CRISOLOGO VS.

SINGSON

FACTS: Dña. Leona Singson died single in 1948. Her last will and testament was admitted to probate
by the lower court and affirmed by the CA. At the time she executed her will, her nearest living
relatives were her brothers Evaristo, Manuel and Dionisio Singson, her nieces Rosario, Emilia and
Trinidad and her grands niece Consolacion all surnamed Florentino.

Consolacion Florentino and her husband Francisco Crisologo and Manuel Singson are the plaintiff and
defendant respectively in this action for partition in connection with the residential lot with
improvements left by Dña. Singson. Plaintiff Consolacion claims that pursuant to the will executed by
Dña. Singson, she is therefore entitled to 1/2 pro indiviso share in the property whereas Manuel
Singson on the other half. Defendants contend however that Consolacion is not the owner of the 1/2
share for what was bequeated to her was a mere unfructuary rights.

It was stated in the will that upon the death of Consolacion Florentino— whether this occurs before or
after that of the testatrix—the property bequeathed to Consolacion shall be delivered or shall belong in
equal parts to the testatrix's three brothers: Evaristo, Manuel and Dionisio, or their forced heirs.

If this clause created what is known as sustitucion vulgar, the necessary result would be that
Consolacion Florentino, upon the death of the testatrix, became the owner of one undivided half
of the property, but if it provided for a sustitution fideicomisaria, she would have acquired
nothing more than usufructuary rights over the same half. In the former case, she would
undoubtedly be entitled to partition, but not in the latter.

As Manresa says, if the fiduciary did not acquire full ownership of the property bequeathed by will, but
mere usufructuary rights thereon until the time came for him to deliver said property to the
fideicomisario, it is obvious that the nude ownership over the property, upon the death of the testatrix,
passed to and was acquired by another person, and the person cannot be other than the fideicomisario.

ISSUE: Whether or not the testamentary disposition with respect to Consolacion was in a form of
fideicommisary substitution. (No)

RULING: A careful perusal of the testamentary clause under consideration shows that the substitution
of heirs provided for therein is not expressly made of the of fideicommissa kind, nor does it contain a
clear statement to the effect that appellee, during her lifetime, shall only enjoy usufructuary rights over
the property bequeathed to her, naked ownership thereof being vested in the brothers of the testatrix. As
already stated, it merely provides that upon appellee's death— whether this happens before or
after that of the testatrix—her share shall belong to the brothers of the testatrix.

In the light of the foregoing, we believe, and so hold, that the last will of the deceased Dña. Leona
Singson, established a mere sustitucion vulgar, the substitution Consolacion Florentino by the brothers
of the testatrix to be effective or to take place upon the death of the former, whether it happens before
or after that of the testatrix.

Therefore, Consolacion is entitled for the partition.

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ACOP VS. PIRASO

FACTS: CFI Benguet rendered a decision denying probate of the alleged last will and testament of the
deceased Piraso written in the English language. In this appeal, the proponent-appellant assigns the
following as alleged errors of the lower court:

1. In holding that in order to be valid the will in question should have been drawn up in their Ilocano
dialect.
2. In not holding that the testator Piraso did not know the Ilocano dialect well enough to understand a
will drawn up in said dialect.
3. In refusing to admit the will in question to probate.

The fundamental errors assigned refer chiefly to the part of the judgment which reads as follows: "The
evidence shows that Piraso knew how to speak the Ilocano dialect, although imperfectly, and could
make himself understood in that dialect, and the court is of the opinion that his will should have been
written in that dialect.”

ISSUE: Whether or not the last will and testament of deceased Piraso is valid and thus shall be
probated. (No)

RULING: The decedent's alleged will, being written in English, a language unknown to said
decedent, cannot be probated because it is prohibited by the law, which clearly and positively
requires that the will be written in the language or dialect known by the testator.

The fact is the instrument was written in English, which the supposed testator Piraso did not know, and
this is sufficient to invalidate said will according to the clear and positive provisions of the law, and
inevitably prevents its probate. Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, strictly provides that: "No
will, except as provided in the preceding section" (as to wills executed by a Spaniard or a resident of
the Philippine Islands, before the present Code of Civil Procedure went into effect), " shall be valid to
pass any estate, real or personal, nor charge or affect the same, unless it be written in the language or
dialect known by the testator."

Nor can the presumption in favor of a will (Abangan vs. Abangan) to the effect that the testator is
presumed to know the dialect of the locality where he resides even be invoked because not only is it not
proven that English is the language of the City of Baguio, where the deceased Piraso lived and where
the instrument was drawn, but that the record contains positive proof that Piraso knew no other
language than the Igorrote dialect, with a smattering of Ilocano. He did not know the English language
in which the will is written.

