EN BANC

G.R. No. L-23102 April 24, 1967

CECILIO MENDOZA, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and LUISA DE LA ROSA MENDOZA, respondents.

Guillermo B. Ilagan for petitioner.

George Y. Cadhit for respondents.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Cecilio Mendoza resorts to this Court for a review of the decision of the Court of Appeals in case CA-G.R. No. 30005-R, denying a
writ of prohibition and injunction against the orders of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija refusing dismissal of Civil Case No.
3436 of that Court.1äwphï1.ñët

We glean from the record that Luisa de la Rosa Mendoza instituted Case No. 3436 against petitioner herein. In the complaint, she
averred that she was married to Cecilio Mendoza on 2 September 1953; that they lived together as husband and wife until 14 July
1954, when the husband departed for the United States to further his studies and practice his profession; that since then, defendant
Mendoza "without justifiable cause or reason deliberately abandoned and neglected plaintiff and despite repeated demands by
plaintiff, defendant has failed and refused, and still fails and refuses, to provide for the maintenance and support of plaintiff, who is
allegel to be pregnant, sickly and without any source of revenue, while defendant (now petitioner) is employed in a hospital in the
United States, earning an average of $200.00 a month, besides being a part-owner of lands in Muñoz, Nueva Ecija, assessed at
P32,330.00 in 1955.

In due course, defendant Cecilio Mendoza moved for dismissal of the complaint for lack of jurisdiction and improper venue. The
motion having been denied, he filed an answer with counterclaim, putting in issue the validity of his marriage to plaintiff (Brief, p.
13), and plaintiff (now respondent) Luisa de la Rosa duly replied.

On 3 July 1961 defendant filed a second motion to dismiss, this time predicated on the complaint's failure to state a cause of action,
because it contained no allegation that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made before the filing of the suit, and
invoking the provisions of Article 222 of the Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 386) that provides:

ART. 222. No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same family unless it should appear that earnest
efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed, subject to the limitations in article 2035.

The Court of First Instance, having refused to entertain his second motion to dismiss, the defendant petitioned the Court of Appeals
for writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction to stop the Court of First Instance from further proceeding with the case. The Court
of Appeals gave due course to his petition and issued the preliminary writ prayed for; but, after hearing and consideration of the
merits, it denied the writ of prohibition and dissolved the injunction.

His motion for reconsideration having been denied, Cecilio Mendoza then resorted to this Court, which gave due course to his
petition for review.

Petitioner argues that Article 222 of the Civil Code of the Philippines (jam. quot.) requires that before a suit between members of the
same family (in this case between husband and wife) is filed or maintained, it must appear that earnest efforts toward a compromise
have been made, and the only way to make it so appear when the suit is filed is by a proper averment to that effect in the complaint.
Since the law forbids a suit being initiated (filed) or maintained unless such efforts at compromise appear, the showing that efforts in
question were made is a condition precedent to the existence of the cause of action. It follows that the failure of the complaint to
plead that plaintiff previously tried in earnest to reach a settlement out of court renders it assailable for lack of cause of action and it
may be so attacked at any stage of the case even on appeal.

While we agree that petitioner's position represents a correct statement of the general rule on the matter, we are nevertheless
constrained to hold that the Court of Appeals and the Court of First Instance committed no error in refusing to dismiss the complaint,
for on its face, the same involved a claim for future support that under Article 2035 of the Civil Code of the Philippines can not be
subject of a valid compromise, and is, therefore, outside the sphere of application of Article 222 of the Code upon which petitioner
relies. This appears from the last proviso of said Article 222, already quoted. Even the answer below, in attacking the validity of the
marriage of plaintiff-respondent Luisa de la Rosa to defendant-petitioner Cecilio Mendoza, poses a non-compromisable issue.

ART. 2035. No compromise upon the following questions shall be valid:

(1) x x x;

(2) The validity of a marriage or a legal separation;

(3) x x x;

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 (4) Future support.

Since no valid compromise is possible on these issues, a showing of previous efforts to compromise them would be superfluous.

