CASES re BAIL

US v PURGANAN
Brief Facts:

Case is about a Petitionfor Extradition filed by the US against Mark Jimenez for crimes
allegedly committed in the US soil. Upon learning for the request for his extradition, he sought and
was granted a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO).The TRO prohibited the Department of Justice
(DOJ) from filing with the RTC a petition for his extradition. Respondent Jimenez also filed an
"Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion," which prayed that petitioner’s application for an arrest
warrant be set for hearing. Jimenez sought an alternative prayer: that in case a warrant should
issue, he be allowed to post bail in the amount of P100,000.

Issues/Ruling:
In extradition proceedings, are prospective extraditees entitled to notice and hearing before
warrants for their arrest can be issued? – NO. Extraditionlaw as well as the Constitution do not
require for the notice and hearing before the issuance of the warrant of arrest. Extradition Law
provides that arrest should be made “immediately” if there’s a prima facie existence of probable
cause from the Petition and the supporting document submitted by the requesting state.
Moreover, in the Constitution (Art 3, Sec 2) what is required is that the "judge must have sufficient
supporting documents upon which to make his independent judgment, or at the very least, upon
which to verify the findings of the prosecutor as to the existence of probable cause.
Equally important, are they entitled to the right to bail and provisional liberty while the extradition
proceedings are pending? – NO. Extradition is different from Ordinary Criminal Proceedings. The
right to bail stated in the Constitution as well as in the Rules of Court does not apply to extradition
proceedings, because extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal. He
should apply for bail before the courts trying the criminal cases against him, not before the
extradition court.
Moreover, there was no Violation of Due Process. In the present case, respondent will be given
full opportunity to be heard subsequently, when the extradition court hears the Petition for
Extradition. Hence, there is no violation of his right to due process and fundamental fairness.

Exceptions to the No Bail Rule

The rule, we repeat, is that bail is not a matter of right in extradition cases. However, the judiciary
has the constitutional duty to curb grave abuse of discretion and tyranny, as well as the power to
promulgate rules to protect and enforce constitutional rights. Accordingly and to best serve the
ends of justice, we believe and so hold that, after a potential extraditee has been arrested or
placed under the custody of the law, bail may be applied for and granted as an exception, only
upon a clear and convincing showing

(1) that, once granted bail, the applicant will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and

(2) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances including, as a matter of
reciprocity, those cited by the highest court in the requesting state when it grants provisional
liberty in extradition cases therein.

Five Postulates of Extradition (Just FYI)

1. Extradition Is a Major Instrument for the Suppression of Crime

2. The Requesting State Will Accord Due Process to the Accused
3. The Proceedings Are Sui Generis
4. Compliance Shall Be in Good Faith
5. There Is an Underlying Risk of Flight

