MARASIGAN, RAISA G.
| LAW ON PUBLIC All the elements of a prejudicial question are clearly and
OFFICERS|CASE DIGEST
G.R. No. 110544 October 17, 1995
Reynaldo Tuanda, etc., petitioners
vs
The Honorable Sandiganbayan, Bartolome Binaohan and Delia
Estrellanes, respondents
Facts:
Petitioners institute this special civil action for certiorari and
prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court to set
aside the resolution of Sandiganbayan and its orders denying
petitioners' motion for suspension of their arraignment. Fabruary 9,
1989 Delia Estrellanes and Bartolome Binaohan were designated
as industrial labor sectoral representative and agricultural labor
sectoral representative for the Sangguniang Bayan of Jimalalud,
Negros Oriental by DILG Secretary Santos. They both took their
oath of office on February 16 and 17, 1989. Then, petitioners filed
a petition with the Office of the President for review and recall of
said designations. This was denied and enjoined Tuanda to
recognize private sectoral representatives. Estrallanes and
Binaohan then filed a petition for mandamus with RTC Negros
Oriental for recognition as members of the Sangguniang Bayan. It
was dismissed. The matter was then brought to RTC Dumaguete
City accusing Tuanda and others of taking advantage of their
official functions and unlawfully causing undue injury to
Estrellanes and Binaohan. Petitioners filed a motion with
Sandiganbayan for suspension of the Criminal Case on the ground
that a prejudicial question exists. The RTC rendered a decision
declaring null and void ab initio the designations issued by DILG
for violation of the provisions saying that the Sanggunian itself
must make a determination first of the number of sectors in the
city/municipality to warrant representation. Meanwhile, the
Sandiganbayan has issued a resolution saying that the private
respondents have rendered such services and the said appointments
enjoy the presumption of regularity; for these reasons, the private
respondents were entitled to the slaries attached to their office.
Even if the RTC later declare the appointments null and void, they
would still be given salaries because of the period they acted as
representatives has made them a de facto officers. Petitioners filed
a motion for reconsideration of the resolution in view of the RTC
nullification of the appointments. But it was likewise denied along
with the cancellation of their arraignment, instead Sandiganbayan
required Tuanda and the others to submit a written show cause why
they should not be cited for contempt of court for their failure to
appear in court today for the arraignment. Hence, this case.
Issue:
whether or not the legality or validity of private respondents'
designation as sectoral representatives which is pending resolution
in CA-G.R. No. 36769 is a prejudicial question justifying
suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case against
petitioners.
Held:
The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to
avoid two conflicting decisions. 14 It has two essential elements:
(a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to
the issue raised in the criminal action; and
(b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the
criminal action may proceed.
Applying the foregoing principles to the case at bench, we find that
the issue in the civil case, CA-G.R. CV No. 36769, constitutes a
valid prejudicial question to warrant suspension of the arraignment
and further proceedings in the criminal case against petitioners.
1
unmistakably present in this case. There is no doubt that the facts
and issues involved in the civil action (No. 36769) and the criminal
case (No. 16936) are closely related. The filing of the criminal case
was premised on petitioners' alleged partiality and evident bad faith
in not paying private respondents' salaries and per diems as sectoral
representatives, while the civil action was instituted precisely to
resolve whether or not the designations of private respondents as
sectoral representatives were made in accordance with law. Private
respondents insist that even if their designations are nullified, they
are entitled to compensation for actual services rendered. We
disagree. As found by the trial court and as borne out by the
records, from the start, private respondents' designations as sectoral
representatives have been challenged by petitioners. They began
with a petition filed with the Office of the President copies of
which were received by private respondents on 26 February 1989,
barely eight (8) days after they took their oath of office. Hence,
private respondents' claim that they have actually rendered services
as sectoral representatives has not been established.
Finally, we find unmeritorious respondent Sandiganbayan's thesis
that even in the event that private respondents' designations are
finally declared invalid, they may still be considered de facto
public officers entitled to compensation for services actually
rendered.
The conditions and elements of de facto officership are the
following:
1) There must be a de jure office;
2) There must be color of right or general acquiescence by the
public; and
3) There must be actual physical possession of the office in good
faith.
Sandiganbayan Resolution was set aside.
G.R. No. L-24828 September 7, 1965
FELIPE N. AUREA and MELECIO MALABANAN,
petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
ISSUE:
Whether or not R.A. 4421 is constitutional?
FACTS|HELD
Upon consideration of case G.R. No. L-24761, "Leon G. Maquera
vs. Juan Borra, et al.," and case G.R. No. L-24828, "Felipe N.
Aurea and Melecio Malabanan vs. Commission on Elections," and
it appearing:
1. That Republic Act No. 4421 requires "all candidates for
national, provincial, city and municipal offices" to post a surety
bond equivalent to the one-year salary or emoluments of the
position to which he is a candidate, which bond shall be forfeited
in favor of the national, provincial, city or municipal government
concerned if the candidate, except when declared winner, fails to
obtain at least 10% of the votes cast for the office to which he has
filed his certificate of candidacy, there being not more than four (4)
candidates for the same office;"
2. That, in compliance with said Republic Act No. 4421, the
Commission on Elections had, on July 20, 1965, decided to require
all candidates for President, Vice-President, Senator and Member
of the House of Representatives to file a surety bond, by a bonding
company of good reputation, acceptable to the Commission, in the
sums of P60,000.00 and P40,000.00, for President and Vice-
President, respectively, and P32,000.00 for Senator and Member of
the House of Representatives;
3. That, in consequence of said Republic Act No. 4421 and the
aforementioned action of the Commission on Elections, every
candidate has to pay the premium charged by bonding companies,
and, to offer thereto, either his own properties, worth, at least, the
amount of the surety bond, or properties of the same worth,
belonging to other persons willing to accommodate him, by way of
counter-bond in favor of said bonding companies;
4. That the effect of said Republic Act No. 4421 is, therefore, to
prevent or disqualify from running for President, Vice-President,
Senator or Member of the House of Representatives those persons
who, although having the qualifications prescribed by the
Constitution therefore, cannot file the surety bond aforementioned,
owing to failure to pay the premium charged by the bonding
company and/or lack of the property necessary for said counter-
bond;
5. That said Republic Act No. 4421 has, likewise, the effect of
disqualifying for provincial, city or municipal elective offices,
persons who, although possessing the qualifications prescribed by
law therefor, cannot pay said premium and/or do not have the
property essential for the aforementioned counter-bond;
6. That said Republic Act No. 4421 has, accordingly, the effect of
imposing property qualifications in order that a person could run
for a public office and that the people could validly vote for him;
7. That said property qualifications are inconsistent with the nature
and essence of the Republican system ordained in our Constitution
and the principle of social justice underlying the same, for said
political system is premised upon the tenet that sovereignty resides
in the people and all government authority emanates from them,
and this, in turn, implies necessarily that the right to vote and to be
voted for shall not be dependent upon the wealth of the individual
concerned, whereas social justice presupposes equal opportunity
for all, rich and poor alike, and that, accordingly, no person shall,
by reason of poverty, be denied the chance to be elected to public
office; and
8. That the bond required in Republic Act No. 4421 and the
confiscation of said bond are not predicated upon the necessity of
defraying certain expenses or of compensating services given in
connection with elections, and is, therefore, arbitrary and
oppressive.
The Court RESOLVED, without prejudice to rendering an
extended decision, to declare that said Republic Act No. 4421 is
unconstitutional and hence null and void, and, hence, to enjoin
respondents herein, as well as their representatives and agents,
from enforcing and/or implementing said constitutional enactment
G.R. No. 104639 July 14, 1995
PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR through its GOVERNOR,
SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN and PROVINCIAL
TREASURER, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and TITO B. DATO, respondent.
FACTS:
Private respondent Tito Dato was appointed as Private Agent. He
was promoted and was appointed Assistant Provincial warden by
then Governor Felix Alfelor, Sr. Because he had no civil service
eligibility for the position he was appointed to, private respondent
could not be legally extended a permanent appointment. Hence,
what was extended to him was only a temporary appointment.
Thereafter, the temporary appointment was renewed annually.
Dato's employment status was changed from temporary to
permanent upon the latter's representation that he passed the civil
service examination for supervising security guards. Said change
of status however, was not favorably acted upon by the Civil
Service Commission (CSC) reasoning that Tito Dato did not
possess the necessary civil service eligibility for the office he was
appointed to. His appointment therefore remained
2
temporary.Thereafter, no other appointment was extended to him.
Tito Dato was indefinitely suspended by Governor Alfelor after
criminal charges were filed against him and a prison guard for
allegedly conniving and/or consenting to evasion of sentence of
some detention prisoners who escaped from confinement. two
years after the request for change of status was made, Mr. Lope B.
Rama, head of the Camarines Sur Unit of the Civil Service
Commission, wrote the Governor of Camarines Sur a letter
informing him that the status of Tito Dato has been changed from
temporary to permanent, the latter having passed the examination
for Supervising Security Guard. The change of status was to be
made retroactive to June 11, 1974, the date of release of said
examination.
However the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, suppressed the
appropriation for the position of Assistant Provincial Warden and
deleted private respondent's name from the petitioner's plantilla.
Tito Dato was subsequently acquitted of the charges against him.
Consequently, he requested the Governor for reinstatement and
backwages.When his request for reinstatement and backwages was
not heeded, private respondent Tito Dato filed an action for
mandamus before the Regional Trial Court of Pili, Camarines Sur
which ruled in favor of the Tito Dato. Petitioner Province of
Camarines Sur appealed the said decision to the Court of Appeals.
CA affirmed RTC's decision. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
whether or not private respondent Tito Dato was a permanent
employee of petitioner Province of Camarines Sur at the time he
was suspended on March 16, 1976?
HELD:
CA's decision affirmed
The Court agrees with petitioner's contention that that when
Governor Alfelor recommended to CSC the change in the
employment status of private respondent from temporary to
permanent, which the CSC approved as only temporary pending
validation of the results of private respondent's examination for
supervising security guard, private respondent's appointment in
effect remained temporary. Hence, his subsequent qualification for
civil service eligibility did not ipso facto convert his temporary
status to that of permanent.
Furthermore, the Court ruled that CSC has the power to approve
or disapprove an appointment set before it. It does not have the
power to make the appointment itself or to direct the appointing
authority to change the employment status of an employee. The
CSC can only inquire into the eligibility of the person chosen to fill
a position and if it finds the person qualified it must so attest. If
not, the appointment must be disapproved. The duty of the CSC is
to attest appointments 10 and after that function is discharged, its
participation in the appointment process ceases. 11 In the case at
bench, CSC should have ended its participation in the appointment
of private respondent on January 1, 1974 when it confirmed the
temporary status of the latter who lacked the proper civil service
eligibility. When it issued the foregoing communication on March
19, 1976, it stepped on the toes of the appointing authority, thereby
encroaching on the discretion vested solely upon the latter.