It may be that the complaint asks for both future support and support in arrears, as petitioner contends. But, the possibility of
compromise on the latter does not negate the existence of a valid cause of action for future support, to which Article 222 can not
apply.

Wherefore, the decision of the Court of Appeals, sustaining that of the court of origin denying dismissal of the complaint, is affirmed.
Costs against petitioner. So ordered.

Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar and Castro, JJ., concur.
Sanchez, J., took no part.

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-32159 October 28, 1977

ZOILA MENDEZ, RAFAEL MENDEZ, and MATILDE BIONSON, petitioners,

vs.
MAXIMO, EUGENIA JUANA, FORTUNATA, PRUDENCIA, ROMAN, ANECITA and MARIA, all surnamed BIONSON and HON.
ALFREDO C. LAYA, Judge, Court of First of Cebu, Branch XII, respondents

Amado G. Olis for petitioners.

Cecilio V. Guaren for private respondents.

FERNANDEZ, J.:têñ.£îhqwâ£

This is a petition to review the summary judgment in Civil Case No. AV-26 of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch XII,
entitled "Maximo Bionson, et al., vs. Zoila Mendez, et al.," the dispositive part of which reads: ñé+.£ªwph!1

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs in the above entitled case and against the
defendants, that the portion of land subject matter of the case which the defendants are occupying is hereby
awarded to the plaintiffs, and the defendants are hereby ordered to vacate the same and to deliver it to the
plaintiffs. without any damages and pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Given in Open Court 15th day of May, 1970, Cebu City, Philippines.

(Sgd.) ALFREDO C. LAYA

Judge 1

The record shows that the petitioners Zoila Mendez and Matilde Bionson, together with ten (10) other persons filed on October 8,
1968 in the Court of First Instance of Cebu an action against Cecilia Bionson, Dionisia Gumapon and Juana, Fortunate. Maximo,
Prudencia, Roman, Anecita, Eugenia and Maria, all surnamed Bionson, for partition of two parcels of land located in Oslob, Cebu.
The action was docketed as Civil Case No. R-10846 and assigned to Branch XI of the Court of First Instance of Cebu.2 It was
praved in the complaint that judgment be rendered declaring plaintiffs Zoila Mendez, Paula, Benigna, Pedro, Felisa, Amos, Toribia
and Macario, all surnamed Bionson, as the lawful owners of one third (1/3) of each parcel of land described in paragraph 4 (a) and
(b) of the complaint; and declaring plaintiffs Matilde, Marina, Ponciano and Leon, all surnamed Bionson, as the lawful owners of
another one-third (1/3) of each of the said properties; declaring defendants as the owners of the remaining one-third (1/3) of each of
the properties and ordering the physical partition of said parcels of land into three (3) equal, parts, and each part to be assigned to
the specific declared owners.

The defendants in Civil Case No. R-10846 alleged in their answer 3 that they are the absolute and exclusive owners of the two (2)
parcels of land and that the plaintiffs have no cause of action against them. As counterclaim, the defendants asked for moral
damages and for the agreed monthly rental of P10.00 and the rentals in arrears for the last ten (10) months of the house owned by
Antonio Bionson rented and occupied by Zoila Mendez on parcel (a), paragraph 4 of the complaint, as well as that portion of the
said land leased to Matilde Bionson and occupied by her house and/or to vacate the premises and for attorneys' fees and expenses
of litigation.

After trial, the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch XI, rendered its decision in Civil Case No. R-10846, the dispositive part of
which reads: ñé+.£ªwph!1

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 PREMISES CONSIDERED JUDGMENT is hereby rendered in favor (if the defendants and against the plaintiffs
dismissing the (- complaint for failure of the plaintiffs to prove their claim on the two parcels ): I of land in question
with preponderance of evidence, with costs. the counter-claim of defendants is hereby dismissed for lack of
sufficient

SO ORDERED

Cebu City Philippines, September 1, 1969.

