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Conservation, exposition, Restauration d’Objets d’Art

HS | 2013
Conservation: Cultures and Connections
Communications

Intergenerational justice: a useful

perspective for heritage conservation
JOEL TAYLOR

Abstracts
English Français
This contribution discusses the emergent field of Intergenerational Justice (IJ) with an aim to drawing new light upon issues in
conservation. Several key issues in IJ are discussed that allow heritage conservation to be contextualised. Methods and debates
from IJ are described and related to conservation practice. The paper is not an exhaustive review, but identifies links to pertinent
issues in conservation.

La contribution discute l'émergence de la notion de justice intergénérationnelle (JI) dans le but d'apporter une lumière nouvelle
sur ses applications en conservation. Nous traiterons de concepts clé de la JI afin de les recontextualiser dans ce domaine et la
pratique. Cet article ne se veut pas une présentation exhaustive mais vise à identifier les liens avec les questions pertinentes de la
conservation.

Index terms
Keywords : Justice, justice intergénérationnelle, patrimoine, conservation, futur, générations
Keywords : justice, intergenerational justice, heritage, conservation, future, generation

Full text
Gratitude goes to Fabian Schuppert (Queen’s University Belfast, UK), Dominic Roser (Oxford University, UK), Carina
Fourie (University of Zurich, Switzerland), Christina Spaarschuh (NIKU), and Jonathan Ashley-Smith for advice and
communications regarding this paper.

Introduction
1 Intergenerational issues sit at the heart of conservation. Every act of conservation is connected to intergenerational
issues, or has intergenerational consequences. The ICOM-CC definition of conservation begins, “All measures and
actions aimed at safeguarding tangible cultural heritage while ensuring its accessibility to present and future
generations” (ICOM-CC 2008, author’s italics). Consequently, it is something that conservators are involved with,
but the discussion of what is meant by present and future generations – and how we define our duties to them – is
often missing.  This can have important implications for conservation policy and practice. The aim of this paper is to
consider how conservators deal with these issues, and what can be learned from this field that can be useful for
conservators through a non-exhaustive review of some concepts in this field.
2 The principle of intergenerational equity is acknowledged in terms of the influence of public policy (Baer and
Snickars 2001), economic valuation of heritage (Throsby 2002), sustainability (Cassar 2003), needs of present and
future museums users (Lindsay 2005) and guidance about expected object lifetime (Dillon et al. 2013), and implicitly
through  social discounting (Ashley-Smith 1999; Dillon et al. 2013). Throsby defines it thus: “The intergenerational

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equity dilemma is a classic inter-temporal allocation problem – that is, a choice between present and future
consumption” (2002: 107).
3 The conservation community has also responded to climate change issues and developed research agendas and
projects (e.g. Cassar and Pender 2003; Sabbioni et al. 2010). This important work has contributed to technical
discussion on the impact to physical heritage and built on the seminal document Our Common Future (WCED 1987),
known as the Brundtland Report. Consequently, there is no claim to introduce a novel concept to conservation in this
paper. Concern for past and future generations is, after all, the very focus of heritage conservation.
4 However, there has been less focus on the philosophical and ethical considerations connected to future
preservation. Intergenerational justice, concerned with the social relations and long-term consequences that stem
from intergenerational considerations, is a discipline in its own right never directly called upon in conservation
literature. Intergenerational Justice was formalised by John Rawls (1921-2002), whose work was a key influence on
the Brundtland report (Gosseries 2008a), and this branch of philosophy continued to be developed after the
influential Brundtland report applied these issues to sustainable development. It can elucidate on some of the
thinking that has deeply influenced conservation in recent years and offer fresh perspectives on conservation. It
holds fruitful parallels with conservation, and may even help tie together existing ideas within conservation.
Consideration of transgenerational approaches might even provide insight into why we conserve.

