Rule 112 Case Digests – Criminal Procedure • Dr.
• Dr. Inocencio-Ortega filed a Motion to Re-Open
1. De Lima vs Reyes GR No. 209330 January 11, 2016
Ponente: Leonen, J.
• Dr. Gerardo Ortega (Dr. Ortega), also known as
"Doc Gerry," was a veterinarian and anchor of several radio
shows in Palawan. On January 24, 2011, at around 10:30
am, he was shot dead inside the Baguio Wagwagan Ukay-
ukay in San Pedro, Puerto Princesa City, Palawan.5 After a
brief chase with police officers, Recamata was arrested. On
the same day, he made an extrajudicial confession
admitting that he shot Dr. Ortega. He also implicated Edrad,
Aranas, Noel, Jr.
• On February 6, 2011, Edrad executed a Sinumpaang
Salaysay before the Counter-Terrorism Division of the NBI
where he alleged that it was former Palawan Governor
Reyes who ordered the killing of Dr. Ortega.
• On February 7, 2011, Secretary Leila De Lima issued
Department Order No. 091 creating a special panel of
prosecutors (First Panel) to conduct preliminary
investigation.
• Dr. Inocencio-Ortega, Dr. Ortega's wife, filed a
Supplemental Affidavit-Complaint implicating former
Governor Reyes as the mastermind of her husband's
murder. Former Governor Reyes' brother, Coron Mayor
Mario T. Reyes, Jr., former Marinduque Governor Carreon,
former Provincial Administrator Atty. Seratubias,
Recamata, Aranas, Lesias, Regalado; Noel, Edrad, and
several John and Jane Does were also implicated.
• The First Panel concluded its preliminary
investigation and issued the Resolution dismissing the
Affidavit-Complaint.
the CA a Supplemental Petition for Certiorari and
Preliminary Investigation that sought the admission of
mobile phone communications between former Governor
Reyes and Edrad. While the Motion was still pending, Dr.
Inocencio-Ortega filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration
Ad Cautelam of the Resolution. The First Panel denied both
Motions.
• The Secretary of Justice issued DO No. 710 creating
a new panel of investigators (Second Panel) to conduct a
reinvestigation of the case and to address the offer of
additional evidence denied by the First Panel. The DO also
revoked Department Order No. 091.
• Dr. Inocencio-Ortega filed before the Secretary a
Petition for Review (Ad Cautelam) assailing the First Panel's
Resolution.
• Former Governor Reyes filed before the CA a
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for a Writ
of Preliminary Injunction assailing the creation of the
Second Panel. He argued that the Secretary gravely abused
her discretion when she constituted a new panel and that
the evidence to be addressed by the reinvestigation was
neither new nor material to the case.
• The Second Panel issued the Resolution finding
probable cause and recommending the filing of
informations on all accused, including former Governor
Reyes
• RTC, Palawan, Branch 52 subsequently issued
warrants of arrest on March 27, 2012. However, the
warrants against former Governor Reyes and his brother
were ineffective since the two allegedly left the country
days before the warrants could be served.
• On March 29, 2012, former Governor Reyes filed
before the Secretary a Petition for Review Ad Cautelam23
assailing the Second Panel's Resolution. Halso filed before
Prohibition impleading RTC, Palawan, Branch 52.
• The CA rendered the Decision declaring DO No. 710
null and void and reinstating the First Panel's Resolutions.
According to the CA, the Secretary committed grave abuse
of discretion when she issued Department Order No. 710
and created the Second Panel. She should have modified or
reversed the Resolutions of the First Panel pursuant to the
2000 NPS Rule on Appeal instead of issuing DO No. 710 and
creating the Second Panel. Therefore, the Second Panel did
not have the authority to assess the admissibility and
weight of any existing or additional evidence.30
• The Secretary of Justice, the Second Panel, and Dr.
Inocencio-Ortega filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
Decision, which was denied by the CA.
• Aggrieved, the Secretary of Justice and the Second
Panel filed the present Petition for Review on
Certiorari34assailing the Decision of the CA.
• Petitioners argue that the Secretary acted within
her authority when she issued DO No. 710. They argue that
her issuance was a purely executive function and not a
quasi-judicial function that could be the subject of a petition
for certiorari or prohibition. In their submissions, they point
out that under Republic Act No. 10071 and the 2000 NPS
Rule on Appeal, the Secretary of Justice has the power to
create a new panel of prosecutors to reinvestigate a case to
prevent a miscarriage of justice.
