People vs.

Silvestre and Atienza

En Banc Villareal, December 14, 1931
Topic: Elements of criminal liability (Art 3.) -- Physical element -- Act/Omission

Facts: Romana Silvestre is the wife of Domingo Joaquin by his second marriage. Romana cohabited
with codefendant Martin Atienza from March 1930 in Masocol, Paombong, Bulacan. On May 16,
1930, Domingo filed with the justice of the peace for Paombong, Bulacan a sworn complaint for
adultery. After being arrested and released on bail, the two defendants begged the municipal president
of Paombong to speak to the complainant and urge him to withdraw the complaint. The two accused
bound themselves to discontinue cohabitation and promised not to live again in Masocol (Atienza
signed the promise). On May 20, 1930, Domingo Joaquin filed a motion for the dismissal of his
complaint and the justice of the peace dismissed the adultery case. The accused left Masocol and wen
to live in Santo Niño, in Paombong. About November 20, 1930: Romana met her son by her former
marriage, Nicolas de la Cruz, in Santo Niño and followed him home to Masocol (under the pretext of
asking him for some nipa leaves). Martin Atienza, who continued to cohabit with Romana, followed
her and lived in the home of Nicolas. On the night of November 25, 1930, while Nicolas, his wife
Antonia, and the appellants were gathered after supper, Martin told Nicolas and Antonia to take their
furniture out of the house because he was going to set fire to it. He said that that was the only way he
could be revenged upon the people of Masocol who, he said, had instigated the charge of adultery
against him and Romana. Martin was armed with a pistol so no one dared say anything to him.
Nicolas and Antonia went to ask for help but were too late. The fire destroyed about 48 houses.
Witnesses saw Martin and Romana leaving the house on fire. The Court of First Instance of Bulacan
convicted Martin and Romana of arson. Martin was convicted as principal by direct participation (14
years, 8 months, and 1 day of cadena temporal). Romana was convicted as accomplice (6 years and 1
day of presidio mayor). The court-appointed counsel for the accused-appellant prays for the affirmance
of the CFI decision with regard to Martin, but assigns errors with reference to Romana: The lower court
erred in convicting Romana as acoomplice. The court erred in not acquitting Romana upon ground of
insufficient evidence, or at least, of reasonable doubt.

Issue: Whether or not Romana can be convicted as accomplice

Holding: No.
Ratio: Art. 14 of the Penal Code, in connection with Art. 13 defines an accomplice to be one who does
not take a direct part in the commission of the act, who does not force or induce other to commit it, nor
cooperates in the commission of the act by another act without which it would not have been
accomplished, yet cooperates in the execution of the act by previous or simultaneous actions. In the
case of Romana: there is no evidence of moral or material cooperation and none of an agreement to
commit the crime in question. Her mere presence and silence while they are simultaneous acts, do not
constitute cooperation, for it does not appear that they encouraged or nerved Martin Atienza to commit
the crime of arson; and as for her failure to give the alarm, that being a subsequent act it does not make
her liable as an accomplice. Mere passive presence at the scene of another's crime, mere silence and
failure to give the alarm, without evidence of agreement or conspiracy, do not constitute the
cooperation required by Art. 14 of the Penal Code for complicity in the commission of the crime
witnessed passively, or with regard to which one has kept silent. Decision is affirmed with reference to
Martin Atienza, reversed with reference to Romana Silvestre, who is acquitted.

People vs. Talingdan

En Banc Per Curiam, July 6, 1978
Topic: Elements of criminal liability (Art. 3) -- Physical element -- Act/Omission
Facts: Teresa Domogma was the supposed wife of the deceased Bernardo Bagabag. No certificate or
any other proof of their marriage could be presented by the prosecution. They lived with their children
in Sobosob, Salapadan, Abra. Their relationship had been strained and beset with troubles for Teresa
had deserted her family home a couple of times and each time Bernardo took time out to look for her.
On 2 different occasions, appellant Nemesis Talingdan has visited Teresa in their house while Bernardo
was out at work, and during those visits Teresa had made Corazon, their then 12-year old daughter to
go down the house and leave them. Bernardo had gotten wind that an illicit relationship was going on
between Talingdan and Teresa. About a month before Bernardo was killed, Teresa had again left their
house and did not come back for a period of more than 3 weeks, and Bernardo came to know later that
she and Talingdan were seen together in the town of Tayum Abra during that time. Just two days before
Bernardo was killed (Thursday), Bernardo and Theresa had a violent quarrel; Bernardo slapped Theresa
several times, resulting in Theresa seeking the help of the police. Accused Talingdan, a policeman,
came armed to the vicinity of Bernardo's house and called him to come down; Bernardo ignored him;
Talingdan instead left and warned Bernardo that someday he would kill him. On Saturday, June 24,
1967, Bernardo was gunned down in his house. The defendants' and Corazon's accounts of what
happened had variations. Corazon's version: Friday morning: Corazon was in a creek to wash clothes.
She saw her mother Teresa meeting with Talingdan and their co-appellants Magellan Tobias, Augusto
Berras, and Pedro Bides in a small hut owned by Bernardo. She heard one of them say "Could he elude
a bullet" When Teresa noticed Corazon, she shoved her away saying "You tell your father that we will
kill him". Saturday, after sunset: Corazon was cooking food for supper when she saw her mother go
down the house to go to the yard where she again met with the other appellants. She noted the long
guns the appellants were carrying. Teresa came back to the house and proceeded to her room. Corazon
informed Bernardo, who was then working on a plow, about the presence of persons downstairs, but
Bernardo paid no attention. Bernardo proceeded to the kitchen and sat himself on the floor near the
door. He was suddenly fired upon form below the stairs of the batalan. The four accused climbed the
stairs of the batalan and upon seeing that Bernardo was still alive, Talingdan and Tobias fired at him
again. Bides and Berras did not fire at that precise time but when Corazon tried to call for helo, Bides
warned her that he will kill her if she calls for help. Teresa came out of her room and when Corazon
informed her that she recognized the killers, the former threatened to kill the latter if she reveals the
matter to anyone. The defendants'' version: Teresa loved Bernardo dearly, they never quarreled, and her
husband never maltreated her. Teresa came to know Talingdan only when the latter became a policeman
in Sallapadan; an illicit relationship never existed between them. Talingdan was not in Sallapadan at the
time of the killing on June 24; he escorted the Mayor in Bangued from June 22 to June 26. Tobias,
Bides, and Berras claimed to be in the house of one Mrs. Bayongan in Sallapadan, 250-300 meters
from the place of the killing

