2002, the COMELEC En Banc issued the assailed Resolution 17 denying
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration for lack of merit and affirming the September 5, 2001
Resolution of the First Division. The En Banc Resolution partly reads:

xxx

"A comparison of the Election Return for Precinct No. 29-A-1 and of the Statement of Votes
by Precinct for the Municipality of Castillejos shows that there was indeed a manifest error in
the copying of the figures from the Election Return to the Statement of Votes by Precinct. The
forty-one (41) votes garnered by petitioner in Precinct No. 29-A-1, as canvassed by the MBC
of Castillejos, was reduced to four (4) in the Statement of Votes by Precinct. Thus, it is but
right for this Commission to order the necessary correction in order to reflect the true will of
the people of the Municipality of Castillejos.

14
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to
AFFIRM the Resolution dated 5 September 2001 rendered by the First Division of this
Commission insofar as it:

1. GRANTED the instant petition of Rizalino F. Pablo, Jr. (now private respondent)
seeking for the correction of manifest errors in the Statement of Votes of Castillejos,
Zambales;

2. ANNULED the proclamation of herein respondent Loretta P. Dela Llana (now

petitioner) finding the same to have been based on an erroneous and/or incomplete
canvass of election returns;

3. ORDERED respondent Loretta P. Dela Llana to immediately vacate her post as the
third winning Board Member of the First District of Zambales and to cease, desist and
refrain from discharging and performing its duties and functions; and

4. DENIED the prayer of petitioner Rizalino F. Pablo, Jr. that he be proclaimed as the real
winning candidate, for being premature. This is in view of the fact that the canvassing of
the five (5) uncanvassed precincts in Subic, Zambales pursuant to the Resolution
rendered by the Second Division of this Commission in SPC No. 01-264 is still pending
before the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Subic; thus, it is not clear yet as to who
between the parties really won in the May 14, 2001 elections.

"ACCORDINGLY, this Commission En Banc DIRECTS, as it hereby DIRECTS,

1. the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Castillejos, Zambales to (i) RECONVENE and

effect the necessary corrections in the Statement of Votes to reflect therein the actual
number of votes garnered by petitioner in Precinct No. 29-A-1; and (ii) to SUBMIT the
corrected Statement of Votes and Certificate of Canvass for Provincial Officials to the
Provincial Board of Canvassers of Zambales; and

2. the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Zambales to (i) RECONVENE and CANVASS

ANEW the corrected Certificates of Canvass to be submitted by the Municipal Board of
Canvassers of Castillejos, Zambales and by the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Subic,
Zambales after the latter has finished canvassing the aforesaid five (5) uncanvassed
precincts in Subic, pursuant to the Resolution rendered by the Second Division of this
Commission in SPC No. 01-264; and (ii) PROCLAIM the TRUE WINNING CANDIDATE for
the disputed position of THIRD BOARD MEMBER OF THE FIRST DISTRICT OF ZAMBALES.

"SO ORDERED. " (Underscoring supplied)

Hence, the present recourse.

15
Petitioner contends that the COMELEC EN BANC, in issuing its February 19, 2002 Resolution,
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it –

TREATED THE PETITION FOR ELECTION PROTEST FILED BY HEREIN RESPONDENT AS A CASE FOR
CORRECTION OF MANIFEST ERRORS;

II

JUSTIFIED SUCH CONVERSION BY SUSPENDING ITS OWN RULES; and

III

DIRECTED THE PROVINCIAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF ZAMBALES TO (1) RECONVENE, (2)

CANVASS ANEW THE CORRECTED CERTIFICATES OF CANVASS TO BE SUBMITTED BY THE
MUNICIPAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF CASTILLEJOS, ZAMBALES, AND (3) PROCLAIM THE
WINNING CANDIDATE FOR THE POSITION OF THIRD MEMBER OF THE PROVINCIAL BOARD,
FIRST DISTRICT, ZAMBALES.18

Petitioner maintains that the COMELEC is without authority/jurisdiction to treat respondent’s

petition for election protest as a case for correction of manifest errors and justify such act by
suspending its own Rules of Procedure. Even assuming it has authority to do so, still such
conversion is no longer possible because respondent’s questioned petition was filed beyond the
reglementary period. Under Section 1, Rule 20 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, a petition
for an election protest must be filed "within 10 ten days after the proclamation of the results of
the election," and under Section 5, Rule 27 of the same Rules, a petition for correction of
manifest errors "must be filed not later than five (5) days following the date of proclamation."
Since petitioner was proclaimed on May 18, 2001, respondent should have filed his petition for
correction of manifest errors within 5 days from said date, or on or before May 23, 2001. It was
only on May 25, 2001, or 2 days late, that he filed his petition with the COMELEC.

In his comment19 on the petition, Solicitor General Alfredo L. Benipayo disputed petitioner’s
theory and prayed that the instant petition be denied for lack of merit.

The petition must fail.

The Constitution has vested to the COMELEC broad powers, involving not only the enforcement
and administration of all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of elections, but also the
resolution and determination of election controversies.20 It also granted the COMELEC the
power and authority to promulgate its rules of procedure, with the primary objective of
ensuring the expeditious disposition of election cases.21

16
Concomitant to such powers is the authority of the COMELEC to determine the true nature of
the cases filed before it. Thus, it examines the allegations of every pleading filed, obviously
aware that in determining the nature of the complaint or petition, its averments, rather than its
title/caption, are the proper gauges.22

This was what the COMELEC did when it treated respondent’s questioned petition in EPC No.
2001-06 (captioned as an election protest) as a case for correction of manifest errors. The
COMELEC found that the averments therein actually call for the rectification of apparent errors
in the Statement of Votes in Precinct No. 29-A-1 of Castillejos, Zambales. The pertinent portions
of respondent’s petition read:

xxx

"9. Unknown to the petitioner (Rizalino F. Pablo, Jr., now respondent), when the election
returns from the precincts of Castillejos were canvassed by the Municipal Board of Canvassers,
the 42 votes obtained by the petitioner in Precinct No. 29-A-1 was altered and reduced to only
4 in the Statement of Votes by Precinct of the Municipal Board of Canvassers for the
Municipality of Castillejos. A copy thereof is attached hereto as Annexes ‘F’, ‘F-1’, ‘F-2’ and ‘F-3’.

"10. Pertinently, in Statement No. 2114713 (Annex ‘G-2’) under the column of Precinct No. 29-
A-1, appears the altered figure ‘4’ instead of the true and correct figure ‘42’ recorded in the
election return (Annex ‘D’) for the said precinct. It is the only single digit number of votes for
petitioner appearing in the Statement of Votes by Precinct, in contrast to the double-digit
numbers of votes in all the other precincts.

"11. Due to the aforementioned reduction and the loss of 38 votes thereby, petitioner was
erroneously recorded by the Municipal Board of Canvassers to have obtained only 4,111 votes
instead of the correct 4,149 votes in the municipality of Castillejos. A copy of the Certificate of
Canvass of Votes (No. 1581410) is attached hereto as Annex ’G’.

"12. Subsequently, the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Zambales canvassed the Certificates of
Canvass of Votes from the three (3) municipalities of Subic, Castillejos and San Marcelino, and
proclaimed the following results of the election for Board Members in the First District as
shown in the Statement of Votes (No. 4010026) attached hereto as Annex ‘H’, to wit:

Jose D. Gutierrez 22,926

Wilfredo V. Felarca 14,458
Loreta P. de la Llana 14,117
Rizalino F. Pablo, Jr. 14,093
Pedro B. Delgado 7,232

17
 Enrique E. Vega 4,502
Dyna P. de la Llana 3,846
Christopher V. Legaspi 2,038

x x x"

Indeed, a reading of respondent’s petition reveals that what is being sought is the correction of
the manifest errors committed in the Statement of Votes. In Trinidad vs. COMELEC,23 we held
that "correction of manifest errors has reference to errors in the election returns, in the entries
of the statement of votes by precinct per municipality, or in the certificate of canvass." Some of
the definitions given for the word "manifest" are that "it is evident to the eye and
understanding; visible to the eye; that which is open, palpable, and incontrovertible; needing
no evidence to make it more clear; not obscure or hidden."24

The fact that petitioner prayed for annulment of respondent’s proclamation in his petition is
immaterial and does not change the nature of the instant petition. "The prayer in a pleading
does not constitute an essential part of the allegations determinative of the jurisdiction of a
court. The question of jurisdiction depends largely upon the determination of the true nature of
the action filed by a party which, in turn, involves the consideration of the ultimate facts alleged
as constitutive of the cause of action therein (Bautista vs. Fernandez, L-24062, April 30, 1971).
The prayer for relief, although part of the complaint, cannot create a cause of action, hence it
cannot be considered a part of the allegations on the nature of the cause of action (Rosales vs.
Reyes, 25 Phil. 495; Cabigao vs. Lim, 50 Phil. 844)."25

In any event, petitioner is estopped from questioning the issue of jurisdiction of the COMELEC.
Not only did she actively participate in the proceedings before the First Division, but she also
sought affirmative relief by filing her Answer with Counter-Protest wherein she asked that "all
the precincts in the 3 municipalities in the First District be placed under protest." 26 It is certainly
not right for a party taking part in the proceedings and submitting his case for decision to attack
the decision later for lack of jurisdiction of the tribunal because the decision turned out to be
adverse to him.27

We likewise find unmeritorious petitioner’s contention that the COMELEC can no longer
entertain respondent’s petition because it was filed 2 days late.

It bears stressing that in an election case, it is the primary duty of the COMELEC and the courts
to ascertain by all means the will of the electorate. Thus, when the COMELEC treated
respondent’s petition as one for correction of manifest errors, it was merely complying with its
duty. Petitioner has put premium on technicalities over and above such noble duty. In
Duremdes vs. COMELEC,28 we held that the determination of the true will of the electorate
should be paramount, thus:

18
"Election contests involve public interest.1âwphi1 Technicalities and procedural barriers should
not be allowed to stand if they constitute an obstacle to the determination of the true will of
the electorate in the choice of their elective officials… Laws (and rules) governing election
contests must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in the choice of
public officials may not be defeated by mere technical objections. In an election case, the court
has an imperative duty to ascertain by all means within its command who is the real candidate
elected by the electorate." (Underscoring supplied)

Instead of dismissing the petition for purely technical reasons, the COMELEC correctly
considered the merits thereof. In Tatlonghari vs. Commission on Elections,29 where a similar
petition was filed 97 days from the date of proclamation, we held:

"The argument is devoid of merit. For one thing, records indicate that respondent’s assumption
of office was effected by a clerical error or simple mathematical mistake in the addition of votes
and not through the legitimate will of the electorate. Thus, respondent’s proclamation was
flawed right from the very beginning. Having been based on a faulty tabulation, there can be no
valid proclamation to speak of insofar as respondent Castillo is concerned. As this Court once
said:

‘x x x. Time and again, this Court has given its imprimatur on the principle that COMELEC is with
authority to annul any canvass and proclamation which was illegally made. The fact that a
candidate proclaimed has assumed office, we have said, is no bar to the exercise of such power.
It of course may not be availed of where there has been a valid proclamation. Since private
respondent’s petition before the COMELEC is precisely directed at the annulment of the
canvass and proclamation, we perceive that inquiry into this issue is within the area allocated
by the Constitution and law to COMELEC.

xxx

‘We have but to reiterate the oft-cited rule that the validity of a proclamation may be
challenged even after the irregularly proclaimed candidate has assumed office.

xxx

‘It is indeed true that after proclamation the usual remedy of any party aggrieved in an election
is to be found in an election protest. But that is so only on the assumption that there has been a
valid proclamation. Where as in the case at bar the proclamation itself is illegal, the assumption
of office cannot in any way affect the basic issues’ (Aguam vs. Commission on Elections, 23
SCRA 883 [1968]; cited in Agbayani vs. Commission on Elections, 186 SCRA 484 [1990]).’