Summation

As we draw to a close, it is now time to summarize and stress these ten points:
1. The ultimate purpose of extradition proceedings is to determine whether the request
expressed in the petition, supported by its annexes and the evidence that may be adduced
during the hearing of the petition, complies with the Extradition Treaty and Law; and
whether the person sought is extraditable. The proceedings are intended merely to assist
the requesting state in bringing the accused -- or the fugitive who has illegally escaped --
back to its territory, so that the criminal process may proceed therein.
2. By entering into an extradition treaty, the Philippines is deemed to have reposed its trust
in the reliability or soundness of the legal and judicial system of its treaty partner, as well
as in the ability and the willingness of the latter to grant basic rights to the accused in the
pending criminal case therein.
3. By nature then, extradition proceedings are not equivalent to a criminal case in which guilt
or innocence is determined. Consequently, an extradition case is not one in which the
constitutional rights of the accused are necessarily available. It is more akin, if at all, to a
court’s request to police authorities for the arrest of the accused who is at large or has
escaped detention or jumped bail. Having once escaped the jurisdiction of the requesting
state, the reasonable prima facie presumption is that the person would escape again if
given the opportunity.
4. Immediately upon receipt of the petition for extradition and its supporting documents, the
judge shall make a prima facie finding whether the petition is sufficient in form and
substance, whether it complies with the Extradition Treaty and Law, and whether the
person sought is extraditable. The magistrate has discretion to require the petitioner to
submit further documentation, or to personally examine the affiants or witnesses. If
convinced that a prima facie case exists, the judge immediately issues a warrant for the
 arrest of the potential extraditee and summons him or her to answer and to appear at
scheduled hearings on the petition.
5. After being taken into custody, potential extraditees may apply for bail. Since the
applicants have a history of absconding, they have the burden of showing that (a) there is
no flight risk and no danger to the community; and (b) there exist special, humanitarian or
compelling circumstances. The grounds used by the highest court in the requesting state
for the grant of bail therein may be considered, under the principle of reciprocity as a
special circumstance. In extradition cases, bail is not a matter of right; it is subject to judicial
discretion in the context of the peculiar facts of each case.
6. Potential extraditees are entitled to the rights to due process and to fundamental fairness.
Due process does not always call for a prior opportunity to be heard. A subsequent
opportunity is sufficient due to the flight risk involved. Indeed, available during the
hearings on the petition and the answer is the full chance to be heard and to enjoy
fundamental fairness that is compatible with the summary nature of extradition.
7. This Court will always remain a protector of human rights, a bastion of liberty, a bulwark
of democracy and the conscience of society. But it is also well aware of the limitations of
its authority and of the need for respect for the prerogatives of the other co-equal and co-
independent organs of government.
8. We realize that extradition is essentially an executive, not a judicial, responsibility arising
out of the presidential power to conduct foreign relations and to implement treaties. Thus,
the Executive Department of government has broad discretion in its duty and power of
implementation.
9. On the other hand, courts merely perform oversight functions and exercise review
authority to prevent or excise grave abuse and tyranny. They should not allow contortions,
delays and "over-due process" every little step of the way, lest these summary extradition
proceedings become not only inutile but also sources of international embarrassment due
to our inability to comply in good faith with a treaty partner’s simple request to return a
fugitive. Worse, our country should not be converted into a dubious haven where fugitives
and escapees can unreasonably delay, mummify, mock, frustrate, checkmate and defeat
the quest for bilateral justice and international cooperation.
10. At bottom, extradition proceedings should be conducted with all deliberate speed to
determine compliance with the Extradition Treaty and Law; and, while safeguarding basic
individual rights, to avoid the legalistic contortions, delays and technicalities that may
negate that purpose.

GOVERNMENT OF HONGKONG v OLALIA

Brief Facts:
The Gov’t of Hongkong filed a Petition for Extradition against Juan Antonio Munoz for allegedly
committing crimes in Hongkong soil. The Hong Kong Department of Justice a request for the
provisional arrest of Munoz which was granted by the RTC of Manila. Munoz filed, in the same
case,- a petition for bail which was granted by Judge Olalia.
Issues/Ruling:

Does a potential extraditee have the right to bail? - YES. The SC ruled that he has the right to bail.
While this Court in Purganan limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings,
however, in light of the various international treaties giving recognition and protection to human
rights, particularly the right to life and liberty, a reexamination of this Court’s ruling in Purganan is
in order.

First, we note that the exercise of the State’s power to deprive an individual of his liberty
is not necessarily limited to criminal proceedings. Respondents in administrative
proceedings, such as deportation and quarantine,4 have likewise been detained.

Second, to limit bail to criminal proceedings would be to close our eyes to our
jurisprudential history. Philippine jurisprudence has not limited the exercise of the right to
bail to criminal proceedings only. This Court has admitted to bail persons who are not
involved in criminal proceedings. In fact, bail has been allowed in this jurisdiction to
persons in detention during the pendency of administrative proceedings, taking into
cognizance the obligation of the Philippines under international conventions to uphold
human rights.

Records show that private respondent was arrested on September 23, 1999, and remained
incarcerated until December 20, 2001, when the trial court ordered his admission to bail. In other
words, he had been detained for over two (2) years without having been convicted of any crime. By
any standard, such an extended period of detention is a serious deprivation of his fundamental
right to liberty. In fact, it was this prolonged deprivation of liberty which prompted the extradition
court to grant him bail.

In his Separate Opinion in Purganan, then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno,
proposed that a new standard which he termed "clear and convincing evidence" should be used in
granting bail in extradition cases. According to him, this standard should be lower than proof
beyond reasonable doubt but higher than preponderance of evidence. The potential extraditee
must prove by "clear and convincing evidence" that he is not a flight risk and will abide with all the
orders and processes of the extradition court.

In this case, there is no showing that private respondent presented evidence to show that he is
not a flight risk. Consequently, this case should be remanded to the trial court to determine
whether private respondent may be granted bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence."