G.R. No. L-26785 May 23, 1991
DEOGRACIAS A. REGIS, JR., petitioner,
vs.
SERGIO OSMEÑA, JR., VICENTE PACIFICO, CITY OF
CEBU, CITY COUNCIL OF CEBU, CITY TREASURER
AND CITY AUDITOR, respondents.
FACTS:
On 1958, petitioner was appointed by then Cebu City Mayor,
Ramon Duterte, as driver, Motorized Division of the Cebu Police
Department, with a yearly compensation of P1,440.00,. petitioner
was then issued another appointment on 1960 as "driver" of the
Cebu Police Department, at an increased yearly compensation at
P1,560.00. On 1961, petitioner was issued another appointment by
then Cebu City Mayor Carlos J. Cuizon as "Driver, Civilian
Employee" of the Cebu Police Department at the increased yearly
compensation of P1,920.00 On 1963, petitioner was extended an
appointment as "driver (Radio Patrol) Civilian Employee" of the
Cebu Police Department at the increased yearly compensation of
P2,040.00. On 1964, petitioner was removed from his position in
the Cebu Police Department without prior investigation or hearing,
the termination having been made in a letter of dismissal.
Petitioner is a civil service eligible, having passed the patrolman
and/or detective (qualified) civil service examination, a fourth year
student in the College of Liberal Arts in the University of the
Visayas. The position of the petitioner, after his removal, was filled
up by the respondent City Mayor with the appointment of Eduardo
Gabiana, a non-civil service eligible as shown in his appointment.
After his removal, the petitioner addressed to the President of the
Philippines and the Civil Service Commissioner, protesting and
appealing his unlawful removal and demanding his reinstatement.
the Executive Secretary to the President indorsed the above-
mentioned letter to the Commissioner of Civil Service, Since the
filing of the instant action, the petitioner has not been afforded the
relief of reinstatement by either the Office of the President of the
Philippines or by the Civil Service Commissioner.
Petitioner received his civil service eligibility for patrolman-
detective on 8 March 1964, a photostatic of which was filed, for
record purposes, with the clerk in charge of the record section of
the CPD on 12 March 1964 his efficiency rating is 88%, the
highest among the drivers of the CPD he is the only civil service
eligible among the drivers in the CPD; after his ouster, the City of
Cebu created positions of drivers; and he attributed his ouster to
politics, alleging that he was being suspected as a supporter of the
faction of then Congressman Durano, the political rival of
respondent Mayor Osmeña. The records of the Regional Office of
the Civil Service Commission in Cebu City do not show that
petitioner possesses any civil service eligibility at the time he was
appointed as driver. In its Decision of the court below dismissed
the petition on the ground that petitioner's questioned appointment
was temporary in nature and, therefore, terminable at the pleasure
of the appointing power.. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court a quo erred in dismissing his petition?
HELD:
The Court agree with the petitioner that the trial court erred in
holding that his appointment is temporary in nature. Obviously, the
trial court failed to appreciate the clear distinction between a
temporary appointment and a provisional appointment. It had
either confused one for the other or considered one as synonymous
with the other as shown in the opening sentence of the first
paragraph of the portions of the decision hereinbefore quoted
wherein it categorized the appointment of petitioner as "temporary
or provisional in nature."
As correctly stated by petitioner, provisional appointments are
governed by paragraph (c) of Section 24 of R.A. No. 2260 while
temporary appointments are covered by paragraph (d) of said
Section. For convenience We quote both paragraphs:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) Provisional appointments — A provisional appointment may be
issued upon prior authorization of the Commissioner in accordance
with the provisions of the Act and the rules and standards
promulgated in pursuance thereto to a person who has not qualified
in an appropriate examination but who otherwise meets the
requirements for appointment to a regular position in the
competitive service, whenever a vacancy occurs and the filling
thereof is necessary in the interest of the service and there is no
appropriate register of eligibles at the time of appointment.
3
(d) Temporary appointment. — A person may receive a temporary
appointment to a position needed only for a limited period not
exceeding six months, provided that a preference in filling such
position be given to persons on appropriate eligible lists.
Accordingly, since there was no certificate of civil service
eligibility received by respondent City Mayor, the provisional
appointment of petitioner remained valid and subsisting. Prior to
such receipt petitioner may only be removed for cause as provided
by law under Section 32 of R.A. No. 2260. That there was "no
more need" for his service was not a valid and lawful cause and
even if it were so, it could not be availed of in this case since, as
admitted by the parties, immediately after the ouster a non-civil
service eligible was appointed to replace petitioner and more driver
positions were included in the succeeding budget of the City of
Cebu. These facts negated the pretended basis for the dismissal.
The real hidden cause was not that service of the nature and
character rendered by petitioner was no longer needed, but that
petitioner had become unacceptable to the appointing authority.
G.R. No. 96298 May 14, 1991
RENATO M. LAPINID, petitioner,
vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, PHILIPPINE PORTS
AUTHORITY and JUANITO JUNSAY, respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioner Renato M. Lapinid was appointed by the Philippine
Ports Authority to the position of Terminal Supervisor at the
Manila International Container Terminal . This appointment was
protested by private respondent Juanito Junsay, who reiterated his
earlier representations with the Appeals Board of the PPA, for a
review of the decision of the Placement Committee. He contended
that he should be designated terminal supervisor, or to any other
comparable position, in view of his preferential right thereto.
complaining that the PPA had not acted on his protest, Junsay went
to the Civil Service Commission and challenged Lapinid's
appointment on the same grounds he had earlier raised before the
PPA. In a resolution, the Commission ruled that It is thus obvious
that Protestants Junsay (79.5) and Villegas (79) have an edge over
that of protestees Lapinid (75) and Dulfo (78). Then it is directed
that Appellants Juanito Junsay and Benjamin Villegas be appointed
as Terminal Supervisor (SG 18) vice protestees Renato Lapinid
and Antonio Dulfo respectively who may be considered for
appointment to any position commensurate and suitable to their
qualifications, and that the Commission be notified within ten (10)
days of the implementation hereof. Upon learning of the said
resolution, Lapinid, filed a motion for reconsideration which was
denied.The Philippine Ports Authority also filed its own motion for
reconsideration which was also denied.A second motion for
reconsideration filed based on the re-appreciation of Lapinid's
rating from 75% to 84%, was also denied. Hence this case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not he Civil Service Commission authorized to
disapprove a permanent appointment on the ground that another
person is better qualified than the appointee and, on the basis of
this finding, order his replacement by the latter?
HELD:
Petition granted. The court declare once again, and let us hope for
the last time, that the Civil Service Commission has no power of
appointment except over its own personnel. Neither does it have
the authority to review the appointments made by other offices
except only to ascertain if the appointee possesses the required
qualifications. The determination of who among aspirants with the
minimum statutory qualifications should be preferred belongs to
the appointing authority and not the Civil Service Commission. It
cannot disallow an appointment because it believes another person
is better qualified and much less can it direct the appointment of its
own choice.

Appointment is a highly discretionary act that even this Court
cannot compel.1âwphi1 While the act of appointment may in
proper cases be the subject of mandamus, the selection itself of the
appointee—taking into account the totality of his qualifications,
including those abstract qualities that define his personality—is the
prerogative of the appointing authority. This is a matter addressed
only to the discretion of the appointing authority. It is a political
question that the Civil Service Commission has no power to review
under the Constitution and the applicable laws.
G.R. No. 110598 December 1, 1994
MONA A. TOMALI petitioner,
vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, OFFICE ON MUSLIM
AFFAIRS (OMA) and ROCAINA M. LUCMA, respondents.
FACTS:
petitioner Mona A. Tomali was appointed Development
Management Officer II ("DMO II") in the Office on Muslim
Affairs ("OMA"). The appointment was extended by then OMA
Executive Director Dimasangcay A. Pundato. She assumed the
duties and functions of the office four months later, or on 01
November 1990, at which time, the appointment had not yet been
transmitted to the Civil Service Commission ("CSC") for approval.
However, the new Director of the OMA, Dr. Ali Basir Lucman,
revoking the previous incomplete appointment of petitioner,
appointed private respondent Rocaina M. Lucman to the position in
question (DMO II). Petitioner, sent public respondent OMA a letter
protesting her replacement. the Chief of the Human Resources
Management Division of the OMA communicated to petitioner the
disapproval/expiration of her appointment. Forthwith, private
respondent took her oath of office and assumed the duties and
functions of DMO II.
petitioner reiterated her protest. 3The Merit Systems Protection
Board ("MSPB"), acting thereon, rendered a decision dismissing
the protest/complaint for lack of merit.
It held that
Glaring is the fact that protestant's appointment to the contested
position was not approved by the Civil Service Commission,
hence, incomplete. In this regard, Section 11, Rule V, of the
Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No.
292, Administrative Code of 1987 is clear and explicit. Said
provision reads, thus:
Sec. 11. An appointment not submitted to the Commission, within
thirty (30) days from the date of issuance, which shall be the date
appearing on the face of the instrument, shall be ineffective.
As applied to the case of the herein protestant, it appears that the
latter has no basis in law to cling to the contested position. Her
prior continuous stay in office was at most by mere tolerance of the
appointing authority. As her appointment is incomplete for lack of
the requisite approval of the Civil Service Commission or its
proper Regional or Field Office, no right to security of tenure as
guaranteed by law and the Constitution attaches thereto or for
incumbent to invoke. . . . .
Her request for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner
appealed to the CSC. In its Resolution No. 93-945, , the
Commission dismissed the appeal for lack of merit. 5
Hence, the instant recourse to this Court
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is validly appointed?
HELD:
No. Compliance with the legal requirements for an appointment to
a civil service position is essential in order to make it fully
effective. 8 Without the favorable certification or approval of the
Commission, in cases when such approval is required, no title to
the office can yet be deemed to be permanently vested in favor of
4
the appointee, and the appointment can still be recalled or
withdrawn by the appointing authority. 9 Until an appointment has
become a completed act, it would likewise be precipitate to invoke
the rule on security of tenure. 10
Petitioner faults public respondents for their failure to have her
appointment properly attended to and timely acted upon and for, in
effect, allowing her in the meanwhile to assume the office in
question.
In Favis vs. Rupisan, 11 this Court has said:
The tolerance, acquiescence or mistake of the proper officials,
resulting in the non-observance of the pertinent rules on the matter
does not render the legal requirement, on the necessity of approval
of the Commissioner of Civil Service of appointments, ineffective
and unenforceable. The employee, whose appointment was not
approved, may only be considered as a de facto officer.