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ABANGAN VS. ABANGAN

FACTS: This is an appeal on the decision of the CFI Cebu admitting to probate the will executed by
Ana Abangan.

Said document, duly probated as Ana Abangan's will, consists of two sheets, the first of which contains
all of the disposition of the testatrix, duly signed at the bottom by Martin Montalban (in the name and
under the direction of the testatrix) and by three witnesses. The following sheet contains only the
attestation clause duly signed at the bottom by the three instrumental witnesses. Neither of these sheets
is signed on the left margin by the testatrix and the three witnesses, nor numbered by letters; and these
omissions, according to appellants' contention, are defects whereby the probate of the will should have
been denied.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not admitting the will of Ana Abangan to probate was proper despite absence of
testator's signature in the second page which only contains the attestation clause and absence of
testator's signature on the left margin of both pages. (Yes)

2. Whether or not testator's signature is necessary in the attestation clause to make the will valid. (No)

3. Whether the will was written in a dialect UNKNOWN to the testator. (No)

RULING:

1. In requiring that each and every sheet of the will should also be signed on the left margin by
the testator and three witnesses in the presence of each other has for its object to avoid the
substitution of any of said sheets, thereby changing the testator's dispositions. But when these
dispositions are wholly written on only one sheet signed at the bottom by the testator and three
witnesses (as the instant case), their signatures on the left margin of said sheet would be completely
purposeless. In requiring this signature on the margin, the statute took into consideration, undoubtedly,
the case of a will written on several sheets and must have referred to the sheets which the testator and
the witnesses do not have to sign at the bottom. A different interpretation would assume that the statute
requires that this sheet, already signed at the bottom, be signed twice. We cannot attribute to the statute
such an intention. As these signatures must be written by the testator and the witnesses in the presence
of each other, it appears that, if the signatures at the bottom of the sheet guaranties its authenticity,
another signature on its left margin would be unnecessary; and if they do not guaranty, same signatures,
affixed on another part of same sheet, would add nothing. We cannot assume that the statute regards of
such importance the place where the testator and the witnesses must sign on the sheet that it would
consider that their signatures written on the bottom do not guaranty the authenticity of the sheet but, if
repeated on the margin, give sufficient security.

2. The signature of the testatrix is not necessary in the attestation clause because this, as its name
implies, appertains only to the witnesses and not to the testator since the latter does not attest,
but executes, the will. We hold that in a will consisting of two sheets the first of which contains all the
testamentary dispositions and is signed at the bottom by the testator and three witnesses and the second
contains only the attestation clause and is signed also at the bottom by the three witnesses, it is not
necessary that both sheets be further signed on their margins by the testator and the witnesses, or be
paged.

3. The records do not show that the testatrix knew the dialect in which the will is written. But the
circumstance appearing in the will itself that same was executed in the city of Cebu and in the dialect
of this locality where the testatrix was a neighbor is enough, in the absence of any proof to the
contrary, to presume that she knew this dialect in which this will is written.
LOPEZ VS, LIBORO

FACTS: Don Sixto Lopez who died at the age of 83 left a purported will which CFI Batangas
addmitted to probate. The appellants opposed such decision on the following grounds: (1) that the
deceased never executed the alleged will; (2) that his signature appearing in said will was a forgery; (3)
that at the time of the execution of the will, he was wanting in testamentary as well as mental capacity
due to advanced age; (4) that, if he did ever execute said will, it was not executed and attested as
required by law, and one of the alleged instrumental witnesses was incapacitated to act as such; and it
was procured by duress, influence of fear and threats and undue and improper pressure and influence
on the part of the beneficiaries instituted therein, principally the testator’s sister, Clemencia Lopez, and
the herein proponent, Jose S. Lopez; and (5) that the signature of the testator was procured by fraud or
trick.

The will in question comprises two pages, each of which is written on one side of a separate sheet. The
first sheet is not paged either in letters or in Arabic numerals. This, the appellant believes, is
a fatal defect.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the questioned will is valid for not having the required page numbering. (Yes)
2. Whether or not the will is valid despite the fact that testator affixed his thumb mark instead of his
signature. (Yes)
3. Whether or not it is required to have an expressed statement in the will that the testator understands
the language used therein. (No)

RULING:

1. The purpose of the law in prescribing the paging of wills is to guard against fraud, and to afford
means of preventing the substitution or of detecting the loss of any of its pages. The omission to put a
page number on a sheet, if that be necessary, may be supplied by other forms of identification
more trustworthy than the conventional numeral words or characters.

