A.

VIRTUE ETHICS There are two central components of virtue

Nicomachean Ethics is the name of a series of ethics: the concept of virtue, and the concept of
books that Aristotle wrote about ethics. In these character.
writings, he uses logic to determine a definition A good person is a virtuous person, one with a
and the potential impacts of ethics. He starts his certain sort of character.
presentation of ethics with a simple assumption: Moral virtues are those qualities of a
humans think and behave in a way to achieve personality that are valuable for everyone to
happiness, which Aristotle defined as the have, whether they are offensive tackles, cyclist,
constant consideration of truth and behavior or anyone else. Possessing and acting on the
consistent with that truth. virtues amounts living a morally worthwhile and
Aristotle defines virtue as the average, or flourishing life for human being.
'mean,' between excess and deficiency.
Partial list of typical moral virtues: loyalty,
Meaning of VIRTUE ETHICS by Aristotle honesty, fairness, kindness, courage,
 Aristotle's perspective on ethics was considerateness, civility, compassion,
based on the virtue of being human; friendliness, patience, self-reliance, generosity,
 There are two important distinctions and dependability.
between Aristotle's approach to ethics According to Aristotle, many virtues are the
and the other predominant perspectives midpoint, or “golden mean” between related
at the time. vices of deficiency or excess. Virtue is a sort of
 First, Aristotle did not consider ethics just Goldilocks zone. Here are some examples.
a theoretical or philosophical topic to
study. To understand ethics, Aristotle Too little Just right Too much
argued, you actually have to observe how Stingy Generous Wasteful
people behave. Cowardly Courageous Reckless
 That led to the second distinction. Ethics Cranky Friendly Sucking
weren't about ''what if'' situations for up/brown-
Aristotle; instead, he took a very practical nosing
approach and much of his ideas on ethics False Honesty about Bragging
were based on what someone did and modesty oneself
how their virtues impacted their actions. Anorexia Moderate Gluttony
consumption
VIRTUE ETHICS sloth ambition Workaholic
The final ethical theory on deck is also the most
ancient, endorsed by religion such as Islam and What is character?
with a pedigree going back to Aristotle’s Virtue theory, the virtues are not specific
discussion in nichomachean ethics. It is the idea behaviors or actions so much as they are habits
that morality isn’t about outcomes (like of character. No single action demonstration
utilitarians think), or rule following (like kant much, if anything, about one’s character. rather,
and Christians think), but about being a certain character is a tendency is a tendency to act in
type of person. Instead of obsessing about good certain sorts of ways.
actions, we ought to focus on what it is to be a
good person. Character is the sort of thing that comes in
This is the idea of virtue ethics. Virtue is an degrees.
appealing way to understand morality. Instead of  So someone with a strong character is
a daunting calculus that must take every actual dependable, steady, unflinching,
and future person into account, or some rigid unwavering, steadfast, and reliable.
and abstract moral law, virtue is within the grasp
 Someone with a weak character is fickle,
of everyone.
weak, faithless, irresolute, erratic,
capricious, and incontinent.

Objections to virtues ethics
Objection 1: Virtue is compatible with evil the
first objection to virtue theory is that it seems
entirely possible to cultivate and endorse the
classic moral virtues and still participate in
considerable wickedness. When Salvatore Lo
Piccolo, the capo the Sicilian Mafia was arrested
in 2017, the police found a written code of
behavior for the mob. Here’s the Mafia’s “ten
commandments”
1. No one can present himself directly to another
of our friends. There must be a third person to
do it.
2. Never look at the wives of friend.
3. Never be seen with cops.
4. Don’t go to pubs and clubs.
5. Always available for Cosa Nostra is a duty-
even if your wife is about to give birth
6. Appointments must absolutely be respected,
7. Wives must be treated with respect
8. When asked for any information, the answer
must be the truth.
9. Money cannot be appropriated if it belongs to
others or to other family
10. People who can’t be part of Cosa Nostra:
anyone who has a close relative in the police,
anyone with two-timing relative in the family,
anyone who behaves and doesn’t hold to moral
values.
Lo Piccolo’s list emphasizes honesty, respect,
duty, and moral values. Traditional Mafia
morality also includes absolute loyalty to the
family, the omertá code of silence, and the
prohibition on harming a made man.
