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Parties Facts Issue/S SC Ruling Province of Abra: Digested Tax Cases Part Iii Dennisaranabriljdii 1
Parties Facts Issue/S SC Ruling Province of Abra: Digested Tax Cases Part Iii Dennisaranabriljdii 1
Petitioner: First, there was a denial of a motion to dismiss an WON the Province of No, there was no due process. Petitioner Province of Abra is therefore fully justified in invoking the
Province of Abra action for declaratory relief by private respondent Abra was given due protection of procedural due process. If there is any case where proof is necessary to demonstrate
Roman Catholic Bishop of Bangued desirous of process. that there is compliance with the constitutional provision that allows an exemption, this is it.
Respondent: being exempted from a real estate tax followed by Instead, respondent Judge accepted at its face the allegation of private respondent. All that was
Hon. Judge a summary judgment granting such exemption, alleged in the petition for declaratory relief filed by private respondents, after mentioning certain
Hernando without even hearing the side of petitioner. parcels of land owned by it, are that they are used "actually, directly and exclusively" as sources of
support of the parish priest and his helpers and also of private respondent Bishop. In the motion to
There being a tax assessment made by the dismiss filed on behalf of petitioner Province of Abra, the objection was based primarily on the lack
Provincial Assessor on the properties of of jurisdiction, as the validity of a tax assessment may be questioned before the Local Board of
respondent Roman Catholic Bishop, petitioner Assessment Appeals and not with a court. There was also mention of a lack of a cause of action, but
failed to exhaust the administrative remedies only because, in its view, declaratory relief is not proper, as there had been breach or violation of
available under Presidential Decree No. 464 the right of government to assess and collect taxes on such property. It clearly appears, therefore,
before filing such court action. Further, it was that in failing to accord a hearing to petitioner Province of Abra and deciding the case immediately
pointed out to respondent Judge that he failed to in favor of private respondent, respondent Judge failed to abide by the constitutional command of
abide by the pertinent provision of such procedural due process.
Presidential Decree which provides as follows:
"No court shall entertain any suit assailing the The Court ordered to hear the case first.
validity of a tax assessed under this Code until the
taxpayer, shall have paid, under protest, the tax NOTA BENE: Under the 1935 Constitution: "Cemeteries, churches, and parsonages or convents
assessed against him nor shall any court declare appurtenant thereto, and all lands, buildings, and improvements used exclusively for religious,
any tax invalid by reason of irregularities or charitable, or educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation." The present Constitution added
informalities in the proceedings of the officers "charitable institutions, mosques, and non-profit cemeteries" and required that for the exemption
charged with the assessment or collection of of ":lands, buildings, and improvements," they should not only be "exclusively" but also "actually
taxes, or of failure to perform their duties within and "directly" used for religious or charitable purposes. Reliance on past decisions would have
this time herein specified for their performance sufficed were the words "actually" as well as "directly" not added. There must be proof therefore of
unless such irregularities, informalities or failure the actual and direct use of the lands, buildings, and improvements for religious or charitable
shall have impaired the substantial rights of the purposes to be exempt from taxation.
taxpayer; nor shall any court declare any portion It has been the constant and uniform holding that exemption from taxation is not favored and is
of the tax assessed under the provisions of this never presumed, so that if granted it must be strictly construed against the taxpayer. Affirmatively
Code invalid except upon condition that the put, the law frowns on exemption from taxation, hence, an exempting provision should be
taxpayer shall pay the just amount of the tax, as construed strictissimi juris."
determined by the court in the pending
proceeding."
CMO 27-2003 further provided for the proper Unfortunately, CMO 27-2003 does not meet these requirements. We do not see how the quality of
procedure for protest or Valuation and wheat is affected by who imports it, where it is discharged, or which country it came from.
Classification Review Committee (VCRC) cases.
Under this procedure, the release of the articles Thus, on the one hand, even if other millers excluded from CMO 27-2003 have imported food
that were the subject of protest required the grade wheat, the product would still be declared as feed grade wheat, a classification subjecting
importer to post a cash bond to cover the tariff them to 7% tariff. On the other hand, even if the importers listed under CMO 27-2003 have
differential. imported feed grade wheat, they would only be made to pay 3% tariff, thus depriving the state of
the taxes due. The regulation, therefore, does not become disadvantageous to respondent only, but
A month after the issuance of CMO 27-2003, on even to the state.