The unnumbered page is clearly identified as the first page by the internal sense of its contents
considered in relation to the contents of the second page. By their meaning and coherence, the first and
second lines on the second page are undeniably a continuation of the last sentence of the testament,
before the attestation clause, which starts at the bottom of the preceding page. Furthermore, the
unnumbered page contains the caption “TESTAMENTO," the invocation of the Almighty, and a
recital that the testator was in full use of his testamentary faculty,— all of which, in the logical order of
sequence, precede the direction for the disposition of the maker’s property. Again, as page two contains
only the two lines above mentioned, the attestation clause, the mark of the testator and the signatures of
the witnesses, the other sheet can not by any possibility be taken for other than page one.

2. A statute requiring a will to be “signed” is satisfied if the signature is made by the testator’s
mark.

The testator affixed his thumbmark to the instrument instead of signing his name. The reason for this
was that the testator was suffering from “partial paralysis.” While another in testator’s place might have
directed someone else to sign for him, as appellant contends should have been done, there is nothing
curious or suspicious in the fact that the testator chose the use of mark as the means of authenticating
his will. It was a matter of taste or preference. Both ways are good.

3. There is no statutory requirement that such knowledge be expressly stated in the will itself. It
is a matter that may be established by proof aliunde. This Court so impliedly ruled in Gonzales vs.
Laurel. in which the probate of a will written in Tagalog was ordered although it did not say that the
testator knew that idiom. In fact, there was not even extraneous proof on the subject other than the fact
that the testator resided in a Tagalog region, from which the court said “a presumption arises that said
Maria Tapia knew the Tagalog dialect.”

CALUYA VS DOMINGO

FACTS: This is an appeal from a judgment of the CFI of the Province of Ilocos Norte denying the
probate of a will. The lower court based its judgment upon three grounds:

1) That although the testator had signed by mark, "it nowhere appeared in the will who had written the
signature or that it had been written at his request;
2) That the witness Antonino Pandaraoan could not really have signed the attestation clause because, at
the time it was executed, he was attending a session of the municipal council as a member thereof; (not
so relevant)
3) That as to the other witness, Segundino Asis, the will mentioned and confirmed a sale of land to him
by the testator, and he being thereby an interested party his testimony could not be believed.

ISSUE:

Whether the lower court was correct in denying probate of the will based on the following:

a) that the will was invalid since the there’s an absence of a statement that some other person had
written the signature of the testator at his reques at his express directiont; (No)
b) that attesting witness Segundino Asis was not a competent witness since testator sold a land to him
prior to his death. (No)

RULING:

a) Where a testator is unable to write and his name is signed by another at his request, in his presence
and in that of the subscribing witnesses thereto, it is unimportant, so far as the validity of the will is
concerned, whether the person who writes the name of the testator signs his own or not. The important
thing is that it clearly appear that the name of the testator was signed at his direction in the presence of
the subscribing witnesses and that they attest and subscribe it in his presence and in the presence of
each other.

Although it was provided that "the attestation clause shall state the fact that the testator signed the will,
or caused it to be signed by some other person, at his express direction, in the presence of three
witnesses, and that they attested and subscribed it in his presence and in the presence of each other. But
the absence of such form of attestation shall not render the will invalid if it is proven that the will
was in fact signed and attested as in this section provided.
Under section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure if the attestation clause is defective or even absent,
the will is valid provided it is satisfactorily proved that it was in fact signed, executed, and
attested as required by law.

b) The fact that the testator in his will mentioned a sale of real estate, fully consummated before his
death, which he had made to one of the witnesses to his will, does not make such person an
incompetent witness; nor does the fact that he signed the will as one of the attesting witnesses render
the will invalid under section 622 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

If a person attests the execution of a will, to whom or to whose wife or husband, or parent, or child, a
beneficial devise, legacy, or interest, of or affecting real or personal estate, is given by such will, such
devise, legacy, or interest shall, so far only as concerns such person, or the wife or husband, or parent
or child of such person, or anyone claiming under such person or such wife or husband, or parent or
child, be void, unless there are three other competent witnesses to such will, and such person so
attesting shall be admitted as a witness as if such devise, legacy, or interest had not been made or given.
But a mere charge on the real or personal estate of the testator, for the payment of debts, shall
not prevent his creditors from being competent witnesses to his will.

YAP VS. YAP

FACTS: On November 20, 1951, Felicidad Esguerra Alto Yap died of heart failure in the UST
Hospital, leaving properties in Pulilan, Bulacan, and in the City of Manila.