Objection 2: Clashing virtues virtue ethics
advises that the good life consists in cultivating
all the virtues. It is a good thing to be honest, but
it is even better if you are a kind person too.
Option 1. It is a much kinder and considerate
response
Option 2. More honest
Objection 3 relativism about virtues the third
objection is that what qualities of character that
count as virtues and which count of vices seems
heavily dependent on the culture which you are
raised.
Objection 4. There is no such thing as character
the final objection of virtue ethics comes from
experimental psychology and perhaps the most
powerful complaint. The essential of virtue
ethics is the notion of character, the idea that
each person has tendency to act in certain sorts
of way given the appropriate situation.
B. ARISTOTLE CONCEPT OF HAPPINESS
Aristotle's first contention in this regard is that
subjective conceptions of happiness fall down
miserably on this score. Sometimes our desires
are satisfied, but instead of feeling pleasure or
satisfaction, we in fact become perplexed with
ourselves, even to the point of self-alienation. A
man who desires a yellow sports car more than
anything, who sacrifices mightily to obtain it,
may wonder, when he has it in his possession
why exactly he had wanted it so very badly.
Further, even if we do feel satisfied when our
desires are realized we may in truth do so
despite the fact of our having develop desires
that are not worthy of us.
Happiness and the human function
It may come as a surprise that human beings
have a function. Computers and can-openers
have functions, to compute and to open cans. We
know that these sorts of artefacts have functions,
and we have no trouble identifying what they
are, for the simple that we gave them the
functions they have. We designed them with
specific purposes in mind. Matters are not so
clear with the functions of human beings. To
begin, Aristotle denies that human beings are
designed by the activity of any form of
intentional agent. Yet he does not suppose that
this precludes our manifesting functions. Final
causes occur in nature, he contends in the
absence of intentional design. If that is so, then it
should be possible to identify a human function,
which in turn will provide a basis of a functional
account of human goodness. That is, just as we
may easily that a good can-opener is a can-
opener which opens cans well, we should
likewise be able to say that a good human being
a human being who performs the human
function well. The key then, is to specify the
human function.
Aristotle's identification of the human good
progresses in the form of his function argument
(FA):
1 The function of any given kind F is determined
by isolating the unique and characteristic activity
of Fs.
2. The unique and characteristic activity of
human beings is reasoning.
3 Hence, the function of human beings is (or
centrally involves) reasoning
4 Exercising a function is an activity (where, in
living beings, this will be the actualization of
some capacity of the soul).
5 Hence, exercising the human function is an
activity of the soul in accordance with reason.
The function argument has proven controversial.
Many regard it as wholly unpersuasive. Even so,
some - though not all – of the difficulties critics
locate in the argument result from
misunderstandings.
Thus, Aristotle concludes, the human good
consists in leading a fully and characteristically
human sort of life. This conclusion high lights
three distinctive features of Aristotle's account of
human happiness: (i) happiness is an activity;
(ii) happiness is objectively rather than
subjectively determined; and (iii) happiness is
forever rather than fleeting.
First, then, human happiness is a kind of living
and is thus an activity rather than a passive state
or affective experience: happiness is a doing
rather than a being. That is, the best form of life
is active rather than passive. This is yet another
reason why a human being would not, upon
rational reflection a pink pleasure pill when
offered: feeling pleasure is an affective state,
whereas the best form of human life involves the
execution of plans ad projects.
He cites with approval a famous dictum of
Solon's: 'Look to the end' (EN 1100a10-11), by
which he means that we cannot stably judge
whether someone is happy before the end of
their life.
, according to Aristotle, sensibly say that we
were happy between lunch and dinner, but not
during either.
Aristotelian happiness (eudaimonia), to
underscore our first two features, is neither
fleeting nor a feeling; still less is it, then, any sort
of fleeting feeling.
Once he has identified the human
function in these terms, it is a
short step for Aristotle to characterize the
human good in his canonical expression (EN
1098a161-17):
• Happiness (eudaimonia) = df an activity of the
soul expressing reason in a virtuous manner.