"In view of the foregoing, the Court deems it unnecessary to pass upon the timeliness of
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration before the respondent Commission.1âwphi1 While
petitioner might have been tardy in filing the same, this Court cannot declare that petitioner

19
lost his right to a public office to which he was duly elected by a mere lapse of time, the length
of which was not even the product of his won wrong doing."

In the same vein, we ruled in Bince, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections30 that:

"Assuming for the sake of argument that the petition was filed out of time, this incident alone
will not thwart the proper determination and resolution of the instant case on substantial
grounds. Adherence to a technicality that would put a stamp of validity on a palpably void
proclamation, with the inevitable result of frustrating the people’s will, cannot be
countenanced."

Thus, the COMELEC did not act with grave abuse of discretion when it entertained respondent’s
petition by suspending its own Rules of Procedure. This is clearly allowed under Section 4, Rule
1 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, which provides:

"Section 4. Suspension of the Rules. – In the interest of justice and in order to obtain speedy
disposition of all matters pending before the Commission, these rules or any portion thereof
may be suspended by the Commission." (Underscoring supplied)

Certainly, such rule of suspension is in accordance with the spirit of Section 6, Article IX-A of the
Constitution which bestows upon the COMELEC the power to "promulgate its own rules
concerning pleadings and practice before it or before any of its offices" to attain justice and the
noble purpose of determining the true will of the electorate.31

It is significant to note that petitioner does not assail the factual findings of the COMELEC that
"there was indeed manifest error in the copying of the figures from the election returns to the
Statement of Votes by Precinct. The 41 votes garnered by petitioner in Precinct No. 29-A-1, as
canvassed by the MBC of Castillejos, was reduced to four (4) in the Statement of Votes by
Precinct."32 Clearly, the assailed Resolution of the COMELEC ordering the necessary correction
of the Statement of Votes of Castillejos, Zambales, to reflect the true will of the people of that
municipality, is in order.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is dISMISSED for lack of merit.

20
MARIA ANGELA S. GARCIA v. COMELEC, GR No. 216691, 2015-07-21
Facts:
Petitioner Maria Angela S. Garcia (Garcia) and Payumo were candidates for the mayoralty race
of Dinalupihan, Bataan during the May 13, 2013 national and local elections. In the poll's
conclusion, Garcia was proclaimed winner for having garnered 31,138 votes as against
Payumo's
13,202. The Office of the Election Officer of Dinalupihan then released to Payumo a certified
copy of the printed Certificate of Canvass of Votes and Proclamation (printed COCP), bearing
May 15, 2013 as the date of proclamation of the winning mayoralty candidate.
On May 27, 2013, Payumo lodged an election protest... with the Regional Trial Court... citing
the alleged prevalence of fraud and irregularities in all the clustered precincts of
Dinalupihan, heightened by the Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS) machines' unreliability,
casting doubt on the results of the counting and canvassing of votes.
Payumo claimed that from May 15, 2013, the proclamation... date appearing on the printed
COCP, he had ten (10) days, or until May 25, 2013, within which to challenge the election
results
Garcia belied the allegations of fraud and urgently moved for the dismissal of Payumo's protest.
On July 1, 2013, the RTC heard the motion for preliminary determination of the affirmative
defense of prescription.
Giving credence to petitioner's assertion, the RTC, through its Order... dated February 17, 2014,
dismissed Payumo's protest for being barred by the statute of limitations.
The Comelec First Division, by its September 10, 2014 Resolution, granted Payumo's appeal
Garcia contends that the reckoning date of the 10-day reglementary period is from the actual
date of proclamation, which is May 14, 2013.
Meanwhile, Payumo counters that Garcia was proclaimed on May 15, 2013, and assuming
arguendo that it was done on May 14, 2013, as Garcia insists the proclamation date to be, he
cannot be faulted for relying on the date appearing on the printed COCP he... received.
Respondent Comelec's Consolidated Comment, filed by the Office of the Solicitor General,
echoes the sentiment of Payumo that the latter could not have known that Garcia was
proclaimed on May 14, 2015 because the printed COCP, which was furnished him, stated
otherwise.

21
Issues:
whether or not Payumo's election protest was filed out of time
Ruling:
The wording of the afore-quoted rule is pregnant with meaning. First, its literal interpretation is
that only the winning candidates have the demandable right to be furnished a copy of the
COCP.
the general rule that the prescriptive period... ought to be reckoned from the actual date of
proclamation, not from notice through service of a COCP, since the losing candidates are not
even required to be served a copy of the COCP in the first place.
it warns the candidates to be more vigilant in monitoring... the results of the elections for them
to be conscious of the deadline for filing an election protest, should they opt to contest the
results.
Court maintains the general rule that the reglementary period for instituting an election period
should be reckoned from the actual date of proclamation, not from the date of notice... the
petition is hereby GRANTED

[ G.R. No. 212953, August 05, 2014 ]

JOSE TAPALES VILLAROSA, PETITIONER, VS. ROMULO DE MESA FESTIN AND COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, RESPONDENT.

RESOLUTION
VELASCO JR., J.:
Nature of the Case

This treats of the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court assailing the Order[1] dated June 3, 2014 of public respondent Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) in SPR (AEL) No. 04-2014.

The Facts

Petitioner Jose Tapales Villarosa (Villarosa) and respondent Romulo de Mesa Festin (Festin)
were two of the four rival candidates for the mayoralty post in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro
during the May 13, 2013 National and Local Elections. On May 15, 2013, private respondent
was proclaimed the victor, having garnered 20,761 votes, edging out petitioner who obtained
19,557 votes.

22
With a difference of only 1,204 votes, petitioner filed a Petition for Protest Ad Cautelam before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) alleging irregularities attending the conduct of the elections.
Specifically, petitioner brought to the attention of the court the complaints of various voters
who claimed that several ballots were pre-marked or that the ovals appearing on the face of
the ballots corresponding to the name of petitioner were embossed or waxed to prevent them
from being shaded. As a consequence of the alleged massive electoral fraud and irregularities in
the 92 clustered precincts of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, private respondent, so petitioner
claimed, was illegally proclaimed.

In his answer, private respondent Festin likewise impugned the election results in the precincts,
particularly the number of votes credited to petitioner.

With both parties raising as principal issue the accuracy of the vote count, a physical recount of
the ballots were conducted under the auspices of the RTC, Branch 46 in San Jose, Occidental
Mindoro.

Ruling of the RTC

On November 7, 2013, the RTC rendered a Decision declaring the proclamation of respondent
Festin void, viz:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court hereby DECLARES the Protestant, JOSE TAPALES
VILLAROSA as the duly elected mayor of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro during the May 13, 2013
National and Local Election and VOIDS the Proclamation of Protestee Romulo De Mesa Festin as
elected Mayor by the Board of Election Inspectors of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro. [2]

The RTC justified its ruling by deducting 2,050 votes from private respondent that were
allegedly pre-marked or tampered.

Following this development, petitioner filed a Motion for Execution Pending Appeal, which was
granted by the RTC on January 15, 2014.[3] On January 23, 2014, respondent Festin's motion for
reconsideration was denied.

Meanwhile, on February 3, 2014, private respondent Festin elevated the case to public
respondent COMELEC via a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for injunctive relief. Petitioner
immediately moved for its dismissal on the ground that the petition's verification is allegedly
defective.

Ruling of the COMELEC

Without yet ruling on the motion to dismiss, the COMELEC, acting through its First Division, on

23
February 13, 2014, issued an Order requiring petitioner to file his answer to the petition.
Through the same Order, the COMELEC issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) to enjoin
the RTC from implementing its Decision during the pendency of the case. Without waiving the
grounds relied on his motion to dismiss, petitioner timely filed his answer to the petition.

To petitioner's surprise, on April 10, 2014, public respondent COMELEC granted private
respondent's request for a preliminary injunction, enjoining the RTC Decision's execution
pending appeal. What petitioner considered questionable was that the injunction was issued by
a newly-constituted Special First Division, which was allegedly formed due to the absence of
several COMELEC commissioners who, at that time, were personally attending to the concerns
of the overseas absentee voters abroad. Petitioner points out that the special division was
constituted only on April 8, 2014 through Resolution No. 9868 and was composed of only two
members, Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. and Commissioner Al A. Parreño, with the former
presiding.

In response to the issuance of the injunction, petitioner filed an urgent motion praying for its
quashal, which was denied by public respondent COMELEC First Division through the assailed
June 3, 2014 Order. Thus, the instant petition.

The Issues

In ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of public respondent COMELEC, petitioner
relied on the following grounds:

1. Public respondent COMELEC (First Division) committed grave abuse of discretion

amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it did not find that the Special First
Division did not have jurisdiction to issue an injunction;

2. Public respondent COMELEC (First Division) committed grave abuse of discretion

amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it denied the urgent ex-parte motion to
quash the writ of preliminary injunction.

Concisely stated, the issue in this case is the legality of the formation of the Special First
Division and the validity of the Orders it issued, specifically the April 10, 2014 Order granting
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.

According to the petitioner, the COMELEC First Division acquired jurisdiction over the case on
February 13, 2014 when it directed him to file an answer relative to the appeal filed by private
respondent Festin, and when it issued a TRO enjoining the execution pending appeal. Thus,
petitioner insists that this precluded the Special First Division from acquiring jurisdiction over

24
the same case and, consequently, from issuing the writ of preliminary injunction. As argued by
the petitioner, the mere absence of two of the commissioners in the division is not sufficient to
oust it of jurisdiction and confer the same on a new one.

The Court's Ruling

We dismiss the petition for lack of merit.

Propriety of certiorari in assailing COMELEC rulings

Petitioner's recourse, aside from being unsound in substance, is procedurally infirm.The

governing provision is Section 7, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:

Section 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any case or
matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or
resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of
the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the rules of the Commission or by the
Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision,
order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the
aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.(emphasis added)

In the instructive case of Ambil v. Commission on Elections,[4]We have interpreted the provision
to limitthe remedy of certiorari against final orders, rulings and decisions of the COMELEC en
banc rendered in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers.[5] Certiorari will not
generally lie against an order, ruling, or decision of a COMELEC division for being premature,
taking into account the availability of the plain, speedy and adequate remedy of a motion for
reconsideration. As elucidated in the case:

Rule 65, Section 1, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, requires that there be no appeal,
or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. A motion for
reconsideration is a plain and adequate remedy provided by law. Failure to abide by this
procedural requirement constitutes a ground for dismissal of the petition.