Paderanga v CA
Brief Facts:
Petitioner was belatedly charged in an amended information as a co-conspirator in the crime of
multiple murder for the killing of members of the Bucag. Petitioner was the mayor at the time.
As petitioner was then confined at the Cagayan Capitol College General Hospital due to "acute
costochondritis," his counsel manifested that they were submitting custody over the person of
their client to the local chapter president of the integrated Bar of the Philippines and that, for
purposes of said hearing of his bail application, he considered being in the custody of the law.
Prosecutor Abejo, on the other hand, informed the trial court that in accordance with the directive
of the chief of their office, Regional State prosecutor Jesus Zozobrado, the prosecution was neither
supporting nor opposing the application for bail and that they were submitting the same to the
sound discretion of the trail judge.
Prosecutor Gingoyon elevated the matter to respondent Court of Appeals through a special civil
action for certiorari. Respondent court observed in its decision that at the time of petitioner's
application for bail, he was not yet "in the custody of the law,".
Issues/Ruling:

Does the petitioner be considered under the custody of the law and thus have the right to file a bail?
– YES. He was under the constructive custody of the law and thus the application and the grant for
bail by the RTC was valid. In the case of herein petitioner, it may be conceded that he had indeed
filed his motion for admission to bail before he was actually and physically placed under arrest. He
may, however, at that point and in the factual ambience therefore, be considered as being
constructively and legally under custody. Thus in the likewise peculiar circumstance which
attended the filing of his bail application with the trail court, for purposes of the hearing thereof
he should be deemed to have voluntarily submitted his person to the custody of the law and,
necessarily, to the jurisdiction of the trial court which thereafter granted bail as prayed for. In fact,
an arrest is made either by actual restraint of the arrestee or merely by his submission to the
custody of the person making the arrest. The latter mode may be exemplified by the so-called
"house arrest" or, in case of military offenders, by being "confined to quarters" or restricted to the
military camp area.

The undeniable fact is that petitioner was by then in the constructive custody of the law.
Apparently, both the trial court and the prosecutors agreed on that point since they never
attempted to have him physically restrained. Through his lawyers, he expressly submitted to
physical and legal control over his person, firstly, by filing the application for bail with the trail
court; secondly, by furnishing true information of his actual whereabouts; and, more importantly,
by unequivocally recognizing the jurisdiction of the said court. Moreover, when it came to his
knowledge that a warrant for his arrest had been issued, petitioner never made any attempt or
evinced any intent to evade the clutches of the law or concealed his whereabouts from the
authorities since the day he was charged in court, up to the submission application for bail, and
until the day of the hearing thereof.

ALMEDA v VILLALUZ
Brief Facts:
Petitioner Leonardo Almeda was charged with the crime of qualified theft of a motor vehicle.
The amount of the bond recommended for the provisional release of Almeda was P15,000, and
this was approved by the respondent judge with a direction that it be posted entirely in cash.
Almeda asked the trial court to allow him to post a surety bond in lieu of the cash bond required
of him. This request was denied.

Issues/Ruling:

Whether the respondent judge has the authority to require a strictly cash bond and disallow
the petitioner's attempt to post a surety bond for his provisional liberty? – NO. The trial court may
not reject otherwise acceptable sureties and insist that the accused obtain his provisional liberty
only thru a cash bond.

In this jurisdiction, the accused, as of right, is entitled to bail prior to conviction except
when he is charged with a capital offense and the evidence of guilt is strong. This right is
guaranteed by the Constitution,2 and may not be denied even where the accused has previously
escaped detention,3 or by reason of his prior absconding.4 In order to safeguard the right of an
accused to bail, the Constitution further provides that "excessive bail shall not be required." This
is logical cause the imposition of an unreasonable bail may negate the very right itself. We have
thus held that "where conditions imposed upon a defendant seeking bail would amount to a
refusal thereof and render nugatory the constitutional right to bail, we would not hesitate to
exercise our supervisory powers to provide the required remedy."

Coming to the issue at hand, the amount fixed for bail, while reasonable if considered in
terms of surety or property bonds, may be excessive if demanded in the form of cash. A surety or
property bond does not require an actual financial outlay on the part of the bondsman or the
property owner, and in the case of the bondsman the bond may be obtained by the accused upon
the payment of a relatively small premium. The posting of a cash bond would entail a transfer of
assets into the possession of the court, and its procurement could work untold hardship on the
part of the accused as to have the effect of altogether denying him his constitutional right to bail.

Whether the amendment to the information, after a plea of not guilty thereto, was properly allowed
in both substance and procedure? – YES. the amendment of the information to include allegations
of habitual delinquency and recidivism, after a previous plea thereto by the accused, is valid and
in no way violates his right to be fully apprised before trial of the charges against him.