Intergenerational justice
5 Rawls was the first person to discuss intergenerational justice systematically (Meyer 2012). It is the respect for the
rights and duties with regard to future and past generations, so ‘transgenerational’. Where intergenerational equity is
the allegorical application of inter-temporal distribution, intergenerational justice deals with how these issues are
managed and defined, and their consequences. Like heritage, it is very political. It offers a broad idea of justice based
on the ‘fairness’ promoted by John Stuart Mill (1969, 1861). Future or past generations can be viewed as holding
legitimate claims or rights against present generations, who in turn have correlative duties to future or past
generations (Meyer 2012). It mainly refers to generations whose lifetimes do not overlap, so decisions affect people
who are not presently alive, which has parallels with heritage conservation.
6 The concept of concern for future generations, and respect for past ones, has a history of its own. It has been found
explicitly in the writings of Edmund Burke (1729-1797), depicting a partnership between those living, dead and to be
born (Burke 1790), correspondence from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (influencing Madison’s Bill of Rights),
in which Jefferson states that, “the Earth belongs usufruct to the living” (Jefferson 1789), usufruct meaning to benefit
from something without harming its substance. Henry Sidgwick stated that temporal position was not relevant to the
moral evaluation of an act (1907: 381). So, the extended notion of universal principles of justice has been applied to
temporal situations for some time.
7 Rawls’ work was originally developed to consider the accumulation of capital (economic and social) in order to
offer an alternative to the unsustainable paradigm of economic growth for its own sake. A clear idea of fair equality of
opportunity (through ‘just savings’) helps to define the obligations of current generations to future ones and to
provide an overarching framework from which actions to can be derived and assessed (Rawls 1971).
8 Intergenerational justice focusses on broad ideas of what is necessary for society to prosper – just institutions,
health, a functioning ecosystem. Rawls acknowledged the difficulty of predicting the future, and accepted that future
generations will be moral agents in their own right with (possibly) different values to our own, as ours differ from
previous generations.
9 The idea was quickly appropriated to consider the issues of sustainability. The Brundtland definition of sustainable
development - “development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the needs of the future”
(WCED 1987: 2.1) - is based on intergenerational equity. The field of intergenerational justice considers climate
change, but also social issues such as pensions, legislation, and compensation for historical grievances,
acknowledging the impact of leaving future generations with unwanted debt, capital, and legislation (Gosseries and
Meyer 2009).
10 Rawls (1971) argues for just savings that would include;

Preserving the gains of culture and civilisation.

Maintain established ‘just institutions’. An institution that enhances life prospects.
Putting aside a suitable amount of ‘real capital accumulation’ over time, eg investment in machinery or
education.

11 In Rawls’ terms, the gains of culture are large entities such as the democratic state. There is no explicit reference to
heritage (nor environmental sustainability) in his work, but Meyer and Roser (2009) define justice considerations as
those relevant to decisions likely to affect the existence, number and identity of future generations. This includes
preservation of cultural capital, such as knowledge and skills (Rawls 1971).
12 Intergenerational justice has taken various forms with different emphases. Much of this goes to acknowledge the
tension connected to the relationships between contemporary societies and how duties towards future generations
are defined. The three principle strands are 1) Equitarian – where everyone is equally well off at a given time and
over time (closest to Rawls), 2) Sufficientarian - where everyone is sufficiently well off, but not necessarily equal
(closest to the Brundtland Report), and 3) Prioritarian – where benefit matters more to the worse off people for
whom the benefits accrue than those better off.
13 Gosseries points out that no single exposition of intergenerational justice guarantees complete equity (2008a) and
there are practical implications. Should people who are faring poorly now have to sacrifice for the benefit of well off
people in the future? For example, a common argument against egalitarian principles is that a simple version
considers it better for everyone to be in an undesirable situation than for some to be better off than others (Meyer
and Roser 2009). Consequently, things are not as simple they may seem when stating that heritage should be
preserved for future generations.   Norton points out the “problem of what we owe the future is not a monolithic,
single problem, but rather an inter-related cluster of problems” (Norton 1999: 422). It could be argued that heritage
preservation is part of that inter-related cluster.