In like manner, a decision, order or resolution of a division of the Comelec must be reviewed
by the Comelec en banc via a motion for reconsideration before the final en banc decision
may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari. The pre-requisite filing of a motion for
reconsideration is mandatory.[6] (emphasis added)

The above doctrine further gained force when it was reiterated in Our recent ruling in Cagas v.
COMELEC,[7] in which We held that a party aggrieved by an interlocutory order issued by a
Division of the COMELEC in an election protest may not directly assail the said order in this

25
Court through a special civil action for certiorari. The remedy is to seek the review of the
interlocutory order during the appeal of the decision of the Division in due course. [8]

The exception in Kho v. COMELEC is inapplicable

As an exception to the cases of Ambil and Cagas, We have ruled in Kho vs. COMELEC[9]that
when it does not appear to be specifically provided under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure that
the challenged final order or decision is one that the COMELEC en banc may sit and consider,
the aggrieved party can, by necessity, directly resort to the Court as the proper forum for
reviewing the ruling. Thus, We have granted,in the said case, the petition assailing an
interlocutory order of a COMELEC division.

The exception, however, does not obtain herein. Noteworthy is that in 1997, when Kho was
resolved, what was then in force was the COMELEC Rules of Procedure promulgated on
February 15, 1993 (1993 COMELEC Rules). As expressly provided in Rule 3 of the 1993 COMELEC
Rules:

Section 2. The Commission en banc. The Commission shall sit en banc in cases hereinafter
specifically provided, or in pre-proclamation cases upon a vote of a majority of the members of
a commission, or in all other cases where a division is not authorized to act, or where, upon a
unanimous vote of all the members of a Division, an interlocutory matter or issue relative an
action or proceeding before it is decided to be referred to the commission en banc.

x x x x

Section 5. Quorum; Votes required. x x x

x x x x

(c) Any motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order or ruling of a Division shall be
resolved by the Commission en banc except motions on interlocutory orders of the division
which shall be resolved by the division which issued the order.

Patent in the above-cited provisions is that the COMELEC en banc, at that time, did not have the
power to resolve motions for reconsideration with respect to interlocutory orders issued by a
division. This circumstance was a controlling factor in Our ruling in Kho.

On the other hand, applicable in the instant petition is COMELEC Resolution No.
8804,[10] promulgated on March 22, 2010. As expressly provided:

26
Rule 20
Motion for Reconsideration

Section 1. Grounds of Motion for Reconsideration. - A motion for reconsideration may be filed
on the grounds that the evidence is insufficient to justify the decision, order or ruling; or that
the said decision, is contrary to law.

x x x x

Section 5. How motion for Reconsideration Disposed of. - Upon the filing of a motion
to reconsider a decision, resolution, order or ruling of a Division, the ECAD Clerk concerned
shall, within twenty-four (24) hours from the filing thereof, notify the Presiding Commissioner.
The latter shall within two (2) days thereafter certify the case to the Commission en banc.

x x x x

Section 7. Period to Decide by the Commission En Banc. - The motion for reconsideration shall
be decided within fifteen (15) days from the date the case or matter is deemed submitted for
decision, unless otherwise provided by law. (emphasis added)

Stark is the contrast between the two cited rules. To reiterate, under the 1993 COMELEC Rules,
the COMELEC en banc is strictly prohibited from entertaining motions for reconsideration of
interlocutory orders unless unanimously referred to the en banc by the members of the division
that issued the same, whereas under COMELEC Resolution No. 8804, all motions for
reconsideration filed with regard to decisions, resolutions, orders and rulings of the COMELEC
divisions are automatically referred to the COMELEC en banc. Thus, in view of COMELEC
Resolution No. 8804's applicability in the instant petition, a motion for reconsideration before
the COMELEC en banc is available to petitioner herein unlike in Kho.

From the foregoing, petitioner's procedural lapse becomes manifest. With the availability of a
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at petitioner's disposal, his hasty resort to certiorari to this
Court cannot be justified. On this ground alone, the instant petition can and should be
dismissed outright.

The assailed Order was not issued in grave abuse of discretion

Even delving into the merits of the case, it cannot be said that the issuance of the assailed
Order was tainted with grave abuse of discretion since public respondent's actions find
sufficient constitutional basis under Sec. 3, Art. IX-C of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:

Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate
its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-
proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in division,

27
provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en
banc.(emphasis added)

Evidently, it is pursuant to this mandate that the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No.
7808[11] on January 16, 2007. Sec. 6, Rule 3 of the said Resolution, in part, provides:

Sec. 6.Substitution of members of a Division.

(a) Temporary vacancy. Whenever a member of a Division is on leave, seriously ill, temporarily
disabled, is absent, inhibits himself, or is disqualified from sitting in a case, the junior member
of the other Division shall substitute such Commissioner, participating therein in an acting
capacity, in addition to his regular membership in his own Division.

x x x x

Under either of the foregoing substitutions, the Division where the acting or signing member is
assigned shall be designated as "Special First Division" or "Special Second Division," as the case
may be, for purposes of the pertinent cases therein pending."

Thereafter, with the retirement of Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento and Commissioner

Armando Velasco, the above-quoted rule was amended by Resolution No. 9636[12] on February
13, 2013 to now read as:

Sec. 6 Substitution of member of a Division. -

(a) Temporary vacancy. - Whenever a member of a Division is on Leave, seriously ill,

temporarily disabled, is absent, inhibits himself, or is disqualified from sitting in a case, the
Chairman shall substitute him with another Commissioner, or the Chairman shall sit in place of
said member, and in that event he will preside.

x x x x

Under either of the foregoing substitutions, the Division where the acting or signing member is
assigned shall be designated as "Special First Division" or "Special Second Division" as the case
may be, for purposes of the pertinent case therein pending.

Invoking the rule, as amended, the COMELEC then issued Resolution No. 9868[13] on April 8,
2014. The Resolution sought to address the temporary vacancies in both Divisions of the
COMELEC in view of the pressing matters concerning overseas absentee voting that required
the attention and presence abroad of Commissioners Lucenito N. Tagle and Christian Robert S.
Lim of the COMELEC First Division, and of Commissioner Elias R. Yusoph of the Second
Division.[14]

28
Due to the absences of the aforementioned Commissioners, and to constitute a quorum for the
Divisions, Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. sat as presiding Chairman for both Divisions until his
colleagues' return.[15] Thus, pursuant to Section 6, Rule 3 as amended, Special Divisions were
created with the following compositions:[16]

SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION

Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. Presiding
Commissioner Al A. Parreño Member Commissioner
SPECIAL SECOND DIVISION
Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. Presiding
Commissioner Maria GraciaCielo M. Padaca Member Commissioner
Commissioner Luie Tito F. Guia Member Commissioner

With the foregoing discussion, it becomes indisputable that the formation of the Special
Divisions is not only sanctioned by the COMELEC Rules but also by the Constitution no less.

No fault, let alone grave abuse of discretion, can be ascribed to the COMELEC when the Special
First Division issued the questioned writ of preliminary injunction. Contrary to petitioner's
claim, it cannot be said that the First Division and the Special First Division are two distinct
bodies and that there has been consequent transfers of the case between the two.Strictly
speaking, the COMELEC did not create a separate Division but merely and temporarily filled in
the vacancies in both of its Divisions. The additional term "special," in this case, merely
indicates that the commissioners sitting therein may only be doing so in a temporary capacity
or via substitution.

The COMELEC First Division exercises jurisdiction over the cases that were assigned to it before
the substitution was made, including SPR (AEL) No. 04-2014. This jurisdiction was not lost by
the subsequent formation of the Special First Division since this only entailed a change in the
Division's composition of magistrates. Indeed, the case was not reassigned or re-raffled anew. If
anything, it was only petitioner's naivety that misled him into interpreting the designation of
the division as a "special" one, meaning it is distinct from the first. Corollarily, petitioner is also
mistaken in claiming that the jurisdiction was eventually "re-acquired" by the First Division from
the Special First Division by ruling on the motion to quash since the First Division never lost
jurisdiction to begin with.

Petitioner raises a fuss anent the temporary or permanent shuffling of members in the
Commission when, in fact, this is not a novel practice. In instances such as this, exigencies
justify the substitution of members and the designation of special divisions to prevent paralysis
in the administration of justice. This is also resorted to in order to ensure that the speedy
disposition of cases is not impeded and that docket systems are unclogged. Obviously, these
advantages far outweigh petitioner's baseless cry of violation of due process.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.

29
G.R. No. 216572
FELICIANO P. LEGASPI, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ALFREDO GERMAR, and ROGELIO P. SANTOS, JR., Respondents.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

This is a Petition for Certiorari1 assailing the Order2 dated 28 January 2015 of respondent
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) en bane in SPA No. 13-323 (DC).

The Parties

Respondents Alfredo Germar (Germar) and Rogelio P. Santos, Jr. (Santos), along with one
Roberto C. Esquivel (Esquivel), were among the candidates fielded by the Liberal Party (LP) to
vie for local elective posts in Norzagaray, Bulacan, during the 13 May 2013 elections. Germar
ran for the position of mayor, Santos ran for the position of councilor, and Esquivel ran for the
position of vice-mayor.

Petitioner Feliciano P. Legaspi, on the other hand, was the National Unity Party’s (NUP’s) bet for
mayor of Norzagaray during the 2013 polls.

The Election Results and the Petition for Disqualification

After the votes cast by the Norzagaray electorate were tallied, Germar emerged as the highest
vote getter in the mayoralty race. Santos, for his part, also appeared to have secured enough
votes to be the second councilor of the municipality. Esquivel, though, failed in his bid to
become vice-mayor of Norzagaray.

Upon learning about the results of the tally, petitioner immediately filed before the Municipal
Board of Canvassers (MBC) of Norzagaray a motion to suspend the proclamation of Germar and
Santos as winning candidates. Such motion, however, proved to be futile.

At exactly 7:45 a.m. on 14 May 2013, despite the petitioner’s motion, the MBC proclaimed
Germar and Santos as duly elected mayor and councilor of the municipality of Norzagaray,
respectively.

A few hours3 after the said proclamation, petitioner filed before the COMELEC a Petition for
Disqualification against Germar, Santos, and Esquivel. In it, petitioner accused Germar, Santos,
and Esquivel of having engaged in rampant vote buying during the days leading to the elections.

The Petition for Disqualification was docketed as SPA No. 13-323 (DC) and was assigned to the
COMELEC First Division, then composed of Commissioners Lucenito N. Tagle (Commissioner

30
Tagle), Christian Robert S. Lim (Commissioner Christian Lim) and Al A. Parreño (Commissioner
Parreño).

COMELEC First Division and Special First Division

In due course, the COMELEC First Division took a vote on SPA No. 13-323 (DC). The vote of the
division was an even 1-1 split, with Commissioner Tagle voting in favor of granting the petition
for disqualification, but with Commissioner Christian Lim voting against it. The third member of
the division, i.e., Commissioner Parreño, was not able to provide the potential tie-breaking vote
as he was then absent and attending to some other official business.

Due to the impasse created by the absence of one of its members, the COMELEC First Division
called for the constitution of a Special First Division through which COMELEC Chairman Sixto S.
Brillantes, Jr. sat in the First Division as acting member vice the absent Commissioner Parreño
for purposes of SPA No. 13-323 (DC).4

On 3 October 2013, the COMELEC Special First Division, by a 2 to 1 vote, rendered a resolution:
(1) disqualifying Germar and Santos for the positions of mayor and councilor, respectively, of
Norzagaray; and (2) referring the criminal aspect of SPA No. 13-323 (DC) to the COMELEC Law
Department for preliminary investigation.5

Germar, Santos, and Esquivel filed a motion for reconsideration with the COMELEC en banc.

