Legal Ethics Reviewer. Atty Siron

Raffa.LegalEthicsNotes.
2015
***This is a summary of the 2014 Golden Notes (Legal and Judicial Ethics). The outline is in accordance to
the 2015 Bar Examinations syllabus in Legal and Judicial Ethics.
LEGAL ETHICS
A. Practice of law (Rule 138)
Rule 138- Sec 1. Who may practice law. Any person heretofore duly admitted as a
member of the bar, or heretofore admitted as such in accordance with the provisions
of this rule, and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law.
1. Concept
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application
of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training, and experience. (Cayetano v. Monsod)
a) Privilege
The practice of law is not a natural, property or constitutional right but a mere
privilege. It is not a right granted to any person who demands it but a privilege to be
extended or withheld in the exercise of sound judicial discretion. It is a privilege
accorded only to those who measure up to certain rigid standards of mental and
moral fitness.
Note: It becomes a PROPERTY RIGHT if there is a contract for ATTORNEY’S FEES.
b) Profession, not business
LAW IS A PROFESSION NOT A TRADE.
The legal profession is not a business. It is not a money-making trade just like a
businessman employing strategy for the purpose of monetary gain. It is a sacred
profession imbued with public interest whose primary objective is public service, as it
is an essential part in the administration of justice and a profession in pursuit of
which pecuniary reward is considered merely incidental.
2. Qualifications
Rule 138- Sec 1. Who may practice law. Any person heretofore duly admitted as a
member of the bar, or heretofore admitted as such in accordance with the provisions
of this rule, and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law.
3. Appearance of non-lawyers
GR: Only those who are licensed to practice law can appear and handle cases in
court.
XPNs:
1. Law student practice
2. Non-lawyers in court can appear for a party in MTC.
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Raffa.LegalEthicsNotes.2015
Note: Sec. 34 of Rule 138 expressly allows pro se practice or the right of a non-member of the
bar to engage in limited practice of law.
3. Non-lawyers in administrative tribunal can represent parties in tribunals such

as the NLRC , DARAB, Cadastral Courts.
a) Law student practice (Rule 138-A)
A law student who has successfully completed his third year of the regular four-
year prescribed law curriculum and is enrolled in a recognized law school’s clinical
legal education program approved by the Supreme Court, may appear without
compensation in any civil, criminal, or administrative case before any trial court,
tribunal, board or officer, to represent indigent clients accepted by the legal clinic
of the law school.
The appearance of the law student authorized by this rule, shall be under the
direct supervision and control of a member of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines duly accredited by the law school. Any and all pleadings, motions
briefs, memoranda, or other papers to be filed MUST BE SIGNED BY THE
SUPERVISING ATTORNEY FOR AND IN BEHALF OF THE LEGAL CLINIC.
NOTE: The law student shall comply with the standards of professional conduct governing
members of the Bar. Failure of an attorney to provide adequate supervision of student
practice may be a ground for disciplinary action.
b) Non-lawyers in courts
The following are the instances whereby non-lawyers may appear in court:
CASES BEFORE THE MTC:
A party to the litigation, may conduct his own case or litigation in person, with
the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose.
BEFORE ANY OTHER COURT:
A party may conduct his own litigation personally. But if he gets someone to aid
him, that someone must be authorized member of the Bar.
Note: A non-lawyer conducting his own litigation is bound by the same rules in
conducting the trial case. He cannot after judgment, claim that he was not
properly represented.
CRIMINAL CASE BEFORE THE MTC:
In a locality where a duly licensed member of the Bar is not available, the judge
may appoint a non-lawyer who is a:
-Resident of the province; AND
-Of good repute for probity and ability to aid the accused in his defense.
ANY OFFICIAL OR OTHER PERSON APPOINTED OR DESIGNATED TO APPEAR FOR
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW
NOTE: Such person shall have all the rights of a duly authorized member of the Bar to
appear in any case in which said government has an interest direct or indirect.
Party-litigant representing himself.

In civil cases, an individual litigant has the right to conduct his litigation personally.
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In criminal cases, in grave and less grave offenses, an accused who is a layman
must always appear by counsel; he cannot conduct his own defense without violating
his right to due process of law.
NOTE: Where an accused was not duly represented by a member of the Bar during
trial, the judgment should be set aside, and the case remanded to the trial court for
a new trial.
With regard to juridical persons, they must always appear in court through a duly
licensed member of the Bar, EXCEPT before MTC where they may be represented by
their agent or officer who need not be a lawyer.
Limits on the appearance of non-lawyers

1. He should confine is work to non-adversary contentions;
2. He should not undertake purely legal work, such as the examination or cross-
examination of witnesses, or the presentation of evidence; and
3. His service should not be habitually rendered. He should not charge or collect
attorney’s fees.
c) Non-lawyers in administrative tribunals
Under the Labor Code, non-lawyers may appear before the NLRC or any Labor
Arbiter, if:
-They represent themselves; or
-They represent their organization or members thereof
-If they are duly accredited members of any legal aid office duly recognized by the
Department of Justice, or the Integrated Bar of the Philippines in cases referred to by
the latter.
NOTE: He is not, however, entitled to attorney’s fees.
Under the Cadastral Act, a non-lawyer can represent a claimant before the
Cadastral Court.
c) Proceedings where lawyers are prohibited from appearing
1. Proceedings before the SMALL CLAIMS COURT- No attorney shall appear in

behalf of or represent a party at the hearing, unless the attorney is the plaintiff
or defendant.
NOTE: If the court determines that a party cannot properly present his claim or defense
and needs assistance, the court may in its discretion, allow another individual who is not
an attorney to assist that party upon the latter’s consent.
2. Proceedings before the KATARUNGANG PAMBARANGAY- During the pre-

trial conference under the Rules of Court, lawyers are prohibited from appearing
for the parties. Parties must appear in person only except minors or
incompetents who may be assisted by their next in kin who are not lawyers.
4. Sanctions for practice or appearance without authority
REMEDIES AGAINST UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW

1. Petition for Injunction;
2. Contempt of court;
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3. Criminal complaint for Estafa against a person who falsely represented himself to
be an attorney to the damage of a party;
4. Disqualification and complaints for disbarment; or
5. Administrative complaint against the erring lawyer or government official.
*Under section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a member of the Bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for
corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority
to do so. Disbarment, however, is the most severe form of disciplinary sanction, and
as such, the power to disbar must always be exercised with great caution, and
should be imposed only for the most imperative reasons and in clear cases of
misconduct affecting the standing and moral character of the lawyer as an officer of
the court and member of the Bar. Accordingly, disbarment should not be decreed
where any punishment less severe such as a reprimand, suspension or fine, would
accomplish the end desired.
NOTE: An unauthorized appearance of an attorney may be ratified by the client either

expressly or impliedly. Ratification retroacts to the date of the lawyer’s first appearance and
validates the action taken by him.
a) Lawyers without authority
(see above discussion)
b) Persons not lawyers
REMEDIES AGAINST UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW BY PERSONS NOT

LAWYERS
1. Petition for Injunction;
2. Contempt of court;
3. Criminal complaint for Estafa against a person who falsely represented himself to
be an attorney to the damage of a party.
They shall be punished with contempt of court , severe censure and 3 months
imprisonment because of the highly fraudulent and improper conduct tending directly
to impede, obstruct, degrade, and make a mockery of the administration of justice.
NOTE: A disbarred lawyer still appearing in court is guilty of indirect contempt.
KINDS OF CONTEMPT
1. DIRECT- Consists of misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court or judge as
to interrupt or obstruct the proceedings before the court or the administration of
justice. Punished summarily.
2. INDIRECT- One committed away form the court involving disobedience or
resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, judgment, or command of the court, or
tending to belittle, degrade, obstruct, interrupt or embarrass the court. Not summary
in nature.
3. CIVIL- Failure to do something ordered to be done by a court or judge for the
benefit of the opposing party therein. It is remedial in nature.
4. CRIMINAL- Conduct directed against the authority and dignity of a court or of a
judge, as in unlawfully assailing or discrediting the authority or dignity of a court or a
judge, or in doing a duly forbidden act. Intent is necessary.
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NOTE: Where the punishment imposed, whether against a party to a suit or a stranger, is
wholly or primarily to protect or vindicate the dignity and power, either by fine payable to the
government or imprisonment or both, it is deemed a judgment in CRIMINAL case.
Where the punishment is by fine directed to be paid to a party in the nature of

damages for the wrong inflicted, or by imprisonment as coercive measure to enforce
the performance of some act for the benefit of the party or in aid of the final
judgment or decree rendered in his behalf, the contempt will, if made before final
decree, be treated as in the nature of an INTERLOCUTORY ORDER.
TWO-FOLD ASPECT OF CONTEMPT POWER (1998 BAR)

1. The proper punishment of the guilty party for his disrespect to the court or its
order; and
2. To compel his performance of some act or duty required of him by the court,
which he refuses to perform.
NOTE: A practicing lawyer facing contempt proceedings cannot just be allowed to retire from
the practice of law which would negate the inherent power of the court to punish him for
contempt.
5. Public officials and practice of law
PROHIBITED ACYS OR OMISSIONS OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

1. Accepting or having any member of his family accept employment in a private
enterprise which has a pending official business with hi during the pendency thereof
or within one year after termination.
2. Own, control, manage or accept employment as officer, employee, consultant,
counsel, broker, agent, trustee or nominee in any private enterprise regulated,
supervised or licensed by their office unless expressly allowed by law.
3. A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or
employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said
service.
4. A lawyer should not accept employment as an advocate in any matter upon the
merits which he has previously acted in a judicial capacity.
NOTE: These prohibitions shall continue to apply for a period of 1 year after resignation or
separation from public office. The 1-year period shall also apply in connection with any matter
before the office he used to be with.
a) Prohibition or disqualification of former government attorneys
A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or

employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said
service. (CPR, CANON 6, RULE 6.03)
The evil sought to be avoided by this provision is the possibility of a lawyer who just
retired, resigned or separated from the government of using his influence for his own
private benefit.
THEORIES RELATING TO THE DISQUALIFICATION OF FORMER GOVERNMENT

LAWYERS IN REPRESENTING A CLIENT ON A MATTER IN WHICH THEY INTERVENED
WHEN THEY WERE IN OFFICE
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1. ADVERSE-INTEREST-CONFLICT- A former government lawyer is enjoined from

representing a client in private practice in a matter which is substantially related to
another matter which the former dealt with while employed by the government, and
if the interests of the current and former clients are adverse.
2. CONGRUENT-INTEREST-REPRESENTATION CONFLICT- The lawyer is prohibited

from representing a private practice client even if the interests of the government
(former employer) and the new client are entirely parallel.
b) Public officials who cannot practice law or with restrictions
NOT ALLOWED TO PRACTICE
1. Judges and other officials as employees of the Supreme Court

2. Officials and employees of the OSG
3. Government prosecutors
4. President, Vice-President, members of the cabinet, their deputies and assistants
5. Members of the Constitutional Commissions
6. Ombudsman and his deputies
7. All governors, city and municipal mayors
8. Those prohibited by special law
RESTRICTIONS ON THE PRACTICE OF LAW ON CERTAIN INDIVIDUALS

(1992, 2000 BAR)
1. No Senator or member of the House of Representatives may personally “appear”

as counsel before any court of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-
judicial and other administrative bodies.
2. Under the Local Government Code, Sanggunian members may practice their
professions provided that if they are members of the Bar, they shall NOT:
A. Appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein a local
government unit or any office, agency, or instrumentality of the government
is the adverse party
B. Appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer or employee of the
national or local government is accused of an offense commited in relation to
his office
C. Collect any fee for their appearance in administrative proceedings involving
the local government unit of which he is an official
D. Use property and personnel of the government except when the Sanggunian
member concerned is defending the interest of the government.
3. A retired justice or judge receiving pension from the government, cannot act as
counsel:
a. In any civil case in which the government, or any of its subdivisions or

agencies is the adverse party; or
b. In a criminal case wherein the officer or employee of the government
is accused of an offense in relation to his office; nor
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c. Collect any fees for his appearance in any administrative proceedings

to maintain an interest adverse to the government, provincial or
municipal, or to any of its legally constituted officers.
4. Civil service officers and employees without permit from their respective
department heads.
Q: Atty. Eliseo represented Allan in a collection suit against PCSO. After his election
as Sangguniang Bayan Member, the court rendered a decision in for of PCSO. Still,
Atty. Eliseo appeared for Allan in the latter’s appeal; prompting PCSO to question his
right to do so. In response, Atty. Eliseo claimed that the local government code
authorizes him to practice law as long as it does not conflict with his duties. Is Atty.
Eliseo correct? (2011 Bar)
A: No, because he cannot appear against a government instrumentality in a civil
case.
NOTE: While certain local elective officials (governor, mayor, provincial board members,
councilors) are expressly subjected to a total or partial proscription to practice their profession
or engage in any occupation, no such interdiction is made on punong barangay and the
members of the Sangguniang Barangay. Expressio unius est exclusion alterius. Since they are
excluded from any prohibition, the presumption is that they are allowed to practice their
profession. (However, he should procure prior permission or authorization from the head of his
Department, as required by the civil service regulations. ???)
6. Lawyers authorized to represent the government
SOLICITOR GENERAL for the National government, and any person appointed to
appear for the government of the Philippines in accordance with law.
In case of Local Government Units, they are represented by a LEGAL OFFICER who
provides legal assistance and support to the mayor or the governor and represents
the LGU in all civil actions and special proceedings wherein it or any of its officials
are involved in an official capacity.
NOTE: In criminal cases, SolGen steps in only when the case has already reached the CA.
While it is with the lower courts it is the PUBLIC PROSECUTOR who represents the
government.
DUTIES OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL
The Solicitor General, in his discretion, may pursue any of the following actions:
1. Prosecute;
2. Not to prosecute;
3. To abandon a prosecution already started; or
4. To take a position adverse to the People of the Philippines in a criminal case,
when he believes that justice will be served by taking a different stand.
DUTY OF A SOLICITOR GENERAL TO REPRESENT THE OTHER PARTY

WHEREBY TWO GOVERNMENT AGENCIES ARE IN CONFLICT
It is incumbent upon the SolGen to represent to the court what he considers as
would legally uphold the best interest of the government. The other government
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agency adversely affected, if it still believes in the merits of its case, may appear on
its own behalf through its legal officer or representative.
7. Lawyer’s oath
I, (name), of (place of birth) do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines; I will support its Constitution and obey the laws as well
as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood,
nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly nor willing promote or
sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, or give aid nor consent to the same; I will
delay no man for money or malice and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to
the best of my knowledge and discretion, with all good fidelity as well to the courts
as to my clients; and I impose upon myself these voluntary obligations without any
mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God.
IMPORTANCE OF THE LAWYER’S OATH
By taking the lawyer’s oath, a lawyer becomes the guardian of truth and the rule of
law and an indispensable instrument in the fair and impartial administration of
justice. Good moral character includes, at least, common honesty. Deception and
other fraudulent acts are not merely unacceptable practices that are disgraceful and
dishonorable; they reveal a basic moral flaw.
The lawyer’s oath is not a mere ceremony or formality for practicing law to be
forgotten afterwards nor is it mere words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that
every lawyer must uphold and keep inviolable at all times.
B. Duties and responsibilities of a lawyer
DUTIES OF AN ATTORNEY UNDER THE RULES OF COURT (2006 BAR)

1. To maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to support the
Constitution and obey the laws of the Philippines;
2. Not to encourage either the commencement or the continuance of an action
or proceeding, or delay any man’s cause, from any corrupt motive or interest;
3. To counsel and maintain only such actions or proceedings which appear to
him to be just and only such defenses as he believes to be honestly debatable
under the law;
4. To observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial
officers;
5. To employ, for purpose of maintaining the causes confided to him, only such
means as are consistent with truth and honor, and never seek to mislead the
judge or any judicial officer by any artifice or false statement of fact or law;
6. To maintain inviolate the confidence and at every peril to himself, to preserve
the secrets in connection with his client’s business except from him or with his
knowledge or approval;
7. To abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to
the honor and reputation of a party or witness unless required by the justice
of the cause with which he is charged;
8. Never to reject, for any consideration personal to himself, the cause of the
defenseless or oppressed; and
9. In the defense of a person accused of a crime, by all fair and honorable
means, regardless of his personal opinion as to the guilt of the accused, to
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present every defense that the law permits to the end that no person may be
deprived of life, liberty, but by due process of law.
1. To society
a) Respect for law and legal processes
CANON 1- A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS

OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
TWO-FOLD DUTY UNDER CANON 1
1. Obey the laws and legal processes.

2. Inspire others to maintain respect and obedience thereto.
CANON 1- RULE 1.01- A LAWYER SHALL NOT ENGAGE IN UNLAWFUL, DISHONEST,

IMMORAL AND DECIETFUL CONDUCT.
DECIETFUL CONDUCT- An act that has the proclivity for fraudulent and deceptive
misrepresentation, artifice or device that is used upon another who is ignorant of the
fact, to the prejudice and damage of the party imposed upon.
UNLAWFUL CONDUCT- A transgression of any provision of law, which need not be a

penal law. The presence of evil intent on the part of the lawyer is not essential on
order to bring his act or omission within the terms of this rule.
IMMORAL CONDUCT- A conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which

shows moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the
community. To warrant disciplinary action, the act must not only be merely immoral
but GROSSLY IMMORAL.
NOTE: GROSSLY IMMORAL CONDUCT is one that is so corrupt and false as to constitute a
criminal act or so unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree.
INSTANCES OF GROSS IMMORALITY AND THE RESULTING CONSEQUENCES
1. Abandonment of wife and cohabiting with another woman. DISBARRED.

2. A lawyer who had carnal knowledge of a woman through a promise of
marriage which he did not fulfill. DISBARRED.
3. Seduction of a woman who is the niece of a married woman with whom
respondent lawyer had an adulterous relation. DISBARRED.
4. Lawyer arranging marriage of his son to a woman with whom the lawyer had
illicit relations. DISBARRED.
5. Lawyer inveigling a woman into believing that they have been married civilly
to satisfy his carnal desires. DISBARRED.
6. Lawyer taking advantage of his position as chairman of the college of
medicine and asked lady student to go with him to Manila where he had
carnal knowledge of her under the threat of flunking all her subjects.
DISBARRED.
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7. A retired judge who penned a decision 7 months after he retired, antedating

the decision and forcing his former staff to include it in the expediente of the
case. DISBARRED.
ACTS NOT CONSTITUTING GROSS IMMORALITY
1. Stealing a kiss from a client

2. Live-in relationship involving two unmarried persons
3. Failure to pay a loan
GR: A lawyer may not be disciplined for failure to pay a loan. The proper remedy is
the filing of an action for collection of a sum of money in regular courts.
XPN: A deliberate failure to pay just debts and the issuance of worthless checks.
Having incurred just debts, a lawyer has the moral duty and legal responsibility to
settle them when they become due. He should comply with his just obligations, act
fairly and adhere to high ethical standards to preserve the court’s integrity, since he
is an employee thereof.
Q: Patricia and Simeon were teen sweethearts. It was after their child was born that
Simeon first promised he would marry her after he passes the Bar. Their relationship
continued and Simeon allegedly made more than twenty or thirty promises of
marriage. Patricia learned that Simeon married another woman. Meanwhile, Simeon
successfully passed the 1970 Bar examinations after four attempts. But before he
could take his oath, Patricia filed a petition to disqualify Simeon to take the Lawyer’s
oath on the ground of gross immoral conduct. Does the act of Simeon in engaging in
premarital relations with Patricia and making promises to marry her constitute gross
immoral conduct?
A: The SC ruled that the facts do not constitute gross immoral conduct warranting
permanent exclusion of Simeon from the legal profession. His engaging in premarital
sexual relations with complainant and promises to marry suggest a doubtful moral
character on his part but the same does not constitute grossly immoral conduct. The
Court has held that to justify suspension or disbarment the act complained of must
not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. A grossly immoral conduct is one that is
so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled or disgraceful
as to be reprehensible to a high degree. It is willful, flagrant, or shameless act, which
shows a moral indifference to the opinion of respectable members of the community.
Q: Catherin and Atty. Rongcal maintained an illicit affair. Catherine filed a case for
disbarment against Atty. Rongcal based on gross immoral conduct alleging that he
misrepresented himself to be single when he was in fact married, and due to the
false pretenses she succumbed to his sexual advances. Will her petition prosper?
A: Yes. Good moral character is a continuing condition in the privilege of law
practice. The mere fact of sexual relation between two unmarried adults is not
sufficient to warrant administrative sanction for such illicit behavior, it is with respect
to betrayal of the marital vow of fidelity. Atty. Rongcal is guilty of immorality in
violation of RULE 1.01 that a lawyer should not engage in unlawful dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct. But his remorse over his indiscretion and the fact of
ending the illicit affair mitigates the liability. Hence a penalty of a fine will suffice
with a warning that the same will be dealt with more severely.
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NOTE: Any errant behavior on the part of a lawyer, be it his public or private activities, which
tends to show him deficient in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor, is
sufficient to warrant his suspension or disbarment.
MORAL TURPITUDE- Imports an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the duties

which one person owes to another or to society in general which is contrary to the
usual accepted and customary rule of right and duty which a person should follow.
The question as to whether an offense involves moral turpitude is for the Supreme
Court to decide.
CANON 1- RULE 1.02 – A LAWYER SHALL NOT COUNSEL OR ABET ACTIVITIES

AIMED AT DEFIANCE OF THE LAW OR AT LESSENING CONFIDENCE IN THE LEGAL
SYSTEM (1994,1998 BAR)
Q: Atty. Asilo, a lawyer and a Notary public, notarized a document already prepared
by spouses Roger and Luisa when they approached him. It stated in the document
that Roger and Luisa formally agreed to live separately from each other and either
one can have a live-in partner with full consent of the other. What is the liability of
Atty. Asilo, if any? (1998 Bar)
A: Atty. Asilo may be held administratively liable for violating Rule 1.02 of the CPR- a
lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at
lessening confidence in the legal system. An agreement between two spouses to live
separately from each other and either one could have a live-in partner is contrary to
law and morals. The ratification by a notary who is a lawyer of such illegal and
immoral contract constitutes malpractice or gross misconduct in office. He should at
least refrain from its consummation.
CANON 1- RULE 1.03- A LAWYER SHALL NOT, FOR ANY CORRUPT MOTIVE OR
INTEREST, ENCOURAGE ANY SUIT OR PROCEEDING OR DELAY ANY MA’S CAUSE.
The rule is aimed against the practice of barratry, stirring up litigation and
ambulance chasing.
BARRATRY VS. AMBULANCE CHASING (1993 BAR)
BARRATRY- An offense of frequently exciting and stirring up quarrels and suits,

either at law or otherwise; lawyer’s act of fomenting suits among individuals and
offering his legal services to one of them. Barratry is not a crime under Philippine
laws. However, it is proscribed by the rules of legal ethics.
AMBULANCE CHASING- An act of chasing victims of accidents for the purpose of

talking to the said victims (or relatives) and offering his legal services for the filing of
a case against the person(s) who caused the accident(s).
NOTE: Volunteer advice to bring lawsuit comes within the prohibition, except where ties of
blood, relationship and trust make it a duty to do so.
Q: Atty. Melissa witnessed the car accident that resulted in injury to Manny, a friend
of hers. While visiting him at the hospital, she advised him about what action he
needed to take regarding the accident. Is Atty. Melissa subject to disciplinary action
if she eventually handles the case for him? (2011 BAR)
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A: No. It is unprofessional for a lawyer to volunteer advice to bring lawsuit, except in

rare cases where ties of blood, relationship or trust make it his duty to do so. In the
case at hand, since Atty. Melissa is a friend of the injured person, she may not be
admonished for extending some legal advice to a friend in need.
CANON1 – RULE 1.04- A LAWYER SHALL ENCOURAGE HIS CLIENTS TO AVOID, END
OR SETTLE A CONTROVERSY IF IT WILL ADMIT OF A FAIR SETTLEMENT
It is the duty of the lawyer to temper his client’s propensity to litigate and resist his
client’s whims and caprices for the lawyers owes duty to the court. A lawyer should
be a mediator for concord and conciliator for compromise rather than an initiator of
controversy and predator for conflict.
The rule requires that lawyers encourage settlement only when the same is fair. It
should be noted that the duty and the right of the lawyer is limited to encouraging
the client to settle. Ultimately, the final decision to settle a claim rests upon the
client.
b) Efficient and convenient legal services
CANON 2- A LAWYER SHALL MAKE HIS LEGAL SERVICES AVAILABLE IN AN

EFFICIENT AND CONVENIENT MANNER COMPATIBLE WITH THE
INDEPENDENCE, INTEGRITY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PROFESSION.
The rationale behind this rule is the lawyer’s prime duty to see to it that justice is
accorded to all without discrimination.
CANON 2-RULE 2.01- A LAWYER SHALL NOT REJECT, EXCEPT FOR VALID REASONS,
THE CAUSE OF THE DEFENSELESS OR THE OPPRESSED
DEFENSELESS- Those who are not in a position to defend themselves due to poverty,
weakness, ignorance or other similar reasons.
OPPRESSED- Those who are victims of cruelty, unlawful exaction, domination or

excessive use of authority.
The inability to pay for legal services is not a valid reason to refuse acceptance of a
case. This is because the profession is a branch of the administration of justice and
not a mere money-making trade.
RA No. 9999 FREE LEGAL ASSISTANCE ACT OF 2010
PURPOSE:
1. Encourage lawyers and professional partnerships to provide free legal

assistance.
2. Solicit the assistance of lawyers and professional partnerships in the private
practice of law in providing quality legal assistance to indigent litigants
through a system of tax incentives.
3. Provide relief to the PAO and other associations accredited by the SC from the
numerous cases they handle.
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4. Provide indigent litigants the opportunity to acquire the services of

distinguished law firms and legal practitioners of the country for free.
5. Ensure that the right of every individual to counsel, as mandated in the
Constitution, is protected and observed.
The PAO, DOJ and other legal aid clinics accredited by the SC shall refer pauper
litigants to identified lawyers and professional partnerships. PAO, DOJ and accredited
legal clinics shall issue a CERTIFICATION that services were rendered by the lawyer
or the professional partnership under this act. The certification shall include the cost
of the actual services given.
CANON2-RULE 2.02- IN SUCH CASES, EVEN IF THE LAWYER DOES NOT ACCEPT A
CASE, HE SHALL NOT REFUSE TO RENDER LEGAL ADVICE TO THE PERSON
CONCERNED IF ONLY TO THE EXTENT NECESSARY TO SAFEGUARD THE LATTER’S
RIGHTS
Rendering of legal advice includes preliminary steps that should be taken, at least,
until the person concerned has obtained the services of a proper counsel’s
representation. Even though no attorney-client relationship is created between the
parties, the lawyer, by providing interim advice preserves the dignity of the
profession by inspiring public faith in the profession.
CANON 2-RULE 2.03- A LAWYER SHALL NOT DO OR PERMIT TO BE DONE ANY ACT
DESIGNATED PRIMARILY TO SOLICIT LEGAL BUSINESS (1997 BAR)
RATIONALE BEHINDTHE RULE THAT THE LEGAL PROFESSION IS NOT

CONSIDERED AS A BUSINESS (2006 BAR)
1. Relation as an officer of the court to the administration of justice involving

thorough sincerity, integrity and reliability
2. Duty of public service
3. Relation to clients with the highest degree of fiduciary
4. Relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness, and
unwillingness to resort to current business methods of advertising and
encroachment on their practice, or dealing directly with their clients.
Q: Atty. David agreed to give ½ of his professional fees to an intermediary or

commission agent and he also bound himself not to deal directly with the clients. Can
he be subjected to disciplinary action?
A: Yes. The agreement is void because it is tantamount to malpractice which is the
practice of soliciting cases for the purpose of gain either personally or through paid
agents or brokers. Malpractice ordinarily refers to any malfeasance or dereliction of
duty committed by a lawyer. The meaning of malpractice is in consonance with the
notion that the practice of law is a profession not a business. The lawyer may not
seek or obtain employment by himself or through others, to do so would be
unprofessional.
NOTE: A general professional partnership with a non-lawyer is VOID. In the formation of

partnership for the practice of law, no person should be admitted or held out as a practitioner
or member who is not a member of the legal profession duly authorized to practice, and
amenable to professional discipline.
Page 13 of 163
ADVERTISEMENT
GR: No advertisement by lawyers is allowed. The most worthy and effective

advertisement possible is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for
professional capacity and fidelity to trust.
XPNs:
1. Reputable law lists

2. Advertisement or simple announcement of the existence of a lawyer or his law
firm posted anywhere it is proper such as his place of business or residence
except courtrooms and government buildings
3. Ordinary simple professional card
4. A simple announcement of the opening of a law firm or of changes in the
partnership, associates, firm name or office address, being for the
convenience of the profession, is not objectionable
5. Advertisement or announcement in any legal publication, including books,
journals, and legal magazines and in telephone directories
6. Writing legal articles
7. Engaging in business and other occupations except when such could be
deemed improper, seen as indirect solicitation or be the equivalent of law
practice
8. Activity of an association for the purpose of legal representation
9. Notice to other local lawyers and publishing in a legal journal of one’s
availability to act as an associate for them
10. Seeking a public which can only be held by a lawyer or, in a dignified manner,
a position of a full time corporate lawyer
11. Listing in a phone directory, but not under a designation of a special branch of
law
RATIONALE FOR THE PROHIBITION
1. The profession is primarily for public service

2. Commercializes the profession
3. Involves self-praise and puffing
4. Damages public confidence
5. May increase lawsuits and result in needless litigation
Q: Atty. Dulcinea writes a regular column in a newspaper of general circulation and

articles on unforgettable legal stories in a leading magazine. Her by-line always
includes the name of her firm where she is a name partner. Would you consider this
as an improper advertising? Explain.
A: Atty. Dulcinea’s by-line including the firm name where she belongs is improper
because it is an indirect way of solicitation or is an advertisement of the law firm.
Q: Facing disciplinary charges for advertising as a lawyer, Atty. A argues that

although the calling card of his businessman friend indicates his law office and his
legal specialty, the law office is located in his friend’s store. DECIDE (2001 BAR)
A: This appears to be a circumvention of the prohibition on improper advertising.
There is no valid reason why the lawyer’s businessman friend should be handing out
calling cards which contains the lawyer’s law office and legal specialty, even if his
Page 14 of 163
office is located in his friend’s store. What makes it more objectionable is the
statement of his supposed legal specialty.
CANON 2-RULE 2.04- A LAWYER SHALL NOT CHARGE RATES LOWER THAN THOSE
CUSTOMARILY PRESCRIBED UNLESS THE CIRCUMSTANCES SO WARRANT
(1997,2005 BAR)
GR: A lawyer shall not charge rates lower than those customarily prescribed.
XPN: When clients are relatives, co-lawyers, or are indigents. These are valid
justifications.
NOTE: What the rule prohibits is a competition in the matter of charging professional fees for
the purpose of attracting clients in favor of the lawyer who offers lower rates. The rule does
not prohibit a lawyer from charging reduced fee or none at all to indigent clients.
c) True, honest, fair, dignified and objective information on legal services
CANON 3- A LAWYER IN MAKING KNOWN HIS LEGAL SERVICES SHALL USE

ONLY TRUE, HONEST, FAIR, DIGNIFIED AND OBJECTIVE INFORMATION OR
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The practice of law is not a trade like the sale of commodities to the general public
where “the usual exaggerations in trade, when the proper party had the opportunity
to know the facts are not in themselves fraudulent”
Q: Atty. E has a daily 10-minute radio program billed as “Court of Common

Troubles.” The program is advertised by the radio station as a public service feature
of those who seek but cannot afford to pay for legal services. Its sponsors include a
food processing company and a detergent manufacturing firm which share with the
radio station the monthly remuneration of Atty. E. Is there any impropriety in Atty.
E’s role under the above arrangement? (1997 BAR)
A: Yes. Giving advice on legal matters through the medium of a newspaper column
or radio station or television broadcast is improper. It would involve indirect
advertising and violation of the confidential relation between the lawyer and the
client.
CANON3-RULE 3.01- A LAWYER SHALL NOT USE OR PERMIT THE USE OF ANY FALSE,
FRAUDULENT, MISLEADIN, DECEPTIVE, UNDIGNIFIED, SELF-LAUDATORY OR UNFAIR
STATEMNET OR CLAIM REGARDING HIS QUALIFICATIONS OR LEGAL SERVICES
(1997 BAR)
Any false, exaggerating or untrue claims about his qualifications are clearly
unethical. Example of this is when a lawyer makes representation to a prospective
client that he has never lost a single case in his entire career. Certainly, this is
impossible for the best lawyers in the country have experienced losing cases.
EXAMPLES OF ADVERTISEMENTS CONSIDERED DECEPTIVE:
1. Misstatement of fact
Page 15 of 163
2. Suggestion that the ingenuity or the prior record of a lawyer rather than
justice of the claim are the principal factors likely to determine the result
3. Inclusion of information irrelevant on selecting a lawyer
4. Representations concerning the quality of service, which cannot be measured
or verified.
CANON 3-RULE 3.02- IN THE CHOICE OF A FIRM NAME, NO FALSE, MISLEADING,

ASSUMED NAME SHALL BE USED. THE CONTINUED USE OF THE NAME OF A
DECEASED PARTNER IS PERMISSIBLE PROVIDED THAT THE FIRM INDICATES IN ALL
ITS COMMUNICATIONS THAT SAID PARTNER IS DECEASED (1994,1996,2001 BAR)
RATIONALE
All the partners have, by their joint and several efforts over a period of years
contributed to the good will attached to the firm name. In the case of a firm having
widespread connections, this good will is disturbed by a change in firm name every
time a partner dies, and that reflects a loss in some degree of the good will to the
building up of which the surviving partners have contributed their time, skill and
labor through a period of years.
NOTE: No name not belonging to any of the partners or associates may be used in the firm
name for any purpose.
Continued use of the name of a deceased partner is permissible provided that the
firm indicates in all its communications that said partner is deceased. The use of a
cross after the name of the deceased partner is sufficient indication. It is advisable
though that the year of death be also indicated.
CANON3-RULE 3.03- WHERE A PARTNER ACCEPTS PUBLIC OFFICE, HE SHALL

WITHDRAW FROM THE FIRM AND HIS NAME SHALL BE DROPPED FROM THE FIRM
NAME UNLESS THE LAW ALLOWS HIM TO PRACTICE LAW CONCURRENTLY
This is to prevent the law firm or partners from making use of the name of the public
official to attract business and to avoid suspicion of undue influence.
CANON 3-RULE 3.04- A LAWYER SHALL NOT PAY OR GIVE ANYTHING OF VALUE TO
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE MASS MEDIA IN ANTICIPATION OF, OR IN RETURN FOR,
PUBLICITY TO ATTRACT LEGAL BUSINESS
This is to prevent some lawyers from gaining an unfair advantage over others
through the use of gimmickry, press agentry or other artificial means.
d) Participation in the improvement and reforms in the legal system
CANON 4- A LAWYER SHALL PARTICIPATE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE

LEGAL SYSTEM BY INITIATING OR SUPPORTING EFFORTS IN LAW REFORM
AND IN THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
By reason of education and experience, lawyers are especially qualified to recognize

deficiencies in the legal system and to initiate corrective measures therein. Thus,
they should participate in proposing and supporting legislation and programs to
Page 16 of 163
improve the system, without regard to the general interests or desires of clients or
former clients.
E.g.:
1. Presenting position papers or resolutions for the introduction of pertinent bills in

Congress; or
2. Petitions with the SC for the amendment of the Rules of Court.
e) Participation in legal education program
CANON 5- A LAWYER SHALL KEEP ABREAST OF LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS,

PARTICIPATE IN CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION PROGRAMS, SUPPORT
EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE HIGH STANDARDS IN LAW SCHOOLS AS WELL AS IN
THE PRACTICAL TRAINING OF LAW STUDENTS AND ASSIST IN
DISSEMINATING INFORMATION REGARDING THE LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE
The duty carried with it the obligation to be well informed of the existing laws, and to
keep abreast with legal developments, recent enactments and jurisprudence. It is
imperative that they be conversant with the basic legal principles. Unless they
faithfully comply with such duty, they may not be able to discharge competently and
diligently their obligations as members of the Bar. Worse, they may become
susceptible to committing mistakes.
The latest circular of the SC provides for the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education
Program of the IBP. For law practitioners, they have to comply with the 36 hours pf
mandatory legal education as a pre-condition to the non-revocation of license to
practice law.
THREE-FOLD OBLIGATION OF A LAWYER
1. He owes it to himself to continue improving his knowledge of the laws

2. He owes it to hid profession to take an active interest in the maintenance of
high standards of legal education
3. He owes it to the public to make the law a part of their social consciousness
LAWYERS IN THE GOVERNMENT AND THE DISCHARGE OF OFFICIAL TASKS
CANON 6- THESE CANOS SHALL APPLY TO LAWYERS IN GOVERNMENT

SERVICE IN THE DISCHARGE OF THEIR OFFICIAL TASKS
Lawyers in the employ of the government should be more sensitive in the

performance of their professional obligations as their conduct is subject to constant
scrutiny of the public.
CANON 6-RULE 6.01- THE PRIMARY DUTY OF A LAWYER ENGAGED IN PUBLIC

PROSECUTION IS NOT TO CONVICT BUT TO SEE TO IT THAT JUSTICE IS DONE. THE
SUPPRESSION OF FACTS OR THE CONCEALMENT OF WITNESSES CAPABLE OF
Page 17 of 163
ESTABLISHING THE INNOCENCE OF THE ACCUSED IS HIGHLY REPREHENSIBLE AND

IS CAUSE FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION (1992, 1993 BAR)
Q: From the viewpoint of legal ethics, why should it be mandatory that the public
prosecutor be present at the trial of a criminal case despite the presence of the
private prosecutor? (2001 BAR)
A: The public prosecutor must be present at the trial of the criminal case despite the
presence of a private prosecutor in order to see to it that the interest of the state is
well-guarded and protected, should the private prosecutor be found lacking
competence in prosecuting the case. Moreover, the primary duty of a public
prosecutor is not to convict but to see to it that justice is done. A private prosecutor
would be naturally interested only in the conviction of the accused.
CANON6-RULE 6.02- A LAWYER IN THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE SHALL NOT USE HIS
PUBLIC POSITION TO PROMOTE OR ADVANCE HIS PRIVATE INTERESTS, NOR ALLOW
THE LATTER TO INTERFERE WITH HIS PUBLIC DUTIES
RESTRICTIONS ON LAWYERS WHO ARE ALSO PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES

DURING THEIR INCUMBENCY
THEY MUST NOT:
1. Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the

Constitution or law, provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to
conflict with their official functions;
2. Own, control, manage or accept employment as officer, employee, consultant,
counsel, broker, agent, trustee, or nominee in any private enterprise
regulated, supervised or licensed by their office unless expressly allowed by
law;
3. Recommend any person to any position in a private enterprise which has a
regular or pending official transaction with their office; and
4. Use or divulge confidential or classified information officially known to them
by reason of their office and not available to the public.
CANON 6-RULE 6.03- A LAWYER SHALL NOT, AFTER LEAVING GOVERNMENT

SERVICE, ACCEPT ENGAGEMENT OR EMPLOYMENT IN CONNECTION WITH ANY
MATTER IN WHICH HE HAD INTERVENED WHILE IN SAID SERVICE (1992,1993,2001
BAR)
The restriction provided under the rule covers engagement or employment which
means that he cannot accept any work or employment from anyone that will involve
or relate to the matter in which he intervened as a public official, except on behalf od
the body or authority which he served during his public employment.
NOTE: Sec 7(b) of R.A. 6713 prohibits former public official or employee for a period of 1 year
after retirement or separation from office to practice his profession in connection with any
matter before the office he used to be with.
2. To the legal profession
Page 18 of 163
CANON 7- A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND

DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF
THE INTEGRATED BAR
a) Integrated Bar of the Philippines (Rule 139-A)
It is the official national body composed of all persons whose names now appear or
may hereafter be included in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.
NOTE: Integrated bar is a state-organized bar, to which every lawyer must belong. As
distinguished from bar associations organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership
in which is voluntary. It is a national organization of lawyers created on 16 January 1973
under Rule 138-A, Rules of Court, and constituted on 4 May 1973 into a body corporate by PD
No. 181.
INTEGRATION OF THE BAR
The official unification of the entire lawyer population, and this requires membership
and financial support of every attorney as condition sine qua non to the practice of
law and the retention of his name in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.
FUNDAMENTAL PURPOSES OF THE IBP
1. To elevate the standards of the legal profession;

2. Improve the administration of justice; and
3. Enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE IBP INTEGRATION
The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege clothed with public interest.
Hence, it is fair and just that the exercise of that privilege be regulated to assure
compliance with the lawyer’s public responsibilities. Given the existing bar
conditions, the most efficient means of doing so is by integrating the Bar through a
rule of court that requires all lawyers to pay annual dues to the Integrated Bar.
STRUCTURE OF THE IBP BOARD
The House of Delegates shall elect 9 Governors from the 9 regions on the
representation basis of 1 governor from each region. Each governor shall be chosen
from a list of nominees submitted by the Delegates from the Region, provided that
no more than one nominee shall come from one chapter. The President and
Executive Vice President, if chosen by the governors from outside of themselves as
provided in Sec 7 of this Rule, shall ipso facto become members of the Board.
TERM OF MEMBERS OF THE IBP BOARD
Members shall hold office for a term of 1 year from the date of their election and
until their successors shall have been duly elected and qualified. No person may be a
Governor for more than two terms.
PRINCIPLE OF ROTATION
Page 19 of 163
Pursuant to the principle of rotation, the governorship of a region shall rotate once in
as may terms as the number of chapters there are in a region, to give every chapter
a chance to represent the region in the Board of Governors.
KINDS OF ROTATION
1.ROTATION BY PRE-ORDAINED SEQUENCE- Effected by the observance of the

sequence of the service of the chapters in the first cycle, which is very predictable.
2. ROTATION BY EXCLUSION- Effected by the exclusion of a chapter who had

previously served until all chapters have taken their turns to serve. In one case, the
SC held that rotation by exclusion shall be adopted since the elections would become
genuine as the opportunity to serve as Governor at any time is once again open to
all, unless, of course, a chapter has already served in the new cycle. While
predictability is not altogether avoided, as in the case where only one chapter
remains in the cycle, still, as previously noted by the Court, “the rotation rule should
be applied in harmony with, and not in derogation of, the sovereign will of the
electorate s expressed through the ballot”.
Transferring to another IBP chapter is not a ground for disqualification to

run as IBP Governor
The same is allowed in the IBP By Laws with the only qualification that the transfer
be made not less than three months immediately preceding any chapter elections.
IBP must be apolitical

No lawyer holding an elective, judicial, quasi-judicial or prosecutor office in the
government or any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof shall be eligible for
election or appointment to any position in the Integrated Bar or any chapter thereof.
A delegate, governor, officer, employee of the Integrated Bar or an officer or
employee of any chapter thereof shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his
position as of the moment he files his certificate of candidacy for any elective public
office or accepts appointment to any judicial, quasi-judicial, or prosecutor office in
the Government or any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof.
(i) Membership and dues
Q: The Integrated Bar of the Philippines adopted a resolution recommending to the

Court the removal of the name Marcial A. Edillon, a duly licensed practicing attorney,
from its Roll of Attorneys for stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues to the IBP
since its constitution, notwithstanding due notice. Is Edillon correct in his objection
that the Court is without power to compel him to become a member of the IBP,
hence, Sec. 1 of Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court is unconstitutional for it impinges
on his constitutional right of freedom to associate (and not to associate)?
A: No. To compel a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional
freedom to associate. Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of
which he is not already a member. He became a member of the Bar when he passed
the Bar Examinations. All that integration actually does is to provide an official
national organization for the well- defined but unorganized and incohesive group of
which every lawyer is already a member.
Assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel a lawyer to be a
member of the Integrated Bar, such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the
Page 20 of 163
police power of the State (In the Matter of IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of
Atty. Edillon, A.C. No. 1928, Dec. 19, 1980).
NOTE: A lawyer does not automatically become a member of the IBP chapter where he resides
or works after becoming a full-fledged member of the Bar. He has the discretion to choose the
IBP Chapter he wants to join (Garcia v. De Vera, A.C. 6052, Dec. 11, 2003).
Unless he otherwise registers his preference for a particular Chapter, a lawyer shall
be considered a member of the Chapter of the province, city, political subdivision or
area where his office is or, in the absence thereof, his residence is located. In no
case shall any lawyer be a member of more than one Chapter (RRC, Sec. 4, Rule
139-A).
Procedure for voluntary termination of membership

A member may terminate his membership by filing a written notice to that effect
with the Secretary of the Integrated Bar, who shall immediately bring the matter to
the attention of the Supreme Court.
Forthwith he shall cease to be a member and his name shall be stricken by the Court
from the Roll of Attorneys (RRC, Sec.11, Rule 139-A).
NOTE: Re-instatement may be made by the Court in accordance with rules and regulations
prescribed by the Board of Governors and approved by the Court (RRC, Sec.11, Rule 139-A).
Membership dues
Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such annual dues as the Board of
Governors shall determine with the approval of the Supreme Court. A fixed sum
equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the collections from each Chapter shall be set
aside as a Welfare Fund for disabled members of the Chapter and the compulsory
heirs of deceased members thereof (RRC, Sec. 9, Rule 139-A).
NOTE: Membership dues are not prohibited by the Constitution. The fee is imposed as a
regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the purposes and objectives of
the integration (In the Matter of IBP Membership dues delinquency of Atty. Marcial Edillon,
A.M. No. 1928, Aug. 3, 1978).
Effect of non-payment of dues

Default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of
membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be
a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of
Attorneys (RRC, Sec. 10, Rule 139-A) subject to the requirement of due process
(Funa, 2009).
Q: Atty. Llamas, for a number of years, has not indicated the proper PTR and IBP OR
Nos. and data in his pleadings. He only indicated “IBP Rizal 259060” but he has been
using this for at least 3 years already. Atty. Llamas averred that he is only engaged
in a “limited” practice of law and under R.A. 7432, as a senior citizen, he is
exempted from payment of income taxes and included in this exemption, is the
payment of membership dues. Is Atty. Llamas correct?
A: Rule 139-A requires that every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay annual
dues and default thereof shall warrant the appropriate penalties. It does not matter
whether or not Atty. Llamas is only engaged in “limited” practice of law. Moreover,
the exemption invoked by Atty. Llamas does not include exemption from payment of
membership or association dues (Santos Jr. v. Atty. Llamas, A.C. No. 4749, Jan. 20,
2000).
Page 21 of 163
NOTE: RA 7432 providing 20% discount to Senior Citizens DO NOT apply to IBP Dues.
Q: Atty. Arevalo sought exemption from payment of IBP dues for the alleged unpaid
accountability for the years 1977-2005. He alleged that after being admitted to the
Philippine Bar in 1961, he became part of the Philippine Civil Service then migrated
to, and worked in, the USA in December 1986 until his retirement in the year 2003.
He maintained that he cannot be assessed IBP dues for the years that he was
working in the Philippine Civil Service since the Civil Service law prohibits the
practice of one’s profession while in government service, and neither can he be
assessed for the years when he was working in the USA. Is Atty. Arevalo entitled to
exemption from payment of his dues during the time that he was inactive in the
practice of law?
A: No. The Integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of the
entire lawyer population. This requires membership and financial support of every
attorney as condition sine qua non to the practice of law and the retention of his
name in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.
Payment of dues is a necessary consequence of membership in the IBP, of which no
one is exempt. This means that the compulsory nature of payment of dues subsists
for as long as one’s membership in the IBP remains regardless of the lack of practice
of, or the type of practice, the member is engaged in. There is nothing in the law or
rules which allow exemption from payment of membership dues (Letter of Atty.
Arevalo, Jr. Requesting Exemption from Payment of Dues, B.M. No. 1370, May 9,
2005).
b) Upholding the dignity and integrity of the profession
CANON 7-RULE 7.01 - A LAWYER SHALL BE ANSWERABLE FOR KNOWINGLY MAKING

A FALSE STATEMENT OR SUPPRESSING A MATERIAL FACT IN CONNECTION WITH
HIS APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO THE BAR. (1995,1997,2004,2005 BAR)
The concealment of an attorney in his application to take the bar exams of the fact
that he had been charged with or indicted for an alleged crime, is ground for
revocation of his license to practice law.
On the other hand, to be liable for suppressing a fact or information in the

application, the suppression must be:
1. Deliberately or knowingly made; and

2. The fact or information suppressed must be material (CPR Annotated, PhilJA).
False statements in the application for admission to the Bar

1. If the false statement or suppression of material fact is discovered before the
candidate could take the bar examinations, he will be denied permission to take the
examinations.
2. If the false statement or suppression of material fact was discovered after the
candidate had passed the examinations but before having been taken his oath, he
will not be allowed to take his oath as a lawyer.
3. If the discovery was made after the candidate had taken his oath as a lawyer, his
name will be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.
Effect concealment of a crime which does not involve moral turpitude
Page 22 of 163
Concealment will be taken against him. It is the fact of concealment and not the
commission of the crime itself that makes him morally unfit to become a lawyer.
When he made concealment he perpetrated perjury.
CANON 7-RULE 7.02 - A LAWYER SHALL NOT SUPPORT THE APPLICATION FOR
ADMISSION TO THE BAR OF ANY PERSON KNOWN BY HIM TO BE UNQUALIFIED IN
RESPECT TO CHARACTER, EDUCATION, OR OTHER RELEVANT ATTRIBUTE.
The rationale behind the rule goes beyond the personal responsibility to be upright
and honest. It further extends to the lawyer’s responsibility to uphold the integrity
and dignity of the profession, by not blindly issuing certifications in support of
applications for admission to the bar of persons known to him or her to have
questionable character, inadequate education or other relevant attributes not
consistent with any or all of the requirements for admission (CPR Annotated, PhilJA).
CANON 7-RULE 7.03 - A LAWYER SHALL NOT ENGAGE IN CONDUCT THAT

ADVERSELY REFLECTS ON HIS FITNESS TO PRACTICE LAW, NOR SHALL HE,
WHETHER IN PUBLIC OR PRIVATE LIFE, BEHAVE IN A SCANDALOUS MANNER TO
THE DISCREDIT OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION (2004 BAR)
Q: Atty. Perenia got married in 2005. Then he met another woman, Helen; they fell
in love and started living together. Atty. Perenia would even bring her along social
functions and introduce her as his second wife. Is such act unethical?
A: Yes, it violates Rule 7.03 of CPR. The fact that he shamelessly flaunts his mistress
constitutes an act which embarrasses and discredits the law profession since it is his
duty and obligation to uphold the dignity and integrity of the profession. The
actuation of Atty. Perenia is contrary to good morals.
While it has been held in disbarment cases that the mere fact of sexual relations
between two unmarried adults is not sufficient to warrant administrative sanction for
such illicit behavior, it is not so with respect to betrayals of the marital vow of
fidelity. Even if not all forms of extra-marital relations are punishable under penal
law, sexual relations outside marriage is considered disgraceful and immoral as it
manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows
protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws (Vitug v. Roncal, A.C. No.
6313, Sept. 7, 2006).
Q: Atty. Kuripot was one of Town Bank’s valued clients. In recognition of his loyalty
to the bank, he was issued a gold credit card with a credit limit of P250,000.00. After
two months, Atty. Kuripot exceeded his credit limit, and refused to pay the monthly
charges as they fell due. Aside from a collection suit, Town Bank also filed a
disbarment case against Atty. Kuripot. In his comment on the disbarment case, Atty.
Kuripot insisted that he did not violate the Code of Professional Responsibility, since
his obligation to the bank was personal in nature and had no relation to his being a
lawyer. Is Atty. Kuripot correct? Explain your answer.
A: Atty. Kuripot is not correct. Section 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
provides that “a lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely affects his fitness
to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession.”
Q: Explain whether Atty. Kuripot should be held administratively liable for his refusal
to settle his credit card bill. (2005 Bar Question)
Page 23 of 163
A: He may not be held administratively liable. The Supreme Court has held that it
does not take original jurisdiction of complaints for collection of debts. The creditor’s
course of action is civil, not administrative in nature and proper reliefs may be
obtained from the regular courts (Litigio v. Dicon, A.M. No. MTJ-93-806, July 13,
1995). Although lawyers have been held administratively liable for obstinacy in
evading payment of a debt (Constantino v. Saludares, A.C. No. 2029, Dec. 7, 1993;
Lao v. Medel, A.C. No. 5916, July 1, 2003), there is no obstinacy shown in this case.
c) Courtesy, fairness and candor towards professional colleagues
CANON 8 - A LAWYER SHALL CONDUCT HIMSELF WITH COURTESY,

FAIRNESS AND CANDOR TOWARD HIS PROFESSIONAL COLLEAGUES, AND
SHALL AVOID HARASSING TACTICS AGAINST OPPOSING COUNSEL.
Lawyers, though they may represent different clients, should bear in mind that they
are not enemies but brothers and sisters in their profession (Antiquiera, 1992).
CANON 8-RULE 8.01 - A LAWYER SHALL NOT, IN HIS PROFESSIONAL DEALINGS,

USE LANGUAGE WHICH IS ABUSIVE, OFFENSIVE OR OTHERWISE IMPROPER.
The lawyer’s arguments, whether written or oral, should be gracious to both the
court and opposing counsel and be of such words as may be properly addressed by
one gentleman to another (National Security Co. v. Jarvis, 278 U.S. 610).
A lawyer’s language should be forceful but dignified, emphatic but respectful as
befitting an advocate and in keeping with the dignity of the legal profession (In Re:
Climaco, A.C. No. 134-J, Jan. 21, 1974).
Lack of want of intention is no excuse for the disrespectful language employed.