Connection to heritage conservation

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14 Coremans (1969) suggested that conservation was first articulated as a discipline in the late nineteenth century,
through the writings of John Ruskin and William Morris. Their principles were appropriated for object conservation,
along with understanding of chemical deterioration (Caple 2000). Ruskin gave direct reference to future generations
by acknowledging, indeed privileging, past and future generations influencing contemporary architecture and the
ethical stance of conservation. Regarding historic buildings, Ruskin stated that, “We have no right whatever to touch
them. They are not ours. They belong partly to those who built them, and partly to all the generations of mankind
who are to follow us.” (Ruskin 1849: 245). This moral stance articulates a relationship with past and future
generations that expresses rights and duties of care and informed the principles of the Society for the Protection of
Ancient Buildings (SPAB) that famously discouraged restoration or alteration. It also held the logical flaw that future
generations never arrive, only become redefined as present, known as ‘infinite saving’ in intergenerational justice. As
recently as 1994, Frost (1994) offered a theoretical ideal for storing collections as a design specification, the Black Box
– a hypothetical museum store that provides absolute protection from all risks. The ideal was a completely sealed
space, equitable in the sense that no-one uses or derives value from it. However, Ruskin’s comments do recognise the
peculiar position of heritage. Many intergenerational issues concern the relationship between present generations
and future or past generations. Heritage preservation holds a relationship with all three.
15 On the whole, approaches to conservation ethics have changed since Ruskin’s writings, but still present challenges.
Objectives for conservation have not always considered the future in great detail, and those that account for material
change are relatively recent. For example, Appelbaum modified her statement, “the fundamental reason we do our
work is to insure that the pieces we treat will last forever” (1987: 72), to note that such an endeavour is “noble but,
practically speaking, unrealistic” (Appelbaum 2007: 271) and that slowing rates of change so objects would last “as
long as possible” (Appelbaum 2007: 271) was more feasible.  Even so, the concept of preservation is still very open-
ended.
16 Risk assessment developed considerations for how far one can reasonably predict the future and collections’
lifetimes (Waller 1994; 2003; Ashley-Smith 1999). In a questionnaire on time preference, Lindsay noted that heritage
professionals felt “the needs of present and future users of collections should have equal influence in decisions on the
use and treatment of collections” (2005: 57). He also included questions of when they considered ‘the future’ to be,
showed some variation with most responses at around 100 years. However, it is difficult to know the extent to which
responses were influenced by risk assessment literature mentioned (and most respondents worked at Waller and
Ashley-Smith’s institutions). A more recent survey of museum visitors asked about how long objects should last,
clustering responses at 50, 100, 200 and 500 years, with about 14% suggesting 1,000 years or more (Dillon et al.
2013). Lithgow notes recent shifts away from arresting decay to a consideration towards “the careful management of
change” (Lithgow 2011: 128). This greater understanding of how long objects might last, and how far into the future
we can consider planning, can help us shape how we define our duties to future generations.

Just savings
17 A key element of defining our duties to future generations is that of ‘just savings’, the extent to which the present
generation should forgo its own rights to uphold the rights of future generations. Equally distributing shares to an
infinite future raises questions about the extent to which we can plan for posterity. When has a generation saved
enough? Three stages that one might consider (Schuppert 2012) are;

Why is the object considered a resource? This may seem obvious, but can often benefit from clarification of its
properties and socio-cultural construction, the way it is understood. Every culture has deliberate non-
resources (or rather partial resources), meaning only for certain non-consumptive practices, such as cows in
India (Schuppert 2012). Distinguishing between resources through their socio-cultural construction allows us
to think beyond preserving things for their own sake.
Why is it valuable in general? This holds several parallels with the poly-vocality that has arisen within
heritage studies and conservation. The notion of inherent value is regularly (and rightly) questioned, so the
different ways an object is valuable, to whom, and what that permits will all affect how we consider its
relationship to future generations.
Why is it worth preserving for the future? This is connected to its value, but also how duties to future
generations are defined. This affects the desired outcomes. An outcome may be that as many people as
possible have physical access to an object, the longevity of its material or that the values it represents are still
embodied. A parallel in conservation is the different kinds of authenticities recognised by the Nara document
(ICOMOS 1994).

Speaking for the future

18 A problem that presents itself in any intergenerational consideration is whether an action or resource will be
valued by future generations. How do we understand the needs of, and reach reciprocal agreements with, future
generations that are not concurrent with our own? The difference between Ruskin’s approach and present day ideas
on conservation illustrate the disparity that can even exist amongst professionals in the same field.
19 Techniques aimed to quantify the value of cultural heritage and of proposed conservation interventions have been
developed. Contingent Valuation, Revealed Preference and Travel Cost methods (eg Navrud and Ready 2002; de la
Torre and Mason 1999; Throsby 2002) ask the public questions such as, “how much would you pay to conserve this
object?” and derive an economic quote for valuation. However, they are all based on questions about value posed at a
particular point in time – temporally biased – and possess problems connected to reducing questions about value to
monetary terms. There are valid reasons to compromise if practical application is to be achieved, but an
acknowledgement of what is lost is also required. Rawls (1971) developed a different approach that was aimed at
moving away from a time-specific view.