The COMELEC En Banc and the Dismissal of the Electoral Aspect of SPA No. 13-323 (DC)

On 10 July 2004, the COMELEC en banc took a vote on the motion for reconsideration. At that
time, the COMELEC en banc had six (6) incumbent members.6 Of the six (6), however, only five
(5) members actually participated in the deliberations and casted votes. Commissioner Parreño
opted to take no part and did not vote.

The following were the results of the voting:

1. As to the electoral aspect of SPA No. 13-323 (DC), the vote was 3-2, i.e., 3 members
voted in favor of the disqualification of Germar and Santos, and 2 dissented.7 Hence, a
majority of at least four (4) votes was not reached with respect to the electoral aspect of
the case.

2. As to the criminal aspect of SPA No. 13-323 (DC), the vote was 4-1, i.e., 4 members
voted in favor of the referral of the criminal aspect of the disqualification case to the
COMELEC Law Department and 1 dissented.8Hence, a majority was reached with respect
to the criminal aspect of the case.

31
In view of the foregoing, the COMELEC en banc issued a resolution 9 denying the motion for
reconsideration with respect to the criminal aspect of SPA No. 13-323 (DC), but ordering the
conduct of a rehearing insofar as the electoral aspect of the case was concerned.

After the rehearing, the COMELEC en banc took another vote but it still failed to muster a
majority consensus on the electoral aspect of SPA No. 13-323 (DC).10 The final vote of the
COMELEC en banc on the matter remained at the exact 3-2 split that it was before the
rehearing.11 Commissioner Parreño maintained his "no part" stance, while newly appointed
Commissioner Arthur D. Lim also opted to take no part and did not vote.

Thus, on 28 January 2015, the COMELEC en banc issued an Order 12 directing the dismissal of
the electoral aspect of SPA No. 13-323 (DC) pursuant to Section 6, Rule 18 of the 1993
COMELEC Rules of Procedure13 (COMELEC Rules), to wit:

Sec. 6. Procedure if Opinion is Equally Divided. – When the Commission en banc is equally
divided in opinion, or the necessary majority cannot be had, the case shall be reheard, and if on
rehearing no decision is reached, the action or proceeding shall be dismissed if originally
commenced in the Commission; in appealed cases gment or order appealed from shall stand
affirmed; and in all incidental matters, the petition or motion shall be denied. (Emphasis ours.)

Unconvinced, petitioner filed the present petition14 before this Court.

The Present Petition

Petitioner claims that COMELEC en banc gravely abused its discretion when it dismissed the
electoral aspect of SPA No. 13-323 (DC). He protests that the dismissal was occasioned by a
"misapplication" by the COMELEC en banc of Section 6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules. 15

OUR RULING

We dismiss the present petition.

Let us start with the basics.

Section 7 of Article IX-A of the Constitution obliges the COMELEC, like the other constitutional
commissions, to decide all cases or matters before it by a "majority vote of all its
[m]embers."16 When such majority vote cannot be mustered by the COMELEC en banc, Section
6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules provides the mechanism to avert a non-decision. Thus:

Sec. 6. Procedure if Opinion is Equally Divided. – When the Commission en banc is equally
divided in opinion, or the necessary majority cannot be had, the case shall be reheard, and if on
rehearing no decision is reached, the action or proceeding shall be dismissed if originally

32
commenced in the Commission; in appealed cases, the jud pealed from shall stand affirmed;
and in all incidental matters, the petition or motion shall be denied.

Verily, under the cited provision, the COMELEC en banc is first required to rehear the case or
matter that it cannot decide or resolve by the necessary majority. When a majority still cannot
be had after the rehearing, however, there results a failure to decide on the part of the
COMELEC en banc. The provision then specifies the effects of the COMELEC en banc’s failure to
decide:

1. If the action or proceeding is originally commenced in the COMELEC, such action or

proceeding shall be dismissed;

2. In appealed cases, the judgment or order appealed from shall stand affirmed; or

3. In incidental matters, the petition or motion shall be denied.

As can be gleaned above, the effects of the COMELEC en banc’s failure to decide vary
depending on the type of case or matter that is before the commission. Thus, under the
provision, the first effect (i.e., the dismissal of the action or proceeding) only applies when the
type of case before the COMELEC is an action or proceeding "originally commenced in the
commission"; the second effect (i.e., the affirmance of a judgment or order) only applies when
the type of case before the COMELEC is an "appealed case"; and the third effect (i.e., the denial
of the petition or motion) only applies when the case or matter before the COMELEC is an
"incidental matter."

Mendoza v. Commission on Elections, et al.17 gives us a key illustration of an application of the

first effect under Section 6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules.

Mendoza involved an electoral protest that was originally filed before the COMELEC and which
was raffled to one of its divisions. The COMELEC division to which the electoral protest was
assigned granted that protest, prompting the protestee to file a motion for reconsideration
with the COMELEC en banc. When the COMELEC en banc took a vote on the motion for
reconsideration, however, it failed to obtain the necessary majority vote. Consequently, the
COMELEC en banc reheard the matter and then took another vote. However, the second vote
also lacked the necessary majority. The final vote of the COMELEC en banc was 3-1 (i.e., 3 in
support of granting the protest and 1 dissent), with 3 members taking no part. 18 On the basis of
the foregoing, the COMELEC en banc issued a resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration (in effect sustaining the division’s decision). The protestee challenged the
foregoing resolution on the strength of the argument that the failure of the COMELEC en banc
to obtain the necessary majority should have resulted in the dismissal of the election protest
case itself pursuant to the first effect under Section 6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules.

When that dispute reached this Court in Mendoza, we sustained the protestee. We held that
the first effect applied because the case before the COMELEC en banc was an electoral protest

33
that was "originally commenced" in the commission. We noted that while the electoral protest
only reached the COMELEC en banc through the motion for reconsideration of the decision of a
division, the same did not change the nature of the case before it; the motion for
reconsideration not being an appeal.19 Thus, we held that the failure of the COMELEC en banc
to decide the motion for reconsideration would result—not in the denial of the said motion or
the affirmance of the division’s decision—but in the dismissal of the electoral protest itself,
pursuant to the first effect under Section 6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules. 20

Guided by the foregoing precepts, we shall now address the issues at hand.

II

The main thrust of petitioner’s challenge is the supposed error of the COMELEC en banc in
applying the first effect under Section 6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules (by dismissing the
electoral aspect of SPA No. 13-323 [DC]) when it was unable to reach a majority vote after the
rehearing.21 According to petitioner, the COMELEC en banc erred in treating SPA No. 13-323
(DC) as an action that was "originally commenced in the commission" under the said
provision.22 As petitioner argues, an action can only be considered as having been "originally
commenced in the commission" under Section 6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules when that
action was originally filed before the COMELEC en banc itself and, as such, is the very matter
pending before it.23

Petitioner then points out that, in this case, what was before the COMELEC en banc was not the
main petition itself but only a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the division in SPA
No. 13-323 (DC). Hence, petitioner submits, the failure of the COMELEC en banc to reach a
majority vote in this case should result, not in the dismissal of the electoral aspect of SPA No.
13-323 (DC), but merely in the denial of the motion for reconsideration and the affirmance of
the division’s decision.24

We do not agree.

The COMELEC en banc did not err when it dismissed the electoral aspect of SPA No. 13-323 (DC)
when it was unable to reach a majority vote after the rehearing. Contrary to what petitioner
asserts, SPA No. 13-323 (DC) is most definitely an action that was filed originally before the
COMELEC within the contemplation of the said provision. While SPA No. 13-323 (DC) reached
the COMELEC en banc only through a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Special
First Division, its character as an original case filed before the commission remains the same.
Hence, the failure of COMELEC en banc to decide in this case properly results in the application
of the first effect of Section 6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules.

SPA No. 13-323 (DC) is an Action

"Originally Commenced in the
Commission" Under Section 6, Rule
18 of the COMELEC Rules

34
Petitioner, to begin with, misconstrues Section 6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules.

The phrase "originally commenced in the commission" in Section 6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC
Rules is worded in plain language and, therefore, must be construed in its ordinary and natural
sense.25 It simply means what it says. The phrase is meant to cover any action or proceeding
that is filed, at the first instance, before the COMELEC—whether sitting in division or en banc—
as contradistinguished from cases that are merely appealed to it. Petitioner’s view that restricts
such phrase to include only those actions or proceedings that are originally filed with the
COMELEC en banc itself (e.g., petition to declare failure of elections) has no basis and only
obscures the otherwise clear import of the phrase’s language.

In this case, the fact that SPA No. 13-323 (DC) is an action originally commenced in the
COMELEC cannot at all be doubted.1âwphi1 The records are crystal clear that the petition was
first filed with the COMELEC and was raffled to the First Division for decision. It is a fresh
petition—as it passed upon no other tribunal, body or entity prior to its filing with the
COMELEC. Hence, for all intents and purposes, SPA No. 13-323 (DC) must be considered as an
action "originally commenced in the commission" under Section 6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC
Rules.

Single Process of COMELEC in

Deciding Election Cases; COMELEC
En Banc Correctly Dismissed
Electoral Aspect of SPA No. 13-323
(DC)

Petitioner’s insistence that the first effect under Section 6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules ought
not to be applied since what was before the COMELEC en banc was merely a motion for
reconsideration and not the petition for disqualification itself, likewise has no merit. It is
premised on the assumption that the proceedings in election cases before the COMELEC
division are separate from those before the en banc—an assumption that has already been
discredited by Mendoza.

In Mendoza, we held that the COMELEC acts on election cases under a single and integrated
process, to wit:

[H]owever the jurisdiction of the COMELEC is involved, xxx, the COMELEC will act on the case in
one whole and single process: to repeat, in division, and if impelled by a motion for
reconsideration, en banc.26

In his concurring opinion in Mendoza, Justice Presbitero J. Velasco (Justice Velasco) described
the act of filing a motion for reconsideration with the COMELEC en banc from a decision of a
division in an election case as but "part" of such single and integrated process and is "not an
appeal" from the latter to the former:

35
At best, the filing of a motion for reconsideration with the COMELEC en banc of a decision or
resolution of the division of the COMELEC should be viewed as part of one integrated process.
Such motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc is a constitutionally guaranteed
remedial mechanism for parties aggrieved by a division decision or resolution. However, at the
risk of repetition, it is not an appeal from the COMELEC division to the en banc. 27

Verily, when an election case originally filed with the COMELEC is first decided by a division, the
subsequent filing of a motion for reconsideration from that decision before the en banc does
not signify the initiation of a new action or case, but rather a mere continuation of an existing
process. The motion for reconsideration—not being an appeal from the decision of the division
to the en banc—only thus serves as a means of having the election case decided by the
COMELEC en banc. Under this view, therefore, the nature of the election case as it was before
the division remains the same even after it is forwarded to the en banc through a motion for
reconsideration. Hence, the failure of the COMELEC en banc to decide a motion for
reconsideration from the decision of a division in an original election case would
unquestionably bring to the fore the application of the first effect under Section 6, Rule 18 of
the COMELEC Rules.

This is exactly what happened in this case. In this case, SPA No. 13- 323 (DC) was filed, at the
first instance, with the COMELEC. Being a petition for disqualification filed under Section 68 of
the Omnibus Election Code,28 SPA No. 13-323 (DC) was initially raffled to and decided by a
division of the commission. From that point, however, SPA No. 13-323 (DC) found its way to the
COMELEC en banc after a motion for reconsideration from the decision of the division was filed.
Hence, when the COMELEC en banc twice failed to reach the necessary majority to decide the
electoral aspect of SPA No. 13-323 (DC), it applied the first effect under Section 6, Rule 18 of
the COMELEC Rules. We find absolutely nothing wrong with such application. It is, in fact,
reinforced by the very provisions of the COMELEC Rules and by Mendoza.