• Respondent argues that the Secretary had no
authority to order motu proprio the reinvestigation of the
case since Dr. Inocencio-Ortega was able to submit her
alleged new evidence to the First Panel when she filed her
Motion for Partial Reconsideration. He argues that all
parties had already been given the opportunity to present
their evidence before the First Panel so it was not necessary
to conduct a reinvestigation. Respondent argues that the
Secretary 's discretion to create a new panel of prosecutors
was not "unbridled" since the 2000 NPS Rule on Appeal
requires that there be compelling circumstances for her to
be able to designate another prosecutor to conduct the
reinvestigation.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the issuance of Department Order No.
710 was an executive function beyond the scope of a
petition for certiorari or prohibition;
2. Whether, under the 2000 NPS Rule on Appeal, the
Secretary of Justice may, even without a pending petition
for review, motu proprio order the conduct of a
reinvestigation; and
3. Whether this Petition for Certiorari has already
been rendered moot by the filing of the information in
court, pursuant to Crespo v. Mogul.
HELD:
1. The determination by the Department of Justice of
the existence of probable cause is not a quasi-judicial
proceeding. However, the actions of the Secretary of Justice
in affirming or reversing the findings of prosecutors may still
be subject to judicial review if it is tainted with grave abuse
of discretion.
In Spouses Dacudao v. Secretary of Justice,56 a petition for
certiorari, prohibition, and. mandamus was filed.against
the Secretary of Justice's issuance of a department order.
The assailed order directed all prosecutors to forward all
cases already filed against Celso de los Angeles of the
Legacy Group to the Secretariat of the Special Panel created
by the Department of Justice.
This court dismissed the petition on the ground that
petitions for certiorari and prohibition are directed only to
tribunals that exercise judicial or quasi-judicial functions.
The issuance of the department order was a purely
administrative or executive function of the Secretary of
Justice. While the Department of Justice may perform
functions similar to that of a court of law, it is not a quasi-
judicial agency:
The fact that the DOJ is the primary prosecution arm of the
Government does not make it a quasi-judicial office or
agency. Its preliminary investigation of cases is not a quasi-
judicial proceeding. Nor does the DOJ exercise a quasi-
judicial function when it reviews the findings of a public
prosecutor on the finding of probable cause in any case.
Indeed, in Bautista v. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court
has held that a preliminary investigation is not a quasi-
judicial proceeding.
There may be some decisions of the Court that have
characterized the public prosecutor's power to conduct a
preliminary investigation as quasi-judicial in nature. Still,
this characterization is true only to the extent that the
public prosecutor, like a quasi-judicial body, is an officer of
the executive department exercising powers akin to those
of a court of law.
A writ of prohibition, on the other hand, is directed against
"the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, officer
or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial functions." The Department of Justice is not a
court of law and its officers do not perform quasi-judicial
functions. The Secretary of Justice's review of the
resolutions of prosecutors is also not a ministerial function.
However, even when an administrative agency does not
perform a judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial function, the
Constitution mandates the exercise of judicial review when
there is an allegation of grave abuse of discretion.
Therefore, any question on whether the Secretary of Justice
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in affirming, reversing, or modifying
the resolutions of prosecutors may be the subject of a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
2. The 2000 NPS Rule on Appeal requires the filing of
a petition for review before the Secretary of Justice can
reverse, affirm, or modify the appealed resolution of the
provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor. The
Secretary of Justice may also order the conduct of a
reinvestigation in order to resolve the petition for review
under Section 11.
Under Rule 112, Section 4 of the Rules of Court, however,
the Secretary of Justice may motu proprio reverse or modify
resolutions of the provincial or city prosecutor or the chief
state prosecutor even without a pending petition for
review.
The Secretary of Justice exercises control and supervision
over prosecutors and it is within her authority to affirm,
nullify, reverse, or modify the resolutions of her
prosecutors.
Decisions or resolutions of prosecutors are subject to
appeal to the secretary of justice who, under the Revised
Administrative Code, exercises the power of direct control
and supervision over said prosecutors; and who may thus
affirm, nullify, reverse or modify their rulings.
Section 39, Chapter 8, Book IV in relation to Section 5, 8,
and 9, Chapter 2, Title III of the Code gives the secretary of
justice supervision and control over the Office of the Chief
Prosecutor and the Provincial and City Prosecution Offices.
The scope of his power of supervision and control is
delineated in Section 38, paragraph 1, Chapter 7, Book IV of
the Code.