Petitioner herself would not appear to be all that blameless. She
assumed the position four months after her appointment was issued
or months after that appointment had already lapsed or had become
ineffective by operation of law. Petitioner's appointment was
issued on 01 July 1990, but it was only on 31 May 1991 that it was
submitted to the CSC, a fact which she knew, should have known
or should have at least verified considering the relatively long
interval of time between the date of her appointment and the date
of her assumption to office. The CSC, such as to be expected,
disapproved the appointment 12 in consonance with Presidential
Decree No. 807
UY VS. COURT OF APPEALS
Facts:
Uy works as supervising mechanical engineer at the provincial
engineering office of agusan del sur on sept. 27, 1982. On feb 26,
1988, governor paredes issued an order reducing the number of
PEO’s personnel including Uy. On may 14, 1988, uy received his
notice of termination effective on may 16, 1988. Mellana, the
respondent, holds the position of mechanical engineer, a position
two steps below, uy which was retained by governor paredes, uy
and other 61 dismissed employees filed before the merit system
protection board assailing the legality of their termination. The
merit system protection board declared that the termination is
illegal and oide governor plaza to reinstate the petitioners in
service and declared invalid appointments of personnel who were
appointed by governor paredes, millana after his services were
terminated raised the ;egality of governor plaza order before the
civil service commission. The CSC ruler in favor of millana and
ordered gov plaza to reinstate him.
Issue:
Whether or not, uy may be reinstated.
Held:
No, it is settled that an appointment whether to a vacancy or to a
neutly created position is essentially within the discretionary power
of whomsoever it is vested. Once the candidate is possesses the
minimum qualities required by law, sufficient discretion, if not
plenary, is granted to the appointee to such position. The civil
service commission has no authority to revoke appointment simply
because it considers another employee to be better qualified for
that would constitute an encroachment on the discretion vested, in
the appointing authority when a choice of an appointee is a
political and administrative decision, such discretion cannot be
exercised arbitrarily to remove a permanent employee occupying
the position without violating millana’s right to security of tenure.
JOCOM VS. REGALADO
Facts:
Bicol river basin council was created under PD412 on 1973 on feb
1986 revolution. Vice president laurel, before the proclamation of
the freedom constitution, appointed Jessie robredo to the petition of
program director of BRB DP vice Carmelo villacorta, However, on
January 27, 1987. Vice president laurel appointed petitioner jocom
to the position of project director of BRBDP. Robredo was
informed of his termination from office w/o stating the groind for
his dismissal. Jocom attempted to assume the office but robredo
prevented him by barricading the building of BRBDP. Robredo
filed a petition for injunction w/ the RTC of naga city which was
granted. Jocom filed a motion to dismiss on jurisdictional ground
that E.O.17 provides that no restraining order or preliminary
injunction can be issued by any court to enjoin the separation/
replacement of any official employee in the government service the
trial court denied said motion, holding that the prohibition is not
applicable to the appointee under the freedom constitution, who is
actually a replacement to an employee appointed under the 1973
constitution. BRBDP was later on, abolished.
Issue: Whether or not,jocom is the party to entitled to receive the
separation benefits provided by the law.
Held:
No, at the time of jocom’s appointment, vice president laurel has
ceased to be chairman of NACIAD. His appointments to jocom
and the removal of robredo from the position of project director,
were in the exercise of power that already belonged to the
president. Such appointment and removal were will and void and
jocom cannot to have a valid right to the petition of project director
of BRBDP. Whether it be career or non career position, such
employee may not be removed without just cause. An employee
who belongs to the non career service is protected from removal or
suspension without just cause, and non observance of due process.
Therefore, jocom is not entitled to receive separation benefits.
Petition is dismissed.
QUINTOS – DELES VS. THE COMMISSION ON
CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS AND OFFICES.
Facts:
Quintos-deles and 3 others were appointec by president as sectorial
representatives. They were about to take their oath of office when
several congressmen protested that they are required to be
confirmed by the commission on appointment before they can
assume office.
Issue:
Whether or not , confirmation on commission on appointment is
required in sectoral representatives appointed by the president.
Held:
Yes, confirmation is needed. Sectoral representatives to the house
of representatives are among the other officers whose ppointments
are vested in the president referred to in the first sentence of
section 16, article 7 whose appointments are subject of
confirmation by the commission on appointments. Petition is
dismissed for each of merit.
GLORIA VS. DE GUZMAN
Facts:
Respondent carillo was issued a one year temporary appointment
to the position of board secretary II of PAFCA (now PSCA) from
jan 1 to dec 31, 1992. It it’s a temporary appointment. On march
24, 1992 she was relieved as board secretary and was designated as
coordinator for extension services. On December 7, 1992. Col.
Loleng inform respondent that she shall be deemed separated for
the service upon their temporary appoinments. After 5 months,
respondent filed before RTC of pasay a petition for mandamus an
reinstatement with back wages and damages.
Issue:
Whether or not, respondent is entitled for reintstatement.
Held:
No, the judgement promogated by the trial court is improper
because it finds no support as to facts and the law. The private
respondents assignment as coordinator for extension services was a
mere designation not being a permanent appointment, the
designation to the position cannot be subject for reinstatement a
mere designee does not acquire any right to the position even if the
position existed. Petition is granted.
5
MALALUAN vs. COMELEC
254 SCRA 397
Facts: Petitioner Luis Malaluan and private respondent Jose
Evangelista were both mayoralty candidates in the Municipality of
Kidapawan, North Cotabato. Private respondent was proclaimed by
the Municipal Board of Canvassers as the duly elected Mayor with
a winning margin of 706 votes. Petitioner filed an election protest
with the Regional Trial Court. The trial court declared petitioner as
the duly elected municipal mayor with a plurality of 154 votes.
Acting without precedent, the court found private respondent liable
not only for Malaluan’s protest expenses but also for moral and
exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. Petitioner filed a motion
for execution pending appeal which was granted by the court.
Subsequently the First Division of the Comelec ordered Malaluan
to vacate the office. The Comelec en banc affirmed said decision.
Malaluan filed this petition for certiorari and prohibition on May
31, 1995 as a consequence. It is significant to note that the term of
office of the local officials elected in the May 1992 elections
expired on June 30, 1995. This petition, thus, has become moot and
academic insofar as it concerns petitioner’s right to the mayoralty
seat because expiration of the term of office contested in the
election protest has the effect of rendering the same moot and
academic.
Issue:
Whether or not the Comelec gravely abused its discretion in
awarding the aforecited damages in favor of private respondent.
Held:
The overriding requirement for a valid and proper award of
damages is that the same is in accordance with law, specifically,
the provisions of the Civil Code pertinent to damages. The
Omnibus Election Code provides that “actual or compensatory
damages may be granted in all election contests or in quo warranto
proceedings in accordance with law.” Comelec Rules of Procedure
provide that “in all election contests the Court may adjudicate
damages and attorney’s fees as it may deem just and as established
by the evidence if the aggrieved party has included such claims in
his pleadings.
Notwithstanding his subsequent ouster as a result of an election
protest, an elective official who has been proclaimed by the
Comelec as winner in an electoral contest and who assumed office
and entered into the performance of the duties of office is entitled
to the compensation, emoluments and allowances legally provided
for that position. The emolument must go to the person who
rendered the service unless the contrary is provided.
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION VS. THE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY
G.R. NO. 83896 FEBRUARY 22, 1991
Facts:
The constitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 issued by then
President Corazon Aquino is being challenged by petitioners on the
principal submission that it adds exceptions to Section 13, Article
VII other than those provided in the Constitution. According to
petitioners, by virtue of the phrase “unless otherwise provided in
this Constitution,” the only exceptions against holding any other
office or employment in Government are those provided in the
Constitution. Petitioners maintain that this Executive Order which,
in effect, allows members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and
assistant secretaries to hold other government offices or positions
in addition to their primary positions, albeit subject to the
limitation therein imposed, runs counter to Section 13, Article VII
of the 1987 Constitution.
Issue:
Whether Executive Order No. 284 is unconstitutional.
Held:
Yes. A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the
intention underlying the provision under consideration. The Court
in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the object sought
to be accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to
be prevented or remedied.
Although Section 7, Article I-XB already contains a blanket
prohibition against the holding of multiple offices or employment
in the government subsuming both elective and appointive public
officials, the Constitutional Commission should see it fit to
formulate another provision, Sec. 13, Article VII, specifically
prohibiting the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet,
their deputies and assistants from holding any other office or
employment during their tenure, unless otherwise provided in the
Constitution itself. Evidently, from this move as well as in the
different phraseologies of the constitutional provisions in question,
the intent of the framers of the Constitution was to impose a stricter
prohibition on the President and his official family in so far as
holding other offices or employment in the government or
elsewhere is concerned.
It is a well-established rule in Constitutional construction that no
one provision of the Constitution is to be separated from all the
others, to be considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing
upon a particular subject are to be brought into view and to be so
interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the instrument.
Sections bearing on a particular subject should be considered and
interpreted together as to effectuate the whole purpose of the
Constitution and one section is not to be allowed to defeat another,
if by any reasonable construction, the two can be made to stand
together. In other words, the court must harmonize them, if
practicable, and must lean in favor of a construction which will
render every word operative, rather than one which may make the
words idle and nugatory.
[G.R. No. 116033. February 26, 1997]
ALFREDO L. AZARCON, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN,
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and JOSE C.
BATAUSA, respondents.
Facts
on June 17, 1985, in the Municipality of Bislig, Province of
Surigao del Sur, Philippines, petitioner Alfredo L. Azarcon, a
private individual voluntarily offered himself who in his capacity
as depository/administrator of property seized or deposited by the
Bureau of Internal Revenue, to act as custodian of one Isuzu
Dumptruck having been seized from Jaime C. Ancla in
satisfaction of his tax liability
However, Azarcon and Ancla were charged before the
Sandiganbayan with the crime of malversation of public funds or
property under Article 217 in relation to Article 222 of the Revised
Penal Code a private individual, alleging that Azarcon allowed
Acla to remove, retrieve, withdraw and tow away the said Isuzu
Dumptruck .
Sandigan Bayan found petitioner and Ancla guilty of the crime
charged.
Hence this petition.
Issue:
WON The Sandiganbayan does not have jurisdiction over crimes
committed solely by private individuals.
Ruling
The SC ruled that the only instances when the
Sandiganbayan will have jurisdiction over a private individual is,
when the complaint charges the private individual either as a co-
principal, accomplice or accessory of a public officer or employee
who has been charged with a crime within its jurisdiction.