Issue: Whether or not Teresa Domogma is an accessory to Bernardo's murder. It is contended that
there is no evidence proving that she actually joined in the conspuracy to kill her husband because there
is no showing of actual cooperation on her part with co-appellants in their culpable acts that led to his
death. It is claimed that what is apparent is "mere cognizance, acquiescence or approval thereof on her
part, which it is argued is less than what is required for her conviction as a conspirator

Holding: Yes. She is an accessory to Bernardo's murder.

Ratio: Note: The court believed Corazon's testimony. It is true that proof of her direct participation
in the conspiracy is not beyond reasonable doubt; she cannot have the same liability as her co-
appellants. She had no hand in the actual shooting. It is also not clear if she helped directly in the
planning and preparation thereof. But the court is convinced that she knew it was going to be done and
did not object. There is in the record morally convincing proof that she is at the very least an
accessory to the offense committed. She did not only order her daughter not to reveal what she knew
to anyone, she also claimed to have no suspects in mind when the peace officers came into their house
later to investigate. Whereas before the actual shooting she was more or less passive in her attitude
regarding the conspiracy, after Bernardo was killed, she became active in her cooperation with her co-
appellants. These acts constitute "concealing or assisting in the escape of the principal in the crime"
Male appellants sentenced to death. Guilty beyond reasonable doubt is Teresa Domogma, sentenced to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of 5 years of prision correccional as minimum to 8 years of prision
mayor as maximum.

EDUARDO P. MANUEL, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent

G.R. No. 165842; November 29, 2005
CALLEJO, SR., J.:

FACTS: This case is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of Court of Appeals affirming the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, convicting the petitioner for the crime of bigamy.

Eduardo P. Manuel, herein petitioner, was first married to Rubylus Gaña on July 18, 1975, who,
according to the former, was charged with estafa in 1975 and thereafter imprisoned and was never seen
again by him after his last visit. Manuel met Tina B. Gandalera in January 1996 when the latter was
only 21 years old. Three months after their meeting, the two got married through a civil wedding in
Baguio City without Gandalera’s knowledge of Manuel’s first marriage. In the course of their marriage,
things got rocky and Gandalera learned that Eduardo was in fact already married when he married him.
She then filed a criminal case of bigamy against Eduardo Manuel. The latter’s defense being that his
declaration of “single” in his marriage contract with Gandalera was done because he believed in good
faith that his first marriage was invalid and that he did not know that he had to go to court to seek for
the nullification of his first marriage before marrying Tina. The Regional Trial Court ruled against him
sentencing him of imprisonment of from 6 years and 10 months to ten years, and an amount 0f
P200,000.00 for moral damages. Eduardo appealed the decision to the CA where he alleged that he was
not criminally liable for bigamy because when he married the private complainant, he did so in good
faith and without any malicious intent. The CA ruled against the petitioner but with modification on the
RTC’s decision. Imprisonment was from 2 years, months and 1 day to ten years. Pecuniary reward for
moral damages was affirmed. Hence, this petition.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error of law when it ruled that petitioner’s
wife cannot be legally presumed dead under Article 390 of the Civil Code as there was no judicial
declaration of presumptive death as provided for under Article 41 of the Family Code.

2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error of law when it affirmed the award of
Php200,000.00 as moral damages as it has no basis in fact and in law.

HELD:
1. The petition is denied for lack of merit. The petitioner is presumed to have acted with malice or evil
intent when he married the private complainant. As a general rule, mistake of fact or good faith of the
accused is a valid defense in a prosecution for a felony by dolo; such defense negates malice or
criminal intent. However, ignorance of the law is not an excuse because everyone is presumed to know
the law. Ignorantia legis neminem excusat. Where a spouse is absent for the requisite period, the
present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage only after securing a judgment declaring the
presumptive death of the absent spouse to avoid being charged and convicted of bigamy; the present
spouse will have to adduce evidence that he had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was
already dead. Such judgment is proof of the good faith of the present spouse who contracted a
subsequent marriage; thus, even if the present spouse is later charged with bigamy if the absentee
spouse reappears, he cannot be convicted of the crime. The court ruled against the petitioner.

2. The Court rules that the petitioner’s collective acts of fraud and deceit before, during and after his
marriage with the private complainant were willful, deliberate and with malice and caused injury to the
latter. The Court thus declares that the petitioner’s acts are against public policy as they undermine and
subvert the family as a social institution, good morals and the interest and general welfare of society.
Because the private complainant was an innocent victim of the petitioner’s perfidy, she is not barred
from claiming moral damages. Considering the attendant circumstances of the case, the Court finds the
award of P200,000.00 for moral damages to be just and reasonable.