In short, the secretary of justice, who has the power of
supervision and control over prosecuting officers, is the
ultimate authority who decides which of the conflicting
theories of the complainants and the respondents should
be believed.
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 10071 also gives the Secretary
of Justice the authority to directly act on any "probable
miscarriage of justice within the jurisdiction of the
prosecution staff, regional prosecution office, and the
provincial prosecutor or the city prosecutor." Accordingly,
the Secretary of Justice may step in and order a
reinvestigation even without a prior motion or petition
from a party in order to prevent any probable miscarriage
of justice.
Dr. Inocencio-Ortega filed a Motion to Re-Open the
preliminary Investigation before the First Panel in order to
admit as evidence mobile phone conversations between
Edrad and respondent and argued that these phone
conversations tend to prove that respondent was the
mastermind of her husband's murder. The First Panel,
however, dismissed the Motion on the ground that it was
filed out of time. In the same Resolution, the First Panel
denied Dr. Inocencio-Ortega's Motion for Partial
Reconsideration on the ground that "the evidence on
record does not suffice to establish probable cause." It was
then that the Secretary of Justice issued Department Order
No. 710.
In her reply-letter dated September 29, 2011 to
respondent's counsel, the Secretary of Justice further
explained that: The order to reinvestigate was dictated by
substantial justice and our desire to have a comprehensive
investigation. We do not want any stone unturned, or any
evidence overlooked. As stated in D.O. No. 710, we want to
give "both parties all the reasonable opportunity to present
their evidence."
Under these circumstances, it is clear that the Secretary of matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the
Justice issued Department Order No. 710 because she had accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation
reason to believe that the First Panel's refusal to admit the or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who
additional evidence may cause a probable miscarriage of reviewed the records of the investigation.
justice to the parties. The Second Panel was created not to
Thus, it would be ill-advised for the Secretary of Justice to
overturn the findings and recommendations of the First
proceed with resolving respondent's Petition for Review
Panel but to make sure that all the evidence, including the
pending before her. It would be more prudent to refrain
evidence that the First Panel refused to admit, was
from entertaining the Petition considering that the trial
investigated. Therefore, the Secretary of Justice did not act
court already issued a warrant of arrest against
in an "arbitrary and despotic manner, by reason of passion
respondent.96 The issuance of the warrant signifies that
or personal hostility."
the trial court has made an independent determination of
3. Dr. Inocencio-Ortega's Petition for Review before the existence of probable cause.
the Secretary of Justice was rendered moot with the
Here, the trial court has already determined, independently
issuance by the Second Panel of the Resolution dated
of any finding or recommendation by the First Panel or the
March 12, 2012 and the filing of the Information against
Second Panel, that probable cause exists for the issuance of
respondent before the trial court.
the warrant of arrest against respondent. Probable cause
The filing of the information and the issuance by the trial has been judicially determined. Jurisdiction over the case,
court of the respondent's warrant of arrest has already therefore, has transferred to the trial court. A petition for
rendered this Petition moot. Once the information is filed certiorari questioning the validity of the preliminary
in court, the court acquires jurisdiction of the case and any investigation in any other venue has been rendered moot
motion to dismiss the case or to determine the accused's by the issuance of the warrant of arrest and the conduct of
guilt or innocence rests within the sound discretion of the arraignment.
court.
The prudent course of action at this stage would be to
The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a proceed to trial. Respondent, however, is not without
complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of remedies. He may still file any appropriate action before the
the case as to its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of trial court or question any alleged irregularity in the
the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. preliminary investigation during pre-trial.
Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the
The Petition is DISMISSED for being moot.
prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already
in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The
Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case
before it. · The determination of the case is within its
exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss
the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court
who has the option to grant or deny the same. It does not
2. Webb vs De Leon GR No. 12134 August 23, 1995
Ponente: Puno, J.
FACTS:
On June 19, 1994, the National Bureau of Investigation filed
with the DOJ a letter-complaint charging petitioners Hubert
Webb, Michael Gatchalian, Antonio J. Lejano and 6 other
persons with the crime of Rape and Homicide of Carmela N.
Vizconde, her mother Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde, and her
sister Anne Marie Jennifer in their home at Number 80 W.
Vinzons, St., BF Homes, Paranaque, Metro Manila on June
30, 1991.
Forthwith, the DOJ formed a panel of prosecutors headed
by Asst Chief State Prosecutor Jovencio R. Zuno to conduct
the preliminary investigation.