On March 17, 1952, Fausto E. Gan initiated in CFI Manila a petition for the probate of a holographic
will allegedly executed by the deceased. The purported will bequeaths decedent's real property in
Bulacan as folows:

Vicente Esguerra - 5 Bahagi

Fausto E. Gan - 2 Bahagi
Rosario E. Gan - 2 Bahagi
Filomena Alto - 1 Bahagi
Beatriz Alto - 1 Bahagi

And that the rest of her property in Manila and other areas are being bequeathed by testatrix to her
husband Idelfonso Yap on the condition that he will establish a health center in a value not less than
60,000 pesos in Pulilan Bulacan in which testatrix's name shall be engraved. Should the value of the
center exceeds the said amount, the excess shall be shouldered by husband Idelfonso so as to satisfy her
wishes.

Idelfonso Yap opposed said probate asserting that decedent had not left any will nor executed any
testament during her lifetime. The will itself was not presented. Gan tried to establish its contents and
due execution by the statements of allegedly four (4) witnesses to the execution of the alleged will.
After hearing the parties and considering their evidence, the court refused to probate the alleged will.
Due to the denial of motion for reconsideration, Gan appealed.

ISSUE: Whether or not a holographic will may be probated upon the testimony of witnesses who have
allegedly seen it and who declare that it was in the handwriting of the testator. (No)
RULING: The Rules of Court allow proof (and probate) of a lost or destroyed will by secondary
evidence – the testimony of witnesses in lieu of the original document. Yet such Rules could not have
contemplated holographic wills which could not then be validly made here. The difference between
holographic wills and ordinary will lies in the nature of the wills. In the first, the only guarantee
of authenticity is the handwriting itself, in the second, the testimony of the subscribing or
instrumental witnesses (and of the notary).

The loss of the holographic will entail the loss of the only medium of proof, if the ordinary will is
lost, the subscribing witnesses are available to authenticate. The evidence of presented by Gan is
refused to be credited. In addition to the dubious circumstance described in the appealed decision, we
find it hard to believe that the deceased should show her will precisely to relative who had received
nothing from it. These could pester her into amending her will to give them a share, or threaten to
reveal its execution to her husband. Further, if she wanted so much to conceal the will from her
husband, why did she not entrust it to her beneficiaries? In fine, even if oral testimony were admissible
to establish and probate a lost holographic will, we think the evidence submitted by petitioner is so
tainted with improbabilities and inconsistencies that it fails to measure up to that clear and distinct
proof required by the Rules of Court.

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RABADILLA VS. CA

FACTS: In a Codicil appended to the Last Will and Testament of testatrix Aleja Belleza, Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla, predecessor-in-interest of the herein petitioner, Johnny S. Rabadilla, was instituted as a
devisee of a parcel of land surveyed. The said Codicil, which was duly probated and admitted by CFI
Negros Accidental contained the following provisions:

1) that testator bequeath a parcel of land in Negros Occidental to Dr. Jorge Rabadilla;
2) that should Jorge die ahead of testator, the said property and rights shall be inherited by his children
and spouse;
3) that should testator die, Jorge shall receive ownership of the property and has obligation until he dies
to give every year to Maria Marlina Belleza 75 piculs of sugar esport and 25 piculs of domestic sugar,
until the Maria Belleza dies;
4) that should Jorge die, his heir who shall inherit the said prorty will have the obligation to still give
yearly the sugar as specified in paragraph 3 on the month od December of each year;
5) That in addition, should any heir decide to later sell, lease, mortage the property, the buyer, lessee,
mortgagee shall also have the obligation to deliver yearly 100 piculs of sugar to Maria Belleza on each
of month of december 75 Export 25 Domestic until Maria shall die;
6) That should any buyer, lessee, mortgagee would not have respected testator's command Maria shall
immediately seize the property from the heir and the latter heir shall turn it over to testator's near
descendants and the latter shall then have the obligation to give the 100 piculs of sugar to Maria until
she dies.
7) That in addition, that the heir will obey and follow and that should they decide to sell, lease, mortage,
they cannot negotiate with others than testator's near descendants and sister.

Pursuant thereto, the property was transferred to Jorge Rabadilla. And when Jorge died in 1989, the
property was inherited by his wife Rufina and children Johnny (petitioner), Aurora, Ofelia and Zenaida
Rabadilla.
In 1989, Maria brought a complaint against the heirs of Jorge Rabadilla to enforce the provisions of the
said codicil. It was contended that the heirs had not complied with the provisions of the codicil when
the subject property was mortgaged to PNB and republic Planters in violation of par. 7. Also the heirs
failed to deliver 100 piculs of sugar in 1985 despite repeated demands. And that PNP failed to comply
with par. 5.