People vs. Puno

En Banc; Regalado, February 17, 1993
Topic: Mental Element (Mens rea) -- Deliberate intent (Dolo) -- General and specific intent

Facts: January 13, 1988 in QC, at around 5:00 pm: the accused Isabelo Puno, who is the personal driver
of Mrs. Sarmiento's husband (who was then away in Davao purportedly on account of local election
there) arrived at Mrs. Sarmiento's bakeshop in Araneta Ave, QC. He told Mrs. Sarmiento that her own
driver Fred had to go to Pampanga on an emergency so Isabelo will temporarily take his place. When it
was time for Mrs. Sarmiento to go home to Valle Verde in Pasig, she got into her husband's Mercedes
Benz with Isabelo driving. After the car turned right on a corner of Araneta Ave, it stopped and a young
man, accused Enrique Amurao, boarded the car beside the driver. Enrique pointed a gun at Mrs.
Sarmiento as Isabelo told her that he needs to "get money" from her. Mrs. Sarmiento had P7,000 on her
bag which she handed to the accused. But the accused said that they wanted P100,000 more. The car
sped off north towards the North superhighway where Isabelo asked Mrs. Sarmiento to issue a check
for P100,000. Mrs. Sarmiento drafted 3 checks: two P30,000 checks and one P40,000 check. Isabelo
then turned the car around towards Metro Manila; later, he changed his mind and turned the car again
towards Pampanga. According to her, Mrs. Sarmiento jumped out of the car then, crossed to the other
side of the superhighway and was able to flag down a fish vendor's van, her dress had blood because
according to her, she fell down on the ground and was injured when she jumped out of the car. The
defense does not dispute the above narrative of the complainant except that according to Isabelo, he
stopped the car at North Diversion and freely allowed Mrs. Sarmiento to step out of the car. He said he
even slowed the car down as he drove away, until he saw that his employer had gotten a ride. He
claimed that she fell down when she stubbed her toe while running across the highway

Issue: Whether or not the accused can be convicted of kidnapping for ransom as charged and Whether
or not the said robbery can be classified as "highway robbery" under PD No. 532 (Anti-Piracy and
Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974)

Holding: No. No.

Ratio: There is no showing whatsoever that appellants had any motive, nurtured prior to or at the time
they committed the wrongful acts against complainant, other than the extortion of money from her
under the compulsion of threats or intimidation. For this crime to exist, there must be indubitable proof
that the actual intent of the malefactors was to deprive the offended party of her liberty. In the case, the
restraint of her freedom of action was merely an incident in the commission of another offense
primarily intended by the offenders. This does not constitute kidnapping or serious illegal detention
Jurisprudence reveals that during the early part of the American occupation of our country, roving
bands were organized for robbery and pillage and since the then existing law against robbery was
inadequate to cope with such moving bands of outlaws, the Brigandage Law was passed (this is the
origin of the law on highway robbery). PD No. 532 punishes as highway robbery only acts of robbery
perpetrated by outlaws indiscriminately against any person or persons on Philippine highways and not
acts of robbery committed against only a predetermined or particular victim. The mere fact that the
robbery was committed inside a car which was casually operating on a highway does not make PD No
532 applicable to the case. This is not justified by the accused's intention. Accused-appellants convicted
of robbery (indeterminate sentence of 4 years and 2 months or prision correccional, as minimum, to 10
years of prision mayor. Accused to pay Mrs. Sarmiento P7,000 as actual damages and P20,000 as moral
damages.)

Criminal Law- People vs. Delim

This case is with regard to Art 8 and 13 of the Revised Penal Code: "the act of one is the act of all"
Case of People of the R.P. vs. Delim
G.R. No. 142773 28; January2003
CALLEJO, SR., J.:

FACTS OF THE CASE: It is due to the automatic review of the decision of the RTC Branch 46
(Urdaneta City) finding the appellants, guilty beyond reasonable doubt and sentencing them to death
for the murder of Modesto Bantas. Appellants pleaded not guilty to the charge. The appellants and
victim are “related” for modesto is an adopted son of their father. On January 23,1999 Marlon, Robert
and Ronald Delim charged into the house and poked a gun at modesto and herded him outside the
house. Leon and Manuel Delim both armed stayed put and made sure that randy and rita stayed put.
Modesto's lifeless body was then found on January 25, 1999. Marlon, Ronald, and Leon used denial
and alibi as their evidence against the charge. *alibis are the weakest of all defenses since it is easy to
contrive and difficult to disprove

ISSUES OF THE CASE: Is conspiracy and treachery present in this case to ensure that murder can be
the crime? Yes there is:

CONSPIRACY- is determined when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to
commit it. Conspiracy must be proven with the same quantum of evidence as the felony itself, more
specifically by proof beyond reasonable doubt. It is not essential that there be proof as to the existence
of a previous agreement to commit a crime. It is sufficient if, at the time of commission of the crime,
the accused had the same purpose and were united in its executed.
appellants acted in unison when they abducted Modesto. So their acts were synchronized and executed
with precision evincing a preconceived plan to kill Modesto

There is no:
TREACHERY- there is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against person,
employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and especially to
insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might
make. For it to be appreciated prosecution needs to prove:
a. employment of means of execution which gives the person no opportunity
to defend himself
b. the means of execution is deliberately and consciously adopted in the appellants case there are no
evidence to the particulars on how Modesto was assaulted and killed and this in fact does mean that
treachery cannot be proven since it cannot be presumed that modesto was defenseless during the time
that he was being attacked and shot at by the appellants. Sheer numbers by the appellants when they
attacked modesto does not constitute proof that the three took advantage of their numerical superiority
and their handguns when Modesto was shot and stabbed.

HELD: APPELLANTS ARE GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE FELONY OF

HOMICIDE (THE DECISION OF THE LOWER COURTS WERE MODIFIED TO LOWER THE
CRIME FROM MURDER TO HOMICIDE

US vs. Ah Chong (Crim1)

The United States, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Ah Chong, defendant-appellant.
En Banc; Carson, March 19, 1910