(Sgd.) AGAPITO HONTANOSAS Judge 4

The said decision in Civil Case No. R-10846 became final and executory. A writ of execution was issued and the Deputy Provincial
Sheriff collected from the plaintiffs therein the sum of P190.80 for costs. 5

In December 1969, the private respondents filed in the Court of First Instance of Cebu an action for recovery of possession and
ownership of one of the parcels of land in Civil Case No. R-10846 10846 against the petitioners. The complaint was docketed as
Civil Case No. AV-26 and assigned to Branch XII of the Court of First Instance of Cebu. The parties, subject matter and issues are
substantially the same in Civil Case No. R-10846 and Civil Case No. AV-26 of the Court of First Instance of Cebu.

After the issues were joined, Civil Case No. AV-26 was set for pre- trial. During the pre-trial, the parties asked that judgment be
rendered on the pleadings and both of them presented the decision in Civil Case No. R-10846. Thereupon, the trial court rendered
a summary judgment which reads: ñé+.£ªwph!1

SUMMARY OF JUDGMENT

During the pre-trial this morning, the parties thru their respective counsels asked for judgment on the pleadings,
and both of them presented the decision in Civil Case No. R-10846. The property under litigation in the case at bar
being the same subject matter in civil Case No. R-10846 the defendants in this present case thru their counsels
manifested to the Court that the decision in Civil Case No. R-10846 has already become final and that no appeal
was made. Going over the decision of the Court in Civil Case No. R-10846 the defendants in that case and who are
the plaintiffs in the case at bar were awarded the property in question but the dispositive portion of the said decision
inadvertently failed to state that the plaintiffs in that case should vacate the premises in question in favor of plaintiffs
herein and for which reason the plaintiffs in the case at bar filed this action for recovery and for the purpose of
requiring the defendants herein to deliver to them the portion of the property in question. As it was extensively
discussed and found out by the Court in Civil Case No. R-10846 that the property in question belongs to plaintiffs in
the case at bar and the defendants refuse to deliver to them the ownership and possession of the same, the former
ask this Court to compel the latter to deliver to them the possession of the portion of the land in question. there
being no appeal taken by them and the decision in Civil Case G.R. No. R-10846. (Exhibit-A for plaintiffs and
Exhibit-1 for, defendants) having become final, the preponderance of evidence is in favor of the herein plaintiffs
who were defendants in Civil Case No. R-10846 and against the defendants herein who were the plaintiffs in said
Civil Case No. R-10846.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs in the above entitled case and against the
defendants, that the portion of land subject matter of the case which the defendants are occupying is hereby
awarded to the plaintiffs, and the defendants are hereby ordered to vacate the same and to deliver it to the
plaintiffs. Without any damages and pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Given in Open Court 15th day of May, 1970, Cebu City, Philippines. ñé+.£ªwph!1

(Sgd.) ALFREDO C.
LAYA ñé+.£ªwph!1

Judge 6

The petitioners assign the following errors:

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT IN CIVIL CASE NO. AV-26 FOR BEING BARRED BY A
PRIOR JUDGMENT IN CIVIL CASE 140. R-10846 RENDERED BY ANOTHER BRANCH OF THE SAME COURT AND WHICH
HAD LONG BECOME FINAL.

II

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN RENDERING A JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS, WHERE THE MATERIAL ALLEGATIONS IN
THE COMPLAINT ARE SPECIFICALLY DENIED AND SERIOUSLY TRAVERSED.

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III

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN RENDERING A JUDGMENT BASED ON A PREVIOUS DECISION RENDERED BY ANOTHER
BRANCH OF THE SAME COURT WITH A DIFFERENT DISPOSITION

IV

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT FOR LACK OF EARNEST EFFORTS BEING EXERTED BY
THE PARTIES TO ARRIVE AT AN AMICABLE SETTLEMENT BEFORE THE ACTION WAS INSTITUTED, THE PARTIES BEING
MEMBERS OF THE SAME FAMILY. 7