19 December 2003, respondent filed a Petition
for Declaratory Relief with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Las Piñas City. It anticipated the
implementation of the regulation on its imported
and perishable Chinese milling wheat in transit
from China.
Defendants’ Arguments:
a. The tax ordinance was within the city’s
power to enact under the Local
Autonomy Act
b. The ordinance did not violate the said
constitutional limitations
RA 5431 amended sec. 24 of Tax Code by making liable for income tax all corporate taxpayers Republic Act No. 5431, in amending section 24 of the Tax
not specifically exempt under par (c) (1) of said section and section 27 of the Tax Code Code by subjecting to income tax all corporate taxpayers
notwithstanding the “provisions of existing special or general laws to the contrary.” Thus, not expressly exempted therein and in section 27 of the
Cagayan Electric and other subject companies were subjected to income tax in addition to Code, had the effect of withdrawing petitioner's exemption
franchise tax. from income tax.
CagElec’s Arguments:
a. Its franchise tax is a commutative tax which already includes the income tax
b. RA 5431 as amended did not amend, alter or repeal its franchise
c. Its franchise is not a contract which can be impaired by an implied repeal
d. Sec 24(d) of the Tax Code should be construed strictly against the Govt.
It is contended however that the fact that the license tax can suppress or control this activity is
unimportant if it does not do so. But that is to disregard the nature of this tax. It is a license tax — a
flat tax imposed on the exercise of a privilege granted by the Bill of Rights . . . The power to impose a
license tax on the exercise of these freedom is indeed as potent as the power of censorship which this
Court has repeatedly struck down. . . . It is not a nominal fee imposed as a regulatory measure to
defray the expenses of policing the activities in question. It is in no way apportioned. It is flat license
tax levied and collected as a condition to the pursuit of activities whose enjoyment is guaranteed by
the constitutional liberties of press and religion and inevitably tends to suppress their exercise. That
is almost uniformly recognized as the inherent vice and evil of this flat license tax."
Section 27 of Commonwealth Act No. 466, otherwise known as the National Internal Revenue Code,
provides:
Appellant's counsel claims that the Collector of Internal Revenue has exempted the plaintiff from this
tax and says that such exemption clearly indicates that the act of distributing and selling bibles, etc. is
purely religious and does not fall under the above legal provisions.
It may be true that in the case at bar the price asked for the bibles and other religious pamphlets was
in some instances a little bit higher than the actual cost of the same but this cannot mean that
appellant was engaged in the business or occupation of selling said "merchandise" for profit. For this
reason We believe that the provisions of City of Manila Ordinance No. 2529, as amended, cannot be
With respect to Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, which requires the obtention the Mayor's permit
before any person can engage in any of the businesses, trades or occupations enumerated therein,
We do not find that it imposes any charge upon the enjoyment of a right granted by the Constitution,
nor tax the exercise of religious practices.
It seems clear, therefore, that Ordinance No. 3000 cannot be considered unconstitutional, even if
applied to plaintiff Society. But as Ordinance No. 2529 of the City of Manila, as amended, is not
applicable to plaintiff-appellant and defendant-appellee is powerless to license or tax the business of
plaintiff Society involved herein for, as stated before, it would impair plaintiff's right to the free
exercise and enjoyment of its religious profession and worship, as well as its rights of dissemination
of religious beliefs, We find that Ordinance No. 3000, as amended is also inapplicable to said
business, trade or occupation of the plaintiff.
By a 9-6 vote, the Supreme Court rejected the challenge, holding that such consolidation was
consistent with the power of the Senate to propose or concur with amendments to the version
originated in the HoR. What the Constitution simply means, according to the 9 justices, is that the
initiative must come from the HoR. Note also that there were several instances before where
Senate passed its own version rather than having the HoR version as far as revenue and other
such bills are concerned. This practice of amendment by substitution has always been accepted.
The proposition of Tolentino concerns a mere matter of form. There is no showing that it would
make a significant difference if Senate were to adopt his over what has been done.
Accordingly, we hold that the portions of the land leased to private entities as well as those
parts of the hospital leased to private individuals are not exempt from such taxes. [45] On the other
hand, the portions of the land occupied by the hospital and portions of the hospital used for its
patients, whether paying or non-paying, are exempt from real property taxes.