In conclusion
Happiness is the ultimate purpose of human
existence
Happiness is living well
Happiness is the final end or Goal that
encompasses the totality of life
Happiness is not subjective
Happiness is not a pleasure
Happiness depends on the cultivation of virtue
“He is happy who lives in accordance with
complete virtue and is sufficiently equipped with
external good, not for some chance period but
throughout a complete life” (Nichomachean
Ethics, 1101a10)
As Aristotle says “for as it is not one swallow or
one fine day that makes a spring, so it is not one
day or short time that makes a man blessed and
happy”
“the function of man is to live a certain kind of
life, and this activity implies a rational principle,
and the function of a good man is the good and
noble performance of these, and if an action is
well performed it is performed in accord with
appropriate excellence: if this is the case, then
happiness turns out to be an activity of the soul
in accordance with virtue. (Nichomachean Ethics
1098a13)”
C.TELOS OR THE ULTIMATE END
Aristotle, the ancient Greek father of western
philosophy, thought so, and he called that
purpose, telos (pronounced ‘TELL-os’ or ‘TAY-
los’). The word telos means purpose, intent, end,
or goal.
Aristotle has this special meaning of “the state in
which something’s nature is fulfilled”, or where
something is fully “in act”.
Also, In Aristotle, Physics II.9, where his theory
of telos is most fully worked out, is said to be
talking “Teleologically because he asserts that
everything that moves, is moved in part by a type
of cause called the telos, i.e. that towards
which the thing moves. In this sense telos is where
something is supposed to be.
Teleological ethics (teleological from
Greek telos, “end”; logos, “science”) theory
of morality that derives duty or moral obligation
from what is good or desirable as an end to be
achieved.
Also known as consequentialist ethics, it is
opposed to deontological ethics (from the
Greek deon, “duty”), which holds that the basic
standards for an action’s being morally right are
independent of the good or evil generated)
In the book of Solomon & Greene Morality and the
Good Life, one of the most important Aristotle’s
theory, that of a thing telos or end, is developed in a
similar way from his many studies of the natural
world, Aristotle concluded that nature is
purposive, that “she does nothing in vain”. That is
everything (almost) has a particular purpose for
which it is the best suited, and that purpose or goal
is what Aristotle calls it Telos.
Included in this account are not only natural
objects such as plants and animals, but man made
artifacts as well.
The telos of human artifacts
The purposes of human-created artifacts;
example are books for reading, chairs for
sitting.
The telos of living things:
The purposes of the natural features of living
things; example are wings for flying, ears for
hearing.
D. MORAL VIRTUE AS GOOD HABIT
Nicomachean Ethics: Books I to IV
Scholars do not agree on where the name for
the Nicomachean Ethics comes from. Both
Aristotle’s father and his son were named
Nicomachus, so it is possible that the book is
dedicated to either one. Other scholars suggest
that Aristotle’s son may have edited the book
after Aristotle died, so that the title
“Nicomachean” may refer to this particular
edition of Aristotle’s ethical works.
Summary
Happiness is the highest good and the end at
which all our activities ultimately aim. All our
activities aim at some end, though most of these
ends are means toward other ends. For example,
we go grocery shopping to buy food, but buying
food is itself a means toward the end of eating
well and thriftily. Eating well and thriftily is also
not an end in itself but a means to other ends.
Only happiness is an end in itself, so it is the
ultimate end at which all our activities aim. As
such, it is the supreme good. The difficulty is that
people don’t agree on what makes for a happy or
good life, so the purpose of the Ethicsis to find an
answer to this question. By its nature, the
investigation is imprecise because there are so
many variables involved when considering a
person’s life as a whole.
Aristotle defines the supreme good as an activity
of the rational soul in accordance with virtue.
Virtue for the Greeks is equivalent to excellence.