Rawls’ hypothetical contract – the ‘original position’

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20 A concept of how justice can be perceived in a trans-generational context is Rawls’ hypothetical contract for
considering how different resources could be distributed temporally (1971).   He referred to it as the ‘original
position’. The original position is a thought experiment developed as a way to achieve an impartial point of view in
considerations about fundamental principles of justice. It reflects upon what could be considered as ‘just saving’ in a
trans-generational context. Participants imagine they are people other than themselves in the position of equality,
jointly in agreement with, and committed to, principles of social and political justice - the ‘original position’. The
exercise does not ask people what they think of a situation at a particular point in time, but tries to create an
environment that allows people to conceptually unify different issues in an egalitarian fashion so as to consider basic
rights Rawls called primary social goods.
21 This collective deliberation is carried out behind a ‘veil of ignorance’. This means participants know nothing about
their particular abilities, tastes, and position within the social order nor individuals' ideas of values such as ‘good’ and
‘leading a good life’. However, they do know of certain fundamental interests and general facts about economics,
biology, and other social and natural sciences.
22 Rawls also assumed that the representatives in the original position would make choices that produced the highest
payoff for the least advantaged position (Rawls 1971; 2001), as people were more risk averse to avoid any group
becoming particularly disadvantaged in any outcome, engendering a kind of social equality. Consequently, an idea of
what constituted a ‘just saving’ could be derived.
23 This description doesn’t do justice to the whole system, but depicts a process designed to consider different needs
and value systems in a wide context and accommodate difference. The process is fair and thought-provoking, but not
without problems.

Problems associated with the original position

24 Rawls’ work was written around the same time that the World Heritage Convention (UNESCO 1972) was being
drawn up. Some parallel problems can be seen in terms of who decides what the gains of civilisation are, and the
representativeness of the group of experts speaking for the many, diverse societies. The Original Position came before
researchers clearly understood the importance of how questions were worded and concepts described (but such
problems can be addressed).
25 The original position is chiefly a means “to help us work out what we now think” (Rawls 1999: 402), and “to make
room for the actions of agents whose moral reference points and needs are not yet known” (Rawls 1971: 587) and was
designed for “the purpose of public- and self-clarification” (Rawls 2001: 17). Its point rather is to enable us to draw
out the consequences of considering certain moral convictions in a transparent way. Focussing on the consequences,
rather than the stated preference of people at a fixed point in time, provides an alternative perspective to valuation
methods currently recommended which transcends the immediate socio-economic climate. It is still used, in an
evolved form, for social deliberation such as social welfare (eg Benhenda 2011).

Temporal distribution
26 How many people will live in the future? There is a historical precedent for future generations being larger than
their forebears, so Heyd (1992) points out that equality between present and future generations may not be enough.
This issue gets even more problematic when dealing with finite, non-renewable (including very slowly renewable)
resources. Cassar (2003) pointed out a pertinent distinction - an ecosystem is a living entity that will be sustained if
treated properly, but historic material does not renew itself.
27 ‘Just savings’ require only that current generations save a percentage of its output for future generations. This
implies that future generations can be compensated adequately for the destruction of natural capital used in
production by saving man-made capital. Ecological perspectives have similar problems (paying for carbon off-setting
will not stop glaciers melting). This is a reason to focus on social discounting, since material preservation is a matter
of distributing a finite resource.
28 This matter also speaks to the inherently political nature of heritage, and the issues of sustainable access that are
currently negotiated in practice. Use of and access to historic material is not harmful per se, as with carbon emissions
(in fact, both are actually necessary). It is when they are used in excess that problems arise. In fact, it could be argued
that negotiations within both carbon emissions and long-term heritage access hold similarities to the political
scientist Harold Lasswell’s (1902-1978) classic definition of politics: a matter of who gets what, when and how
(Lasswell 1935).

Substitutability
29 This shines a light on recent debate on what heritage actually is, and issues that arise from how cultural capital is
used (Bourdieu 1986). The focus of conservation on historic material alone has been questioned in many quarters of
the heritage field. The idea that “heritage becomes… the values and meanings that are constructed at and around [the
object or place] – heritage is what is done and not what is conserved, preserved or managed” (Smith and Waterton
2009: 15-16) promotes the idea that materiality is not always a key issue for heritage. Such matters are
accommodated in intergenerational justice in discussion of levels of ‘substitutability’ – something does not have to
take the same form in order to meet the needs of the future. Intergenerational distribution of non-renewable resource
like oil may be very difficult, but it is distribution of a source of energy that is really important (Schuppert 2012).
Different kinds of heritage will vary in terms of extent of substitutability, but it is important to consider the forms of
use that can be to the detriment of what is passed on in any given case. This connects with fundamental aspects of
conservation. As Avrami states, “the ultimate aim of conservation is not to preserve material for its own sake, but
rather to maintain (and shape) the values embodied by the heritage” (Avrami et al. 2000: 7).
30 This relates back to the Nara document, and the relatively recent recognition that objects embody more than one
value. It also allows us to consider what rights are being promoted and infringed – in other words, how we define our
duties to future generations. This moves away from existing classifications, such as moveable and immoveable, to
how heritage values and uses can be passed on to future generations. Intergenerational justice considers ‘opportunity
cost’ – what present costs are likely to lead to the most benefit. If a chosen action yields benefit over time, it does not
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mean that it would yield greater benefit that another possible action. The net result is a gain, but there was
opportunity for greater gain.
31 This raises questions for heritage and conservation, especially when we have acknowledged as a profession that no
material can last forever. What is substitutable? What will be handed on to future generations if nothing is
considered substitutable? What will inevitably be lost? What should be chosen for conservation?