Counsel cannot escape responsibility by claiming that his words did not mean what
any reader must have understood them as meaning (Rheem of the Philippines v.
Ferrer, G.R. No. L-22979, Jan. 27, 1967).
Although the Canon that the Rule implements pertains to a lawyer’s dealings with his
fellow lawyers, the Rule is generally worded to apply to anyone in the wider context
of a lawyer’s professional dealings, including his or her clients and witnesses (CPR
Annotated, PhilJA).
CANON 8-RULE 8.02 - A LAWYER SHALL NOT, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY,

ENCROACH UPON THE PROFESSIONAL EMPLOYMENT OF ANOTHER LAWYER;
HOWEVER, IT IS THE RIGHT OF ANY LAWYER, WITHOUT FEAR OR FAVOR, TO GIVE
PROPER ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE TO THOSE SEEKING RELIEF AGAINST
UNFAITHFUL OR NEGLECTFUL COUNSEL (1995,1997,2001,2005,2006 BAR)
A person without a retained lawyer is a legitimate prospective client for any lawyer
whom he approaches for legal services. But, as soon as he had retained one and had
not dismissed the retained counsel, efforts on the part of another lawyer to take him
as client constitutes an act of encroaching upon the employment of another lawyer.
A lawyer should not in any way communicate upon the subject of controversy with a
party represented by counsel much less should he undertake to negotiate or
compromise the matter with him, but should deal with his counsel.
Any act which is aimed to ease out a previous lawyer with the intention to grab the
case is highly unethical and should be avoided (Antiquiera, 1992).
Page 24 of 163
Exceptions
1. A lawyer may properly interview any witness or prospective witness or prospective
witness for the opposing side in any civil or criminal action without the consent of
opposing counsel or party.
2. Any person who seeks relief against an unfaithful or neglectful lawyer may
approach another lawyer for proper advice and assistance. Any advice or assistance
extended after proper verification is not encroaching upon the business of another
lawyer for such act is justified under the circumstances.
Q: Myrna, in a case for custody of children against her husband, sought advice from
Atty. Mendoza whom she met at a party. She informed Atty. Mendoza that her
lawyer, Atty. Khan, has been charging her exorbitant appearance fees when all he
does is move for postponements which have unduly delayed the proceedings; and
that recently, she learned that Atty. Khan approached her husband asking for a huge
amount in exchange for the withdrawal of her Motion for Issuance of Hold Departure
Order so that he and his children can leave for abroad. Is it ethical for Atty. Mendoza
to advise Myrna to terminate the services of Atty. Khan and hire him instead for a
reasonable attorney’s fees?
A: Such advice would be unethical. A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy,
fairness and candor towards his professional colleagues (CPR, Canon 8). Specifically,
he should not directly or indirectly encroach upon the professional employment of
another lawyer (CPR, Canon 8).
Q: What should Atty. Mendoza do about the information relayed to him by Myrna
that Atty. Khan approached her husband with an indecent proposal? (2006 Bar
Question)
A: He can advise her to terminate the services of Atty. Khan and/or file an
administrative case against Atty. Khan. It is the right of any lawyer, without fear or
favor, to give proper advice and assistance to those seeking relief against unfaithful
or neglectful counsel (CPR, Rule 8.02).
Q: You are the counsel of K in his action for specific performance against DEV, Inc., a
subdivision developer which is represented by Atty. L. Your client believes that the
president of DEV Inc., would be willing to consider an amicable settlement and your
client urges you to discuss the matter with DEV Inc., without the presence of Atty. L
whom he consider to be an impediment to an early compromise. Would it be alright
for you to negotiate the terms of the compromise as so suggested above by your
client? (1997 Bar Question)
A: No. Rule 8.02, Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that “a
lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the professional employment of
another lawyer.” Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Ethics is more particular. “A
lawyer should not in any way communicate upon the subject of the controversy with
a party represented by counsel, much less should he undertake to negotiate or
compromise the matter with him but should deal only with his counsel.” In the case
of Likong v. Lim, A.C. No. 3149, August 17, 1994, a lawyer was suspended for
negotiating a compromise agreement directly with the adverse party without the
presence and participation of her counsels.
d) No assistance in unauthorized practice of law
Page 25 of 163
CANON 9 - A LAWYER SHALL NOT, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ASSIST IN

THE UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW.
The rationale of this canon is to protect the public, the court, the client and the bar
from the incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not
subject to the disciplinary control of the court.
There is no violation of this canon if a lawyer employs a paralegal graduate to assist
him in the practice of law since the job of a paralegal is limited to drafting of
documents, case management, etc. (Antiquiera, 1992).
Q: Sanchez alleged that the complaint against him and the supporting affidavits were
subscribed and sworn to before Tupas, the Clerk of Court, who is not a member of
the IBP and therefore engaged in unauthorized practice of law. Is Tupas as Clerk of
Court authorized to administer oath?
A: The term "clerk of courts" in Section 41 of the Administrative Code as amended is
used as a general term. The intention of the law is to authorize all clerks of court
regardless of whether they are clerks of the MTCs, to administer oaths on matter
involving official business. As Clerk of Court of MCTC, Tupas has the authority to
administer oath of affidavits of parties and witnesses which are to be filed in court
(Sanchez v. Tupas, A.M. OCA IPI No. 03- 1687-P, Mar. 1, 2004).
CANON 9-RULE 9.01 - A LAWYER SHALL NOT DELEGATE TO ANY UNQUALIFIED

PERSON THE PERFORMANCE OF ANY TASK WHICH BY LAW MAY ONLY BE
PERFORMED BY A MEMBER OF THE BAR IN GOOD STANDING.
The qualifications to be a lawyer is personal and the Bar is an exclusive group of

professionals who possess the requisite qualifications and for whom defined functions
are reserved. To delegate the functions would violate the rationale behind reserving
defined functions exclusively for those who are admitted to the bar.
Although the authority of a lawyer to represent a client cannot be delegated to an
unqualified person, it does not follow however that the retained lawyer is
automatically authorized to make such delegation to a qualified person because a
client-lawyer relationship is personal (CPR Annotated, PhilJA).
Q: Lorenzo is a lawyer but is suspended in the practice of law due to some unethical
acts. He worked for a law firm owned by one of his friends. Since he has so many
cases to handle, Atty. Berenguer assigned a case to Lorenzo, believing he can handle
such easy case. Did Atty. Berenguer violate any rule?
A: Yes, because he delegates handling of a case to a person suspended from the
practice of law. Under Rule 9.01 of CPR – A lawyer shall not delegate to any
unqualified person the performance of any task which by law may only be performed
by a member of the bar in good standing.
CANON 9-RULE 9.02 - A LAWYER SHALL NOT DIVIDE OR STIPULATE TO DIVIDE A

FEE FOR LEGAL SERVICES WITH PERSONS NOT LICENSED TO PRACTICE LAW,
EXCEPT:
A) WHERE THERE IS A PRE-EXISTING AGREEMENT WITH A PARTNER OR ASSOCIATE
THAT, UPON THE LATTER’S DEATH, MONEY SHALL BE PAID OVER A REASONABLE
PERIOD OF TIME TO HIS ESTATE OR TO PERSONS SPECIFIED IN THE AGREEMENT;
OR
B) WHERE A LAWYER UNDERTAKES TO COMPLETE UNFINISHED LEGAL BUSINESS OF
A DECEASED LAWYER; OR
Page 26 of 163
C) WHERE A LAWYER OR LAW FIRM INCLUDES NON-LAWYER EMPLOYEES IN A

RETIREMENT PLAN, EVEN IF THE PLAN IS BASED IN WHOLE OR IN PART, ON A
PROFITABLE SHARING ARRANGEMENT.
The interest promoted by the prohibition is that the independence of the professional
judgment of a lawyer, which the client is paying for, could be at risk if a non-lawyer
has direct rights to share in the legal fees resulting from the exercise of such
professional judgment (CPR Annotated, PhilJA).
Exceptions to Rule 9.02

1. Where there is a pre-existing agreement with a partner or associate that, upon
the latter’s death, money shall be paid over a reasonable period of time to his estate
to persons specified in the agreement; (CPR, Rule 9.02, second par., Canon 9) or
NOTE: This exception is in the nature of a bequest. It is still in substance, payment to the
deceased lawyer. His estate and/or assignee could not claim entitlement to the money in their
own right but only by representation (CPR Annotated, PhilJA).
2. Where a lawyer undertakes to complete unfinished legal business of a deceased

lawyer; (CPR, Rule 9.02, third par., Canon 9) or
NOTE: The estate or the heir cannot be made a member of the partnership with the surviving
partners. The legal fees in this case, no longer represent compensation for past
3. Where a lawyer or law firm includes a non-lawyer employees in a retirement plan,

even if the plan is based in whole or in part, on a profit sharing agreement (CPR,
Rule 9.02, fourth par., Canon 9).
NOTE: This is not a division of legal fees but a pension representing deferred wages for the
employees’ past services. This exception is an implicit recognition of the incontestable fact
that lawyers need to, and in fact, depend on non-lawyers for the administrative support
functions necessary to allow lawyers to discharge their legal functions more efficiently (CPR
Annotated, PhilJA).
Q: You had just taken your oath as lawyer. The secretary to the president of a big
university offered to get you as the official notary public of the school. She explained
that a lot of students lose their identification cards and are required to secure an
affidavit of loss before they can be issued a new one. She claimed that this would be
very lucrative for you, as more than 30 students lose their identification cards every
month. However, the secretary wants you to give her one-half of your earning
therefrom. Will you agree to the arrangement? Explain. (2005 Bar Question)
A: No, I will not agree. Rule 9.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides
that “a lawyer shall not divide or stipulate to divide a fee for legal service with
persons not licensed to practice law”. The secretary is not licensed to practice law
and is not entitled to a share of the fees for notarizing affidavits, which is a legal
service.
3. To the courts
CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE

COURT.
a) Candor, fairness and good faith towards the courts
Page 27 of 163
CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE

COURT.
The burden cast on the judiciary would be intolerable if it could not take at face value
what is asserted by counsel.
As officers of the court, lawyers have the primary obligation towards the
administration of justice. To mislead the court is contumacious and clearly a ground
for disciplinary action (Antiquiera, CPR, p. 39).
Requirements of candor
1. A lawyer shall not suppress material and vital facts which bear on the merit or
lack of merit of complaint or petition.
2. A lawyer shall volunteer to the court any development of the case which has
rendered the issue raised moot and academic.
3. Disclosure to the court of any decision adverse to his position of which opposing
counsel is apparently ignorant and which court should consider in deciding a case.
4. He shall not represent himself as a lawyer for a client, appear in court and present
pleadings in the latter’s behalf only to claim later that he was not authorized to do
so.
CANON 10-RULE 10.01 - A LAWYER SHALL NOT DO ANY FALSEHOOD, NOR CONSENT
TO THE DOING OF ANY IN COURT; NOR SHALL HE MISLEAD, OR ALLOW THE COURT
TO BE MISLED BY ANY ARTIFICE.
A lawyer must be a disciple of truth. He should bear in mind that as an officer of the
court his high vocation is to correctly inform the court upon the law and the facts of
the case and to aid it in doing justice and arriving at correct conclusion.
The courts on the other hand are entitled to expect only complete honesty from
lawyers appearing and pleading before them. While a lawyer has the solemn duty to
defend his client’s cause, his conduct must never be at the expense of truth (Young
v. Batuegas, A.C. No. 5379, May 9, 2003).
NOTE: A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client but not at the expense of truth and the
administration of justice (Garcia v. Francisco, Adm. Case no. 3923, Mar. 30,1993).
Presenting false evidence is not justifiable

Aside from violations of the CPR , the lawyer is also guilty of a crime under ART. 184,
Revised Penal Code, which states, “Any person who shall knowingly offer in evidence
a false witness or testimony in any judicial or official proceeding, shall be punished
as guilty of false testimony and shall suffer the respective penalties provided in this
section”
CANON 10-RULE 10.02 - A LAWYER SHALL NOT KNOWINGLY MISQUOTE OR

MISREPRESENT THE CONTENTS OF PAPER, THE LANGUAGE OR THE ARGUMENT OF
OPPOSING COUNSEL, OR THE TEXT OF A DECISION OR AUTHORITY, OR
KNOWINGLY CITE AS LAW A PROVISION ALREADY RENDERED INOPERATIVE BY
REPEAL OR AMENDMENT, OR ASSERT AS A FACT THAT WHICH HAS NOT BEEN
PROVED.
Page 28 of 163
If not faithfully and exactly quoted, the decisions and rulings of the court may lose
their proper and correct meaning, to the detriment of other courts, lawyers and the
public who may thereby be misled.
CANON 10-RULE 10.03 - A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE THE RULES OF PROCEDURE

AND SHALL NOT MISUSE THEM TO DEFEAT THE ENDS OF JUSTICE.
Filing multiple actions constitutes an abuse of the Court’s processes. Those who filed
multiple or repetitive actions subject themselves to disciplinary action for
incompetence or willful violation of their duties as attorneys to act with all good
fidelity to the courts, and to maintain only such actions that appear to be just and
consistent with truth and honor (Pablo R. Olivares etc. v. Atty. Arsenio Villalon Jr.,
A.C. No. 6323, Apr. 13, 2007).
Instances when lawyers can be disciplined based on the pleadings he filed

When a counsel deliberately:
1. Files an unsigned pleading in violation of the rules;
2. Alleges scandalous matters therein;
3. Fails to promptly report to the court a change of his address (RRC, Sec. 3, Rule
7).
NOTE: A lawyer should not abuse his right of recourse to the courts for the purpose of arguing
a cause that had been repeatedly rebuffed. Neither should he use his knowledge of law as an
instrument to harass a party nor to misuse judicial processes, as the same constitutes serious
transgression of the Code of Professional Responsibility. For while he owes fidelity to the cause
of his client, it should not be at the expense of truth and the administration of justice (Garcia
v. Francisco, A.C. No. 3923, Mar. 30, 1993).
CANON 10-RULE 10.04 A LAWYER SHALL, WHEN FILING A PLEADING, FURNISH THE
OPPOSING PARTY WITH A COPY THEREOF, TOGETHER WITH ALL THE DOCUMENTS
ANNNEXED THERETO. UNLESS A MOTION EX PARTE, HE SHOULD SET IT FOR
HEARING, WITH SUFFICIENT NOTICE TO THE OTHER PARTY.
b) Respect for courts and judicial officers
CANON 11 - A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE

TO THE COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSIST ON
SIMILAR CONDUCT BY OTHERS.
Disrespect toward the court would necessarily undermine the confidence of the
people in the honesty and integrity of the members of the court, and consequently to
lower or degrade the administration of justice by the court.
All lawyers are expected to recognize the authority of the Supreme Court and obey
its lawful processes and orders. Despite errors which one may impute on the orders
of the Court, these must be respected, especially by the bar or the lawyers who are
themselves officers of the courts (Yap-Paras v. Atty. Paras, A.C. No. 4947, June 7,
2007).
In case of conflict between his duty to the court and his duty to the society and his
client, the other must yield since it is his duty to the court that should take
precedence.
Page 29 of 163
Q: Atty. Z criticized the court in a tactful manner, not in any way causing disrespect.
Is that allowed?
A: Yes. The fact that a person is a lawyer does not deprive him of the right, as
enjoyed by every citizen, to comment on and criticize the actuations of a judge but it
is the cardinal condition of all criticisms that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill
over the walls of decency and propriety (Zaldivar v. Gonzales, G.R. Nos. 79690-707,
Feb. 1, 1989).
NOTE: What a lawyer can ordinarily say against a concluded litigation and the manner the
judge handed down the decision therein may not generally be said to a pending action. The
court, in a pending litigation, must be shielded from embarrassment and influence in
performing the important duty of deciding it. On the other hand, once litigation is concluded,
the judge who decided on it is subject to the same criticism as any other public official
because then his ruling becomes public property and is thrown open to public consumption.
CANON 11-RULE 11.01 - A LAWYER SHALL APPEAR IN COURT PROPERLY ATTIRED.
As an officer of the court and in order to maintain the dignity and respectability of
the legal profession, a lawyer who appears in court must be properly attired.
Consequently, the court can hold a lawyer in contempt of court if he does not appear
in proper attire. Any deviation from the commonly accepted norm of dressing in
court (barong or tie, not both) is enough to warrant a citing for contempt.
The traditional attires for male lawyers in the Philippines are the long-sleeve Barong
Tagalog or coat and tie. Female lawyers appear in semi-formal attires. Judges also
appear in the same attire in addition to black robes.
CANON 11-RULE 11.02 - A LAWYER SHALL PUNCTUALLY APPEAR AT COURT

HEARINGS.
Punctuality is demanded by the respect which a lawyer owes to the court, the
opposing counsel and to all the parties to the case (Funa, 2009).
CANON 11-RULE 11.03 - A LAWYER SHALL ABSTAIN FROM SCANDALOUS,

OFFENSIVE OR MENACING LANGUAGE OR BEHAVIOR BEFORE THE COURTS.
The language of a lawyer, both oral and written, must be respectful and restrained in
keeping with the dignity of the legal profession and with his behavioral attitude
toward his brethren in the profession. The use of abusive language by counsel
against the opposing counsel constitutes at the same time disrespect to the dignity
of the court justice. Moreover, the use of impassioned language in pleadings, more
often than not, creates more heat than light (Buenaseda v. Flavier, G.R. No. 106719,
Sept. 21, 1993).
The duty to observe and maintain respect is not a one-way duty from a lawyer to a
judge. A judge should also be courteous to counsel, especially those who are young
and inexperienced and to all those appearing or concerned in the administration of
justice.
NOTE: The lawyer’s duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is essential to the
orderly administration of justice. Hence, in the assertion of the client’s rights, lawyers – even
Page 30 of 163
those gifted with superior intellect, are enjoined to rein up their tempers (Zaldivar v.
Gonzalez, G.R. Nos. 79690-707, Oct. 7, 1988).
CANON 11-RULE 11.04 - A LAWYER SHALL NOT ATTRIBUTE TO A JUDGE MOTIVES

NOT SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD OR HAVE NO MATERIALITY TO THE CASE.
Every citizen has the right to comment upon and criticize the actuations of public
officers. This right is not dismissed by the fact that the criticism is aimed at a judicial
authority, or that it is articulated by a lawyer.
Such right is especially recognized where the criticism concerns a concluded
litigation, because the Court’s actuations are thrown open to public consumption.
Courts thus treat with forbearance and restraint a lawyer who vigorously assails their
actuations for courageous and fearless advocates are the strands that weave
durability into the tapestry of justice.
Post litigation utterances or publications made by lawyers, critical of the courts and
their judicial actuations, whether amounting to a crime or not, which transcend the
permissible bounds of fair comment and legitimate criticism and thereby tend to
bring them into dispute or to subvert public confidence in their integrity and in the
orderly administration of justice, constitute grave professional misconduct which may
be visited with disbarment or other lesser appropriate disciplinary sanctions by the
SC in the exercise of the prerogatives inherent in it as the duly constituted guardian
of the morals and ethics of the legal fraternity (In Re: Almacen, G.R. No. L-27654,
Feb. 18, 1970).
Q: When is public comment and criticism of a court decision permissible and when
would it be improper? (1997 Bar Question)
A: A lawyer, like every citizen, enjoys the right to comment on and criticize the
decision of a court. As an officer of the court, a lawyer is expected not only to
exercise that right but also to consider it his duty to expose the shortcomings and
indiscretions of courts and judges. But such right is subject to the limitations that it
shall be bona fide. It is proper to criticize the courts and judges, but it is improper to
subject them to abuse and slander, degrade them or destroy public confidence in
them. Moreover, a lawyer shall not attribute to a judge motives not supported by the
record or have no materiality in the case (CPR, Rule 11.04).
NOTE: A lawyer should be reminded of his primary duty to assist the court in the
administration of justice. The relations between counsel and judge should be based on mutual
respect and on a deep appreciation by one of the duties of the other. It is upon their cordial
relationship and mutual cooperation that the hope of our people for speedy and efficient
justice rests (Abiera v. Maceda, A.C. No. RTJ-91-660, June 30, 1994). If the court official or
employee or a lawyer is to be disciplined, the evidence against him should be substantial,
competent and derived from direct knowledge, not on mere allegations, conjectures,
suppositions or on the basis of hearsay (Cervantes v. Atty. Sabio, A.C. No. 7828, Aug. 11,
2008).
CANON 11-RULE 11.05 - A LAWYER SHALL SUBMIT GRIEVANCES AGAINST A JUDGE

TO THE PROPER AUTHORITIES ONLY.
Proper venue/forum for the filing of the following cases
If administrative in nature- It shall be filled with the Office of the Court

Administrator of the Supreme Court
Page 31 of 163
If criminal and not purely administrative in nature- It shall be filled with the
Office of the Ombudsman, also with the OCP
If it involves a Justice of the Supreme Court based on impeachable offense-
It must be coursed through the House of Representatives and the Senate in
accordance with the rules on impeachment
NOTE: An administrative complaint is not an appropriate remedy where judicial recourse is still
available, such as a motion for reconsideration, an appeal, or a petition for certiorari, unless
the assailed order or decision is tainted with fraud, malice, or dishonesty (Santiago III v.
Justice Enriquez, Jr., A.M. No. CA-09-47-J, Feb. 13, 2009).
c) Assistance in the speedy and efficient administration of justice
CANON 12 - A LAWYER SHALL EXERT EVERY EFFORT AND CONSIDER IT HIS

DUTY TO ASSIST IN THE SPEEDY AND EFFICIENT ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE.
A lawyer must exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and
efficient administration of justice.
A lawyer is bound by his oath to serve his client with utmost zeal and dedication and
shall conduct himself according to the best of his knowledge and discretion
(Antiquiera, CPR, p. 50).
The filing of another action concerning the same subject matter, in violation of the
doctrine of res judicata, runs contrary to this Canon (Lim v. Montano, A.C. No. 5653,
Feb. 27, 2006).
CANON 12-RULE 12.01 - A LAWYER SHALL NOT APPEAR FOR TRIAL UNLESS HE HAS
ADEQUATELY PREPARED HIMSELF ON THE LAW AND THE FACTS OF HIS CASE, THE
EVIDENCE HE WILL ADDUCE AND THE ORDER OF ITS PREFERENCES. HE SHOULD
ALSO BE READY WITH THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENTS FOR COMPARISON WITH THE
COPIES.
A newly hired counsel who appears in a case in the midstream is presumed and
obliged to acquaint himself with all the antecedent processes and proceedings that
have transpired in the record prior to his takeover (Villasis v. CA, G.R. Nos. L-
36874-76, Sept. 30, 1974).
CANON 12-RULE 12.02 - A LAWYER SHALL NOT FILE MULTIPLE ACTIONS ARISING
FROM THE SAME CAUSE (1991,1997,1998,2002 BAR)
The mere filing of several cases based on the same incident does not necessarily
constitute forum shopping. The question is whether the several actions filed involve
the same transactions, essential facts and circumstances. If they involve essentially
different facts, circumstances and causes of action, there is no forum shopping
(Paredes v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 108251, January 31, 1996).
The essence of forum shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the same
parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the
purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment (Foronda v. Atty. Guerrero, A.C. No.
5469, Aug. 10, 2004).
Page 32 of 163
It is an act of malpractice for it trifles with the courts, abuses their processes,
degrades the administration of justice and adds to the already congested court
dockets. What is critical is the vexation brought upon the courts and the litigants by
a party who asks different courts to rule on the same or related causes and grant the
same or substantially the same relief and in the process creates the possibility of
conflicting decisions being rendered by different forums upon the same issues,
regardless of whether the court, in which one of the suits was brought, has no
jurisdiction over the action (Top Rate Construction and General Services v. Paxton
Devt. Corp., G.R. No. 151081, Sept. 11, 2003).
Possible consequences of forum shopping

1. Summary dismissal without prejudice unless there is a willful or deliberate forum-
shopping (RRC, Sec. 5, Rule 7).
2. Penalty for direct contempt of court on the party and his lawyer in case of willful
and deliberate forum-shopping (RRC, Sec. 5, Rule 7).
3. Criminal action for a false certification of non-forum shopping and indirect
contempt
4. Disciplinary proceedings for the lawyer concerned (RRC, Sec. 5, Rule 7).
CANON 12-RULE 12.03 - A LAWYER SHALL NOT, AFTER OBTAINING EXTENSIONS OF

TIME TO FILE PLEADINGS, MEMORANDA OR BRIEFS, LET THE PERIOD LAPSE
WITHOUT SUBMITTING THE SAME OR OFFERING AN EXPLANATION FOR HIS
FAILURE TO DO SO (2003 BAR)
The court censures the practice of counsels who secure repeated extensions of time
to file their pleadings and thereafter simply let the period lapse without submitting
the pleading or even an explanation or manifestation of their failure to do so
(Achacoso v. CA, G.R. No. L-35867, June 28, 1973).
Asking for extension of time must be in good faith. Otherwise, it is an obstruction of
justice and the lawyer is subject to discipline (CPR Annotated, PhilJA).
The same rule applies more forcefully to motion for continuance. Postponement is
not a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion (Edrial v. Quilat- Quilat, G.R. No.
133625, Sept. 6, 2000).
CANON 12-RULE 12.04 - A LAWYER SHALL NOT UNDULY DELAY A CASE, IMPEDE
THE EXECUTION OF A JUDGEMENT OR MISUSE COURT PROCESSES.
It is understandable for a party to make full use of every conceivable legal defense
the law allows it. However, of such attempts to evade liability to which a party
should respond, it must ever be kept in mind that procedural rules are intended as
an aid to justice, not as means for its frustration.
Once a judgment becomes final and executory, the prevailing party should not be
denied the fruits of his victory by some subterfuge devised by the losing party.
Unjustified delay in the enforcement of a judgment sets at naught the role of the
courts in disposing justiciable controversies with finality (Aguilar v. Manila Banking
Corporation, GR No. 157911, September 19, 2006).
Lawyers should not resort to nor abet the resort of their clients, to a series of actions
and petitions for the purpose of thwarting the execution of a judgment that has long
become final and executory (Cobb-Perez v. Lantin, No. L-22320, May 22, 1968).
Page 33 of 163
The writs of amparo and habeas data are extraordinary remedies which cannot be
used as tools to stall the execution of a final and executory decision in a property
dispute (Castillo v. Cruz, G.R. No. 182165, November 25, 2009).
CANON 12-RULE 12.05 - A LAWYER SHALL REFRAIN FROM TALKING TO HIS

WITNESS DURING A BREAK OR RECESS IN THE TRIAL, WHILE THE WITNESS IS
STILL UNDER EXAMINATION.
The rule is designed to uphold and maintain fair play with the other party and to
prevent the examining lawyer from being tempted to coach his own witness to suit
his purpose.
Guidelines in interviewing witnesses (2001, 2005 Bar Questions)

1. A lawyer may interview a witness in advance of the trial to guide him in the
management of the litigation;
2. A lawyer may also interview a “prospective witness” for the opposing side in any
civil and criminal action without the consent of opposing counsel or party;
3. A lawyer must properly obtain statements from witnesses whose names were
furnished by the opposing counsel or interview the employees of the opposing party
even though they are under subpoena to appear as witnesses for the opposite side;
4. If after trial resulting in defendant’s conviction, his counsel has been advised that
a prosecution witness has committed perjury, it is not only proper but it is the
lawyer’s duty to endeavor honorable means to obtain such witness’ reaction, even
without advising the public prosecutor of his purpose and even though the case is
pending appeal; and
5. An adverse party, though he may be used as a witness, is not however a witness
within the meaning of the rule permitting a lawyer to interview the witness of the
opposing counsel.
NOTE: Although the law does not forbid an attorney to be a witness and at the same time an
attorney in a cause, the courts prefer that counsel should not testify as a witness unless it is
necessary and that they should withdraw from the active management of the case (PNB v. Uy
Teng Piao, G.R. No. L- 35252, Oct. 21, 1932).
CANON 12-RULE 12.06 - A LAWYER SHALL NOT KNOWINGLY ASSIST A WITNESS TO

MISREPRESENT HIMSELF OR TO IMPERSONATE ANOTHER.
Sanctions to a lawyer who instructs a witness to perpetuate

misrepresentation
Art. 184, Revised Penal Code provides: The lawyer who presented a witness knowing
him to be a false witness is criminally liable for “Offering False Testimony in
Evidence.”
Criminal liability of a witness who makes the misrepresentation

The witness who commits the misrepresentation is criminally liable for “False
Testimony” _either under Art. 181, 182 or 183, Revised Penal Code, depending
upon the nature of the case.
CANON 12-RULE 12.07 - A LAWYER SHALL NOT ABUSE, BROWBEAT OR HARASS A

WITNESS NOR NEEDLESSLY INCONVENIENCE HIM.
Page 34 of 163
It must be stressed that in dealing with rape cases of children, especially those below
12 years of age, due care must be observed by the trial court in handling the victim.
In fact, more often than not, the grueling experience in the trial court in the course
of direct examination and cross-examination is more traumatic than the fact of the
rape itself. On such occasions, mishandling of victims lead to psychological
imbalances which, if not properly treated by medical experts, will lead to an
abnormal behavioral response against the idea of sex itself and disturbed interaction
with the opposite or same sex.
By subjecting her into explaining whether she was forced or intimidated is excessive.
It is because proof of force and intimidation is unnecessary in statutory rape.
Considering that there is a medical report substantiating the allegations made by the
victim, the manner of examination of the victim must be tempered. Especially in this
case since the child is only six years old who remains uncorrupted (People v. Boras,
G.R. No. 127495, Dec. 22, 2000).
CANON 12-RULE 12.08 - A LAWYER SHALL AVOID TESTIFYING IN BEHALF OF HIS

CLIENT,EXCEPT:
A) ON FORMAL MATTERS, SUCH AS THE MAILING, AUTHENTICATION OR CUSTODY

OF AN INSTRUMENT, AND THE LIKE, OR
B) ON SUBSTANTIAL MATTERS, IN CASES WHERE HIS TESTIMONY IS ESSENTIAL TO
THE ENDS OF JUSTICE, IN WHICH EVENT HE MUST, DURING HIS TESTIMONY,
ENTRUST THE TRIAL OF THE CASE TO ANOTHER COUNSEL.
The function of a witness is to tell the facts as he recalls them in answer to

questions. The function of an advocate is that of a partisan. It is difficult to
distinguish between the zeal of an advocate and the fairness and impartiality of a
disinterested witness.
Matters to which a lawyer CANNOT testify on (TARCC)

1. When, as an attorney, he is to Testify on the theory of the case;
2. When such would Adversely affect any lawful interest of the client with respect to
which confidence has been reposed on him;
3. Having accepted a Retainer, he cannot be a witness against his client;
4. He cannot serve Conflicting interests; and
5. When he is to violate the Confidence of his client.
Matters to which a lawyer CAN testify on (FETAD)

1. On Formal matters, such as the mailing, authentication or custody of instrument
and the like;
2. Acting as an Expert on his fee;
3. On substantial matters in cases where his Testimony is essential to the ends of
justice, in which event he must, during his testimony, entrust the trial of the case to
another counsel;
4. Acting as an Arbitrator; and
5. Deposition.
d) Reliance on merits of his cause and avoidance of any impropriety which

tends to influence or gives the appearance of influence upon the courts
Page 35 of 163
CANON 13 - A LAWYER SHALL RELY UPON THE MERITS OF HIS CAUSE AND
REFRAIN FROM ANY IMPROPRIETY WHICH TENDS TO INFLUENCE, OR GIVES
THE APPEARANCE OF INFLUENCING THE COURT
It is unethical for a lawyer to give an appearance as if he is capable of influencing

judges and court personnel.
CANON 13-RULE 13.01 - A LAWYER SHALL NOT EXTEND EXTRAORDINARY

ATTENTION OR HOSPITALITY TO, NOR SEEK OPPORTUNITY FOR CULTIVATING
FAMILIARITY WITH JUDGES.
Giving of gifts to the judges is discouraged as it tends to give an appearance of

influencing the conduct of judicial function or breeding familiarity with judges
(Antiquiera, 1992).
It is reprehensible for a lawyer to wrongfully use the name of the law office for the
purpose of “giving more weight and credit to the pleading.” Motions and pleadings
filed in courts are acted upon in accordance with their merits or lack of it, and not on
the reputation of the law firm or the lawyer filing the same (Rodica v. Atty. Lazaro,
et al. A.C. No. 9259, August 23, 2012).
CANON 13-RULE 13.02 - A LAWYER SHALL NOT MAKE PUBLIC STATEMENTS IN THE
MEDIA REGARDING A PENDING CASE TENDING TO AROUSE PUBLIC OPINION FOR
OR AGAINST A PARTY.
Prejudicial Publicity
There must be an allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced,
not simply that they might be, by barrage of publicity (CPR Annotated, PhilJA).
The restriction does not prohibit issuances of statements by public officials charged
with the duty of prosecuting or defending actions in court.
NOTE: In a concluded litigation, a lawyer enjoys a wider latitude to comment on or

criticize the decision of a judge of his actuation. Thus, it has been held that a
newspaper publication tending to impede, obstruct, embarrass or influence the
courts in administering justice in a pending case constitutes criminal contempt, but
the rule is otherwise after the litigation is ended (In re: Loazano, 54 Phil. 801,
July 24, 1930).
Q: Dumbledore, a noted professor of commercial law, wrote an article on the subject

of letters of credit, which was published in the IBP Journal. Assume that he devoted
a significant portion of the article to a commentary on how the Supreme Court
should decide a pending case involving the application of the law on letters of credit.
May he be sanctioned by the Supreme Court? Explain.
A: Yes, Professor Dumbledore may be sanctioned by the Supreme Court. Rule 13.02
of the CPR provides that “a lawyer shall not make public statements in the media
regarding a pending case tending to arouse public opinion for or against a party.”
The Court in a pending litigation must be shielded from embarrassment or influence
in its duty of deciding the case.
Q: Assume Dumbledore did not include any commentary on the case. Assume
further after the Supreme Court decision on the case had attained finality, he wrote
Page 36 of 163
another IBP Journal article, dissecting the decision and explaining why the Supreme
Court erred in all its conclusions. May he be sanctioned by the Supreme Court?
Explain. (2008 Bar Question)
A: He may not be sanctioned by the Supreme Court. Once a case is concluded, the
judge who decided it is subject to the same criticism as any other public official
because his decision becomes public property and is thrown open to public
consumption. The lawyer enjoys a wide latitude in commenting or criticizing the
judge’s decision, provided that such comment or criticism shall be bona fide and not
spill over the bounds of decency and propriety.
CANON 13-RULE 13.03 - A LAWYER SHALL NOT BROOK OR INVITE INTERFERENCE

BY ANOTHER BRANCH OR AGENCY OF THE GOVERNMENT IN THE NORMAL COURSE
OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS.
The reason for this rule is that such action will be contrary to the principle of
separation of powers.
All lawyers must uphold, respect and support the independence of the judiciary. This
independence from interference is made to apply against all branches and agencies
of the government (Funa, 2009).
The Supreme Court accordingly administered a reprimand to Bumanlag for gross

ignorance of law and of the Constitution in having asked the President to set aside by
decree the Court’s decision which suspended him for two years from the practice of
law (De Bumanlag v. Bumanlag, A.M. No. 188, Nov. 29, 1976).
4. To the clients
Necessity of a contract between lawyer and client

The absence of a written contract will not preclude a finding that there is a
professional relationship. Documentary formalism is not an essential element in the
employment of an attorney; the contract may be express or implied.
Three principal types of professional activity of a lawyer (LAP)

1. Legal advice and instructions to clients to inform them of their rights and
obligations;
2. Appearance for clients before public tribunals which possess power and authority
to determine rights of life, liberty, and property according to law, in order to assist in
proper interpretation and enforcement of law; and
3. Preparation for clients of documents requiring knowledge of legal principles not
possessed by ordinary layman (CPR Annotated, PhilJA).
a) Availability of service without discrimination
CANON 14 - A LAWYER SHALL NOT REFUSE HIS SERVICES TO THE NEEDY.
The poor and indigent should not be further disadvantaged by lack of access to the
Philippine legal system.
Lawyer’s right to decline employment (1990, 1993, 2000, 2002, 2006 Bar
Questions)
GR: A lawyer is not obliged to act as legal counsel for any person who may wish to
become his client. He has the right to decline employment.
Page 37 of 163
XPNs:
1. A lawyer shall not refuse his services to the needy (Canon 14).
2. He shall not decline to represent a person solely on account of the latter’s race,
sex, creed or status in life or because of his own opinion regarding the guilt of said
person (Rule 14.01);
3. He shall not decline, except for serious and efficient cause like
a. If he is not in a position to carryout effectively or competently; and
b. If he labors under a conflict of interest between him and the prospective clien.
(Rule 14.03).
Legal aid cases

Legal aid cases are those actions, disputes and controversies that are criminal, civil
and administrative in nature in whatever stage, wherein an indigent and pauper
litigants need legal representation.
Rationale for establishing legal aid services

Legal aid is not a matter of charity. It is a means for the correction of social
imbalances that may and often do lead to injustice, for which reason it is a public
responsibility of the Bar. The spirit of public service should, therefore, underlie all
legal aid offices. The same should be so administered as to give maximum possible
assistance to the indigent and deserving members of the community in all cases,
matters and situations in which legal aid may be necessary to forestall an injustice
(Public Service. Sec. 1 Art. 1 IBP Guidelines on Legal Aid).
Q: Are there instances where a lawyer has the duty to decline employment? (1993
BAR)
A: A lawyer should decline no matter how attractive the fee offered may be if its
acceptance will involve:
(RACCAA)
1. A violation of any of the Rules of the legal profession;
2. Advocacy in any manner in which he had intervened while in the government
service;
3. Nullification of a Contract which he prepared;
4. Employment with a Collection agency which solicits business to collect claims;
5. Employment, the nature of which might easily be used as a means of Advertising
his professional services of his skill; or
6. Any matter in which he knows or has reason to believe that he or his partner will
be an essential witness for the prospective client.
Reasons why a lawyer may not accept a “losing case”
1. The attorney’s signature in every pleading constitutes a certificate by him that

there is good cause to support it and that it is not interposed for delay, and willful
violation of such rule shall subject him to disciplinary action;
2. It is the attorney’s duty to “counsel or maintain such actions or proceedings only
as appears to him to be just and only such defenses as he believes to be honestly
debatable under the law”;
3. A lawyer is not to encourage either the commencement or the continuance of an
action or proceeding, or delay any man’s cause, for any corrupt motive or interest;
and
4. A lawyer must decline to conduct a civil cause or to make a defense when
convinced that it is intended merely to harass or injure the opposite party or to work
oppression or wrong.
Page 38 of 163
Q: Is there an instance when a lawyer may accept losing case? (1996, 2001, 2002,
2005 Bar Questions)
a. In criminal case?
b. In civil case?
A:
a) A lawyer may accept a “losing” criminal case since an accused is presumed to be
innocent until his guilt is proven beyond reasonable doubt. Furthermore, CPR
provides that a lawyer shall not decline to represent a person because of his opinion
regarding the guilt of said person. Otherwise innocent persons might be denied
proper defense (CPR, Rule 14.01).
b) A lawyer may also accept a losing civil case, provided that, in so doing, he must
not engage in dilatory tactics and must advise his client about the prospects and
advantage of settling the case through a compromise to the extent of representing
indigents, defenseless and the oppressed.
(i) Services regardless of a person’s status
CANON 14-RULE 14.01 - A LAWYER SHALL NOT DECLINE TO REPRESENT A PERSON

SOLELY ON ACCOUNT OF THE LATTER’S RACE, SEX, CREED OR STATUS OF LIFE, OR
BECAUSE OF HIS OWN OPINION REGARDING THE GUILT OF SAID PERSON.
Q: Atty. DD’s services were engaged by Mr. BB as defense counsel in a lawsuit. In

the course of the proceedings, Atty. DD discovered that Mr. BB was an agnostic and
a homosexual. By reason thereof, Atty. DD filed a motion to withdraw as counsel
without Mr. BB’s express consent. Is Atty. DD’s motion legally tenable? Reason
briefly. (2004 Bar Question)
A: No. Atty. DD’s motion is not legally tenable. He has no valid cause to terminate
his services. His client, Mr. BB, being an agnostic and homosexual, should not be
deprived of his counsel’s representation solely for that reason.
(ii) Services as counsel de officio
CANON 14-RULE 14.02 - A LAWYER SHALL NOT DECLINE, EXCEPT FOR SERIOUS
AND SUFFICIENT CAUSE, AN APPOINTMENT AS COUNSEL DE OFICIO OR AS AMICUS
CURIAE, OR A REQUEST FROM THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES OR ANY
OF ITS CHAPTERS FOR RENDITION OF FREE LEGAL AID.
A court may assign an attorney to render professional aid free of charge to any party
in case, if upon investigation it appears that the party is destitute and unable to
employ an attorney and that the services of counsel are necessary to secure the
ends of justice and to protect the rights of the party. It shall be the duty of the
attorney so assigned to render the required service, unless he is excused therefrom
by the court for sufficient cause shown (RRC, Sec. 31, Rule 138).
Counsel de oficio
1. Members of the bar in good standing;
2. Any person, resident of the province and of good repute for probity and ability, in
localities without lawyers
Considerations in appointing a counsel de oficio
Page 39 of 163
1. Gravity of offense
2. Difficulty of questions that may arise; and
3. Experience and ability of appointee
The right to counsel must be more than just the presence of a lawyer in the
courtroom or the mere propounding of standard questions and objections. The right
to counsel means that the accused is amply accorded legal assistance extended by a
counsel who commits himself to the cause for the defense and acts accordingly. The
right assumes an active involvement by the lawyer in the proceedings, particularly at
the trial of the case, his bearing constantly in mind of the basic rights of the accused,
his being well-versed on the case, and his knowing the fundamental procedures,
essential laws and existing jurisprudence.
It is never enough that accused be simply informed of his right to counsel; he should
also be asked whether he wants to avail himself of one and should be told that he
can hire a counsel of his own choice if he so desires or that one can be provided to
him at his request.
A counsel de officio is expected to act with utmost diligence. A mere pro-forma

appointment of de officio counsel who fails to genuinely protect the interests of the
accused merits disapprobation. The exacting demands expected of a lawyer should
be no less than stringent when one is a counsel de officio. He must take the case not
as a burden but as an opportunity to assist in the proper dispensation of justice. No
lawyer is to be excused from this responsibility except only for the most compelling
and cogent reasons.
(iii) Valid grounds for refusal
CANON 14-RULE 14.03 - A LAWYER MAY NOT REFUSE TO ACCEPT REPRESENTATION

OF AN INDIGENT CLIENT UNLESS:
A) HE IS IN NO POSITION TO CARRY OUT THE WORK EFFECTIVELY OR
COMPETENTLY;
B) HE LABORS UNDER A CONFLICT OF INTEREST BETWEEN HIM AND THE
PROSPECTIVE CLIENT OR BETWEEN A PRESENT CLIENT AND THE PROSPECTIVE
CLIENT;
Grounds of refusal of appointment to be a Counsel de Oficio

1. Too many de officio cases assigned to the lawyer; (People v. Daeng, G.R. No. L-
34091, Jan. 30, 1973)
2. Conflict of interest; (CPR, Rule 14.03)
3. Lawyer is not in a position to carry out the work effectively or competently;
(supra)
4. Lawyer is prohibited from practicing law by reason of his public office which
prohibits appearances in court; and
5. Lawyer is preoccupied with too many cases which will spell prejudice to the new
clients.
6. Health reasons
7. Extensive travel abroad
NOTE: A lawyer may refuse to handle cases due to these valid reasons. However, Rule 2.02
requires him to give advice on preliminary steps if he is asked until the client secures the
services of counsel. He shall refrain from giving this preliminary advice if there is conflict of
Page 40 of 163
interest between a present client and a prospective one for extending such legal advice will
create and establish an attorney-client relationship between them and may involve a violation
of the rule prohibiting a lawyer from representing conflicting interest.
Q: May a lawyer decline a request for free legal aid to an indigent accused made by a
chapter of the IBP? Explain. (2002 Bar Question)
A: No. Rule 14.02 of the CPR provides that “a lawyer shall not decline, except for
serious and sufficient cause, an appointment as counsel de officio or as amicus
curiae or a request from the IBP or any of its chapter for rendition of free legal aid.”
He may, decline such appointment only for “serious and sufficient cause”.
Q: Will your answer be different if the legal aid is requested in a civil case? (2002
Bar Question)
A: The answer will not be exactly the same, because in a civil case, the lawyer can
also decline if he believes the action or defense to be unmeritorious. He is ethically
bound to maintain only actions and proceedings which appear to him to be just and
only such defenses which he believes to be honestly debatable under the law.
CANON 14-RULE 14.04 - A LAWYER WHO ACCEPTS THE CAUSE OF A PERSON

UNABLE TO PAY HIS PROFESSIONAL FEES SHALL OBSERVE THE SAME STANDARD
OF CONDUCT GOVERNING HIS RELATIONS WITH PAYING CLIENTS (2008 BAR)
**Further, regardless of the agreement Atty. Dajoyag, Jr. had with Ramos with
respect to the payment of his fees, Atty. Dajoyag, Jr. owed it to Ramos to do his
utmost to ensure that every remedy allowed by law is availed of. Rule 14.04 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins every lawyer to devote his full attention,
diligence, skills, and competence to every case that he accepts. Pressure and large
volume of legal work do not excuse Atty. Dajoyag, Jr. for filing the petition for
certiorari out of time.
NOTE: The fact that his services are rendered without remuneration should not occasion a
diminution in his zeal (Ledesma v. Climaco, G.R. No. L-23815, June 28, 1974).
b) Candor, fairness and loyalty to clients
CANON 15 - A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY

IN ALL HIS DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENTS.
A lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the cause of his client. He owes his client full
devotion to his interest, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights.
It demands of an attorney an undivided allegiance, a conspicuous and high degree of
good faith, disinterestedness, candor, fairness, loyalty, fidelity and absolute integrity
in all his dealings and transactions with his clients and an utter renunciation of every
personal advantage conflicting in any way, directly or indirectly, with the interest of
his client (Oparel Sr. v. Abaria, A.C. No. 959, July 30, 1971).
If they find that their client’s cause is defenseless, then it is their bounden duty to
advise the latter to acquiesce and submit rather than to traverse the incontrovertible
(Rollon v. Atty. Naraval, A.C. No. 6424, Mar. 4, 2005)
(i) Confidentiality rule
Page 41 of 163
A lawyer shall preserve the confidences and secrets of his client even after the
attorney-client relation is terminated (CPR, Canon 21).
It is one of the duties of a lawyer, as provided for in the Rules of Court, to maintain
inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself, to preserve the secrets of his
client (RRC, Sec. 20 (e), Rule 138).
(ii) Privileged communications
A privileged communication is one that refers to information transmitted by

voluntary act of disclosure between attorney and client in confidence and by means
of which, in so far as the client is aware, discloses the information to no third person
other than one reasonably necessary for the transmission of the information or the
accomplishment of the purpose for which it was given.
CANON 15-RULE 15.02 - A LAWYER SHALL BE BOUND BY THE RULE ON PRIVILEGE

COMMUNICATION IN RESPECT OF MATTERS DISCLOSED TO HIM BY A PROSPECTIVE
CLIENT (2008 BAR)
Disclosure of a prospective client

The foregoing disqualification rule applies to prospective clients of a lawyer. Matters
disclosed by a prospective client to a lawyer are protected by the rule on privileged
communication even if the prospective client does not thereafter retain the lawyer or
the latter declines the employment. It covers crimes and offenses already committed
by the client.
The reason for this is to make the prospective client free to discuss whatever he
wishes with the lawyer without fear that what he tells the lawyer will be divulged or
used against him, and for the lawyer to be equally free to obtain information from
the prospective client (CPR Annotated, PhilJA).
Requisites of privileged communication
1. There is attorney-client relationship or a kind of consultancy requirement with a
prospective client;
2. The communication was made by the client to the lawyer in the course of the
lawyer’s professional employment; and
3. The communication must be intended to be confidential.
NOTE: The party who avers that the communication is privileged has the burden of proof to
establish the existence of the privilege unless from the face of the document itself, it clearly
appears that it is privileged. The mere allegation that the matter is privileged is not sufficient
(People v. Sleeper, G.R. No. 22783, Dec. 3, 1924; Lapena Jr., 2009).
Client identity
Client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists that revealing the
client’s name would implicate that client in the very activity for which he sought the
lawyer’s advice. (Regala v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 105938, Sept. 20, 1996).
Coverage of the attorney-client privilege

1. Lawyer;
2. Client; and
3. Third persons who by reason of their work have acquired information about the
case being handled such as:
a. Attorney’s secretary, stenographer and clerk;
Page 42 of 163
b. Interpreter, messengers and agents transmitting communication; and

c. An accountant, scientist, physician, engineer who has been hired for effective
consultation. (RRC, Sec. 24(b), Rule 130)
Duration of privileged communication

The privilege continues to exist even after the termination of the attorney-client
relationship.
NOTE: The privilege character of the communication ceases only when waived by the client
himself or after his death, by his heir or legal representative (Lapena, Jr. 2009).
Instances when communication is not privileged

A communication made by a client to a lawyer is not privileged in the following
instances:
1. After pleading has been filed because such becomes part of public records.
2. When communication was intended by the client to be sent to a third person
through his counsel.
3. When the communication sought by client is intended to aid future crime or
perpetration of fraud.
4. When communication between attorney and client is heard by a third party.
5. When there is consent or waiver of the client.
6. When the law requires disclosure.
7. When disclosure is made to protect the lawyer’s rights .
NOTE: Even if the communication is unprivileged, the rule of ethics prohibits lawyers from
voluntarily revealing or using to his benefit or to that of a third person, to the disadvantage of
the client, the said communication unless the client consents thereto (RRC, Sec. 3, Rule 138-
A).
(iii) Conflict of interest

(1991,1992,1993,1994,1997,1999,2000,2001,2002,2003,2004,2005,2006,
2008 BAR)
CANON 15-RULE 15.01 - A LAWYER, IN CONFERRING WITH A PROSPECTIVE CLIENT,

SHALL ASCERTAIN AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE WHETHER THE MATTER WOULD
INVOLVE A CONFLICT WITH ANOTHER CLIENT OR HIS OWN INTEREST, AND IF SO,
SHALL FORTHWITH INFORM THE PROSPECTIVE CLIENT.
Purpose of “conflict search”

By conducting a conflict search, the lawyer will be able to determine, in the first
instance, if he is barred from accepting the representation through conflicts with his
present clients or the lawyer’s own interest (CPR Annotated, PhilJA).
Three tests to determine existence of conflict of interest

1. Conflicting Duties - When, on behalf of one client, it is the attorney’s duty to
contest for that which his duty to another client requires him to oppose or when
possibility of such situation will develop.
2. Invitation of Suspicion - Whether the acceptance of the new relation will prevent a
lawyer from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client
or will invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance
thereof.
3. Use of Prior Knowledge Obtained - Whether a lawyer will be called upon in his new
Page 43 of 163
relation to use against the first client any knowledge acquired in the previous
employment.
Types of conflict of interest

1. Concurrent or multiple representations – Generally occurs when a lawyer
represents clients whose objectives are adverse to each other, no matter how slight
or remote such adverse interest may be.
The tests for concurrent or multiple representations are:

a. Whether a lawyer is duty-bound to fight for an issue or claim in behalf of one
client and, at the same time, to oppose that claim for the other client;
b. Whether the acceptance of a new relation would prevent the full discharge of the
lawyer’s duty of undivided fidelity or loyalty to the client;
c. Whether the acceptance of new relation would invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or
double-dealing in the performance of the lawyer’s duty of undivided fidelity and
loyalty; and
d. Whether, in the acceptance of a new relation, the lawyer would be called upon to
use against a client confidential information acquired through their connection.
2. Sequential or successive representation – Involves representation by a law firm of
a present client who may have an interest adverse to a prior or former client of the
firm. (CPR Annotated, PhilJA)
NOTE: What is material in determining whether there is a conflict of interest in the

representation is probability, not certainty of conflict. (see discussion on disqualification or
limitation of public officials in practicing law, congruent-interest representation conflict and
adverse-interest conflict).
Being a counsel-of-record of the other party is not a requisite to be guilty of

representing conflicting interests
To be guilty of representing conflicting interests, a counsel-of-record of one party
need not also be counsel-of-record of the adverse party. He does not have to publicly
hold himself as the counsel of the adverse party, nor make his efforts to advance the
adverse party's conflicting interests of record --- although these circumstances are
the most obvious and satisfactory proof of the charge. It is enough that the counsel
of one party had a hand in the preparation of the pleading of the other party,
claiming adverse and conflicting interests with that of his original client. To require
that he also be counsel-of-record of the adverse party would punish only the most
obvious form of deceit and reward, with impunity, the highest form of disloyalty
(Artueza v. Atty. Maderazo, A.C. No. 4354, Apr. 22, 2002).
Rule when the lawyer of the corporation and the board of directors of such
corporation is the same
The interest of the corporate client is paramount and should not be influenced by any
interest of the individual corporate officials. A lawyer engaged as counsel for a
corporation cannot represent members of the same corporation's Board of Directors
in a derivative suit brought against them. To do so would be tantamount to
representing conflicting interests which is prohibited by the Code of Professional
Responsibility (Hornilla v. Atty. Salunat, A.C. No. 5804, July 1, 2003).
Q: Six months ago, Atty. Z was consulted by A, about a four-door apartment in

Manila left by her deceased parents. A complained that her two siblings, B and C,
who were occupying two units of the apartment, were collecting the rentals from the
other two units and refusing to give her any part thereof. Atty. Z advised A to first
Page 44 of 163
seek the intervention of her relatives and told her that if this failed, he would take
legal action as A asked him to do. B asks Atty. Z to defend him in a suit brought by A
against him (B) and C through another counsel. Should Atty. Z accept the case?
A: No. When A consulted him about her complaint against B and C, a lawyer-client
relationship was created between A and Atty. Z. Atty. Z cannot subsequently
represent B against A in a matter he was consulted about. This constitutes conflict of
interest. It does not matter if Atty. Z is not handling the case for A.
Q: Should Atty. Z tell B that A consulted him earlier about the same case? Why?
(2002 Bar Question)
A: Yes. Rule 21.07 of the CPR provides that "a lawyer shall not reveal that he has
been consulted about a particular case except to avoid possible conflict of interest.”
In this case, he has to reveal to B that he had been consulted by A on the case that
B if offering to retain his services, in order to avoid a possible conflict of interest.
CANON 15-RULE 15.03 - A LAWYER SHALL NOT REPRESENT CONFLICTING

INTERESTS EXCEPT BY WRITTEN CONSENT OF ALL CONCERNED GIVEN AFTER A
FULL DISCLOSURE OF THE FACTS.
GR: An attorney cannot represent diverse interests. It is highly improper to

represent both sides of an issue. The proscription against representation of
conflicting interest finds application where the conflicting interest arise with respect
to the same general matter and is applicable however slight such adverse interest
may be. It applies although the attorney’s intention and motives were honest and he
acted in good faith.
XPN: Representation of conflicting interest may be allowed where the parties
consent to the representation after full disclosure of facts (Nakpil v. Valdez, A.C. No.
2040, Mar. 4, 1998).
NOTE: A lawyer may at a certain stage of the controversy and before it reaches the court
represent conflicting interests with the express written consent of all parties concerned given
after disclosure of the facts. The disclosure should include an explanation of the effects of the
dual representation, such as the possible revelation or use of confidential information.
An attorney owes loyalty to his client not only in the case in which he has
represented him but also after relation of attorney and client has terminated.
Instances when lawyers cannot represent conflicting interest even if the

consent of both clients were secured
Where the conflict is:
1. Between the attorney’s interest and that of a client; or
2. Between a private client’s interests and that of the government or any of its
instrumentalities.
Effects of representing adverse interests (DJ-FAC)

1. Disqualification as counsel of new client on petition of former client;
2. Where such is unknown to, and becomes prejudicial to the interests of the new
client, a Judgment against such may, on that ground, be set aside;
3. The attorney’s right to Fees may be defeated if found to be related to such conflict
and such was objected to by the former client, or if there was a concealment and
prejudice by reason of the attorney’s previous professional relationship with the
opposite party;
4. A lawyer can be held Administratively liable through disciplinary action and may
Page 45 of 163
be held Criminally liable for betrayal of trust.
CANON 15-RULE 15.04 - A LAWYER MAY, WITH THE WRITTEN CONSENT OF ALL
CONCERNED, ACT AS MEDIATOR, CONCILIATOR OR ARBITRATOR IN SETTLING
DISPUTES.
(iv) Candid and honest advice to clients
CANON 15-RULE 15.05 - A LAWYER WHEN ADVISING HIS CLIENT, SHALL GIVE A
CANDID AND HONEST OPINION ON THE MERITS AND PROBABLE RESULTS OF THE
CLIENT’S CASE, NEITHER OVERSTATING NOR UNDERSTATING THE PROSPECTS OF
THE CASE.
Rule 15.05 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires that lawyers give their
candid and best opinion to their clients on the merit or lack of merit of the case,
neither overstating nor understating their evaluation thereof. Knowing whether a
case would have some prospect of success is not only a function, but also an
obligation on the part of lawyers. If they find that their client's cause is defenseless,
then it is their bounden duty to advise the latter to acquiesce and submit, rather
than to traverse the incontrovertible (Rollon v. Naraval, A.C. No. 6424, Mar. 4,
2005).
CANON 15-RULE 15.06 - A LAWYER SHALL NOT STATE OR IMPLY THAT HE IS ABLE
TO INFLUENCE ANY PUBLIC OFFICIAL, TRIBUNAL OR LEGISLATIVE BODY.
This rule is known as INFLUENCE-PEDDLING. It is improper for a lawyer to show

in any way that he has connections and can influence any tribunal or public official,
judges, prosecutors, congressmen and others, especially so if the purpose is to
enhance his legal standing and to entrench the confidence of the client that his case
or cases are assured of victory.
(v) Compliance with laws
CANON 15-RULE 15.07 - A LAWYER SHALL IMPRESS UPON HIS CLIENT COMPLIANCE
WITH THE LAWS AND PRINCIPLES OF FAIRNESS.
**Rule 15.07 obliges lawyers to impress upon their clients compliance with the laws
and the principle of fairness. To permit lawyers to resort to unscrupulous practices
for the protection of the supposed rights of their clients is to defeat one of the
purposes of the State, the administration of justice. While lawyers owe their entire
devotion to the interest of their clients and zeal in the defense of their client's right,
they should not forget that they are, first and foremost, officers of the court, bound
to exert every effort to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice.
The client's interest is amply protected by the real estate mortgage executed by
complainant. Thus, Atty. Tiamson failed to live up to this expectation (Suzuki v.
Tiamson, A.C. No. 6542, Sept. 30, 2005).
(vi) Concurrent practice of another profession
Page 46 of 163
CANON 15-RULE 15.08 - A LAWYER WHO IS ENGAGED IN ANOTHER PROFESSION

OR OCCUPATION CONCURRENTLY WITH THE PRACTICE OF LAW SHALL MAKE CLEAR
TO HIS CLIENT WHETHER HE IS ACTING AS A LAWYER OR IN ANOTHER CAPACITY.
This rule is intended to avoid confusion; it is for the benefit of both the client and the
lawyer (Funa, 2009).
NOTE: The lawyer should inform the client when he is acting as a lawyer and when he is not,
because certain ethical considerations governing the client-lawyer relationship may be
operative in one case and not in the other (Report of the IBP Committee, p.84).
A party’s engagement of his counsel in another capacity concurrent with the practice
of law is not prohibited, so long as the roles being assumed by such counsel is made
clear to the client (New Sampaguita Builder Construction, Inc. v. Philippine National
Bank, G.R. No. 148753, July 30, 2004).
c) Client’s moneys and properties
CANON 16 - A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND

PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.
Money collected by the lawyer on a judgment favorable to his client constitute trust
funds and should be immediately paid over to the client. While Section 37, Rule 138
of the Rules of Court grants the lawyer a lien upon the funds, documents and papers
of his client, which have lawfully come into his possession, such that he may retain
the same until his lawful fees and disbursements have been paid, and apply such
funds to the satisfaction thereof, the lawyer still has the responsibility to promptly
account to his client for such moneys received. Failure to do so constitutes
professional misconduct.
The lawyer’s failure to turn over such funds, moneys, or properties to the client
despite the latter’s demands give rise to the presumption that the lawyer had
converted the money for his personal use and benefit. This failure also renders the
lawyer vulnerable to judicial contempt under Section 25, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court (CPR Annotated, PhilJA).
Prohibition of a Lawyer acquiring client property

Pursuant to Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Furthermore, Article 1491 of the Civil Code states that:
“The following persons cannot acquire or purchase, even at public or judicial auction, either in
person or through the mediation of another:
xxx
(5) lawyers, with respect to the property and rights which may be the object of any litigation
in which they take part by virtue of their profession.” (see NCC)
NOTE: This prohibition is entirely independent of fraud and such need not be alleged or
proven. Art. 1491 (5) of the NCC applies only if the sale or assignment of the property takes
place during the pendency of the litigation involving the client’s property (Ramos v. Ngaseo,
A.C. No. 6210, Dec. 9, 2004).
Page 47 of 163
(i) Fiduciary relationship
CANON 16-RULE 16.01 - A LAWYER SHALL ACCOUNT FOR ALL MONEY OR PROPERTY
COLLECTED OR RECEIVED FOR OR FROM THE CLIENT.
A lawyer must be scrupulously careful in handling money entrusted to him in his

professional capacity, because of the high degree of fidelity and good faith expected
on his part (Medina v. Bautista, A.C. No. 190, Sept. 26, 1964).
Lawyer’s inexcusable act of withholding the property of client and imposing
unwarranted fees in exchange for release of documents deserve the imposition of
disciplinary action (Miranda v. Carpio, A.C. No. 6281, September 26, 2011).
Q: X sought assistance to the President of the IBP to enable him to talk to Atty. U
who had allegedly been avoiding him for more than a year. Atty. U failed to turn–
over to his client the amount given to him by X as settlement for a civil case. Is Atty.
U guilty for violating Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility?
A: Yes. The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates every lawyer to hold in
trust all money and properties of his client that may come into his possession. A
lawyer’s failure to return upon demand the funds or property held by him on behalf
of his client gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his
own use to the prejudice of, and in violation of the trust reposed in him by, his client.
The relation between attorney and client is highly fiduciary in nature. Being such, it
requires utmost good faith, loyalty, fidelity and disinterestedness on the part of the
attorney. Its fiduciary nature is intended for the protection of the client (Espiritu vs.
Ulep, A.C. No. 5808, May 4, 2005).
Fiduciary duty
The principle that an attorney derives no undue advantage that may operate to the
prejudice or cause an occasion for loss of a client. The relationship between the
lawyer and client is one of mutual trust and confidence of the highest degree.
Instances when civil liability arises

1. Client is prejudiced by lawyer's negligence or misconduct;
2. Breach of fiduciary obligation;
3. Civil liability to third persons;
4. Libelous words in pleadings;
5. violation of communication privilege;
6. Liability for costs of suit (Treble Costs) – when lawyer is made liable for insisting
on client's patently unmeritorious case or interposing appeal merely to delay
litigation
Remedy of the client

Recover property from lawyer, together with its fruits, subject to client’s returning to
his lawyer the purchase price thereof and the legal interests thereon.
Exemption from liability

A lawyer is exempted from liability for slander, libel or for words otherwise
defamatory, published in the course of judicial proceedings, provided the statements
are connected with, relevant, pertinent and material to the cause in hand or subject
of inquiry.
Page 48 of 163
NOTE: Test of relevancy – The matter to which the privilege does not extend must be palpably
wanting in relation to the subject of controversy, that no reasonable man can doubt its
relevancy or propriety.
Criminal liability of lawyers

A lawyer may be held criminally liable if he commits any of the following:
1. Causing prejudice to the client thru malicious breach of professional duty or thru
inexcusable negligence or ignorance;
2. Revealing client’s secrets learned in lawyer’s professional capacity thru malicious
breach of professional duty or inexcusable negligence or ignorance;
3. A lawyer who has undertaken the defense of a client or has received confidential
information from said client in a case may be criminally liable for undertaking
defense of opposing party in same cause without consent of first client; (RPC, Art.
209)
4. A lawyer who shall knowingly introduce in evidence in any judicial proceeding or to
the damage of another or who, with intent to cause such damage, shall use any false
document may be held criminally liable therefor; (RPC, Art. 172) and
5. A lawyer who is appropriates his client’s funds may be held liable for estafa.
NOTE: When a lawyer collects or receives money from his client for a particular purpose, he
should promptly account to the client how the money was spent. His failure either to render an
accounting or to return the money (if the intended purpose of the money does not materialize)
constitutes a blatant disregard of Rule 16.01 of the CPR (Belleza v. Malaca, A.C. No. 7815,
July 23, 2009).
Costs of Suit
GR: Losing client and not the lawyer is liable for costs of suit in favor of prevailing
party, the lawyer not being a party-litigant.
XPN: Where the lawyer insisted on client’s patently unmeritorious case or interposed
an appeal to delay litigation or thwart prompt satisfaction of prevailing party’s just
and valid claim, the court may adjudge lawyer to pay treble costs of suit.
(ii) Commingling of funds
CANON 16-RULE 16.02 - A LAWYER SHALL KEEP THE FUNDS OF EACH CLIENT
SEPARATE AND APART FROM HIS OWN AND THOSE OF OTHERS KEPT BY HIM.
Failure of the lawyer to account all the funds and property of his client which may
come into his possession would amount to misappropriation which may subject him
to disbarment on the ground of grave misconduct or a criminal prosecution for estafa
under Art. 315, par. 1(b) of the RPC.
In dealing with trust property, a lawyer should be very scrupulous. Money or other
trust property of the client coming into the possession of the lawyer should be
reported by the latter and account any circumstances, and should not be
commingled with his own or be used by him (Espiritu v. Cabredo, A.C. No. 5831,
Jan. 13, 2003).
(iii) Delivery of funds
Page 49 of 163
CANON 16-RULE 16.03 - A LAWYER SHALL DELIVER THE FUNDS AND PROPERTY OF
HIS CLIENT WHEN DUE OR UPON DEMAND. HOWEVER, HE SHALL HAVE A LIEN
OVER THE FUNDS AND MAY APPLY SO MUCH THEREOF AS MAY BE NECESSARY TO
SATISFY HIS LAWFUL FEES AND DISBURSEMENTS, GIVING NOTICE PROMPTLY
THEREAFTER TO HIS CLIENT. HE SHALL ALSO HAVE A LIEN TO THE SAME EXTENT
ON ALL JUDGEMENTS AND EXECUTIONS HE HAS SECURED FOR HIS CLIENT AS
PROVIDED FOR IN THE RULES OF COURT.
Counsel cannot unilaterally retain client’s property for his attorney’s lien
A counsel has no right to retain or appropriate unilaterally as lawyer’s lien any
amount belonging to his client which may come into his possession (Cabigao v.
Rodrigo, Aug. 9, 1932).
NOTE: While this rule provides that the lawyer has the right to retain the funds of his client as
may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements known as attorney’s lien and
his lien to the same extent on all judgments and executions he has secured for his client called
charging lien, he is still duty bound to render an accounting of his client’s funds and property
which may come into his possession in the course of his professional employment In the
application of attorney’s lien, a lawyer shall give notice to his client otherwise, the same might
be construed as misappropriation which may subject him to disciplinary action (Antiquiera,
2007).
(iv) Borrowing or lending
CANON 16-RULE 16.04 - A LAWYER SHALL NOT BORROW MONEY FROM HIS CLIENT
UNLESS THE CLIENT’S INTERESTS ARE FULLY PROTECTED BY THE NATURE OF THE
CASE OR BY INDEPENDENT ADVICE. NEITHER SHALL A LAWYER LEND MONEY TO A
CLIENT EXCEPT, WHEN IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE, HE HAS TO ADVANCE
NECESSARY EXPENSES IN A LEGAL MATTER HE IS HANDLING FOR THE CLIENT.
Prohibition from borrowing money from client

GR: A lawyer is not allowed to borrow money from his client.
XPN: The client’s interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by
independent advice.
Prohibition of lending money to client

GR: A lawyer is not allowed to lend money to his client.
XPN: When in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a
legal matter he is handling for the client (CPR, Rule 16.04).
NOTE: Prohibition from lending is intended to assure the lawyer’s independent professional
judgment, for if the lawyer acquires a financial interest in the outcome of the case the free
exercise of his judgment may be adversely affected. The principle behind Rule 16.04 is to
prevent the lawyer from taking advantage of his influence over the client or to avoid acquiring
a financial interest in the outcome of the case.
d) Fidelity to client’s cause
CANON 17 - A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND

HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.
Page 50 of 163
Q: Matias Lagramada residing with his uncle, Apolonio Lagramada, was invited by
the latter to accompany him to the police station, supposedly to pick up a
refrigerator they were to repair. Upon their arrival there, Matias was immediately
taken in and locked behind bars. Two information were filed against him only 10
months after the first day of his incarceration. With the assistance of counsel, Matias
pleaded not guilty when arraigned, without raising the invalidity of the arrest. Was
the case properly handled?
A: No. Lawyers owe fidelity to the cause of their clients and must be mindful of the
trust and confidence reposed in them. Matias’ counsel, in the spirit of safeguarding
his client’s rights, should have taken the necessary steps to correct the situation.
However, he allowed his client to enter a plea during the latter’s arraignment without
raising the invalidity of arrest. Thus, the former effectively waived his client’s right to
question its validity. Defense counsels are expected to spare no effort to save the
accused from unrighteous incarcerations.
Matias’ counsel should have not only perfunctorily represented his client during the
pendency of the case, but should have kept in mind his duty to render effective legal
assistance and true service by protecting the latter’s rights at all times (People v.
Lagramada, G.R. Nos. 146357 & 148170, Aug. 29, 2002).
e) Competence and diligence
CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND

DILIGENCE.
Diligence is the attention and care required of a person in a given situation and is the
opposite of negligence. It is axiomatic in the practice of law that the price of success
is eternal diligence to the cause of the client (Edquibal v. Ferrer, A.C. No. 5687, Feb.
3, 2005).
Degree of diligence required in the profession

The legal profession demands of a lawyer that degree of vigilance and attention of a
good father of a family (Lapena, 2009) or ordinary pater familias (Pineda, 2009). He
is not required to exercise extraordinary diligence (Edquibal v. Ferrer, Jr., A.C. No.
5687, Feb. 3, 2005).
(i) Adequate preparation
CANON 18-RULE 18.02 - A LAWYER SHALL NOT HANDLE ANY LEGAL MATTER
WITHOUT ADEQUATE PREPARATION.
A lawyer should prepare his pleadings with great care and circumspection. He should
refrain from using abrasive and offensive language, for it merely weakens rather
than strengthens the force of legal reasoning and detracts from its persuasiveness.
In preparing a complaint for damages, counsel for plaintiff should allege and state
the specific amounts claimed not only in the body of the complaint but also in the
prayer, so that the proper docket fees can be assessed and paid (Fernandez v. Atty.
Novero, A.C. No. 5394, Dec. 2, 2002).
The counsel must constantly keep in mind that his actions or omissions, even
malfeasance and nonfeasance would be binding to his client. Verily, a lawyer owes to
the client the exercise of utmost prudence and responsibility in representation
(Fernandez v. Atty. Novero, A.C. No. 5394, Dec. 2, 2002).
Page 51 of 163
(ii) Negligence
CANON 18-RULE 18.03 - A LAWYER SHALL NOT NEGLECT A LEGAL MATTER

ENTRUSTED TO HIM, AND HIS NEGLIGENCE IN CONNECTION THERE WITH SHALL
RENDER HIM LIABLE (1998,2002)
A lawyer is enjoined not to neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. It is the duty of the
lawyer to serve his client with competence and diligence and he should exert his best
efforts to protect within the bounds of the law, the interest of his client (Vda. De
Enriquez v. San Jose, 516 SCRA 486, 2007).
Negligence of a lawyer
What amounts to carelessness or negligence in a lawyer’s discharge of his duty to
client is incapable of exact formulation. It will depend upon the circumstances of the
case. Also, when he failed to comply with the clear provisions of the law and the
rules.
Instances of negligence by attorneys

Failure to appeal to CA despite instructions by the client to do so constitutes
inexcusable negligence on the part of the counsel (Abiero v. Juanino, A.C. No. 5302,
Feb.18, 2005).
Even if a lawyer was "honestly and sincerely" protecting the interests of his client,
the former still had no right to waive the appeal without the latter's knowledge and
consent (Abay v. Atty. Montesino, A.C. No. 5718, Dec. 4, 2003).
Q: As an incident in the main case, Velasquez appointed his counsel as attorney-in-

fact to represent him at the pre-trial. Counsel failed to appear, hence Velasquez was
declared in default. The order of default was received by counsel but no steps were
taken to have it lifted or set aside. Decide.
A: It is binding on Velasquez who is himself guilty of negligence when, after
executing the special power of attorney in favor of his lawyer, he left for abroad and
apparently paid no further attention to his case until he received the decision. There
is therefore no fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence which will warrant a
lifting of the order of default. As a general rule, a client is bound by the mistakes of
his counsel; more so by the result of his own negligence
Q: Are the mistakes or negligence of a lawyer binding upon the client? (1998, 2000,
2002 Bar Questions)
GR: Client is bound by attorney’s conduct, negligence and mistake in handling a case
or in the management of litigation and in procedural technique, and he cannot
complain that the result might have been different had his lawyer proceeded
differently.
XPNs: (LIPIG)
1. Lack of acquaintance with technical aspect of procedure;
2. When adherence thereto results in outright deprivation of client’s liberty or
property or where Interest of justice so requires;
3. Where error by counsel is Purely technical which does not substantially affect
client’s cause;
4. Ignorance, incompetence, or inexperience of lawyer is so great and error so
serious that client, who has a good cause, is prejudiced and denied a day in court;
5. Gross negligence of lawyer.
Page 52 of 163
NOTE: If by reason of the lawyer’s negligence, actual loss has been caused to his client, the
latter has a cause of action against him for damages. However, for the lawyer to be held
liable, his failure to exercise reasonable care, skill and diligence must be proximate cause of
the loss.
(iii) Collaborating counsel
CANON 18-RULE 18.01 - A LAWYER SHALL NOT UNDERTAKE A LEGAL SERVICE

WHICH HE KNOWS OR SHOULD KNOW THAT HE IS NOT QUALIFIED TO RENDER.
HOWEVER, HE MAY RENDER SUCH SERVICE IF, WITH THE CONSENT OF HIS CLIENT,
HE CAN OBTAIN AS COLLABORATING COUNSEL A LAWYER WHO IS COMPETENT ON
THE MATTER.
The lawyer’s acceptance, whether for a fee or not, is an implied representation that
he possesses the requisite degree of academic learning, skill and ability to handle the
case.
He is therefore directed not to take legal services, which he knows or should know he
is not qualified or competent to render except if his client consents, the lawyer can
take as collaborating counsel another lawyer who is competent on the matter.
(iv) Duty to apprise client
CANON 18-RULE 18.04 - A LAWYER SHALL KEEP THE CLIENT INFORMED OF THE
STATUS OF HIS CASE AND SHALL RESPOND WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME TO
CLIENT’S REQUEST FOR INFORMATION.
A lawyer should notify his client of the adverse decision while within the period to
appeal to enable the client to decide whether to seek an appellate review. He should
communicate with him concerning the withdrawal of appeal with all its adverse
consequences. The client is entitled to the fullest disclosure of the mode or manner
by which his interest is defended or why certain steps are taken or omitted.
NOTE: The lawyer is obliged to respond within a reasonable time to a client's request for
information. A client is entitled to the fullest disclosure of the mode or manner by which that
client's interest is defended or why certain steps are taken or omitted. A lawyer who
repeatedly fails to answer the inquiries or communications of a client violates the rules of
professional courtesy and neglects the client's interests (Villariasa-Reisenbeck v. Abarrientos,
A.C. No. 6238, Nov. 4, 2004).
Doctrine of imputed knowledge

The knowledge acquired by an attorney during the time that he is acting within the
scope of his authority is imputed to the client. It is based on the assumption that an
attorney, who has notice of matter affecting his client, has communicated the same
to his principal in the course of professional dealings.
NOTE: The doctrine applies regardless of whether or not the lawyer actually communicated to
the client what he learned in his professional capacity, the attorney and his client being one
judicial person.
Notice to counsel is notice to client, but not vice versa if the latter appeared
Page 53 of 163
by attorney
GR: The law requires that service of any notice upon a party who has appeared by
attorney shall be made upon his attorney. Notice sent to a party who has appeared
by counsel is not notice in law, it being immaterial that the client actually received
the notice or volunteered to get a copy thereof.
XPNs:
1. Strict application might foster dangerous collusion to the detriment of justice;
2. Service of notice upon party instead of upon his attorney is ordered by the court;
3. Notice of pre-trial is required to be served upon parties and their respective
lawyers;
4. In appeal from the lower court to the RTC, upon docketing of appeal.
f) Representation with zeal within legal bounds
CANON 19 - A LAWYER SHALL REPRESENT HIS CLIENT WITH ZEAL WITHIN

THE BOUNDS OF THE LAW.
Authority to appear in court is presumed

GR: A lawyer is presumed to be properly authorized to represent any cause in which
he appears.
XPN: On motion of either party and on reasonable grounds, the presiding judge may
require an attorney to prove the authority under which he appears (RRC, Rule 138,
Sec. 21).
Voluntary appearance of lawyer without authority

An attorney may not appear for a person until he is in fact employed by, or retained
for such person. An attorney willfully appearing in court for a person without being
employed, unless by leave of court, may be punished for contempt as an officer of
the court, who has misbehaved in his official transactions (Rule 138, Sec. 26).
Effects of unauthorized appearance

1. The party represented is not bound by attorney’s appearance in the case neither
by the judgment rendered therein;
2. Court does not acquire jurisdiction over the person of the party represented;
3. The adverse party who has been forced to litigate as a defendant by the
unauthorized action on the part of the attorney for the plaintiff may, on that ground,
move for the dismissal of the complaint; and
4. If unauthorized appearance is willful, attorney may be cited for contempt as an
officer of the court who has misbehaved in his official transactions, and he may be
disciplined for professional misconduct.
Ratification of unauthorized appearance

1. Express – Categorized assertion by client that he has authorized a lawyer or that
he confirms his authorization to represent him in the case.
2. Implied – Where party with knowledge of fact that a lawyer has been representing
him in a case, accepts benefits of representation or fails to promptly repudiate the
assumed authority.
Requisites of implied ratification by silence

1. The party represented by the attorney is of age or competent or if he suffers from
any disability, he has a duly appointed guardian or legal representative;
2. The party or his guardian, as the case may be, is aware of the attorney’s
Page 54 of 163
representation; and
3. He fails to promptly repudiate assumed authority.
Extent of lawyer’s authority in litigation

A lawyer has authority to bind the client in all matters of ordinary judicial procedure.
The cause of action, the claim or demand sued upon and the subject matter of the
litigation are within the exclusive control of the client. A client may waive, surrender,
dismiss, or compromise any of his rights involved in litigation in favor of the other
party even without or against the consent of his attorney.
(i) Use of fair and honest means
CANON 19-RULE 19.01 - A LAWYER SHALL EMPLOY ONLY FAIR AND HONEST MEANS
TO ATTAIN THE LAWFUL OBJECTIVES OF HIS CLIENT AND SHALL NOT PRESENT,
PARTICIPATE IN PRESENTING OR THREATEN TO PRESENT UNFOUNDED CRIMINAL
CHARGES TO OBTAIN AN IMPROPER ADVANTAGE IN ANY CASE OR PROCEEDING
(1997 BAR)
Rule 19.01 of the CPR obligates a lawyer, in defending his client, to employ only such
means as are consistent with truth and honor. He should not prosecute patently
frivolous and meritless appeals or institute clearly groundless actions. The act of a
lawyer in preventing the execution of the judgment against his clients shows that he
actually committed what the above rule expressly prohibits (Que v. Revilla, A.C. No.
7054, Dec. 4, 2009).
Under this rule, a lawyer should not file or threaten to file any unfounded or baseless
criminal case or cases against the adversaries of his client designed to secure a
leverage to compel the adversaries to yield or withdraw their own cases against the
lawyer’s client.
(ii) Client’s fraud
CANON 19-RULE 19.02 - A LAWYER WHO HAS RECEIVED INFORMATION THAT HIS
CLIENT HAS, IN THE COURSE OF THE REPRESENTATION, PERPETRATED A FRAUD
UPON A PERSON OR TRIBUNAL, SHALL PROMPTLY CALL UPON THE CLIENT TO
RECTIFY THE SAME, AND FAILING WHICH HE SHALL TERMINATE THE RELATIONSHIP
WITH SUCH CLIENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RULES OF COURT(2001 BAR)
The lawyer’s duty to his client does not mean freedom to set up false or fraudulent
claims especially with respect to provisions of law or administrative rules and that
while lawyers are bound to exert utmost legal skill in prosecuting their client’s cause
or defending it, their duty, first and foremost, is to the administration of justice (CPR
Annotated, PhilJA).
NOTE: It is an unethical tactic for a lawyer to offer monetary rewards to anyone who could
give him information against a party so that he could have leverage against all actions
involving such party (CPR Annotated, PhilJA).
(iii) Procedure in handling the case
CANON 19-RULE 19.03 - A LAWYER SHALL NOT ALLOW HIS CLIENT TO DICTATE THE
PROCEDURE ON HANDLING THE CASE.
Page 55 of 163
Who has control over the case

1. As to matters of procedure - it is the client who yields to the lawyer and not the
lawyer yielding to the client (Lapena 2009).
NOTE: The basis of this rule is that the lawyer is better trained and skilled in law.
2. As to subject matter - the client is in control.
NOTE: Cause of action, claim or demand, and subject of litigation are within client’s control.
Proceedings to enforce the remedy are within the exclusive control of the attorney.
Authority of counsel to compromise

GR: The attorney has no authority to compromise his client’s case. This is so
because the client, even if represented by counsel, retains exclusive control over the
subject matter of the litigation. The client can, of course, authorize his lawyer to
compromise his case, and the settlement made by the lawyer will bind his client.
XPNs:
1. When the lawyer is confronted with an emergency where prompt and urgent
action is necessary to protect the interest of his client and there is no opportunity for
consultation with the latter.
2. Settlement of Monetary Obligation to client is full payment in cash.
NOTE: Compromise is a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid
litigation or put an end to one already commenced (NCC, Art. 2028).
Duty of the lawyer in gathering information regarding the case

The lawyer cannot entirely depend on the information his client gave or the time his
client wished to give. The lawyer should take more control over handling the case.
Where the client is based overseas, the lawyer should with more reason, have
moved to secure all the legal means available to him either to continue representing
his client effectively or to make the necessary manifestation in court, with the client’s
conformity, that he was withdrawing as counsel of record (CPR Annotated, PhilJA).
Appearance
It is the coming into court as a party either as a plaintiff or as a defendant and
asking relief therefrom.
Kinds of appearance
1. General appearance – When a party comes to court either as plaintiff or defendant
and seeks general reliefs from the court for satisfaction of his claims or
counterclaims respectively.
2. Special appearance – When a defendant appears in court solely for the purpose of
objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over his person.
NOTE: By virtue of Sec. 20, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, there is no more
distinction between general appearance and special appearance, in the sense that a defendant
may file a motion to dismiss not only on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over his person but
also on some other grounds without waiving the jurisdiction of the court over his person.
Entry of appearance v. Appearance of counsel

Entry of appearance is the written manifestation submitted by the counsel of record
to inform the court that he will act as the counsel of a party made before the date of
the hearing while appearance is the verbal manifestation of the counsel in order for
the court to recognize his presence during the hearing of the case. (Sec.21, Rule
138, Rules of Court).
Page 56 of 163
g) Attorney’s fees (1990,1991,1992,1994,1995,1997,1998,2005,2006,2007

BAR)
CANON 20 - A LAWYER SHALL CHARGE ONLY FAIR AND REASONABLE FEES.
GR: Only lawyers are entitled to attorney’s fees. The same cannot be shared with a
non-lawyer. It is unethical.
XPNs: A lawyer may divide a fee for legal services with persons not licensed to
practice law: (CPR)
1. A lawyer undertakes to Complete the unfinished legal business of a deceased
lawyer;
2. There is a Pre-existing agreement with a partner or associate that, upon the
latter’s death, money shall be paid over a reasonable period of time to his estate or
to persons specified in the agreement;
3. A lawyer or law firm includes non-lawyer employees in Retirement plan, even if
the plan is based, in whole or in part, on a profit-sharing agreement. (CPR, Rule
9.02)
NOTE: Entitlement to lawyer’s fees is presumed (Funa, 2009). Unless otherwise expressly
stipulated, rendition of professional services by a lawyer is for a fee or compensation and is
not gratuitous (Research and Services Realty, Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. 124074, Jan. 27,1997).
CANON 20-RULE 20.01 - A LAWYER SHALL BE GUIDED BY THE FOLLOWING

FACTORS IN DETERMINING HIS FEES:
A) THE TIME SPENT AND THE EXTENT OF THE SERVICES RENDERED OR REQUIRED;
B) THE NOVELTY AND DIFFICULTY OF THE QUESTIONS INVOLVED;
C) THE IMPORTANCE OF THE SUBJECT MATTER;
D) THE SKILL DEMANDED;
E) THE PROBABILITY OF LOSING OTHER EMPLOYMENT AS A RESULT OF
ACCEPTANCE OF THE PROFFERED CASE;
F) THE CUSTOMARY CHARGES FOR SIMILAR SERVICES AND THE SCHEDULE OF
FEES OF THE IBP CHAPTER TO WHICH HE BELONGS;
G) THE AMOUNT INVOLVED IN THE CONTROVERSY AND THE BENEFITS RESULTING
TO THE CLIENT FORM THE SERVICE;
H) THE CONTINGENCY OR CERTAINTY OF COMPENSATION;
I) THE CHARACTER OF THE EMPLOYMENT, WHETHER OCCASIONAL OR
ESTABLISHED; AND
J) THE PROFESSIONAL STANDING OF THE LAWYER.
NOTE: Generally, the amount of attorney’s fees due is that stipulated in the retainer
agreement which is conclusive as to the amount of lawyer’s compensation (Funa, 2009) unless
the stipulated amount in the written contract is found by the court to be unconscionable or
unreasonable (Sec. 24, Rule 138, RRC). In the absence thereof, the amount of attorney’s fees
is fixed on the basis of quantum meruit (Sesbreno v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 117438, June
8,1995; Funa, 2009).
Kinds of payment
1. Fixed or absolute fee that which is payable regardless of the result of the case.
a. A fixed fee payable per appearance
b. A fixed fee computed upon the number of hours spent
c. A fixed fee based on piece work
d. Combination of any of the above
Page 57 of 163
2. Contingent fee – a fee that is conditioned on the securing of a favorable judgment

and recovery of money or property and the amount of which may be on a percentage
basis.
Requisites for the accrual of attorney’s fees

1. Existence of attorney-client relationship; and
2. Rendition by the lawyer of services to the client.
NOTE: A pauper, while exempted from payment of legal fees is not exempted from payment of
attorney’s fees (Cristobal v. Employees Compensation Commission, G.R. No. L-49280, Feb.
26, 1981).
Factors in determining the attorney’s fees (1994 Bar Question)

In determining what is fair and reasonable, a lawyer shall be guided by the following
factors: (STIP-SNACCC)
1. Skill demanded;
2. Time spent and the extent of the services rendered or required;
3. Importance of the subject matter;
4. Probability of losing other employment as a result of acceptance of the proffered
case;
5. Professional Standing of the lawyer;
6. Novelty and difficulty of the questions involved;
7. Amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client from
the services;
8. Customary Charges for similar services and the schedule of fees of the IBP
chapter to which he belongs;
9. Contingency or certainty of compensation; and
10. Character of the employment, whether occasional or established. (Rule 20.01)
NOTE: Imposition of interest in the payment of attorney’s fees is not justified (Funa, 2009).
Contracts for attorney’s services in this jurisdiction stands upon an entirely different
footing from other contract for the payment of compensation for any other services
(Mambulao Lumber Co. v. Philippine National Bank, 130 Phil. 366).
NOTE: No court shall be bound by the opinion of attorneys as expert witnesses as to the
proper compensation, and may disregard such testimony and base its conclusion on its
professional knowledge. A written contract for services shall control the amount to be paid
therefor, unless found by the court to be unconscionable or unreasonable (RRC, Sec. 24, Rule
138).
Factors to consider in determining the amount of attorney’s fees in the

absence of any fee arrangement (TINS)
1. Time spent and the services rendered or required – A lawyer is justified in fixing
higher fees when the case is so complicated and requires more time and effort in
fixing it.
2. Importance of subject matter – The more important the subject matter or the
bigger the value of the interest of the property in litigation, the higher is the
attorney’s fees.
3. Novelty and difficulty of questions involved – When the questions in a case are
novel and difficult, greater effort, deeper study and research are bound to burn the
lawyer’s time and stamina considering that there are no local precedents to rely
upon.
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4. Skill demanded of a lawyer – The totality of the lawyer’s experience provides him
skill and competence admired in lawyers.
Different types of fee arrangements

1. Retainer’s fee where the lawyer is paid for services for an agreed amount for the
case.
2. The lawyer agrees to be paid per court appearance.
3. Contingent fee where the lawyer is paid for his services depending on the success
of the case. This applies usually in civil suits for money or property where the
lawyer’s fee is taken from the award granted by the court.
4. Attorney de officio. The attorney is appointed by the court to defend the indigent
litigant in a criminal case. The client is not bound to pay the attorney for his services
although he may be paid a nominal fee taken from a public fund appropriated for the
purpose.
5. Legal aid. The attorney renders legal services for those who could not afford to
engage the services of paid counsel.
6. Quantum meruit basis. If there is no specific contract between the lawyer and the
client, the lawyer is paid on quantum meruit basis, that is, what the lawyer deserves
for his services.
Kinds of Retainer Agreements on Attorney’s Fees

1. General retainer or retaining fee – It is the fee paid to a lawyer to secure his
future services as general counsel for any ordinary legal problem that may arise in
the ordinary business of the client and referred to him for legal action. The client
pays fixed retainer fees, which could be monthly or otherwise. The fees are paid
whether or not there are cases referred to the lawyer;
2. Special retainer – It is a fee for a specific or particular case or service rendered by
the lawyer for a client.
Q: Atty. Francisco’s retainer agreement with RXU said that his attorney's fees in its
case against CRP “shall be 15% of the amounts collected.” Atty. Francisco asked the
trial court to issue a temporary restraining order against CRP but this was denied,
prompting him to file a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals to question
the order of denial. At this point, RXU terminated Atty. Francisco’s services. When
the parties later settled their dispute amicably, CRP paid RXU P100 million. Because
of this, Atty. Francisco came around and claimed a 15% share in the amount. What
should be his attorney’s fees? (2011 Bar Question)
A: A reasonable amount that the court shall fix upon proof of quantum meruit which
means “as much as he deserves”.
Instances when the measure of quantum meruit may be resorted to (2007

Bar Question)
1. There is no express contract for payment of attorney’s fees agreed upon between
the lawyer and the client;
2. Although there is a formal contract for attorney’s fees, the stipulated fees are
found unconscionable or unreasonable by the court;
3. The contract for attorney’s fees is void due to purely formal matters or defects of
execution;
4. The counsel, for justifiable cause, was not able to finish the case to its conclusion;
5. Lawyer and client disregard the contract for attorney’s fees; and
6. The client dismissed his counsel before the termination of the case.
Page 59 of 163
Q: A client refuses to pay Atty. A his contracted attorney's fees on the ground that
counsel did not wish to intervene in the process of effecting a fair settlement of the
case. Decide. (2001 Bar Question)
A: Rule 1.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that "a lawyer shall
encourage his clients to avoid, end or settle a controversy if it will admit of a fair
settlement". If a lawyer should refuse to intervene in a settlement proceeding, his
entitlement to his attorney's fees may be affected. However, if he has already
rendered some valuable services to the client, he must be paid his attorney's fees on
the basis of quantum meruit, even if it is assumed that he is dismissed.
Instances when counsel cannot recover the full amount despite written
contract for attorneys’ fees (2006 Bar Question)
1. When the services called for were not performed as when the lawyer withdrew
before the case was finished, he will be allowed only reasonable fees
2. When there is a justified dismissal of the attorney, the contract will be nullified
and payment will be on the basis of quantum meruit only. A contrary stipulation will
be invalid
3. When the stipulated attorney’s fees are unconscionable, when it is
disproportionate as compared to the value of services rendered and is revolting to
human conscience;
4. When the stipulated attorney’s fees are in excess of what is expressly provided by
law;
5. When the lawyer is guilty of fraud or bad faith toward his client in the matter of
his employment;
6. When the counsel’s services are worthless because of his negligence;
7. When contract is contrary to law, morals or public policy; and
8. Serving adverse interest unless the lawyer proves that it was with the consent of
both parties.
Rationale behind the rule that the court may reduce unconscionable
attorney’s fees
1. Indubitably intertwined with the lawyer’s duty to charge only reasonable fees is
the power of the court to reduce the amount of attorney’s fees if the same is
excessive and unconscionable (Roxas v. De Zuzuarregui, Jr., G. R. No. 152072, Jan.
31, 2006).;
2. A lawyer is primarily an officer of the court hence fees should be subject to judicial
control;
3. Sound public policy demands that courts disregard stipulations for attorney’s fees
when they appear to be a source of speculative profit at the expense of the debtor or
mortgagor (Borcena v. IAC, et. al., G.R. No. 70099, Jan. 7, 1987).
NOTE: A trial judge may not order the reduction of the attorney’s fees on the ground that the
attorney is “below average standard of a lawyer.” The opinion of the judge as to the capacity
of a lawyer is not a basis of the right to a lawyer’s fees (Fernandez v. Hon. Bello, No. L-14277,
Apr. 30, 1960).
(i) Acceptance fees
An acceptance fee is not a contingent fee, but is an absolute fee arrangement which
entitles a lawyer to get paid for his efforts regardless of the outcome of the litigation.
Dissatisfaction from the outcome of the cases would not render void the retainer
agreement for Atty. Jack appears to have represented the interest of Rose (Yu v
Bondal, A.C. No. 5534, Jan. 17, 2005).
Page 60 of 163
NOTE: The expiration of the retainer contract between the parties during the pendency of the
labor case does not extinguish the respondent’s right to attorney’s fees (Uy v. Gonzales, A.C.
No. 5280, Mar. 30, 2004).
(ii) Contingency fee arrangements
Contingency fee contract

One which stipulates that the lawyer will be paid for his legal services only if the suit
or litigation ends favorably to the client (Taganas vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 118746,
September 7, 1995). It is like a contract subject to a suspensive condition wherein
the obligation to pay the counsel is based upon the outcome of the case.
Contingent fees are sanctioned by the CPE and by the CPR subject to certain
limitations (Licudan vs. CA, G.R. No. 91958, January 24, 1991).
NOTE: If a lawyer employed on contingent basis dies or becomes disabled before the final
adjudication or settlement of the case has been obtained, he or his estate will be allowed to
recover the reasonable value of the services rendered. The recovery will be allowed only after
the successful termination of the litigation in the client’s favor (Morton v. Forsee, Ann. Cas.
1914 D. 197; Lapena, 2009, Pineda, 2009).
Rationale for contingent fee contracts

Contracts of this nature (contingent fee contract) are permitted because they
redound to the benefit of the poor client and the lawyer especially in cases where the
client has meritorious cause of action, but no means with which to pay for the legal
services unless he can, with the sanction of law, make a contract for a contingent fee
to be paid out of the proceeds of the litigation (Francisco, 1949)
Limitation of the stipulation regarding contingent fee contract

