Art 1431 Estoppel-Defined As A Condition or State by Virtue of Which An Admission or Representation Is Rendered

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Art 1431

Estoppel- defined as a condition or state by virtue of which an admission or representation is rendered


conclusive upon the person making it and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying
thereon; ESTOPPEL IN PAIS and ESTOPPEL BY DEED

Art. 1432-1433

Estoppel in pais - Estoppel in pais or by conduct is that which arises when one by his acts,
representations, or admissions, or by his silence when he ought to speak out, intentionally or through
culpable negligence, induces another to believe certain facts to exist and such other rightfully relies and
acts on such belief, as a consequence of which he would be prejudiced if the former is permitted to deny
the existence of such facts.

Estoppel by silence. — Estoppel by silence or inaction refers to a type of estoppel in pais which arises
when a party, who has a right and opportunity to speak or act as well as a duty to do so under the
circumstances, intentionally or through culpable negligence, induces another to believe certain facts to
exist and such other relies and acts on such belief, as a consequence of which he would be prejudiced if
the former is permitted to deny the existence of such facts. A good example of this type of estoppel
would be that which is contemplated in Art. 1437 of the New Civil Code.

Estoppel by acceptance of benefits. — Estoppel by acceptance of benefi ts refers to a type of estoppel in


pais which arises when a party by accepting benefi ts derived from a certain act or transaction,
intentionally or through culpable negligence, induces another to believe certain facts to exist and such
other relies and acts on such belief, as a consequence of which he would be prejudiced if the former is
permitted to deny the existence of such facts. A good example of this type of estoppel would be that
which is contemplated in Art. 1438 of the New Civil Code.

Estoppel by deed or by record. — Strictly speaking, estoppel by deed and estoppel by record are two
distinct types of technical estoppel. Thus, estoppel by deed is defi ned as a type of technical estoppel by
virtue of which a party to a deed and his privies are precluded from asserting as against the other party
and his privies any right or title in derogation of the deed, or from denying any material fact asserted
therein. On the other hand, estoppel by record is defi ned as a type or technical estoppel by virtue of
which a party and his privies are precluded from denying the truth of matters set forth in a record
whether judicial or legislative.

Estoppel by judgment. — Estoppel by judgment refers to a type of estoppel by virtue of which the party
to a case is precluded from denying the facts adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction. Actually,
estoppel by judgment is merely a type of estoppel by record. It may be defined as the preclusion of a
party to a case from denying the facts adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction. It must not,
however, be confused with res judicata. Estoppel by judgment bars the parties from raising any question
that might have been put in issue and decided in the previous litigation, whereas res judicata makes a
judgment conclusive between the same parties as to the matter directly adjudged.

Estoppel by laches. — Laches, in a general sense, is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been
done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a
presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. It is,
therefore, a type of equitable estoppel which arises when a party, knowing his rights as against another,
takes no step or delays in enforcing them until the condition of the latter, who has no knowledge or
notice that the former would assert such rights, has become so changed that he cannot without injury
or prejudice, be restored to his former state.

Elements. — In order to apply the doctrine of laches, four essential elements must be present. These
elements are:

(1) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation of
which complaint is made and for which the complaint seeks a remedy;

(2) delay in asserting the complainant’s rights, the complainant having had knowledge or notice, of the
defendant’s conduct and having been afforded an opportunity to institute a suit;

(3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant would assert the right
on which he bases his suit; and

(4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant, or the suit is
not held to be barred.

Laches distinguished from prescription. —

(1) Laches is concerned with the effect of delay; prescription is concerned with the fact of delay.

(2) Laches is principally a question of inequity of permitting a claim to be enforced, this inequity being
founded on some changes in the condition of the property or the relation of the parties; prescription is a
question or matter of time;

(3) Laches is not statutory, whereas prescription is statutory.

(4) Laches applies in equity, whereas prescription applies at law.

(5) Laches is not based on fi xed time, whereas prescription is based on fi xed time.

Art. 1440

Trust - Trust is the legal relationship between one person having an equitable ownership in a certain
property and another person owning the legal title to such property.

3 persons involved in the creation of a trust – whether by intention of parties/operation of law

1. the trustor, or the person who establishes the trust;

2. the trustee, or the one in whom confi dence is repose as regards property for the benefi t of another
person; and

3. the beneficiary, or the person for whose benefit the trust has been created.
TRUST RES – object of the trust; res must consist of property, actually in existence, in which the trustor
has a transferable interest or title, although as av rule, it consists of any kind of transferable property,
either realty or personalty, including undivided, future, or contingent interest therein.

Art. 1441 Trusts are either express or implied. Express trusts are those created by the intention of the
trustor or of the parties. Implied trusts come into being by operation of law. Implied trusts may be
either resulting or constructive.

Express and implied trusts may be distinguished from each other asfollows:

(1) Express trust is one created by the intention of the trustor or of the parties, whereas an implied trust
is one that comes into being by operation of law.

(2) Express trusts are those created by the direct and positive acts of the parties, by some writing or
deed or will or by words evidencing an intention to create a trust, whereas implied trusts are those
which, without being expressed, are deducible from the nature of the transaction by operation of law as
matters of equity, independently of the particular intention of the parties.

(3) Thus, if the intention to establish a trust is clear, the trust is express; if the intent to establish a trust
is to be taken from circumstances or other matters indicative of such intent, then the trust is implied.

(4) An express trust concerning an immovable or any interest therein cannot be proved by parole
evidence, whereas an implied trust concerning an immovable or any interest therein may be proved by
parole evidence.

(5) An action to enforce an express trust, so long as there is no express repudiation of the trust by the
trustee and made known to the benefi ciary, cannot be barred by laches or by extinctive prescription,
whereas an action to enforce an implied trust, even when there is no express repudiation of the trust by
the trustee and made known to the benefi ciary, may be barred by laches or by extinctive prescription.

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