Under section 13 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, the trial court has discretion to allow
amendments to the information on all matters of form after the defendant has pleaded and during
the trial when the same can be done without prejudice to the rights of the defendant. What are
prohibited at this stage of the proceedings are amendments in substance. And the substantial
matter in a complaint or information is the recital of facts constituting the offense charged and
determinative of the jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are merely of form.
The additional allegations of habitual delinquency and recidivism do not have the effect of
charging another offense different or distinct from the charge of qualified theft (of a motor
vehicle) contained in the information.

HARVEY v SANTIAGO
Brief Facts:
The 3 petitioners were among those 22 alien pedophiles who were apprehended. 17 of them
opted for self-deportation and the other 2 were released for lack of evidence. Thus, only 3 of them
have chosen to face deportation.
Deportation proceedings were instituted and warrants of arrest were issued.
petitioner Andrew Harvey filed a Manifestation/Motion stating that he had "finally agreed to a
self-deportation" and praying that he be "provisionally released for at least 15 days and placed
under the custody of Atty. Asinas before he voluntarily departs the country." The Board of Special
Inquiry — III allowed provisional release of five (5) days only under certain conditions. However, it
appears that on the same date that the aforesaid Manifestation/ Motion was filed, Harvey and his
co-petitioners had already filed the present petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.
Petitioners question the validity of their detention.
Issues/Ruling:

Were they validly detained? – YES. That petitioners were not "caught in the act" does not make
their arrest illegal. Petitioners were found with young boys in their respective rooms, the ones
with John Sherman being naked. Under those circumstances the CID agents had reasonable
grounds to believe that petitioners had committed "pedophilia". While not a crime under the
Revised Penal Code, it is behavior offensive to public morals and violative of the declared policy of
the State to promote and protect the physical, moral, spiritual, and social well-being of our youth
(Article II, Section 13, 1987 Constitution).

At any rate, the filing by petitioners of a petition to be released on bail should be considered as a
waiver of any irregularity attending their arrest and estops them from questioning its validity
(Callanta v. Villanueva, L-24646 & L-24674, June 20, 1977, 77 SCRA 377; Bagcal vs. Villaraza, L-
61770, January 31, 1983, 120 SCRA 525).

TEHANKEE v ROVIRA
Brief Facts:
Haydee Herras Teehankee is a political detainee delivered by the Counter Intelligence Corps,
United States Army, to the Commonwealth Government. She is now confined in the Correctional
Institution for Women under the custody of the Commonwealth Government since October, 1945,
when she was thus delivered to the said government. Herras Teehankee, through her husband,
Alberto Teehankee, filed with the People's Court a petition wherein, invoking the provisions of
Executive Order No. 65, she prayed that her immediate release be ordered on the ground that no
evidence exists upon which she could be charged with any act punishable by law, or, alternatively,
that the People's Court fix the bail for her provisional liberty. Hon. Leopoldo Rovira, Presiding Judge
of the People's Court, entered an order referring the petition for provisional release for
consideration by the Fifth Division of the People's Court, but adding the following statement: "in
my opinion, it should be denied notwithstanding the recommendation of the Solicitor General for
her provisional release under a bond of P50,000." On the same date, the Hon. Pompeyo Diaz,
Associate Judge of the People's Court, entered an order disposing of said petition and denying the
same "in view of the gravity of the offense as can be deduced from the fact that the office of the
Special Prosecutors recommends as high as P50,000 for her provisional release." Herras
Teehankee filed for reconsideration, but the Court, through Associate Judge Pompeyo Diaz, denied
said motion. Herras Teehankee filed a petition for the writs of certiorari and mandamus with the
Supreme Court.
Issues/Ruling:
Whether a person may file for bail even before a formal charge or information is filed against him?
– YES. Article III, section 1(16) of the Commonwealth Constitution -- which provides that "All
persons shall before conviction be bailable by sufficient sureties, except those charged with capital
offenses when evidence of guilt is strong. Excessive bail shall not be required" -- refers to all
persons, not only to persons against whom a complaint or information has already been formally
filed.
It lays down the rule that all persons shall before conviction be bailable except those charged with
capital offenses when evidence of guilt is strong. According to the provision, the general rule is
that any person, before being convicted of any criminal offense, shall be bailable, except when he is
charged with a capital offense and the evidence of his guilt is strong. Of course, only those persons
who have been either arrested, detained or otherwise deprived of their liberty will ever have
occasion to seek the benefits of said provision. But in order that a person can invoke this
constitutional precept, it is not necessary that he should wait until a formal complaint or
information is filed against him. From the moment he is placed under arrest, detention or restraint
by the officers of the law, he can claim this guarantee of the Bill of Rights, and this right he retains
unless and until he is charged with a capital offense and evidence of his guilt is strong. Indeed if, as
admitted on all sides, the precept protects those already charged under a formal complaint or
information, there seems to be no legal or just reason for denying its benefits to one as against
whom the proper authorities may even yet conclude that there exists no sufficient evidence of
guilt. To place the former in a more favored position than the latter would be, to say the least,
anomalous and absurd. If there is a presumption of innocence in favor of one already formally
charged with criminal offense (Constitution, Article III, section 1[17]), a fortiori, this presumption
should be indulged in favor of one yet so charged, although already arrested or detained.
COMMENDADOR v DE VILLA
Brief Facts:
The case involves 4 consolidated cases of the officers of the AFP who are facing prosecution for
their alleged participation in the failed coup d’ etat on December 1-9, 1989:
G.R. No. 95020-certiorari- against the respondent judge on the ground that he has no
jurisdiction of GCM No. 14 and no authority to set aside its ruling of denying bail to private
respondents
Charges against them include mutiny, conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman, and
various crimes in relation to murder
In G.R. No. 95020, Ltc. Jacinto Ligot applied for bail and it was denied by GMC No. 14. The RTC
granted him provisional liberty but he was not released immediately, “pending the final resolution
of the appeal to be taken.”
Issues/Ruling:
Whether or not the military personnel are entitled to bail, thus, WON there was a violation of the
right to bail? - NO. “We find that the right to bail invoked by the private respondents in G.R. Nos.
95020 has traditionally not been recognized and is not available in the military, as an exception to
the general rule embodied in the Bill of Rights.”
However, a right to speedy trial is given more emphasis in the military, where the right to bail does
not exist.
Solicitor General’s explanation of the exception: “The unique structure of the military should be
enough reason to exempt military men from the constitutional coverage on the right to bail.”