The Information does not charge petitioner Azarcon of being
a co-principal, accomplice or accessory to a public officer
committing an offense under the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction.Thus,
unless petitioner be proven a public officer, the Sandiganbayan will
have no jurisdiction over the crime charged. Article 203 of the
RPC determines who are public officers:
WHEREFORE, the questioned Resolution and Decision of
the Sandiganbayan are hereby SET ASIDE and declared
NULL and VOID for lack of jurisdiction. No costs.
6
G.R. No. L-23258 July 1, 1967
ROBERTO R. MONROY, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and FELIPE DEL ROSARIO,
respondent.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
Petitioner Roberto Monroy was the incumbent Mayor of Navotas,
Rizal, when on September 15, 1961, his certificate of candidacy as
representative of the first district of Rizal in the forthcoming
elections was filed with the Commission on Elections. On
September 18, 1961, petitioner withdraw said certificate of
candidacy. The Commission on Elections, approved the
withdrawal. But on September 21, 1961, respondent Felipe del
Rosario, then the vice-mayor of Navotas, took his oath of office as
municipal mayor on the theory that petitioner had forfeited the said
office upon his filing of the certificate of candidacy .the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, held that petitioner had deemed resigned
upon filling his COC and ordered to reimburse salaries received in
favor of the respondent..on appeal by petitioner to the Court of
Appeals, affirmed in toto Hence, this petition for certiorari to
review the ruling of the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE:
WON Respondent is entitled to the salary of the office from
September 21, 1961 up to the time he can reassume said office
RULING:
Yes. De facto officer liable to reimburse salaries received to
rightful incumbent
General Rule: The rightful incumbent of a public office may
recover from a de facto officer the salary received by the latter
during the time of his wrongful tenure, even though he entered into
the office in good faith and under color of title.
The possession of the title of office is decisive. A de facto officer
not having good title takes the salaries at his risk and must account
to the de jure officer the amount of salary he received during his
wrongful tenure. Where a mayor withdrew his certificate of
candidacy for Congressman and then reassumed the position, thus
preventing the vice-mayor from discharging the duties of the
position of mayor, the mayor should reimburse to the vice-mayor,
as the rightful occupant of the position of mayor, the salaries which
he had received.The de facto doctrine was formulated for the
protection of the public and individuals who get involved in the
official acts of persons discharging the duties of an office without
being lawful officers. The withdrawal of the certifiate of candidacy
does not restore Monroy to his former position. It does not render
the withdrawal void ab initio. Once filed, the permanent legal
effects produced thereby remain even if the certificate itself be
subsequently withdrawn.
G.R. No. 95244 September 4, 1991
DRS. ELLEN AMBAS, et. al. vs. DRS. BRIGIDA
BUENASEDA, et.al
FACTS:
Petitioners were employed and retained as resident trainee
physicians by the DOH, assigned to the National Center for Mental
Health (NCM) under the Residency Program of the government.
By authority of the Secretary of Health, petitioners were issued
temporary appointments as resident trainees.
However, in an undated confidential report, the NCMH Medical
Training Officer, Dr. Efren Reyes, recommended the termination
of petitioners' services because of poor academic performance and
low ranking. The recommendation of the Training Officer for the
termination of petitioners' services was based on the result of an
evaluation conducted by the Residency Evaluation Committee on
16 June 1989 of all NCMH resident trainees.
Petitioners filed a letter-complaint with the Secretary of Health,
which the latter referred to the CSC for appropriate action. In the
same indorsement, the Secretary of Health confirmed the action of
NCMH in terminating petitioners' services as resident trainees.On
28 August 1989, the Board rendered a decision declaring
petitioners' termination as not valid and ordered their reinstatement
to their former positions. It was the opinion of the Board that the
power to remove petitioners belongs to the appointing authority,
namely, the Secretary of Health, and that, therefore, the NCMH
through its representative has no power to remove the petitioners.
The Secretary of Health later confirmed the removal on 17 August
1989.
ISSUE:
WON NCMH has the authority to remove petitioners from their
position.
RULING:
The NCMH had no power to terminate the trainees. Only the
Secretary of Health, as the appointing authority, had the power to
remove them from the service. Thus, the removal of petitioners by
NCMH effective 1 July 1989 was not valid. But, the confirmation
on 17 August 1989 made by the Secretary of Health of petitioners'
termination had the force and effect of a valid removal, effective
on the date such confirmation was made.The Secretary of Health
did not commit grave abuse of discretion in terminating petitioners
from the service because the same was done with just cause, i.e.,
the petitioners' poor academic performance and low ranking in the
evaluation conducted by the Residency Evaluation Committee of
NCMH. Under the circumstances, the valid removal of petitioners
took effect only 17 August 1989, and, therefore, they are entitled to
backwages from 1 July 1989 to 17 August 1989
MATURAN VS MAGLANA
FACTS
Petitioner Tereso Maturan is a police sergeant at San Franciso,
Southern Leyte. He got promoted from being a
patrolman (February 1965) to a police sergeant (September
1972) through appointments which were provisional. His
provisional appointment was annually renewed for the span of
seven years including respective increase in the salary.
Respondent Mayor Maglana suspended Maturan on September
1972 because of two pending cases against him 1.Falsification of public
document by making untruthful statement in the narration offacts
and 2. Falsification of public document. A month after, respondent Vice
Mayor Magoncia who was then the Acting Mayor instructed
Maturan to tender his resignation pursuant to the Letter of Instruction No. 14 of the
President of the Philippines. Maturan submitted his letter of resignation on the same
month. The resignation was approved on January 19, 1973 and petitioner was
accordingly informed thereof . However cases against MATURAN were. A
month after Maturan sought to have his resignation rendered null
and void for on the ground that Letter of Instruction No. 14 does not apply to
him. Given that criminal charges against him were already dismissed, the
NaPolCom chairman stated that the preventive suspension is lifted and he could go
back to work. However, the Chief of Police refused to accept Maturan. Hence, he
appealed to the court. He filed for a claim for back wages and reinstatement. The
lower court denied the claim ruling that his appointment was provisional and he can
be removed at anytime by the appointing power.
ISSUE
WON Maturan be reinstated to his position as police sergeant
RULING
NO .Maturan cannot be reinstated to his former post. This is so
because he was not qualified for the position nor was he possessing
any civil service eligibility for any position in the government.
Lack of civil service eligibility makes his appointment temporary
and is dependent upon the pleasure of the appointing power. When
he was appointed as patrolman and as a police sergeant, he had no
eligibility. It does not matter if he gained eligibility subsequently
or during his post; this does not apply to his provisional temporary
appointment. Gaining civil service eligibility while actively serving
his appointment does not make his temporary appointment
automatically permanent; it does not follow. Upon his
appointment, he had no eligibility and that should apply until the
end of his temporary appointment. What is required is a new
appointment and not merely a reinstatement. Also, the Mayor
cannot be compelled to appoint him for such power of the Mayor is
discretionary.
7
LUEGO VS CSC
143 SCRA 327
FACTS:
Petitioner was appointed Administrative OfficerII, Office of the
City Mayor, Cebu City, by Mayor Florentino Solon on 18 February
1983. The appointment was described as "permanent" but the Civil
Service Commission approved it as "temporary." On 22 March
1984, the Civil Service Commission found the private respondent
better qualified than the petitioner for the contested position and
accordingly directed herein private respondent in place of
petitioner's position. The private respondent was so appointed on
28 June 1984,by the new mayor; Mayor Ronald Duterte. The
petitioner is now invoking his earlier permanent appointment as
well as to question the Civil Service Commission's order and the
private respondent's title.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Civil Service Commission is authorized to
disapprove a permanent appointment on the ground that another
person is better qualified than the appointee and, on the basis of
this finding, order his
replacement by the latter.
HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. The Civil Service
Commission is not empowered to determine the kind or nature of
the appointment extended by the appointing officer, its authority
being limited to approving or reviewing the appointment in the
light of the requirements of the Civil Service Law. When the
appointee is qualified and the other legal requirements are satisfied,
the Commission has no choice but to attest to the appointment in
accordance with the Civil Service Laws. Hence, the Civil Service
Commission's resolution is set aside.
LACSON VS ROMERO
Facts:
Petitioner Lacson was on July 25, 1946, appointed by the President
of the Philippines, provincial fiscal of Negros Oriental. The
appointment was confirmed by the Commission on Appointment
on August 6, 1946. He took his oath of office on August10, 1946,
and thereafter performed the duties of that office. Upon
recommendation of the Secretary of Justice, on May 17, 1949, the
President nominated petitioner Lacson to the post of provincial
fiscal of Tarlac. On the same date, the President nominated for the
position of provincial fiscal of Negros Oriental respondent
Romero. Both nominations were simultaneously confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments on May 19, 1949.Lacson neither
accepted the appointment nor assumed the office of fiscal of
Tarlac. But respondent Romero took his oath of office (the post of
fiscal of Negros Oriental) in Manila on June 16, 1949, notified the
Solicitor General of the fact, and thereafter proceeded to his
station. Upon arrival at Dumaguete City, capital of Negros
Oriental, he notified Lacson of his intention to take over the office
the following day, but Lacson objected. Hence this petition
ISSUE:
Whether or not Lacson is entitled to the position
HELD :
The Court ruled that: The appointment to a government post
like that of provincial fiscal to be complete involves several steps.
First, comes the nomination by the President. Then to make that
nomination valid and permanent, the Commission on
Appointments of the Legislature has to confirm said nomination.
The last step is the acceptance thereof by the appointee by his
assumption of office. The first two steps, nomination and
confirmation, constitute a mere offer of a post. They are acts of the
Executive and Legislative departments of the Government. But the
last necessary step to make the appointment complete and effective
rests solely with the appointee himself. He may or he may not
accept the appointment or nomination. Consequently, since Lacson
has declined to accept his appointment as provincial fiscal of
Tarlac and no one can compel him to do so, then he continues as
provincial fiscal of Negros Oriental and no vacancy in said office
was created, unless Lacson had been lawfully removed as Such
fiscal of Negros Oriental.
ALFREDO B. FELIX, petitioner,
vs.
DR. BRIGIDA BUENASEDA, in her capacity as Director, and
ISABELO BAÑEZ, JR., in his capacity as Administrator, both
of the National Center for Mental Health, and the CIVIL
SERVICE COMMISSION, respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioner Dr. Alfredo Felix joined the National Center
for Mental Health as a Resident Physician. He was promoted to the
position of Senior Resident Physician he held until the Ministry of
Health reorganized the NCMH. Under the reorganization,
petitioner was appointed as Senior Resident Physician in a
temporary capacity. He was again promoted to the position of
Medical Specialist I, still at temporary status.