The principal issue is the interpretation of the decision in Civil Case No. R-10846. The petitioners' contention that the decision in
Civil Case No. R-10846 'denied the private respondents' claim of ownership' 8 has no merit. Precisely, the Court of First Instance of
Cebu, Branch XI, rendered judgment in favor of the defendants and against the plaintiffs dismissing the complaint for failure of the
latter to prove their claim on the two parcels of land in question with preponderance of evidence. The pertinent portion of the
decision in Civil Case No. R-10846 reads: ñé+.£ªwph!1

After a careful review and study of the evidence of both parties, this Court is of the view that the plaintiffs have
failed to establish their claims to the two parcels of land in question with preponderance of evidence although the
testimonial evidence of their witnesses is presented in the manner more elaborately than that of the defendants. It
cannot be held, however, that said testimonial evidence is superior to and/or more paramount than that of the
defendants considering all the surrounding circumstances of the case and taking into consideration the
documentary evidence in support of the defendant, testimonial evidence. What is decisive in the determination as
to which party has established its claim or theory with preponderance of evidence is the documentary exhibits
consisting of tax declarations as shown in Exhibits "1" to "11" and the official tax receipts as shown in Exhibits "12"
"12-A" to "12-W". Chest official documents speak better than the best oral testimony a witness is of making. 9

It is clear that in Civil Case No. R-10846 the defendants, private respondents herein, were declared as the owners of the land in
question.

It is true that the counterclaim of the defendants in Civil Case No. 10846 was also dismissed for lack of sufficient evidence.

However, the dismissal of the counterclaim cannot affect the rights of the private respondents on the two (2) parcels of land in
question because said counterclaim referred only to the demand for moral damages, rentals and attorney's fees.

As owners of the land in question, the private respondents have a right to the possession thereof and have the right of action
against the holder and possessor of the land in order to recover it. 10

The plaintiffs in Civil Case No. R-10846 alleged in their complaint that they exerted diligent efforts to arrive at an amicable
settlement or compromise to the extent of asking the intervention of local municipal officials. 11 The petitioners may no longer assign
as error failure of the trial court to dismiss Civil Case No. AV-26 for alleged lack of earnest efforts of the private respondents to
settle the case amicably. Civil Case No. AV-26 is a mere consequence of Civil Case No. R-10846.

Moreover, the parties are not members of the same family as provided in Article 217, Civil Code of the Philippines which
reads: ñé+.£ªwph!1

ART 217. Family relations shall include those:

1. Between husband and wife;

2. Between parent and child;

3. Among other ascendants and their descendants;

4. Among brothers and sisters.

12
The parties are collateral relatives who are not brothers and sisters.

The trial court did not commit the errors assigned.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Muñ;oz Palma, Martin and Guerrero, JJ., concur.1äwphï1.ñët

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 FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 109068 January 10, 1994

GAUDENCIO GUERRERO, petitioner,

vs.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ILOCOS NORTE, BR. XVI, JUDGE LUIS B. BELLO, JR., PRESIDING, and PEDRO G.
HERNANDO, respondents.

Juan Jacito for petitioner.

Alipio V. Flores for private respondent.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

Filed by petitioner as an accion publicana1 against private respondent, this case assumed another dimension when it was
dismissed by respondent Judge on the ground that the parties being brother-in-law the complaint should have alleged that earnest
efforts were first exerted towards a compromise.

Admittedly, the complaint does not allege that the parties exerted earnest towards a compromise and that the same failed.
However, private respondent Pedro G. Hernando apparently overlooked this alleged defect since he did not file any motion to
dismiss nor attack the complaint on this ground in his answer. It was only on 7 December 1992, at the pre-trial conference, that the
relationship of petitioner Gaudencio Guerrero and respondent Hernando was noted by respondent Judge Luis B. Bello, Jr., they
being married to half-sisters hence are brothers-in-law, and on the basis thereof respondent Judge gave petitioner five (5) days "to
file his motion and amended complaint" to allege that the parties were very close relatives, their respective wives being sisters, and
that the complaint to be maintained should allege that earnest efforts towards a compromise were exerted but failed. Apparently,
respondent Judge considered this deficiency a jurisdictional defect.