BRAVO v BORJA
Brief Facts:

Petitioner Jojo Pastor Bravo, Jr., is charged with murder for the killing of one Ramon Abiog.
petitioner filed a motion for bail based on two reasons: (a) that the evidence against him is not
strong in view of the retraction by Ferdinand del Rosario, one of the prosecution witnesses, of his
previous statement naming petitioner as the assailant; and (b) that he is a minor of 16 years,
entitled as such to a privileged mitigating circumstance under Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code
which would make the murder charge against him non-capital.

Respondent Judge Melecio B. Borja denied the motion for bail on the finding that the evidence of
petitioner's guilt is strong and his minority was not proved. He also denied the motion for
reconsideration.
Issues/Ruling:
Whether petitioner is entitled to bail as a matter of right? – YES. The orders of respondent Judge
denying bail to petitioner are set aside and petitioner is entitled to bail as a matter of right.

Under the Constitution, "all persons, except those charged with capital offenses when evidence of
guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties." (Article IV, Section 18.)
Generally, therefore, bail is a matter of right before conviction, unless the accused is charged with
a capital offense and the evidence of guilt is strong.

The charge against petitioner is murder qualified by treachery and attended by two aggravating
circumstances: evident premeditation and nocturnity. Punishable by reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to death, the crime is therefore a capital offense.

Under Section 5 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, a capital offense is "an offense which, under the
law existing at the time of its commission, and at the time of the application to be admitted to
bail, may be punished by death." It is clear from this provision that the capital nature of an offense
is determined by the penalty prescribed by law, with reference to which it is relatively easy to
ascertain whether the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong. Moreover, when the
Constitution or the law speaks of evidence of guilt, it evidently refers to a finding of innocence or
culpability, regardless of the modifying circumstances.

To allow bail on the basis of the penalty to be actually imposed would require a consideration not
only of the evidence of the commission of the crime but also evidence of the aggravating and
mitigating circumstances. There would then be a need for a complete trial, after which the judge
would be just about ready to render a decision in the case.

Nevertheless, where it has been established without objection that the accused is only 16 years old,
it follows that, if convicted, he would be given "the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law,"
which effectively rules out the death penalty.

The Constitution withholds the guaranty of bail from one who is accused of a capital offense where
the evidence of guilt is strong. The obvious reason is that one who faces a probable death sentence
has a particularly strong temptation to flee. This reason does not hold where the accused has been
established without objection to be a minor who by law cannot be sentenced to death.