In 1988, DOH issued DO No. 347 requiring board
certification as a prerequisite for renewal of specialist positions of
the said department. It stated that services of those who failed to
meet the requirement may be extended at the discretion of the
appointing authority. Petitioner was one of the govt medical
specialist who would’ve been adversely affected by DO 347 since
he was not yet accredited by the Psychiatry Specialty Board. His
appointment was extended until 1991 when the Medical
Credentials Committee of NCMH recommended non-renewal of
his appointment.
Petitioner filed a petition with the Merit System
Protection Board complaining about the alleged harassment by
respondents and questioning the non-renewal of his appointment.
MPSB and CSC, on appeal, both dismissed the case. Hence the
petition where petitioner assails his dismissal as illegal and
violative of the constitutional provision on security of tenure.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner’s temporary appointment after
reorganization violated his constitutional right of security of
tenure.
HELD:
No. The appointment was for a definite and renewable
period which, when it was not renewed, did not involve a dismissal
but an expiration of the petitioner's term. Petitioner made no
attempt to oppose his temporary appointment since 1988 despite
renewals. He is therefore estopped from insisting upon a right or
claim which he had abandoned when he accepted the promotion.
Any claim to any position in the civil service, permanent,
temporary of otherwise, or any claim to a violation of the
constitutional provision on security of tenure should be made
within a reasonable period of time. An assurance of some degree of
stability in the civil service is necessary in order to avoid needless
disruptions in the conduct of public business.
The failure to assert a claim or the voluntary acceptance of another
position in government, obviously without reservation, leads to a
presumption that the civil servant has either given up his claim of
has already settled into the new position. This is the essence of
laches which is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time to do that which, by exercising due
diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is the
negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time,
warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either
has abandoned it or declined to assert it.
The change in designation from permanent resident physician to
temporary resident physician was deemed necessary. The attempts
by the Department of Health not only to streamline these positions
but to make them conform to current standards of specialty practice
is a step in a positive direction.
8
G.R. No. 92403 April 22, 1992
VICTOR A. AQUINO, petitioner,
vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and LEONARDA D. DE LA
PAZ, respondents.
FACTS:
In 1984, Petitioner Aquino, Clerk II of Division of City
Schools of San Pablo City, was designation of OIC of the Division
Supply Office by the DECS Regional Director in view of the
retirements of Supply Officer I, Mr Jose Aviquivil.
After two years, private respondent De La Paz was
promoted as Supply Officer I. She assumed and performed duties
and functions of the position and received the compensation and
benefits therefor. Civil Service Regional Office IV approved her
appointment as permanent.
One month after, petitioner filed a protest with the DECS
Secretary questioning the qualification and competence of private
respondent for the position of Supply Officer I. DECS Secretary
Quisumbing sustained the protest and revoked the appointment of
private respondent on the ground that petitioner has a decided
advantage over the latter in terms of education, experience and
training. Petitioner was issued permanent appointment.
CSC, however, revoked the appointment of petitioner
Aquino and restored private respondent de la Paz. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not CSC committed grave abuse of discretion
in revoking the appointment of petition Aquino.
HELD:
No. The general rule is that the CSC has no authority to
revoke an appointment. However, the situation is different as in the
instant case, where the Civil Service Commission revoked the
appointment of the successful protestant, petitioner herein,
principally because the right to security of tenure of the prior
appointee, private respondent herein, to the contested position had
already attached. CSC merely restored the appointment of private
respondent who was first appointed to the contested position.
Private respondent was issued a permanent appointment on
September 19, 1986 as Supply Officer I in the DECS Division and
was approved by the Civil Service Regional Office. The permanent
appointment extended to private respondent, under the
circumstances of the case, is deemed complete. As such, she is
entitled to the protection of the law against unjust removal.
Further, an appointment cannot be revoked by the appointing
authority on the ground merely that the protestant is more qualified
than the first appointee, subject however to the condition that the
first appointee should possess the minimum qualifications required
by law. Otherwise, the security of tenure guaranteed by Article IX-
B, Section 2 par. (3) of the 1987 Constitution would be rendered
meaningless.
While a protest is a mode of action that may be availed of by the
aggrieved party to contest the appointment made, the protest must
be "for cause" or predicated on those grounds provided for under
Section 19 par. (6) of the Civil Service Law (P.D. 807), namely:
(1) that the appointee is not qualified; (2) that the appointee is not
the next-in-rank; and (3) in case of appointment by transfer,
reinstatement, or by original appointment, that the protestant is not
satisfied with the written special reason or reasons given by the
appointing authority. The ground relied upon by petitioner in his
protest that he is more qualified than private respondent in terms of
education, experience and training does not fall within the meaning
of "for cause"
Flores v Drilon (223 SCRA 568)
FACTS:
The constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227, otherwise
known as the "Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992,"
under which respondent Mayor Richard J. Gordon of Olongapo
City was appointed Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the
Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA), is challenged with
prayer for prohibition, preliminary injunction and temporary
restraining order. Said provision provides the President the power
to appoint an administrator of the SBMA provided that in the first
year of its operation, the Olongapo mayor shall be appointed as
chairman and chief of executive of the Subic Authority. Petitioners
maintain that such infringes to the constitutional provision of Sec.
7, first par., Art. IX-B, of the Constitution, which states that "no
elective official shall be eligible forappointment or designation in
any capacity to any public officer or position during his tenure,"
The petitioners also contend that Congress encroaches upon the
discretionary power of the President to appoint.
ISSUE:
Whether or not said provision of the RA 7227 violates the
constitutional prescription against appointment or designation of
elective officials to other government posts.
RULING:
The court held the Constitution seeks to prevent a public officer to
hold multiple functions since they are accorded with a public office
that is a full time job to let them function without the distraction of
other governmental duties.The Congress gives the President the
appointing authority which it cannot limit by providing the
condition that in the first year of the operation the Mayor of
Olongapo City shall assume the Chairmanship. The court points
out that the appointing authority the congress gives to the President
is no power at all as it curtails the right of the President to exercise
discretion of whom to appoint by limiting his choice.
[G.R. No. 103903. September 11, 1992.]
Sampayan vs Daza
FACTS:
Petitioners filed the instant petition seeking to disqualify
respondent Daza, then incumbent congressman, from continuing to
exercise the functions of his office on the ground that the latter is a
greencard holder and a lawful permanent resident of US.
Petitioners manifested that the instant petition is concerned with
the unlawful assumption of office by respondent Daza from 1987
to 1992.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Daza should be disqualified as a
member of the House of Representatives for violation of Sec 68 of
the OEC.
HELD:
No. Jurisdiction of this case rightfully pertains to the House
Electoral Tribunal. Under Section 17 of Article VI of the 1987
Constitution, it is the House Electoral Tribunal which shall be the
sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualification of its members. Since petitioners challenge the
qualifications of Congressman Daza, the appropriate remedy
should have been to file a petition to cancel respondent Daza’s
certificate of candidacy before the election 9 or a quo warranto
case with the House Electoral Tribunal within ten (10) days after
Daza’s proclamation. As a de facto public officer, respondent
cannot be made to reimburse funds disbursed during his term of
office because his acts are as valid as those of a de jure officer.
Moreover, as a de facto officer, he is entitled to emoluments for
actual services rendered. G.R. No. 123989 January 26, 1998
ATTY. DAVID B. CORPUZ, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, and MOVIE AND TELEVISION
REVIEW AND CLASSIFICATION BOARD, respondents.
FACTS:
In 1986, Petitioner Atty. Corpuz was appointed as the
MTRCB’s Legal Counsel in Prosecutor and Investigation Services
and was approved by Asst Regional Director Benita Santos of the
CSC-NCR. In 1991, for failure of the past MTRCB Chairmen to
submit for approval the appointments of administrative and
subordinate employees to the MTRCB before forwarding them to
the CSC, Resolution No. 8-1-91 was passed declaring as null and
void the appointments of the administrative and subordinate
employees of MTRCB. In 1992, an Ad Hoc Committee was
constituted to look into the appointments who then resolved to
9
recommend to the MTRCB the approval of the appointments,
except that of Corpuz and seven others.
Petition filed a complaint with the CSC which was
granted by the latter and ruled that revocation or recall of
petitioner’s appointment was not brought within a reasonable
period of time after its approval hence, Corpuz had already
acquired security of tenure. Court of Appeals reversed CSC’s
resolution. Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner’s appointment, without the
approval of the MTRCB Board, has acquired security of tenure.
HELD:
No. Under PD 1986, there are two stages in the process
of appointing MTRCB personnel, other than its Secretary, namely:
(a) recommendation by the Chairman which is accomplished by
the signing of the appointment paper; and (b) approval or
disapproval by the MTRCB of the appointment. It is long settled in
the law of public offices and officers that where the power of
appointment is absolute, and the appointee has been determined
upon, no further consent or approval is necessary, and the formal
evidence of the appointment, the commission, may issue at once.
Where, however, the assent or confirmation of some other officer
or body is required, the commission can issue or the appointment
may be complete only when such assent or confirmation is
obtained. In either case, the appointment becomes complete when
the last act required of the appointing power is performed. Until the
process is completed, the appointee can claim no vested right in the
office nor invoke security of tenure. Hence, in the case of
CORPUZ, since the last act required for the completion of his
appointment, viz., approval by the MTRCB itself, was not
obtained, as a matter of fact, the MTRCB ultimately disapproved
it, his appointment ceased to have effect, if at all, and his services
were properly terminated. Compliance with the legal requirements
for an appointment to a civil service position is essential to make it
fully effective. Those years of service cannot substitute for the
want of consent of another body required by law to complete the
appointment.
A public official or employee who assumed office under an
incomplete appointment is merely a de facto officer for the
duration of his occupancy of the office for the reason that he
assumed office under color of a known appointment which is void
by reason of some defect or irregularity in its exercise. Undeniably,
under the facts here, CORPUZ was such a de facto officer. G.R.
No. 71228 September 24, 1987
ERLINDA P. MERAM, petitioner,
vs.
FILIPINA V. EDRALIN, THE MINISTER OF NATURAL
RESOURCES AND THE PRESIDENTIAL ASSISTANT FOR
LEGAL AFFAIRS, respondents.
FACTS:
Private respondent Edralin, a training officer, was
proposed for appointment to the position of Administrative Officer
V. Petitioner Meram and Agravio, AO III and Supply Officer V,
respectively, filed their protests against the proposal. On
deliberation of the BFD Promotion Board, it was found that there
are four BFD Personnel including the protestants, who are
considered “next-in-rank” to the position of AO V while the
private respondent was not next-in-rank.Respondent Minister
recommended and forwarded the permanent appointment of
respondent Edralin to the Commission for appropriate action. The
latter approved Edralin’s appointment subject to the final outcome
of the protests.Respondent Minister dismissed that protest. Merit
Systems Board, however, revoked the previous approval of the
appointment of respondent Edralin and directing the Minister to
appoint Agravio. The decision was modified and the petitioner was
appointed.CSC likewise dismissed petitioner’s appeal. Hence,
respondent filed a letter-petition with the Office of the President
alleging that appeal on promotional contests should be taken to the
Office of the President, thus, MSB and CSC had no jurisdiction to
action on petitioner’s appeal. Respondent obtained favorable
decision from the OP. Hence, the petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Office of the President acted correctly
in taking cognizance of respondent’s letter-petition.