Topic: Mental element (Mens rea) - Deliberate intent (Dolo) - Mistake of fact

Facts: The defendant Ah Chong was a cook at "Officers' quarters, No. 27," Fort McKinley, Rizal
Province. Pascual Gualberto, deceased, works at the same place as a house boy or muchacho.
"Officers' quarters, No. 27" was a detached house some 40 meters from the nearest building. No one
slept in the house except the two servants who jointly occupied a small room toward the rear of the
building, the door of which opened upon a narrow porch running along the side of the building.
This porch was covered by a heavy growth of vines for its entire length and height. The door of the
room was not furnished with a permanent bolt or lock; the occupants, as a measure of security, had
attached a small hook or catch on the inside of the door, and were in the habit of reinforcing this
somewhat insecure means of fastening the door by placing against it a chair. On the night of August 14,
1908, at about 10:00 pm, the defendant was suddenly awakened by some trying to force open the door
of the room. He called out twice, "Who is there?". He heard no answer and was convinced by the noise
at the door that it was being pushed open by someone bent upon forcing his way into the room. The
defendant warned the intruder "If you enter the room, I will kill you.". Seizing a common kitchen knife
which he kept under his pillow, the defendant struck out wildly at the intruder (when he entered the
room) who turned out to be his roommate Pascual. Pascual ran out upon the porch heavily wounded
Recognizing Pascual, the defendant called to his employers who slept in the next house and ran back to
his room to secure bandages to bind up Pascual's wounds. Pascual died from the effects of the wound
the following day. The roommates appear to have been in friendly and amicable terms prior to the
incident, and had an understanding that when either returned at night, he should knock that the door
and acquaint his companion with his identity. The defendant alleges that he kept the knife under his
pillow as personal protection because of repeated robberies in Fort McKinley. Defendant admitted to
stabbing his roommate, but said that he did it under the impression that Pascual was "a ladron (thief)"
because he forced open the door of their sleeping room, despite the defendant's warnings. Defendant
was found guilty by the trial court of simple homicide, with extenuating (mitigating) circumstances,
and sentenced to 6 years and 1 day presidio mayor, the minimum penalty prescribed by law

Issue: Whether or not the defendant can be held criminally responsible

Holding: No.
Ratio: By reason of a mistake as to the facts, the defendant did an act for which he would be exempt
from criminal liability if the facts were as he supposed them to be (i.e. if Pascual was actually a thief,
he will not be criminally liable/responsible because it would be self-defense), but would constitute the
crime of homicide or assassination if the actor had known the true state of the facts (i.e. if he knew that
it was actually Pascual, he would be guilty of homicide/assassination). The defendant's ignorance or
mistake of fact was not due to negligence or bad faith. "The act itself foes not make man guilty unless
his intention were so". The essence of the offense is the wrongful intent, without which it cannot exist
"The guilt of the accused must depend on the circumstances as they appear to him." If one has
reasonable cause to believe the existence of facts which will justify a killing, if without fault or
carelessness he does believe them, he is legally guiltless of the homicide. The defendant was doing no
more than exercise his legitimate right of self-defense. He cannot be said to have been guilty of
negligence or recklessness or even carelessness in falling into his mistake as to the facts. RTC's
decision is reversed. The defendant is acquitted.

People v. Oanis, 74 Phil. 257

G.R. No.L-47722 July 27, 1943
MORAN, J.

Lesson applicable: mitigating circumstances

FACTS: Captain Godofredo Monsod, Constabulary Provincial Inspector at Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija,
received from Major Guido a telegram of the following tenor: "Information received escaped convict
Anselmo Balagtas with bailarina and Irene in Cabanatuan get him dead or alive." Captain Monsod
accordingly called for his first sergeant and asked that he be given four men. The same instruction was
given to the chief of police Oanis who was likewise called by the Provincial Inspector. Defendants
Oanis and Galanta then went to the room of Irene, and an seeing a man sleeping with his back towards
the door where they were, simultaneously or successively fired at him with their .32 and .45 caliber
revolvers. Awakened by the gunshots, Irene saw her paramour already wounded, and looking at the
door where the shots came, she saw the defendants still firing at him. Shocked by the entire scene.
Irene fainted; it turned out later that the person shot and killed was not the notorious criminal Anselmo
Balagtas but a peaceful and innocent citizen named Serapio Tecson, Irene's paramour. According to
Appellant Galanta, when he and chief of police Oanis arrived at the house, the latter asked Brigida
where Irene's room was. Brigida indicated the place, and upon further inquiry as to the whereabouts of
Anselmo Balagtas, she said that he too was sleeping in the same room.

ISSUE: W/N they may, upon such fact, be held responsible for the death thus caused to Tecson

HELD: appellants are hereby declared guilty of murder with the mitigating circumstance
YES. ignorantia facti excusat, but this applies only when the mistake is committed without fault or
carelessness. Appellants found no circumstances whatsoever which would press them to immediate
action. The person in the room being then asleep, appellants had ample time and opportunity to
ascertain his identity without hazard to themselves, and could even effect a bloodless arrest if any
reasonable effort to that end had been made, as the victim was unarmed. "No unnecessary or
unreasonable force shall be used in making an arrest, and the person arrested shall not be subject to any
greater restraint than is necessary for his detention."A peace officer cannot claim exemption from
criminal liability if he uses unnecessary force or violence in making an arrest. The crime committed by
appellants is not merely criminal negligence, the killing being intentional and not accidental. In
criminal negligence, the injury caused to another should be unintentional, it being simply the incident
of another act performed without malice. 2 requisites in order that the circumstance may be taken as a
justifying one: offender acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right-present
injury or offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of such duty or the
lawful exercise of such right or office.-not present. According to article 69 of the Revised Penal Code,
the penalty lower by 1 or 2 degrees than that prescribed by law shall, in such case, be imposed.