III

We next address the contra argument raised by Justice Velasco in his Dissenting Opinion.

Justice Velasco, in his dissent, shared petitioner’s position that the failure of the COMELEC en
banc to reach a necessary majority in this case should have resulted merely in the denial of the
motion for reconsideration and not in the dismissal of SPA No. 13-323 (DC) itself. The learned
justice, however, justified the said position with an argument different from that advanced by
petitioner: Justice Velasco, in essence, concedes that the first effect under Section 6, Rule 18 of
the COMELEC Rules applies in this case, but contends that the COMELEC en banc erred in how it
applied the said provision.

Justice Velasco points out that the first effect under Section 6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules
speaks of the dismissal of either an "action" or a "proceeding" – which, the good justice
submits, supposedly pertains to different cases or matters that may be brought before the
COMELEC en banc. After identifying what those matters are, Justice Velasco concluded that the

36
word "action" as used under the subject provision has reference to the "cases originally filed
before the COMELEC division or en banc" whilst the word "proceeding" under the same rule
has reference to "motions for reconsideration challenging the rulings [of a division in election
cases]."29

Thus, Justice Velasco opines, the failure of the COMELEC en banc to reach a majority vote on a
mere motion for reconsideration of a division decision in an original election case would –
under the first effect of Section 6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules – only lead to a dismissal of
the "proceeding" or of the motion for reconsideration; not the dismissal of the "action" or of
the election case itself.

Cognizant that the foregoing view is a betrayal of the principles laid down by the Court in
Mendoza, Justice Velasco now clamors for a "modification" or an abandonment of our ruling in
the said case insofar as how it applied the first effect under Section 6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC
Rules.30 Justice Velasco cautions the Court that pursuing Mendoza’s interpretation of Section 6,
Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules is bound to lead to absurd and illogical results – such as one
wherein a decision of a COMELEC division in an election case can simply be overturned by the
COMELEC en banc even though the latter is not able to reach a majority vote. 31

The Court is not convinced.

Meaning of the Words "Action" and
"Proceeding" Determinable From Other
Provisions of the COMELEC Rules;
Justice Velasco’s Interpretation of the
Word "Proceeding" Contradicted By
COMELEC Rules, Taken As A Whole

The pin that holds Justice Velasco’s argument is his interpretation of the terms "action" and
"proceeding" under Section 6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules. While an isolated view of the
contested terms does lend some degree of reason to the respected justice’s interpretation, a
more careful consideration of such terms in the context of the other parts of the COMELEC
Rules, however, will quickly reveal the interpretation’s fault.

Verily, we are unable to accept it.

The words "action" and "proceeding" and even the entire phrase "action or proceeding" are not
exclusive to Section 6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules. Such words and phrase, in fact, appear in
other parts of the COMELEC Rules, most notably in Part V thereof. To our minds, an
examination of how the words "action" and "proceeding" and the phrase "actions or
proceedings" were used in Part V of the COMELEC Rules is telling of how the COMELEC Rules
actually intended such terms and phrase to be understood, which is, in the context of its other
provisions.32

37
Part V of the COMELEC Rules, which is aptly titled "Particular Actions or Proceedings," is one of
the nine major parts of the COMELEC Rules. It is composed of Rules 20 to 34 of the COMELEC
Rules, wherein each rule covers a specific "action or proceeding" that the COMELEC can take
cognizance of, thus:

COMELEC RULES OF PROCEDURE – PART V

PARTICULAR ACTIONS OR PROCEEDINGS

A. ORDINARY ACTIONS

 Rule 20 – Election Protests

 Rule 21 – Quo Warranto
 Rule 22 – Appeals from Decisions of Courts in Election Protest
 Cases

B. SPECIAL ACTIONS

 Rule 23 – Petition to Deny Due Course To or Cancel Certificates of

 Candidacy
 Rule 24 – Proceedings Against Nuisance Candidates
 Rule 25 – Disqualification of Candidates
 Rule 26 – Postponement of Suspension of Elections

C. SPECIAL CASES

 Rule 27 – Pre-proclamation Controversies

D. SPECIAL RELIEFS

 Rule 28 – Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus

 Rule 29 – Contempt

E. PROVISIONAL REMEDIES

 Rule 30 – Injunction

F. SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS

 Rule 31 – Annulment of Permanent List of Voters

 Rule 32 – Registration of Political Parties or Organization
 Rule 33 – Accreditation of Citizens’ Arms of the Commission

G. ELECTION OFFENSES

38
  Rule 34 – Prosecution of Election Offenses

Evidently, what Part V actually discloses are the particular cases or matters that may be
considered as "actions or proceedings" for purposes of the COMELEC Rules. Notably, all the
actions or proceedings identified thereunder, save for the provisional remedy of injunction, are
all main cases cognizable by the COMELEC. Notable too is that a motion for reconsideration
from a decision of a division – which is but a part of a main case – is not among those included
in Part V.33

Accordingly, we find Justice Velasco’s formulation linking the term "proceeding" under Section
6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules with "motions for reconsideration challenging the rulings [of a
division in election cases]"34 to be inconsistent with how such term was actually intended to be
understood by the COMELEC Rules. Such a formulation, rooted as it was in an isolated analysis
of the contested term, is out of touch with the rest of the provisions of the COMELEC Rules.

Pursuing Mendoza Ruling Will Not

Lead to Absurdity

We likewise rebut Justice Velasco's submission that continuing with Mendoza's interpretation
of the first effect under Section 6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules is bound to lead to absurd
results.

To our minds, there is no "absurdity" in the fact that the decision of a division in an election
case ceases to be a COMELEC decision as a consequence of the failure of the COMELEC en bane
to reach a majority vote on reconsideration. That fact, far from being absurd, is nothing but the
natural and logical consequence of the application of the first effect under Section 6, Rule 18 of
the COMELEC Rules which, in tum, only complements our Constitution.

IV

All told, we found no indications that the COMELEC en bane had acted with grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing the electoral aspect of SPA No. 13-323 (DC). On the contrary, what we
found is that such dismissal was perfectly in accord with the provisions of its own rules of
procedure and is consistent with established jurisprudence on the matter. Mendoza, to our
minds, remains good law. Certainly, the extraordinary writ of certiorari does not lie here.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

39
JOSE L. GUEVARA vs. COMELEC G.R. No. L-12596 July 31, 1958

FACTS:
Guevara was ordered by the COMELEC to show cause why he should not be punished for
contempt for having published in the newspaper an article which tended to interfere with and
influence the COMELEC awarding the contracts for the manufacture and supply of ballot boxes;
and which article likewise tended to degrade, bring into disrepute, and undermine the exclusive
constitutional function of this Commission and its Chairman
Petitioner, filed a motion to quash on the following ground that the Commission has no
jurisdiction to punish as contempt the publication of the alleged contemptuous article, as
neither in the Constitution nor in statutes is the Commission granted a power to so punish the
same.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC has the power and jurisdiction to conduct contempt proceedings
against Guevara in connection with the publication of an article.

RULING:
Although the negotiation conducted by the Commission has resulted in controversy between
several dealers, that however merely refers to a ministerial duty which the Commission has
performed in its administrative capacity. It only discharged a ministerial duty; it did not exercise
any judicial function. Such being the case, it could not exercise the power to punish for
contempt as postulated in the law, for such power is inherently judicial in nature. As this Court
has aptly said: "The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts; its existence is
essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings, and to the enforcement of
judgments, orders and mandates of courts, and, consequently, in the administration of justice".
We are therefore persuaded to conclude that the Commission on Elections has no power nor
authority to submit petitioner to contempt proceedings if its purpose is to discipline him
because of the publication of the article mentioned in the charge under consideration.

40
PANADERO V COMELEC

G.R. No. 215548, April 05, 2016

UNDERSECRETARY AUSTERE A. PANADERO AND REGIONAL DIRECTOR RENE K. BURDEOS,

BOTH OF THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
(DILG), Petitioners, v.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

G.R. NO. 215726

UNDERSECRETARY AUSTERE A. PANADERO AND REGIONAL DIRECTOR RENE K. BURDEOS,

BOTH OF THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
(DILG), Petitioners, v.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND MOHAMMAD EXCHAN GABRIEL
LIMBONA, Respondents.

G.R. NO. 216158

MANGONDAYA ASUM TAGO, Petitioner, v. COMELEC AND MOHAMMAD EXCHAN GABRIEL

LIMBONA, Respondents.

DECISION

REYES, J.:

Before the Court are consolidated petitions for certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 215548,1 G.R.
No. 2157262 and G.R. No. 216158,3 which assail the Resolutions dated November 17, 20144 and
January 5, 20155 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) en bane, in EM. No. 14-005, citing
Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) Undersecretary Austere A. Panadero
(Usec. Panadero), DILG Regional Director Rene K. Burdeos (RD Burdeos) and Mangondaya Asum
Tago (Tago) (petitioners) in indirect contempt and providing penalties therefor, following the
DILG's implementation of the Decision6dated September 30, 2009 of the Office of Ombudsman
(Ombudsman) in OMB-L-A-08-0530-H, against Mohammad Exchan Gabriel Limbona (Limbona).

The Antecedents

In the Decision rendered by the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon on September 30,
2009 and approved by then Ombudsman Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez on October 23,
2009,7 Limbona was among the persons8 found to be guilty of grave misconduct, oppression
and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, which he committed while he was
still the Chairman of Barangay Kalanganan Lower, Pantar, Lanao del Norte, and in relation to
the killing of Hadji Abdul Rasid Onos, the former Municipal Vice Mayor of Pantar. Limbona was
meted the penalty of dismissal from public service, with the accessory penalties of cancellation
of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits and perpetual disqualification from re-
employment in the government service. In the dispositive portion of the decision, the DILG

41
Secretary was directed to immediately implement the ruling against Limbona, pursuant to
Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 17 (Ombudsman Rules of Procedure) in relation
to Memorandum Circular No. 1, series of 2006. Limbona moved for reconsideration, but this
was denied by the Ombudsman in a Joint Order9 dated March 22, 2010.

On November 15, 2013, the Ombudsman issued an Order10 forwarding to the DILG Secretary a
copy of its Decision against Limbona for implementation, as it had become final and executory
in 2011. The order indicated that Limbona had been elected as Municipal Mayor of Pantar.
Acting on the order, Usec. Panadero issued, on April 3, 2014, a Memorandum11 directing RD
Burdeos, as the RD of the DILG Region X Office, to cause the immediate implementation of the
Ombudsman decision insofar as Limbona was concerned.