On 11 December 1992, Guerrero moved to reconsider the 7 December 1992 Order claiming that since brothers by affinity are not
members of the same family, he was not required to exert efforts towards a compromise. Guerrero likewise argued that Hernando
was precluded from raising this issue since he did not file a motion to dismiss nor assert the same as an affirmative defense in his
answer.

On 22 December 1992, respondent Judge denied the motion for reconsideration holding that "[f]ailure to allege that earnest efforts
towards a compromise is jurisdictional such that for failure to allege same the court would be deprived of its jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the case." He warned that unless the complaint was amended within five (5) days the case would be dismissed.

On 29 January 1993, the 5-day period having expired without Guerrero amending his complaint, respondent Judge dismissed the
case, declaring the dismissal however to be without prejudice.

Guerrero appeals by way of this petition for review the dismissal by the court a quo. He raises these legal issues: (a) whether
brothers by affinity are considered members of the same family contemplated in Art. 217, par. (4), and Art. 222 of the New Civil
Code, as well as under Sec. 1, par. (j), Rule 16, of the Rules of Court requiring earnest efforts towards a compromise before a suit
between them may be instituted and maintained; and, (b) whether the absence of an allegation in the complaint that earnest efforts
towards a compromise were exerted, which efforts failed, is a ground for dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.

The Constitution protects the sanctity of the family and endeavors to strengthen it as a basic autonomous social institution. 2 This is
also embodied in Art. 149,3 and given flesh in Art. 151, of the Family Code, which provides:

Art. 151. No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified
complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same had failed. If it is
shown that no such efforts were in fact made, the case must be dismissed.

This rule shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of compromise under the Civil Code.

Considering that Art. 151 herein-quoted starts with the negative word "No", the requirement is mandatory4 that the complaint or
petition, which must be verified, should allege that earnest efforts towards a compromise have been made but that the same failed,
so that "[i]f it is shown that no such efforts were in fact made, the case must be dismissed."

Further, Art. 151 is contemplated by Sec. 1, par. (j), Rule 16, of the Rules of Court which provides as a ground for motion to dismiss
"(t)hat the suit is between members of the same family and no earnest efforts towards a compromise have been made."

The Code Commission, which drafted the precursor provision in the Civil Code, explains the reason for the requirement that earnest
efforts at compromise be first exerted before a complaint is given due course —
5|Page
 This rule is introduced because it is difficult to imagine a sadder and more tragic spectacle than a litigation between
members of the same family. It is necessary that every effort should be made toward a compromise before a
litigation is allowed to breed hate and passion in the family. It is known that a lawsuit between close relatives
generates deeper bitterness than between strangers . . . A litigation in a family is to be lamented far more than a
lawsuit between strangers . . . 5

But the instant case presents no occasion for the application of the
above-quoted provisions. As early as two decades ago, we already ruled in Gayon v. Gayon6 that the enumeration of "brothers and
sisters" as members of the same family does not comprehend "sisters-in-law". In that case, then Chief Justice Concepcion
emphasized that "sisters-in-law" (hence, also "brothers-in-law") are not listed under Art. 217 of the New Civil Code as members of
the same family. Since Art. 150 of the Family Code repeats essentially the same enumeration of "members of the family", we find
no reason to alter existing jurisprudence on the matter. Consequently, the court a quo erred in ruling that petitioner Guerrero, being
a brother-in-law of private respondent Hernando, was required to exert earnest efforts towards a compromise before filing the
present suit.

In his Comment, Hernando argues that ". . . although both wives of the parties were not impleaded, it remains a truism that being
spouses of the contending parties, and the litigation involves ownership of real property, the spouses' interest and participation in
the land in question cannot be denied, making the suit still a suit between half-sisters . . ."7

Finding this argument preposterous, Guerrero counters in his Reply that his "wife has no actual interest and participation in the land
subject of the . . . suit, which the petitioner bought, according to his complaint, before he married his wife." 8 This factual controversy
however may be best left to the court a quo to resolve when it resumes hearing the case.