Padilla vs. Dizon

February 23, 1988
Per Curiam

Facts: Respondent Baltazar R. Dizon acquitted, in his decision, the tourist and accused, Lo Chi Fai,
saying that Lo Chi Fai had no willful intention to violate the law. He also directed the release to Lo Chi
Fai of at least the amount of US$3,000.00 under Central Bank Circular No. 960. Lo Chi Fai was caught
by Customs guard at the Manila International Airport while attempting to smuggle foreign currency and
foreign exchange instruments out of the country. An information was filed against Lo Chi Fai with the
RTC for violation of Sec. 6, Central Bank Circular No. 960 with a penal sanction provided by Sec. 1,
PD NO. 1883. Sec. 6, Central Bank Circular No. 960 provides that no person shall take out or transmit
or attempt to take out or transmit foreign exchange in any form out of the Philippines without an
authorization by the Central Bank. Tourists and non-resident visitors may take out or send out from the
Philippine foreign exchange in amounts not exceeding such amounts of foreign exchange brought in by
them. Tourists and non-resident temporary visitors bringing with them more than US$3,000.00 or its
equivalent in other foreign currencies shall declare their foreign exchange in the form prescribed by the
Central Bank at points of entries upon arrival in the Philippines. Sec. 1, P.D. No. 1883 provides that any
person who shall engage in the trading or purchase and sale of foreign currency in violation of existing
laws or rules and regulations of the Central Bank shall be guilty of the crime of blackmarketing of
foreign exchange and shall suffer the penalty of reclusion temporal (minimum of 12 years and 1 day
and maximum of 20 years) and a fine of no less than P50,000.00. At the trial, Lo Chi Fai tried to
establish that he was a businessman from Hongkong, that he had come to the Philippines 9 to 10 times
to invest in business in the country with his business associates, and that he and his business associates
declared all the money they brought in and all declarations were handed to and kept by him.
Because of the revolution taking place in Manila during that time, Lo Chi Fai was urged by his
business associates to come to Manila to bring the money out of the Philippines. Commissioner of
Customs, Alexander Padilla, then filed a complaint against Baltazar R. Dizon for acquitting Lo Chi Fai.

Issue: Whether or not respondent Baltazar R. Dizon is guilty of gross incompetence or gross ignorance
of the law in holding that the accused, Lo Chi Fai, for violation of Central Bank Circular No. 960, the
prosecution must establish that the accused had the criminal intent to violate the law.

Held: Yes.

Ratio: Baltazar R. Dizon ignored the fact that the foreign currency and foreign currency instruments
found in the possession of Lo Chi Fai when he was apprehended at the airport and the amounts of such
foreign exchange did not correspond to the foreign currency declarations presented by Lo Chi Fai at the
trial, and that these currency declarations were declarations belonging to other people. In invoking the
provisions of the Central Bank Circular No. 960 to justify the release of US$3,000.00 to Lo Chi Fai,
Baltazar R. Dizon again diplayed gross incompetence and gross ignorance of law. There is nothing in
the Central Bank Circular which could be taken as authority for the trial court to release the said
amount of US Currency to Lo Chi Fai.
Magno vs. CA
Oriel Magno vs. Honorable Court of Appeals and People of the Philippines
June 26, 1992; Paras, J:

Facts: Oriel Magno, lacking fund in acquiring complete set of equipment to make his car repair shop
operational, approached Corazon Teng, Vice President of Mancor Industries. VP Teng referred Magno
to LS Finance and Management Corporation, advising its Vice President, Joey Gomez, that Mancor
was willing to supply the pieces of equipment needed if LS Finance could accommodate Magno and
and provide him credit facilities. The arrangement went on requiring Magno to pay 30% of the total
amount of the equipment as warranty deposit but Magno couldn't afford to pay so he requested VP
Gomez to look for third party who could lend him that amount. Without Magno's knowledge, Corazon
was the one who provided that amount. As payment to the equipment, Magno issued six checks, two of
them were cleared and the rest had no sufficient fund. Because of the unsuccessful venture, Magno
failed to pay LS Finance which then pulled out the equipment. Magno was charged of violation of BP
Blg. 2 (The Bouncing Checks Law) and found guilty.

Issue: Whether or not Magno should be punished for the issuance of the checks in question.

Held: No

Ratio: To charge Magno for the refund of a warranty deposit which he did not withdraw as it was not
his own account, it having remained with LS Finance, is to even make him pay an unjust debt since he
did not receive the amount in question. All the while, said amount was in the safekeeping of the
financing company which is managed by the officials and employees of LS Finance.

Garcia v. People (GR 157171, March 14 2006)

August 27, 2016 / Russell Jay

FACTS: On May 11, 1995, within the canvassing period of 1995 senatiorial elections, Aquilino
Pimintel, Jr., was informed that Arsenia Garcia (Arsenia), along with her co-conspirators, willfully and
unlawfully decreased the number of votes of the candidate from 6,998 to 1921 votes. Pimintel filed a
complaint against Asenia and her co-conspirators. All the accused was acquited due to lack of evidence
except for Arsenia who was found guilty of the crime defined under Republic Act 6646, Section 27 (b)
for decreasing the votes of Senator Pimentel in the total of 5,034 and in relation to BP Blg. 881.
Petitioner appealed to CA which also affirmed the decision of the RTC. Arsenia appealed to SC,
contending that the judgment of CA is erroneous and there was no motive on her part to reduce the
votes of private complainant. Respondent on the other hand contends that good faith is not a defense in
the violation of an election law, which falls under the class of mala prohibita.

ISSUES: (1) Whether or not a violation of Section 27(b) of Rep. Act No. 6646, classified under mala in
se. (2) Whether or not good faith and lack of criminal intent be valid defenses?

HELD: (1) YES. Section 27(b) of Republic Act No. 6646 provides: Any member of the board of
election inspectors or board of canvassers who tampers, increases, or decreases the votes received by a
candidate in any election or any member of the board who refuses, after proper verification and
hearing, to credit the correct votes or deduct such tampered votes. Clearly, the acts prohibited in
Section 27(b) are mala in se. For otherwise, even errors and mistakes committed due to overwork and
fatigue would be punishable. (2) NO. Public policy dictates that extraordinary diligence should be
exercised by the members of the board of canvassers in canvassing the results of the elections. Any
error on their part would result in the disenfranchisement of the voters. The Certificate of Canvass for
senatorial candidates and its supporting statements of votes prepared by the municipal board of
canvassers are sensitive election documents whose entries must be thoroughly scrutinized. The instant
petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals sustaining petitioners conviction
but increasing the minimum penalty in her sentence to one year instead of six months is AFFIRMED.

People of the R.P. vs. Pugay

THIS CASE IS WITH REGARD TO ART. 3(2) & 8(2) OF THE R.P.C.

"A Conspiracy exists when two or more people come to an agreement concerning the commission of a
felony and decide to commit it."

"A man must use common sense, and exercise due reflection in all his acts; it is his duty to be cautious,
careful and prudent, if not from instinct, then through fear of incurring punishment."