Petitioners: fault the DOJ Panel for its finding of probable
cause. They assail the credibility of Jessica Alfaro as
inherently weak and uncorroborated due to her
inconsistencies between her April 28, 1995 and May 22,
1995 sown statements. They criticize the procedure
followed by the DOJ Panel when it did not examine
witnesses to clarify the alleged inconsistencies.
charge that respondent Judge Raul de Leon and
respondent Judge Amelita Tolentino issued warrants of
arrest against them without conducting the required
preliminary examination.
Complain about the denial of their constitutional right to
due process and violation of their right to an impartial
investigation. They also assail the prejudicial publicity that
attended their preliminary investigation.
ISSUES:
(1) Did the DOJ Panel gravely abuse its discretion in holding
that there is probable cause to charge accused with crime
of rape and homicide?
(2) Did respondent judges de Leon and Tolentino gravely
abuse their discretion when they failed to conduct a
preliminary examination before issuing warrants of arrest
against the accused?
(3) Did the DOJ Panel deny them their constitutional right
to due process during their preliminary investigation?
(4) Did the DOJ Panel unlawfully intrude into judicial
prerogative when it failed to charge Jessica Alfaro in the
information as an accused?
HELD:
(1) NO. Valid determination -- A probable cause needs only
to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not, a
crime has been committed and was committed by the
suspects. Probable cause need not be based on clear and
convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence
establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and definitely,
not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt.
(2) NO. Valid arrest -- In arrest cases, there must be a
probable cause that a crime has been committed and that
the person arrested committed it.
Section 6 of Rule 112 provides that – “upon filing of an
information, the RTC may issue a warrant for the accused.”
Clearly then, our laws repudiate the submission that
respondent judges should have conducted “searching
examination of witnesses” before issuing warrants of arrest
against them.
(3) NO. There is no merit in this contention because
petitioners were given all the opportunities to be heard.
The DOJ Panel precisely requested the parties to adduce
more evidence in their behalf and for the panel to study the
evidence submitted more fully.
(4) NO. Petitioner's argument lacks appeal for it lies on the
faulty assumption that the decision whom to prosecute is a
judicial function, the sole prerogative of courts and beyond
executive and legislative interference.
In truth, the prosecution of crimes appertains to the
executive department whose principal power and
responsibility is to see that our laws are faithfully executed.
A necessary component of this right is to prosecute their
violators.
3. De Ocampo vs Secretary of Justice GR No. 147932
January 25, 2006
Ponente: Carpio, J.
FACTS:
Magdalena Dacarra (Magdalena) executed a sworn
statement before the Women’s Desk of the CPD Police
Station in Batasan Hills, QC of an incident that happened on
4 December 1999 to her 9-year old son, Ronald. She
narrated that Ronald arrived home at around 6PM
complaining about dizziness which was eventually followed
by vomiting. Ronald said that his teacher, petitioner Laila De
Ocampo, banged hus head against that of his classmate,
Lorendo Orayan (Lorendo). Upon inspection, Magdalena
saw a woundless contusion in his head. He was then
brought to an albularyo. The following morning, Ronald was
brought to the East Avenue Medical Center for x-ray. The
attending physician informed Magdalena that Ronald’s
head had a fracture. He died 4 days after. Lorendo also
executed a sworn statement narrating how petitioner
banged his head against Ronald’s.
During the inquest proceedings on 14 December 1999, it
was ruled that evidence warrants the release of petitioner
for further investigation of the charges against her. The case
is not proper for inquest as the incident complained of
happened on December 4. Further, it is found that the
evidence was insufficient to support the charge for
homicide against her. There is no concrete evidence to
show proof that the alleged banging of the heads of the two
minor victims could be the actual and proximate cause of
Ronald.
Subsequently the case was referred for preliminary
investigation. Lorendo’s mother, Erlinda Orayan (Erlinda)
alleged that De Ocampo offered her P100,000 which she
initially accepted, for her and her son’s non-appearance at
the preliminary investigation. Erlinda presented the money
to the investigating prosecutor. Jennilyn Quirong, who
witnessed the head-banging incident, and Melanie Lugales,
who claimed to be another victim of petitioner’s alleged
cruel deeds, filed their sworn statements with the Office of
the Quezon City Prosecutor.
In her counter-affidavit, De Ocampo invoked the disposition
of the inquest prosecutor finding insufficient evidence to
support the charges against her. She assailed the omission
in Magdalena’s sworn statement about Ronald's head
injury due to a vehicular accident in November 1997.