An amicable settlement was entered into by both parties thus a Memorandum of Agreement was
executed which contains that" an annuity for crop year 1988-1989 shall be delivered to Maria Belleza
and that those the prior years and later years shall be complied in cash equivalent of the number of
piculs. However, the Memorandum was not complied with and that among all the agreements only 50
piculs of sugar were delivered fpr crop year 1988-1989.

The trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action stating that, “While there may be the
non-performanceof the command as mandated, exaction from them (thepetitioners), simply because
they are the children of Jorg eRabadilla, the title holder/owner of the lot in question, does not warrant
the filing of the present complaint.”

The CA, reversed the decision and held that the institution of Dr. Rabadilla is in the nature of a modal
institution and a cause of action in favor of private respondent arose when petitioner failed to comply
with their obligation under the codicil, and ordered the reconveyance of the subject property together
with fruits and interests from heirs of Jorge Rabadila to the estate of testatrix Aleja Belleza.

The heirs of Jorge Rabadilla contend that there was no modal institution and the testatrix intended a
mere simple substitution—i.e. the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, was to be substituted by the
testatrix’s “near descendants” should the obligation to deliver the fruits to herein private respondent be
not complied with. And since the testatrix died single and without issue, there can be no valid
substitution and such testamentary provision cannot be given any effect.

ISSUE: Whether or not the heirs of Rabadilla was correct in interposing that the modal institution was
ineffective since what testator intends was substitution. (No)

RULING: Substitution is the designation by the testator of a person or persons to take the place of the
heir or heirs first instituted. Under substitutions in general, the testator may either (1) provide for the
designation of another heir to whom the property shall pass in case the original heir should die before
him/her, renounce the inheritance or be incapacitated to inherit, as in a simple substitution, or (2)
leave his/her property to one person with the express charge that it be transmitted subsequently to
another or others, as in a fideicommissary substitution. The Codicil sued upon contemplates
neither of the two.

In simple substitutions, the second heir takes the inheritance in default of the first heir by reason of
incapacity, pre-decease or renunciation. In the case under consideration, the provisions of subject
Codicil do not provide that should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla default due to predecease, incapacity or
renunciation, the testatrix’s near descendants would substitute him. What the Codicil provides is
that, should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfill the conditions imposed in the Codicil, the
property referred to shall be seized and turned over to the testatrix’s near descendants.

Neither is there a fideicommissary substitution here and on this point, petitioner is correct. In a
fideicommissary substitution, the first heir is strictly mandated to preserve the property and to transmit
the same later to the second heir. In the case under consideration, the instituted heir is in fact allowed
under the Codicil to alienate the property provided the negotiation is with the near descendants or the
sister of the testa-trix. Thus, a very important element of a fideicommissary substitution is lacking; the
obligation clearly imposing upon the first heir the preservation of the property and its transmission to
the second heir. “Without this obligation to preserve clearly imposed by the testator in his will, there is
no fideicommissary substitution.” Also, the near descendants’ right to inherit from the testatrix is not
definite. The property will only pass to them should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfill the
obligation to deliver part of the usufruct to private respondent.

The institution of an heir in the manner prescribed in Article 882 is what is known in the law of
succession as an institution sub modo or a modal institution. In a modal institution, the testator
states (1) the object of the institution, (2) the purpose or application of the property left by the
testator, or (3) the charge imposed by the testator upon the heir. A “mode” imposes an obligation
upon the heir or legatee but it does not affect the efficacy of his rights to the succession. On the
other hand, in a conditional testamentary disposition, the condition must happen or be fulfilled in
order for the heir to be entitled to succeed the testator. The condition suspends but does not
obligate; and the mode obligates but does not suspend. To some extent, it is similar to a
resolutory condition. From the provisions of the Codicil litigated upon, it can be gleaned unerringly
that the testatrix intended that subject property be inherited by Dr. Jorge Rabadilla. It is likewise clearly
worded that the testatrix imposed an obligation on the said instituted heir and his successors-in-interest
to deliver one hundred piculs of sugar to the herein private respondent, Marlena Coscolluela Belleza,
during the lifetime of the latter. However, the testatrix did not make Dr. Jorge Rabadilla’s inheritance
and the effectivity of his institution as a devisee, dependent on the performance of the said obligation.
It is clear, though, that should the obligation be not complied with, the property shall be turned
over to the testatrix’s near descendants. The manner of institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla under
subject Codicil is evidently modal in nature because it imposes a charge upon the instituted heir
without, however, affecting the efficacy of such institution.

CA’s decision affirmed.