Case of People of the R.P. vs. Pugay

No. L-74324 17November1988

FACTS OF THE CASE: The accused are pronounced by the RTC of Cavite guilty beyond reasonable
doubt for the crime of murder of Bayani Miranda and sentencing them to a prison term ranging from 12
years (prison mayor) as mimimum to 20 years (prison temporal) as maximum and for samson to be
sentenced to reclusion perpetua. Miranda and the accused Pugay are friends. Miranda used to run
errands for Pugay and they used to sleep together. On the evening of May 19, 1982 a town fiesta was
held in the public plaza of Rosario Cavite. Sometime after midnight accused Pugay and Samson with
several companions arrived (they were drunk), and they started making fun of Bayani Miranda. Pugay
after making fun of the Bayani, took a can of gasoline and poured its contents on the latter, Gabion
(principal witness) told Pugay not to do the deed. Then Samson set Miranda on fire making a human
torch out of him. They were arrested the same night and barely a few hours after the incident gave their
written statements.

ISSUES OF THE CASE: Is conspiracy present in this case to ensure that murder can be the crime? If
not what are the criminal responsibilities of the accused?

There is no:
CONSPIRACY- is determined when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to
commit it. Conspiracy must be proven with the same quantum of evidence as the felony itself, more
specifically by proof beyond reasonable doubt. It is not essential that there be proof as to the existence
of a previous agreement to commit a crime. It is sufficient if, at the time of commission of the crime,
the accused had the same purpose and were united in its executed.
Since there was no animosity between miranda and the accused, and add to the that that the meeting at
the scene of the incident was purely coincidental, and the main intent of the accused is to make fun of
miranda. Since there is no conspiracy that was proven, the respective criminal responsibility of Pugay
and Samson arising from different acts directed against miranda is individual NOT collective and each
of them is liable only for the act that was committed by him. **Conspiracy may be implied from
concerted action of the assailants in confronting the victim.
Criminal Responsibilities:
PUGAY: Having failed to exercise diligence necessary to avoid every undesirable consequence arising
from any act committed by his companions who at the same time were making fun of the deceased. -
GUILTY OF RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE RESULTING TO HOMICIDE

SAMSON:Since there are NO sufficient evidence that appears in the record establishing qualifying
circumstances (treachery, conspiracy). And granted the mitigating circumstance that he never
INTENDED to commit so grave a wrong. - GUILTY OF HOMICIDE

HELD:
JUDGEMENT OF THE LOWER COURT WAS AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS.
JUDGEMENT FOR GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT FOR MURDER WAS LOWERED
TO THE ABOVE JUDGEMENTS.

IVLER vs. HON. MODESTO

January 25, 2017 § Leave a comment
G.R. No. 172716, November 17, 2010

FACTS: Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler was charged before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City (MeTC), with two separate offenses: (1) reckless imprudence
resulting in slight physical injuries for injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce; and (2)
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to property for the death of respondent Ponce’s
husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponce’s vehicle.
Crimes charged: 1) reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries; and 2) reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to property. On September 7, 2004, Ivler pleaded guilty
to the charge in reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries and was meted out the penalty
of public censure. Invoking this conviction, Ivler moved to quash the Information of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to property for placing him in jeopardy of second
punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence.

MeTC: denied the motion to quash

RTC: denied Ivler’s Petition for Certiorari in dismissing his Motion to Quash

ISSUE: Whether or not Ivler’s constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars further
proceedings in the information charging him with reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and
damage to property (YES)

Defense: Ivler argues that his constitutional right not to be placed twice in jeopardy of punishment for
the same offense bars his prosecution in reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to
property having been previously convicted in reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries
for injuries for the same offense. Ivler submits that the multiple consequences of such crime are
material only to determine his penalty

HELD: The Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the RTC. Petitioner’s conviction in the case of
reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries bars his prosecution in criminal reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to property
1) Reckless Imprudence is a Single Crime; its Consequences on Persons and Property are Material
Only to Determine the Penalty

Quasi-offenses penalize “the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness,
lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia punible,” unlike willful offenses which punish the intentional
criminal act. These structural and conceptual features of quasi-offenses set them apart from the mass of
intentional crimes.

2) Prior Conviction or Acquittal of Reckless Imprudence Bars Subsequent Prosecution for the Same
Quasi-offense

Once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless imprudence, the accused may not be
prosecuted again for that same act. For the essence of the quasi-offense of criminal negligence under
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if
intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless
act, not the result thereof.

The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determine the penalty, it does not qualify
the substance of the offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the injurious result should affect
one person or several persons, the offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the same, and cannot
be split into different crimes and prosecutions.

3) Article 48 Does Not Apply to Acts Penalized Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code

Article 48 is a procedural device allowing single prosecution of multiple felonies falling under either of
two categories: (1) when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies (thus
excluding from its operation light felonies); and (2) when an offense is a necessary means for
committing the other. The legislature crafted this procedural tool to benefit the accused who, in lieu of
serving multiple penalties, will only serve the maximum of the penalty for the most serious crime.

In contrast, Article 365 is a substantive rule penalizing not an act defined as a felony but the mental
attitude behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, a single mental attitude
regardless of the resulting consequences. Thus, Article 365 was crafted as one quasi-crime resulting in
one or more consequences. Article 48 is incongruent to the notion of quasi-crime resulting in one or
more consequences.

Article 48 is incongruent to the notion of quasi-crimes under Article 365. It is conceptually impossible
for a quasi-offense to stand for (1) a single act constituting two or more grave or less grave felonies; or
(2) an offense which is a necessary means for committing another.

Prosecutions under Article 365 should proceed from a single charge regardless of the number or
severity of the consequences. In imposing penalties, the judge will do no more than apply the penalties
under Article 365 for each consequence alleged and proven. In short, there shall be no splitting of
charges under Article 365, and only one information shall be filed in the same first level court.