What is a ‘generation’?
32 ‘Conserving things for future generations’ is such a vague term, that it is understandable to question why the
concept of ‘generation’ is used at all. However, there are still many documents that simply state that heritage
institutions aim to preserve things for future generations without any qualification.
33 The concept of a ‘generation’ is clearly a construct since “individuals do not come into and out of existence as
temporally discreet classes” (Gardiner 2003: 482). Considering what a ‘generation’ is, and the implications of this,
can be far-reaching in moral and management terms (Gosseries 2008b). The notion of generations has historically
been defined by events that affect one or more societies, such as World wars. However, there is no moral relevance to
such distinctions (Gardiner 2003). Furthermore, depending on the definition, some people will live for one
generation and some through several.
34 Generation is most pertinent to express relationships over time in terms of decision-making, in particular the
matter of ‘causal asymmetry’, that is the power of the older group to impose costs on the later group. It is the feature
that controls defining something as intergenerational (and makes talk of generations meaningful). Parents may make
decisions that affect their children, but they may receive care in their old age. There is reciprocation and motivation
for equity between generations. The idea of reciprocity grows weaker as temporal distance increases, and decisions
are made that can cause benefit or harm with no expectation or hope of reciprocation.
35 How a generation is defined has a lot of impact on how long a generation might be (Fig. 1). Defining generations in
terms of excluding mutual interaction (no-one alive today will interact with anyone of the next generation) may
emphasise causal asymmetry, but means that generations could last up to 200 years (Gardiner 2003). The length of
time in which the rights and responsibilities of adulthood are assumed (as voters or as parents) is often used because
this defines ‘causal parity’ (as opposed to asymmetry). Consequently, talk of generations is useful, “even if
asymmetries cannot be assigned to rigidly separated groups” (Gardiner 2003: 486). Decision-making in heritage
conservation can be affected by cycles that are both longer (institutional) and shorter (career) than generations of
people. However, the notion of causal asymmetry may be worth considering in its own right for the conservation of
heritage collections.

Fig.1 A graphical representation of different conceptions of generation, based on Gardiner’s (2003) definitions and
author’s family.

Thick black horizontal lines: Lifetimes (with uncertainty after ‘now’). Blue striped columns: Generation defining events in time, such as the Baby
Boomers. Thin Red Lines: Causal asymmetry, where peoples’ lifetimes do not meet (up to 200 years). Blue dashed lines: ‘Replacement’ time
required for children to take on parents’ responsibilities, which varies but achieves some ‘causal parity’.

36 The concept of a generation has been addressed in heritage conservation, but very rarely. Ito (1995) explained that
the rationale behind the systematic replacement of material every twenty years at the Ise Grand Shrine in Japan was
a combination of religious, human and material concerns. “Twenty years means the life cycle of the deities, just the
same as a human generation, and also indicates the time limit by which the bottom of columns, whose diameter can
be up to thirty centimeters, will decay” (Ito 1995: 40). In the Shinto religion, the deities are said to be embodied by
the plant life which also have a life cycle of about twenty years (Ito 1995).
37 The Victoria and Albert museum considered the matter of generations when developing a practical lighting policy,
designed to determine a rate for objects’ fading. “The choice of 1 PC [Perceptible Change] in 50 years equals
noticeable damage occurring over a minimum of two generations, and satisfies current government demands for
access to be ‘not only for the present but future generations’… This policy is acknowledged to be a practical approach
for the collection at the V&A” (Ashley-Smith et al. 2002: 6). This approach pragmatically aligned vague government
policy with evidence about fading rates, based on the notion that one generation lasted 25 years (Ashley-Smith 2012).
Consequently, both accounts of generation comprise a meeting point of causal parity, material properties and
external, socio-cultural context (government or religion), which goes some way to expressing how we address future
generations as conservators.