On April 21, 2014, however, RD Burdeos reported that he received from Limbona's counsel a
copy of the Resolution12 dated June 6, 2013 issued by the COMELEC First Division, dismissing
the petition for disqualification filed against Limbona. The petition, entitled Malik T. Alingan v.
Mohammad Limbona,docketed as SPA No. 13-252 (DC), questioned Limbona's eligibility to run
for public office in the 2013 elections after the Ombudsman found him guilty in 2009 in OMB-L-
A-08-0530-H. In the COMELEC resolution, Limbona was declared to still be qualified to run for
public office, citing the case of Aguinaldo v. Santos13 (Aguinaldo doctrine), holding that "a
public official cannot be removed for administrative misconduct committed during a prior term,
since his re-election to office operates as a condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to
the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor."14 Thus, the resolution reads in part:

In other words, misconduct committed by [Limbona] in 2008 have been condoned by the
people of Pantar, Lanao del Norte[,] when they elected him as their Mayor in 2010. Hence, such
fact cannot serve as ground for his disqualification for purposes of the 2013
elections.chanrobleslaw

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is hereby DISMISSED. [Limbona]

is QUALIFIED to run for Municipal Mayor of Pantar, Lanao del Norte.

SO ORDERED.15ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

On April 30, 2014, Usec. Panadero then sought clarification from Ombudsman Conchita Carpio-
Morales on the applicability of the Aguinaldo doctrine in Limbona's case in light of the
COMELEC First Division's resolution.16 Pending receipt of the Ombudsman's reply, Usec.
Panadero also issued on even date a Memorandum,17 addressed to RD Burdeos, directing him
to proceed with the implementation of the Ombudsman's decision. He explained that:

Pending such clarification, you are hereby directed to proceed with the implementation of the
Ombudsman Decision and Joint Order dated 30 September 2009 and 22 March 2010,
respectively, pursuant to Ombudsman Memorandum Circular No. 01, series of 2006 in relation
to the case of Office of the Ombudsman vs. De Chavez, et al. that the decision of the
Ombudsman is immediately executory pending appeal and may not be stayed by the filing of an

42
appeal or the issuance of an injunctive writ.

For compliance.18 (Citation omitted)

Limbona, on the other hand, sought the Office of the President's (OP) revocation and/or recall
of the DILG Memoranda dated April 3, 2014 and April 30, 2014, relative to the implementation
of the Ombudsman's decision against him.19

On May 5, 2014, the DILG served the dismissal order of Limbona, which led to his removal from
office and the assumption to the mayoralty of then Vice Mayor Tago.20 Displeased by the DILG's
actions, Limbona filed with the COMELEC a petition21 to cite the petitioners for indirect
contempt. In his petition, he also sought the COMELEC's issuance of an injunctive writ that
would enjoin the performance of any act that would directly or indirectly contravene the tenor
and substance of the COMELEC First Division's resolution.

Meanwhile, Usec. Panadero followed up from the Ombudsman its reply to the clarification
sought by the DILG on Limbona's case.22 The DILG later received from the Ombudsman an
Indorsement23 dated June 23, 2014 still referring to the DILG the said Ombudsman decision "for
implementation, with the information that [therein] respondents' petitions filed with-the [CA]
and Supreme Court had all been dismissed."24

In their Comment25 on the petition for indirect contempt, Usec. Panadero and RD Burdeos
contended, among other arguments, that: first, the petition was premature because the
COMELEC First Division's resolution was not yet final, as it remained pending with the
COMELEC en banc; second, the COMELEC had no jurisdiction over the petitioners and the
decision of the Ombudsman; and third, the petitioners were not in bad faith but were merely
implementing a final and executory decision of the Ombudsman.

In the meantime, the motion for reconsideration filed by Malik Alingan against the COMELEC
First Division's Resolution dated June 6, 2013 was later resolved by the COMELEC en banc. On
August 8, 2014, the DILG received a copy of the COMELEC en banc's Resolution26 dated July 8,
2014, which affirmed with modification its division's Resolution. The COMELEC en
banc disagreed with the First Division's application of the Aguinaldo doctrine. It said that the
doctrine on condonation could not apply in Limbona's case because he was elected as Mayor
for the term 2010-2013, which was different from his position as Barangay Chairman in 2007-
2010 when his administrative case was filed. The COMELEC en banc, nonetheless, declared that
Limbona was qualified to run for public office because he was not removed from his post as
Barangay Chairman, and was able to finish his term prior to the finality of the Ombudsman's
decision. Section 40(b) of the Local Government Code (LGC) disqualifies from running for any
elective local position "those removed from office as a result of an administrative
case."27cralawred

On August 5, 2014, the COMELEC issued a Certificate of Finality28 covering COMELEC

Resolutions dated June 6, 2013 and July 8, 2014. These COMELEC resolutions were assailed in a

43
petition docketed as G.R. No. 213291, which was dismissed via this Court's Resolutions dated
March 24, 201529 and June 16, 2015.30 Meanwhile, Limbona's petition with the OP for the
revocation and/or recall of the DILG's Memoranda dated April 3, 2014 and April 30, 2014 was
dismissed in a Decision31 dated December 5, 2014.

Ruling of the COMELEC

On November 17, 2014, the COMELEC en banc issued its Resolution32 citing the petitioners in
indirect contempt. It explained:

The violation of the final and executory resolution of the Comelec constitutes contempt. The
[COMELEC] already ruled that the Ombudsman Decision cannot be the cause of the
disqualification or ouster of [Limbona]. The [petitioners] completely disregarded the ruling
despite their knowledge and receipt of the Entry of Judgment thereof. The fact that the DILG is
not a party to the case cannot be used to circumvent the Resolution of [COMELEC]. They
themselves admit of the receipt of the same. It behooves the [COMELEC] the motivation of the
[petitioners] to blatantly disobey the Resolutions of [COMELEC].

All told, the [COMELEC] finds the [petitioners] [to have] disobeyed the legal order/resolution of
[COMELEC].33ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

No penalty for the contempt was provided in the aforequoted COMELEC resolution, the
dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, petition is hereby GRANTED. The [COMELEC] (En Banc)
hereby RESOLVES to CITE [THE PETITIONERS] in CONTEMPT.

SO ORDERED.34

Among the petitioners, only Tago filed a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en
banc, assailing the abovequoted resolution.

The Present Petitions

G.R. No. 215548

The foregoing prompted the filing on December 17, 2014 by Usec. Panadero and RD Burdeos,
through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), the Petition for Certiorari (under Rule 64 of
the Rules of Court)35 docketed as G.R. No. 215548, contending that: (1) the COMELEC had no
jurisdiction over the acts of the Ombudsman; (2) there was no basis to hold the parties in
contempt; and (3) the Aguinaldodoctrine does not apply to the case of Limbona. They, thus,
asked the Court to set aside the COMELEC resolution citing them in contempt.

G.R. No. 215726

44
On January 5, 2015, after the petition in G.R. No. 215548 had been filed, the COMELEC en
banc issued a Resolution36 resolving Tago's motion for reconsideration of the COMELEC en
bane's Resolution dated November 17, 2014. The COMELEC en bane denied Tago's motion,
imposed penalties upon the petitioners for indirect contempt, and ordered their arrest. The
dispositive portion of the new resolution reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED. The
Resolution of [COMELEC] dated November 17. 2014 is AFFIRMED in toto.

Accordingly, a fine of One thousand pesos (Phpl,000.00) and a penalty of imprisonment for six
(6) months is imposed against [the petitioners].

Let a warrant of arrest be issued against [the petitioners].

SO ORDERED.37

Aggrieved, Usec. Panadero and RD Burdeos filed with the Court another Petition
for Certiorari With a Very Urgent Application for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or
Temporary Restraining Order38 (TRO) docketed as G.R. No. 215726, which sought to set aside
the COMELEC en banc's Resolutions dated November 17, 2014 and January 5, 2015. They
argued that the COMELEC cannot motu proprio amend its decision by imposing upon them the
penalties of fine and imprisonment. They further reiterated their argument that the COMELEC
did not have jurisdiction over the petitioners and the acts of the Ombudsman.

Acting on the application for a TRO against the issuance of warrants of arrest pending
determination of the merits of the petition, the Court issued, on January 8, 2015, a TRO to
enjoin the COMELEC, its agents, representatives, or persons acting in its place and stead, from
implementing the COMELEC Resolution dated January 5, 2015 effective immediately until
further orders from the Court.39

G.R. No. 216158

On February 5, 2015, Tago filed his own Petition for Certiorari with Motion to
Adopt,40 docketed as G.R. No. 216158, against the COMELEC and Limbona. Tago argued, among
several grounds, that the petitioners did not commit acts constituting indirect contempt as
defined by law. His assumption to office, in particular, was supported by legal bases given the
issuances of the Ombudsman and the DILG, in light of pertinent provisions on succession under
the LGC. Tago further adopted the petition filed by the OSG for Usec. Panadero and RD
Burdeos.

The Issue

The core issue for the Court's resolution is whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of

45
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in finding the petitioners in contempt of
court and imposing the penalties of fine and imprisonment.

Ruling of the Court

At the outset, the Court emphasizes that its determination in the pending petitions shall be
limited to the COMELEC resolutions on the finding of indirect contempt and the penalties
imposed therefor, being the issuances assailed via the three consolidated petitions. While the
Ombudsman's ruling in OMB-L-A-08-0530-H and the COMELEC's disposition in SPA No. 13-252
(DC) are related to the finding of contempt, the subject matters thereof were covered by
separate petitions before the Court,41 and are beyond the cover of the Court's present review.

The Court grants the petitions.

Power of contempt

"The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts and is essential to the preservation
of order in judicial proceedings and to the enforcement of judgments, orders, and mandates of
the court, and consequently, to the due administration of justice."42 Contempt is defined as a
disobedience to the court by acting in opposition to its authority, justice and dignity. It signifies
not only a willful disregard or disobedience of the court's orders, but such conduct which tends
to bring the authority of the court and the administration of law into disrepute or in some
manner to impede the due administration of justice. It is a conduct that tends to bring the
authority and administration of the law into disrespect or to interfere with or prejudice parties-
litigant or their witnesses during litigation.43 By jurisprudence, the power to punish for
contempt, however, should be used sparingly with caution, restraint, judiciousness,
deliberation, and due regard to the provisions of the law and the constitutional rights of the
individual.44

The COMELEC is similarly vested with the power to punish for contempt. Article VII, Section
52(e) of The Omnibus Election Code expressly gives it the power to "[p]unish contempts
provided for in the Rules of Court in the same procedure and with the same penalties provided
therein. Any violation of any final and executory decision, order or ruling of the Commission
shall constitute contempt thereof." The pertinent provision on indirect contempt in the Rules of
Court referred to is Rule 71, Section 3, which provides:

Sec. 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge or hearing. After a charge in writing has
been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within such period
as may be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the
following acts may be punished for indirect contempt:

(a) Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of his official duties or in his official
transactions;

46
DE GUZMAN, JR. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 129118 (July 19, 2000)

EN BANC The minutes of voting will show the existence of illiterate or physically disabled voters
which necessitated voting by assistors. Thus, several ballots could be prepared by one person
who is the assistor.

FACTS:

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with urgent prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order, assailing the validity of Section 44 of
Republic Act No. 8189 (RA 8189) otherwise known as "The Voters Registration Act of 1996". De
Guzman vs. Comelec

SEC. 44. Reassignment of Election Officers. - No Election Officer shall hold office in a particular
city or municipality for more than four (4) years. Any election officer who, either at the time of
the approval of this Act or subsequent thereto, has served for at least four (4) years in a
particular city or municipality shall automatically be reassigned by the Commission to a new
station outside the original congressional district.