People v. Guillen (G.R. No. L-1477)

January 18, 1950 | G.R. No. L-1477
PER CURIAM, J.:
FACTS: On March 10, 1947, in an event sponsored by the Liberal Party at Plaza Miranda in Quiapo,
Manila, Guillen planted a hand grenade near the stage and threw another one toward then President
Manuel Roxas in an apparent assassination attempt born out of Guillen's spite for the President over the
latter's perceived failure to fulfill his promises and his call for the passage of the so-called parity
measure. General Castaneda managed to kick the grenade off the stage. However, its explosion caused
the death of Simeon Varela (Barrela). It also caused the injuries of Alfredo Eva, Jose Fabio, Pedro
Carillo, and Emilio Maglalang. Guillen pleaded not guilty to the consequent charges of murder and
multiple frustrated murder filed against him. At one point, he even tried to use the insanity excuse, but
he was found to have been mentally stable. Later on, by his own admission, he confessed to his crimes.
He was subsequently found guilty of all the charges and was sentenced to death.

ISSUE: Whether or not the conviction of the accused was proper.

HELD: No, the SC ruled that Guillen's actions on March 10, 1947 and their penalties were covered by
Art. 48 of the RPC, not sub-section 1 of Art. 49. The Court said that by a single act -- throwing a hand
grenade at President Roxas -- he committed two grave felonies:
(a) murder and (b) multiple attempted murder.
At the same time, the murder of Varela was attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery, given
that the victim was not able to put up a defense against the attack, even though he was not the principal
target.
And lastly, the Court ruled that the injuries sustained by the other victims constitute attempted and not
frustrated murder. The Court reasoned that Guillen's failed attempt to kill President Roxas was due to
some reason or accident (General kicking the grenade off the stage) other than his own spontaneous
desistance.
In the end the Court affirmed the death sentence handed out by the lower court.
Art. 48, RPC: "Penalty for complex crimes -- When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less
grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the
most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period."

294 SCRA 751, August 31, 1998

PEOPLE vs. ROLUSAPE SABALONES
PANGANIBAN, J.:

Fact: Beronga, Sabalones, Alegarbes, and Cabanero were convicted after a shooting incident in Cebu in
1985 which led to the death of Glenn Tiempo and Alfredo Nardo, and fatal injuries of Nelson Tiempo,
Rey Bolo and Rogelio Presores. The victims were asked to bring the car of a certain Stephen Lim who
also attended a wedding party. Nelson Tiempo drove the car with Rogelio Presores. Alfredo Nardo
drove the owner-type jeep along with Glenn Tiempo and Rey Bolo to aid the group back to the party
after parking the car at Lim’s house. When they reached the gate, they were met with a sudden burst of
gunfire. The accused were identified as the gunmen. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
trial court. Sabalones and Beronga appealed. Crime Committed: Two counts of murder, and three
counts of frustrated murder. Contention of the People: Prosecution witnesses Edwin Santos and Rogelio
Presores testified about the shooting and identified the faces of the accused. Presores was riding in the
car that is behind the jeep. He positively identified Sabalones as one of the gunmen. When the gunmen
fired at the car, driver Nelson Tiempo immediately maneuvered and arrived at Major Juan Tiempo’s
house from which they have escaped death. Contention of the Accused: Accused-appellants Sabalones
and Beronga denied their presence during the commission of the crime. Sabalones presented numerous
witnesses who stated that he was sound asleep when the incident took place [since he got tired
watching over his brother’s wake]. While Beronga testified that he attended a cock-derby in Cebu, and
was fetched by his wife at 7 pm, arrived home by 10:30 pm to sleep. Sabalones even escaped from
place to place to flee from the wrath of Maj. Juan Tiempo, the father of the two victims. The defense
even pointed out errors from the testimonies of the witnesses arguing that the place where the incident
happened is dim and not lighted.

RULING: The appeal is DENIED. Costs against appellants.

Issue 1: Whether the prosecution witnesses and evidences are credible? Yes. RTC findings were
binding to court with appreciated testimonies of two witnesses. There was positive identification by
survivors who saw them when they peered during lulls in gunfire. The place was well-lit, whether from
post of car’s headlights. The extrajudicial confession has no bearing because the conviction was based
on positive identification. It is binding though to the co-accused because it is used as cirmustancial
evidence corroborated by one witness. The inconcistencies are minor and inconsequential which
strengthen credibility of testimony. Furthermore, in aberratio ictus [mistake in blow], mistake does not
diminish culpability; same gravity applies, more proper to use error in personae. Alibi cannot prevail
over positive identification by the prosecution witnesses.

Issue 2: Whether the alibis are acceptable? No. It was still quite near the crime scene. It is overruled by
positive identification. Using the case of People v. Nescio, Alibi is not credible when the accused-
appellant is only a short distance from the scene of the crime. Furthermore, flight indicates guilt.

Issue 3:Whether the correct penalty is imposed? No. Under Article 248 of the RPC, the imposable
penalty is reclusion temporal in its maximum period, to death. There being no aggravating or
mitigating circumstance, aside from the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the appellate court
correctly imposed reclusion perpetua for murder. The CA erred in computing the penalty for each of the
three counts of frustrated murder. Under Article 50 of the RPC, the penalty for frustrated felony is next
lower in degree than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony. Because there are no
mitigating or aggravating conspiracy between the two accused. It does not matter that the prosecution
has failed to show who was between the two who actually pulled the trigger that killed the child. They
are liable as co-conspirators since the act of a conspirator becomes the act of another regardless of the
precise degree of participation in the act. Also there was a presence of treachery, because of the
circumstances that the crime was done at night time and that the accused hid themselves among the
bamboo. Evident premeditation is also an aggravating circumstance [the accused had planned to kill the
victim some days before].

Bataclan v. Medina
G.R. No. L-10126, October 22, 1957
MONTEMAYOR, J.