Uncertainties in considering future generations

38 There are moral problems that are peculiar to acts like preservation and resource allocation, not least the
facelessness of those generations with whom we will not come in direct contact. There is uncertainty of what future
generations will value, uncertainty that present action will indeed benefit future generations (and ‘mistakes’ that may
benefit), even uncertainty that these efforts will be continued or wasted by future generations. The applications of
these cautious principles involve a good deal of caution themselves in terms of justice.

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The Non-Identity problem

39 A seemingly intractable problem in intergenerational justice is referred to as the non-identity problem, which
relates to the moral obligations we have to future generations. Parfit (1984) notes that our individual identities are
formed by a number of different circumstances. If we were born at a different time, under different circumstances,
we would be someone else (in other words, we wouldn’t exist). Consequently, we all owe our existence to those that
shaped those circumstances, whether good or bad. Future generations owe their existence to whatever choices we
make. If this is the case, there is no moral obligation to sacrifice for future generations.
40 So why do it? Since there is no contact between distant generations, love, friendship, solidarity and sympathy are
limited. Gosseries (2008b) suggests that reciprocity between generations forms a ‘chain of obligation’ extending
motivations and actions beyond the lifetime expected by an individual or group. Birnbacher (2009) suggests other
contributing factors, such as group loyalties, ideals for their own sake, and the satisfaction of embedding oneself is a
larger, longer project or entity than oneself. De-Shalit (1995) suggests that through this last point, an abstract form of
reciprocity takes place as future generations will carry on projects that are important to us, providing meaning and
depth to our lives. Perhaps this is worth considering when we define our duties to future generations.

Conclusion
41 As stated, the idea of futurity, and the idea of fairness that stems from conserving heritage for future generations, is
not novel to conservation. However, consideration of the field of intergenerational justice offers the opportunity to
see separately identified issues in conservation to be put in a wider ethical context. Conservation is deeply engaged in
these issues, but not in their ethical or philosophical expression. Through intergenerational justice, we have the
opportunities to consider the implications of our work in a new light, and concepts such as causal asymmetry and
substitutability.
42 Viewing intergenerational justice broadly has the further advantage of considering influences and interests outside
one’s own domain when the future generations’ rights and needs are being discussed (Gosseries 2008a). Policy
makers are unlikely to view heritage in isolation, and will be interested in ensuring the impact of their actions, and
the opportunity costs they may forfeit.
43 This is not an exhaustive review, and each of these issues is discussed in much more detail within the field.
However, how we do (or do not) define our duties to future generations, and the implications of what we chose,
affects policy and practice. Conservators cannot directly influence all of these issues, but need to be aware of them
and aware of how they are connected to conservation.

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List of illustrations
Fig.1 A graphical representation of different conceptions of generation, based on Gardiner’s (2003)
Title
definitions and author’s family.
Thick black horizontal lines: Lifetimes (with uncertainty after ‘now’). Blue striped columns: Generation
Caption defining events in time, such as the Baby Boomers. Thin Red Lines: Causal asymmetry, where peoples’
lifetimes do not meet (up to 200 years). Blue dashed lines: ‘Replacement’ time required for children to
take on parents’ responsibilities, which varies but achieves some ‘causal parity’.
URL http://journals.openedition.org/ceroart/docannexe/image/3510/img-1.jpg
File image/jpeg, 66k

References
Electronic reference
Joel Taylor, « Intergenerational justice: a useful perspective for heritage conservation », CeROArt [Online], HS | 2013, Online
since 30 October 2013, connection on 02 August 2019. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/ceroart/3510 ; DOI :
10.4000/ceroart.3510

About the author

Joel Taylor
Joel Taylor is a researcher at the Norwegian Institute for Cultural Heritage Research (NIKU). He has a BSc in Archaeological
Conservation, and PhD on condition surveying and risk assessment (Cardiff University 1996; 2009). He was the first
environmental management intern at English Heritage and continued to become Senior Collections Conservator (1999-2002). He
then joined the University College London Centre for Sustainable Heritage as a researcher, then director of the Sustainable
Heritage MSc course (2002-2011). He moved to Norway in 2011, working with the University of Oslo as senior lecturer before his
current position. Norwegian Institute for Cultural Heritage Research (NIKU), Postboks 736, Sentrum, N-0105, Oslo, Norway,
joel.taylor@niku.no

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