It must be reasonable based on the circumstance of the case. Contingent fee
contracts are under the supervision and close scrutiny of the court in order that
clients may be protected from just charges. Its validity depends on the measure of
reasonableness of the stipulated fees under the circumstances of the case. Stipulated
attorney’s fees must not be unconscionable wherein the amount is by far so
disproportionate compared to the value of the services rendered as to amount to
fraud perpetrated to the client (Sesbreno vs. CA, G.R. No. 117438, June 8, 1995).
Q: The stipulation between the lawyer and counsel is as follows, “the attorney’s fees
of the Atty. X will be . of whatever the client might recover from his share in the
property subject of the litigation.” Is the stipulation valid?
A: Yes. The stipulation made is one of a contingent fee which is allowed by the CPE
and the CPR. It does not violate the prohibition of acquisition of property subject of
the litigation by the lawyer provided for in the Civil Code since the prohibition applies
only to a sale or assignment to the lawyer by his client during the pendency of the
litigation. The transfer actually takes effect after the finality of the judgment and not
during the pendency of the case. As such it is valid stipulation between the lawyer
and client.
Acceptance of an initial fee before or during the progress of the litigation

detract from the contingent nature of the fees
The acceptance of an initial fee before or during the progress of the litigation does
not detract from the contingent nature of the fees, as long as the bulk thereof is
made dependent upon the successful outcome of the action (Francisco vs. Matias,
January 31, 1964, G.R. No. L-16349).
Page 61 of 163
Q: Chester asked Laarni to handle his claim to a sizeable parcel of land in Quezon
City against a well-known property developer on a contingent fee basis. Laarni asked
for 15% of the land that may be recovered or 15% of whatever monetary settlement
that may be received from the property developer as her only fee contingent upon
securing a favorable final judgment or compromise settlement. Chester signed the
contingent fee agreement. Assume the property developer settled the case after the
case was decided by the Regional Trial Court in favor of Chester for P1 Billion.
Chester refused to pay Laarni P150 Million on the ground that it is excessive. Is the
refusal justified? Explain.
A: The refusal of Chester to pay is unjustified. A contingent fee is impliedly
sanctioned by Rule 20.01(f)
of the CPR. A much higher compensation is allowed as contingent fees is
consideration of the risk that the lawyer will get nothing if the suit fails. In several
cases, the Court has indicated that a contingent fee of 30% of the money or property
that may be recovered is reasonable. Moreover, although the developer settled the
case, it was after the case was decided by the RTC in favor of Chester, which shows
that Atty. Laarni has already rendered service to the client.
Q: Assume there was no settlement and the case eventually reached the Supreme
Court which promulgated a decision in favor of Chester. This time Chester refused to
convey to Laarni 15% of the litigated land as stipulated on the ground that the
agreement violates Article 1491 of the Civil Code, which prohibits lawyers from
acquiring by purchase properties and rights, which are the object of litigation in
which they take part by reason of their profession. Is the refusal justified? Explain.
(2008 Bar Question)
A: Chester’s refusal is not justified. A contingent fee arrangement is not covered by
Art.1491 of the Civil Code, because the transfer or assignment of the property in
litigation takes effect only upon finality of a favorable judgment. (Director of Lands v.
Ababa, No. L-26096, Feb. 27, 1979); (Macariola v. Asuncion, A.C. No. 133-J, May
31, 1982).
Champertous contract
Is one where the lawyer stipulates with his client in the prosecution of the case that
he will bear all the expenses for the recovery of things or property being claimed by
the client, and the latter agrees to pay the former a portion of the thing or property
recovered as compensation. It is void for being against public policy (like gambling).
NOTE: A champertous contract is considered void due to public policy, because it would make
him acquire a stake in the outcome of the litigation which might lead him to place his own
interest above that of the client (Bautista v. Gonzales, A.M. No. 1625, Feb. 12, 1990).
Contingent v. Champertous contract

CONTINGENT CONTRACT- Payable in cash – dependent on the success of the
litigation. Lawyers do not undertake to pay all expenses of litigation. Valid.
CHAMPERTOUS CONTRACT- Payable in kind - a portion of the thing or property
recovered as compensation. Lawyers undertake to pay all expenses of litigation.
Void.
Q: The contract of attorney's fees entered into by Atty. Quintos and his client,
Susan, stipulates that if a judgment is rendered in favor of the latter, Atty. Quintos
gets 60% of the property recovered as contingent fee. In turn, he will assume
payment of all expenses of the litigation. May Atty. Quintos and Susan increase the
amount of the contingent fee to 80%? (2006 Bar Question)
Page 62 of 163
A: No. Atty. Quintos and Susan cannot agree to increase the amount of the
contingent fee to 80% because the agreement is champertous. Even if there is no
champertous provision present, the contingent fee of 80% of the PROPERTY
recovered could still be considered as unconscionable, because it is so
disproportionate as to indicate that an unjust advantage had been taken of the
client, and is revolting to human conscience. Contracts for attorney's fees are always
subject to control by the courts.
(iii) Attorney’s liens
Attorney’s retaining lien

A retaining lien is the right of an attorney to retain the funds, documents and papers
of his client who have lawfully come into his possession and may retain the same
until his lawful fees and disbursements have been paid, and may apply such funds to
the satisfaction thereof.
NOTE: A lawyer is not entitled to unilaterally appropriate his client’s money for himself by the
mere fact alone that the client owes him attorney’s fees (Rayos v. Hernandez, GR No. 169079,
Feb. 12, 2007).
Requisites in order for an attorney to be able to exercise his retaining lien

(ALU)
1. Attorney-client relationship;
2. Lawful possession by the lawyer of the client’s funds, documents and papers in his
professional capacity; and
3. Unsatisfied claim for attorney’s fees or disbursements.
Attorney’s charging lien

A charging lien is the right of a lawyer to the same extent upon all judgments for the
payment of money, and executions issued in pursuance of such judgments which he
has secured in a litigation of his client, from and after the time when he shall have
caused a statement of his claim of such lien to be entered upon the records of the
court rendering such judgment, or issuing such execution, and shall have caused
written notice thereof to be delivered to his client and to the adverse party; and he
shall have the same right and power over such judgments and executions as his
client would have to enforce his lien and secure the payment of his fees and
disbursements (RRC, Sec. 37, Rule 138).
Requisites in order for an attorney to be able to exercise his charging lien

1. Existence of attorney-client relationship;
2. The attorney has rendered services;
3. Favorable money judgment secured by the counsel for his client;
4. The attorney has a claim for attorney’s fees or advances; and
5. A statement of the claim has been duly recorded in the case with notice thereof
served upon the client and the adverse party.
NOTE: A charging lien, to be enforceable as a security for the payment of attorney’s fees,
requires as a condition sine qua non a judgment for money and execution in pursuance of
such judgment secured in the main action by the attorney in favor of his client.
Retaining lien v. Charging lien
Page 63 of 163
RETAINING LIEN
NATURE: Passive lien. It cannot be actively enforced. It is a general lien.
BASIS: Lawful possession of papers, documents, property belonging to the client.
COVERAGE: Covers papers, documents, and properties in the lawful possession of
the attorney by reason of his professional employment.
EFFECT: As soon as the attorney gets possession of papers, documents, or property.
APPLICABILITY: May be exercised before judgment or execution or regardless
thereof.
EXTINGUISHMENT: When possession lawfully ends as when lawyer voluntarily parts
with funds, documents, and papers of client or offers them as evidence.
CHARGING LIEN
NATURE: Active lien. It can be enforced by execution. It is a special lien.
BASIS: Securing of a favorable money judgment for client.
COVERAGE: Covers all judgments for the payment of money and execution issued in
pursuance of such judgment.
EFFECT: As soon as the claim for attorney’s fees had been entered into the records
of the case
APPLICABILITY: Generally, exercised only when the attorney had already secured a
favorable judgment for his client.
EXTINGUISHMENT: When client loses action as lien may only be enforced against
judgment awarded in favor of client, proceeds thereof/executed.
Q: Upon being replaced by Justice C, Atty. B, the former counsel of the parents of
the victims of the OZONE Disco tragedy, was directed to forward all the documents
in his possession to Justice C. Atty. B refused, demanding full compensation
pursuant to their written contract. Sensing that a favorable judgment was
forthcoming, Atty. B filed a motion in court relative to his attorney’s fees, furnishing
his former clients with copies thereof. Is Atty. B legally and ethically correct in
refusing to turn over the documents and in filing the motion? Explain. (1996 Bar
Question)
A: Yes. He is entitled to a retaining lien which gives him the right to retain the funds,
documents and papers of his client which have lawfully come to his possession until
his lawful fees and disbursement have been paid (RRC, Sec. 37, Rule 138; CPR, Rule
16.03). He is also legally and ethically correct in filing a motion in court relative to
his fees. He is entitled to a charging lien upon all judgments for the paying of money,
and executions issued in pursuance of such judgments, which he has secured in a
litigation of his client, from and after the time when the records of the court
rendering such judgment or issuing such execution.
(iv) Fees and controversies with clients
CANON 20-RULE 20.02 - A LAWYER SHALL, IN CASES OF REFERRAL, WITH THE

CONSENT OF THE CLIENT, BE ENTITLED TO A DIVISION OF FEES IN PROPORTION
TO WORK PERFORMED AND RESPONSIBILITY ASSUMED.
This is not in the nature of a broker’s commission.
Lawyer-referral system
Under this system, if another counsel is referred to the client, and the latter agrees
to take him as collaborating counsel, and there is no express agreement on the
payment of attorney’s fees, the said counsel will receive attorney’s fees in proportion
Page 64 of 163
to the work performed and responsibility assumed. The lawyers and the client may
agree upon the proportion but in case of disagreement, the court may fix the
proportional division of fees (Lapena, 2009).
CANON 20-RULE 20.03 - A LAWYER SHALL NOT, WITHOUT THE FULL KNOWLEDGE
AND CONSENT OF THE CLIENT, ACCEPT ANY FEE, REWARD, COSTS, COMMISSION,
INTEREST, REBATE OR FORWARDING ALLOWANCE OR OTHER COMPENSATION
WHATSOEVER RELATED TO HIS PROFESSIONAL EMPLOYMENT FROM ANYONE OTHER
THAN THE CLIENT(1997,2003 BAR)
It is intended to secure the fidelity of the lawyer to his client’s cause and to prevent
a situation in which the receipt by him of a rebate or commission from another with
the client’s business may interfere with the full discharge of his duty to his client.
(Report of the IBP Committee)
GR: Fees shall be received from the client only.
XPN: A lawyer may receive compensation from a person other than his client when
the latter has full knowledge and approval thereof (Sec. 20 (e), Rule 138).
CANON 20-RULE 20.04 - A LAWYER SHALL AVOID CONTROVERSIES WITH CLIENTS

CONCERNING HIS COMPENSATION AND SHALL RESORT TO JUDICIAL ACTION ONLY
TO PREVENT IMPOSITION, INJUSTICE OF FRAUD (1998 BAR)
GR: A lawyer should avoid the filing of any case against a client for the enforcement
of attorney’s fees.
NOTE : The legal profession is not a money-making trade but a form of public service. Lawyers
should avoid giving the impression that they are mercenary (Perez v. Scottish Union and
National Insurance Co., C.A. No. 8977, Mar. 22, 1946). It might even turn out to be
unproductive for him for potential clients are likely to avoid a lawyer with a reputation of suing
his clients.
XPNs:
1. To prevent imposition
2. To prevent injustice
3. To prevent fraud (CPR, Rule 20.04)
NOTE: A client may enter into a compromise agreement without the intervention of the
lawyer, but the terms of the agreement should not deprive the counsel of his compensation for
the professional services he had rendered. If so, the compromise shall be subjected to said
fees. If the client and the adverse party who assented to the compromise are found to have
intentionally deprived the lawyer of his fees, the terms of the compromise, insofar as they
prejudice the lawyer, will be set aside, making both parties accountable to pay the lawyer’s
fees. But in all cases, it is the client who is bound to pay his lawyer for his legal representation
(Atty. Gubat v. NPC, G.R. No. 167415, Feb. 26, 2010),
Ways on how lawyer’s claim attorney’s fees

1. In the same case – It may be asserted either in the very action in which the
services of a lawyer had been rendered or in a separate action.
2. In a separate civil action – A petition for attorney's fees may be filed before the
judgment in favor of the client is satisfied or the proceeds thereof delivered to the
client.
Page 65 of 163
The determination as to the propriety of the fees or as to the amount thereof will
have to be held in abeyance until the main case from which the lawyer's claim for
attorney's fees may arise has become final. Otherwise, the determination of the
courts will be premature.
Instances when an independent civil action is necessary to claim attorney’s

fees:
1. Main action is dismissed or nothing is awarded;
2. Court has decided that it has no jurisdiction over the action or has already lost it;
3. Person liable for attorney’s fees is not a party to the main action;
4. Court reserved to the lawyer the right to file a separate civil suit for recovery of
attorney’s fees;
5. Services for which the lawyer seeks payment are not connected with the subject
litigation; and
6. Judgment debtor has fully paid all of the judgment
proceeds to the judgment creditor and the lawyer has not taken any legal step to
have his fees paid directly to him from the judgment proceeds.
7. Failure to exercise Charging Lien
Effects of the nullity of contract on the right to attorney’s fees

If the nullification is due to:
1. The illegality of its object - the lawyer is precluded from recovering; and
2. Formal defect or because the court has found the amount to be unconscionable -
the lawyer may recover for any services rendered based on quantum meruit.
Kinds of lawyer according to services rendered and the compensation they

are entitled to
1. Counsel de parte – He is entitled to the reasonable attorney’s fees agreed upon,
or in the absence thereof, on quantum meruit basis.
2. Counsel de officio – The counsel may not demand from the accused attorney’s
fees even if he wins the case. He may, however, collect from the government funds,
if available based on the amount fixed by the court.
3. Amicus Curiae – not entitled to attorney’s fees.
(v) Concepts of attorney’s fees
Two concepts of attorney’s fees

1. Ordinary attorney's fee – The reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer by his
client for the legal services he has rendered to the latter (Pineda, 2009).
NOTE: The basis for this compensation is the fact of his employment by and his agreement
with the client.
2. Extraordinary attorney's fee – An indemnity for damages ordered by the court to

be paid by the losing party in litigation.
NOTE: The basis for this is any of the cases provided for by law where such award can be
made, such as those authorized in Article 2208 of the Civil Code, and is payable to the client,
NOT to the lawyer unless they have agreed that the award shall pertain to the lawyer as
additional compensation or as part thereof.
(a) Ordinary concept
Page 66 of 163
Q: Aurora Pineda filed an action for declaration of nullity of marriage against Vinson
Pineda, who was represented by Attys. Clodualdo de Jesus, Carlos Ambrosio and
Emmanuel Mariano. The parties' proposal for settlement regarding Vinson's visitation
rights over their minor child and the separation of their properties was approved by
the court. The marriage was subsequently declared null and void. Throughout the
proceedings counsels and their relatives and friends, availed of free products and
treatments from Vinson’s dermatology clinic. This notwithstanding, they billed him
additional legal fees amounting to P16.5 million which he, however, refused to pay.
Instead, he issued them several checks totaling P1.12 million as full payment for
settlement. Still not satisfied, the three lawyers filed in the same court a motion for
payment of lawyers' fees for P50 million, which is equivalent to 10% of the value of
the properties awarded to Pineda in the case. Are their claim justified?
A: No. Clearly, what they were demanding was additional payment for legal services
rendered in the same case. Demanding P50 million on top of the generous sums and
perks already given to them was an act of unconscionable greed. They could not
charge Pineda a fee based on percentage, absent an express agreement to that
effect. The payments to them in cash, checks, free products and services from
Pineda’s business more than sufficed for the work they did. The full payment for
settlement should have discharged Vinson's obligation to them.
As lawyers, they should be reminded that they are members of an honorable
profession, the primary vision of which is justice. It is the lawyer’s despicable
behavior in the case at bar which gives lawyering a bad name in the minds of some
people. The vernacular has a word for it: nagsasamantala. The practice of law is a
decent profession and not a money-making trade. Compensation should be but a
mere incident (Pineda v. de Jesus, G.R. No. 155224, Aug. 23, 2006).
(b) Extraordinary concept
Rules on extraordinary concept of attorney’s fees

GR: Attorney’s fees as damages are not recoverable. An adverse decision does not
ipso facto justify their award in favor of the winning party.
XPNs: Attorney’s fees in the concept of damages may be awarded in any of the
following circumstances:
1. When there is an agreement;
2. When exemplary damages are awarded;
3. When defendant’s action or omission compelled plaintiff to litigate;
4. In criminal cases of malicious prosecution
a. Plaintiff was acquitted; and
b. The person who charged him knowingly made the false statement of facts or that
the filing was prompted by sinister design to vex him;
5. When the action is clearly unfounded;
6. When defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith;
7. In actions for support;
8. In cases of recovery of wages;
9. In actions for indemnity under workmen’s compensation and employee’s liability
laws;
10. In a separate civil action arising from a crime;
11. When at least double costs are awarded (costs of suit does not include attorney’s
fees);
12. When the court deems it just and equitable; and
13. When a special law so authorizes (NCC, Art. 2208).
Page 67 of 163
Rationale behind the rule that the Court shall state the reason for attorney’s
fees in in its decision
The award of attorney’s fees being an exception rather than the general rule, it is
necessary for the court to make findings of facts and law that would bring the case
within the exception and justify the grant of such award (Agustin vs. CA, G.R. No.
84751, June 6, 1990).
NOTE: Attorney’s fees must be specifically prayed for and proven and justified in the decision
itself (Trans-Asia Shipping Lines, Inc. vs. CA, G.R. No. 118126, Mar. 4, 1996).
h) Preservation of client’s confidences
CANON 21 - A LAWYER SHALL PRESERVE THE CONFIDENCE AND SECRETS OF

HIS CLIENT EVEN AFTER THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATION IS TERMINATED
The protection given to the client is perpetual and does not cease with the
termination of the litigation nor is affected by the party ceasing to employ the
attorney and employ another or any other change of relation between them. It even
survives the death of the client.
(i) Prohibited disclosures and use
CANON 21-RULE 21.01 - A LAWYER SHALL NOT REVEAL THE CONFIDENCES OR

SECRETS OF HIS CLIENT EXCEPT:
A) WHEN AUTHORIZED BY THE CLIENT AFTER ACQUIANTING HIM OF THE
CONSEQUENCES OF THE DISCLOSURE;
B) WHEN REQUIRED BY LAW;
C) WHEN NECESSARY TO COLLECT HIS FEES OR TO DEFEND HIMSELF, HIS
EMPLOYEES OR ASSOCIATES OR BY JUDICIAL ACTION.
GR: A lawyer shall not reveal the confidences and secrets of his client.
NOTE: An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined as to any
communication made by the client to him, or his advice given thereon in the course of, or with
a view to, professional employment, nor can an attorney’s secretary, stenographer, or clerk be
examined, without the consent of the client and his employer, concerning any fact the
knowledge of which has been acquired in such capacity (RRC, Sec. 24(b), Rule 130).
XPNs:
1. When authorized by his client after acquainting him of the consequences of the
disclosure;
NOTE: The only instance where the waiver of the client alone is insufficient is when the person
to be examined with reference to any privileged communication is the attorney’s secretary,
stenographer or clerk, in respect to which, the consent of the attorney is likewise necessary.
2. When required by law;

3. When necessary to collect his fees or to defend himself, his employees or
associates by judicial action.
NOTE: Payment of retainer fee is not essential before an attorney can be required to safeguard
a prospective client’s secret acquired by the attorney during the course of the consultation
Page 68 of 163
with the prospective client, even if the attorney did not accept the employment.
Instances when a lawyer may testify as a witness in a case which he is

handling for a client
1. On formal matters, such as the mailing, authentication or custody of an
instrument and the like;
2. Acting as an expert on his free;
3. Acting as an arbitrator;
4. Depositions; and
5. On substantial matters in cases where his testimony is essential to the ends of
justice, in which event he must, during his testimony, entrust the trial of the case to
another counsel.
CANON 21-RULE 21.02 - A LAWYER SHALL NOT, TO THE DISADVANTAGE OF HIS

CLIENT, USE INFORMATION ACQUIRED IN THE COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT, NOR
SHALL HE USE HE SAME TO HIS OWN ADVANTAGE OR THAT OF A THIRD PERSON,
UNLESS THE CLIENT WITH FULL KNOWLEDGE OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES CONSENTS
THERETO.
CANON 21-RULE 21.05 - A LAWYER SHALL ADOPT SUCH MEASURES AS MAY BE

REQUIRED TO PREVENT THOSE WHOSE SERVICES ARE UTILIZED BY HIM, FROM
DISCLOSING OR USING CONFIDENCES OR SECRETS OF THE CLIENT.
CANON 21-RULE 21.06 - A LAWYER SHALL AVOID INDISCREET CONVERSATION

ABOUT A CLIENT’S AFFAIRS EVEN WITH MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY.
CANON 21-RULE 21.07 - A LAWYER SHALL NOT REVEAL THAT HE HAS BEEN
CONSULTED ABOUT A PARTICULAR CASE EXCEPT TO AVOID POSSIBLE CONFLICT OF
INTEREST.
Acts punished under Art. 209 of the Revised Penal Code (betrayal of trust by
attorney)
1. By causing damage to his client, either 1) by any malicious breach of professional
duty, 2) by inexcusable negligence or ignorance
2. By revealing any of the secrets of his clients learned by him in his professional
capacity.
3. By undertaking the defense of the opposing party in the same case, without the
consent of his first client, after having undertaken the defense of said first client or
after having received confidential information from said client.
(ii) Disclosure, when allowed
CANON 21-RULE 21.04 - A LAWYER MAY DISCLOSE THE AFFAIRS OF A CLIENT OF

THE FIRM TO PARTNERS OR ASSOCIATES THEREOF UNLESS PROHIBITED BY THE
CLIENT.
Professional employment of a law firm is equivalent to retainer of members thereof.

In a law firm, partners or associates usually consult one another involving their cases
and some work as a team. Consequently, it cannot be avoided that some information
about the case received from the client may be disclosed to the partners or
associates.
Page 69 of 163
Q: In need of legal services, Niko secured an appointment to meet with W Atty.

Henry of Henry & Meyer Law Offices. During the meeting, Niko divulged highly
private information to Atty. Henry, believing that the lawyer would keep the
confidentiality of the information. Subsequently, Niko was shocked when he learned
that Atty. Henry had shared the confidential information with his law partner, Atty.
Meyer, and their common friend, private practitioner Atty. Canonigo. When
confronted, Atty. Henry replied that Niko never signed any confidentiality agreement,
and that he shared the information with the two lawyers to secure affirmance of his
legal opinion on Niko’s problem. Did Atty. Henry violate any rule of ethics? Explain
fully. (2008 Bar Question)
A: Atty. Henry violated Canon No. 21 of the CPR by sharing information obtained
from his client Niko with Atty. Canonigo. Canon No. 20 provides that “a lawyer shall
preserve the confidences or secrets of his client even after the attorney-client
relationship is terminated.” The fact that Atty. Canonigo is a friend from whom he
intended to secure legal opinion on Niko’s problem, does not justify such disclosure.
He cannot obtain a collaborating counsel without the consent of the client (CPR, Rule
18.01).
On the other hand, Atty. Henry did not violate Canon 21 in sharing information with
his partner Atty. Meyer. Rule 21.04 of the CPR specifically provides that “a lawyer
may disclose the affairs of a client of the firm to partners or associates thereof unless
prohibited by the client.” Atty. Henry was not prohibited from disclosing the affairs of
Niko with the members of his law firm. The employment of a member of a firm is
generally considered as employment of the firm itself (Hilado v. David, G.R. No. L-
961, Sept. 21, 1949).
Privileged communication rule with regard to the identity of his client
GR: A lawyer may not invoke privileged communication to refuse revealing a client’s
identity.
XPNs:
1. When there is a strong possibility that revealing the client’s name would implicate
the client in the very activity for which he sought the lawyer’s advice;
2. When disclosure would open the client to civil liability;
3. When government’s lawyers have no case against an attorney’s client and
revealing the client’s name would furnish the only link that would come from the
chain of testimony necessary to convict him.
Reasons why a lawyer may not invoke privileged communication to refuse

revealing a client’s identity
1. Due process considerations require that the opposing party should know the
adversary;
2. The privilege pertain to the subject matter of the relationship;
3. The privilege begins to exist only after attorney-client relationship has been
established hence it does not attach until there is a client; and
4. The court has a right to know that the client whose privileged information is
sought to be protected is flesh and blood.
Q: Atty. X was charged of violating Code of Responsibility for representing conflicting

interests by accepting the responsibility of representing Mr. A in the cases similar to
those in which he had undertaken to represent Mr. D and his group, notwithstanding
that Mr. A was the very same person whom Mr. D and his group had accused with
Atty. X’s legal assistance. He had drafted the demand letters and the complaint-
affidavit that became the bases for the filing of the estafa charges against Mr. A.
Atty. X contends that his lawyer-client relationship with Mr. D ended when he and his
group entered into the compromise settlement. Is his contention correct?
Page 70 of 163
A: No. Atty. X’s contention is not correct. The lawyer-client relationship did not
terminate as of the date of compromise agreement, for the fact remained that he still
needed to oversee the implementation of the settlement as well as to proceed with
the criminal cases until they were dismissed or otherwise concluded by the trial
court. It is also relevant to indicate that the execution of a compromise settlement in
the criminal cases did not ipso facto cause the termination of the cases not only
because the approval of the compromise by the trial court was still required, but also
because the compromise would have applied only to the civil aspect, and excluded
the criminal aspect pursuant to Article 2034 of the Civil Code (Samson vs. Era, A.C.
No. 6664, July 16, 2013).
CANON 22 - A LAWYER SHALL WITHDRAW HIS SERVICES ONLY FOR GOOD

CAUSE AND UPON NOTICE APPROPRIATE IN THE CIRTUMSTANCES.
Right to withdraw
GR: A lawyer lacks the unqualified right to withdraw once he has taken a case. By
his acceptance, he has impliedly stipulated that he will prosecute the case to
conclusion. This is especially true when such withdrawal will work injustice to a client
or frustrate the ends of justice.
XPNs: The right of a lawyer to retire from the case before its final adjudication,
which arises only from:
1. The client’s written consent; or
2. By permission of the court after due notice and hearing.
Instances when a lawyer may withdraw his services without the consent of
his client (FIC MOVIE)
1. When the client deliberately Fails to pay the fees for the services or fails to comply
with the retainer agreement;
2. When the client pursues an Illegal or immoral course of conduct in connection with
the matter he is handling;
3. When the lawyer finds out that he might be appearing for a Conflicting interest;
4. When the Mental or physical condition of the lawyer renders it difficult for him to
carry out the employment effectively;
5. Other similar cases;
6. When the client insists that the lawyer pursue conduct in Violation of these canons
and rules;
7. When his Inability to work with co-counsel will not promote the best interest of
the client; and
8. When the lawyer is Elected or appointed to a public office (CPR, Rule 22.01).
Procedure to follow when withdrawal is without client’s consent

1. File a petition for withdrawal in court.
2. Serve a copy of this petition upon his client and the adverse party at least 3 days
before the date set for hearing.
NOTE: He should present his petition well in advance of the trial of the action to enable the
client to secure the services of another lawyer.
If the application is filed under circumstances that do not afford a substitute counsel
sufficient time to prepare for trial or that work prejudice to the client’s cause, the
court may deny his application and require him to conduct the trial.
Page 71 of 163
A lawyer should not presume that the court will grant his petition for withdrawal.
Until his withdrawal shall have been proved, the lawyer remains counsel of record
who is expected by his client as well as by the court to do what the interests of his
client require.
Q: Can a client discharge the services of his lawyer without a cause? (1994, 1997,
1998 Bar Question)
A: Yes. A client has the right to discharge his attorney at any time with or without a
cause or even against his consent.
1. With just cause – lawyer is not necessarily deprived of his right to be paid for his
services. He may only be deprived of such right if the cause for his dismissal
constitutes in itself a sufficient legal obstacle to recovery.
2. Without just cause
a. No express written agreement as to fees - reasonable value of his services up to

the date of his dismissal (quantum meruit).
b. There is written agreement and the fee stipulated is absolute and reasonable – full
payment of compensation.
c. The fee stipulated is contingent.
d. If dismissed before the conclusion of the action - reasonable value of his services
(quantum meruit)
e. If contingency occurs or client prevents its occurrence – full amount.
NOTE: A lawyer should question his discharge otherwise he will only be allowed to recover on
quantum meruit basis.
Limitations on client’s right to discharge the services of his lawyer

1. When made with justifiable cause, it shall negate the attorney’s right to full
payment of compensation.
2. The attorney may, in the discretion of the court, intervene in the case to protect
his right to fees.
3. A client may not be permitted to abuse his right to discharge his counsel as an
excuse to secure repeated extensions of time to file a pleading or to indefinitely
avoid a trial.
Conditions for substitution of counsel

1. Written application
2. Written consent of the client
3. Written consent of the attorney to be substituted, or in the absence thereof, proof
of service of notice of said motion to the attorney to be substituted in the manner
prescribed by the rules.
Heavy workload as excuse for withdrawal as counsel

Standing alone, heavy workload is not sufficient reason for the withdrawal of a
counsel. When a lawyer accepts to handle a case, whether for a fee or gratis et
amore, he undertakes to give his utmost attention, skill and competence to it
regardless of its significance. Failure to fulfill his duties will subject him to grave
administrative liability as a member of the Bar (Ceniza v. Atty. Rubia, A.C. No. 6166,
October 2, 2009).
Page 72 of 163
CANON 22-RULE 22.01 -A LAWYER MAY WITHDRAW HIS SERVICES IN ANY OF THE
FOLLOWING CASES:
A) WHEN THE CLIENT PURSUES AN ILLEGAL OR IMMORAL COURSE OF CONDUCT IN
CONNECTION WITH THE MATTER HE IS HANDLING;
B) WHEN THE CLIENT INSISTS THAT THE LAWYER PURSUE CONDUCT VIOLATIVE OF
THESE CANONS AND RULES;
C) WHEN HIS INABILITY TO WORK WITH CO-COUNSEL WILL NOT PROMOTE THE
BEST INTEREST OF THE CLIENT;
D) WHEN THE MENTAL OR PHYSICAL CONDITION OF THE LAWYER RENDERS IT
DIFFICULT FOR HIM TO CARRY OUT THE EMPLOYMENT EFFECTIVELY;
E) WHEN THE CLIENT DELIBERATELY FAILS TO PAY THE FEES FOR THE SERVICES
OR FAILS TO COMPLY WITH THE RETAINER AGREEMENT;
F) WHEN THE LAWYER IS ELECTED OR APPOINTED TO PUBLIC OFFICE; AND
G) OTHER SIMILAR CASES.
NOTE: In cases a-e (above), the lawyer must file a written motion with an express consent of
his client and the court shall determine whether he ought to be allowed to retire.
He may also retire at any time from an action or special proceeding without the
consent of his client, should the court, on notice to the client and attorney, and on
hearing, determine that he ought to be allowed to retire (RRC, Sec. 26, Rule 138).
Hot Potato Rule

GR: A lawyer may not unreasonably withdraw from representing a client.
XPN: Withdrawal may be allowed if there is a conflict of interest arising from

circumstances beyond the control of the lawyer or the law firm (Black’s Law
Dictionary,9th edition).
Q: On the eve of the initial hearing for the reception of evidence for the defense, the
defendant and his counsel had a conference where the client directed the lawyer to
present as principal defense witnesses 2 persons whose testimonies were personally
known to the lawyer to have been perjured. The lawyer informed his client that he
refused to go along with the unwarranted course of action proposed by the
defendant. But the client insisted on the directive, or else he would not pay the
agreed attorney’s fees. When the case was called for hearing the next morning the
lawyer forthwith moved in open court that he be relieved as counsel for the
defendant. Both the defendant and the plaintiff’s counsel objected to the motion.
Under the given facts, is the defense lawyer legally justified in seeking withdrawal
from the case? Why or why not? Reason briefly.
A: Yes, he is justified. Under rule 22.01 of the CPR, a lawyer may withdraw his
services “if the client insists that the lawyer pursue conduct violative of these canon
and rules”. The insistence of the client that the lawyer present witnesses whom he
personally knows to have been perjured, will expose him to criminal and civil liability
and violate his duty of candor, fairness and good faith to the court.
Q: Was the motion for relief as counsel made by the defense lawyer in full accord
with the procedural requirements for a lawyer’s withdrawal from a court case?
Explain briefly. (2004 Bar Question)
A: No, his actuation is not in accord with the procedural requirements for the
lawyer’s withdrawal from a court case. Whether or not a lawyer has a valid cause to
Page 73 of 163
withdraw from a case, he cannot just do so and leave the client in the cold
unprotected. He must serve a copy of his petition upon the client and the adverse
party. He should, moreover, present his petition well in advance of the trial of the
action to enable the client to secure the services of another lawyer.
Q: Atty. X filed a notice of withdrawal of appearance as counsel for the accused Y

after the prosecution rested its case. The reason for the withdrawal of Atty. X was
the failure of accused Y to affix his conformity to the demand of Atty. X for increase
in attorney's fees. Is the ground for withdrawal justified? Explain. (2000 Bar
Question)
A: The ground for the withdrawal is not justified. Rule 22.01 (e) of the Code of
Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer may withdraw his services when
the client deliberately fails to pay the fees for his services or fails to comply with the
retainer agreement. In this case, the client has not failed to pay the lawyer's fees or
to comply with the retainer agreement. He has only refused to agree with the
lawyer's demand for an increase in his fees. It is his right to refuse as that is part of
his freedom of contract.
CANON 22-RULE 22.02 - A LAWYER WHO WITHDRAWS OR IS DISCHARGED SHALL,

SUBJECT TO A RETAINER LIEN, IMMEDIATELY TURN OVER ALL PAPERS AND
PROPERTY TO WHICH THE CLIENT IS ENTITLED, AND SHALL COOPERATE WITH HIS
SUCCESSOR IN THE ORDERLY TRANSFER OF THE MATTER, INCLUDING ALL
INFORMATION NECESSARY FOR THE PROPER HANDLING OF THE MATTER.
Duties of a discharged lawyer or one who withdraws

1. Immediately turn-over all papers and property to which the client is entitled; and
2. To cooperate with his successor in the orderly transfer of the case.
C. Suspension, disbarment and discipline of lawyers (Rule 139-B, Rules of

Court)
1. Nature and characteristics of disciplinary actions against lawyers
Rationale of disciplining errant lawyers

Practice of law is in the nature of a privilege. Hence, the same may be suspended or
removed from the lawyer for reasons provided in the rules, law and jurisprudence.
NOTE: A lawyer may be disciplined or suspended for any misconduct professionally or privately
(Cruz v. Atty. Jacinto, Adm. Case No. 5235, March 22, 2000).
Nature of the power to discipline

The power to discipline a lawyer is JUDICIAL in nature and can be exercised only by
the courts. It cannot be defeated by the legislative or executive departments.
NOTE: The power to disbar and to reinstate is an inherently judicial function (Andres v.
Cabrera, SBC- 585, Feb. 29, 1984).
Powers of the Supreme Court in disciplining lawyers (WARD-SIP)

1. Warn;
2. Admonish;
3. Reprimand;
4. Disbar;
Page 74 of 163
5. Suspend a lawyer; [Sec. 27, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court (RRC)]
6. Interim suspension; and
7. Probation (IBP Guidelines)
Powers of the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts

They are also empowered to: (WARSP)
1. Warn;
2. Admonish;
3. Reprimand;
4. Suspend an attorney from practice for any of the causes named in Sec 27, Rule
138 until further action of the Supreme Court in the case; (Sec. 16, Rule 139-B) and
5. Probation (IBP Guidelines)
NOTE: The CA and RTC cannot disbar a lawyer.
Other sanctions and remedies

1. Restitution;
2. Assessment of costs;
3. Limitation upon practice;
4. Appointment of a receiver;
5. Requirement that a lawyer take the bar examination or professional responsibility
examination;
6. Requirement that a lawyer attend continuing education courses; and
7. Other requirements that the highest court or disciplinary board deems consistent
with the purposes of the sanctions.
Forms of disciplinary measures (WARCS-DIP)

1. Warning – an act of putting one on his guard against an impending danger, evil,
consequence or penalty;
2. Admonition – a gentle or friendly reproof, mild rebuke, warning, reminder, or
counseling on a fault, error or oversight; an expression of authoritative advice;
3. Reprimand – a public and formal censure or severe reproof, administered to a
person at fault by his superior officer or the body to which he belongs;
4. Censure – official reprimand;
5. Suspension – temporary withholding of a lawyer’s right to practice his profession
as a lawyer for a certain period or for an indefinite period of time:
a. Definite;
b. Indefinite – qualified disbarment; lawyer determines for himself how long or how
short his suspension shall last by proving to court that he is once again fit to resume
practice of law.
NOTE: Indefinite suspension is not cruel. Indefinite suspension put in his hands the key for the
restoration of his rights and privileges as a lawyer (Dumadag v. Atty. Lumaya, A.C. No. 2614,
June 29, 2000).
6. Disbarment – it is the act of the Supreme Court of withdrawing from an attorney

the right to practice law. The name of the lawyer is stricken out from the Roll of
Attorneys;
NOTE: A disbarred lawyer cannot be disbarred again (Yuhico v. Atty. Gutierrez, A.C. No. 8391,
November 23, 2010).
Page 75 of 163
7. Interim Suspension – it is the temporary suspension of a lawyer from the practice

of law pending imposition
a. Suspension upon conviction of a “serious crime”;

b. Suspension when the lawyer’s continuing conduct is or is likely to cause
immediate and serious injury to a client or public
8. Probation – it is a sanction that allows a lawyer to practice law under specified

conditions.
a) Sui generis
Sui generis in nature
Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own (sui generis).
They are distinct from and may proceed independently of civil and criminal cases (In
re Almacen, G.R. No. L-27654, Feb. 18, 1970; Funa, 2009).
NOTE: The purpose and the nature of disbarment proceedings make the number of defenses
available in civil and criminal actions inapplicable in disciplinary proceedings.
b) Prescription
There is no prescriptive period for the filing of a complaint against an erring

lawyer
Rule VII, Section 1 of the Rules of Procedure of the CBD-IBP, which provides for a
prescriptive period for the filing of administrative complaints against lawyers, should
be struck down as void and of no legal effect for being ultra vires (Heirs of Falame v.
Atty. Baguio, A.C. No. 6876, Mar. 7, 2008).
Q: May Atty. Gutierrez be disbarred for the second time?

A: No. The SC held that while the IBP recommended to disbar Atty. Gutierrez for the
second time, we do not have double or multiple disbarment in our laws or
jurisprudence and neither do we have a law mandating a minimum 5-year
requirement for readmission, as cited by the IBP. Thus, while Gutierrez’s infraction
calls for the penalty of disbarment, they cannot disbar him anew (Yuhico v Atty.
Gutierrez, A.C. No. 8391, Nov. 23, 2010).
2. Grounds
Specific grounds for suspension or disbarment of a lawyer

1. Deceit;
2. Malpractice;
3. Grossly immoral conduct;
4. Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude;
5. Violation of oath of office;
6. Willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court;
7. Corrupt or willful appearance as an attorney for a party to a case without
authority to do so (RRC, Sec. 27, Rule 138);
8. Non-payment of IBP membership dues (Santos, Jr. v. Atty. Llas, Adm. Case No.
4749, January 20, 2000).
Page 76 of 163
HOWEVER, The statutory enumeration is not to be taken as a limitation on the

general power of SC to suspend or disbar a lawyer (In Re: Puno, A.C. No. 389, Feb.
28, 1967). HENCE, the grounds enumerated are NOT exclusive.
Lawyer’s misconduct committed prior and after admission to the bar and its
effects
1. Prior to admission to the bar - acts of misconduct prior to admission include those
that indicate that at the time the lawyer took his oath, he did not possess the
required qualifications for membership in the bar. Consequently, the cancellation of
his license is justified.
2. After admission to the bar - those which cause loss of moral character on his part
or involve violation of his duties to the court, his client, to the legal profession and to
the public.
NOTE: Disbarment and suspension of a lawyer, being the most severe forms of disciplinary
sanction, should be imposed with great caution and only in those cases where the misconduct
of the lawyer as an officer of the court and a member of the bar is established by clear,
convincing and satisfactory proof (Vitug v. Rongcal, A.C. No. 6313, Sept. 7, 2006).
Disbarment is merited when the action is not the lawyer’s first ethical infraction of
the same nature (Que v. Revilla, A.C. No. 7054, Dec. 4, 2009).
Legal malpractice
It consists of failure of an attorney to use such skill, prudence and diligence as a
lawyer of ordinary skill and capacity commonly possess and exercise in the
performance of tasks which they undertake, and when such failure proximately
causes damage, it gives rise to an action in tort (Tan TekBeng v. David, A.C. No.
1261, Dec. 29, 1983).
Other statutory grounds for suspension and disbarment of members of the

bar
Other statutory grounds include:
1. Acquisition of interest in the subject matter of the litigation, either through
purchase or assignment (NCC, Art. 1491);
2. Breach of professional duty, inexcusable negligence, or ignorance, or for the
revelation of the client’s secrets (RPC, Art. 208);
3. Representing conflicting interests (RPC, Art. 209).
Other grounds for discipline

1. Non-professional misconduct
GR: A lawyer may not be suspended or disbarred for misconduct in his non-
professional or private capacity.
XPN: Where such is so gross as to show him to be morally unfit for office or
unworthy of privilege, the court may be justified in suspending or removing him from
the Roll of Attorneys. (2005 Bar Question)
NOTE: The issuance of worthless checks constitutes gross misconduct as its effect transcends
the private interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the
interests of the community at large.
2. Gross immorality – An act of personal immorality on the part of a lawyer in his private
relation with opposite sex may put his character in doubt. But to justify suspension or
disbarment, the act must not only be immoral, it must be grossly immoral (Abaigar v. Paz,
Page 77 of 163
A.M. No. 997, Sept. 10, 1979).
NOTE: Cohabitation per se is not grossly immoral. It depends on circumstances and is not
necessary that there be prior conviction for an offense before lawyer may be disciplined for
gross immorality. If the evidence is not sufficient to hold a lawyer liable for gross immorality,
he may still be reprimanded where evidence shows failure on his part to comply with rigorous
standards of conduct required from lawyers.
3. Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude – All crimes of which fraud or

deceit is an element or those inherently contrary to rules of right conduct, honesty or
morality in civilized community.
4. Promoting to violate or violating penal laws
5. Misconduct in discharge of official duties – A lawyer who holds a government office
may not be disciplined as a member of the bar for misconduct in the discharge of his
duties as government official.
However, if the misconduct is in violation of the CPR or of his oath as a lawyer or is
of such a character as to affect his qualifications as a lawyer, he may be subject to
disciplinary action such as disbarment (Collantes v. Renomeron, A.C. No. 3056, Aug.
16, 1991).
NOTE: This rule does not apply to impeachable officials like SC justices, members of
constitutional commissions and Ombudsman because they can be removed only by
impeachment.
6. Commission of fraud or falsehood; and
7. Misconduct as notary public
NOTE: By applying for having himself commissioned as notary public, a lawyer assumes duties
in a dual capacity, the non-performance of which may be a ground for discipline as a member
of the bar.
3. Proceedings
Characteristics of disbarment proceedings

1. Sui Generis –
a. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they are investigations by the Court into
the conduct of one of its officers.
b. Not a civil action because there is neither plaintiff nor respondent, and involves no
private interest. The complainant is not a party and has no interest in the outcome
except as all citizens have in the proper administration of justice. There is no redress
for private grievance.
c. Not a criminal prosecution because it is not meant as a punishment depriving him
of source of livelihood but rather to ensure that those who exercise the function
should be competent, honorable and reliable so that the public may repose
confidence in them.
NOTE: A disbarment proceeding may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the
complainant (Rayos-Ombac v. Rayos, A.C. No. 2884, Jan. 28, 1998). However, if the
complainant refuses to testify and the charges cannot then be substantiated, the court will
have no alternative but to dismiss the case. (2000 Bar Question)
2. The defense of “double jeopardy” cannot be availed of in a disbarment

proceeding;
3. It can be initiated motu proprio by the SC or IBP. It can be initiated without a
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complaint;
4. It is imprescriptible;
5. Conducted confidentially;
6. It can proceed regardless of the interest or the lack thereof on the part of the
complainant; and
7. It in itself constitutes due process of law.
8. Whatever has been decided in a disbarment case cannot be a source of right that
may be enforced in another action;
9. In pari delicto rule not applicable;
10. No prejudicial question in disbarment proceedings;
11. Penalty in a disbarment case cannot be in the alternative; and
12. Monetary claims cannot be granted except restitution and return of monies and
properties of the client given in the course of the lawyer-client relationship.
Three-fold purpose of confidentiality of disbarment proceedings

1. To enable the court to make its investigation free from extraneous influence or
interference;
2. To protect the personal and professional reputation of attorneys from baseless
charges of disgruntled, vindictive and irresponsible persons or clients by prohibiting
publication of such charges pending their final resolution (Albano v. Coloma, A.C. No.
528, Oct. 11, 1967);
3. To deter the press from publishing charges or proceedings based thereon for even
a verbatim reproduction of the complaint against an attorney in the newspaper may
be actionable.
NOTE: The confidentiality of the proceedings is a privilege which may be waived by the lawyer
in whom and for the protection of whose personal and professional reputation it is vested, as
by presenting the testimony in a disbarment case or using it as impeaching evidence in a civil
suit (Villalon v. IAC, G.R. No. L-73751, Sept. 24, 1986).
Offices authorized to investigate disbarment proceedings

1. Supreme Court (RRC, Sec. 13, Rule 139-B)
2. IBP through its Commission on Bar Discipline or authorized investigator (RRC,
Sec. 2, Rule 139-B)
3. Office of the Solicitor General (RRC, Sec. 13, Rule 139-B)
Purposes of disbarment
1. To protect the public
2. To protect and preserve the legal profession
3. To compel the lawyer to comply with his duties and obligations under the CPR.
The burden of proof is upon the complainant and the SC will exercise its disciplinary
power only if the complainant establishes his case by the required quantum of proof
which is clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence (Aquino v. Mangaoang, A.C. No.
4934, Mar. 17, 2004).
PROCEDURE FOR DISBARMENT
BAR MATTER NO. 1960 (MAY 1, 2000)

AMANEDMENT OF SEC. 1, RULE 139-B OF THE ROC
Proceedings for disbarment, suspension or discipline of attorneys may be taken by
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the:
1. Supreme Court motu proprio; or
2. Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) upon the verified complaint of any person.
The complaint shall state clearly and concisely the facts complained of and shall be
supported by affidavits of persons having personal knowledge of the facts therein
alleged and/or by such documents as may substantiate said facts.
DISBARMENT PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE IBP

The IBP Board of Governors may motu proprio, or upon referral by the Supreme
Court, or by a Chapter Board of Officers, or at the instance of any person, initiate
and prosecute proper charges against erring attorneys including those in the
government service; Provided, however, that all charges against Justices of the
Court of Tax Appeals and the Sandiganbayan, and Judges of the Court of Tax
Appeals and lower courts, even if lawyers are jointly charged with them, shall be
filed with the Supreme Court; Provided, further, that charges filed against Justices
and Judges before the IBP, including those filed prior to their appointment in the
Judiciary, shall immediately be forwarded to the Supreme Court for disposition and
adjudication.
Propriety of a motion for reconsideration
1. A party can no longer file a motion for reconsideration of any order or resolution
of the Investigating Commissioner, such motion being a prohibited pleading.
2. Regarding the issue of whether a motion for reconsideration of a decision or
resolution of the Board of Governors (BOG) can be entertained, an aggrieved party
can file said motion with the BOG within fifteen (15) days from notice of receipt
thereof by said party.
3. In case a decision is rendered by the BOG that exonerates the respondent or
imposes a sanction less than suspension or disbarment, the aggrieved party can file
a motion for reconsideration within the 15-day period from notice. If the motion is
denied, said party can file a petition for a review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
with the Supreme Court within fifteen (15) days from notice of the resolution
resolving the motion. If no motion for reconsideration is filed, the decision shall
become final and executory and a copy of said decision shall be furnished the
Supreme Court.
4. If the imposable penalty is suspension from the practice of law or disbarment, the
BOG shall issue a resolution setting forth its findings and recommendations. The
aggrieved party can file a motion for reconsideration of said resolution with the BOG
within fifteen (15) days from notice. The BOG shall first resolve the incident and shall
thereafter elevate the assailed resolution with the entire case records to the
Supreme Court for final action. If the 15-day period lapses without any motion for
reconsideration having been filed, then the BOG shall likewise transmit to this Court
the resolution with the entire case records for appropriate action.
NOTE: Lawyers must update their records with the IBP by informing the IBP National Office or
their respective chapters of any change in office or residential address and other contact
details. In case such change is not duly updated, service of notice on the office or residential
address appearing in the records of the IBP National Office shall constitute sufficient notice to
a lawyer for purposes of administrative proceedings against him (KeldStemmerik v. Atty.
Leonuel Mas, A.C. No. 8010, June 16, 2009).
DISBARMENT PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT

1. In proceedings initiated motu proprio by the Supreme Court or in other proceeding
when the interest of justice so requires, the Supreme Court may refer the case for
investigation to the Solicitor General or to any officer of the Supreme Court or judge
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of a lower court, in which case the investigation shall proceed in the same manner
provided in Sections 6 to 11 of Rule 139-B, RRC, save that the review of the report
of investigation shall be conducted directly by the Supreme Court (RRC, Sec. 13,
Rule 139-B)
NOTE: Reference of the Court to the IBP of complaints against lawyers is not mandatory
(Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 79590-707; Zaldivar v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 80578, Oct.
7,1988).
NOTE: Reference of complaints to the IBP is not an exclusive procedure under Rule 139-B,
RRC. The Court may conduct disciplinary proceedings without the intervention of the IBP by
referring cases for investigation to the Solicitor General or to any officer of the Supreme Court
or judge of a lower court. In such case, the report or recommendation of the investigating
official shall be reviewed directly by the Supreme Court (Bautista v. Gonzales, A.M. No. 1626,
February 12,1990; Funa, 2009).
2. Based upon the evidence adduced at the investigation, the Solicitor General or
other Investigator designated by the Supreme Court a report containing his findings
of fact and recommendations together with the record and all the evidence presented
in the investigation for the final action of the Supreme Court (RRC, Sec. 14, Rule
139-B).
Effect of lawyer’s death in an administrative proceeding against him