Petitioners, who are either City or Municipal Election Officers, were reassigned to different
stations by the COMELEC. De Guzman vs. Comelec

Petitioners contend that the said law is unconstitutional because it violates the equal
protection clause guaranteed by the 1987 Constitution because it singles out the City and
Municipal Election Officers of the COMELEC as prohibited from holding office in the same city
or municipality for more than four (4) years. They maintain that there is no substantial
distinction between them and other COMELEC officials, and therefore, there is no valid
classification to justify the objective of the provision of law under attack.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 44 of RA 8189 violates the equal protection clause. De Guzman vs.
Comelec

HELD:
No.
The singling out of election officers in order to "ensure the impartiality of election officials by
preventing them from developing familiarity with the people of their place of assignment" does
not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution. De Guzman vs. Comelec

47
BRION, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari filed by Rolando P. Tolentino from the May 25, 2015 Order of the
Commission on Elections (Comelec/the Commission) in SPR (BRGY) No. 03-2015.[1] Tolentino
questions the Commission's order advising the Election Officer of Tarlac City to await its
resolution of the case before implementing the writ of execution issued by the Municipal Trial
Court in Cities (MTCC), Tarlac City, in Election Case No. 03-2013.

Antecedents

During the 2013 barangay elections, Tolentino and respondent Henry Manalo both ran for the
position of Barangay Captain in Barangay Calingcuan, Tarlac City.

The election was held on October 28, 2013. Manalo was proclaimed the winner after garnering
441 votes compared to Tolentino's 440. Tolentino immediately filed an election protest before
the MTCC on October 30, 2013. The protest was docketed as Election Case No. 03-2013.

During the revision of votes, the MTCC's initial tally was 439 votes for Tolentino and 442 votes
for Manalo. However, the MTCC invalidated six (6) of the ballots cast for Manalo and one (1)
ballot cast for Tolentino. Thus, Tolentino came out ahead.

On November 26, 2014, the MTCC proclaimed Tolentino as the winner with 438 votes
compared to Manalo's 436. On the very same day, Manalo filed a Notice of Appeal with the
MTCC.

The following day, November 27, 2014, Tolentino moved for execution pending appeal. Manalo
opposed the motion.

On December 16, 2014, the MTCC issued a Special Order granting Tolentino's motion for
execution pending appeal [pursuant to Rule 14, Section 11 (b)[2] of the Rules of Procedure in
Election Contests Before the Courts Involving Elective Municipal and Barangay Officials], but
held the issuance of the writ in abeyance. The MTCC also gave due course to Manalo's appeal.

On January 8, 2015, Manalo filed with the COMELEC a Petition for Certiorari, with a
corresponding application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO), a status quo
ante order, or a writ of preliminary injunction. Manalo argued that the MTCC issued the Special
Order with grave abuse of discretion because: (1) an execution pending appeal was not
justified, and (2) Manalo, not Tolentino, was the clear winner in the election. The petition was
docketed as SPR (BRGY) No. 03-2015.

On January 30, 2015, the MTCC issued the writ of execution.

On the same day, the COMELEC, First Division, issued a 60-day TRO prohibiting the MTCC from
implementing its Special Order in Election Protest Case No. 03-2013. The Commission also

48
required Tolentino to file his answer to the petition.

On February 5, 2015, Tolentino filed his answer and moved for the reconsideration of the TRO.

On February 9, 2015, the Commission required Manalo to file his Comment/Opposition to the
motion for reconsideration. Manalo complied on February 17, 2015.

On February 27, 2015, Tolentino filed an urgent motion for the Commission to resolve his
pending motion for reconsideration. Acting on the urgent motion, the Commission resolved to
include the matter in the hearing of the main petition scheduled on March 4, 2015.

After hearing the parties on March 4, 2015, the Commission directed both parties to submit
their respective memoranda within 10 days, after which the case shall be deemed submitted
for resolution.

The 60-day TRO lapsed on April 1, 2015, without the Commission issuing a writ of preliminary
injunction or rendering a decision. Thus, on April 10, 2015, Tolentino wrote the MTCC
requesting the implementation of the writ of execution pending appeal. Tolentino also wrote to
the City Election Officer of Tarlac requesting the implementation of the writ of execution
pending appeal.[3]

On April 27, 2015, the MTCC denied Tolentino's request/motion because it no longer had
jurisdiction to entertain any further motions after it had transmitted the records of the case to
the Commission.

Despite the MTCC's denial, Tolentino, through Atty. Ramon D. Facun, wrote a "Final Request" to
the COMELEC City Election Office demanding the implementation of the writ of execution
pending appeal with an accompanying threat that he would file contempt charges if immediate
implementation would not take place:

In view of the foregoing, protestant Rolando Tolentino respectfully request, [sic] again, for the
immediate implementation of the Writ of Execution Pending appeal dated January 30, 2015
within five (5) days from receipt hereof. Otherwise, much to my regret my client will file
contempt charge [sic] and other charges necessary for your non-action to the Writ of
Execution Pending Appeal for implementation.[4] (emphasis supplied)

Respondent Atty. Cristina R. Guiao-Garcia, Election Officer IV, endorsed the matter to the
Commission's Law Department which, in turn, made its own endorsement to the First Division
where the case was pending.

Acting on the endorsement, the Commission issued the assailed order on May 25, 2015. The
relevant portion reads:

49
Acting thereon and considering that the instant case is now deemed submitted for resolution
per Order dated March 4, 2015 issued by the Commission (First Division) and the main case, the
Election Appeal Case, docketed as EAC (BRGY) No. 07-2015 [sic] entitled"Rolando Tolentino,
protestant-appellee vs. Henry Manalo, protestee-appellant," is likewise submitted for
resolution, the Commission (First Division) hereby ADVISES herein Atty. Cristina T. Guiao-
Garcia, Election Officer IV, Tarlac City, Tarlac, to await the Order and Resolution of the case by
the Commission (First Division).

SO ORDERED.[5]

On June 26, 2015, Tolentino filed the present petition.

The Petition

Tolentino protests: (1) that the Commission committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
Order dated May 25, 2015, pursuant to the endorsement of the Law Department; (2) that the
order was issued without giving him the benefit of a hearing; (3) that the order effectively
prohibited the implementation of the writ of execution pending appeal without the issuance of
a writ of injunction; and (4) that Atty. Guiao-Garcia's refusal to implement the writ of execution
pending appeal amounted to willful disobedience and is unethical for a lawyer.

Manalo counters: (1) that nothing in the assailed Order constitutes grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the Commission; (2) that Tolentino was trying to subvert the Commission's
authority, in blatant disregard of the pendency of the case, by seeking relief from another
forum: the local COMELEC office; and (3) that Tolentino failed to exhaust his available remedies
because he did not move for the reconsideration of the Comelec's Order.

Finally, the Commission maintains: (1) that the present petition is premature because Tolentino
has a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy available - a motion for reconsideration of the May
25 Order; and (2) that the petition failed to show that Atty. Guiao-Garcia, who even sought
guidance from the Commission, brazenly disregarded the appropriate processes.

Our Ruling

We dismiss the petition for patent lack of merit.

Certiorari is available when a court or other tribunal exercising quasi-judicial powers acts
without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. It is an extraordinary remedy of last resort designed to correct errors of
jurisdiction.

50
There is grave abuse of discretion justifying the issuance of the writ of certiorari when there is
such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction;[6] where power is exercised arbitrarily or in a despotic manner by reason of
passion, prejudice; or where action is impelled by personal hostility amounting to an evasion of
positive duty, or to virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all in contemplation
of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion and hostility.[7]

After evaluating the facts, this Court fails to see any action on the part of the Commission that
constitutes grave abuse of discretion or absence of jurisdiction.

First, the assailed Order dated May 25, 2015, was directed to City Election Officer IV Atty.
Guiao-Garcia. As an agent of the Commission, an election officer is under the Commission's
direct and immediate control and supervision.[8] The Commission clearly has the power and
jurisdiction to issue orders to its employees to carry out its mandate. It is even clothed with the
power to discipline or relieve any officer or employee who fails to comply with its
instructions.[9]

Second, the Commission is authorized to enforce its directives and orders that, by law, enjoy
precedence over that of the MTCC. The Omnibus Election Code explicitly states:

Omnibus Election Code

Article VII
The Commission on Elections

Sec. 52 Powers and functions of the Commission on Elections. - In addition to the powers and
functions conferred upon it by the Constitution, the Commission shall have exclusive charge of
the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections for the
purpose of ensuring free, orderly and honest elections, and shall: x x x

(f) Enforce and execute its decisions, directives, orders and instructions which shall have
precedence over those emanating from any other authority, except the Supreme Court and
those issued in habeas corpus proceedings.[10]

Third, the MTCC's writ of execution pending appeal cannot be enforced because it was issued
after the MTCC had already lost its residual jurisdiction.

The MTCC rendered its decision on November 26, 2014. Both parties received copies of the
judgment on the same day. Pursuant to Rule 14, Section 5 of AM No. 07-4-15-SC, Manalo had a
reglementary period of five days, or until December 1, to file his notice of appeal.

Manalo filed his notice of appeal on the very same day. Pursuant to Rule 14, Section 10 of AM

51
No. 07-14-15-SC, the MTCC clerk of court was duty bound to transmit the records of the case to
the Commission within fifteen days, or until December II.[11] Tolentino moved for execution
pending appeal on November 27, 2014.

Rule 14, Section 11 of AM No. 07-4-15-SC provides the window of time when the MTCC retains
residual powers to order execution pending appeal:

Sec. 11. Execution pending appeal. — On motion of the prevailing party with notice to the
adverse party, the court, while still in possession of the original records, may, at its discretion,
order the execution of the decision in an election contest before the expiration of the period
to appeal, subject to the following rules: x x x. (emphasis supplied)

Under this Rule, the MTCC retains residual jurisdiction while two conditions concur: (1) records
of the case have not yet been transmitted to the Commission; and (2) the period to appeal has
not yet expired.

The MTCC ordered execution pending appeal on December 16, 2014. At this point in time, the
five-day period to appeal had already expired. Moreover, under the presumption of regularity
in the performance of their duties, the clerk of court was presumed to have already transmitted
the records of the case to the Electoral Contests Adjudication Department of the Commission.

Thus, the MTCC had already lost complete jurisdiction of the case when it issued the writ of
execution pending appeal. At this point, the proper forum that could have granted execution
pending appeal was the Commission itself which already acquired jurisdiction over the case. It
is a fundamental legal tenet that any order issued without jurisdiction is void and without legal
effect - a lawless thing which can be treated as an outlaw and slain on sight.[12]

Fourth, even assuming that the writ of execution was issued before the MTCC lost jurisdiction,
the MTCC is still subject to the Commission's appellate jurisdiction. The Commission has the
power and jurisdiction to affirm, reverse, vacate, or annul the MTCC's judgment. The
Commission also has jurisdiction to restrain implementation of the MTCC's judgment through
injunctive writs. Tolentino cannot argue that the Commission's refusal to implement the
decision pending appeal is beyond the latter's jurisdiction.

We note that despite Manalo's notice of appeal, he filed a petition for certiorari with the
Commission rather than an appeal brief. Nevertheless, we glean an intention from the
Commission to treat the petition as an appeal. This Court is mindful of the liberal spirit
pervading the Commission's rules of procedure[13] and the Commission's authority to suspend
any portion of its rules in the interest of justice.[14] Thus, the Commission has the prerogative to
treat the petition for certiorari as an appeal, as this Court has done in the past in the interest of
justice. This Court will not interfere in the Commission's exercise of this prerogative.