Petitioner pointed out the absence of damage/injury on
Lorendo as borne out by his medical certificate. She
contended that the head-banging incident was not the
proximate cause of Ronald's death, but the failed medical
attention or medical negligence. Petitioner also alleged that
Quirong and Lugales have immature perception. Petitioner
further asserted that the causes of death stated in Ronald's
Death Certificate are hearsay and inadmissible in the
preliminary investigation.
Ronald's Death Certificate shows the immediate cause of
his death as Cardio Pulmonary Arrest, the underlying cause
as Cerebral Edema, and other significant conditions
contributing to death as Electrolyte imbalance and
vomiting. The Autopsy Report states the cause of death as
Intracranial hemorrhage secondary to traumatic injury of
the head. The investigating prosecutor thus, issued a
Resolution finding probable cause against petitioner for the
offenses charged.
In her appeal to the DOJ, petitioner contended that the
investigating prosecutor showed bias in favor of
complainants Magdalena and Erlinda (complainants) for
not conducting a clarificatory hearing and unilaterally
procuring the autopsy report. She argued that the
investigating prosecutor erred in concluding that her
alleged act of banging Ronald’s and Lorendo’s heads was
the cause of Ronald's injury and that such was an act of child
abuse. Petitioner also alleged that it is the Office of the
Ombudsman which has jurisdiction over the case.
The DOJ Secretary upheld the investigating prosecutor's
finding that Ronald's injury was the direct and natural result
of petitioner's act of banging Ronald’s and Lorendo’s heads.
The DOJ Secretary stated that petitioner never denied such
act, making her responsible for all its consequences even if
the immediate cause of Ronald's death was allegedly the
failed medical attention or medical negligence. The DOJ
Secretary also held that assuming there was failure of
medical attention or medical negligence, these inefficient
intervening causes did not break the relation of the felony
committed and the resulting injury. Thus, the claim that she
is innocent as held by the inquest prosecutor was rejected.
According to the DOJ Secretary, the inquest prosecutor did
not dismiss the case. She merely recommended petitioner's
release for further investigation since the case was not
proper for inquest and the evidence was then insufficient.
ISSUE:
Is the petitioner denied due process in the preliminary
investigation for not conducting a clarificatory hearing?
HELD:
No. A clarificatory hearing is not indispensable during
preliminary investigation. Rather than being mandatory, a
clarificatory hearing is optional on the part of the
investigating officer as evidenced by the use of the term
may in Section 3(e) of Rule 112. This provision states:
(e) If the investigating officer believes that there are
matters to be clarified, he may set a hearing to propound
clarificatory questions to the parties or their witnesses,
during which the parties shall be afforded an opportunity to
be present but without the right to examine or cross-
examine.
In this case, the investigating prosecutor no longer
conducted hearings after petitioner submitted her counter-
affidavit. This simply means that at that point the
investigating prosecutor believed that there were no more
matters for clarification. It is only in petitioner’s mind that
some crucial points still exist and need clarification. In any
event, petitioner can raise these important matters during
the trial proper.
Petitioner was not deprived of due process as well since
both parties were accorded equal rights in arguing their
case and presenting their respective evidence during the
preliminary investigation. Due process is merely an
opportunity to be heard. Petitioner cannot successfully
invoke denial of due process since she was given the
opportunity of a hearing. She even submitted her counter-
affidavit to the investigating prosecutor.
Preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial. It is not a
trial of the case on the merits. Its sole purpose is to
determine whether a crime has been committed and
whether the respondent is probably guilty of the crime. It is
not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the
parties evidence. Hence, if the investigating prosecutor is
already satisfied that he can reasonably determine the
existence of probable cause based on the parties evidence
thus presented, he may terminate the proceedings and
resolve the case.
4. Estrada vs Ombudsman GR No. 212140-41 January 21,
2015
Ponente: Carpio, J.
FACTS:
The Ombudsman served on Sen. Estrada copies of the two
criminal complaints for plunder against him. Eighteen of
Sen. Estrada’s co-respondents in the two complaints filed
their counter-affidavits.
On 20 March 2014, Sen. Estrada filed his “Request to be
Furnished with Copies of Counter-Affidavits of the Other
Respondents, Affidavits of New Witnesses and Other
Filings” (“Request”).
Sen. Estrada’s request was made “[p]ursuant to the right of
a respondent ‘to examine the evidence submitted by the
complainant which he may not have been furnished’
(Section 3[b], Rule 112 of the Rules of Court) and to ‘have
access to the evidence on record’ (Section 4[c], Rule II of the
Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman).”