1. Renders the action moot and academic, but
2. The Court may still resolve the case on its merit in order to clear publicly the
name of the lawyer.
Effect of the desistance or withdrawal of complaint or non-appearance of

complainant in disbarment proceedings
The desistance or the withdrawal of the complainant of the charges against a
judge/lawyer does not deprive the court of the authority to proceed to determine the
matter. Nor does it necessarily result in the dismissal of the complaint except when,
as a consequence of the withdrawal or desistance no evidence is adduced to prove
the charges.
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable in cases of dismissal of judges

or disbarment of lawyers (1996, 2003 Bar Questions)
This principle or doctrine applies to both judges and lawyers. Judges had been
dismissed from the service without need of a formal investigation because based on
the records, the gross misconduct or inefficiency of judges clearly appears (Uy v.
Mercado, A.M. No. R-368-MTJ, Sept. 30, 1987).
The same principle applies to lawyers. Thus, where on the basis of the lawyer’s
comment or answer to show a show-cause order of SC, it appears that the lawyer
has so conducted himself in a manner which exhibits his blatant disrespect to the
court, or his want of good moral character or his violation of the attorney’s oath, the
lawyer may be suspended or disbarred without need of trial-type proceeding. What
counts is that the lawyer has been given the opportunity to air his side (Prudential
Bank v. Castro, A.M. No. 2756, June 5, 1986).
Mitigating circumstances in disbarment

1. Good faith in the acquisition of a property of the client subject of litigation (In Re:
Ruste, A.M. No. 632, June 27, 1940);
2. Inexperience of the lawyer (Munoz v. People, G.R. No. L-33672, Sept. 28, 1973);
3. Age (Santos v. Tan, A.C. No. 2697, Apr. 19, 1991);
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4. Apology (Munoz v. People, G.R. No. L- 33672, Sept. 28, 1973);

5. Lack of Intention to slight or offend the Court (Rheem of the Philippines, Inc. v.
Ferrer, G.R. No. L-22979, Jan. 27, 1967);
6. Absence of prior disciplinary record;
7. Absence of dishonest or selfish motive;
8. Personal or emotional problems;
9. Timely good faith effort to make restitution or to rectify consequences of
misconduct;
10. Full and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward the
proceedings;
11. Character or reputation;
12. Physical or mental disability or impairment;
13. Delay in disciplinary proceedings;
14. Interim rehabilitation;
15. Imposition of other penalties or sanctions;
16. Remorse;
17. Remoteness of prior offenses (IBP Guidelines 9.32).
NOTE: Disbarment should not be decreed where any punishment less severe such as
reprimand, suspension or fine would accomplish the end desired (Amaya v. Tecson, A.C. No.
5996, Feb. 7, 2005).
Aggravating circumstances in disbarment

1. Prior disciplinary offenses;
2. Dishonest or selfish motives;
3. A pattern of misconduct;
4. Multiple offenses;
5. Bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by intentionally failing to
comply with rules or orders of the disciplinary agency;
6. Submission of false evidence, false statements, or other deceptive practices
during the disciplinary process;
7. Refusal to acknowledge wrongful nature of conduct;
8. Vulnerability of victim;
9. Substantial experience in the practice of law; and
10. Indifference to making restitution. (IBP Guidelines 9.22)
Guidelines to be observed in the lifting of an order suspending a lawyer

from the practice of law
1. Upon the expiration of the period of suspension, respondent shall file a Sworn
Statement with the Court, through the Office of the Bar Confidant, stating therein
that he or she has desisted from the practice of law and has not appeared in any
court during the period of his or her suspension;
2. Copies of the Sworn Statement shall be furnished to the Local Chapter of the IBP
and to the Executive Judge of the courts where respondent has pending cases
handled by him or her, and/or where he or she has appeared as counsel; and
3. The Sworn Statement shall be considered as proof of respondent’s compliance
with the order of suspension;
4. Discipline of Filipino lawyers practicing abroad
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If the Filipino lawyer is disbarred or suspended from the practice of law by a

competent court or disciplinary agency in a foreign jurisdiction where he has been
admitted as an attorney, and a ground therefor includes any of the acts enumerated
in Section 27, Rule 138 of the RRC, such disbarment or suspension is a ground for
his disbarment or suspension in the Philippines (Lapena, 2009).
NOTE: The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary agency shall be
prima facie evidence of the ground for disbarment or suspension (SC Resolution date 21
February 1992 amending Sec. 27, Rule 138, RRC).
Judgment of suspension of a Filipino lawyer in a foreign court

The judgment of suspension against a Filipino lawyer in a foreign jurisdiction does
not automatically result in his suspension or disbarment in the Philippines as the acts
giving rise to his suspension are not grounds for disbarment and suspension in this
jurisdiction. Judgment of suspension against a Filipino lawyer may transmute into a
similar judgment of suspension in the Philippines only if the basis of the foreign
court's action includes any of the grounds for disbarment or suspension in this
jurisdiction. Such judgment merely constitutes prima facie evidence of unethical acts
as lawyer (Velez v. De Vera, A.C. No. 6697, July 25, 2006).
Q: Atty. LA is a member of the Philippine Bar and the California Bar in the United
States. For willful disobedience of a lawful order of a Superior Court in Los Angeles,
Atty. LA was suspended from the practice of law in California for one (1) year. May
his suspension abroad be considered a ground for disciplinary action against Atty. LA
in the Philippines? Why? (2002 Bar Question)
A: The suspension of Atty. LA from the practice of law abroad may be considered as
a ground for disciplinary action here if such suspension was based on one of the
grounds for disbarment in the Philippines or shows a loss of his good moral
character, a qualification he has to maintain in order to remain a member of the
Philippine Bar.
D. Readmission to the Bar
Reinstatement and its requirements

Reinstatement is the restoration of the privilege to practice law after a lawyer has
been disbarred. The applicant must, satisfy the Court that he is a person of good
moral character – a fit and proper person to practice law.
NOTE: The power of the Supreme Court to reinstate is based on its constitutional prerogative
to promulgate rules on the admission of applicants to the practice of law (1987 Constitution,
Sec. 5[5], Art. VIII).
1. Lawyers who have been suspended
Q: Raul Gonzales was found guilty of both contempt of court in facie curiae and
gross misconduct as an officer of court and member of the bar. For this, he was
suspended indefinitely. After more than 4 years from his suspension, Gonzales filed
an ex-parte motion to lift his suspension from the practice of law, alleging that he
gave free legal aid services by paying lawyers to do the same as he could not
personally represent said clients; pursued civic work for the poor; brought honor to
the country by delivering a paper in Switzerland; that he has a long record in the
service of human rights and the rule of law; his suspension of 51 months has been
the longest so far; states his profound regrets for the inconvenience which he has
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caused to the Court; sincerely reiterates his respect to the institution as he reiterates
his oath to conduct himself as a lawyer. May his suspension be lifted?
A: Yes. Gonzales’ contrition, so noticeably absent in his earlier pleadings, has
washed clean the offense of his disrespect. His remorse has soften his arrogance and
made up for his misconduct. Gonzales’ suspension has given him ample time and
opportunity to amend his erring ways, rehabilitate himself, and thus, prove himself
worthy once again to enjoy the privileges of membership of the Bar. His motion was
granted (Zaldivar v. Gonzales, G.R. Nos. 79690- 707, April 7, 1993).
Lifting of suspension is not automatic upon the end of the period stated in the
Court’s decision
The lifting of a lawyer’s suspension is not automatic upon the end of the period
stated in the Court’s decision, and an order from the Court lifting the suspension at
the end of the period is necessary in order to enable [him] to resume the practice of
his profession (J.K. Mercado and Sons Agricultural Enterprises, Inc. et al. v. Atty. de
Vera, et al. and Atty. de Vera v. Atty. Encanto, et al.).
Thus, according to the OBC, a suspended lawyer must first present proof(s) of his
compliance by submitting certifications from the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and from the Executive Judge that he has indeed desisted from the practice of law
during the period of suspension. Thereafter, the Court, after evaluation, and upon a
favorable recommendation from the OBC, will issue a resolution lifting the order of
suspension and thus allow him to resume the practice of law (Maniago v. Atty. De
Dios, A.C. No. 7472, March 30, 2010).
Guidelines to be observed in case of lifting an order which suspended a

lawyer from the practice of law
The following guidelines were issued by the Supreme Court, the same to be observed
in the matter of the lifting of an order suspending a lawyer from the practice of law:
1. After a finding that respondent lawyer must be suspended from the practice of
law, the Court shall render a decision imposing the penalty;
2. Unless the Court explicitly states that the decision is immediately executory upon
receipt thereof, respondent has 15 days within which to file a motion for
reconsideration thereof. The denial of said motion shall render the decision final and
executory;
3. Upon the expiration of the period of suspension, respondent shall file a Sworn
Statement with the Court, through the Office of the Bar Confidant, stating therein
that he or she has desisted from the practice of law and has not appeared in any
court during the period of his or her suspension;
4. Copies of the Sworn Statement shall be furnished to the Local Chapter of the IBP
and to the Executive Judge of the courts where respondent has pending cases
handled by him or her, and/or where he or she has appeared as counsel;
5. The Sworn Statement shall be considered as proof of respondent’s compliance
with the order of suspension;
6. Any finding or report contrary to the statements made by the lawyer under oath
shall be a ground for the imposition of a more severe punishment, or disbarment, as
may be warranted.
2. Lawyers who have been disbarred
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Requirements for judicial clemency for disbarred lawyers and judges

1. There must be proof of remorse and reformation.
2. Sufficient time must have elapsed from the imposition of the penalty to ensure a
period of reform.
3. The age of the person asking for clemency must show that he still has productive
years ahead of him that can be put to good use by giving him a chance to redeem
himself.
4. There must be a showing of promise (such as intellectual aptitude, learning or
legal acumen or contribution to the legal scholarship and the development of the
legal system), as well as potential for public service.
5. There must be other relevant factors and circumstances that may justify
clemency.
Supreme Court’s guidelines in reinstatement

1. The applicant’s character and standing prior to the disbarment;
2. The nature and character of the charge for which he was disbarred;
3. His conduct subsequent to the disbarment, and the time that has elapsed between
the disbarment and the application for reinstatement (Prudential Bank v. Benjamin
Grecia, A.C. No. 2756, Dec. 18, 1990);
4. His efficient government service (In re: Adriatico, G.R. No. L-2532, Nov. 17,
1910);
5. Applicant’s appreciation of the significance of his dereliction and his assurance that
he now possesses the requisite probity and integrity; and
6. Favorable endorsement of the IBP and pleas of his loved ones (Yap Tan v.
Sabandal, B.M. No. 144, Feb. 24, 1989).
NOTE: Whether or not the applicant shall be reinstated rests on the discretion of the court
(Prudential Bank v. Benjamin Grecia, A.C. No. 2756, Dec. 18, 1990). The court may require
applicant for reinstatement to enroll in and pass the required fourth year review classes in a
recognized law school (Cui v. Cui, In Re: Resian, A.C. No. 270, Mar. 20, 1974).
Effects of reinstatement
1. Reinstatement to the roll of attorneys wipes out the restrictions and disabilities
resulting from a previous disbarment (Cui v. Cui, G.R. No. L-18727, Aug. 31, 1964);
2. Recognition of moral rehabilitation and mental fitness to practice law;
3. Lawyer shall be subject to same law, rules and regulations as those applicable to
any other lawyer; and
4. Lawyer must comply with the conditions imposed on his readmission.
Effect of the executive pardon granted by the President

If during the pendency of a disbarment proceeding the respondent was granted
executive pardon, the dismissal of the case on that sole basis will depend on whether
the executive pardon is absolute or conditional.
1. Absolute or unconditional pardon - the disbarment case will be dismissed.
2. Conditional pardon - the disbarment case will not be dismissed on the basis
thereof.
NOTE: To be reinstated, there is still a need for the filing of an appropriate petition
with the Supreme Court (In re: Rovero, A.M. No. 126, Dec. 29, 1980).
Q: X filed proceedings for disbarment against his lawyer, Atty. C, following the
latter’s conviction for estafa for misappropriating funds belonging to his client (X).
While the proceedings for disbarment was pending, the President granted absolute
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pardon in favor of Atty. C. Atty. C, then, moved for the dismissal of the disbarment
case. Should the motion be granted?
A: An absolute pardon by the President is one that operates to wipe out the
conviction as well as the offense itself. The grant thereof to a lawyer is a bar to a
proceeding for disbarment against him, if such proceeding is based solely on the fact
of such conviction (In re: Parcasio, A.C. No. 100, Feb. 18, 1976).
But where the proceeding to disbar is founded on the professional misconduct
involved in the transaction which culminated in his conviction, the effect of the
pardon is only to relieve him of the penal consequences of his act and does not
operate as a bar to the disbarment proceeding, inasmuch as the criminal acts may
nevertheless constitute proof that the attorney does not possess good moral
character (In re: Lontok, 43 Phil. 293, Apr. 7, 1922).
NOTE: In the light of recent court pronouncements that a lawyer may be disciplined even for
non-professional misconduct, one may argue that a lawyer convicted of a crime involving
moral turpitude, and subsequently receives absolute pardon, may still be proceeded against
under the Code of Professional Responsibility even if the acts of which he was found guilty did
not involve professional misconduct (A modification of In Re Lontok, supra). The ground for
the petition for disciplinary action under the Code must, however, not be founded alone on the
conviction but must be based on the acts committed by the lawyer which rendered him
morally unfit to be a member of the bar (Aguirre, Legal and Judicial Ethics. A Pre-week
Reviewer, 2006 Edition).
Q: X, a member of the Bar, was charged with and found guilty of estafa, for which he
was sentenced to suffer imprisonment and to indemnify the offended party for the
amount Involved. Not having taken an appeal from the judgment of conviction, upon
finality thereof he was taken into custody to serve sentence. A month after he was
incarcerated, he was granted pardon by the Chief Executive on condition that he
would not commit another offense during the unserved portion of his prison
sentence. Soon after X’s release from custody after being pardoned, the offended
party in the criminal case filed a Complaint for Disbarment against X in the Supreme
Court. X set up the defense that having been pardoned thus he may not be disbarred
from the practice of law anymore. Is X’s contention tenable? (1999 Bar Question)
A: X’s contention is not tenable. He was granted only a conditional pardon. Such
conditional pardon merely relieved him of the penal consequences of his act but did
not operate as a bar to his disbarment. Such pardon does not reach the offense
itself. Hence, it does not constitute a bar to his disbarment. (In Re GutierrezbA.C.
No. L-363, July 31, 1962; In re Avancena, A.C. No. 407, Aug. 15, 1967).
Furthermore, the acts of X leading to his conviction may be used to show that he
does not possess the necessary requirement of good moral character for continued
membership in the Bar (In re Valloces, A.C. No. 439, Sept. 30, 1982).
3. Lawyers who have been repatriated
Q: Dacanay practiced law until he migrated to Canada to seek medical attention to

his ailments. He subsequently applied for Canadian citizenship to avail of Canada’s
free medical aid program. His application was approved and he became a Canadian
citizen. Dacanay later on reacquired his Philippine citizenship by virtue of R.A. 9225.
Did Dacanay lose his membership in the Philippine bar when he gave up his
Philippine citizenship? Can he automatically practice law upon reacquiring Filipino
citizenship?
A: The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in the Philippines
shall be limited to Filipino citizens save in cases prescribed by law. Since Filipino
citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar, loss thereof terminates
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membership in the Philippine bar and, consequently, the privilege to engage in the
practice of law. In other words, the loss of Filipino citizenship ipso jure terminates
the privilege to practice law in the Philippines. The practice of law is a privilege
denied to foreigners.
The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization as a
citizen of another country but subsequently reacquired pursuant to R.A. 9225. This is
because “all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be
deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of R.A.
9225.” Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country is
deemed never to have lost his Philippine citizenship if he reacquires it in accordance
with R.A. 9225. Although he is also deemed never to have terminated his
membership in the Philippine bar, no automatic right to resume law practice accrues.
Before a lawyer who reacquires Filipino citizenship pursuant to R.A. 9225 can resume
his law practice, he must first secure from the SC the authority to do so, conditioned
on:
1. The updating and payment in full of the annual membership dues in the IBP;
2. The payment of professional tax;
3. The completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal
education, this is especially significant to refresh the applicant/petitioner’s knowledge
of Philippine laws and update him of legal developments; and
4. The retaking of the lawyer’s oath which will not only remind him of his duties and
responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of the Court, but also renew his pledge
to maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines (Petition for Leave to
Resume Practice of Law of Benjamin Dacanay, B.M. No. 1678, Dec. 17, 2007).
E. Mandatory Continuing Legal Education
1. Purpose
MCLE ensures that members of the IBP are kept abreast with law and jurisprudence
throughout their career, maintain the ethics of the profession and enhance the
standards of the practice of law.
Committee on Mandatory Continuing Legal Education

1. Composition:
a. Retired Justice of the SC – to act as Chairman, who is nominated by the SC
b. IBP National President – acts as the Vice-Chairman
c. 3 other members – nominated by the Philippine Judicial Academy, UP Law Center
and Association of Law Professors, respectively
2. Members are of proven probity and integrity
3. Compensation as may be determined by the SC
4. The initial terms of each of the 3 members shall be 5, 4, and 3 years respectively
2. Requirements
Members of the IBP, unless exempted under Rule 7, shall complete every 3 years at
least 36 hours of continuing legal education activities. The 36 hours shall be divided
as follows:
1. 6 hours – legal ethics
2. 4 hours – trial and pretrial skills
3. 5 hours – alternative dispute resolution
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4. 9 hours – updates on substantive and procedural laws and jurisprudence

5. 4 hours – legal writing and oral advocacy
6. 2 hours – international law and international conventions
7. Remaining 6 hours – such other subjects as may be prescribed by the Committee
on MCLE
MCLE for a newly admitted member of the bar

Starts on the first day of the month of his admission. (Bar Matter No. 850, Sec. 5,
last par.)
Classes of credits
1. Participatory credit – Attending approved education activities like seminars,
conventions, symposia, and the like; speaking or lecturing, or assigned as panelist,
reactor, or commentator, etc. in approved education activities; teaching in law
school or lecturing in bar review classes.
2. Non-participatory – Preparing, as author or co-author, written materials (article,
book or book review) which contribute to the legal education of the author member,
which were not prepared in the ordinary course of his practice or employment;
editing a law book, law journal or legal newsletter.
3. Compliance
Non-compliance of the MCLE

1. Failure to complete education requirement within the compliance period;
2. Failure to provide attestation of compliance or exemption;
3. Failure to provide satisfactory evidence of compliance (including evidence of
exempt status) within the prescribed period;
4. Failure to satisfy the education requirement and furnish evidence of such
compliance within 60 days from receipt of non-compliance notice;
5. Failure to pay non-compliance fee within the prescribed period; or
6. Any other act or omission analogous to any of the foregoing or intended to
circumvent or evade compliance with the MCLE requirements.
NOTE: Members failing to comply will receive a Non-Compliance Notice stating the specific
deficiency and will be given 60 days from date of notification to file a response.
4. Exemptions
Persons exempted from the MCLE

1. The President, Vice-President and the Secretaries and Undersecretaries of
Executive Departments;
2. Senators and Members of the House of Representatives;
3. The Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, incumbent and
retired members of the judiciary, incumbent members of Judicial Bar Council,
incumbent members of the MCLE Committee, incumbent court lawyers who have
availed of the Philippine Judicial Academy programs of continuing judicial education
(Amendment to Bar Matter 850, Resolution\ of the Court En Banc, July 13, 2004);
4. The Chief State Counsel, Chief State Prosecutor and Assistant Secretaries of the
Dept. of Justice;
5. The Solicitor General and the Assistant Solicitor General;
6. The Government Corporate Counsel, Deputy and Assistant Government Corporate
Counsel;
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7. The Chairman and Members of the Constitutional Commissions;

8. The Ombudsman, the Overall Deputy Ombudsman, the Deputy Ombudsmen and
the Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman;
9. Heads of government agencies exercising quasi-judicial functions;
10. Incumbent deans, bar reviewers and professors of law who have teaching
experience for at least 10 years in accredited law schools;
11. The Chancellor, Vice-Chancellor and members of the Corps of Professional and
Professorial Lecturers of the Philippine Judicial Academy; and
12. Governors and Mayors because they are prohibited from practicing their
profession
Other parties exempted:
1. Those who are not in law practice, private or public;
2. Those who have retired from law practice with the approval of the IBP Board of
Governors.
Request for exemption under special circumstance

If there is a good cause for exemption from or modification of requirement, member
may file a verified request setting forth good cause for exemption (such as physical
disability, illness, post-graduate study abroad, proven expertise in law, etc.) from
compliance with or modification of any of the requirements, including an extension of
time for compliance, in accordance with procedure to be established by the
Committee on MCLE.
NOTE: Applications for exemption from or modification of the MCLE requirement shall be under
oath and supported by documents.
Q: Atty. Mike started teaching Agrarian Reform and Taxation in June 2001 at the
Arts and Sciences Department of the Far Eastern University. In 2005, he moved to
San Sebastian Institute of Law where he taught Political Law. Is Atty. Mike exempt
from complying with the MCLE for the 4th compliance period in April 2013? (2011
Bar Question)
A: No, since he has yet to complete the required teaching experience to be exempt.
5. Sanctions
Consequences of non-compliance
A member who fails to comply with the requirements after the 60-day period shall be
listed as delinquent member by the IBP Board of Governors upon recommendation of
the Committee on MCLE.
NOTE: The listing as a delinquent member is an administrative in nature but it shall be made
with notice and hearing by the Committee on MCLE. B.M. No. 1922, which took effect on
January 1, 2009, requires practicing members of the bar to indicate in all pleadings filed
before the courts or quasi-judicial bodies, the number and date of issue of their MCLE
Certificate of Compliance or Certificate of Exemption, as may be applicable, for the
immediately preceding compliance period. Failure to disclose the required information would
cause the dismissal of the case and the expunction of the pleadings from the records.
6. Bar Matter 2012, Rule on Mandatory Legal Aid Service
The mandatory Legal Aid Service mandates every practicing lawyer to render a
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minimum of 60 hours of free legal aid services to indigent litigants yearly.
Purpose
The rule seeks to enhance the duty of lawyers to the society as agents of social
change and to the courts as officers thereof by helping improve access to justice by
the less privileged members of society and expedite the resolution of cases involving
them. Mandatory free legal service by members of the bar and their active support
thereof will aid the efficient and effective administration of justice especially in cases
involving indigent and pauper litigants (Sec. 2, B.M. No. 2012).
Scope
It shall govern the mandatory requirement for practicing lawyers to render free legal
aid services in all cases (whether, civil, criminal or administrative) involving indigent
and pauper litigants where the assistance of a lawyer is needed. It shall also govern
the duty of other members of the legal profession to support the legal aid program of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (B.M. No. 2012, Sec 3).
Practicing lawyers are members of the Philippine Bar who appear for and in behalf of
parties in courts of law and quasi-judicial agencies.
Legal aid cases

It includes actions, disputes, and controversies that are criminal, civil and
administrative in nature in whatever stage wherein indigent and pauper litigants
need legal representation (B. M.2012, Sec. 4[c]).
Requirements for mandatory legal aid service

Under the Rule, a practicing lawyer, among others, shall coordinate with the Clerk of
Court or the Legal Aid Chairperson of one’s Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
Chapter for cases where the lawyer may render free legal aid service:
1. Every practicing lawyer is required to render a minimum of 60 hours of free legal
aid services to indigent litigants in a year. Said 60 hours shall be spread within the
period of 12 months, with a minimum of 5 hours of free legal aid services each
month. However, where it is necessary for the practicing lawyer to render legal aid
service for more than 5 hours in one month, the excess hours may be credited to the
said lawyer for the succeeding periods (B.M. 2012, Sec. 5[a] first par.).
2. The practicing lawyer shall report compliance with the requirement within 10 days
of the last month of each quarter of the year. (B.M. 2012, Sec. 5[a] third par.)
3. A practicing lawyer shall be required to secure and obtain a certificate from the
Clerk of Court attesting to the number of hours spent rendering free legal aid
services in a case. (B.M. 2012, Sec. 5[b])
4. Said compliance report shall be submitted to the Legal Aid Chairperson of the IBP
Chapter within the Court’s jurisdiction. (B.M. 2012, Sec. 5[c])
5. The IBP chapter shall, after verification, issue a compliance certificate to the
concerned lawyer. The IBP Chapter shall also submit compliance reports to the IBP’s
National Committee on Legal Aid (NCLA) for recording and documentation. The
submission shall be made within forty-five (45) days after the mandatory submission
of compliance reports by the practicing lawyers. (B.M. 2012, Sec. 5[d])
6. Practicing lawyers shall indicate in all pleadings filed before the courts or quasi-
judicial bodies the number and date of issue of their certificate of compliance for the
immediately preceding compliance period. (B.M. 2012, Sec 5[e])
Sanctions in case of non-compliance with the rule on mandatory legal aid
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service
1. At the end of every calendar year, any practicing lawyer who fails to meet the
minimum prescribed 60 hours of legal aid service each year shall be required by the
IBP, through the National Committee on Legal Aid (NCLA), to explain why he was
unable to render the minimum prescribed number of hours.
2. If no explanation has been given or if the NCLA finds the explanation
unsatisfactory, the NCLA shall make a report and recommendation to the IBP Board
of Governors that the erring lawyer be declared a member of the IBP who is not in
good standing.
3. Upon approval of the NCLA’s recommendation, the IBP Board of Governors shall
declare the erring lawyer as a member not in good standing.
4. The notice to the lawyer shall include a directive to pay P4,000.00 penalty which
shall accrue to the special fund for the legal aid program of the IBP.
5. The “not in good standing” declaration shall be effective for a period of 3 months
from the receipt of the erring lawyer of the notice from the IBP Board of Governors.
6. During the said period, the lawyer cannot appear in court or any quasi-judicial
body as counsel.
7. Provided, however, that the “not in good standing” status shall subsist even after
the lapse of the 3-month period until and unless the penalty shall have been paid.
8. Any lawyer who fails to comply with his duties under this Rule for at least 3
consecutive years shall be the subject of disciplinary proceedings to be instituted
motu proprio by the Committee on Bar Discipline. (B.M. 2012, Sec. 7)
NOTE: The falsification of a certificate or any contents thereof by any Clerk of Court or by any
Chairperson of the Legal Aid Committee of the IBP local chapter where the case is pending or
by the Director of a legal clinic or responsible officer of an NGO (non-governmental
organizations) or PO (people’s organizations) shall be a ground for an administrative case
against the said Clerk of Court or Chairperson. This is without prejudice to the filing of the
criminal and administrative charges against the malfeasor (B.M. 2012, Sec. 7[e]).
F. Notarial Practice (A. M. No. 02-8-13-SC, as amended) (1996, 2005, 2007

BAR)
Purpose of the Notarial Law

1. To promote, serve, and protect public interest;
2. To simplify, clarify, and modernize the rules governing notaries public; and
3. To foster ethical conduct among notaries public (Sec. 2, Rule I, A.M. No. 02-8-13-
SC)
Effect of notarized document

A document acknowledged before a notary public is a public document (RRC, Sec.
19, Rule 132) and may be presented in evidence without further proof, the certificate
of acknowledgment being prima facie evidence of the execution of the instrument or
document involved (RRC, Sec. 30, Rule 132).
1. Qualifications of notary public
Notary public
A person appointed by the court whose duty is to attest to the genuineness of any
deed or writing in order to render them available as evidence of facts stated therein
and who is authorized by the statute to administer various oaths.
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NOTE: “Notary Public" and "Notary" refer to any person commissioned to perform official acts
under the rules on Notarial Practice (Sec. 9, Rule II, A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC).
Qualifications of a notary public

To be eligible for commissioning as notary public, the petitioner must be:
1. A citizen of the Philippines;
2. Over 21 years of age;
3. A resident in the Philippines for at least 1 year and maintains a regular place of
work or business in the city or province where the commission is to be issued;
4. A member of the Philippine Bar in good standing with clearances from the Office of
the Bar Confidant of the Supreme Court and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines;
and
5. Has not been convicted in the first instance of any crime involving moral turpitude
(second par., Sec. 1, Rule III,2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, A.M.).
Commission
It refers to the grant of authority to perform notarial acts and to the written evidence
of the authority (Sec. 3, Rule II, A.M. 02-8-13-SC).
Issuance of notarial commission

A notarial commission may be issued by an Executive Judge to any qualified person
who submits a petition in accordance with the Rules on Notarial Practice (A.M. No.
02-8-13-SC, first par., Sec. 1, Rule III).
Two kinds of duties

1. Execution of formalities required by law; and
2. Verification of the capacity and identity of the parties as well as the legality of the
act executed
Duties of a notary public

1. To keep a notarial register
2. To make the proper entry or entries in his notarial register touching his notarial
acts in the manner required by the law
3. To send the copy of the entries to the proper clerk of court within the first 10 days
of the month next following
4. To affix to acknowledgments the date of expiration of his commission, as required
by law
5. To forward his notarial register, when filled, to the proper clerk of court
6. To make report, within reasonable time to the proper judge concerning the
performance of his duties, as may be required by such judge
7. To make the proper notation regarding residence certificates (Sec. 240, Rev. Adm.
Code).
Lawyers as notary public

GR: Only those admitted to the practice of law are qualified to be notaries public.
XPNs: When there are no persons with the necessary qualifications or where there
are qualified persons but they refuse appointment. In which case, the following
persons may be appointed as notaries:
1. Those who passed the studies of law in a reputable university; or
2. A clerk or deputy clerk of court for a period of not less than two years.
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Prohibition against the RTC judges to notarize

Section 35, Rule 138, of the Revised Rules of Court as well as Canon 5, Rule 5.07 of
the Code of Judicial Conduct provides that no judge or other official or employee of
the superior courts shall engage in private practice as a member of the bar or give
professional advice to clients. Notarization of documents is considered a practice of
law.
The rights, duties, privileges and functions of the office of an attorney-at-law are so
inherently incompatible with the official functions, duties, powers, discretions and
privileges of a judge of the Regional Trial Court.
Authority of MTC judges to notarize and its limitation

MTC and MCTC judges may act as notaries public ex-officio in the notarization of
documents connected only with the exercise of their official functions and duties.
They may not, as notaries public ex-officio, undertake the preparation and
acknowledgment of private documents, contracts and other acts of conveyances
which bear no direct relation to the performance of their functions as judges.
However, MTC and MCTC judges assigned to municipalities or circuits with no
lawyers or notaries public may, in the capacity as notaries public ex-officio, perform
any act within the competence of a regular notary public, provided that:
1. All notarial fees charged be for the account of the Government and turned over to
the municipal treasurer
2. Certification be made in the notarized documents attesting to the lack of any
lawyer or notary public in such municipality or circuit.
Their authority to notarize is limited to their sala. Hence, they cannot notarize
documents filed in another town because it will be considered as practice of law.
Q: Vicente Batic charged Judge Victorio Galapon Jr. with engaging in unauthorized
notarial practice for having notarized a Deed of Absolute Sale between Antonio
Caamic and Lualhati Ellert. Under the deed of sale, Lualhati Ellert, was described as
single. At the time of Galapon’s notarization of the Deed of Sale, there was a notary
public in Dulag, Leyte. Judge Galapon claims that he did not prepare the document
and that his participation was limited to its acknowledgment, for which the
corresponding fee was collected by and paid to the clerk of court. Are MTC judges
like Judge Galapon absolutely prohibited from acting as notaries public?
A: No. While Judge Galapon explains that he sincerely believed that when no notary
public is available, the MTC may act as ex-officio notary public, provided the fees
shall be for the government, such is not enough to exonerate him from liability. His
acts do not fall under the exception because at the time of his notarization of the
Deed of Sale, there was a notary public in Dulag, Leyte (Vicente Batic v. Judge
Victorio Galapon Jr., A.M. No. MTJ-99-1239, July 29, 2005).
Clerk of court as notary

Clerk of court may at as notary public, provided he is commissioned and has been
permitted by his superior. Such consent is necessary because the act of notarizing a
document is a practice of law.
2.Term of office of notary public
Term of office of a notary public (1995 Bar Question)

A notary public may perform notarial acts for a period of 2 years commencing the 1st
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day of January of the year in which the commissioning is made until the last day of
December of the succeeding year regardless of the actual date when the application
was renewed, unless earlier revoked or the notary public has resigned under the
Rules on Notarial Practice and the Rules of Court (A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC, Section 11,
Rule III).
NOTE: The period of 2 years of a notarial commission will commence at January first
regardless of when it was really granted and will end at exactly 2 years from said date of
commencement up to December of the 2nd year. Ex. Atty. Antonio applied for and was given
notarial commission on 12 November 2010, such term will expire on 31 December 2011 (2011
Bar Question).
Q: Juan dela Cruz was commissioned as a notary public in 2001. His friend asked
him to notarize a deed of absolute sale sometime in 2004, to which he agreed free of
charge. A complaint for malpractice was filed against him. Is Juan dela Cruz guilty of
malpractice?
A: Yes. Absent any showing that his notarial commission has been renewed, his act
constitutes malpractice because at the time he notarized the document, his notarial
commission has already expired. It is not a defense that no payment has been
received. The requirement for the issuance of the commission as notary public must
not be treated as a mere casual formality. In fact, Juan’s act also constitutes
falsification of public document.
Expired Commission
A notary public may file a written application with the Executive Judge for the
renewal of his commission within 45 days before the expiration thereof. A mark,
image or impression of the seal of the notary public shall be attached in the
application (A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC, first par., Sec. 13, Rule III).
NOTE: If a person is applying for a commission for the first time, what he files is a petition and
not an application.
Failure of the notary public to file an application for the renewal of his
commission
Failure to file said application will result in the deletion of the name of the notary
public in the register of notaries public and may only be reinstated therein after he is
issued a new commission (A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC, second and third pars., Sec. 13,
Rule III).
NOTE: The Executive Judge shall, upon payment of the application fee, act on an application
for renewal of a commission within thirty (30) days from receipt thereof. If the application is
denied, the Executive Judge shall state the reasons therefor (A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC, Sec. 14,
Rule III).
3. Powers and limitations
Powers of a notary public

A notary public is empowered to perform the following notarial acts: (JAO-CAS)
1. Acknowledgements;
2. Oaths and affirmations;
3. Jurats;
4. Signature witnessings;
5. Copy certifications; and
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6. Any other act authorized by these rules (A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC, Section 1(a), Rule
IV)
Notarization of a private document

Notarization converts a private document to a public instrument, making it
admissible in evidence without the necessity of preliminary proof of its authenticity
and due execution. A notarized document is by law entitled to full credit upon its face
and it is for this reason that notaries public must observe the basic requirements in
notarizing documents (Dolores dela cruz, ET AL V. Atty. Jose Dimaano, Jr.,
September 12, 2008, A.C. No. 7781).
Acknowledgment
Refers to an act in which an individual on a single occasion:
1. Appears in person before the notary public and presents an integrally complete
instrument or document;
NOTE: A notary public cannot perform a notarial act over a document that has missing pages,
or that contains blanks that should be filled-in prior to the notarial act.
2. Is attested to be personally known to the notary public or identified by the notary

public through competent evidence of identity as defined by the Rules on Notarial
Practice; and
3. Represents to the notary public that the signature on the instrument or document
was voluntarily affixed by him for the purposes stated in the instrument or
document, declares that he has executed the instrument or document as his free and
voluntary act and deed, and, if he acts in a particular representative capacity, that
he has the authority to sign in that capacity (Sec. 1, Rule II, A.M. 02-8-13-SC).
Q: “Before me personally appeared this 30th of August 2010 Milagros A. Ramirez,

who proved her identity to me through witnesses: 1. Rosauro S. Balana, Passport
UU123456; 1-5-2010/Baguio City; and 2. Elvira N. Buela, Passport VV200345; 1-17-
2009/Manila. “Both witnesses, of legal ages, under oath declare that: Milagros A.
Ramirez is personally known to them; she is the same seller in the foregoing deed of
sale; she does not have any current identification document nor can she obtain one
within a reasonable time; and they are not privy to or are interested in the deed he
signed.” What is the status of such a notarial acknowledgement? (2011 Bar
Question)
A: Valid, since it is a manner of establishing the identity of the person executing the
document.
Jurat
1. Appears in person before the notary public and presents an instrument or
document;
2. Is personally known to the notary public or identified by the notary public through
competent evidence of identity as defined by the Rules on Notarial Practice;
3. Signs the instrument or document in the presence of the notary; and
4. Takes an oath or affirmation before the notary public as to such instrument or
document (A.M. 02-8-13-SC, Sec. 6, Rule II).
NOTE: A jurat is not a part of a pleading but merely evidences the fact that the affidavit was
properly made. The claim or belief of Atty. Dela Rea that the presence of petitioner Gamido
was not necessary for the jurat because it is not an acknowledgment is patently baseless. If
Page 95 of 163
this had been his belief since he was first commissioned as a notary public, then he has been
making a mockery of the legal solemnity of an oath in a jurat. Notaries public and others
authorized by law to administer oaths or to take acknowledgments should not take for granted
the solemn duties appertaining to their offices. Such duties are dictated by public policy and
are impressed with public interest (Gamido v. Bilibid Prisons Officials, G.R. No. 114829, Mar.
1, 1995).
Acknowledgement vs. Jurat
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
a. Act of one who has executed a deed, in going to some competent officer or court
and declaring It to be his act or deed.
b. The notary public or officer taking the acknowledgement shall certify that the
person acknowledging the instrument or document is known to him and he is the
same person who executed it and acknowledged that the same is his free act and
deed.
c. Two-fold purpose: To authorize the deed to be given in evidence without further
proof of its execution, and, to entitle it to be recorded.
d. Where used: 1. To authenticate an agreement between two or more persons; or
2. Where the document contains a disposition of property.
e. E.g. The acknowledgement in a deed of lease of land.
JURAT
a. That part of an affidavit in which the notary public or officer certifies that the
instrument was sworn to before him.
b. It is not part of a pleading but merely evidences the fact that the affidavit was
properly made.
c. Purpose: Gives the document a legal character
d. Where used: 1. Affidavits; 2. Certifications; 3. Whenever the person executing
makes a statement of facts or attests to the truth of an event, under oath
e. E.g. An affidavit subscribed before a notary public or public official authorized for
the purpose
NOTE: In notarial wills, acknowledgement is required, not merely a jurat.
Signature witnessing
Refers to a notarial act in which an individual on a single occasion:
1. Appears in person before the notary public and presents an instrument or
document;
competent evidence of identity as defined by the Rules on Notarial Practice; and
3. Signs the instrument or document in the presence of the notary public (A. M. No.
02-8-13-SC, Sec. 14, Rule II).
Q: Is a notary public authorized to certify the affixing of a signature by thumb or

other mark on an instrument or document presented for notarization? (1995 Bar
Question)
A: Yes. It is also within the powers of a notary public, provided:
1. The thumb or other mark is affixed in the presence of the notary public and of two
(2) disinterested and unaffected witnesses to the instrument or document;
2. Both witnesses sign their own names in addition to the thumb or other mark;
3. The notary public writes below the thumb or other mark: “thumb or other mark
affixed by (name of signatory by mark) in the presence of (names and addresses of
Page 96 of 163
witnesses) and undersigned notary public”; and

4. The notary public notarizes the signature by thumb or other mark through an
acknowledgment, jurat or signature witnessing. (Sec. 1(b), Rule IV, A.M. No. 02-8-
13-SC)
Q: Is a notary public authorized to sign on behalf of a person who is physically

unable to sign or make a mark on an instrument or document? (1995 Bar Question)
A: Yes. It likewise falls within the powers of a notary public, provided:
1. The notary public is directed by the person unable to sign or make a mark to sign
on his behalf;
2. The signature of the notary public is affixed in the presence of 2 disinterested and
unaffected witnesses to the instrument or document;
3. Both witnesses sign their own names;
4. The notary public writes below his signature: “Signature affixed by notary in the
presence of (names and addresses of person and 2 witnesses)”; and
5. The notary public notarizes his signature by acknowledgment or jurat (A.M. 02-8-
13-SC, Sec. 1(c), Rule IV).
Copy certification
Refers to a notarial act in which a notary public:
1. Is presented with an instrument or document that is neither a vital record, a
public record, nor publicly recordable;
2. Copies or supervises the copying of the instrument or document;
3. Compares the instrument or document with the copy; and
4. Determines that the copy is accurate and complete (A.M. 02-8-13-SC, Sec. 4,
Rule II).
NOTE: The document copied must be an original document. It cannot be a copy itself.
Notarial certificate
Refers to the part of, or attachment to a notarized instrument or document that is
completed by the notary public which bears the notary's signature and seal, and
states the facts attested to by the notary public in a particular notarization as
provided for by the Rules on Notarial Practice (A. M. No. 02-8-13, Sec. 8, Rule II).
NOTE: “Loose notarial certificate” refers to a notarial certificate that is attached to a notarized
instrument or document.
Limitations to the performance of a notarial act

A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the
instrument or document is:
a. Not in the notary's presence personally at the time of the notarization; and (A.M.
No. 02-8-13-SC, Sec. 2(b)(1), RuleIV).
b. Not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the notary
public through competent evidence of identity as defined by the Rules on Notarial
Practice (A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC, Sec.2(b)(2), Rule IV)
c. The document is blank or incomplete; (A.M. 02-8-13-SC, Sec.6 (a) Rule IV)
d. An instrument or document is without appropriate notarial certification (A.M. 02-
8-13-SC, Sec. 6, Rule IV).
Q: Engineer Cynthia de la Cruz Catalya filed an application for building permit in

connection with the renovation of a building situated on a lot owned by her brother
Page 97 of 163
Rolando de la Cruz. One of the documents required in the processing of the

application was an affidavit to be executed by the lot owner. Since Rolando de la
Cruz was a resident abroad, an affidavit was prepared wherein it was made to
appear that he was a resident of Leyte. Atty. Francisco Villamor notarized the
purported affidavit. According to him, a Chinese mestizo appeared in his law office
one time, requesting that his affidavit be notarized. Said person declared that he was
Rolando de la Cruz. Atty. Villamor then asked for the production of his residence
certificate, but he said, he did not bother to bring the same along with him anymore
as, he has already indicated his serial number, in the jurat portion together with the
date of issue and place of issue. Did Atty. Francisco Villamor commit a violation of
notarial law?
A: Yes. It is the duty of the notarial officer to demand that the document presented
to him for notarization should be signed in his presence. By his admission, the
affidavit was already signed by the purported affiant at the time it was presented to
him for notarization. Atty. Villamor thus failed to heed his duty as a notary public to
demand that the document for notarization be signed in his presence (Traya Jr. v.
Villamor, A.C. No. 4595,Feb. 6, 2004).
Disqualification of a notary public to perform a notarial act

A notary public is disqualified to perform notarial act when he:
1. Is a party to the instrument or document that is to be notarized;
2. Will receive, as a direct or indirect result, any commission, fee, advantage, right,
title, interest, cash, property, or other consideration, except as provided by the Rules
on Notarial Practice and by law; or
3. Is a spouse, common-law partner, ancestor, descendant, or relative by affinity or
consanguinity of the principal within the fourth civil degree (A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC,
Sec. 3, Rule IV).
NOTE: The function would be defeated if the notary public is one of the signatories to the
instrument. For then, he would be interested in sustaining the validity thereof as it directly
involves himself and the validity of his own act. It would place him in an inconsistent position,
and the very purpose of the acknowledgment, which is to minimize fraud, would be thwarted
(Villarin v. Sabate, A.C. No. 3224,Feb. 9, 2000).
Instances when notary public may refuse to notarize

1. The notary knows or has good reason to believe that the notarial act or
transaction is unlawful or immoral;
2. The signatory shows a demeanor which engenders in the mind of the notary public
reasonable doubt as to the former's knowledge of the consequences of the
transaction requiring a notarial act;
3. In the notary's judgment, the signatory is not acting of his or her own free will;
(A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC, Sec.4, Rule V) or
4. If the document or instrument to be notarized is considered as an improper
document by the Rules on Notarial Practice.
NOTE: Improper instrument/document is a blank or incomplete instrument or an instrument or

document without appropriate notarial certification (A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC, Sec. 6, Rule V).
Affirmation or oath
1. Appears in person before the notary public;
competent evidence of identity as defined by the Rules on Notarial Practice; and
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3. Avows under penalty of law to the whole truth of the contents of the instrument or
document (Sec. 2,Rule II, A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC).
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9406

MARCH 23, 2007
Officers allowed to administer oaths

1. President;
2. Vice-President;
3. Members and Secretaries of both Houses of the Congress;
4. Members of the Judiciary;
5. Secretaries of Departments;
6. Provincial governors and lieutenant-governors;
7. City mayors;
8. Municipal mayors;
9. Bureau directors;
10. Regional directors;
11. Clerk of courts;
12. Registrars of deeds;
13. Other civilian officers in the public service of the government of the Philippines
whose appointments are vested in the President and are subject to confirmation by
the Commission on Appointments;
14. All other constitutional officers;
15. PAO lawyers in connection with the performance of duty; and
16. Notaries public (Sec. 41)
Duty to administer oaths

Officers authorized to administer oaths, with the exception of notaries public,
municipal judges and clerks of court, are not obliged to administer oaths or execute
certificates save in matters of official business or in relation to their functions as
such; and with the exception of notaries public, the officer performing the service in
those matters shall charge no fee, unless specifically authorized by law (Section 42).
NOTE: P.A.O. Lawyers now have the authority to administer oaths, provided it is in connection
with the performance of their duties. The fiscal or the state prosecutor has the authority to
administer oaths (RA No. 5180, as amended by P.D. 911).
4. Notarial register
A notary public shall keep, maintain, protect and provide for lawful inspection as
provided in these Rules, a chronological official notarial register of notarial acts
consisting of a permanently bound book with numbered pages.
NOTE: Failure of the notary to make the proper entry or entries in his notarial register
touching his notarial acts in the manner required by law is a ground for revocation of his
commission. (Father Ranhilio C. Aquino Et. Al., s. Complainants, Vs. Atty. Edwin Pascua,
Respondent. A.C. No. 5095, November 28, 2007, En Banc)
Signing or affixing a thumbmark in the notarial register

At the time of notarization, the notary's notarial register shall be signed or a thumb
or other mark affixed by each:
Page 99 of 163
1. Principal;
2. Credible witness swearing or affirming to the identity of a principal; and
3. Witness to a signature by thumb or other mark, or to a signing by the notary
public on behalf of a person physically unable to sign (A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC, Sec.
3,Rule VI).
Rules in case of loss, destruction or damage of notarial register

1. In case the notarial register is stolen, lost, destroyed, damaged, or otherwise
rendered unusable or illegible as a record of notarial acts, the notary public shall,
within ten (10) days after informing the appropriate law enforcement agency in the
case of theft or vandalism, notify the Executive Judge by any means providing a
proper receipt or acknowledgment, including registered mail and also provide a copy
or number of any pertinent police report.
2. Upon revocation or expiration of a notarial commission, or death of the notary
public, the notarial register and notarial records shall immediately be delivered to the
office of the Executive Judge (Sec. 5, Rule VI, A. M. No. 02-8-13-SC, Sec. 5, Rule
VI).
The notary public may refuse the request of inspection for register of deeds
If the notary public has a reasonable ground to believe that a person has a criminal
intent or wrongful motive in requesting information from the notarial register, the
notary shall deny access to any entry or entries therein (A. M. No. 02-8-13-SC, Sec.
4(c), Rule VI).
5. Jurisdiction of notary public and place of notarization
Jurisdiction of notary public

A notary public may perform notarial acts in any place within the territorial
jurisdiction of the commissioning court.
Under the Notarial Law, the jurisdiction of a notary public is co-extensive with the
province for which he was commissioned; and for the notary public in the city of
Manila, the jurisdiction is co-extensive with said city. Circular 8 of 1985, however,
clarified further that the notary public may be commissioned for the same term only
by one court within the Metro Manila region.
“Regular place of work or business” of a notary public meaning

The regular place of work or business refers to a stationary office in the city or
province wherein the notary public renders legal and notarial services (Sec. 11, Rule
II, 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice).
Rules with regard to jurisdiction of notary public

GR: A notary public shall not perform a notarial act outside his jurisdiction and his
regular place of work or business.
NOTE: Outside the place of his commission, a notary public is bereft of power to perform any
notarial act (Guerrero v. Bihis, 2007).
XPNs: A notarial act may be performed at the request of the parties in the following
sites, other than his regular place of work or business, located within his territorial
jurisdiction:
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1. Public offices, convention halls, and similar places where oaths of office may be
administered;
2. Public function areas in hotels and similar places for the signing of instruments or
documents requiring notarization;
3. Hospitals and other medical institutions where a party to an instrument or
document is confined for treatment
4. Any place where a party to an instrument or document requiring notarization is
under detention (A. M. No. 02-8-13-SC, Sec. 2, Rule IV).
5. Such other places as may be dictated because of emergency.
NOTE: It is improper for a notary public to notarize documents in sidewalk since it is now
required that a notary public should maintain a regular place of work or business within the
city or province where he is commissioned. The SC evidently wants to eradicate the practice of
“fly by night” notaries public who notarized documents in “improvised” offices.
6. Revocation of commission
Who may revoke the notarial commission

1. The Executive Judge of the RTC who issued the commission on any ground on
which an application for commission may be denied (A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC,Sec. 1,
Rule XI); or
2. By the Supreme Court itself in the exercise of its general supervisory powers over
lawyer.
Grounds for Revocation