HELD:
No. Both the MSB and the Commission had jurisdiction
to pass upon the petitioner's protest. The petitioner correctly filed
her protest with the MSB in accordance with P.D. No. 1409. Office
of the President has no exclusive jurisdiction in promotional
contests.
Further, Respondent Edralin is now estopped from questioning the
orders of the MSB and the Commission since she submitted to the
jurisdiction of these two bodies by filing for reconsideration with
the MSB and upon denial of the same, by appealing to the
Commission.
Although there is no mandatory nor peremptory requirement that
persons next-in-rank are entitled to preference in appointments, the
very purpose of the civil service law dictates that persons who are
qualified and next-in-rank should be given preferential
consideration when filling up a vacated position through
promotion.
Appointments under the civil service law should be based on merit
and fitness and should never depend on how intimate a friend or
how closely related an appointee is to the powers that be.
G.R. No. 79974 December 17, 1987
ULPIANO P. SARMIENTO III AND JUANITO G.
ARCILLA, petitioners,
vs.
SALVADOR MISON, in his capacity as COMMISSIONER OF
THE BUREAU OF CUSTOMS, AND GUILLERMO
CARAGUE, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET, respondents, COMMISSION
ON APPOINTMENTS, intervenor.
FACTS:
Subject of the petition is Section 16, Article VII of the
Constitution whereas there are four groups of officers from the
President shall appoint. These are: 1) officers whose appointments
are vested in him in the Constitution (heads of the executive
departments, ambassadors, etc.); 2) all other officers of the
Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by
law; 3) those whom the President may be authorized by law to
appoint; and 4) officers lower in rank whose appointments the
Congress may by law vest in the President alone.
Petitioners claim that all groups should be appointed with
the consent of the Commission on Appointments thus, Mison’s
appointment as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is
unconstitutional for not having been confirmed by the Commission
on Appointments.
ISSUE:
Whether or not all officers appointed by the President
shall be made with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments.
HELD:
No. The intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution, is
not to require the consent of the Commission on Appointments in
the 2nd, 3rd and 4th group of appointments.
In the 1935 Constitution almost all presidential
appointments required the consent of the Commission on
Appointments while 1973 Constitution placed the absolute power
of appointment in the President with hardly any check on the part
of the legislature. But the framers of the 1987 Constituion, as
inferred from the course of debates, struck a “middle ground” by
requiring the consent of the Commission on Appointments for the
first group of appointments and leaving to the President, without
such confirmation, the appointment of other officers.
The power to appoint is fundamentally executive or presidential in
character. Limitations or qualifications must be clearly stated in
order to be recognized. But, it is only in the first sentence of Sec.
16, Art. VII where it is clearly stated that appointments by the
10
President to the positions therein enumerated require the consent of
the Commission on Appointments. Hence, since the position of
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a bureau head) is not one
of those within the first group of appointments, the President of the
Philippines acted within her constitutional authority and power in
appointing respondent Salvador Mison, Commissioner of the
Bureau of Customs, without submitting his nomination to the
Commission on Appointments for confirmation.
[G.R. No. 124521. January 29, 1998]
MICHAEL O. MASTURA, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS (Second Division), THE NEW MUNICIPAL
BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF MATANOG,
MAGUINDANAO, THE NEW PROVINCIAL BOARD OF
CANVASSERS OF MAGUINDANAO and DIDAGEN P.
DILANGALEN, respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioner Michael O. Mastura and private respondent Didagen P.
Dilangalen were congressional candidates for the first district of
Maguindanao during the 8 May 1995 elections. In the canvassing
of votes, Dilangalen objected to the inclusion of the Certificate of
Canvass of the Municipality of Matanog on the ground that the
same was allegedly tampered. Acting on the objection, the
COMELEC Second Division ordered the production and
examination of the election returns of the Municipality of Matanog.
Upon examination and comparison of the copies of the election
returns of the MTC Judge and the COMELEC, the COMELEC
Second Division found that, indeed, the Certificate of Canvass of
the Municipality of Matanog had been tampered with.
Consequently, the COMELEC Second Division issued the herein
assailed Order of 29 February 1996 annulling the Certificate of
Canvass of Matanog. WHEREFORE, the canvass conducted by the
Municipal Board of Canvassers for the position of Member, House
of Representatives (First District) is hereby ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE.A new Municipal Board of Canvassers for the Municipality
of Matanog, Maguindanao is hereby constituted x x x to conduct a
new recanvassing at the Comelec Session Hall at Intramuros,
Manila, prepare a new Certificate of Canvass using the Comelec
copy of the election returns and, thereafter, to immediately submit
the new Certificate of Canvass to the new Provincial Board of
Canvassers as herein constituted.
ISSUE:
Whether or not COMELEC Second Division committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing its
Orders of 29 February 1996, 5 March 1996, 14 March 1996, and
20 March 1996 in annulling the certificate of canvass of Matnog.
HELD:
No. We find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent
COMELEC. It is settled jurisprudence that COMELEC can
suspend the canvass of votes pending its inquiry whether there
exists a discrepancy between the various copies of election returns
from the disputed voting centers. That the Certificate of Canvass of
the Municipality of Matanog was tampered with is a factual finding
of the COMELEC. Absent any showing of abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction, this Court should refrain from
reviewing the same, and must accord it instead the respect it
deserves. The rule that factual findings of administrative bodies
will not be disturbed by courts of justice except when there is
absolutely no evidence or no substantial evidence in support of
such findings should be applied with greater force when it concerns
the COMELEC, as the framers of the Constitution intended to
place the COMELEC - created and explicitly made independent by
the Constitution itself - on a level higher than statutory
administrative organs. The COMELEC has broad powers to
ascertain the true results of the election by means available to it.
For the attainment of that end, it is not strictly bound by the rules
of evidence.
G.R. No. 167101 January 31, 2006
MANUEL A. ALEJANDRO, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, TINGA, DAMIAN L. CO,
and the CHICO-NAZARIO, and MUNICIPAL BOARD OF
CANVASSERS OF ALICIA, ISABELA, Respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioner Manuel A. Alejandro and private respondent Damian L.
Co were rival candidates for Vice-Mayor of the Municipality of
Alicia, Isabela during the May 10, 2004 national and local
elections. After the canvass of votes, the petitioner was proclaimed
as the duly elected vice-mayor by the Municipal Board of
Canvassers (MBC) on May 13, 2004.
On May 24, 2004, private respondent Co filed a Petition3 to annul
the proclamation of petitioner Alejandro on the ground that it was
the result of manifest errors committed by the MBC in the
canvassing of the election returns from the 156 precincts
comprising the said municipality.
Private respondent Co alleged that the MBC erroneously
proclaimed petitioner Alejandro as the vice-mayor-elect. The
Certificate of Canvass of Votes and Proclamation of the Winning
Candidates for Municipal Offices prepared by the MBC showed
that the petitioner obtained a total of 11,866 votes. However, based
on the taras, words and figures stated in all the election returns,
petitioner Alejandro only obtained a total of 11,152 votes while
private respondent Co received a total of 11,401 votes, thereby
making him the rightful winner of the disputed office with the
winning margin of 249 votes. The total, showing the victory of
private respondent Co, allegedly resulted from the correct addition
of the votes received by each of said candidates based on the
election returns from all the 156 precincts of the said municipality.
Private respondent Co asserted that he was the victim of "vote-
padding and vote-shaving," more commonly known as "dagdag-
bawas," committed by the MBC or its tabulators, as clearly shown
by a comparison of the election returns from the precincts
concerned vis-à-vis the statement of votes per precinct and
certificate of canvass.
petitioner Alejandro prayed in his Comment that the petition to
annul his proclamation be denied for being filed out of time. He
alleged that the petition was actually one for correction of manifest
errors and, therefore, should have been filed as a pre-proclamation
controversy.
ACCORDINGLY, the Resolution of the Commission (Second
Division) dated November 23, 2004 directing EO Teresita
Angangan to 1) reconvene the Municipal Board of Canvassers of
Alicia, Isabela for the purpose of correcting the errors committed
in the tallying of votes for the Vice-Mayoralty race in Alicia,
Isabela; and 2) determine and proclaim the rightful winner, is
hereby AFFIRMED.
ISSUE:
The issues to be resolved are whether respondent COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion in: (1) ruling that private
respondent Co’s petition to annul petitioner Alejandro’s
proclamation was timely filed; (2) admitting and considering the
answer filed by Election Officer Angangan, the Chairperson of the
MBC; (3) not conducting a hearing for the examination of the
disputed election documents thereby depriving the petitioner of due
process; and (4) ordering the MBC to reconvene to rectify its errors
and to proclaim the winner in the Vice-Mayoralty race in Alicia,
Isabela.
HELD:
NO.
First Issue: Petitioner Alejandro characterizes private respondent
Co’s petition filed with COMELEC as a "dual-purpose" petition
because it expressly prayed for both the correction of manifest
errors and the declaration of nullity of the petitioner’s
proclamation. This tack was allegedly adopted by private
respondent Co to circumvent the mandatory five-day period to file
a petition to correct manifest errors. Even if the petition was one
for the annulment of his proclamation, it was still allegedly filed
11
out of time since it was filed more than 10 days following the date
of proclamation.
Second Issue: The public and private respondents assert that as
then Chairperson of the MBC, Angangan had no alternative but to
file an answer because she received the summons sent by the
COMELEC. Hence, even on the assumption that her answer was
not that of the MBC, the respondents believe that it still constitutes
evidence of the highest order. For the respondents, Angangan’s
allegations therein are admissions made by a party in the pleadings,
and a responsible officer of the COMELEC.
Third Issue: Despite the admission of private respondent
[petitioner Alejandro herein] that there were indeed errors in the
tallying of votes, pursuant to the ruling by the Supreme Court in
Bince, Jr. v. Comelec, We cannot annul the proclamation of private
respondent without notice and hearing. This requirement will be
satisfied when the Municipal Board of Canvassers convenes and
corrects the errors committed in the original tallying of votes.
Fourth Issue: There is no question that errors were committed
regarding the copying of the results of the elections from the
Election Returns to the Statement of Votes. Both the public and
private respondent admitted that errors were indeed made. They
just differ as to who will be the real winner if these errors are
corrected. According to public respondent, petitioner won; private
respondent maintains he would still have won even if the errors
were corrected.