The Ombudsman issued a Joint Resolution which found
probable cause to indict Sen. Estrada and his co-
respondents with plunder and violation of Sec. 3(e) of RA
No. 3019.
Sen. Estrada filed a Motion for Reconsideration praying for
the issuance of a new resolution dismissing the charges
against him. Without filing a Motion for Reconsideration of
the Ombudsman’s Order denying his Request, Sen. Estrada
filed the present Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 and
sought to annul and set aside the latter Order.
ISSUE:
What is the quantum of evidence necessary during
preliminary investigation?
RULING:
First, there is no law or rule which requires the Ombudsman
to furnish a respondent with copies of the counter-
affidavits of his co-respondents. The Rules of Criminal
Procedure, as well as the Rules of Procedure of the Office
of the Ombudsman do not provide for the relief sought by
Sen. Estrada in his Request.
It should be underscored that the conduct of a preliminary
investigation is only for the determination of probable
cause, and “probable cause merely implies probability of
guilt and should be determined in a summary manner. A
preliminary investigation is not a part of the trial and it is
only in a trial where an accused can demand the full
exercise of his rights, such as the right to confront and
cross-examine his accusers to establish his innocence.”
Thus, the rights of a respondent in a preliminary
investigation are limited to those granted by procedural
law.
A preliminary investigation is defined as an inquiry or
proceeding for the purpose of determining whether there
is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that
a crime cognizable by the Regional Trial Court has been
committed and that the respondent is probably guilty
thereof, and should be held for trial. The quantum of
evidence now required in preliminary investigation is such
evidence sufficient to “engender a well-founded belief” as
to the fact of the commission of a crime and the
respondent’s probable guilt thereof.
A preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full
and exhaustive display of the parties’ evidence; it is for the
presentation of such evidence only as may engender a well-
grounded belief that an offense has been committed and
that the accused is probably guilty thereof.
Futhermore, the technical rules on evidence are not binding
on the fiscal who has jurisdiction and control over the
conduct of a preliminary investigation.
Thus, probable cause can be established with hearsay
evidence, as long as there is substantial basis for crediting
the hearsay. Hearsay evidence is admissible in determining
probable cause in a preliminary investigation because such
investigation is merely preliminary, and does not finally
adjudicate rights and obligations of parties.
5. People vs Inting GR No. 88919 July 25, 1990
Ponente: Gutierrez, Jr., J.
Facts:
Mrs. Editha Barba filed a letter-complaint against OIC-
Mayor Dominador Regalado of Tanjay, Negros Oriental with
the COMELEC for allegedly transferring her, a permanent
Nursing Attendant, Grade I, in the office of the Municipal
Mayor to a very remote barangay and without obtaining
prior permission or clearance from COMELEC as required by
law.
After a preliminary investigation of Barba’s complaint, Atty.
Lituanas found a prima facie case. Hence, on September 26,
1988, he filed with the respondent trial court a criminal case
for violation of section 261, Par. (h), Omnibus Election Code
against the OIC-Mayor. In an Order dated September 30,
1988, the respondent court issued a warrant of arrest
against the accused OIC Mayor.

However, in an order dated October 3, 1988 and before the

accused could be arrested, the trial court set aside its
September 30, 1988 order on the ground that Atty. Lituanas
is not authorized to determine probable cause pursuant to
Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The trial court
later on quashed the information. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Does a preliminary investigation conducted by a Provincial

Election Supervisor involving election offenses have to be
coursed through the Provincial Prosecutor, before the
Regional Trial Court may take cognizance of the
investigation and determine whether or not probable cause
exists?

Held:

The 1987 Constitution empowers the COMELEC to conduct

preliminary investigations in cases involving election
offenses for the purpose of helping the Judge determine
probable cause and for filing an information in court. This
power is exclusive with COMELEC. The evident
constitutional intendment in bestowing this power to the
COMELEC is to insure the free, orderly and honest conduct
of elections, failure of which would result in the frustration
of the true will of the people and make a mere idle
ceremony of the sacred right and duty of every qualified
citizen to vote. To divest the COMELEC of the authority to
investigate and prosecute offenses committed by public
officials in relation to their office would thus seriously
impair its effectiveness in achieving this clear constitutional
mandate. Bearing these principles in mind, it is apparent
that the respondent trial court misconstrued the
constitutional provision when it quashed the information
filed by the Provincial Election Supervisor.