The executive Judge shall revoke a notarial commission for any ground on which an
application for a commission may be denied. In addition, the Executive Judge may
revoke the commission of, or impose appropriate administrative sanctions upon, any
notary public who:
1. Fails to keep a notarial register;
2. Fails to make the proper entry or entries in his notarial register concerning his
notarial acts;
3. Fails to send the copy of the entries to the Executive Judge within the first ten
(10) days of the month following;
4. Fails to affix to acknowledgments the date of expiration of his commission;
5. Fails to submit his notarial register, when filled, to the Executive Judge;
6. Fails to make his report, within a reasonable time, to the Executive Judge
concerning the performance of his duties, as may be required by the judge;
7. Fails to require the presence of a principal at the time of the notarial act;
NOTE: "Principal" refers to a person appearing before the notary public whose act is the
subject of notarization.
8. Fails to identify a principal on the basis of personal knowledge or competent

evidence;
9. Executes a false or incomplete certificate under Section 5, Rule IV;
10. Knowingly performs or fails to perform any other act prohibited or mandated by
these Rules; and
11. Commits any other dereliction or act which in the judgment of the Executive
Judge constitutes good cause for revocation of commission or imposition of
administrative sanction (Sec. 1, Rule XI,Rule on Notarial Practice).
NOTE: Functions of notary public – violations: suspension as notary not for the practice of law
Page 101 of 163

(Villarin v. Sabate, A.C. No. 3224,Feb. 9, 2000).
7. Competent evidence of identity
Competent evidence of identity

Competent evidence of identity refers to the identification of an individual based on
the following:
1. At least one current identification document issued by an official agency bearing
the photograph and signature of the individual such as but not limited to those
enumerated in the law.
2. The oath or affirmation of one credible witness not privy to the instrument,
document or transaction who is personally known to the notary public and who
personally knows the individual, or of two credible witnesses neither of whom is privy
to the instrument, document or transaction who each personally knows the individual
and shows to the notary public documentary identification. (Amendment to Sec. 12
(a), Rule II of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, Feb. 19, 2008).
NOTE: Competent evidence of identity is not required in cases where the affiant is personally
known to the Notary Public (Amora, Jr. v. Comelec, G.R. No.192280, Jan. 25, 2011).
8. Sanctions
Punishable acts under the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice

The Executive Judge shall cause the prosecution of any person who knowingly:
1. Acts or otherwise impersonates a notary public;
2. Obtains, conceals, defaces, or destroys the seal, notarial register, or official
records of a notary public; and
3. Solicits, coerces, or in any way influences a notary public to commit official
misconduct.(Rule on Notarial Practice, Sec. 1, Rule XII).
NOTE: Notarizing documents without the requisite commission therefore constitutes

malpractice, if not the crime of falsification of public documents (St. Louis Laboratory High
School Faculty And Staff V. Dela Cruz , A.C. No. 6010. August 28, 2006).
G. Canons of Professional Ethics
The Canons of Professional Ethics (CPE) was framed by the American Bar Association
in 1908 and were adopted in the Philippines in 1917 and subsequently revised in
1946. It is one of the sources or the main basis of our legal ethics at the present
which is the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR). While the CPE is superseded
by the CPR, the CPE continues to be an invaluable source of knowledge and
understanding of legal ethics.
NOTE: Most of the provisions of the Code of Professional Ethics are incorporated in the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Only those topics not considered incorporated are included to
prevent redundancy.
Q: Can a lawyer stipulate with the client that a portion of the latter’s interest in the
property subject of the litigation be conveyed to the former as payment for his
services?
A: No. The same is prohibited both by the CPE and the Civil Code. The CPE provides
that a lawyer should not purchase any interest in the subject matter of the litigation
Page 102 of 163

which he is conducting. Likewise, the Civil Code provides that prosecuting attorneys
connected with the administration of justice cannot acquire by purchase properties in
litigation to which they exercise their respective functions (Canon 10 CPE; Art. 1491,
NCC).
Q: Is it proper for a lawyer to write articles in a newspaper and the like for
publication?
A: A lawyer may with propriety write articles for publications in which he gives
information upon the law; but he could not accept employment from such publication
to advice inquiries in respect to their individual rights (Canon 40, CPE).
Q: May a lawyer interview any witness or prospective witness for the opposing side
in any civil or criminal action without the consent of opposing counsel or party?
A: Yes. In doing so, however, he should scrupulously avoid any suggestion calculated
to induce the witness to suppress or deviate from the truth, or in any degree to
affect his free and untrammeled conduct when appearing at the trial or on the
witness stand (Canon 39, CPE).
Q: Mr. A disclosed to his lawyer that he had been bribing one of the court officials to
destroy the evidence of the other party to tilt the disposition of the case in his favor.
If you are Mr. A’s lawyer, what will you do?
A: When a lawyer discovers that some fraud or deception has been practiced, upon
the court or party, he should endeavor to rectify it; at first by advising his client, and
should endeavor to rectify it and if his client refuses to forego the advantage thus
unjustly gained, he should promptly inform the injured person or his counsel, so that
they may take appropriate steps. (Canon 41, CPE). Furthermore, if the client failed
or refuses to rectify the same, he shall terminate the relationship with such client in
accordance with the Rules of Court (Canon 19.02, CPR)
II. JUDICIAL ETHICS
The branch of moral science which treats of the right and proper conduct to be
observed by all judges in trying and deciding controversies brought before them for
adjudication which conduct must be demonstrative of impartiality, integrity,
competence, independence and freedom from improprieties. This freedom from
improprieties must be observed in both the public and private life of a judge – being
the visible representation of the law.
A judge is a public officer who, by virtue of his office, is clothed with judicial
authority; A public officer lawfully appointed to decide litigated questions in
accordance with law (People v. Manantan, G.R. No. L-14129, Aug. 30, 1962).
Proper judicial deportment
1. Attitude toward counsel – He must be courteous especially to the young and

inexperienced, should not interrupt in their arguments except to clarify his minds as
to their positions, must not be tempted to an unnecessary display of learning or
premature judgment, may criticize and correct unprofessional conduct of a lawyer
but not in an insulting manner.
2. Attitude toward litigants and witnesses– He must be considerate, courteous and

civil, must not utter intemperate language during the hearing of a case.
Page 103 of 163

Proper judicial conduct
Judges and justices must conduct themselves as to be beyond reproach and

suspicion and be free from appearance of impropriety in their personal behavior not
only in the discharge of official duties but also in their everyday lives.
Q: In several policy addresses extensively covered by media since his appointment

on December 21, 2005, Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban vowed to leave a
judiciary characterized by "four Ins" and to focus in solving the "four ACID" problems
that corrode the administration of justice in our country. Explain this "four Ins" and
"four ACID" problems (2006 Bar Question).
A: Chief Justice Panganiban vowed to lead a judiciary characterized by four Ins:
Independence, Integrity, Industry and Intelligence; one that is morally courageous
to stand its ground against the onslaughts of influence, interference, indifference and
insolence; and that is impervious to the plague of ships - kinship, relationship,
friendship and fellowship.
He identified four ACID problems that corrode justice in our country; namely, (1)
limited Access to justice by the poor; (2) Corruption; (3) Incompetence; and (4)
Delay in the delivery of quality judgments.
NOTE: Then Chief Justice Panganiban also asked for the employees of the Judiciary for three
things encapsulated by the Code DHL: Dedication to duty, Honesty in every way, and full
loyalty to the judiciary and to the Supreme Court
Q: The Chief Justice also said that the judiciary must "safeguard the liberty" and
"nurture the prosperity" of our people. Explain this philosophy. Cite Decisions of the
Supreme Court implementing each of these twin beacons of the Chief Justice (2006
Bar Question)
A: The twin beacons of LIBERTY and PROSPERITY constitute the core judicial
philosophy of Chief Justice Panganiban. He “advances the view that liberty must
include the freedoms that prosperity allows. In the same manner, prosperity must
include liberty, especially the liberty to strive for the ‘good life’ according to a
person’s conception”. He further said that the Judiciary can contribute to the
advancement of liberty and prosperity by adopting two standards of judicial review:
“that in litigations involving civil liberties, the scales should weigh heavily against the
government and in favor of the people. However, in conflicts affecting prosperity,
development and the economy, deference must be accorded to the political branches
of the government.”
In the case of Lumanlaw v. Peralta, GR No. 164953, February 13, 2006, a decision
penned by the Chief Justice himself, the Court ordered the release of a detainee who
had been imprisoned at the Manila City Jail for almost two years but had not yet
been arraigned.
In the case of Republic, et al. v. Judge Gingoyon and Philippine International Air
Terminals Co., Inc., GR No. 166429, February 1, 2006, the Court upheld PIATCO’s
right to be paid Php300 billion before the Government can take over the Ninoy
Aquino International Airport Passenger Terminal III facilities.
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A. Sources
The two sources of judicial ethics

a. New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary (Bangalore
Draft);
Focuses on the institutional and personal independence of judicial officers. Contains
eight norms of conduct that judges “shall follow”.
b. Code of Judicial Conduct
Concerned primarily with the institutional independence of the judiciary. Contained
three guidelines explaining what judges “should do” * Canon 1 of the 1989 Code
created a weaker mandate.
1. New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary (Bangalore

Draft)
The New Code of Judicial Conduct (NCJC) for the Philippine Judiciary which took
effect on June 1, 2004 supersedes the Canons of Judicial Ethics and the Code of
Judicial Conduct. Provided, however, that in case of deficiency or absence of specific
provisions in this New Code, the Canons of Judicial Ethics and Code of Judicial
Conduct shall be applicable in a suppletory character (2007, 2009 Bar Questions).
This was adopted from the universal declaration of standards for ethical conduct
embodied in the Bangalore Draft as revised at the Round Table Conference of Chief
Justices at the Hague.
The purpose of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary is to
update and correlate the code of judicial conduct and canons of judicial ethics
adopted for the Philippines, and also to stress the Philippines’ solidarity with the
universal clamor for a universal code of judicial ethics (See aforementioned "four
Ins" and "four ACID" problems by Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban).
NOTE: The New Code contains 6 Canons and 44 Rules.
Q: One of the foundations of the Bangalore Draft of the Code of Judicial Conduct is
the importance in a modern democratic society of what? (2011 Bar Question)
A: Public confidence in its judicial system and in the moral authority and integrity of
its judiciary.
The six (6) canons under the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary
1. Independence
2. Integrity
3. Impartiality
4. Propriety
5. Equality
6. Competence and Diligence
Duties of a magistrate that will bolster the public’s confidence to our judicial
system
1. Duty to be above reproach and to appear above reproach (NCJC, Sec.1, Canon 2)
2. Duty to be impartial (NCJC, Canon 3)
3. Duty to avoid improprieties and appearance of improprieties (NCJC, Sec. 1, Canon
4)
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4. Duty of Financial Transparency and duty to avoid financial conflicts of interest

(NCJC, Sec. 7, Canon 4)
5. Duty to be efficient, fair and prompt (NCJC, Sec. 5, Canon 6)
6. Duty to be free from favor, bias, or prejudice (NCJC, Sec. 1, Canon 3).
2. Code of Judicial Conduct
Applicability
This code applies suppletorily.
Q: A complaint was filed against Judge Grageda for the delay in the resolution of
motions relative to Civil Case No. 54-2001, entitled Pio Angelia v. Arnold Oghayan.
Plaintiff Angelia averred that the case was filed way back on August 8, 2001. After
numerous postponements, pre-trial was finally set on December 6, 2007. On
December 20, 2007, counsel for complainant received an order dated December 6,
2007 dismissing the case for failure to prosecute. On December 28, 2007, Angelia
filed a motion for reconsideration reasoning out that the failure to prosecute could
not be attributed to him. On July 28, 2008, he filed his Urgent Motion for the Early
Resolution of said December 2007 Motion for Reconsideration. He claimed that
despite the lapse of a considerably long period of time, no action was taken by Judge
Grageda. Is respondent Judge Gragela GUILTY of undue delay in resolving a motion
in violation of Rule 1.02, Canon 1 and Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct?
A: Yes. Failure to decide cases and other matters within the reglementary period
constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants the imposition of administrative sanction
against the erring magistrate. Delay in resolving motions and incidents pending
before a judge within the reglementary period of ninety (90) days fixed by the
Constitution and the law is not excusable and constitutes gross inefficiency. As a trial
judge, Judge Grageda was a frontline official of the judiciary and should have at all
times acted with efficiency and with probity.
CANON 1
A JUDGE SHOULD UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND INDEPENDENCE OF THE
JUDICIARY
RULE 1.01 - A judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity and

independence.
RULE 1.02 - A judge should administer justice impartially and without delay.
RULE 1.03. - A judge should be vigilant against any attempt to subvert the
independence of the judiciary and should forthwith resist any pressure from
whatever source intended to influence the performance of official functions.
CANON 2
A JUDGE SHOULD AVOID IMPROPRIETY AND THE APPEARANCE OF
IMPROPRIETY
IN ALL ACTIVITIES
RULE 2.01 - A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in
the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.
Q: Judge Canoy was charged with several counts of gross ignorance of the law
and/or procedures, grave abuse of authority, and appearance of impropriety (CJC,
Canon 2) for granting bail to Melgazo, the accused in a criminal case, without any
application or petition for the grant of bail filed before his court or any court. He
verbally ordered the branch clerk of court to accept the cash deposit as bail, to
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earmark an official receipt for the cash deposit, and to date it the following day. He
did not require Melgazo to sign a written undertaking containing the conditions of the
bail under Sec. 2, Rule 114 to be complied with by Melgazo. Thus, Judge Canoy
ordered the police escorts to release Melgazo without any written order of release.
Should respondent Judge Canoy be held administratively liable for violating of
Supreme Court rules, directives and circulars under Sec. 9, Rule 140, RRC (as
amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC)?
A: Yes. Granting of bail without any application or petition to grant bail is a clear
deviation from the procedure laid down in Sec. 17 of Rule 114. As regards the
insistence of Judge Canoy that such may be considered as “constructive bail,” there
is no such species of bail under the Rules. Despite the noblest of reasons, the Rules
of Court may not be ignored at will and at random to the prejudice of the rights of
another. Rules of procedure are intended to ensure the orderly administration of
justice and the protection of substantive rights in judicial and extrajudicial
proceedings. In this case, the reason of Judge Canoy is hardly persuasive enough to
disregard the Rules (Pantilo III v. Canoy, A.M. No. RTJ-11-2262, Feb. 9, 2011)
RULE 2.02 - A judge should not seek publicity for personal vainglory.
RULE 2.03 - A judge shall not allow family, social, or other relationships to influence
judicial conduct or judgment. The prestige of judicial office shall not be used or lent
to advance the private interests of others, nor convey or permit others to convey the
impression that they are in a special position to influence the judge.
RULE 2.04 - A judge should refrain from influencing in any manner the outcome of
litigation or dispute pending before another court or administrative agency.
The prestige of judicial office shall not be used or lent to advance the private
interests of others, nor convey the impression that they are in a special position to
influence the judge.
Q: Judge Belen was charged with grave abuse of authority and conduct unbecoming
a judge. He filed a complaint for Estafa against complainant’s father. However such
was dismissed by the city prosecutor for lack of probable cause. After the dismissal
of the complaint, Judge Belen started harassing and threatening the complainant
with filing of several cases against the latter. He also wrote using his personal
stationary, several letters addressed to certain local government authorities and
employees, requesting information on complainant’s piggery and poultry business
and advising them of the alleged violations by the complainant of the National
Building Code and certain environmental laws. An administrative complaint was filed
against the judge for violation of the New Code of Judicial Conduct on the ground
that by using the letter head indicating his position as the Presiding Judge he was
trying to use the prestige of his judicial office for his own personal interest. Is the
judge liable?
A: Yes. While the use of the title is an official designation as well as an honor that an
incumbent has earned, a line still has to be drawn based on the circumstances of the
use of the appellation. While the title can be used for social and other identification
purposes, it cannot be used with the intent to use the prestige of his judicial office to
gainfully advance his personal, family or other pecuniary interests. Nor can the
prestige of a judicial office be used or lent to advance the private interests of others,
or to convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special
position to influence the judge JC, Canon 2, Rule 2.03). To do any of these is to
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cross into the prohibited field of impropriety (Belen v. Belen,A.M. No. RTJ-08-2139,
Aug. 9, 2010).
CANON 3
A JUDGE SHOULD PERFORM OFFICIAL DUTIES HONESTLY, AND WITH
IMPARTIALITY AND DILIGENCE
RULE 3.01 - A judge shall be faithful to the law and maintain professional
competence.
Q: Plaintiff Conquilla was charged for direct assault after respondent Judge B
conducted a preliminary investigation and found probable cause to hold the
complainant for trial for the said crime. Complainant then filed an administrative
complaint, alleging that under A.M. No. 05-08-[2]6-SC, first level court judges no
longer have the authority to conduct preliminary investigations. Is the respondent
judge guilty of gross ignorance of the law?
A: Yes. When a law or a rule is basic, judges owe it to their office to simply apply the
law. Anything less is gross ignorance of the law. Judges should exhibit more than
just a cursory acquaintance with the statutes and procedural rules, and should be
diligent in keeping abreast with developments in law and jurisprudence.
It was therefore incumbent upon respondent judge to forward the records of the
case to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor for preliminary investigation, instead of
conducting the preliminary investigation himself upon amendment of the law
stripping the power of first level court judges to conduct preliminary
investigation (Conquilla v. Bernando, A.M. No.MTJ-09-1737, Feb. 9, 2011).
RULE 3.02 - In every case, a judge shall endeavor diligently to ascertain the facts
and the applicable law unswayed by partisan interests, public opinion or fear of
criticism.
RULE 3.03 - A judge shall maintain order and proper decorum in the court.
RULE 3.04 - A judge should be patient, attentive, and courteous to lawyers,

especially the inexperienced, to litigants, witnesses, and others appearing before the
court. A judge should avoid unconsciously falling into the attitude of mind that the
litigants are made for the courts, instead of the courts for the litigants.
Q: How would you characterize the relationship between the judge and a lawyer?
Explain (1996 Bar Question)
A: The Code of Professional Responsibility requires lawyers to observe and maintain
respect for judicial officers (CPR, Canon 11). On the other hand, the Code of Judicial
Conduct requires judges to be patient, attentive and courteous to lawyers (CJC, Rule
3.03). In a word, lawyers and judges owe each other mutual respect and courtesy.
RULE 3.05 - A judge shall dispose of the court's business promptly and decide cases
within the required periods.
The Court has repeatedly emphasized the need for judges to resolve their cases with
dispatch. Delay does not only constitute a serious violation of the parties’
constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases, it also erodes the faith and
confidence of the people in the judiciary, lowers its standards, and brings it into
disrepute (Office of the Court Administrator v. Quilatan, A.M. No. MTJ-09-1745,
Sept. 27, 2010).
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RULE 3.06 - While a judge may, to promote justice, prevent waste of time or clear
up some obscurity, properly intervene in the presentation of evidence during the
trial, it should always be borne in mind that undue interference may prevent the
proper presentation of the cause or the ascertainment of truth.
RULE 3.07 - A judge should abstain from making public comments on any pending or
impending case and should require similar restraint on the part of court personnel.
RULE 3.08 - A judge should diligently discharge administrative responsibilities,

maintain professional competence in court management, and facilitate the
performance of the administrative functions or other judges and court personnel.
RULE 3.09 - A judge should organize and supervise the court personnel to ensure the
prompt and efficient dispatch of business, and require at all times the observance of
high standards of public service and fidelity.
RULE 3.10 - A judge should take or initiate appropriate disciplinary measures against
lawyers or court personnel for unprofessional conduct of which the judge may have
become aware.
RULE 3.11 - A judge should appoint commissioners, receivers, trustees, guardians,
administrators and others strictly on the basis of merit and qualifications, avoiding
nepotism and favoritism. Unless otherwise allowed by law, the same criteria should
be observed in recommending appointment of court personnel. Where the payment
of compensation is allowed, it should be reasonable and commensurate with the fair
value of services rendered.
RULE 3.12 - A judge should take no part in a proceeding where the judge's
impartiality might reasonably be questioned. These cases include among others,
proceedings where:
(a) the judge has personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the
proceeding;
(b) the judge served as executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or lawyer in the
case or matter in controversy, or a former associate of the judge served as counsel
during their association, or the judge or lawyer was a material witness therein;
(c) the judge's ruling in a lower court is the subject of review;
(d) the judge is related by consanguinity or affinity to a party litigant within the sixth
degree or to counsel within the fourth degree;
(e) the judge knows the judge's spouse or child has a financial interest, as heir,
legatee, creditor, fiduciary, or otherwise, in the subject matter in controversy or in a
party to the proceeding, or any other interest that could be substantially affected by
the outcome of the proceeding.
In every instance, the judge shall indicate the legal reason for inhibition.
Q: In a hearing before the Court of Tax Appeals, Atty. G was invited to appear as
amicus curiae. One of the Judges hearing the tax case is the father of Atty. G. The
counsel for the respondent moved for the inhibition of the judge in view of the
father-son relationship. Is there merit to the motion? Decide. (1996 Bar Question)
A: There is no merit to the motion. Rule 3.12 of the CJC provides that “a judge
should take no part where the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.
Among the instances for the disqualification of a judge is that he is related to a party
litigant within the sixth degree or to counsel within the fourth degree of
consanguinity or affinity. But this refers to counsel of the parties. As amicus, he
represents no party to the case. There is, therefore, no ground to fear the loss of the
judge’s impartiality in this case if his son is appointed amicus curiae.
Page 109 of 163

RULE 3.13 - A judge disqualified by the terms of rule 3.12 may, instead of
withdrawing from the proceeding, disclose on the record the basis of disqualification.
If, bases on such disclosure, the parties and lawyers independently of judge's
participation, all agree in writing that the reason for the inhibition is immaterial or
insubstantial, the judge may then participate in the proceeding. The agreement,
signed by all parties and lawyers, shall be incorporated in the record of the
proceeding.
CANON 5
A JUDGE SHOULD REGULATE EXTRA-JUDICIAL ACTIVITIES TO MINIMIZE
THE RISK
OF CONFLICT WITH JUDICIAL DUTIESADVOCATIONAL, CIVIC AND
CHARITABLE ACTIVITIES (1995,1997,1999,2000,2002 BAR)
RULE 5.01 - A judge may engage in the following activities provided that they do not
interfere with the performance of judicial duties or detract from the dignity of the
court:
(a) write, teach and speak on non-legal subjects;

(b) engage in the arts, sports, and other special recreational activities;
(c) participate in civic and charitable activities;
(d) serve as an officer, director, trustee, or non-legal advisor of a non-profit or non-
political educational, religious, charitable, fraternal, or civic organization.
RULE 5.02 - A judge shall refrain from financial and business dealing that tend to
reflect adversely on the court's impartiality, interfere with the proper performance of
judicial activities or increase involvement with lawyers or persons likely to come
before the court. A judge should so manage investments and other financial interests
as to minimize the number of cases giving grounds for disqualifications.
Rule regarding financial activities

A judge shall refrain from financial and business dealings that tend to:
1. Reflect adversely on the court’s impartiality;
2. Interfere with the proper performance of judicial activities; or
3. Increase involvement with lawyers or persons likely to come before the court.
A judge should so manage investments and other financial interests as to minimize

the number of cases giving grounds for disqualification. (Rule 5.02)
RULE 5.03 - Subject to the provisions of the proceeding rule, a judge may hold and
manage investments but should not serve as officer, director, manager or advisor, or
employee of any business except as director of a family business of the judge.
Rule on judges having investments

GR: A judge may hold and manage investments but should not serve as:
1. An officer
2. Director
3. Manager
4. Advisor
5. Employee of any business
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XPN: As director of a family business of the judge. (Rule 5.03)
RULE 5.04 - A judge or any immediate member of the family shall not accept a gift,
bequest, factor or loan from any one except as may be allowed by law.
RULE 5.05 - No information acquired in a judicial capacity shall be sued or disclosed

by a judge in any financial dealing or for any other purpose not related to judicial
activities.
RULE 5.06 - A judge should not serve as the executor, administrator, trustee,
guardian, or other fiduciary, except for the estate, trusts, or person of a member of
the immediate family, and then only if such service will not interfere with the proper
performance of judicial duties. "Member of immediate family" shall be limited to the
spouse and relatives within the second degree of consanguinity. As a family, a judge
shall not:
(a) serve in proceedings that might come before the court of said judge; or
(b) act as such contrary to rules 5.02 to 5.05.
RULE 5.07 - A judge shall not engage in the private practice of law. Unless prohibited
by the Constitution or law, a judge may engage in the practice of any other
profession provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with judicial
functions.
RULE 5.08 - A judge shall make full financial disclosure as required by law.
RULE 5.09 - A judge shall not accept appointment or designation to any agency
performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions.
RULE 5.10 - A judge is entitled to entertain personal views on political questions. But
to avoid suspicion of political partisanship, a judge shall not make political speeches,
contribute to party funds, publicly endorse candidates for political office or
participate in other partisan political activities.
B. Qualities
1. Independence
CANON 1
INDEPENDENCE
Judicial independence is a pre-requisite to the rule of law and a

fundamental guarantee of a fair trial. A judge shall therefore uphold and
exemplify judicial independence in both its individual and institutional
aspects.
Judicial Independence
An independent Judiciary is one free from inappropriate outside influence.
Judicial independence is a pre-requisite to the rule of law and a fundamental
guarantee of a fair trial. A judge shall, therefore, uphold and exemplify judicial
independence in both its individual and institutional aspects (NCJC, Canon 1).
Individual Judicial Independence focuses on each particular case and seeks to insure
his or her ability to decide cases with autonomy within the constraints of the law
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while Institutional Judicial Independence focuses on the independence of the

judiciary as a branch of government and protects judges as a class (In the Matter of
the Allegations Contained in the Columns of Mr. Amado P. Macasaet Published in
Malaya dated Sept. 18, 19, 20 and 21, 2007).
NOTE: The treatment of independence as a single Canon is the primary difference between the
new Canon 1 and the Canon 1 of the 1989 Code.
SEC. 1. Judges shall exercise the judicial function independently on the

basis of their assessment of the facts and in accordance with a
conscientious understanding of the law, free of any extraneous influence,
inducement, pressure, threat or interference, direct or indirect, from any
quarter or for any reason.
Judges should inspire public confidence in the judiciary which can be attained only if
judges are perceived by the public to be fair, honest, competent, principled, dignified
and honorable. Accordingly, the first duty of judges is to conduct themselves at all
times in a manner that is beyond reproach.
Judges must reject pressure by maintaining independence from, but not limited to
the following:
1. Independence from public officials – the public laid their confidence on the fact
that the official is mentally and morally fit to pass upon the merits of their varied
intentions.
2. Independence from government as a whole – avoid inappropriate connections, as
well as any situation that would give rise to the impression of the existence of such
inappropriate connections.
3. Independence from family, social, or other relationships –Do not sit in litigation
where a near relative is a part of or counsel; be independent from judicial colleagues
(Sec. 2) and avoid such actions as may reasonably tend to wake the suspicion that
his social or business relations constitute an element in determining his judicial
course.
4. Independence from public opinion –only guide is the mandate of law.
Q: In a civil case submitted for a decision, Judge Corpuz-Macandog acted on it based

on a telephone call from a government official telling her to decide the case in favor
of the defendant, otherwise she will be removed. The judge explained that she did so
under pressure considering that the country was under a revolutionary government
at that time. Did the judge commit an act of misconduct?
A: Yes. A judge must decide a case based on its merits. For this reason, a judge is
expected to be fearless in the pursuit to render justice, to be unafraid to displease
any person, interest or power, and to be equipped with a moral fiber strong enough
to resist temptation lurking in her office. Here, it is improper for a judge to have
decided a case based only on a directive from a government official and not on the
judge’s own ascertainment of facts and applicable law (Ramirez v. Corpuz-Macandog
A.M. No. R-351-RJT,Sept.26,1986)
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SEC. 2. In performing judicial duties, judges shall be independent from

judicial colleagues in respect of decisions which the judge is obliged to
make independently.
Degree of independence
The highest degree of independence is required of judges. He must be independent
in decision-making. He cannot consult with staff and court officials. However, he can
ask colleagues purely academic or hypothetical questions but not to the extent of
asking them to decide a case.
NOTE: It is every judge’s duty to respect the individual independence of fellow judges.
SEC. 3. Judges shall refrain from influencing in any manner the outcome of
litigation or dispute pending before another court or administrative agency.
(Principle of Subjudice)
A judge is prohibited from making public statements in the media regarding a

pending case so as not to arouse public opinion for or against a party. (2007 Bar
Question)
This section affirms that a judge’s restraint from exerting influence over other
judicial or quasi-judicial bodies is required for more than just propriety.
Any attempt, whether successful or not, to influence the decision-making process of
another judge, especially one who is of lower rank and over whom a judge exercises
supervisory authority constitutes serious misconduct.
NOTE: If the consultation is purely on an academic or hypothetical basis, and the judge does
not surrender his or her independent decision making, there can be no breach of Sections 2
and 3 of Canon 1 of the New Code.
Q: A Judge of the RTC wrote a letter to the judge of the lower court, seeking to
influence him to hear the case and even intimating that he issue an order of
acquittal. Is it proper?
A: No, the Supreme Court ruled that a judge who tries to influence the outcome of a
case pending before another court not only subverts the independence of the
judiciary but also undermines the people’s faith in its integrity and impartiality. The
interference in this decision-making process of another judge is a breach of conduct
so serious as to justify dismissal from service based only on preponderance of
evidence (Sabitsana Jr. vs. Villamor, A.M. No. 90-474, Oct. 4 1991).
SEC. 4. Judges shall not allow family, social, or other relationships to

influence judicial conduct or judgment. The prestige of judicial office shall
not be used or lent to advance the private interests of others, nor convey or
permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special position to
influence the judge.
Purpose of Sec. 4, Canon 1 of NCJC

It is intended to ensure that judges are spared from potential influence of family
members by disqualifying them even before any opportunity for impropriety presents
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itself.
The term “judge’s family” include:

1. Judge’s spouse
2. Son
3. Daughter
4. Son-in-law
5. Daughter-in-law
6. Other relative by consanguinity or affinity within the sixth civil degree, or
7. Person who is a companion or employee of the judge and who lives in the judge’s
household (NCJC of the Philippine Judiciary-Annotated, February 2007).
When the judge is related to one of the parties within the sixth degree of
consanguinity or affinity, a judge’s disqualification to sit in a case is
mandatory.
NOTE: Judges should ensure that their family members, friends and associates refrain from
creating the impression that they are in a position to influence the judge. Judges should,
therefore, at all times remind themselves that they are not in the judiciary to give out favors
but to dispense justice. They should also make it clear to the members of their family, friends
and associates that they will neither be influenced by anyone, nor would they allow anyone to
interfere in their work.
SEC. 5. Judges shall not only be free from inappropriate connections with,
and influence by, the executive and legislative branches of government, but
must also appear to be free therefrom to a reasonable observer.
This section affirms the independence of the judiciary from the two other branches of
government.
Judicial independence is the reason for leaving exclusively to the Court the authority
to deal with internal personnel issues, even if the court employees in question are
funded by the local government (Bagatsing v. Herrera, G.R. No. L-34952,July 25,
1975).
Q: Several employees of the city government of Quezon City were appointed and
assigned at the office of the Clerk of Court-MeTC QC to assist the organic staff of the
Judiciary. However, the executive judge of MeTC QC, in view of a reorganization
plan, returned those employees to different offices of QC government saying that the
court is already overstaffed. The judge also requested the QC Mayor to re-employ
the laid off employees. Did the judge commit any improper conduct?
A: Yes. An executive judge has no authority to cause the transfer of court employees
as the jurisdiction to do so is lodge solely upon the SC through the Office of the
Court Administrator. This is so because of the need to maintain judicial
independence. Moreover, a judge shall be free from inappropriate connections with
and influence from the executive and legislative branch. Here, the judge did not act
independently of the LGU when she asked the Mayor of QC to re-employ the
displaced employees instead of informing the SC through the OCA of the need to
streamline her court of its personal needs (Alfonso v. Alonzo-Legasto, A.M. No. MTJ
94-995, Sept. 5, 2002).
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SEC. 6. Judges shall be independent in relation to society in general and in

relation to the particular parties to a dispute which he or she has to
adjudicate.
SEC. 7. Judges shall encourage and uphold safeguards for the discharge of
judicial duties in order to maintain and enhance the institutional and
operational independence of the judiciary.
SEC. 8. Judges shall exhibit and promote high standards of judicial conduct
in order to reinforce public confidence in the judiciary, which is fundamental
to the maintenance of judicial independence.
Sections 7 and 8 of Canon 1 are intended to serve as catch-all provisions for all other
acts that would guarantee the independence of the judiciary.
There can be no sure guarantee of judicial independence than the character of those
appointed to the Bench. Judges must remain conscious of their character and
reputation as judges and should avoid anything which will not dignify their public
positions and demean the institution to which they belong, in whatever atmosphere
or environment they may happen to be.
2. Integrity
CANON 2
INTEGRITY
Integrity is essential not only to the proper discharge of the judicial office
but also to the personal demeanor of judges.
A judge should act with integrity and behave with integrity at all times so as to
promote public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary.
Integrity is required not only in the discharge of judicial duties but also to
the personal demeanor of judges
The integrity of the judiciary rests not only upon the fact that it is able to administer
justice but also upon the perception and confidence of the community that people
who run the system have done justice. Justice must not be merely done but must
also be seen to be done. (Panaligan v. Judge Ibay, A.M. No. TJ-06-1972, June 21,
2006)
In the Judiciary, moral integrity is more than a cardinal virtue, it is a necessity
(Pascual v. Bonifacio, AM No. RTJ-01-1625, Mar. 10, 2003). Judges must be models
of uprightness, fairness and honesty (Rural Bank of Barotac Nuevo, Inc v. Cartagena,
A.M. No. 707-MJ, July 21, 1978).
NOTE: Under the 1989 Code, the values of INTEGRITY and INDEPENDENCE were grouped
together, but the New Code of Judicial Conduct separated them to emphasize the need to
maintain a life of PERSONAL and PROFESSIONAL INTEGRITY in order to properly carry out
their judicial functions.
Presumption regarding judges
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Judges are presumed honest and, are men of integrity, unless proven otherwise.
SEC. 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach,
but that it is perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable observer.
The maintenance of the court’s integrity is not the sole duty of the judge. It is also
the duty of court personnel to see to it that its integrity is unblemished.
NOTE: A judge’s personal behavior, both in the performance of his duties and in his daily life,
must be free from any appearance of impropriety as to be beyond reproach.
Judges must always wear a robe at hearings

A judge must take care not only to remain true to the high ideals of competence and
integrity his robe represents, but also that he wears one in the first place (Chan v.
Majaducan A.M. No. RTJ-02-1697, Oct. 15, 2003).
SEC. 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the people’s faith
in the integrity of the judiciary. Justice must not merely be done but must
also be seen to be done.
A judge has the duty to not only render a just and impartial decision, but also render
it in such a manner as to be free from any suspicion as to its fairness and
impartiality, and also as to the judge’s integrity. While judges should possess
proficiency in law in order that they can completely construe and enforce the law, it
is more important that they should act and behave in such a manner that the parties
before them should have confidence in their impartiality (Sibayan-Joaquin v.
Javellana, A.M. No. RTJ-00-1601, Nov. 13, 2001).
Q: Justice Mariano Del Castillo was charged with plagiarism, twisting of cited
materials, and gross neglect in connection with the decision he wrote for the court in
G.R. No. 162230, entitled Vinuya v. Romulo. Petitioners, members of the Malaya
Lolas Organization, seek reconsideration of the decision of the Court dated October
12, 2010 that dismissed the said complaint. Petitioners claim that the Court has by
its decision legalized or approved of the commission of plagiarism in the Philippines.
Should the respondent justice be held guilty for plagiarism?
A: No. A judge writing to resolve a dispute, whether trial or appellate, is exempted
from a charge of plagiarism even if ideas, words or phrases from a law review article,
novel thoughts published in a legal periodical or language from a party’s brief are
used without giving attribution. Thus, judges are free to use whatever sources they
deem appropriate to resolve the matter before them, without fear of reprisal. This
exemption applies to judicial writings intended to decide cases for two reasons: the
judge is not writing a literary work and, more importantly, the purpose of the
writing is to resolve a dispute. As a result, judges adjudicating cases are not
subject to a claim of legal plagiarism.
Although as a rule, practicing lawyers receive compensation for every pleading or

paper they file in court or for every opinion they render to clients, lawyers also need
to strive for technical accuracy in their writings. They should not be exposed to
charges of plagiarism in what they write so long as they do not depart, as officers of
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the court, from the objective of assisting the Court in the administration of justice
(In matter of the Charges of Plagiarism etc.. Against Associate Justice Mariano C. Del
Castillo, A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, February 8, 2011).
SEC. 3. Judges should take or initiate appropriate disciplinary measures

against lawyers or court personnel for unprofessional conduct of which the
judge may have become aware.
A judge may summarily punish any person including lawyers and court personnel, for
direct contempt for misbehavior committed in the presence of or so near a court or a
judge as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same (RRC, Rule 71).
He may also punish any person for indirect contempt after appropriate charge and
hearing, for acts enumerated under Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.
Judge’s duty with respect to court employees

A judge should constantly keep a watchful eye on the conduct of his employees. His
constant scrutiny of the behavior of his employees would deter any abuse on the
part of the latter in the exercise of their duties (Buenaventura v. Benedicto, A.C. No.
137-5, Mar. 27, 1971).
A judge cannot dismiss a court personnel. The power to dismiss a court employee is
vested in the Supreme Court (Dailay-Papa v. Almora, A.M. Nos. 543-MC and 1525-
MJ, Dec. 19, 1981).
NOTE: Judges should not be lenient in the administrative supervision of employees. As an

administrator, the judge must ensure that all court personnel perform efficiently and promptly
in the administration of justice (Ramirez v. Corpuz-Macandog, A.M. No. R-351-RTJ, Sept. 26,
1986).
All court personnel, from the lowliest employees to the clerks of court, are involved
in the dispensation of justice like judges and justices, and parties seeking redress
from the courts for grievances look upon them also as part of the judiciary. In
performing their duties and responsibilities, court personnel serve as sentinels of
justice, that any act of impropriety they commit immeasurably affects the honor and
dignity of the judiciary and the people's confidence in the judiciary. They are,
therefore, expected to act and behave in a manner that should uphold the honor and
dignity of the judiciary, if only to maintain the people’s confidence in the judiciary
(Guerrero v.Ong, A.M. No. P-09-2676, Dec. 16, 2009).
Q: While Judge Tuparin was in his chambers dictating an order to a stenographer,

two lawyers who were in the courtroom waiting for the start of the session almost
came to blows as a result of a heated argument. Tuparin came out of his chambers
and after identifying the lawyers involved in the commotion promptly declared them
in contempt of court. Was the action of Judge Tuparin proper?
A: No. The act committed by the two lawyers was indirect contempt violative of the
rule punishing “any improper conduct tending directly or indirectly, to impede,
obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice”, since the judge was then
engaged in dictating an order before the morning session was called. The act of the
two lawyers constituted obstruction of the administration of justice, which was
indirect contempt. Accordingly, they could only be punished after notice and hearing.
3. Impartiality
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CANON 3
IMPARTIALITY
Impartiality is essential to the proper discharge of the judicial office. It

applies not only to the decision itself but also to the process by which the
decision is made.
Impartiality is essential to the proper discharge of the judicial office. It applies not
only to the decision itself but also to the process by which the decision is made
(NCJC, Canon 3).
Principle of cold neutrality of an impartial judge

A judge should not only render just, correct, and impartial decision but should do so
in a manner free from suspicion as to his fairness, impartiality and integrity. This is
an indispensable requisite of due process (Rallos v. Gako, A.M. No.RTJ-98-1484,
Mar. 17, 2000).
NOTE: A judge has both: the duty of rendering a just decision; and, doing it in a manner
completely free from suspicion as to his fairness and as to his integrity.
SEC. 1. Judges shall perform their judicial duties without favor, bias or
prejudice.
It is the duty of all judges not only to be impartial but also to appear impartial.
Degree of proof required to prove bias on the part of the judge

The complainant must prove the same by clear and convincing evidence since
allegations of bias are quite serious. Mere allegations are not sufficient to constitute
a violation of the rule.
Q: A filed an action for specific performance with the RTC of Quezon City, presided
by Judge Santiago, against X Corporation asking for the delivery of the title of 1
subdivision lot in Batangas which lot was given to him in payment for his services as
geodetic surveyor. Meanwhile X Corporation filed with MTC of Batangas an action for
an unlawful detainer against certain lot buyers on motion of A. Judge Santiago issued
TRO against X Corporation and Judge of MTC and enjoining the latter from
proceeding with the case. X Corporation now filed a motion to inhibit the judge on
the ground that he arbitrarily issued such TRO, but without presenting evidence
showing partiality on the part of the judge. Should the judge be inhibited?
A: No. For a judge to be inhibited, allegations of partiality and pre-judgment must be
proven by clear and convincing evidence. Here, mere allegation that the judge
arbitrarily issued the TRO without presenting evidence showing bias on his part is not
sufficient. While Judge Santiago acted in excess of his jurisdiction when he issued the
TRO for such should only be enforceable within his territorial jurisdiction, such error
may not necessarily warrant inhibition at most it is correctible by certiorari (Dimo
Realty &Development, Inc. v. Dimaculangan, G.R. No. 130991, Mar. 11, 2004).
Extra-judicial source rule

It means that the decision is based on some influence other than the facts and law
presented in the courtroom.
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Q: A motion to inhibit Judge Dicdican was filed on the ground of partiality and bias
on his part for allegedly denying a motion to hear affirmative defenses thereby
denying the movant the opportunity to be heard. Should the judge be inhibited?
A: No. Judge Dicdican cannot be charged with bias and partiality, merely on the
basis of his decision not to grant a motion for a preliminary hearing. Allegations and
perceptions of bias from the mere tenor and language of a judge are insufficient to
show pre-judgment. Moreover, as long as opinions formed in the course of judicial
proceedings are based on the evidence presented and the conduct observed by the
judge, such opinion – even if later found to be erroneous on appeal or made with
grave abuse of discretion on certiorari –will not necessarily prove personal bias or
prejudice on the part of the judge. To allow inhibition for such reason would open
floodgates to abuse. Here, the denial of the motion to hear affirmative defenses is
based on the Rules of Court which provides that preliminary hearing of defenses is
discretionary, hence the judge cannot be charged with partiality on the basis of such
decision (Gochan v. Gochan,G.R. No. 143089, Feb. 27, 2003).
SEC. 2. Judges shall ensure that his or her conduct, both in and out of court,
maintains and enhances the confidence of the public, the legal profession
and litigants in the impartiality of the judge and of the judiciary.
Rationale: No judge should handle a case in which he might be perceived, rightly or

wrongly, to be susceptible to bias and impartiality. His judgment must not be tainted
by even the slightest suspicion of improbity or preconceived interest. The rule is
aimed at preserving at all times the faith and confidence in courts of justice by any
party to the litigation (Urbanes, Jr. v. C.A., G.R. No. 117964, Mar.28, 2001).
There is undue interference where the judge’s participation in the conduct of the trial
tends to build or to bolster a case of one of the parties (Ty v. Banco Filipino Savings
and Mortgage Bank, CA and Hon. Tac-an G.R. Nos. 149797-98, Feb. 13, 2004).
A trial judge can ask questions from witnesses. In every examination of a witness,
the court shall take active part in examining him to determine his credibility as well
as the truth of his testimony and to elicit the answers that it needs for resolving the
issues (Judicial Affidavit Rule, Sec. 7).
NOTE: In disposing of a criminal case, a judge should avoid appearing like an advocate for
either party. It is also improper for the judge to push actively for amicable settlement against
the wishes of the complainant. A judge’s unwelcome persistence makes the judge vulnerable
to suspicions of favoritism (Montemayor v. Bermejo, Jr.,A.M. No.MTJ-04-1535, Mar. 12,
2004).
SEC. 3. Judges shall, so far as is reasonable, so conduct themselves as to

minimize the occasions on which it will be necessary for them to be
disqualified from hearing or deciding cases.
Meaning of “duty to sit”
It means that a judge must ensure that he will not be unnecessarily disqualified from
a case.
A judge cannot inhibit himself as he pleases. A decision to inhibit must be based on
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good, sound or ethical grounds, or for just and valid reasons. It is not enough that a
party cast some tenuous allegations of partiality at the judge.
Rule of necessity
It states that a judge is not disqualified to sit in a case where there is no other judge
available to hear and decide the case. Furthermore, when all judges will be
disqualified as a result, it will not be permitted to destroy the only tribunal with the
power in the premises. The doctrine operates on the principle that a basic judge is
better than no judge at all. It is the duty of the disqualified judge to hear and decide
the case regardless of objections or disagreements (Parayno v.Meneses, G.R. No.
112684, Apr. 26, 1994).
SEC. 4. Judges shall not knowingly, while a proceeding is before or could

come before them, make any comment that might reasonably be expected
to affect the outcome of such proceeding or impair the manifest fairness of
the process. Nor shall judges make any comment in public or otherwise that
might affect the fair trial of any person or issue.
A judge’s language, both written and spoken, must be guarded and measured, lest
the best of intentions be misconstrued (Fecundo v. Berjamen,G.R. No. 88105, Dec.
18, 1989).
Reason for the rule

This Section warns judges against making any comment that might reasonably be
expected to affect the outcome of the proceedings before them; or those that the
judge may later decide but not yet before him; or "impair the manifest fairness of
the process.”
Q: Justice Antonio Carpio penned a decision regarding the invalidity of the amended
joint venture agreement between Public Estates Authority (PEA) and Amari Coastal
Bay Development Corporation saying that the agreement is unconstitutional as PEA
cannot transfer ownership of a reclaimed land to a private corporation. Amari now
filed a motion to inhibit Justice Carpio on the ground of bias and pre-judgment
allegedly because he had previously wrote in his column in Manila Times a statement
to the effect that the law requires public bidding of reclaimed projects and that the
PEA-Amari contract is flawed for it was not bid by the PEA. Decide on the motion.
A: The motion to inhibit must be denied for three reasons:
1. The motion to inhibit must be denied if filed after a member of the court had
already rendered his opinion on the merits of the case. Here, the motion was filed
after Justice Carpio had already rendered a decision;
2. The ratio decidendi of the decision was not based on his statements on the
column. Here, the decision was based on constitutional grounds and not in the
absence of public bidding; and
3. Judges and justices are not disqualified from participating in a case just because
they have written legal articles on the law involved in the case (Chavez v. PEA, G.R.
No. 133250, May 6, 2003).
No absolute prohibition against judges from making comments
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Not all comments are impermissible. Judges may express their open-mindedness
regarding a pending issue in cases where the judges’ comments do not necessarily
favor one side over the other.
However, judges should avoid side remarks, hasty conclusions, loose statements or
gratuitous utterances that suggest they are prejudging a case. Judges should be
aware that the media might consider them a good and credible source of opinion or
ideas, and therefore should refrain from making any comment on a pending case.
Not only is there danger of being misquoted, but also of compromising the rights of
the litigants in the case.
SEC. 5. Judges shall disqualify themselves from participating in any

proceedings in which they are unable to decide the matter impartially or in
which it may appear to a reasonable observer that they are unable to decide
the matter impartially. Such proceedings include, but are not limited to,
instances where
(a) The judge has actual bias or prejudice concerning a party or personal
knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceedings;
(b) The judge previously served as a lawyer or was a material witness in the
matter in controversy;
(c) The judge, or a member of his or her family, has an economic interest in
the outcome of the matter in controversy;
(d) The judge served as executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or lawyer

in the case or matter in controversy, or a former associate of the judge
served as counsel during their association, or the judge or lawyer was a
material witness therein;
(e) The judge’s ruling in a lower court is the subject of review;
(f) The judge is related by consanguinity or affinity to a party litigant within

the sixth civil degree or to counsel within the fourth civil degree; or
(g) The judge knows that his or her spouse or child has a financial interest,
as heir, legatee, creditor, fiduciary, or otherwise, in the subject matter in
controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any other interest that could
be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceedings;
Q: When Atty. Rojas was appointed as a judge, he inherited a criminal case in which
he acted as prosecutor. He explained that his delay in inhibiting himself from
presiding on that case was because it was only after the belated transcription of the
stenographic notes that he remembered that he handled that case. He also says that
the counsels did not object and he never held “full-blown” hearings anyway. Should
Judge Rojas be reprimanded?
A: Yes. The Rules of Court prevent judges from trying cases where they acted as
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counsel “without” the consent of the parties. This prevents not only a conflict of
interest but also the appearance of impropriety on the part of the judge. Here, the
judge should not have taken part in the proceeding as his impartiality will naturally
be questioned considering that he previously handled the case as prosecutor. He
should administer justice impartially & without delay. The prohibition does not only
cover hearings but all judicial acts (e.g. orders, resolutions) some of which, Judge
Rojas did make (Re: Inhibition of Judge Eddie R. Rojas, A.M. No. 98-6-185-RTC, Oct.
30, 1998).
Q: Judge Mijares was charged with grave misconduct for taking cognizance and
deciding a special proceeding for correction of entry in the record of her grandson,
notwithstanding such relationship. It was also alleged that the judge dispensed with
the publication requirement in said proceeding. In her answer, Judge Mijares
contended that the prohibition provided for under the Code does not apply to special
proceeding which is not controversial in nature and since she does not have any
pecuniary interest in the case. Is the contention correct?
A: No. A judge who is related to a party within the 6th degree of consanguinity is
mandated to inhibit himself from hearing the case “notwithstanding lack of pecuniary
interest in the case”. This is so because lack of such interest does not mean that she
can already be free from bias and partiality in resolving the case by reason of her
close blood relationship as evident from the fact that here, she waived the
publication requirement in order to save the petitioner from the payment of
publication fee. Thus, the judge’s taking cognizance of the petition is improper
(Villaluz v.Mijares, A.M. No. RTJ -98-1402 288, Apr. 3, 1998).
Degree of compliance required by the rule under Canon 3, Section 5 of NCJC