As regards the second issue, we need only reiterate our ruling in

O'Laco v. Co Cho Chit,9 citing Mendoza v. Court of Appeals, 10 that the attempt to compromise as well as the inability to succeed is
a condition precedent to the filing of a suit between members of the same family, the absence of such allegation in the complaint
being assailable at any stage of the proceeding, even on appeal, for lack of cause of action.

It is not therefore correct, as petitioner contends, that private respondent may be deemed to have waived the aforesaid defect in
failing to move or dismiss or raise the same in the Answer. On the other hand, we cannot sustain the proposition of private
respondent that the case was, after all, also dismissed pursuant to Sec. 3, Rule 17, of the Rules of Court 11 for failure of petitioner to
comply with the court's order to amend his complaint.

A review of the assailed orders does not show any directive which Guerrero supposedly defied. The Order of 7 December 1992
merely gave Guerrero five (5) days to file his motion and amended complaint with a reminder that the complaint failed to allege that
earnest efforts were exerted towards a compromise. The Order of 22 December 1992, which denied Guerrero's motion for
reconsideration, simply stated that "Plaintiff if it (sic) so desire must
amend the complaint otherwise, the court will have to dismiss the case (emphasis supplied) . . ." The Order of 29 January 1993
dismissing the case without prejudice only made reference to an earlier order "admonishing" counsel for Guerrero to amend the
complaint, and an "admonition" is not synonymous with "order". Moreover, since the assailed orders do not find support in our
jurisprudence but, on the other hand, are based on an erroneous interpretation and application of the law, petitioner could not be
bound to comply with them. 12

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the appealed Orders of

7 December 1992, 22 December 1992 and 29 January 1993 are SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 16, or
whichever branch of the court the case may now be assigned, is directed to continue with Civil Case
No. 10084-16 with deliberate dispatch.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, Davide, Jr. and Quiason, JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 125465 June 29, 1999

SPOUSES AUGUSTO HONTIVEROS and MARIA HONTIVEROS, petitioners,

vs.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, Branch 25, Iloilo City and SPOUSES GREGORIO HONTIVEROS and TEODORA
AYSON, respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:

On December 3, 1990, petitioners, the spouses Augusto and Maria Hontiveros, filed a complaint for damages against private
respondents Gregorio Hontiveros and Teodora Ayson before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 25, where it was
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docketed as Civil Case No. 19504. In said complaint, petitioners alleged that they are the owners of a parcel of land, in the town of
Jamindan, Province of Capiz, as shown by OCT No. 0-2124, issued pursuant to the decision of the Intermediate. Appellate Court,
dated April 12, 1984, which modified the decision of the Court of First Instance of Capiz, dated January 23, 1975, in a land
registration case 1 filed by private respondent Gregorio Hontiveros; that petitioners were deprived of income from the land as a
result of the filing of the land registration case; that such income consisted of rentals from tenants of the land in the amount of
P66,000.00 per year from 1968 to 1987, and P595,000.00 per year thereafter; and that private respondents filed the land
registration case and withheld possession of the land from petitioners in bad faith. 2

In their answer, private respondents denied that they were married and alleged that private respondent Hontiveros was a widower
while private respondent Ayson was single. They denied that they had deprived petitioners of possession of and income from the
land. On the contrary, they alleged that possession of the property in question had already been transferred to petitioners on August
7, 1985, by virtue of a writ of possession, dated July 18, 1985, issued by the clerk of court of the Regional Trial Court of Capiz,
Mambusao, the return thereof having been received by petitioners' counsel; that since then, petitioners have been directly receiving
rentals from the tenants of the land, that the complaint failed to state a cause of action since it did not allege that earnest efforts
towards a compromise had been made, considering that petitioner Augusto Hontiveros and private respondent Gregorio Hontiveros
are brothers; that the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court in Land Registration Case No. N-581-25 was null and void since
it was based upon a ground which was not passed upon by the trial court; that petitioners' claim for damages was barred by
prescription with respect to claims before 1984; that there were no rentals due since private respondent Hontiveros was a
possessor in good faith and for value; and that private respondent Ayson had nothing to do with the case as she was not married to
private respondent Gregorio Hontiveros and did not have any proprietary interest in the subject property. Private respondents
prayed for the dismissal of the complaint and for an order against petitioners to pay damages to private respondents by way of
counterclaim, as well as reconveyance of the subject land to private respondents. 3

On May 16, 1991, petitioners filed an Amended Complaint to insert therein an allegation that "earnest efforts towards a compromise
have been made between the parties but the same were unsuccessful."