A man has virtue as a flautist, for instance, if he
plays the flute well, since playing the flute is the
distinctive activity of a flautist. A virtuous person
is someone who performs the distinctive activity
of being human well. Rationality is our
distinctive activity, that is, the activity that
distinguishes us from plants and animals. All
living things have a nutritive soul, which governs
growth and nutrition. Humans and animals are
distinct from plants in having a sensitive soul,
which governs locomotion and instinct. Humans
are distinct above all for having also a rational and don’ts but rather in the same kind of striving
soul, which governs thought. Since our after excellence that might make an athlete train
rationality is our distinctive activity, its exercise hard. The Greek word ethos, from which we
is the supreme good. derive the word ethics, literally means
Aristotle defines moral virtue as a disposition to “character,” and Aristotle’s goal is to describe
behave in the right manner and as a mean what qualities constitute an excellent character.
between extremes of deficiency and excess, The important lesson to draw from Aristotle’s
which are vices. We learn moral virtue primarily Doctrine of the Mean is that virtue consists of
through habit and practice rather than through finding an appropriate middle ground between
reasoning and instruction. Virtue is a matter of
two extremes. As such, each virtue has not one
having the appropriate attitude toward pain and
pleasure. For example, a coward will suffer opposite but two. The opposite of courage is
undue fear in the face of danger, whereas a rash both cowardice and rashness, for example. This
person will not suffer sufficient fear. Aristotle idea that there are two opposites for every virtue
lists the principle virtues along with their goes against much of the received wisdom of
corresponding vices, as represented in the Aristotle’s time, including Plato’s writings on
following table. A virtuous person exhibits all of virtue. It also emphasizes the importance of
the virtues: they do not properly exist as distinct Sphere of
qualities but rather as different aspects of a action or
virtuous life. feeling Excess (vice) Mean (virtue) Deficiency (vice)
Fear and
confidence Rashness Courage Cowardice
Pleasure and
We can only be held responsible for actions we pain Licentiousness Temperance Insensibility
Getting and
perform voluntarily and not for cases involving spending
physical compulsion or unavoidable ignorance. (minor) Prodigality Liberality Illiberality
The best measure of moral judgment is choice, Getting and
spending
since choices are always made voluntarily by (major) Vulgarity Magnificence Pettiness
means of rational deliberation. We always Honor and
choose to aim at the good, but people are often dishonor
(major) Vanity Magnanimity Pusillanimity
ignorant of what is good and so aim at some Honor and
apparent good instead, which is in fact a vice. dishonor Proper
(minor) Ambition ambition Unambitiousness
Anger Irascibility Patience Lack of spirit
Analysis
The Nicomachean Ethics advances an Self-expression Boastfulness Truthfulness Understatement
understanding of ethics known as virtue Conversation Buffoonery Wittiness Boorishness
ethicsbecause of its heavy reliance on the
Obsequiousness
concept of virtue. The word we translate Social conduct or flattery Friendliness Cantankerousness
as virtue is aretê, and it could equally be Shame Shyness Modesty Shamelessness
translated as “excellence.” Something has aretê if Righteous Malicious
it performs its function well. A good horseman, Indignation Envy indignation enjoyment
for example, has the aretê of being good at moderation: we achieve virtue by finding a
handling horses, and a good knife has middle ground, not by aiming for an extreme.
the aretê of sharpness. For the Greeks, moral Where exactly this middle ground lies, however,
virtue is not essentially different from these
is less obvious. Aristotle repeats a number of
other kinds of excellence. The Greeks do not
have a distinctive concept of morality like we do, times that his table presents only a rough
which carries associations of sanctity or duty. approximation and that virtues lie closer to one
Moral virtue is simply a matter of performing vice than another to different extents for
well in the function of being human. For the different people. The Table of Virtues just
Greeks, the motivation for being good is not presented is not intended as a set of exact rules.
based in a divine legislator or a set of moral dos
On the contrary, Aristotle argues that a truly
virtuous person will naturally be inclined to
behave appropriately and will have no need of
rules.
Aristotle is clear that we arrive at moral virtue
primarily through practice and that the value of
studying ethical texts such as the one he has
written is limited. This view makes sense when
we consider that moral virtue is not essentially
different from other forms of excellence as far as
the Greeks are concerned. If we want to achieve
excellence in rock climbing, for instance, it helps
to study texts that show us how to improve our
technique, but we can’t make any significant
improvements except by getting on a rock wall
and practicing. Analogously, it helps to read texts
like the Nicomachean Ethics to get a clearer
understanding of moral virtue, but the only way
to become more virtuous is through practice. We
can only become more courageous by making a
point of facing down our fears, and we can only
become more patient by making a habit of
controlling our anger. Since practice, not study, is
the key to becoming virtuous, Aristotle takes a
strong interest in the education of the young. He
perceives that there is only so much we can do to
improve a nasty adult, and we can more easily
mold virtuous youths by instilling the proper
habits in them from a young age.