Strict compliance of the rule is required so as to protect the rights of the parties and
assure an impartial administration of justice, as well as to prevent erosion of the
people's confidence in the judiciary (Marfil v. Cuachon, A.M. No. 2360-MJ ,Aug. 31,
1981). The grounds for disqualification of a judge enumerated under Sec. 5 of Canon
3 are not exclusive. The provision provides that it is not limited to the grounds
therein provided.
SEC. 6. A judge disqualified as stated above may, instead of withdrawing

from the proceeding, disclose on the records the basis of disqualification. If,
based on such disclosure, the parties and lawyers, independently of the
judge’s participation, all agree in writing that the reason for the inhibition is
immaterial or unsubstantial, the judge may then participate in the
proceeding. The agreement, signed by all parties and lawyers, shall be
incorporated in the record of the proceedings.
Types of disqualification
1. Mandatory or compulsory disqualification
2. Voluntary disqualification or inhibition
Inhibition
An act when a judge personally prevents himself from taking cognizance of the case.
This is made through a written petition to inhibit which shall state the grounds for
the same. The explanation of the judge whether or not to take cognizance of the
case must also be in writing.
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If the judge inhibits himself from taking cognizance of the case, the same cannot be
appealed. However, the judge should not immediately inhibit himself. He should
make a careful examination by first taking into consideration the following:
1. General consideration – whether or not people’s faith in the judicial system will be
impaired
2. Special consideration –He must reflect on the probability that the losing party will
nurture at the back of his mind that he tilted the scale of justice
Disqualification v. Inhibition
DISQUALIFICATION- There are specific grounds enumerated under the rules of court
for disqualification. The judge has no discretion; mandatory.
INHIBITION-The rule only provides broad basis for inhibition. The rule leaves the
matter to the judge’s sound discretion.
Grounds for mandatory disqualification

1. When he, or his wife, or child is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor, or
otherwise;
2. When he is related to either party within the 6th degree of consanguinity or
affinity or to counsel within the 4th civil degree;
3. When he has been an executor, guardian, administrator, trustee, or counsel; or
4. When he has presided in an inferior court where his ruling or decision is subject to
review, without the written consent of the parties. (Rule 137, RRC)
Voluntary inhibition of a judge

The judge may in his discretion inhibit himself, for just and valid reasons other than
the grounds for mandatory disqualification. The rule on voluntary disqualification or
inhibition is discretionary upon the judge on the basis of his conscience.
This leaves the discretion to the judge to decide for himself questions as to whether
he will desist from sitting in a case for other just and valid reasons with only his
conscience to guide him, unless he cannot discern for himself his inability to meet
the test of cold neutrality required of him, in which event the appellate court will see
to it that he disqualifies himself.
A decision to disqualify himself is not conclusive and his competency may be

determined on application for mandamus to compel him to act. Judge’s decision to
continue hearing a case in which he is not legally prohibited from trying
notwithstanding challenge to his objectivity may not constitute reversible error.
The filing of an administrative case against a judge disqualify does not automatically
disqualify him from sitting in a case. It must be shown that there are other acts or
conducts by the judge which constitute a ground for his disqualification.
A judge may by mandamus be compelled to act on questions regarding his

disqualification from sitting in a case.
Time to file the petition to disqualify a judge

It must be filed before rendition of the judgment, and cannot be raised on appeal.
Otherwise, the parties are deemed to have waived any objection regarding the
impartiality of the judge.
Q: A judge rendered a decision in a criminal case finding the accused guilty of estafa.
Counsel for the accused filed a motion for reconsideration which was submitted
without arguments. Later, another lawyer entered his appearance for the accused.
The judge issued an order inhibiting himself from further sitting in the case because
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the latter lawyer had been among those who recommended him to the bench. Can
the judge’s voluntary inhibition be sustained?
A: The judge may not voluntarily inhibit himself by the mere fact that a lawyer
recommended him to the bench. In fact, the appearance of said lawyer is a test as to
whether the judge can act independently and courageously in deciding the case
according to his conscience. “Inhibition is not allowed at every instance that a friend,
classmate, associate or patron of a presiding judge appears before him as counsel
for one of the parties to a case. ‘Utang na loob’, per se, should not be a hindrance to
the administration of justice. Nor should recognition of such value in Philippine
society prevent the performance of one’s duties as judge.” However, in order to
avoid any suspicion of partiality, it is better for the judge to voluntarily inhibit himself
(Query of Executive Judge Estrella T. Estrada, Regional Trial Court of Malolos,
Bulacan, on the Conflicting Views of Regional Trial Court – Judges Masadao and
Elizaga Re: Criminal Case No. 4954-M, A.M. No. 87-9-3918-RTC, Oct. 26, 1987).
Q: Does a judge’s active participation during the hearing of the writ of preliminary
injunction amount to an evident display of his bias and partiality in favor of the
private respondents and should he therefore disqualify himself from further hearing
the civil case?
A: No. Mere intervention of the respondent judge during the hearing of preliminary
injunction by simply asking the materiality of a question directed upon the witness
and ruling against the petitioners are within the prerogatives and powers of the
judge. The fact that the judge asked questions in the course of the trial does not
make him a biased judge (Hizon v. Dela Fuente,G.R. No. 152328, Mar. 23, 2004).
Remittal of disqualification
A judge disqualified may, instead of withdrawing from the proceeding, disclose in the
records the basis of disqualification. If, based on such disclosure, the parties and
lawyers, independently of the judge’s participation, all agree in writing that the
reason for the inhibition is immaterial or insubstantial; the judge may then
participate in the proceeding. The agreement, signed by all parties and lawyers, shall
be incorporated in the record of the proceedings. (NCJC, Sec. 6, Canon 3)
Requirements for a judge to continue hearing a case despite the existence

of reasons for disqualifications
1. The bona fide disclosure to the parties in litigation; and
2. The express acceptance by all the parties of the cited reason as not material or
substantial.
4. Propriety
CANON 4
PROPRIETY
Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance

of all the activities of a judge.
NOTE: The judge’s own perception of motives is not relevant when considering appearance of
impropriety.
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SEC. 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in

all of their activities.
NOTE: The public holds judges to higher standards of integrity and ethical conduct than
lawyers and other persons not invested with public trust.
Prohibition provided by the Code

It prohibits not only actual impropriety but even the mere appearance of
impropriety.
Appearance of impropriety
When the conduct of a judge would create unreasonable minds a perception that the
judge’s ability to carry out judicial responsibilities with integrity, impartiality and
competence is impaired.
NOTE: Acts done by a judge which are not illegal may still constitute a violation of this rule.
Q: After the prosecution cross-examined Sheila, a witness for the accused, Judge
Pedro asked her ten additional questions that were so intense, they made her cry.
One question forced Sheila to admit that her mother was living with another man, a
fact that weighed against the accused. This prompted the latter’s counsel to move to
move to expunge the judge’s questions for building on the prosecution’s case. Judge
Pedro denied the motion, insisting that bolstering a party’s case is incidental to the
court’s desire to be clarified. Did Judge Pedro commit an impropriety? (2011 Bar
Question)
A: Yes, because he effectively deprived the defense of its right to due process when
he acted both as prosecutor and judge.
Examples of acts of a judge which are not illegal but will constitute a
violation of this rule
1. The act of a judge of hearing cases on a day when he is supposed to be on official
leave (Re: Anonymous complaint Against Judge Edmundo Acuña, A.M. No. RTJ-04-
1891, July 28, 2005).
2. Photograph showing the judge and a subordinate coming out of a hotel together
even if there was no clear evidence of sexual congress between them is enough to
give rise to the appearance of impropriety that the code strongly warns against
(Liwanag v. Lustre, A.M. No. MTJ-98-1168, Apr. 21 1999).
3. Joking remark made by a judge to a litigant suggesting that the litigant prove he
harbored no ill feelings towards the judge (Co v. Plata, A.M. No. MTJ-03-1501,Mar.
14, 2005).
Q: During the hearing of an election protest filed by the brother of Judge Dojillo, the
latter sat beside the counsel of his brother allegedly to give moral support. Did the
judge commit any improper conduct?
A: Yes. The judge violated the rule on impropriety under Sec 1, Canon 4, NCJC for
even if he did not intend to use his position as a judge to influence the outcome of
his brother’s election protest, it cannot be denied that his presence in the courtroom
during the hearing of his brother’s case would immediately give cause for the
community to suspect that his being a colleague in the judiciary would influence the
judge trying the case to favor his brother (Vidal v. Judge Dojillo Jr., A.M. No. MTJ-
05-1591, July 14, 2005).
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NOTE: The Judge’s act in riding in defendant’s car deserves the stern probation of the Court.
By such act, he openly exposed himself and the office he holds to suspicion, thus impairing the
trust and faith of the people in the administration of justice. A judge’s official conduct should
be free from the appearance of impropriety and his personal conduct and behavior should be
beyond reproach (Spouses Cabreana v. Avelino A.M. No. 1733 CFI, Sept. 30, 1981).
SEC. 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal

restrictions that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and
should do so freely and willingly. In particular, judges shall conduct
themselves in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.
Membership in the judiciary circumscribes one’s personal conduct and imposes upon
him certain restrictions, the faithful observance of which, is the price one has to pay
for holding such a distinguished position. Accordingly, a magistrate of the law must
comport himself in a manner that his conduct must be free of a whiff of impropriety,
not only with respect to the performance of his official duties, but also to his
behavior outside his sala and as a private individual. His conduct must be able to
withstand the most searching public scrutiny, for the ethical principles and sense of
propriety of a judge are essential to the preservation of the people’s faith in the
judicial system lest public confidence in the judiciary would be eroded by the
incompetent, irresponsible and negligent conduct of judges (Bayaca v. Judge Ramos,
A.M. No. MTJ-07-1676, Jan. 29, 2009).
Dignified conduct
It is best described as conduct befitting men and women possessed of temperance
and respect for the law and for others.
SEC. 3. Judges shall, in their personal relations with individual members of

the legal profession who practice regularly in their court, avoid situations
which might reasonably give rise to the suspicion or appearance of
favoritism or partiality.
This section is directed at bolstering the principle of cold neutrality of an impartial

judge as it requires judges to scrupulously guard against any act that may be
construed as an expression of bias in favor of a litigant.
NOTE: Constant company with a lawyer tends to breed intimacy and camaraderie to the point
that favors in the future may be asked from the judge which he may find it hard to resist. If a
judge is seen eating and drinking in public places with a lawyer who has cases pending in his
or her sala, public suspicion may be aroused, thus tending to erode the trust of litigants in the
impartiality of the judge (Padilla v. Zantua, G.R. No. 110990, Oct. 23, 1994).
Q: Complainant Prosecutor filed an administrative complaint against respondent

Sandiganbayan Justices for grave misconduct, conduct unbecoming a Justice, and
conduct grossly prejudicial to the interest of the service. Allegedly, during a hearing,
Justice Ong uttered words like “We are playing Gods here, we will do what we want
Page 126 of 163

to do, your contempt is already out, we fined you eighteen thousand pesos, even if
you will appeal, by that time I will be there, Justice of the Supreme Court.” Also, he
often asked lawyers from which law schools they had graduated, and frequently
inquired whether the law school in which Justice Hernandez had studied and from
which he had graduated was better than his (Justice Ong’s) own alma mater. The
complainant opined that the query was manifestly intended to emphasize that the
San Beda College of Law, the alma mater of Justice Ong, and the UP College of Law,
that of Justice Hernandez, were the best law schools. On another occasion in that
hearing in Cebu City, Justice Hernandez discourteously shouted at Prosecutor
Hazelina Tujan-Militante, who was then observing trial from the gallery and said “You
are better than Director Somido? Are you better than Director Chua? Are you here to
supervise Somido? Your office is wasting funds for one prosecutor who is doing
nothing”. Finally, Justice Hernandez berated Atty. Pangalangan, the father of former
UP Law Dean Raul Pangalangan, and uttered words such as “Just because your son is
always nominated by the JBC to Malacañang, you are acting like that! Do not forget
that the brain of the child follows that of their (sic) mother.” Should the respondent
justices be held liable for conduct unbecoming?
A: Yes. Publicizing professional qualifications or boasting of having studied in and
graduated from certain law schools, no matter how prestigious, might have even
revealed, on the part of Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez, shows their bias for or
against some lawyers. Their conduct was impermissible, consequently, for Section 3,
Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, demands
that judges avoid situations that may reasonably give rise to the suspicion or
appearance of favoritism or partiality in their personal relations with individual
members of the legal profession who practice regularly in their courts. Judges should
be dignified in demeanor, and refined in speech. In performing their judicial duties,
they should not manifest bias or prejudice by word or conduct towards any person or
group on irrelevant grounds. It is very essential that they should live up to the high
standards their noble position on the Bench demands. Their language must be
guarded and measured, lest the best of intentions be misconstrued. In this regard,
Section 3, Canon 5 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary,
mandates judges to carry out judicial duties with appropriate consideration for all
persons, such as the parties, witnesses, lawyers, court staff, and judicial colleagues,
without differentiation on any irrelevant ground, immaterial to the proper
performance of such duties (Jamsani-Rodriguez v. Ong, A.M. No. 08-19-SB-J, Aug.
24, 2010).
SEC. 4. Judges shall not participate in the determination of a case in which

any member of their family represents a litigant or is associated in any
manner with the case.
This rule rests on the principle that no judge should preside in a case in which the
judge is not wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent.
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SEC. 5. Judges shall not allow the use of their residence by a member of the
legal profession to receive clients of the latter or of other members of the
legal profession.
The reason is that judges are required to always exhibit cold neutrality of an
impartial judge.
NOTE: It was inappropriate for a judge to have entertained a litigant in his house particularly
when the case is still pending before his sala (J. King and Sons. v. Hontanosas, Adm. Matter
No. RTJ-03-1802, Sept. 21, 2004).
SEC. 6. Judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of expression,
belief, association and assembly, but in exercising such rights, they shall
always conduct themselves in such a manner as to preserve the dignity of
the judicial office and the impartiality and independence of the judiciary.
While judges are not expected to live a hermit-like existence or cease functioning as
citizens of the Republic, they should remember that they do not disrobe themselves
of their judicial office upon leaving their salas. In the exercise of their civil liberties,
they should be circumspect and ever mindful that their continuing commitment to
upholding the judiciary and its values places upon them certain implied restraints to
their freedom.
Q: In an anonymous letter sent to the OCA, Judge Acuña was charged with improper
conduct for allegedly making humiliating statements such as “putris,” and “putang-
ina”. In his comment, Judge Acuña explained that those words are only his favorite
expressions and they are not directed to any particular person. He also explained
that his behavior is justified by the fact that he is still mourning the sudden demise
of his eldest son. Is the Judge guilty of improper conduct?
A: Yes. Judges are demanded to be always temperate, patient and courteous both in
the conduct and language. Indeed, judges should so behave at all times because
having accepted the esteemed position of a judge he ought to have known that more
is expected of him than ordinary citizen. Here, the judge’s use of humiliating and
insensitive expressions like “putris” and ”putang-ina” is improper as such
intemperate language detracts from how he should conduct himself. Moreover, it
does not matter whether such expressions were directed to a particular person or
not, as they give the impression of a person’s ill manners (Re: Anonymous complaint
Against Judge Acuña, A.M. No. RTJ-04-1891, July 28, 2005).
NOTE: Judges in the exercise of their civil liberties, should be circumspect and ever mindful of
their continuing commitment to uphold the judiciary and its value places upon them certain
implied restraints to their freedom. A judge was admonished for the appearance of engaging
in partisan politics when he participated in a political rally sponsored by one party, even
though he only explained the mechanics of block voting to the audience (Macias v. Arula, A.M.
No. 1895-CFI, July 20, 1982).
SEC. 7. Judges shall inform themselves about their personal fiduciary and
financial interests and shall make reasonable efforts to be informed about
the financial interests of members of their family.
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A judge shall refrain from financial and business dealings that tend to reflect
adversely on the court's impartiality, interfere with the proper performance of judicial
activities, or increase involvement with lawyers or persons likely to come before the
court.
SEC. 8. Judges shall not use or lend the prestige of the judicial office to
advance their private interests, or those of a member of their family or of
anyone else, nor shall they convey or permit others to convey the
impression that anyone is in a special position improperly to influence them
in the performance of judicial duties.
Prohibited acts by the rule

1. Judge’s act of using judicial office to advance private interests
2. Judge’s act of giving impression that he can be influenced to use the judicial office
to advance the private interests of others.
NOTE: Another common violation of this rule is using judicial power to exact personal
vengeance.
Ticket fixing
It is misconduct in which judges impermissibly take advantage of their public
position to avoid punishment for traffic violations.
SEC. 9. Confidential information acquired by judges in their judicial capacity

shall not be used or disclosed for any other purpose related to their judicial
duties.
Rationale: The prohibition will discourage, if not stop judges from making business
speculations in some business ventures, the secrets of which they learned by reason
of their position as judges.
Q: Judge Lilagam was charged with improper conduct for allowing his wife to have
access to court records. In his answer, the judge admitted that he requested his wife
who was previously a legal researcher, to go over the records and pinpoint problem
areas and to suggest measures to rectify the same and to improve the system of
case monitoring. Is the judge guilty of improper conduct?
A: Yes. Records of cases are necessarily confidential, and to preserve their integrity
and confidentiality, access thereto ought to be limited only to the judge, the parties
or their counsel and the appropriate court personnel in charge of the custody of said
records. Here, since Mrs. Lilagam is not a court employee specifically in charge of the
custody of said records, the judge’s act of allowing her to have access thereto is
improper as such would convey the impression that she is the one who can influence
the judge’s official function (Gordon v. Lilagam, A.M. No. RTJ-00-1564, July 26,
2001).
Violation of the rule which constitutes criminal offense

The following , under Sec. 3[k] of R.A. 3019, and under Art. 229 and 230 of the RPC,
are violation of the rule which also constitute criminal offense:
1. Divulging valuable information of a confidential character, acquired by his office or
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by him on account of his official position to unauthorized persons, or releasing such

information in advance of its authorized release date (R.A. 3019, Sec. 3[k]).
2. Revelation of secrets by an officer –Any public officer who shall reveal any secret
known to him by reason of his official capacity, or shall wrongfully deliver papers or
copies of papers of which he may have charge and which should not be published,
shall suffer imprisonment (RPC, Art.229) .
3. Public officer revealing secrets of private individual –Any public officer to whom
the secrets of any private individual shall become known by reason of his office who
shall reveal such secrets, shall suffer the penalties of arresto mayor and a fine (RPC,
Art.230).
SEC. 10. Subject to the proper performance of judicial duties, judges may
(a) Write, lecture, teach and participate in activities concerning the law,
the legal system, the administration of justice or related matters;
(b) Appear at a public hearing before an official body concerned with

matters relating to the law, the legal system, the administration of justice
or related matters;
(c) Engage in other activities if such activities do not detract from the
dignity of the judicial office or otherwise interfere with the performance of
judicial duties.
This section allows the judge to participate in legal academia and public discourse on
legal matters with the proviso that there shall be no interference in the performance
of the judge’s primary functions with respect to his or her jurisdiction. In dealing with
the media however, the Philippine Judicial Academy suggests that a judge or court
should avoid acrimonious debate with reporters and the public, for a knee jerk
reaction from the court or judge may only provoke negative follow-up reports and
articles.
This section’s tolerance of judicially-related activities is limited by Sec. 12, Article
VIII of the Constitution, which prohibits judges from being “designated to any
agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions”.
Judge cannot be a member of Provincial Committee on Justice

Such membership would violate the constitutional provision on the discharge by
members of the judiciary of administrative functions in quasi-judicial or
administrative agencies. This does not mean, however, that judges should adopt an
attitude of monastic insensibility or unbecoming indifference to the Provincial/City
Committee on Justice. As incumbent judges, they form part of the structure of
government. Even as non-members, Judges should render assistance to said
Committees to help promote the laudable purposes for which they exist, but only
when such assistance may be reasonably incidental to the fulfillment of their judicial
duties. (In Re: Designation of Judge Rodolfo U. Manzano, A.M. No. 88-7-1861-RTC,
Oct. 5, 1988)
NOTE: Under Sec. 10(c), Section 10, Canon 4, a judge may engage in private business without
the written permission of the Supreme Court (Borre v. Moya,A.M. No. 1765-CFI, Oct. 17,
1980).
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SEC. 11. Judges shall not practice law whilst the holder of judicial office.
This prohibition is based on the inherent incompatibility of the rights, duties and
functions of the office of an attorney with the powers, duties and functions of a
judge.
NOTE: Sec. 35 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court prohibits judges from engaging in the practice
of law or giving professional advice to clients. Philippine courts not only prohibit judges from
overtly representing clients as counsel of record, but also from acting more subtly in a way
more befitting an advocate than a judge.
The rule disqualifying a municipal judge from engaging in the practice of law seeks to
avoid the evil of possible use of the power and influence of his office to affect the
outcome of the litigation where he is retained as counsel. Compelling reasons of
public policy lie behind this prohibition, and judges are expected to conduct
themselves in such a manner as to preclude any suspicion that they are representing
the interests of party litigant (Dia-Anonuevo v. Bercacio, A.M. No. 177-MTJ, Nov. 27,
1975)
Q: Judge Malanyaon was present in the hearing of her daughter to advise her on
what to do and say during the hearing, to the point of coaching her. Was the act of
the judge considered contrary to Section 11, Canon 4 of the NCJC, prohibiting judges
from engaging in the private practice of law or giving professional advice to clients?
A: Yes. The Court held that the judge engaged in the private practice of law by
assisting his daughter at his wife’s administrative case, coaching his daughter in
making manifestations or posing motions to the hearing officer, and preparing the
questions that he prompted to his daughter (Decena vs. Malanyaon A.M. No. RTJ-10-
2217, April 8, 2013).
Q: In an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of the late Juan Mayaman, the heirs
requested Judge Maawain, a family friend, to go over the document prepared by a
new lawyer before they signed it. Judge Maawain agreed and even acted as an
instrumental witness. Did Judge Maawain engage in the unauthorized practice of
law? Why? (2002 Bar Question)
A: No. In the case of de Castro v. Capulong, 118SCRA 5 (1982), the Supreme Court
held that a judge who merely acted as a witness to a document and who explained
to the party waiving his rights of redemption over mortgaged properties the
consequences thereof, does not engage himself in the practice of law. This appears
to be more applicable to the case of Judge Maawain. He did not give professional
advice in anticipation of litigation. He was just asked to review a deed of extrajudicial
settlement of estate. He signed merely as an instrumental witness and not as a legal
counsel. Besides, his act was an isolated act.
SEC. 12. Judges may form or join associations of judges or participate in
other organizations representing the interests of judges.
This rule recognizes the difference between membership in associations of judges

and membership in associations of other legal professionals. While attendance at
lavish events hosted by lawyers might create an appearance of impropriety,
participation in judges-only organizations does not.
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Rules relating to prohibition against accepting gifts, bequests, or loans

GR: Sections 13 and 14 of Canon 4 of the NCJC.
XPN: Section 15 of Canon 4 of the NCJC.
SEC. 13. Judges and members of their families shall neither ask for, nor
accept, any gift, bequest, loan or favor in relation to anything done or to be
done or omitted to be done by him or her in connection with the
performance of judicial duties.
SEC. 14. Judges shall not knowingly permit court staff or others subject to
their influence, direction or authority, to ask for, or accept, any gift,
bequest, loan or favor in relation to anything done or to be done or omitted
to be done in connection with their duties or functions.
This section is intended to assure that what the judge cannot do directly (soliciting
gifts), may not be done indirectly through the use of employees or staff members.
NOTE: Section 13 should be read in conjunction with Section 7(d) of R.A. 6713 (Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public officials and Employee) which provides that, public
officials and employees shall not solicit or accept, directly or indirectly, any gift, gratuity,
favor, entertainment, loan or anything of money value from any person in the course of their
official duties or in connection with any operation being regulated by, or any transaction which
may be affected by the functions of their office.
Q: X was charged with grave threat before the sala of Judge Elias Lelina. During the
pendency of the case, X offered a business partnership to the daughter of Judge
Lelina who then accepted the same. Should the judge be disciplined?
A: Yes. Judges should not allow members of their family to accept gifts nor favor in
relation to anything done, to be done, or omitted to be done by the judge in
connection with the performance of his official duties. Here, the judge’s act of
allowing his daughter to accept the business offer of X despite knowledge of the
possible intention of the latter who has pending case in his sala is improper (Dulay v.
Lelina Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-99-1516, July 14, 2005).
SEC. 15. Subject to law and to any legal requirements of public disclosure,
judges may receive a token gift, award or benefit as appropriate to the
occasion on which it is made, provided that such gift, award or benefit
might not reasonably be perceived as intended to influence the judge in the
performance of judicial duties or otherwise give rise to an appearance of
partiality.
Judges are allowed to accept token gifts, awards, or benefits when given as a
consequence of a special occasion.
Gifts and grants allowed from foreign countries

1. The acceptance and retention by a public official or employee of a gift of nominal
value tendered and received as a souvenir or mark of courtesy;
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2. The acceptance by a public official or employee of a gift in the nature of a

scholarship or fellowship grant or medical treatment; or
3. The acceptance by a public official or employee of travel grants or expenses for
travel taking place entirely outside the Philippines (such as allowances,
transportation, food and lodging) of more than nominal value if such acceptance is
appropriate or consistent with the interest of the Philippines, and permitted by the
head office, branch or agency to which the judge belongs (Sec. 7[d], R.A. 6713).
Indirect and direct bribery of judges

Acceptance of gifts given by reason of the office of the judge is indirect bribery (RPC,
Art. 211) Acts punishable in direct bribery are as follows:
a) By agreeing to perform an act which constitute a crime in connection with his
official duties for a consideration.
b) By accepting a gift in consideration of the execution of an act which does not
constitute a crime in consideration with the performance of his official duty.
c) By refraining, from doing something which it is his official duty to do, in
consideration of gift or promise (RPC, Art. 210).
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act: Judges receiving gifts or other

material benefits
GR: Yes, the judge is liable criminally for directly or indirectly receiving gifts,
presents or other pecuniary or material benefit for himself or for another under
conditions provided in Section 2, pars. b and c of the law.
XPN: Unsolicited gifts or presents of small value offered or given as a mere ordinary
token of gratitude or friendship according to local custom or usage (RA 3019, Section
14)
NOTE: Under Section 16 Article XI of the 1987Constitution “No loan, guarantee or other form
of financial controlled bank or financial institution to members of the Supreme Court during
their tenure.
It is a serious misconduct for a judge to receive money from a litigant in the form of
loans which he never intended to pay back. Even if the judge intends to pay, it is an
act of impropriety to take a loan from a party litigant. The judge could not be wholly
free from bias in deciding a case where his lender is a party. A judge should always
strive to be free from suspicion and all forms of improprieties (Ompoc v. Judge
Torres, A.M. No. MTJ-86-11, Sept. 27, 1989).
NOTE: To ensure equality of treatment to all before the courts is essential to the due
performance of the judicial office. As the guardians of justice, courts must adhere to the
principle of equality. People expect the courts to be unaffected by differences in social status,
degree of education and even physical abilities.
5. Equality
CANON 5
EQUALITY
Ensuring equality of treatment to all before the courts is essential to the due
performance of the judicial office.
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A judge must be able to render substantial justice and maintain public confidence in
the judicial system, by being aware of the diversity in society. With that awareness,
a judge should not yield to first impression, reach hasty conclusions or prejudge
matters (Castillo v. Judge Juan, 62 SCRA 124).
SEC. 1. Judges shall be aware of, and understand, diversity in society and
differences arising from various sources, including but not limited to race,
color, sex, religion, national origin, caste, disability, age, marital status,
sexual orientation, social and economic status and other like causes.
To render substantial justice and maintain public confidence in the judicial system,
judges are expected to be aware of the diversity in society that results from an
increased worldwide exchange of people and ideas.
NOTE: Judges should be mindful of the various international instruments and treaties ratified
by the Philippines, which affirm the equality of all human beings and establish a norm of non-
discrimination without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion. Judges should not yield
to first impression, reach hasty conclusions or prejudge matters. They have a duty to ensure
that the minority status of a party plays no part in their decisions.
SEC. 2. Judges shall not, in the performance of judicial duties, by words or

conduct, manifest bias or prejudice towards any person or group on
irrelevant grounds.
Magistrates of law must comport themselves at all times in such a manner that their
conduct, can withstand the highest level of public scrutiny.
Judges should avoid private remarks, hasty conclusions, or distasteful jokes that
may give even erroneous impressions of prejudice and lead the public to believe that
cases before them are being prejudged.
SEC. 3. Judges shall carry out judicial duties with appropriate consideration
for all persons, such as the parties, witnesses, lawyers, court staff and
judicial colleagues, without differentiation on any irrelevant ground,
immaterial to the proper performance of such duties.
As arbiters of the law, judges should be conscientious, studious, courteous, patient

and punctual in the discharge of their judicial duties, recognizing that time of
litigants, witnesses and counsel is of value. Judges should act with decorum toward
jurors, parties, court staff, spectators, and alike.
Q: Judge Tormis made a comment in a certain case to the effect that the same
should be dismissed as the act complained of was already decriminalized by a special
law. Thereafter, Judge Navarro, who previously handled the case before he was
appointed as a judge, barged into the office of Judge Tormis telling to the staff that
their judge does not know her law. Judge Tormis then retaliated by saying that to
her, the office of Judge Navarro does not exist. Are the judges guilty of conduct
unbecoming of a judge?
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A: Yes. Judges, being dispensers of justice should not act in a way that would cast
suspicion in order to preserve faith in the administration of justice. They should so
behave to avoid poor public impression on the judiciary. Here, the judges act of
fighting each other by uttering derogatory remarks against each other is a conduct
unbecoming of a judge for which they should be disciplined as their fight has
impaired the image of the judiciary (Navarro v. Tormis, A.M. No. MTJ-00-1337, Apr.
27, 2004).
Q: Atty. Quinto was the defense counsel in a criminal case. In his verified complaint,
he alleged that during the hearing, he manifested that he was waiving the
presentation of evidence for the accused. Judge Vios then allegedly got angry,
shouted and scolded him, stating that the defense had no right to waive the
presentation of evidence. He did not even listen to Atty. Quinto’s explanation and,
thereafter, compelled the latter to withdraw his appearance as counsel of the
accused, under pain of contempt. In the presence of the complainant, Judge Vios
appointed a counsel deofficio. May Judge Vios be held administratively liable for
compelling the lawyer to withdraw as counsel for the accused under pain of
contempt?
A: Yes. A judge should avoid unconsciously falling into the attitude of mind
that the litigants are made for the courts, instead of the courts for the litigants.
Here, the judge should be held liable for misconduct when he threatened to punish
complainant for contempt of court if he would refuse to withdraw his appearance, as
counsel for the accused, when the latter insisted on waiving the presentation of the
evidence for the defense (Atty. Quinto v. Judge Vios, A.M. No. MTJ-04-1551, May 21,
2004).
SEC. 4. Judges shall not knowingly permit court staff or others subject to his
or her influence, direction or control to differentiate between persons
concerned, in a matter before the judge, on any irrelevant ground.
Duties of judges under this section

1. To ensure that court personnel under their supervision do not discriminate by
dispensing special favors or disclosing confidential information to any unauthorized
person, regardless of whether such information came from authorized or
unauthorized sources; and
2. To organize their courts to ensure the prompt and convenient dispatch of business
and should not tolerate misconduct by clerks, sheriffs and other assistants who are
sometimes prone to expect favors or special treatment due to their professional
relationship with the judge.
NOTE: All personnel involved in the dispensation of justice should conduct themselves with a
high degree of responsibility (Mataga v. Rosete, A.M. No.MTJ-03-1488, Oct. 13, 2004).
SEC. 5. Judges shall require lawyers in proceedings before the court to

refrain from manifesting, by words or conduct, bias or prejudice based on
irrelevant grounds, except such as are legally relevant to an issue in
proceedings and may be the subject of legitimate advocacy.
Judges should conduct proceedings in court with dignity and in a manner that
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reflects the importance and seriousness of proceedings. They should maintain order
and proper decorum in the court (1989 Code of Judicial Conduct, Rule 3.03, Canon
3).
Judges have the duty to prevent lawyers from abusing witnesses with unfair
treatment.
As courts are expected to ensure equality, any lawyer who makes an insensitive or
demeaning comment in court should be admonished.
Q: During the hearing of a case for statutory rape filed against X, the lawyer is
asking the 6-year-old victim to relate exactly and step by step the sexual intercourse
between her and the accused. The lawyer is also asking questions whether at the
time of the alleged rape, the accused’s penis was hard, and whether at the time they
were caught, the accused was still pushing and pulling his penis inside her vagina.
Should the judge allow such questions?
A: No. The judge shall require lawyers to refrain from making abusive and uncalled
for queries. Here, the fact that the victim of rape is a child of tender years, there is
more reason to require the lawyer to be tactful. No woman especially child of tender
years would exactly remember step by step the sexual intercourse in the hands of
the maniacal beast. Hence, all the questions asked are excessive (People v. Boras,
G.R. No. 127495, Dec. 22, 2000).
6. Competence and diligence
CANON 6
COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE
Competence and diligence are prerequisites to the due performance of

judicial office.
A judge upon assumption to office, becomes the visible representation of law and of
justice, hence, the Constitution (Section 7 (3), Article VIII), prescribes that he must
be a person of proven competence as a requisite of his membership in the judiciary.
A judge should be the epitome of competence, integrity and independence to be able
to render justice and uphold public confidence in the legal system. He must be
conversant with basic legal principles and well-settled doctrines. He should strive for
excellence and seek the truth with passion (Rino v. Judge Cawaling, A.M. No. MTJ-
02-1391, June 7, 2004).
NOTE: As members of the judiciary, judges ought to know the fundamental legal principles;
otherwise, they are susceptible to administrative sanction for gross ignorance of the law (Heirs
of Piedad v.Estrella, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2170, Dec. 16, 2009).
SEC. 1. The judicial duties of a judge take precedence over all other
activities.
Duties of a judge under this section

1. A judge must perform his judicial duties with regard to a case where he is not
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disqualified to do so and, may not divest himself of such case if he is not so

disqualified; and
2. A judge shall not inhibit himself simply to avoid sitting on difficult or controversial
cases.
Q: An administrative case against Judge Calderon was filed for incurring leaves of
absence for almost a straight period of 3 years. In his comment, he claimed that he
was suffering from a lingering illness of malignant hypertension which claim was
supported by medical certificates prepared by his personal doctor. However, when
the court physician conducted some tests, the same contradicted the diagnosis given
by the judge’s personal doctor. Is Judge Calderon guilty of gross misconduct?
A: Yes. A judge shall be cautious of his court duties. Here, the judge should have
been aware that, in frequently leaving his station, he has caused great disservice to
many litigants and has denied them speedy justice (Re: Leaves of Absence Without
Approval of Judge Eric Calderon, Municipal Trial Court Judge of Calumpit, Bulacan,
A.M. No. 98-8-105-MTC, Jan. 26, 1999).
SEC. 2. Judges shall devote their professional activity to judicial duties,

which include not only the performance of judicial functions and
responsibilities in court and the making of decisions, but also other tasks
relevant to the judicial office or the court’s operations.
Violations of this section often involve a failure to keep records or handle funds in
compliance with court rules.
Q: Judge Daguman was charged with neglect of duty in failing to retain a copy and
to register with the Local Civil Registrar a marriage contract. In his comment, the
judge explained that his failure to do so was occasioned by circumstances beyond his
control. He averred that after the wedding ceremony, the copies of the marriage
contract were left on top of his desk in his private office where the ceremony was
held but after few days, when he gathered all the documents relating to the
marriage, the copies were already missing. He also explained that he was not able to
inform the parties about the fact of loss as they were already out of the country.
Should the judge be disciplined?
A: Yes. A judge is charged with extra care in ensuring that records of the cases and
official documents in his custody are intact. Moreover, judges must adopt a system
of record management, and organize their dockets in order to bolster the prompt and
efficient dispatch of business. Here, the circumstances show that the loss of the
documents was occasioned by the carelessness on the part of the judge. The judge
should not have left such important documents in his table to be gathered only after
few days, instead, he should have devised a filing system in his court so as to avoid
such incident (Beso v.Daguman, A.M. No. MTJ-99-1211, Jan. 28, 2000).
Judges should return records upon retirement

Since the proper and efficient management of the court is the responsibility of the
judge, he is the one directly responsible for the proper discharge of official functions.
Thus, a judge is obliged to return to the court the records of the cases filed in his
sala upon his retirement (Office of the Court Administrator v. Retired Judge
Carteciano, A.M. No. MTJ-07-1664, Feb. 18, 2008).
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SEC. 3. Judges shall take reasonable steps to maintain and enhance their
knowledge, skills and personal qualities necessary for the proper
performance of judicial duties, taking advantage for this purpose of the
training and other facilities which should be made available, under judicial
control, to judges.
Service in the judiciary means a continuous study and research on the law from
beginning to end. Judges are regarded as persons learned in the law. “Ignorance of
the law excuses no one” has special application to judges.
Though good faith and absence of malice or corruption are sufficient defenses, such
does not apply where the issues are so simple and the applicable legal principles
evident and basic as to be beyond possible margin of error (Corpus v.Ochotoresa,
A.M. No. RTJ 04-1861, July 30, 2004).
One who accepts the exalted position of a judge owes the public and the Court the
duty to maintain professional competence at all times. When a judge displays an
utter lack of familiarity with the rules, he erodes the confidence of the public in the
courts. A judge owes the public and the Court the duty to be proficient in the law and
is expected to keep abreast of laws and prevailing jurisprudence. Ignorance of the
law by a judge can easily be the mainspring of injustice (Villanueva v.Judge Buaya,
A.M. No. RTJ-08-2131, Nov. 22, 2010).
Q: Judge Gacott Jr. dismissed an election case on the ground of non-payment of

docket fees, although the case had been previously admitted and was deemed
properly filed by the original Judge (who inhibited himself due to relationship to one
of the parties). Judge Gacott issued the dismissal order relying on a case
(Manchester v.CA) which states that - a case is deemed commenced only upon the
payment of the proper docket fees. To his opinion, the required fees in this case
were not yet paid by the protestant. Enojas charged him with gross ignorance of the
law. Is Judge Gacott Jr. guilty of gross ignorance of the law?
A: Yes. A judge is duty bound to adhere to, and apply the recent jurisprudence, and
he cannot feign ignorance thereof, because he is required to be an embodiment of,
among other things, judicial competence. Here, the ruling relied upon by the judge
does not apply to election cases as in the latter case the filing fee is fixed and the
claim for damages, to which the docket fess shall be made to apply, is merely
ancillary to the main cause of action and is not even determinative of the court’s
jurisdiction. It must also be noted that in this case, the original judge already made
an order that from the deposit given by the protestant for the expenses of reopening
the questioned ballots, an amount shall be allocated for the payment of the required
fees. Thus, the election protest was already properly filed (Enojas v. Judge Gacott,
Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-99-1513, Jan. 19, 2000).
SEC. 4. Judges shall keep themselves informed about relevant developments

of international law, including international conventions and other
instruments establishing human rights norms.
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Norms of international law has become the concern of judges because they form part
of legal standards by which their competence and diligence required by the New
Code of Judicial Conduct are to be measured.
SEC. 5. Judges shall perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of
reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly and with reasonable promptness.
A judge may be subject to an administrative fine for inefficiency, neglect, and

unreasonable delay in elevating the records of a civil case to the Court of Appeals. A
delay of three years in the transmission of court records to the appellate court,
where a period of 30 days is required, is inexcusable (Pataleon v. Guidez,A.M. No.
RTJ-00-1525, Jan. 25, 2000).
Q: The records disclose that on February 21, 1994, Cabasares filed a Complaint for
Malicious Mischief against a certain Rodolfo Hebaya. The case was docketed as
Criminal Case No. 8864 and subsequently assigned to the branch of respondent
Judge. As early as February 27, 2002, the case had been submitted for decision, but
respondent judge did not pen a decision. He was charged with violation of Section 15
(1), Article VIII of the Constitution and Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct. The judge contend that it have escaped his mind.
A: Judges should meticulously observe the periods prescribed by the Constitution for
deciding cases because failure to comply with the said period transgresses the
parties’ constitutional right to speedy disposition of their cases. Thus, failure to
decide cases within the ninety (90)-day reglementary period may warrant imposition
of administrative sanctions on the erring judge. However, the Court is not unmindful
of circumstances that justify the delay in the disposition of the cases assigned to
judges. When a judge sees such circumstances before the reglementary period ends,
all that is needed is to simply ask the Court, with the appropriate justification, for an
extension of time within which to decide the case. Evidently, respondent Judge failed
to do any of these options. Since the judge retired from service he was only fined
(Antonio Y. Cabasares v. Judge Filemon A. Tandinco, Jr. Municipal Trial Court in
Cities, 8th Judicial Region, Calbayog City, Western Samar, A.M. No. MTJ-11-1793,
Oct. 19, 2011).
Flag lawyer
Refers to a lawyer of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and people’s
organizations (POs) who by the nature of his work already render free legal aid to
indigent and pauper litigants. (BAR MATTER No. 2012,Feb. 10, 2009, Section 4a(iii))
SEC. 6. Judges shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings before
the court and be patient, dignified and courteous in relation to litigants,
witnesses, lawyers and others with whom the judge deals in an official
capacity. Judges shall require similar conduct of legal representatives, court
staff and others subject to their influence, direction or control.
Besides possessing the requisite learning in the law, a magistrate must exhibit that
hallmark judicial temperament of utmost sobriety and self-restraint which are
indispensable qualities of every judge (Rodriguez v. Bonifacio, A.M. No. RTJ-99-
1510, Nov. 6, 2000).
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Q: Judge Belen was charged with conduct unbecoming of a judge allegedly for
humiliating, demeaning and berating a young lawyer who appeared in his sala. It
was alleged that when the judge learned that the lawyer was an alumnus of MCQU
and not of UP, the judge made the following statement “you’re not from UP”. Then
you cannot equate yourself to me because there is a saying and I know this, not all
law students are created equal, not all law schools are created equal, not all lawyers
are created equal despite what the Supreme Being stated that we all are created
equal in His form and substance.” Should the judge be disciplined?
A: Yes. The judge’s sarcastic, humiliating, threatening and boastful remarks to a
young lawyer are improper. A judge must be aware that an alumnus of a particular
law school has no monopoly of knowledge of the law. By hurdling the Bar
Examinations, taking of the Lawyer’s oath, and signing of the Roll of Attorneys, a
lawyer is presumed to be competent to discharge his functions and duties as, inter
alia, an officer of the court, irrespective of where he obtained his law degree. For a
judge to determine the fitness or competence of a lawyer primarily on the basis of
his alma mater is clearly an engagement in an argumentum ad hominem. As a
judge, he must address the merits of the case and not on the person of the counsel.
Judges must be that even on the face of boorish behavior from those they deal with,
they ought to conduct themselves in a manner befitting gentlemen and high officers
of the court (Atty. Mane v. Judge Belen, A.M. No.RTJ-08-2119, June 30, 2008).
Q: Judge Ante Jr. was charged with conduct unbecoming of a judge. It was alleged
that when the court employee placed the docket book on top of the filing cabinet, the
same fell on the floor causing loud sound. Unexpectedly, the judge shouted saying
“why did you throw the docket book? You get out of here, punyeta, we don’t need
you!” The judge also threw a monobloc chair at the court employee. Should the
judge be disciplined?
A: Yes. The judge, for shouting invectives and hitting complainant with a chair
displayed a predisposition to use physical violence and intemperate language which
reveals a marked lack of judicial temperament and self-restraint - traits which, aside
from the basic equipment of learning in the law - are indispensable qualities of every
judge (Briones v. Judge Ante Jr., A.M. No.MTJ-02-1411, Apr. 11, 2002).
SEC. 7. Judges shall not engage in conduct incompatible with the diligent
discharge of judicial duties.
Duty of the judge under this section

A judge shall not accept duties that will interfere with his devotion to the expeditious
and proper administration of his official functions
NOTE: When a judge, along with two other people, acted as real estate agents for the sale of a
parcel of land for which he agreed to give a commission of P100,000 to each of his
companions, and after the transaction was completed only gave the complainants P25,000
each, the high Court held that the judge violated the section of the prior Code of Judicial
Conduct (Catbagan v. Barte, A.M. No. MTJ-02-1452, Apr. 6, 2005).
C. Discipline of members of the Judiciary
Power to discipline members of the bench

The Supreme Court shall have the administrative supervision over all courts and the
personnel (1987 Consitution, Section 6, Art. VIII).
The Court en banc has the power to discipline all judges of lower courts including
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justices of the Court of Appeals (1987 Constiution, Section 11, Art. VIII).
Disbarment of judges and justices

Judges and justices, being lawyers, may also be disbarred, if found guilty of certain
crimes and/or other causes for disbarment under the Rules of Court.
Justices of the Supreme Court however may not be disbarred unless and until
they shall have been first impeached in accordance with the Constitution.
NOTE: While it is the duty of the court to investigate and determine the truth behind every
matter in complaints against judges and other court personnel, it is also their duty to see to it
that they are protected and exonerated from baseless administrative charges. The Court will
not shirk from its responsibility of imposing discipline upon its magistrates, but neither will it
hesitate to shield them from unfounded suits that serve to disrupt rather than promote the
orderly administration of justice (Ocenar v. Judge Mabutin, A.M. No. MTJ 05- 1582, Feb. 28,
2005).
A judge may be disciplined for acts committed before his appointment to the
judiciary
It is settled that a judge may be disciplined for acts committed prior to his
appointment to the judiciary. In fact, even the new Rule itself recognizes this, as it
provides for the immediate forwarding to the Supreme Court for disposition and
adjudication of charges against justices and judges before the IBP, including those
filed prior to their appointment to the judiciary (Heinz Heck vs. Judge Anthony E.
Santos, regional trial court, branch 19, Cagayan De Oro City A.M. No. Rtj-01-1657,
23 February 2004, en banc).
1. Members of the Supreme Court
a) Impeachment
Impeachment
It is a constitutional process of removing public servants from office as an assurance
against abusive officials in the country (Impeachment Primer, Official Gazette,
2012).
Object of impeachment
The object of impeachment is solely to determine whether or not the official is
worthy of the trust conferred upon him/her. It is not determination of criminal guilt
or innocence as in criminal case (Ibid.).
The nature of impeachment proceedings against SC justices is “Sui Generis” or “a
class of its own”
Grounds for impeachment

1. Treason
2. Bribery
3. Other High Crimes
4. Graft and Corruption
5. Betrayal of Public Trust (1987 Constitution, Sec. 2 Art. XI)
Impeachable officers
1. The President
2. Vice-President
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3. Members of the Supreme Court

4. Members of the Constitutional Commissions
5. Ombudsman
All other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by
law, but not by impeachment (1987 Constitution, Sec. 2 Art. XI).
The Philippine Congress holds the sole power in impeachment process.
1. House of Representatives - initiates all cases of impeachment.
2. Senate – tries and decides on all the cases.
Who can file an impeachment complaint

1. Any member of the House of Representatives
2. Any citizen with an endorsement of any member of the House of Representatives.
NOTE: When the President of the Philippines is impeached, the Chief Justice presides over the
impeachment trial; in all other cases of impeachment, the Senate President presides.
Procedure of impeachment
1. Initiate impeachment through filing of a verified complaint
2. Include in Order of Business within 10 session days
3. Referred to the proper committee within 3 session days
4. Committee conducts hearing
5. Committee votes
6. If YES, the matter will be referred to the Plenary within 60 days.
7. Plenary votes – at least 1/3 vote is required
8. If at least 1/3 vote is attained, Resolution and Articles of Impeachment are
referred to Senate
9. House elects its prosecutors
10. Senate as plenary body adopts its rules on impeachment
11. Senate convenes as impeachment court
12. Senate issues summons to respondent
13. Respondent appears and files answer
14. Senate receives testimonial and documentary evidence
15. Senator-judges interpose questions
16. Submission for voting (Convict or Acquit)
Fast track procedure for impeachment

If an impeachment complaint or resolution is filed by at least one-third (1/3) of all
members of the House, the Articles of Impeachment shall be sent to Senate for trial.
Determination for conviction or acquittal

Senators are expected to vote according to their conscience. The standard of proof
required is NOT “proof beyond reasonable doubt” because it is not a criminal trial.
Rather, it is a political process (Impeachment Primer, Official Gazette, 2012).
Votes needed for conviction
A vote of at least two-thirds (2/3) of all members of the Senate for any one article of
impeachment.
NOTE: 16 votes are required to convict on any article while 8 Negative votes can prevent
conviction on any article.
Result of conviction
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Removal from office. The Senate can additionally impose penalty of disqualification
from holding any office in the Philippine government.
However, the party convicted shall nevertheless be subject to prosecution, trial, and
punishment according to law. Criminal liability must be established by criminal trial
(Impeachment Primer, Official Gazette, 2012).
b) Ethical Lessons from Former Chief Justice Corona’s Impeachment
Grounds for impeachment against former Chief Justice Renato Corona

1. Betrayal of public trust through:
a. Track record marked by partiality and subservience in cases involving the Arroyo
administration from the time of his appointment as Supreme Court justice and until
his dubious appointment as a midnight chief justice to the present. (Article I)
b. Wanton arbitrariness and partiality in consistently disregarding the principle of res
judicata in the cases involving the 16 newly-created cities, and the promotion of
Dinagat Island into a province. (Article V)
c. Arrogating unto himself, and to a committee he created, the authority and
jurisdiction to improperly investigate a justice of the Supreme Court for the purpose
of exculpating him. Such authority and jurisdiction is properly reposed by the
Constitution in the House of Representatives via impeachment. (Article VI)
d. Partiality in granting a temporary restraining order (TRO) in favor of former
president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and her husband Jose Miguel Arroyo in order to
give them an opportunity to escape prosecution and to frustrate the ends of justice,
and in distorting the supreme court decision on the effectivity of the TRO in view of a
clear failure to comply with the conditions of the Supreme Court own TRO. (Article
VII)
e. Commission of graft and corruption when he failed and refused to account for the
judiciary development fund (JDF) and special allowance for the judiciary (SAJ)
collections. (Article VIII)
2. Culpable violation of the Constitution through:

a. Failure to disclose to the public his statement of assets, liabilities, and net worth
as required under Sec. 17, Art. XI of the 1987 Constitution (Article II)
b. Failure to meet and observe the stringent standards under Art. VIII, Section 7 (3)
of the Constitution that provides that [a] member of the judiciary must be a person
of proven competence, integrity, probity, and independence _in allowing the
Supreme court to act on mere letters filed by a counsel which caused the issuance of
flip-flopping decisions in final and executory cases; in creating an excessive
entanglement with Mrs. Arroyo through her appointment of his wife to office; and in
discussing with litigants regarding cases pending before the Supreme Court. (Article
III)
c. Blatant disregard of the principle of separation of powers by issuing a status quo
ante order against the House of Representatives in the case concerning the
impeachment of then Ombudsman Merceditas Navarro-Gutierrez (Article IV).
Reason for CJ Corona’s Impeachment