It is thus imperative that a Municipal Board of Canvasser be
immediately convened to correct with dispatch the errors
committed in the tallying of votes
41. Republic of the Philippines
G.R. No. 94255 May 5, 1992
RICARDO L. MEDALLA, JR., petitioner,
vs.
HON. PATRICIA A. STO. TOMAS, in her capacity as
Chairman of the Civil Service Commission and HON.
EDUARDO O. CARRASCOSO, in his capacity as General
Manager of the Manila International Airport Authority and
ARMANDO F. SINGSON, respondents.
FACTS:
Engr. Ricardo Medalla, petitioner herein, was appointed as a
Geodetic Engineer of the then Manila International Airport
Authority (MIAA for brevity). In 1986, he was promoted to
Supervising Engineer A of its Buildings, Pavements and Grounds
Division, otherwise known as the B P and G Division. On February
16, 1987, Engr. Elpidio Mendoza, the said Decision's Department
Manager, was likewise promoted, thereby leaving his position
vacant. The MIAA Selection/Promotion Board, however, in its
meeting on October 9, 1987, unanimously appointed Medalla as
the new Division Manager B of the B P and G Division. On the
same date, Medalla was issued his formal appointment by the then
MIAA General Manager Aurelio German after which he
immediately assumed his post. Apparently aggrieved over
Medalla's appointment, Singson filed a protest on October 19, 1987
to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) of the Civil Service
Commission. In response thereto, Mr. German affirmed Medalla's
promotional appointment and in effect dismissed Singson's protest.
The latter appealed the decision once more to the MSPB (Annex
"Q-1", Ibid., p. 60) which again referred the same to the MIAA
General Manager for comment. Acting thereon, Mr. Evergisto C.
Macatulad as the Officer-in-Charge, reiterated MIAA's position as
contained in the letter of Mr. German, thus reaffirming Medalla's
appointment. Macatulad added that their office will no longer
submit supplemental comments on the matter. ). The MSPB then
required the submission of the list of positions considered next-in-
rank, the approved organization chart and systems of ranking
positions and the qualification standards for the contested position.
In the meantime, the MIAA underwent a reorganization pursuant to
its Resolutions Nos. 87-55 and 87-68. On December 20, 1988, the
new MIAA General Manager Eduardo Carrascoso sought
clarification on the effectivity of this decision considering that both
Singson and Medalla had already been given their positions based
on the new plantilla.
Singson's appeal to MIAA General Manager Carrascoso asking for
the implementation of the same decision. Medalla filed before the
CSC a motion for reconsideration of the above order (Annex "DD",
Ibid., p. 113) but the motion was denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the act of the Commission through the MSPB in
replacing an appointee with an employee of its choice is valid.
HELD:
NO. The Court has already repeatedly ruled that the Commission
has no such authority to do so. Its only function is limited to
approving or reviewing appointments to determine their
accordance with the requirements of the Civil Service Law. ).
Indeed, the determination of who among several candidates for a
vacant position has the best qualifications is vested in the sound
discretion of the Department Head or appointing authority and not
in the Commission. This is because the appointing authority
occupies the ideal vantage point from which to identify and
designate the individual who can best fill the post and discharge its
functions in the government agency he heads. Consequently, when
the appointing authority has already exercised his power of
appointment, the Commission cannot revoke the same on the
ground that another employee is better qualified for that would
constitute an encroachment on the decision vested in the
appointing authority. In the light of the foregoing doctrines, the
Commission appears to have overstepped its jurisdiction when it
revoked the appointment of petitioner Medalla who was shown to
have satisfied the requirements prescribed for the contested
position, and instead directed the appointment of protestant
Singson. PREMISES CONSIDERED, a) the decision, order and
resolutions appealed from are SET ASIDE and b) Engr. Ricardo
Medalla and Engr. Armando Singson are REINSTATED to the
posts of Division Manager D and Principal Engineer C
respectively, of the Civil Works Division.
G.R. No. L-32271 January 27, 1983
MARCIAL COSTIN, ESTANISLAO LAJER, LIONEL
KANEN as Chief of Police; FRANCISCO TISADO,
OCTAVIO TRAYA as Municipal Mayor; DOMINGO IPONG
as Municipal Treasurer; and THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL
OF ABUYOG, LEYTE, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE LOPE C. QUIMBO, Judge of the Court of
First Instance of Leyte, and HIGINIO VERRA, respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioner Estanislao Lajer was a member of the municipal police
force of Abuyog, Leyte since January 1, 1949. He was extended a
promotional appointment as sergeant of police on October 15,
1958. On November 25, 1959, the outgoing municipal mayor of
Abuyog accorded Lajer another promotional appointment as chief
of police. This last appointment was not attested and approved as
required by law.
On January 14, 1960, the new municipal mayor dismissed Lajer
and eight other members of the police department. On the same
day, the municipal mayor extended to respondent Higinio Verra a
permanent appointment as Chief of Police of Abuyog with a salary
of P2,280.00 per annum. Verra immediately took over the position.
His appointment was eventually approved as permanent under
Section 24 (b) of Republic Act 2260 by the Commissioner of Civil
Service. Lajer and the eight members of the police force filed an
action for mandamus (Civil Case No. 2713) against the municipal
mayor. respondent Verra filed Civil Case No. 3606 for quo
warranto with mandamus against Marcial Costin the municipal
mayor, and the municipal treasurer, questioning the legality of his
separation alleging that he could not be dismissed as chief of police
because he was a civil service eligible and in possession of an
appointment to the position of chief of police of Abuyog, Leyte
duly attested "Permanent" by the Civil Service Commission,
respondent Verra amended his petition, impleading Lajer as
additional respondent therein. Respondent judge rendered his,
12
declaring that Verra is entitled to reinstatement with salary to be
paid to him for the Whole period of his illegal separation to the
date of his reinstatement. The court also ordered the municipal
mayor to reinstate Verra immediately and the municipal treasurer
to pay his salary. This decision is now before us for review.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the appointment of respondent Higinio Verra to
the position of Chief of Police of Abuyog, Leyte, was valid and
consequently his removal therefrom illegal.
2. Whether the Court of Appeals in its decision in C.A.-G.R. No.
29313-R (Civil Case No. 2713-CFI, Leyte) ordered the
reinstatement of petitioner Lajer to the position of Sergeant of
Police or Chief of Police.
3. Whether or not respondent Verra is bound by the decision of the
lower court in Case No. 2713-CFI, Leyte, for mandamus, not being
a party to it.
HELD:
With respect to the first issue, respondent Verra, contends that the
office in question was legally vacant when he was appointed
thereto because Lajers appointment was never attested as required
by law or incomplete, and, therefore, never became effective. It is
further contended that Lajers appointment as chief of police was
temporary in character and terminable at the pleasure of the
appointing authority and when Lajer was separated from the office
of chief of police, the position became legally and physically
vacant. Verra also claims that since he is a civil service eligible and
his appointment as chief of police was attested as permanent under
Section 20 of Republic Act 2260 and served as such for four (4)
years and two (2) days when he was dismissed without cause, his
dismissal is illegal. 2. Mr. Lajer did not go to court to contest the
position of police sergeant or to question his removal as police
sergeant, He was never removed from a position as sergeant of
police, Lajer filed a petition for mandamus to be reinstated as chief
of police. The January 30, 1961 decision of Judge S. C. Moscoso
of tile Court of First Instance of Leyte discusses an appointment as
chief of police. When the decision ordering Lajers reinstatement,
was appealed to the Court of Appeals, the appellate court
specifically described petitioner Lajer as chief of police and
petitioner Mariano Tomines as police sergeant. When Lajer and
Tontines were ordered reinstated, it was to the said positions as
chief of police and police sergeant respectively. 3. Municipal
council, Municipal Treasurer, and the Municipality of Abuyog,
Leyte illegally terminated the chief of police. sergeant of police,
and six other members of the, police force from their respective
offices and whether or lot mandamus may issue to compel their
reinstatement. mandamus having issued, any person whether Mr.
Higinio Verra or any other appointee to the contested position must
give up the office in favor of the officer adjudged by the courts to
be entitled to it.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby granted. The decision
of the respondent court in Civil Case No. 3606 is reversed and set
aside and the petition for quo warranto with mandamus filed in the
court a quo is ordered dismissed.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 86439 April 13, 1989
MARY CONCEPCION BAUTISTA, petitioner,
vs.
SENATOR JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON
APPOINTMENTS COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE, JUDICIAL
AND BAR COUNCIL AND HUMAN RIGHTS AND
HESIQUIO R. MALLILLIN, respondents.
FACTS:
On 27 August 1987, the President of the Philippines designated
herein petitioner Mary Concepcion Bautista as "Acting Chairman,
Commission on Human Rights."
It is to be noted that by virtue of such appointment, petitioner
Bautista was advised by the President that she could qualify and
enter upon the performance of the duties of the office of Chairman
of the Commission on Human Rights, requiring her to furnish the
office of the President and the Civil Service Commission with
copies of her oath of office. On 9 January 1989, petitioner Bautista
received a letter from the Secretary of the Commission on
Appointments requesting her to submit to the Commission certain
information and documents as required by its rules in connection
with the confirmation of her appointment as Chairman of the
Commission on Human Rights, petitioner Bautista wrote to the
Chairman of the Commission on Appointments stating, for the
reasons therein given, why she considered the Commission on
Appointments as having no jurisdiction to review her appointment
as Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights.
ISSUE:
whether the President, subsequent to her act of 17 December 1988,
and after petitioner Bautista had qualified for the office to which
she had been appointed called for confirmation by the Commission
on Appointments.
HELD:
YES. It is to the credit of the President that, in deference to the rule
of law, after petitioner Bautista had elevated her case to this
Tribunal, Her Excellency merely designated an Acting Chairman
for the Commission on Human Rights (pending decision in this
case) instead of appointing another permanent Chairman. The latter
course would have added only more legal difficulties to an already
difficult situation.
Petitioner Bautista is declared to be, as she is, the duly appointed
Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights and the lawful
incumbent thereof, entitled to all the benefits, privileges and
emoluments of said office. The temporary restraining order
heretofore issued by the Court against respondent Mallillin
enjoining him from dismissing or terminating personnel of the
Commission on Human Rights is made permanent. This refers to
the ad interim appointment which Her Excellency extended to
Atty. Mary Concepcion Bautista on 14 January 1989 as
Chairperson of the Commission on Human Rights.