Aristotle calls happiness an “activity,” which
distinguishes his conception of happiness both
from our modern conception of happiness and
from virtue, which Aristotle calls a “disposition.”
We tend to think of happiness as an emotional
state and hence as something we are, rather than
as something we do. The Greek word generally
translated as “happiness” is eudaimonia, and it
can equally be rendered as “success” or
“flourishing.” People who are eudaimon are not
in a particular emotional state so much as they
are living successfully. While happiness is the
activity of living well, virtue represents the
potential to live well. Excelling in all the moral
virtues is fine and good, but it doesn’t ensure our
happiness unless we exercise those virtues.
Courageous people who never test their courage
by facing down fear have virtue, but they are not
happy. Aristotle illustrates this distinction
between happiness and virtue by saying that the
best athletes only win at the Olympic Games if
they compete. A virtuous person who does not
exercise virtue is like an athlete who sits on the
sideline and watches. Aristotle has a proactive
conception of the good life: happiness waits only
for those who go out and seize it.
Ethical Virtue as Disposition
Aristotle describes ethical virtue as a “hexis”
(“state” “condition” “disposition”)—a tendency
or disposition, induced by our habits, to have
appropriate feelings (1105b25–6). Defective
states of character are hexeis (plural of hexis) as
well, but they are tendencies to have
inappropriate feelings. The significance of
Aristotle's characterization of these states
as hexeis is his decisive rejection of the thesis,
found throughout Plato's early dialogues, that
virtue is nothing but a kind of knowledge and
vice nothing but a lack of knowledge. Although
Aristotle frequently draws analogies between
the crafts and the virtues (and similarly between
physical health and eudaimonia), he insists that
the virtues differ from the crafts and all branches
of knowledge in that the former involve
appropriate emotional responses and are not
purely intellectual conditions.
Furthermore, every ethical virtue is a condition
intermediate (a “golden mean” as it is popularly
known) between two other states, one involving
excess, and the other deficiency (1106a26–b28).
In this respect, Aristotle says, the virtues are no
different from technical skills: every skilled
worker knows how to avoid excess and
deficiency, and is in a condition intermediate
between two extremes. The courageous person,
for example, judges that some dangers are worth
facing and others not, and experiences fear to a
degree that is appropriate to his circumstances.
He lies between the coward, who flees every
danger and experiences excessive fear, and the
rash person, who judges every danger worth
facing and experiences little or no fear. Aristotle
holds that this same topography applies to every
ethical virtue: all are located on a map that
places the virtues between states of excess and
deficiency. He is careful to add, however, that the
mean is to be determined in a way that takes into
account the particular circumstances of the
individual (1106a36–b7). The arithmetic mean
between 10 and 2 is 6, and this is so invariably,
whatever is being counted. But the intermediate
point that is chosen by an expert in any of the
crafts will vary from one situation to another.
There is no universal rule, for example, about
how much food an athlete should eat, and it
would be absurd to infer from the fact that 10
lbs. is too much and 2 lbs. too little for me that I
should eat 6 lbs. Finding the mean in any given
situation is not a mechanical or thoughtless
procedure, but requires a full and detailed
acquaintance with the circumstances.
It should be evident that Aristotle's treatment of
virtues as mean states endorses the idea that we
should sometimes have strong feelings—when
such feelings are called for by our situation.
Sometimes only a small degree of anger is
appropriate; but at other times, circumstances
call for great anger. The right amount is not some
quantity between zero and the highest possible
level, but rather the amount, whatever it
happens to be, that is proportionate to the
seriousness of the situation. Of course, Aristotle
is committed to saying that anger should never
reach the point at which it undermines reason;
and this means that our passion should always
fall short of the extreme point at which we would
lose control. But it is possible to be very angry
without going to this extreme, and Aristotle does
not intend to deny this.
The theory of the mean is open to several
objections, but before considering them, we
should recognize that in fact there are two
distinct theses each of which might be called a
doctrine of the mean. First, there is the thesis
that every virtue is a state that lies between two
vices, one of excess and the other of deficiency.