Fifth, Tolentino insists that he was not given notice nor the opportunity to be heard. However,

52
the records (and even in Tolentino's pleadings) indicate otherwise: (1) Tolentino filed his
answer to the petition and motion for reconsideration of the Commission's TRO on February 5,
2015; (2) the Commission heard Tolentino's motion for reconsideration of the TRO on March 4,
2015; and (3) the Commission even allowed Tolentino to file his memoranda.

Thus, we find no basis in Tolentino's allegation that he was denied the right to notice and
hearing. All things considered, we fail to see how the Commission allegedly exceeded its
jurisdiction or acted with grave abuse of discretion.

Lastly, certiorari is a remedy of last resort. It is not available if a party still has another speedy
and adequate remedy available. The petition is premature because Tolentino could still have
moved for reconsideration. Tolentino sought relief from everywhere (particularly, from the
MTCC, the local COMELEC office) except from the proper body that had jurisdiction to order
execution pending appeal.

As a final word, this Court deems it necessary to admonish the petitioner and his counsel for
their thinly veiled threat against the respondent City Election Officer Atty. Guiao-Garcia. Section
261(f) of the Omnibus Election Code provides:

Article XXII.
Election Offenses

Sec. 261. Prohibited Acts. - The following shall be guilty of an election offense: xxx

(f) Coercion of election officials and employees. - Any person who, directly or indirectly,
threatens, intimidates, terrorizes or coerces any election official or employee in the
performance of his election functions or duties.[15]

Atty. Ramon D. Facun already knew that the MTCC refused to enforce the writ of execution
pending appeal after having lost jurisdiction over the case. The matter, too, was already before
the Commission, in Division. Yet in his zeal to advance the interests of his client, Atty. Facun
threatened an election officer with the filing of a baseless contempt charge in violation of
Canon 19.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility in relation with Section 261 (f) of the
Omnibus Election Code.

While we cannot usurp the Commission's prerogative of prosecuting election offenses, this
Court retains disciplinary authority over all members of the Bar.[16] Canon 19 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility for Lawyers provides:

CANON 19 - A LAWYER SHALL REPRESENT HIS CLIENT WITH ZEAL WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF THE
LAW.

53
Rule 19.01 - A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of
his client and shall not present, participate in presenting or threaten to present unfounded
criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case or proceeding.

Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility demands that a lawyer represent his client
with zeal; but the same Canon provides that a lawyer's performance of his duties towards his
client must be within the bounds of the law. Rule 19.01 of the same Canon requires, among
others, that a lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of
his client. Canon 15, Rule 15.07 also obliges lawyers to impress upon their clients compliance
with the laws and the principle of fairness.[17]

For lawyers to resort to unscrupulous practices for the protection of the supposed rights of
their clients defeats one of the purposes of the state -the administration of justice. While
lawyers owe their entire devotion to the interest of their clients and zeal in the defense of their
client's right, they should not forget that they are, first and foremost, officers of the court,
bound to exert every effort to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. [18]

WHEREFORE, we hereby DISMISS the petition for lack of merit. Further, Atty. Ramon D. Facun
is WARNED that his threatening action in this case dangerously lies at the margins of Rule 19.01
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and did not spill over into a violation of this Rule only
because of the liberality of this Court. Given this warning, any repetition of this or other similar
acts shall not be liberally dealt with.

Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

AQUINO v. COMELEC, G.R. NOS. 211789-90 (March 17, 2015) EN BANC As a general rule, the
period of election starts at ninety (90) days before and ends thirty (30) days after the election
date pursuant to Section 9, Article IX-C of the Constitution and Section 3 of BP 881. This rule,
however, is not without exception. Under these same provisions, the COMELEC is not precluded
from setting a period different from that provided thereunder.

DR. REY B. AQUINO, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

Aquino vs Comelec

On January 8, 2010, Aquino, as President and Chief Executive Officer of the Philippine Health Insurance
Corporation (PHIC),issued PhilHealth Special Order No. 16, Series of 2010 (reassignment order)5
directing the reassignment of several PHIC officers and employees.

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On the same date, Aquino released the reassignment order, via the PHIC’s intranet service, to all PHIC
officers and employees, including the following: (1) Dennis Adre, PHIC Regional Vice-President (VP); (2)
Masiding Alonto, PHIC Regional VP; and (3) Khaliquzzaman M. Macabato, PHIC Assistant Regional VP.

On January 11, 2010, Aquino issued an Advisory implementing the reassignment order.

In view of the reassignment order and its directive, Dean Rudyard A. Avila III, consultant to the Chairman
of the Board of PHIC and former Secretary of the PHIC Board of Directors, filed before the COMELEC on
January 18, 2010, a complaint against Aquino and Melinda C. Mercado, PHIC Officer-in-Charge,
Executive VPand Chief Operating Officer, for violation of COMELEC Resolution No. 8737in relation to
Section 261(h) of BP 881. The case was docketed as E.O. Case No. 10-003.

On March 29, 2010, Aquino filed a petition10 before the COMELEC reiterating his request and
maintaining that PhilHealth SO No. 16-2010 is beyond the coverage of Resolution No. 8737. The
COMELEC directed its Law Department to file the appropriate information against Aquino for violation of
Resolution No. 8737 in relation to Section 261(h) of BP 881; it dismissed, for lack of merit, the complaint
against Mercado, Mendiola, and Basa.

The COMELEC declared that Aquino violated Section 261(h) of BP 881 when he directed the
transfer/reassignment of the PHIC officers and employees within the declared election period without its
prior approval. It pointed out that Section 261(h) considers an election offense for "any public official who
makes or causes the transfer or detail whatever of any public officer or employee in the civil service x x x
within the election period except upon prior approval of the Commission."

On December 7, 2012, Aquino sought reconsideration15 of the COMELEC’s October 19, 2012 resolution.

The COMELEC agreed with the complainants’ position and ruled that the word "whatever" in Section
261(h) of BP 881 expanded the coverage of the prohibition so as to include any movement of personnel,
including reassignment, among others. In fact, to dispel any ambiguity as regards Section 261(h)’s
prohibition, Resolution No. 8737 defined the word "transfer" as including any personnel action.

The COMELEC affirmed in toto the October 19, 2012 resolution.

ISSUE :
WON the COMELEC validly found prima facie case against Aquino for violation of Resolution No. 8737
in relation to Section 261(h).

HELD :
COMELEC Resolution No. 8737 is valid

A common and clear conclusion that we can gather from these provisions is the obvious and unequivocal
intent of the framers of the Constitution and of the law to grant the COMELEC with powers, necessary
and incidental to achieve the objective of ensuring free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections.

In Resolution No. 8737, the COMELEC defined the phrase "transfer or detail whatever" found in Section
261(h) of BP 881 as including any personnel action, i.e., "reassignment." Aquino questions this
COMELEC interpretation as an unwarranted expansion of the legal prohibition which he argues renders
the COMELEC liable for grave abuse of discretion.

the Court already clarified the interpretation of the term whatever as used in Section 261(h) of BP 881 in
relation to the terms transfer and detail. In agreeing with the Solicitor General’s position, this Court
declared that the terms transfer and detail are modified by the term whatever such that "any movement of
personnel from one station to another, whether or not in the same office or agency, during the election
period is covered by the prohibition.

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Read in the light of this ruling, we affirm the COMELEC’s interpretation of the phrase "transfer or detail
whatever" as we find the Regalado interpretation consistent with the legislative intent

Thus, to reiterate and emphasize – the election law’s prohibition on transfer or detail covers any
movement of personnel from one station to another, whether or not in the same office or agency when
made or caused during the election period.

As a general rule, the period of election starts at ninety (90) days before and ends thirty (30) days after
the election date pursuant to Section 9, Article IX-C of the Constitution and Section 3 of BP 881. This rule,
however, is not without exception. Under these same provisions, the COMELEC is not precluded from
setting a period different from that provided thereunder.

In this case, the COMELEC fixed the election period for the May 10, 2010 Elections at 120 days before
and 30 days after the day of the election. We find this period proper as we find no arbitrariness in the
COMELEC’s act of fixing an election period longer than the period fixed in the Constitution and BP 881

Under Section 261(h) of BP 881,a person commits the election offense of violation of the election transfer
ban when he makes or causes the transfer or detail whatever of any official or employee of the
government during the election period absent prior approval of the COMELEC.

By its terms, Section 261(h) provides at once the elements of the offense and its exceptions. The
elements are: (1) the making or causing of a government official or employee’s transfer or detail
whatever; (2) the making or causing of the transfer or detail whatever was made during the election
period; and (3) these acts were made without the required prior COMELEC approval

By its terms, Section 261(h) provides at once the elements of the offense and its exceptions. The
elements are: (1) the making or causing of a government official or employee’s transfer or detail
whatever; (2) the making or causing of the transfer or detail whatever was made during the election
period; and (3) these acts were made without the required prior COMELEC approval

Make is defined as "to cause to exist. To do, perform, or execute; as to make an issue, to make oath, to
make a presentment. To do in form of law; to perform with due formalities; to execute in legal form; as to
make answer, to make a return or report. To execute as one’s act or obligation; to prepare and sign; to
issue; to sign, execute, and deliver."44

Cause, on the other hand, is defined as "each separate antecedent of an event. Something that precedes
and brings about an effect or result. A reason for an action or condition x x x x an agent that brings about
something. That which in some manner is accountable for condition that brings about an effect or that
produces a cause for the resultant action or state.

Significantly, the terms make and cause indicate one and the same thing – the beginning, the start of
something, a precursor; it pertains to an act that brings about a desired result. If we read these definitions
within the context of Section 261(h) of BP 881, the legal prohibition on transfer or detail undoubtedly
affects only those acts that go into the making or causing or to the antecedent acts.

In short, during the making or causing phase of the entire transfer or reassignment process – from
drafting the order, to its signing, up to its release – the issuing official plays a very real and active role.
Once the transfer or reassignment order is issued, the active role is shifted to the addressee of the order
who should now carry out the purpose of the order. At this level – the implementation phase – the issuing
official’s only role is to see to it that the concerned officer or employee complies with the order. The
issuing official may only exert discipline upon the addressee who refuses to comply with the order.

Following these considerations, we find that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in this case
based on the following facts:

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First, Aquino made or caused the reassignment of the concerned PHIC officers and employees before the
election period.

Second, Aquino sent out, via the PHIC’s intranet service, the reassignment order to all affected PHIC
officers and employees before the election period.

Third, the reassignment order was complete in its terms, as it enumerated clearly the affected PHIC
officers and employees as well as their respective places of reassignments, and was made effective
immediately or on the day of its issue, which was likewise before the election period.
Fourth, the subsequent orders that Aquino issued were not reassignment orders per se contrary to the
COMELEC’s assessment.

Based on these clear facts, Aquino completed the act of making or causing the reassignment of the
affected PHIC officers and employees before the start of the election period. In this sense, the evils
sought to be addressed by Section 261 (h) of BP 881 is kept intact by the timely exercise of his
management prerogative in rearranging or reassigning PHIC personnel within its various offices
necessary for the PHIC's efficient and smooth operation. As Aquino's acts of issuing the order fell outside
the coverage of the transfer prohibition, he cannot be held liable for violation of Section 261(h).

In sum, the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when, firstly, it used wrong or irrelevant
considerations when it sought to hold Aquino liable for violation of Section 261 (h) for issuing orders that
were clearly not for reassignment, but which were simply orders for retention of position or orders for
temporary discharge of additional duties.

57