He was convicted under Article II of the Articles of impeachment, which is the failure
to disclose to the public his statement of assets, liabilities, and net worth as required
under sec. 17, Art. XI of the 1987 Constitution, by a vote of 20-3.
NOTE: It is the "obligation" of an employee to submit a sworn statement, as the "public has a
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right to know" the employee's assets, liabilities, net worth and financial and business interests.
Hence, a court interpreter who failed to include in her SALN rental payments she received
from a market stall was dismissed from service (Rabe v. Flores, A.M. No. P-97-1247, May 14,
1997). The Senator judges ruled that the law applies to all, including the Chief Justice of the
Philippines, thus, his failure to include his dollar accounts in his SALN warrants his
impeachment from office.
Q: Is the Law on Secrecy of Foreign Currency Deposit Account (FCDA) a defense in

failing to include a dollar deposit in a SALN?
A: No. The issue is not the conflict between the FCDA requiring secrecy of foreign
currency deposits and the disclosure required by the SALN law, but the Constitution
which requires public officials to declare their assets and does not distinguish
between peso and foreign accounts (Senator Judge Pangilinan).
The Supreme Court in one case said that the FCDA cannot be used as a haven for
the corrupt and the criminals. To interpret it in the manner that the Chief Justice
would want … is to say that the law could be used as a haven to hide proceeds of
criminal acts (Senator Judge Drilon).
Mandate of the Chief Justice to disclose his statement of assets and

Lliabilities
1. 1987 Constitution - Section 17. A public officer or employee shall, upon
assumption of office and as often thereafter as may be required by law, submit a
declaration under oath of his assets, liabilities, and net worth. In the case of the
President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, the Congress, the
Supreme Court, the Constitutional Commissions and other constitutional offices, and
officers of the armed forces with general or flag rank, the declaration shall be
disclosed to the public in the manner provided by law.
2. R.A. 6713 - Section 8. Statements and Disclosure. Public officials and employees
have an obligation to accomplish and submit declarations under oath of, and the
public has the right to know, their assets, liabilities, net worth and financial and
business interests including those of their spouses and of unmarried children under
eighteen (18) years of age living in their households.
Statements of Assets and Liabilities and Financial Disclosure. - All public officials and
employees, except those who serve in an honorary capacity, laborers and casual or
temporary workers, shall file under oath their Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net
Worth and a Disclosure of Business Interests and Financial Connections and those of
their spouses and unmarried children under eighteen (18) years of age living in their
households.
The Statements of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth and the Disclosure of Business
Interests and Financial Connections shall be filed by:
xxx
(2) Senators and Congressmen, with the Secretaries of the Senate and the House of
Representatives, respectively; Justices, with the Clerk of Court of the Supreme
Court; Judges, with the Court Administrator; and all national executive officials with
the Office of the President.
Basis for the public’s right to inquire upon the statement of assets and
liabilities of public officers
The postulate of public office is a public trust, institutionalized in the Constitution to
protect the people from abuse of governmental power, would certainly be mere
empty words if access to such information of public concern is denied.
The right to information (Section 7, Article III of Constitution) goes hand-in-hand
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with the constitutional policies of full public disclosure and honesty in the public
service. It is meant to enhance the widening role of the citizenry in governmental
decision-making as well as in checking abuse in government (Valmonte v. Belmonte,
Jr., 252 Phil. 264, February 13 1989).
Established limitations to the right to information, with its companion right

of access to official records
1. National security matters and intelligence information
2. Trade secrets and banking transactions
3. Criminal matters
4. Other confidential information such as confidential or classified information
officially known to public officers and employees by reason of their office and not
made available to the public as well as diplomatic correspondence, closed door
Cabinet meetings and executive sessions of either house of Congress, and the
internal deliberations of the Supreme Court.
Probity
It is the uncompromising adherence to the highest principles and ideals or
impeachable integrity (Webster's 3rd New International Dictionary).
Importance of probity as a quality of a magistrate

Canons 3 and 4 of the new Code of Judicial Conduct mandate, respectively, that
“judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is
perceived to be so in the view of the reasonable observer” and that “judges shall
avoid improprieties and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.” These
very stringent standards of decorum are demanded of all magistrates and employees
of the courts. As such, those who serve in the judiciary, particularly justices and
judges, must not only know the law but must also possess the highest degree of
integrity and probity, and an unquestionable moral uprightness both in their public
and private lives (Veloso vs. Caminade, A.M. No. RTJ- 01-1655, July 8, 2004).
Integrity
It is a steadfast adherence to a strict moral or ethical code. It is honesty and
honorableness put into one.
Observance of integrity in the judiciary

In the Judiciary, moral integrity is more than a cardinal virtue, it is a necessity. The
exacting standards of conduct demanded from judges are designed to promote public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. When the judge himself
becomes the transgressor of the law which he is sworn to apply, he places his office
in disrepute, encourages disrespect for the law and impairs public confidence in the
integrity of the judiciary itself (Lachica vs Tormis, A.M. No. MTJ-05-1609, September
20, 2005).
Importance of maintaining the confidence of the people upon the judiciary
The integrity of the Judiciary rests not only upon the fact that it is able to administer
justice, but also upon the perception and confidence of the community that the
people who run the system have administered justice. In order to create such
confidence, the people who run the judiciary, particularly judges and justices, must
not only be proficient in both the substantive and procedural aspects of the law, but
more importantly, they must possess the highest integrity, probity, and
unquestionable moral uprightness, both in their public and in their private lives. Only
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then can the people be reassured that the wheels of justice in this country run with
fairness and equity, thus creating confidence in the judicial system (Tan vs.
Pacuribot, A.M. No. RTJ-06-1982, December 14, 2007).
2. Lower court judges and justices of the Court of Appeals and

Sandiganbayan (Rule 140)
The acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action. In
the absence of fraud, malice or dishonesty in rendering the assailed decision or
order, the remedy of the aggrieved party is to elevate the assailed decision or order
to the higher court for review and correction. However, an inquiry into a judge’s civil,
criminal and/or administrative liability may be made after the available remedies
have been exhausted and decided with finality (Republic v. Caguioa, A.M. No. RTJ-
07-2063, June 26, 2009).
Institution of proceedings for the discipline of judges

Proceedings for the discipline of judges of regular and special courts and justices of
the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan may be instituted:
1. Motu proprio by the Supreme Court;
2. Upon a verified complaint filed before the Supreme Court supported by:
a. Affidavit of persons who have personal knowledge of the facts alleged therein; or
b. Documents which may substantiate said allegations.
3. Anonymous complaint supported by public records of indubitable integrity filed
with the Supreme Court.
Form and content of the complaint

The complaint shall be in writing and shall state clearly and concisely the acts and
omissions constituting violations of standards of conduct prescribed for judges by
law, the Rules of Court, or the Code of Judicial Conduct.
3. Grounds
Grounds for discipline of judges

1. Serious Misconduct – implies malice or wrongful intent, not mere error of
judgment. Judicial acts complained of:
a. Must be corrupt or inspired by an intention to violate the law; or
b. Were in persistent disregard for well-known legal rules.
NOTE: There is misconduct when there is reliable evidence showing that judicial actions are
corrupt or inspired by intent to violate the law or in persistent disregard of legal rules.
2. Inefficiency – implies negligence, incompetence, ignorance and carelessness. A

judge would be inexcusably negligent if he failed to observe in the performance of
his duties that diligence, prudence and circumspection which the law requires in the
rendition of any public service.
Q: Should a judge be held administratively liable for ignorance of the law for
granting bail to an accused in a criminal case without the requisite bail hearing, and
despite the fact that there was an eyewitness to the murder who made a positive
identification of the accused?
A: Yes. It is already settled that when a judge grants bail to a person charged with a
capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment
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without conducting the required bail hearing, he is considered guilty of ignorance or

incompetence the gravity of which cannot be excused by a claim of good faith or
excusable negligence. When a judge displays an utter unfamiliarity with the law and
the rules, he erodes the confidence of the public in the courts. A judge owes the
public and the court the duty to be proficient in the law and is expected to keep
abreast of laws and the prevailing jurisprudence. Ignorance of the law by a judge can
easily be the mainspring of injustice (Grageda v. Judge Tresvalles, A.M. MTJ No. 04-
1526, Feb. 2, 2004).
Q: Respondent judge failed to cause the raffle of an injunction case and failed to
follow the procedural requirements in issuing a TRO and a writ of preliminary
injunction as he issued them without prior notice to the defendant and without a
hearing. Is he liable for gross ignorance of the law?
A: Yes. Though not every judicial error bespeaks ignorance of the law or of the rules,
and that, when committed in good faith, does not warrant administrative sanction,
the rule applies only in cases within the parameters of tolerable misjudgment. When
the law or the rule is so elementary, not to be aware of it or to act as if one does not
know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. A judge is expected to keep abreast
of the developments and amendments thereto, as well as of prevailing jurisprudence.
Ignorance of the law by a judge can easily be the mainspring of injustice. In the
absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity
are not subject to disciplinary action. However, the assailed judicial acts must not be
in gross violation of clearly established law or procedure, which every judge must be
familiar with (Sps. Lago v. Judge Abul, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-10-2255, Jan. 17, 2011).
Q: Santiago and Sanchez were complainants in two different criminal cases before
the MTC of Bulacan and the RTC of Pampanga respectively. The suspects in each of
the criminal cases were caught and detained by authorities. However, both suspects
were released by order of Judge Jovellanos of MCTC Pangasinan. The complainants
questioned both Orders for Release, alleging that the requirements for the bail bond
had not been fulfilled and that the said judge had no jurisdiction to order the release.
Is Judge Jovellanos guilty of gross incompetence and gross ignorance of the law?
A: Yes. A judge should be acquainted with legal norms and precepts as well as with
statutes and procedural rules. Unfamiliarity with the Rules of Court is a sign of
incompetence. He must have the basic rules at the palm of his hands as he is
expected to maintain professional competence at all times. Here, there are two
defects in the Orders for Release signed by Judge Jovellanos. First, in both cases, the
detainees had not registered the bailbond in accordance with the Rules of Criminal
Procedure. One may not be given provisional liberty if the bailbond is not registered
with the proper office. Secondly, Judge Jovellanos did not have jurisdiction to order
the release of the detainees as the cases were not pending in his court and the
suspects were not arrested within his jurisdiction (Santiago v. Judge Jovellanos, A.M.
No. MTJ-00-1289, Aug. 1, 2000).
NOTE: Judges are not expected to be infallible; not every error or irregularity committed by
judges in the performance of official duties is subject to administrative sanction. In the
absence of bad faith, fraud, dishonesty, or deliberate intent to do injustice, incorrect rulings do
not constitute misconduct and may give rise to a charge of gross ignorance of the law (Cruz v.
Iturralde, A.M. No. MTJ-03-1775, Apr. 30, 2003).
Q: Cruz was the defendant in an ejectment case filed by the Province of Bulacan
involving a parcel of land owned by the said province. A decision was rendered
against Cruz. He then filed an appeal and several motions for reconsideration but
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Justice Alino-Hormachuelos before whom the motions were filed subsequently denied
all. Consequently, Cruz charged all the judges and justices with grave misconduct,
gross inexcusable negligence, and rendering a void judgment. Should the judges be
held liable for grave misconduct and gross ignorance of the law?
A: No. The Court has consistently held that judges will not be held administratively
liable for mere errors of judgment in their rulings or decisions absent a showing of
malice or gross ignorance on their part. Bad faith or malice cannot be inferred simply
because the judgment is adverse to a party. To hold a judge administratively
accountable for every erroneous ruling or decision he renders, assuming that he has
erred, would be nothing short of harassment and would make his position
unbearable. Here, the fact that the judge or justices rendered a decision not
favorable to Cruz is not enough to make them liable for grave misconduct (Cruz v.
Justice Alino- Hormachuelos et. al., A.M. No. CA-04-38, Mar. 31, 2004).
Disciplinary and criminal actions not a substitute for judicial remedy

Disciplinary and criminal actions against a judge, are not complementary or
suppletory of, nor a substitute for, judicial remedies, whether ordinary or
extraordinary. Resort to and exhaustion of judicial remedies are prerequisites for the
taking of other measures against the persons of the judges concerned, whether of
civil, administrative, or criminal nature. It is only after the available judicial remedies
have been exhausted and the appellate tribunals have spoken with finality that the
door to an inquiry into his criminal, civil, or administrative liability may be said to
have opened, or closed (Maquiran v. Grageda, A.M. No. RTJ-04-1888, Feb. 11,
2005).
Q: Santiago’s Petition for Reconstitution of Lost/Destroyed Original Certificate of Title

was granted by the Quezon City RTC. The Republic of the Philippines through the
Office of the Solicitor General appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals the case
of which was raffled to the Division where Justice Enriquez was Chairperson. The
special division reversed and set aside the Decision of the Quezon City RTC. Motion
for Reconsideration having been denied, complainant filed the present complaint
before the SC. Pending the decision of the SC, an
administrative charge of Gross Ignorance of the law/Gross Incompetence was filed
against respondent Associate Enriquez. Is the filing of the administrative complaint
against him proper?
A: No. The remedy of the aggrieved party is not to file an administrative complaint
against the judge, but to elevate the assailed decision or order to the higher court for
review and correction. An administrative complaint is not an appropriate remedy
where judicial recourse is still available, such as a motion for reconsideration, an
appeal, or a petition for certiorari, unless the assailed order or decision is tainted
with fraud, malice, or dishonesty.
The failure to interpret the law or to properly appreciate the evidence presented does
not necessarily render a judge administratively liable.
A judicial officer cannot be called to account in a civil action for acts done by him in
the exercise of his judicial function, however erroneous. In the words of Alzua and
Arnalot v. Johnson, “it is a general principle of the highest importance to the proper
administration of justice that a judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in
him, shall be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal
consequences to himself." This concept of judicial immunity rests upon consideration
of public policy, its purpose being to preserve the integrity and independence of the
judiciary. This principle is of universal application and applies to all grades of judicial
officers from the highest judge of the nation and to the lowest officer who sits as a
court (Santiago III v. Justice Enriquez, Jr. A.M. No. CA-09-47-J, Feb. 13, 2009).
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Classifications of administrative charges

1. Serious
2. Less serious
3. Light
NOTE: Administrative penalties imposed on judges are both punitive and corrective (2011 Bar
Question).
Serious charges
1. Bribery, direct or indirect
2. Dishonesty and violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Law (R.A. 3019)
3. Gross misconduct constituting violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct
4. Knowingly rendering an unjust judgment or order as determined by a competent
court in an appropriate proceeding
5. Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude
6. Willful failure to pay a just debt
7. Borrowing money or property from lawyers and litigants in a case pending before
the court
8. Immorality
9. Gross ignorance of the law or procedure
10. Partisan political activities
11. Alcoholism and/or vicious habits
Less serious charges

1. Undue delay in rendering a decision or order, or in transmitting the records of a
case
2. Frequently and unjustified absences without leave or habitual tardiness
3. Unauthorized practice of law
4. Violation of Supreme Court rules, directives, and circulars
5. Receiving additional or double compensation unless specifically authorized by law
6. Untruthful statements in the certificate of service
7. Simple misconduct
Light charges
1. Vulgar and unbecoming conduct
2. Gambling in public
3. Fraternizing with lawyers and litigants with pending case/cases in his court
4. Undue delay in the submission of monthly reports
Confidentiality of proceedings
Proceedings against judges of regular and special courts and justices of the Court of
Appeals and the Sandiganbayan shall be private and confidential, but a copy of the
decision or resolution of the Court shall be attached to the record of the respondent
in the Office of the Court Administrator (RRC, Sec 12, Rule 140).
Resignation or retirement pending administrative case

The retirement of a judge or any judicial officer from service does not preclude the
finding of any administrative liability to which he should still be answerable. Also, the
withdrawal or recantation of the complaint does not necessarily result in the
dismissal of the case (Atty. Molina v. Judge Paz, A.M. No. RTJ -01-1638, Dec. 8,
2003).
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NOTE: The acceptance by the President of the resignation does not necessarily render the case
moot or deprive the SC of the authority to investigate the charges. The court retains its
jurisdiction either to pronounce the respondent officially innocent of the charges or declare
him guilty thereof. A contrary rule will be fraught with injustice and pregnant with dreadful
and dangerous implications (Pesole v. Rodriguez A.M. No. 755-MTJ, Jan. 31, 1978).
Quantum of evidence required

The ground for removal of a judicial officer should be established beyond reasonable
doubt. Such is the rule where the charge on which the removal is sought is
misconduct in office, willful neglect, corruption or incompetence. The general rules in
regard to admissibility of evidence in criminal trials apply.
Q: May a judge be disciplined by the Supreme Court based solely on a complaint

filed by the complainant and the answer of respondent judge? If so, in what
circumstances? What is the rationale behind this power of the Supreme Court? (1996
Bar Question)
A: A judge may be disciplined by the Supreme Court based solely on the basis of the
complaint filed by the complainant and the answer of the respondent judge, under
the principle of res ipsa loquitor. The Supreme Court has held that when the facts
alleged in the complaint are admitted or are already shown on the record, and no
credible explanation that would negate the strong inference of evil intent is
forthcoming, no further hearing to establish such facts to support a
judgment as to culpability of the respondent is necessary (In Re: Petition for
dismissal of Judge Dizon).
NOTE: The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not and cannot dispense with the twin
requirements of due process, notice and the opportunity to be heard. It merely dispenses with
the procedure laid down in Rule 140, RRC (Rule 140: Discipline of Judges of Regular and
Special Courts and Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan).
Q: In Administrative Circular No. 1 addressed to all lower courts dated January 28,
1988, the Supreme Court stressed that all judges are reminded that the Supreme
Court has applied the Res Ipsa Loquitor rule in the removal of judges even without
any formal investigation whenever a decision, on its face, indicates gross
incompetence or gross ignorance of the law or gross misconduct (Cathay Pacific
Airways v. Romillo, G.R. No. 64276, 12 August 1986). The application of the res ipsa
loquitor rule in the removal of judges is assailed in various quarters as inconsistent
with due process and fair play. Is there any basis for such a reaction? Explain.
A:
1. First view - there is a basis for the reaction against the res ipsa loquitor rule on
removing judges. According to the position taken by the Philippine Bar Association,
the res ipsa loquitor rule might violate the principle of due process that is the right to
be heard before one is condemned.
Moreover, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court provides for the procedure for the removal
of judges. Upon service of the complaint against him, he is entitled to file an answer.
If the answer merits a hearing, it is referred to a justice of the Court of Appeals for
investigation, the report of the investigation is submitted to the Supreme Court for
proper disposition.
The danger in applying the res ipsa loquitor rule is that the judge may have
committed only an error of judgment. His outright dismissal does violence to the
jurisprudence set in (In Re Horilleno, 43 Phil. 212, March 20, 1922).
2. Second view- According to the Supreme Court the lawyer or a judge can be
suspended or dismissed based on his activities or decision, as long as he has been
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given an opportunity to explain his side. No investigation is necessary.
Suspension pendente lite not applicable to judges

While it is true that preventive suspension pendente lite does not violate the right of
the accused to be presumed innocent as the same is not a penalty, the
rules on preventive suspension of judges, not having been expressly included in the
Rules of Court, are amorphous at best.
Moreover, it is established that any administrative complaint leveled against a judge
must always be examined with a discriminating eye, for its consequential effects are,
by their nature, highly penal, such that the respondent judge stands to face the
sanction of dismissal or disbarment. As aforementioned, the filing of criminal cases
against judges may be used as tools to harass them and may in the long run create
adverse consequences (Re: Conviction of Judge Adoracion G. Angeles, A.M. No. 06-
9-545-RTC, Jan. 31, 2008).
Grievance procedure in the rules of court is not applicable to justices and

judges
Complaints against justices and judges are filed with the Supreme Court which has
exclusive administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof
pursuant to Section 6 Art. VIII, Constitution. The Court en banc has the power to
discipline all judges of lower courts including justices of the Court of Appeals (1987
Constitution, Section 11, Art. VII).
As a matter of practice, the Supreme Court has assigned complaints against
Municipal or Metropolitan Trial Judges to an Executive Judge of a Regional Trial Court
and complaints against judges of Regional Trial Courts to a justice of the Court of
Appeals, while a complaint against a member of the Court of Appeals would probably
be assigned to a member of the Supreme Court for investigation, report and
recommendation. Retired SC Justices are now tasked for this purpose.
Rules on the liability of judges

GR: A judge is not liable administratively, civilly, or criminally, when he acts within
his legal powers and jurisdiction, even though such acts are erroneous so long as he
acts in good faith. In such a case, the remedy of aggrieved party is not to file an
administrative complaint against the judge but to elevate the error to a higher court
for review and correction.
NOTE: The reason behind such rule is to free the judge from apprehension of personal
consequences to himself and to preserve the integrity and independence of the judiciary.
XPN: Where an error is gross or patent, deliberate and malicious, or is incurred with
evident bad faith; or when there is fraud, dishonesty, or corruption.
Civil liabilities under the New Civil Code

1. Article 27 – refusal or neglect without just cause by a public servant to perform
his official duty
2. Article 32 – directly or indirectly obstructing, defeating, violating or in any manner
impeding or impairing civil liberties guaranteed by the Constitution
This responsibility for damages is not, however, demandable of judges except when
his act or omission constitutes a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute.
Disabilities/restrictions under the New Civil Code

1. Article 1491 (5) – Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of court of
superior and inferior courts and other officers and employees connected with the
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administration of justice cannot acquire by purchase, even at a public or judicial

action, either in person or through the mediation of another the property and rights
in litigation or levied upon an execution before the court within whose jurisdiction or
territory they exercise their respective functions.
This prohibition includes the act of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to
lawyers, with respect to the property and rights that may be the object of any
litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their profession (1996 Bar
Question).
2. Article 739 – Donations made to a judge, his wife, descendants and ascendants by
reason of his office are void.
Criminal Liabilities under the RPC and the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act
1. Misfeasance
a. Article 204 – Knowingly rendering unjust judgment.
b. Manifestly Unjust Judgment – one which is so patently against the law, public
order, public policy and good morals that a person of ordinary discernment can easily
sense its invalidity and injustice.
NOTE: It must be shown beyond doubt that the judgment is unjust as it is contrary to law or is
not supported by evidence and the same was made with conscious and deliberate intent to do
an injustice (In Re: Climaco, A.C. No. 134-J, January 21, 1974). If the decision rendered by
the judge is still on appeal, the judge cannot be disqualified on the ground of knowingly
rendering an unjust judgment (Abad v. Bleza, A.M. No. R-227-RTJ, October 13, 1986).
2. Article 205 – Judgment rendered through negligence – committed by reason of

inexcusable negligence or ignorance.
NOTE: Negligence and ignorance are inexcusable if they imply a manifest injustice, which
cannot be explained by reasonable interpretation (In Re: Climaco, A.C. No. 134-J, January 21,
1974).
3. Article 206– Knowingly rendering an unjust interlocutory order; and
4. Maliciously delaying the administration of justice.
NOTE: The act must be committed maliciously with deliberate intent to prejudice a party in a
case.
4. Impeachment (ethical aspects)
Constitutional provisions on the accountability of public officers

Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve
them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism
and justice, and lead modest lives (1987 Constitution, Sec. 1, Article XI).
Nature of public office

A public office is a public trust. It is not to be understood as a position of honor,
prestige and power but a position of rendering service to the public.
Principle of accountability
It sets down the mandate that all government officials and employees, whether they
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be the highest in the land or the lowliest public servants, shall at all times be
answerable for their misconduct to the people from whom the government derives its
powers.
Purpose of impeachment in relation the accountability of public officers

Its purpose is to protect the people from official delinquencies or malfeasances. It is
therefore primarily intended for the protection of the State, not for the punishment
of the offender.
Importance of maintaining public trust in public offices

It is essential that responsible and competent public officers be chosen for public
office to maintain the faith and confidence of the people to the government
otherwise it becomes ineffective. No popular government can survive without the
confidence of the people. It is the lone guarantee and justification of its existence.
5. Sanctions imposed by the Supreme Court on erring members of the

Judiciary
Sanctions for a judge found guilty of a serious charge

Any of the following sanctions may be imposed:
1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court
may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public
office, including government-owned or controlled corporations. Provided, however,
that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits
2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3)
but not exceeding six (6) months
3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00
Sanctions for a judge found guilty of a less serious charge

1. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1)
nor more than three (3) months; or
2. A fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.
Sanctions for a judge found guilty of a light charge

Any of the following sanctions shall be imposed:
1. A fine of not less than P1,000.00 but not exceeding P10,000.00 and/or
2. Censure
3. Reprimand
4. Admonition with warning
Propriety of reinstatement
Reinstatement is proper when there is no indication that the judge is inspired by
corrupt motives or reprehensive purpose in the performance of his functions.
Factors to be considered in reinstatement

1. Unsullied name and service of record prior to dismissal
2. Commitment to avoid situation that spur suspicion of arbitrary conditions
3. Complainant mellowed down in pushing from his removal
4. Length of time separated from service
D. Disqualification of Justices and Judges (Rule 137)
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1. Compulsory
Section 1 of Rule 317 provides that a judge is mandated by law to be disqualified if

any of the following instance, is present:
1. The judge, or his wife, or child is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or
otherwise
2. The judge is related to either party of the case within the sixth degree of
consanguinity or affinity, or to the counsel within the fourth degree (computed
according to the rule of civil law)
3. The judge has been an executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel
4. The judge has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the
subject of review
Rationale
There is a conclusive presumption that the judge cannot objectively or impartially try
the case. The law expressly prohibits him and strikes at the judge’s authority to hear
and decide the case.
Exception to compulsory/voluntary disqualification

The same rule also provides that the judge may hear and decide the case despite the
presence of a disqualification provided the interested parties both give a written
consent, signed by them and entered upon the record. It has been decided by the
Supreme Court that oral consent is not valid, even though both parties have agreed
(Lazo v. Judge Tiong, 300 SCRA 173, 1998).
2. Voluntary
Voluntary Inhibition according to the Rules of Court states that a judge through
the exercise of sound discretion may, for just or valid reasons to inhibit himself.
NOTE: A presiding judge must maintain and preserve the trust and faith of the parties-
litigants. He must hold himself above reproach and suspicion. At the very sign of lack of faith
and trust in his actions, whether well-grounded or not, the judge has no other alternative but
to inhibit himself from the case (Gutang v. Court of Appeals, 292 SCRA 76). The self-
examination of the judge is necessary. He should exercise his discretion in a way that people’s
faith in the courts of justice will not be impaired. His decision, as to whether to hear the case
or not should be based and dependent to giving importance to the confidence in the
impartiality of a judge.
E. Powers and Duties of Courts and Judicial Officers (Rule 135)
When pleading/motion for trial of cases/ other pleadings may be filed

Section 1, Rule 135 of Rules of Court provides: “Courts always open; justice to be
promptly and impartially administered.” Courts of justice shall always be open,
except on legal holidays, for the filing of any pleading, motion or other papers, for
the trial of cases, hearing of motions, and for the issuance of orders or rendition of
judgments. Justice shall be impartially administered without unnecessary delay.
GR: Courts of justice shall always be open; Justice to be promptly and impartially
administered.
XPN: Legal holidays
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NOTE: Upon the request of the local government unit concerned, the Executive Judges of the
MeTCs or the MTCCs of the cities and municipalities comprising Metro Manila and of the cities
of Baguio, Bacolod, Cagayan de Oro, Cebu, Davao and Iloilo may assign all judges to hold
night court sessions daily from Monday to Friday and on official holidays and special days,
from four-thirty o’clock in the afternoon to eleven o’clock in the evening, on rotation basis,
and in pairs of two (Sec. 15, A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC).
Exclusion of the public from the proceedings

Section 2, Rule 135 of Rules of Court provides: “Publicity of proceedings and records-
- The sitting of every court of justice shall be public, but any court may, in its
discretion, exclude the public when the evidence to be adduced is of such nature as
to require their exclusion in the interest of morality or decency. xxx”
GR: The sitting of every court of justice shall be public

XPN: When the evidence to be adduced is of such nature as to require their
exclusion in the interest of morality or decency.
Records of a court of justice is NOT always public

Section 2, Rule 135 of Rules of Court provides: “The records of every court of justice
shall be public records and shall be available for the inspection of any interested
person, at all proper business hours, under the supervision of the clerk having
custody of such records, unless the court shall, in any special case, have forbidden
their publicity, in the interest of morality or decency.”
GR: The records of every court of justice shall be public records and shall be
available for the inspection
of any interested person, at all proper business hours, under the supervision of the
clerk having custody of such records.
XPN: Unless the court shall, in any special case, have forbidden their publicity, in the
interest of morality or decency.
Enforceability of the processes in inferior courts

GR: Within the province where the municipality or city lies.
XPN: Outside its boundary, provided it is with the approval of judge of first instance
of said province.
Criminal processes served outside judge’s jurisdiction is allowed

When the district judge, or in his absence the provincial fiscal, shall certify that in his
opinion the interests of justice require such service.
Section 4 of Rule 135 of Rules of Court provides: The process of inferior courts shall
be enforceable within the province where the municipality or city lies. It shall not be
served outside the boundaries of the province in which they are comprised except
with the approval of the judge of first instance of said province, and only in the
following cases:
a. When an order for the delivery of personal property lying outside the province is
to be complied with;
b. When an attachment of real or personal property lying outside the province is to
be made;
c. When the action is against two or more defendants residing in different provinces;
d. When the place where the case has been brought is that specified in a contract in
writing between the parties, or is the place of the execution of such contract as
appears therefrom.
Page 155 of 163

Writs of execution issued by inferior courts may be enforced in any part of the
Philippines without any previous approval of the judge of first instance.
Criminal process may be issued by a justice of the peace or other inferior court, to
be served outside his province, when the district judge, or in his absence the
provincial fiscal, shall certify that in his opinion the interests of justice require such
service.
Instances in which Superior Court processes are enforceable in any part of

the Philippines
1. A case is pending to bring in a defendant
2. For the arrest of an accused person
3. Execution of any order or judgment of the court
Cases where the judge of the first instance of a particular province can
approve the service of process of inferior courts outside the boundaries of
province in which they are comprised
1. When an order for the delivery of personal property lying outside the province is
to be complied with;
2. When an attachment of real or personal property lying outside the province is to
be made;
3. When the action is against two or more defendants residing in different provinces;
4. When the place where the case has been brought is that specified in a contract in
writing between the parties, or is the place of the execution of such contract as
appears therefrom
Inherent powers of the courts

Section 5, Rule 135 of Rules of Court provides:
Inherent powers of courts-- Every court shall have power:
a. To preserve and enforce order in its immediate presence;
b. To enforce order in proceedings before it, or before a person or persons
empowered to conduct a judicial investigation under its authority;
c. To compel obedience to its judgments, orders and processes, and to the lawful
orders of a judge out of court, in a case pending therein;
d. To control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of its ministerial officers, and of
all other persons in any manner connected with a case before it, in every manner
appertaining thereto;
e. To compel the attendance of persons to testify in a case pending therein;
f. To administer or cause to be administered oaths in a case pending therein, and in
all other cases where it may be necessary in the exercise of its powers;
g. to amend and control its process and orders so as to make them comfortable to
law and justice;
h. To authorize a copy of a lost or destroyed pleading or other paper to be filed and
used instead of the original, and to restore, and supply deficiencies in its records and
proceedings.
Carrying jurisdiction into effect

All auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to carry jurisdiction into
effect may be employed by court or officer.
Section 6, Rule 135 of Rules of Court provides:
Means to carry jurisdiction into effect. -- When by law jurisdiction is conferred on a
court or judicial officer, all
Page 156 of 163

auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be
employed by such court or officer; and if the procedure to be followed in the exercise
of such jurisdiction is not specifically pointed out by law or by these rules, any
suitable process or mode of proceeding may be adopted which appears conformable
to the spirit of said law or rules.
Instances where the hearings may be had at any place in the judicial district
which the judge shall deem convenient
1. On the filing of a petition for the writ of habeas corpus
2. For release upon bail or reduction of bail in any Court of First Instance (Section 8,
Rule 135 of Rules of Court)
Supreme Court can authorize the judge to continue hearing and to decide
said case notwithstanding his transfer or appointment to another court of
equal jurisdiction
1. If a case has been heard only in part.
2. If no other judge had heard the case in part.
F. Court Records and General Duties of Clerks and Stenographer (Rule 136)
SEC. 4. Issuance by clerk of process. - The clerk of a superior court shall issue
under the seal of the court all ordinary writs and process incident to pending cases,
the issuance of which does not involve the exercise of functions appertaining to the
court or judge only; and may, under the direction of the court or judge, make out
and sign letters of administration, appointments of guardians, trustees and receivers,
and all writs and process issuing from the court.
SEC. 5. Duties of the clerk in the absence or by direction of the judge. - In
the absence of the judge, the clerk may perform all the duties of the judge in
receiving applications, petitions, inventories, reports, and the issuance of all orders
and notices that follow as a matter of course under these rules, and may also, when
directed so to do by the judge, receive the accounts off executors, administrators,
guardians, trustees, and receivers, and all evidence relating to them, or to the
settlement of the estates of deceased persons, or to guardianships, trusteeships, or
receiverships, and forthwith transmit such reports, accounts, and evidence to the
judge, together with the findings in relation to the same, if the judge shall direct him
to make findings and include the same in his report.
SEC. 6. Clerk shall receive papers and prepare minutes. - The clerk of each
superior court shall receive and file all pleadings and other papers properly
presented, endorsing on each such paper the time when it was filed, and shall attend
all of the sessions of the court and enter its proceedings for each day in a minute
book to be kept by him.
SEC. 7. Safekeeping of property. - The clerk shall safely keep all records,
papers, files, exhibits and public property committed to his charge, including the
library of the court, and the seal and furniture belonging to his office.
SEC. 14. Taking of record from the clerk’s office. - No record shall be taken
from the clerk’s office without an order of the court except as otherwise provided by
these rules. However, the Solicitor General or any of his assistants, the provincial
fiscal or his deputy, and the attorneys de officio shall be permitted, upon proper
receipt, to withdraw from the clerk’s office the record of any case in which they are
interested.
SEC. 17. Stenographer. - It shall be the duty of the stenographer who has
attended a session of a court either in the morning or in the afternoon, to deliver to
Page 157 of 163

the clerk of court, immediately at the close of such morning or afternoon session, all
the notes he has taken, to be attached to the record of the case; and it shall likewise
be the duty of the clerk to demand that the stenographer comply with said
duty. The clerk of court shall stamp the date on which notes are received by
him. When such notes are transcribed, the transcript shall be delivered to the clerk,
duly initialed on each page thereof, to be attached to the record of the case. (See
Administrative Circular No. 24-90 (July 12, 1990) Re: Revised Rules on
Transcription of Stenographic Notes and Their Transmission to Appellate Courts).
Whenever requested by a party, any statement made by a judge of first instance, or

by a commissioner, with reference to a case being tried by him, or to any of the
parties thereto, or to any witness or attorney, during the hearing of such case, shall
be made of record in the stenographic notes.
G. Legal Fees (Rule 141)
1. Manner of payment
Payment shall be made upon the filing of the pleading or other application which
initiates an action or proceeding. The fees prescribed shall be paid in full upon filing
of the pleading or application.
2. Fees in lien
Where the court in its final judgment awards a claim not alleged, or a relief different
from, or more than that claimed in the pleading, the party concerned shall pay the
additional fees which shall constitute a lien on the judgment in satisfaction of said
lien.
3. Persons authorized to collect legal fees
Except as otherwise provided, these officers and persons, together with their
assistants and deputies, may demand, receive, and take the several fees hereinafter
mentioned and allowed for any business by them respectively done by virtue of their
several offices, and no more:
1. Clerks of the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan and Court of Tax
Appeals
2. Clerks of Regional Trial Courts
3. Clerks of Court of the First Level Courts
4. Sheriffs, process servers and other persons serving processes
5. Notaries
6. Other officers taking depositions
The following persons are also entitled to receive fees/ compensation under
rule 141:
1. Stenographers
2. Witnesses
3. Appraisers
4. Commissioners in eminent domain proceedings
5. Commissioners in the proceedings for partition of real estate
Page 158 of 163

NOTE: The persons herein authorized to collect legal fees shall be accountable officers and
shall be required to post bond in such amount as prescribed by the law.
Basis of the amount of fee in filing an action or proceeding with the Court of
Tax Appeals
1. In an action or proceeding, including petition for intervention, and for all services
in the same – amount of fee would be based on the:
a. Sum claimed or amount of disputed tax or customs assessment, inclusive of
interest, penalties and surcharges, damages of whatever kind and attorney’s fees
b. Value of the article of property in seizure cases.
If the value of the subject matter cannot be estimated – P 5,000.
2. Petition for review from a decision of the RTC or of the Central Board of
Assessment Appeals or a special civil action with the CTA or an appeal from a
decision of a CTA Division to the CTA En Banc – P3,000.00.
Consequences if fees are not paid

If the fees are not paid, the court may refuse to proceed with the action until they
are paid and may dismiss the action or proceedings.
Basis of the amount of fee in filing permissive OR COMPULSORY counter-

claim, CROSS-CLAIM, money claim against an estate not based on judgment,
third-party, fourth-party, etc. complaint, complaint-in-intervention in the
RTC
TOTAL SUM CLAIMED, Inclusive of Interests, Penalties, Surcharges, Damages of
whatever kind, and Attorney’s Fees, Litigation Expenses and Costs
In cases involving REAL property in litigation it is based on the fair market
value as:
1. stated in the current tax declaration or
2. current zonal valuation of the bureau of internal revenue, whichever is higher,
3. if there is none, the stated value of the property in litigation
In case of PERSONAL property, the FAIR MARKET value of the property in

litigation as alleged by the claimant.
Basis for determining amount of fees in personal actions in first level courts
The value of the subject matter involved, or the amount of the demand, inclusive of
interests, PENALTIES, SURCHARGES, damages of whatever kind, attorney’s fees,
litigation expenses and costs.
Basis for determining amount of fees in real actions

The FAIR MARKET value of the property:
1. Stated in the current tax declaration or
2. Current zonal valuation of the bureau of internal revenue, whichever is higher, or,
If not declared for taxation purposes, the estimated value thereof shall be alleged by
the claimant and shall be the basis in computing the fees.
Exemptions to fees to real actions

In forcible entry and unlawful detainer, the amount of fees would depend on whether
damages or costs are prayed for.
Witnesses are entitled to fees
Page 159 of 163

Witnesses in the Supreme Court, in the Court of Appeals and in the Regional Trial
Courts and in the 1st level courts, either in actions or special proceedings, shall be
entitled to P200.00 per day, inclusive of ALL EXPENSES;
Fees to which witnesses may be entitled in a civil action shall be allowed on the
certification of the clerk of court or judge of his appearance in the case.
Limitations
1. A witness shall not be allowed compensation for his attendance in more than one
case or more than one side of the same case at the same time, but may elect in
which of several cases or on which side of a case, when he is summoned by both
sides, to claim his attendance.
2. A person who is compelled to attend court on other business shall not be paid as a
witness.
Sheriff’s expense is NOT the same as Sheriff’s fees

Sheriff’s expenses are not exacted for any service rendered by the court; they are
the amount deposited to the Clerk of Court upon filing of the complaint to defray the
actual travel expenses of the sheriff, process server or other court-authorized
persons in the service of summons, subpoena and other court processes that would
be issued relative to the trial of the case. . It is not the same as sheriff’s fees under
Section 10, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, which refers to those imposed by the
court for services rendered to a party incident to the proceedings before it (Re:
Letter dated April 18, 2011 of Chief Public Attorney Persida Rueda-Acosta Requesting
Exemption From the Payment Of Sheriff’s Expenses, A.M. No. 11-10-03-0, July 30,
2013).
Persons exempt from payment of legal fees

1. Indigent litigants
2. Republic of the Philippines
NOTE: The clients of PAO shall be exempt from payment of docket and other fees incidental to
instituting an action in court and other quasi-judicial bodies, as an original proceeding or on
appeal. (R.A. No. 9406, Section 6)
Rule with regard to indigent litigants

Indigent litigants are exempt from payment of legal fees. However, the legal fees
shall be a lien on any judgment rendered in the case favorable to the indigent litigant
unless the court otherwise provides.
Requisites for the indigents to be able to enjoy exemption

He must execute an affidavit that he and his immediate family do not earn a gross
income abovementioned, and they do not own any real property with the fair value
aforementioned, supported by an affidavit of a disinterested person attesting to the
truth of the litigant’s affidavit. The current tax declaration, if any, shall be attached
to the litigant’s affidavit.
Any falsity in the affidavit of litigant or disinterested person shall be sufficient cause
to dismiss the complaint or action or to strike out the pleading of that party, without
prejudice to whatever criminal liability may have been incurred. (Sec. 19)
Rule as to Republic of the Philippines

The Republic of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities are exempt from
paying the legal fees provided in the rule.
Exemption to the rule that the Republic is exempt from paying legal fees
Page 160 of 163

Local governments and government-owned or controlled corporations with or without

independent charters are not exempt from paying such fees. However, all court
actions, criminal or civil, instituted at the instance of the provincial, city or municipal
treasurer or assessor under Sec. 280 of the Local Government Code of 1991 shall be
exempt from the payment of court and sheriff’s fees.
Purpose of mediation fund

The Fund shall be utilized for the promotion of court-annexed mediation and other
relevant modes of alternative dispute resolution (ADR), training of mediators,
payment of mediator’s fees, and operating expenses of the Philippine Mediation
Center (PMC) units including expenses for technical assistance and
organizations/individuals, transportation/communication expenses, photocopying,
supplies and equipment, expense allowance and miscellaneous expenses, whenever
necessary, subject to auditing rules and regulations.
Fees do NOT form part of the Judiciary Development Fund

The mediation fees shall not form part of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)
under P.D. No. 1949 nor of the special allowances granted to justices and judges
under Republic Act No. 9227.
The amount collected shall be receipted and separated as part of a special fund to be
known as the “Mediation Fund” and shall accrue to the SC-PHILJA-PMC Fund,
disbursements from which are and shall be pursuant to guidelines approved by the
Supreme Court.
Exceptions in paying mediation fees

The following are exempt from contributing to the mediation fund:
1. Pauper litigant.
NOTE: However, the court shall provide that the unpaid contribution to the Mediation Fund
shall be considered a lien on any monetary award in a judgment favorable to the pauper
litigant.
2. Accused-appellant
H. Costs
1. Recovery of costs (Rule 142)
a) Prevailing party
Costs allowed to a prevailing party

Costs shall be allowed to a prevailing party as a matter of course. However, the court
shall have power, for special reasons, to adjudge that either party shall pay the costs
of an action, or that the same be divided, as may be equitable (RRC, Sec. 1, Rule
142)
Costs shall not be allowed to the Republic of the Philippines. (RRC, Sec. 1,
Rule 142)
Q: Is the Land bank of the Philippines liable to the cost of suit in the performance of
a governmental function such as disbursement of agrarian funds to satisfy awards of
just compensation?
A: No, the Land Bank of the Philippines is in the performance of a Governmental
Page 161 of 163

function in an agrarian reform proceeding, hence, according to Rule 142, it is exempt

from the payment of Cost of Suit (Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Esther Anson
Rivera, G.R. No. 182431, Nov. 17, 2010).
b) Dismissed appeal or action
Power of the court to render judgment for costs even if an Appeal has been
dismissed
If an Action or Appeal is dismissed, for want of Jurisdiction or otherwise, the Court
retains the power to render judgment for Costs, as justice may require (RRC, Sec. 2,
Rule 142).
c) Frivolous appeal
If an appeal is deemed frivolous, double or treble costs shall be imposed on the

plaintiff or appellant, which shall be paid by his attorney, if so ordered by the Court
(RRC, Sec. 3, Rule 142).
Q: A vehicular accident between a Fuso truck owned by Maglana Rice and Corn Mill
and a Honda Accord owned by Sps. Tan occurred on Aug. 28, 1996. Sps. Tan filed a
complaint in the MTCC which was favored. The petitioners appealed, but RTC upheld
the MTCC. Petitioners further appealed to the CA, which was denied for lack of merit.
The MR being also denied, hence the appeal to the Supreme Court. The issue is
whether or not the appeal is frivolous.
A: Yes, the rejection by CA indicated that the three lower courts with legal capacity
and official function to resolve issues, all found the same set of facts. In this
recourse, the petitioners presented no ground sufficient to persuade the court to
warrant a review of the uniform findings of fact. Given the frivolousness of the
appeal, the court imposes treble costs of suit on the petitioners under Rule 142
(Maglana Rice and Corn Mill Inc. vs. Annie L. Tan, G.R. No. 159051, Sept. 21, 2011).
d) False allegations
A false allegation made without reasonable cause and found untrue shall subject the
offending party to the reasonable expenses as may have been necessarily incurred
by the other part by reason of such untrue pleading. The amount fixed by the Judge
and taxed as costs (RRC, Sec. 4, Rule 142).
e) Non-appearance of witness
If a Witness fails to appear at the time and place specified in the subpoena issued by
any inferior court, the costs of the warrant of arrest and of the arrest of the witness
shall be borne by him, if the court determines that his failure to answer the
subpoena was willful and without excuse (RRC, Sec. 12, Rule 142).
IMPORTANT NOTES:
1. This listing of covered topics is not intended and should not be used by
the law schools as a course outline. This was drawn up for the limited
purpose of ensuring that Bar candidates are guided on the coverage of the
2015 Bar Examinations.
Page 162 of 163

2. All Supreme Court decisions – pertinent to a given Bar subject and its
listed topics, and promulgated up to March 31, 2015 – are examinable
materials within the coverage of the 2015 Bar Examinations.
***Read recent jurisprudence.
Prayer to St. Jude Thaddeus
St. Jude, glorious Apostle and

faithful servant the Son of God,
the church honors and invokes
you universally as patron of
hopeless cases. I place before
you my problems, sure that you
will not turn a deaf ear to my
request.
Come to my assistance in this

great moment of need, that may
receive strength and
perseverance and that I may
ultimately accept God’s Holy
will, (that I may be able to
retain and understand all that I
have studied and be able to give
my best so that I may be able to
pass the bar examinations).
I promise you O glorious Apostle

that I will forever be mindful for
this great favor and never cease
to honor you as my special
patron. May the holy will of God
be in all things done forever.
Amen.
Page 163 of 163

Legal Ethics Reviewer. Atty Siron

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Raffa.LegalEthicsNotes.

A. Practice of law (Rule 138)

Note: It becomes a PROPERTY RIGHT if there is a contract for ATTORNEY’S FEES.

b) Profession, not business

LAW IS A PROFESSION NOT A TRADE.

3. Non-lawyers in administrative tribunal can represent parties in tribunals such

a) Law student practice (Rule 138-A)

Party-litigant representing himself.

Limits on the appearance of non-lawyers

c) Non-lawyers in administrative tribunals

NOTE: He is not, however, entitled to attorney’s fees.

c) Proceedings where lawyers are prohibited from appearing

1. Proceedings before the SMALL CLAIMS COURT- No attorney shall appear in

2. Proceedings before the KATARUNGANG PAMBARANGAY- During the pre-

4. Sanctions for practice or appearance without authority

REMEDIES AGAINST UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW

NOTE: An unauthorized appearance of an attorney may be ratified by the client either

a) Lawyers without authority

(see above discussion)

b) Persons not lawyers

REMEDIES AGAINST UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW BY PERSONS NOT

NOTE: A disbarred lawyer still appearing in court is guilty of indirect contempt.

Where the punishment is by fine directed to be paid to a party in the nature of

TWO-FOLD ASPECT OF CONTEMPT POWER (1998 BAR)

5. Public officials and practice of law

PROHIBITED ACYS OR OMISSIONS OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

a) Prohibition or disqualification of former government attorneys

A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or

THEORIES RELATING TO THE DISQUALIFICATION OF FORMER GOVERNMENT

1. ADVERSE-INTEREST-CONFLICT- A former government lawyer is enjoined from

2. CONGRUENT-INTEREST-REPRESENTATION CONFLICT- The lawyer is prohibited

b) Public officials who cannot practice law or with restrictions

NOT ALLOWED TO PRACTICE

1. Judges and other officials as employees of the Supreme Court

RESTRICTIONS ON THE PRACTICE OF LAW ON CERTAIN INDIVIDUALS

1. No Senator or member of the House of Representatives may personally “appear”

a. In any civil case in which the government, or any of its subdivisions or

c. Collect any fees for his appearance in any administrative proceedings

6. Lawyers authorized to represent the government

DUTIES OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL

DUTY OF A SOLICITOR GENERAL TO REPRESENT THE OTHER PARTY

IMPORTANCE OF THE LAWYER’S OATH

B. Duties and responsibilities of a lawyer

DUTIES OF AN ATTORNEY UNDER THE RULES OF COURT (2006 BAR)

a) Respect for law and legal processes

CANON 1- A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS

TWO-FOLD DUTY UNDER CANON 1

1. Obey the laws and legal processes.

CANON 1- RULE 1.01- A LAWYER SHALL NOT ENGAGE IN UNLAWFUL, DISHONEST,

UNLAWFUL CONDUCT- A transgression of any provision of law, which need not be a

IMMORAL CONDUCT- A conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which

INSTANCES OF GROSS IMMORALITY AND THE RESULTING CONSEQUENCES

1. Abandonment of wife and cohabiting with another woman. DISBARRED.

7. A retired judge who penned a decision 7 months after he retired, antedating

ACTS NOT CONSTITUTING GROSS IMMORALITY

1. Stealing a kiss from a client

MORAL TURPITUDE- Imports an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the duties