The Court, with all due respect to both the Executive and
Legislative Departments of government, and after careful
deliberation, is constrained to hold and rule in the negative. When
Her Excellency, the President converted petitioner Bautista's
designation as Acting Chairman to a permanent appointment as
Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights on 17 December
1988, significantly she advised Bautista (in the same appointment
letter) that, by virtue of such appointment, she could qualify and
enter upon the performance of the duties of the office (of Chairman
of the Commission on Human Rights). All that remained for
Bautista to do was to reject or accept the appointment. Obviously,
she accepted the appointment by taking her oath of office before
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Hon. Marcelo B. Fernan
and assuming immediately thereafter the functions and duties of
the Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights. Bautista's
appointment therefore on 17 December 1988 as Chairman of the
Commission on Human Rights was a completed act on the part of
the President.
G.R. No. 88498 June 9, 1992
GENEROSO R. SEVILLA, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and NERITO L. SANTOS,
respondents.
FACTS:
The petitioner has been in the government service since 1949. His
last appointment was last Assistant City Engineer of Palayan City
which he discharged until he was designated Acting City Engineer
of Cabanatuan City by President Ferdinand E. Marcos on May 2,
1981. He unhesitatingly assumed the latter position and discharged
its functions and responsibilities until "People Power" and the
EDSA Revolution intervened. On August 18, 1986, the then
Officer-in charge (OIC Mayor) of Cabanatuan City, Cesar Vergara,
appointed defendant-appellant Santos as city engineer of
Cabanatuan City, and on August 28, 1986, defendant-appellant
Santos assumed the position of city engineer. On that very same
day, a memorandum informing petitioner-appellee Sevilla of the
13
appointment of defendant-appellant Santos was sent by then OIC
Mayor. As petitioner-appellee Sevilla was on leave at the time, the
memorandum was received on his behalf by Anita de Guzman, the
administrative officer of the Department of Public Works and
Highways (DPWH) Office of Cabanatuan City, where petitioner-
appellee Sevilla also holds office. Petitioner-appellee then returned
to Cabanatuan City. On March 27, 1987, he filed a petition for quo
warranto against defendant-appellant Santos. On January 29, 1988,
the lower rendered the impugned decision reinstating petitioner-
appellee Sevilla and entitling him payment of vacation and sick
leaves for the duration of his absence.
On August 18, 1986, the OIC Mayor of Cabanatuan City, Cesar
Vergara, appointed Nerito L. Santos as the new city engineer of
Cabanatuan City. Santos assumed the position on August 28 1986.
On the same day, a memorandum was addressed to Sevilla
informing him of Santos' appointment as city engineer of
Cabanatuan City. Anita de Guzman, administrative officer of the
Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) unit in
Cabanatuan City received the notice for Sevilla who was on leave
on that time. Sevilla filed a petition for quo warranto against
Santos, the lower court rendered a decision reinstating Sevilla as
acting City Engineer of Cabanatuan City with right to payment of
vacation and sick leaves for the duration of his absence.
Santos appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals. In a decision
dated May 31, 1989 (pp. 53-57, Rollo), the Court of Appeals set
aside the lower court's decision and entered a new one, dismissing
the petition for quo warranto. The Court of Appeals held that by
accepting another office. Sevilla in effect voluntarily surrendered
his former office, and was thereby precluded from maintaining a
quo warranto action against Santos. When he accepted the position
in Pasay City, he lost his right to the position in Cabanatuan City
ISSUE:
Whether an officer who was appointed to an office in an "acting"
capacity, bring a quo warranto action against the permanent
appointee to the position?
HELD:
An "acting" appointment is merely temporary, one which is good
only until another appointment is made to take its place. Hence,
petitioner's right to hold office as "Acting City Engineer of
Cabanatuan City" was merely temporary. It lapsed upon the
appointment of Nerito Santos as the permanent city engineer of
Cabanatuan City on August 18, 1986.
Petitioner was the incumbent city engineer of Palayan City when
he was designated as Acting City Engineering of Cabanatuan City.
There is a difference between an appointment an appointment and
a designation. Appointment is the selection by the proper authority
of an individual who is to exercise the functions of an office.
Designation, on the other hand, connotes merely the imposition of
additional duties, upon a person already in the public service by
virtue of an earlier appointment or election. the Court of Appeals
committed no reversible error in dismissing petitioner's action for
quo warranto. Petitioner's ouster upon, and by virtue of, Santos'
appointment as City Engineer of Cabanatuan City, was not illegal
for the petitioner's right to discharge the functions of Acting City
Engineer of Cabanatuan City was extinguished when a permanent
appointment to the same office was made in favor of the private
respondent, Engineer Nerito L. Santos.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED. The decision
of the Court of Appeals dismissing petitioner's action for quo
warranto is AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
G.R. No. L-52245 January 22, 1980
PATRICIO DUMLAO, ROMEO B. IGOT, and ALFREDO
SALAPANTAN, JR., petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
FACTS:
The Petition alleges that petitioner, Patricio Dumlao, is a former
Governor of Nueva Vizcaya, who has filed his certificate of
candidacy for said position of Governor in the forthcoming
elections of January 30, 1980. Petitioner, Romeo B. Igot, is a
taxpayer, a qualified voter and a member of the Bar who, as such,
has taken his oath to support the Constitution and obey the laws of
the land. Petitioner, Alfredo Salapantan, Jr., is also a taxpayer, a
qualified voter, and a resident of San Miguel, Iloilo.
Petitioner Dumlao specifically questions the constitutionality of
section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 as discriminatory and
contrary to the equal protection and due process guarantees of the
Constitution. Petitioner Dumlao alleges that the aforecited
provision is directed insidiously against him, and that the
classification provided therein is based on "purely arbitrary
grounds and, therefore, class legislation."
.... (Batas Pambansa Blg. 51) Sec. 4.
Any person who has committed any act of disloyalty to the State,
including acts amounting to subversion, insurrection, rebellion or
other similar crimes, shall not be qualified to be a candidate for any
of the offices covered by this Act, or to participate in any partisan
political activity therein
ISSUE:
Whether section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 is constitutional.
HELD:
In the case of petitioners Igot and Salapantan, it was only during
the hearing, not in their Petition, that Igot is said to be a candidate
for Councilor. Even then, it cannot be denied that neither one has
been convicted nor charged with acts of disloyalty to the State, nor
disqualified from being candidates for local elective positions.
Neither one of them has been calle ed to have been adversely
affected by the operation of the statutory provisions they assail as
unconstitutional Theirs is a generated grievance. They have no
personal nor substantial interest at stake. In the absence of any
litigate interest, they can claim no locus standi in seeking judicial
redress.
Petitioner Dumlao's contention that section 4 of BP Blg. 52 is
discriminatory against him personally is belied by the fact that
several petitions for the disqualification of other candidates for
local positions based on the challenged provision have already
been filed with the COMELEC. This tellingly overthrows
Dumlao's contention of intentional or purposeful discrimination.
Being infected with constitutional infirmity, a partial declaration of
nullity of only that objectionable portion is mandated. It is
separable from the first portion of the second paragraph of section
4 of Batas Pambansa Big. 52 which can stand by itself.
WHEREFORE, 1) the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas
pambansa Bilang 52 is hereby declared valid. Said paragraph
reads:
SEC. 4. Special disqualification. — In addition to violation of
Section 10 of Article XII(C) of the Constitution and
disqualifications mentioned in existing laws which are hereby
declared as disqualification for any of the elective officials
enumerated in Section 1 hereof, any retired elective provincial, city
or municipal official, who has received payment of the retirement
benefits to which he is entitled under the law and who shall have
been 65 years of age at the commencement of the term of office to
which he seeks to be elected, shall not be qualified to run for the
same elective local office from which he has retired.
G.R. No. L-3913 August 7, 1952
EULOGIO RODRIGUEZ, SR., plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
CARLOS TAN, defendant-appellee
FACTS:
Plaintiff seeks to collect from the defendant the aggregate sum of
P18,400 as salaries and allowances and the sum of P35,524.55 as
damages, upon the plea that the latter usurped the office of Senator
of the Philippines which rightfully belongs to the former from
December 30, 1947, to December 27, 1949.
Plaintiff claims that on December 30, 1947, defendant usurped the
office of Senator of the Philippines, and from that date until
December 1949, he continously collected the salaries, emoluments
and privileges attendant to that office amounting to P18,400; that
protest having been filed by plaintiff against defendant, the Senate
Electoral Tribunal on December 16, 1949, rendered judgment
14
declaring plaintiff to have been duly elected to the office; and that
by reason of such usurpation, plaintiff suffered damages in the
amount of P35,524.55 for expenses he incurred in prosecuting the
protest, defendant filed a motion to dismiss alleging, on one hand,
that the judgment rendered by the Senate Electoral Tribunal in the
protest case is a bar to this action under the principle of res
judicata, and, on the other, that said Tribunal denied without any
reservation the claim of the plaintiff for expenses incurred in
prosecuting the protest. The issue having been thus joined upon the
motion to dismiss, the Court entered on an order dismissing the
complaint with costs.
ISSUE:
The issue having been thus joined upon the motion to dismiss, the
Court entered on an order dismissing the complaint with costs.
HELD:
After a careful consideration of the issue in the light of the law and
precedents obtaining in this jurisdiction, we are inclined to uphold
the point of view of the defendant. There is no question that the
defendant acted as a de facto officer during the time he held the
office of Senator. He was one of the candidates of the Liberal Party
in the elections of November 11, 1947, and was proclaimed as one
of those who had been elected by the Commission on Elections,
and thereafter he took the oath of office and immediately entered
into the performance of the duties of the position. Having been thus
duly proclaimed as Senator and having assumed office as required
by law, it cannot be disputed that defendant is entitled to the
compensation, emoluments and allowances which our Constitution
provides for the position (article VI, section 14). This is as it
should be. This is in keeping with the ordinary course of events.
This is simple justice. The emolument must go to the person who
rendered service unless the contrary is provided. There is no
averment in the complaint that he is linked with any irregularity
vitiating his election. This is the policy and the rule that has been
followed consistently in this jurisdiction in connection with the
provisions held by persons who had been elected thereto but were
later ousted as a result of an election protest. The right of the
persons elected to compensation during their incumbency has
always been recognized. We cannot recall of any precedent
wherein the contrary rule has been upheld.
Another reason that may be involved in opposition to the claim of
the plaintiff is the principle of res judicata. It appears that plaintiff
had already set up this claim in the protest he filed against the
defendant before the Senate Electoral Tribunal, but when the case
was decided on the merits the Tribunal passed up this matter sub
silentio. In our opinion, this silence may be interpreted as a denial
of the relief. This is a matter which can be considered as an
incident to the power and authority given to the Electoral Tribunal
by our Constitution, whose jurisdiction over election cases is ample
and unlimited and when the Tribunal chose to pass sub silentio, or
ignore altogether, this important claim, the clear implication is that
it deemed it unjustified.