Facts: At about 2:00am of September 13, 1952, the bus, operated by its owner defendant Mariano
Medina and driven by its regular chauffeur, Conrado Saylon, left the town of Amadeo, Cavite. While
on its way to Pasay City, one of the front tires burst and the vehicle began to zig-zag until it fell into a
canal or ditch on the right side of the road and turned turtle. Some of the passengers managed to leave
the bus but the three passengers seated beside the driver, named Bataclan, Lara and the Visayan and the
woman behind them named Natalia Villanueva, could not get out of the overturned bus. No evidence to
show that the freed passengers, including the driver and the conductor, made any attempt to pull out or
extricate and rescue the four passengers trapped inside the vehicle. After half an hour, came about ten
men, one of them carrying a lighted torch, approach the overturned bus, and almost immediately, a
fierce fire started, burning and all but consuming the bus, including the four passengers trapped inside
it. That same day, the charred bodies of the four passengers inside the bus were removed and duly
identified that of Juan Bataclan. By reason of his death, his widow, Salud Villanueva, in her name and
in behalf of her five minor children, brought the present suit to recover from Mariano Medina
compensatory, moral, and exemplary damages and attorney's fees in the total amount of P87,150.
After trial, the CFI Cavite awarded P1,000 to the plaintiffs plus P600 as attorney's fee, plus P100, the
value of the merchandise being carried by Bataclan to Pasay City for sale and which was lost in the
fire. Both plaintiffs and defendants appealed the case to CA which endorsed the case to SC.

Issue: W/N the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan was the overturning of the bus or the fire that
burned the bus, including the 4 passengers left inside.

Held: The Court held that the proximate cause was the overturning of the bus because when the vehicle
turned not only on its side but completely on its back, the leaking of the gasoline from the tank was not
unnatural or unexpected. The coming of the men with a lighted torch was in response to the call for
help, made not only by the passengers, but most probably, by the driver and the conductor themselves,
and that because it was dark (about 2:30 in the morning), the rescuers had to carry a light with them,
and coming as they did from a rural area where lanterns and flashlights were not available. In other
words, the coming of the men with a torch was to be expected and was a natural sequence of the
overturning of the bus, the trapping of some of its passengers and the call for outside help. Moreover,
the burning of the bus can also in part be attributed to the negligence of the carrier, through its driver
and its conductor. According to the witness, the driver and the conductor were on the road walking
back and forth. They, or at least, the driver should and must have known that in the position in which
the overturned bus was, gasoline could and must have leaked from the gasoline tank and soaked the
area in and around the bus. The leaked gasoline can be smelt and directed even from a distance, and yet
neither the driver nor the conductor would appear to have cautioned or taken steps to warn the rescuers
not to bring the lighted torch too near the bus. In addition, the case involves a breach of contract of
transportation because the Medina Transportation failed to carry Bataclan safely to his destination,
Pasay City. There was likewise negligence on the part of the defendant, through his agent, the driver
Saylon. There is evidence to show that at the time of the blow out, the bus was speeding and that the
driver failed to changed the tires into new ones as instructed by Mariano Medina. The driver had not
been diligent and had not taken the necessary precautions to insure the safety of his passengers. Had he
changed the tires, specially those in front, with new ones, as he had been instructed to do, probably,
despite his speeding, the blow out would not have occurred.

Ratio: Proximate cause is that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.
Comprehensively, 'the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either
immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of
events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the
chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted,
under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent
and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an
injury to some person might probably result therefrom.

Urbano v. IAC
G.R. No. 72964 January 7, 1988
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

Facts: On October 23, 1980, petitioner Filomeno Urbano was on his way to his ricefield. He found the
place where he stored palay flooded with water coming from the irrigation canal. Urbano went to the
elevated portion to see what happened, and there he saw Marcelino Javier and Emilio Efre cutting
grass. Javier admitted that he was the one who opened the canal. A quarrel ensued, and Urbano hit
Javier on the right palm with his bolo, and again on the leg with the back of the bolo. On October 27,
1980, Urbano and Javier had an amicable settlement. Urbano paid P700 for the medical expenses of
Javier. On November 14, 1980, Urbano was rushed to the hospital where he had lockjaw and
convulsions. The doctor found the condition to be caused by tetanus toxin which infected the healing
wound in his palm. He died the following day. Urbano was charged with homicide and was found
guilty both by the trial court and on appeal by the Court of Appeals. Urbano filed a motion for new trial
based on the affidavit of the Barangay Captain who stated that he saw the deceased catching fish in the
shallow irrigation canals on November 5. The motion was denied; hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether the wound inflicted by Urbano to Javier was the proximate cause of the latter’s death

Held: A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is... "that cause, which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the
result would not have occurred."And more comprehensively, "the proximate legal cause is that acting
first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a
natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate
predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable
result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first
event should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the
moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom." If the
wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already infected by tetanus germs at the time, it is more
medically probable that Javier should have been infected with only a mild cause of tetanus because the
symptoms of tetanus appeared on the 22nd day after the hacking incident or more than 14 days after the
infliction of the wound. Therefore, the onset time should have been more than six days. Javier,
however, died on the second day from the onset time. The more credible conclusion is that at the time
Javier's wound was inflicted by the appellant, the severe form of tetanus that killed him was not yet
present. Consequently, Javier's wound could have been infected with tetanus after the hacking incident.
Considering the circumstance surrounding Javier's death, his wound could have been infected by
tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days before he died. The rule is that the death of the victim must
be the direct, natural, and logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. And
since we are dealing with a criminal conviction, the proof that the accused caused the victim's death
must convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt. The medical findings, however, lead us to a
distinct possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or
between the time Javier was wounded to the time of his death. The infection was, therefore, distinct and
foreign to the crime. There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause and its subsequent
infection, for failure to take necessary precautions, with tetanus may have been the proximate cause of
Javier's death with which the petitioner had nothing to do. "A prior and remote cause cannot be made
the be of an action if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the
occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there intervened between such prior or remote
cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though such
injury would not have happened but for such condition or occasion. If no danger existed in the
condition except because of the independent cause, such condition was not the proximate cause. And if
an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the instances which result in
injury because of the prior defective condition, such subsequent act or condition is the proximate
cause."