Second, there is the idea that whenever a
virtuous person chooses to perform a virtuous
act, he can be described as aiming at an act that
is in some way or other intermediate between
alternatives that he rejects. It is this second
thesis that is most likely to be found
objectionable. A critic might concede that in
some cases virtuous acts can be described in
Aristotle's terms. If, for example, one is trying to
decide how much to spend on a wedding
present, one is looking for an amount that is
neither excessive nor deficient. But surely many
other problems that confront a virtuous agent
are not susceptible to this quantitative analysis.
If one must decide whether to attend a wedding
or respect a competing obligation instead, it
would not be illuminating to describe this as a
search for a mean between extremes—unless
“aiming at the mean” simply becomes another
phrase for trying to make the right decision. The
objection, then, is that Aristotle's doctrine of the
mean, taken as a doctrine about what the ethical
agent does when he deliberates, is in many cases
inapplicable or unilluminating.
A defense of Aristotle would have to say that the
virtuous person does after all aim at a mean, if
we allow for a broad enough notion of what sort
of aiming is involved. For example, consider a
juror who must determine whether a defendant
is guilty as charged. He does not have before his
mind a quantitative question; he is trying to
decide whether the accused committed the
crime, and is not looking for some quantity of
action intermediate between extremes.
Nonetheless, an excellent juror can be described
as someone who, in trying to arrive at the correct
decision, seeks to express the right degree of
concern for all relevant considerations. He
searches for the verdict that results from a
deliberative process that is neither overly
credulous nor unduly skeptical. Similarly, in
facing situations that arouse anger, a virtuous
agent must determine what action (if any) to
take in response to an insult, and although this is
not itself a quantitative question, his attempt to
answer it properly requires him to have the right
degree of concern for his standing as a member
of the community. He aims at a mean in the sense
that he looks for a response that avoids too much
or too little attention to factors that must be
taken into account in making a wise decision.
Perhaps a greater difficulty can be raised if we
ask how Aristotle determines which emotions
are governed by the doctrine of the mean.
Consider someone who loves to wrestle, for
example. Is this passion something that must be
felt by every human being at appropriate times shameful and ugly. Determining what is kalon is
and to the right degree? Surely someone who difficult (1106b28–33, 1109a24–30), and the
never felt this emotion to any degree could still normal human aversion to embracing difficulties
live a perfectly happy life. Why then should we helps account for the scarcity of virtue
not say the same about at least some of the (1104b10–11).
emotions that Aristotle builds into his analysis of
the ethically virtuous agent? Why should we
experience anger at all, or fear, or the degree of
concern for wealth and honor that Aristotle
commends? These are precisely the questions
that were asked in antiquity by the Stoics, and
they came to the conclusion that such common
emotions as anger and fear are always
inappropriate. Aristotle assumes, on the
contrary, not simply that these common passions
are sometimes appropriate, but that it is
essential that every human being learn how to
master them and experience them in the right
way at the right times. A defense of his position
would have to show that the emotions that figure
in his account of the virtues are valuable
components of any well-lived human life, when
they are experienced properly. Perhaps such a
project could be carried out, but Aristotle himself
does not attempt to do so.
He often says, in the course of his discussion, that
when the good person chooses to act virtuously,
he does so for the sake of the “kalon”—a word
that can mean “beautiful”, “noble”, or “fine” (see
for example 1120a23–4). This term indicates
that Aristotle sees in ethical activity an attraction
that is comparable to the beauty of well-crafted
artifacts, including such artifacts as poetry,
music, and drama. He draws this analogy in his
discussion of the mean, when he says that every
craft tries to produce a work from which nothing
should be taken away and to which nothing
further should be added (1106b5–14). A craft
product, when well designed and produced by a
good craftsman, is not merely useful, but also has
such elements as balance, proportion and
harmony—for these are properties that help
make it useful. Similarly, Aristotle holds that a
well-executed project that expresses the ethical
virtues will not merely be advantageous
but kalon as well—for the balance it strikes is
part of what makes it advantageous. The young
person learning to acquire the virtues must
develop a love of doing what is kalon and a
strong aversion to its opposite—the aischron, the