PASCUA VS.

FLORENDO
G.R. No. L-39047 ; April 30, 1985
By Michelle Uy

TOPIC: Rule 9 _ Default

FACTS:
Petitioners Alberto Pascua et.al alleged that their late brother Martin Pascua sold their inherited parcel of land to Clemente Castro without their consent
and through fraud because their signatures were forged.

Petitioners and respondents have been neighbors since war. The deed of sale complained of was executed May 8, 1951.

On May 31, 1973, more than 20 years later, the petitioners filed a complaint for reconveyance with damages against the private respondents. The
respondents, in lieu of filing an answer, filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the complaint states no cause of action and that the
same is already barred by the statute of limitations. They assert that the action for reconveyance of real property resulting from fraud requires that an
action be filed within four years from the discovery of fraud.

The trial court denied the respondents' motion after finding that the grounds relied upon by them did not appear on the face of the complaint. The court
subsequently declared the respondents in default for their having failed to file an answer within the reglementary period.

Thus, the petitioners proceeded to present their evidence ex-parte. However, the trial court later on rendered a decision dismissing the petitioner’s
action on the ground that the period within which to file the same had already prescribed.

Not satisfied with the trial court's decision, petitioners elevated the case to this Court contending that the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion
when, after hearing their evidence presented ex-parte, the respondents having been declared in default, it dismissed the case on the ground that the
action had already prescribed. When the same ground was earlier raised, the court denied the motion to dismiss filed by the respondents. The petitioners
argue that because of it denying the motion to dismiss, the trial court is estopped from dismissing the case on the same ground.

Petitioners further contend that the court's conclusion that they had knowledge of the sale executed by their deceased brother, Martin Pascua about
twenty years ago is based merely on surmises and conjectures because it was only in 1973 when they came to learn of the deed of sale executed by
their deceased brother in 1951. In 1973, the deed was shown to them by respondent Clemente Castro at the Agrarian office.

Therefore, the period of prescription should be counted from the knowledge of the petitioners of the deed of sale and not from the date it was executed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in not granting relief to plaintiffs although the defendants were declared in default.

RULING:
No. The petitioner’s contention that the court had no alternative but to grant the relief prayed for in their complaint (which is reconveyance) and their
reliance on Rule 18, Section 1 of the Rules of Court is misplaced.

Rule 18, Section 1 reads:

Judgment by default.—If the defendant fails to answer within the time specified in these rules, the court shall, upon motion of the plaintiff and proof of
such failure, declare the defendant in default. Thereupon the court shall proceed to receive the plaintiff's evidence and render judgment granting him
such relief as the complaint and the facts proven may warrant. This provision applies where no answer is made to a counter-claim, cross-claim or
third-party complaint within the period provided in this Rule.

Nowhere in the aforequoted provision nor in the summons issued by the respondent court is it stated that the petitioners are automatically entitled to
the relief prayed for, once the respondents are declared in default.

Favorable relief can be granted only after the court has ascertained that the evidence offered, and the facts proven by the presenting party, petitioners
in this case, warrant the grant of the same. Otherwise, it would be meaningless to require presentation of evidence if every time the other party is
declared in default, a decision would automatically be rendered in favor of the non-defaulting party and exactly according to the tenor of his prayer.
This is not contemplated by the Rules nor is it sanctioned by the due process clause.

PRINCIPLE:

A defaulted defendant is not actually thrown out of court. While in a sense it may be said that by defaulting, he leaves himself at the mercy of the
court, the rules see to it that any judgment against him must be in accordance with law. The evidence to support the plaintiff's cause is, of course,
presented in his absence, but the court is not supposed to admit that which is basically incompetent. Although the defendant would not be able to
object, elementary justice requires that only legal evidence should be considered against him. If the evidence presented should not be sufficient to
justify a judgment for the plaintiff, the complaint must be dismissed. And if an unfavorable judgment should be justifiable, it cannot exceed in
amount or be different in kind from what is prayed for in the complaint.