It results that petitioner is entitled to bail as a matter of right, which makes it unnecessary to decide
whether he, being a minor, is entitled to be placed pending trial in the care and custody of the MSSD
pursuant to Article 191 of P.D. No. 603.

PEOPLE v DACUDAO
Brief Facts:
An Information for Murder with the qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident
premeditation was filed against accused Rey Christopher Paclibar and Nero Desamparado for the
death of Cesarlito Nolasco.
Accused Rey Christopher Paclibar filed a motion for bail. and without conducting a hearing in the
application for bail, respondent Judge summarily issued the order granting the motion for bail.
Private prosecutor Alex R. Monteclar filed a motion for reconsideration alleging that "THE
GRANTING OF BAIL TO THE ACCUSED WITHOUT A HEARING IS VIOLATIVE OF PROCEDURAL DUE
PROCESS, HENCE, NULL AND VOID'.
Issues/Ruling:
Is the bail granted by the respondent judge valid?
1.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; RIGHT OF ACCUSED TO BAIL; PROSECUTION DEPRIVED OF PROCEDURAL
DUE PROCESS; ALL GRANTED TO ACCUSED WITHOUT HEARING. — The respondent court acted
irregularly in granting bail in a murder case without any hearing on the motion asking for it, without
bothering to ask the prosecution for its conformity or comment, and, as it turned out later, over
its strong objections. The court granted bail on the sole basis of the complaint and the affidavits
of three policemen, not one of whom apparently witnessed the killing. Whatever the court
possessed at the time it issued the questioned ruling was intended only for prima facie
determining whether or not there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that the
crime was committed and pinpointing the persons who probably committed it. Whether or not
the evidence of guilt is strong for each individual accused still has to be established unless the
prosecution submits the issue on whatever it has already presented. To appreciate the strength
or weakness of the evidence of guilt, the prosecution must be consulted or heard. It is equally
entitled as the accused to due process.
2.REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; FIXING OF BAILBOND; GUIDELINES THEREFOR. — Certain
guidelines in the fixing of a bailbond call for the presentation of evidence and reasonable
opportunity for the prosecution to refute it. Among them are the nature and circumstances of the
crime, character and reputation of the accused, the weight of the evidence against him, the
probability of the accused appearing at the trial, whether or not the accused is a fugitive from
justice, and whether or not the accused is under bond in other cases. (Section 6, Rule 144, Rules
of Court) It is highly doubtful if the trial court can appreciate these guidelines in an ex-parte
determination where the Fiscal is neither present nor heard.
3.ID.; ID.; BAIL NOT A MATTER OF RIGHT; HEARING ON MOTION FOR BAIL, INDISPENSABLE. — Bail
is not a matter of right as regards persons charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua
when the evidence of guilt is strong. Thus, Sec. 5, Art. 114 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure
requires a hearing before resolving a motion for bail by persons charged with offenses punishable
by reclusion perpetua where the prosecution may discharge its burden of showing that the
evidence of guilt is strong. The case at bar, which is murder, is punishable by reclusion perpetua.
LIBARIOS v DABALOS
Brief Facts:
An administrative complaint was filed by Roan I. Libarios for and on behalf of his client Mariano
Corvera, Jr. against respondent Judge Rosarito F. Dabalos, for grave ignorance of the law, grave
abuse of discretion, gross misconduct and partiality, relative to the issuance of a warrant of arrest
of the respondent judge against the accused Tranquilino Calo Jr. and Belarmino Alloco for the
crime of murder fixing their bail without any prior hearing.

Issues/Ruling:
W/N Judge Rosarito F. Dabalos violated the New Code of Judicial Conduct? - YES. A judge should
endeavor diligently to ascertain the facts and the applicable law unswayed by partisan or personal
interests, public opinion or fear of criticism. He should not have allowed himself to be swayed into
issuing an order fixing bail for the temporary release of the accused charged with murder, without
a hearing, which is contrary to established principles of law. It has been an established legal
principle or rule that in cases where a person is accused of a capital offense, the trial court must
conduct a hearing in a summary proceeding, to allow the prosecution an opportunity to present,
within a reasonable time, all evidence it may desire to produce to prove that the evidence of guilt
against the accused is strong, before resolving the issue of bail for the temporary release of the
accused.
A judge should not only render a just, correct and impartial decision but should do so in a manner
as to be free from any suspicion as to his fairness, impartiality and integrity.
The respondent judge is imposed of a FINE of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00) and
WARNED to exercise more care and diligence in the performance of his duties as a judge, and that
the same or similar offense in the future will be dealt with more severally.