In due time, private respondents filed an Answer to Amended Complaint with Counterclaim, in which they denied, among other
things, that earnest efforts had been made to reach a compromise but the parties was unsuccessful.

On July 19, 1995, petitioners moved for a judgment on the pleadings on the ground that private respondents' answer did not tender
an issue or that it otherwise admitted the material allegations of the complaint. 4 Private respondents opposed the motion alleging
that they had denied petitioners' claims and thus tendered certain issues of fact which could only be resolved after
trial.5

On November 23, 1995, the trial court denied petitioners' motion. At the same time, however, it dismissed the case on the ground
that the complaint was not verified as required by Art. 151 of the Family Code and, therefore, it did not believe that earnest efforts
had been made to arrive at a compromise. The order of the trial court reads: 6

The Court, after an assessment of the diverging views and arguments presented by both parties, is of the opinion
and so holds that judgment on the pleadings is inappropriate not only for the fact that the defendants in their
answer, particularly in its paragraph 3 to the amended complaint, specifically denied the claim of damages against
them, but also because of the ruling in De Cruz vs. Cruz, G.R. No. 27759, April 17, 1970 (32 SCRA 307), citing Rili
vs. Chunaco, 98 Phil. 505, which ruled that the party claiming damages must satisfactorily prove the amount
thereof and that though the rule is that failure to specifically deny the allegations in the complaint or counter-claim is
deemed an admission of said allegations, there is however an exception to it, that is, that when the allegations refer
to the amount of damages, the allegations must still be proved. This ruling is in accord with the provision of Section
1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court.

That while the plaintiffs in their amended complaint alleged that earnest efforts towards a compromise with the
defendants were made, the fact is that their complaint was not verified as provided in Article 151 of the Family
Code. Besides, it is not believed that there were indeed earnest efforts made to patch up and/or reconcile the two
feuding brothers, Gregorio and Augusto, both surnamed Hontiveros.

The submission of the plaintiffs that, assuming no such earnest efforts were made, the same is not necessary or
jurisdictional in the light of the ruling in Rufino Magbaleta, et al., petitioner, vs. Hon. Arsenio M. Ganong, et al.,
respondents, No. L-44903, April 22, 1977, is, to the mind of this Court, not applicable to the case at bar for the fact
is the rationale in that case is not present in the instant case considering these salient points:

a) Teodora Ayson, the alleged wife of defendant Gregorio Hontiveros and allegedly not a member of the Hontiveros
Family, is not shown to be really the wife of Gregorio also denied in their verified answer to the amended complaint.

b) Teodora Ayson has not been shown to have acquired any proprietary right or interest in the land that was
litigated by Gregorio and Augusto, unlike the cited case of Magbaleta where it was shown that a stranger to the
family acquired certain right;

c) In the decision rendered by the appellate court no mention was made at all of the name of Teodora Ayson as
part-awardee of Lot 37 that was adjudged to Gregorio other than himself who was therein described as a widower.
Moreover, Teodora was never mentioned in said decision, nor in the amended complaint and in the amended
motion for judgment on the pleadings that she ever took any part in the act of transaction that gave rise to the
damages allegedly suffered by the plaintiffs for which they now claim some compensation.
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 WHEREFORE, in the light of all the foregoing premises, the Court orders, as it hereby orders, the dismissal of this
case with cost against the plaintiffs.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the order of dismissal, but their motion was denied. 7 Hence, this petition for review
on certiorari. Petitioner contend:

I. THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT PALPABLY ERRED IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT ON

THE GROUND THAT IT DOES NOT ALLEGE UNDER OATH THAT EARNEST EFFORTS
TOWARD A COMPROMISE WERE MADE PRIOR TO THE FILING THEREOF AS REQUIRED BY
ARTICLE 151 OF THE FAMILY CODE.

II. THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT PALPABLY ERRED IN NOT DENYING THE MOTION FOR
JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS AND ORDERING A TRIAL ON THE MERITS.

Private respondents raise a preliminary question. They argue that petitioners should have brought this case on appeal to the Court
of Appeals since the order of the trial court judge was actually a decision on the merits. On the other hand, even if petition
for certiorari were the proper remedy, they contend that the petition is defective because the judge of the trial court has not been
impleaded as a respondent.8

Private respondents' contention is without merit. The petition in this case was filed pursuant to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. As
explained in Atlas Consolidated Mining Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals:9

Under Section 5, subparagraph (2)(e), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, the Supreme Court is vested with the
power to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari as the law or the Rules of Court may
provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in all cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.
A similar provision is contained in Section 17, fourth paragraph, subparagraph (4) of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as
amended by Republic Act No. 5440. And, in such cases where only questions of law are involved, Section 25 of the
Interim Rules and Guidelines implementing Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, in conjunction with Section 3 of Republic Act
No. 5440, provides that the appeal to the Supreme Court shall be taken by petition for certiorari which shall be
governed by Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

The rule, therefore, is that direct appeals to this Court from the trial court on questions of law have to be through the
filing of a petition for review on certiorari. It has been held that:

. . . when a CFI (RTC) adjudicates a case in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, the correct
mode of elevating the judgment to the Court of Appeals is by ordinary appeal, or appeal by writ of
error, involving merely the filing of a notice of appeal — except only if the appeal is taken in special
proceedings and other cases wherein multiple appeals are allowed under the law, in which even
the filing of a record on appeal is additionally required. Of course, when the appeal would involve
purely questions of law or any of the other cases (except criminal cases as stated hereunder)
specified in Section 5(2), Article X of the Constitution, it should be taken to the Supreme Court by
petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rules 42 and 45 of the Rules of Court.

By way of implementation of the aforestated provisions of law, this Court issued on March 9, 1930 Circular No. 2-
90, paragraph 2 of which provides:

2. Appeals from Regional Courts to the Supreme Court. — Except in criminal cases where the
penalty imposed is life imprisonment or reclusion perpetua, judgments of regional trial courts may
be appealed to the Supreme Court only by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule
45 of the Rules of Court in relation to Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, this
being the clear intendment of the provision of the Interim Rules that (a)ppeals to the Supreme
Court shall be taken by petition for certiorari which shall be governed by Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court.

Under the foregoing considerations, therefore, the inescapable conclusion is that herein petitioner adopted the
correct mode of appeal in G.R. No. 88354 by filing with this Court petition to review on certiorari the decision of the
Regional Trail Court of Pasig in Civil Case No. 25528 and raising therein purely questions of law.

In Meneses v. Court of Appeals, it was held: 10

It must also be stressed that the trial court's order of 5 June 1992 dismissing the petitioner's complaint was,
whether it was right or wrong, a final order because it had put an end to the particular matter resolved, or settled
definitely the matter therein disposed of and left nothing more to be done by the trial court except the execution of
the order. It is a firmly settled rule that the remedy against such order is the remedy of appeal and not certiorari.
That appeal may be solely on questions of law, in which case it may be taken only to this Court; or on questions of
fact and law, in which case the appeal should be brought to the Court of Appeals. Pursuant to Murillo v. Consul, the
appeal to this Court should be by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
8|Page
As private respondents themselves admit, the order of November 23, 1995 is a final order from which an appeal can be taken. It is
final in the sense that it disposes of the pending action before the court and puts an end to the litigation so that nothing more was
left for the trial court to do. 11 Furthermore, as the questions raised as the questions of law, petition for review on certiorari is the
proper mode of appeal. These questions are: (1) whether after denying petitioners' motion for judgment on the pleadings, the trial
court could dismiss their complaint motu proprio for failure to comply with Art. 151 of the Family Code which provides that no suit
between members of the same family shall prosper unless it appears from the complaint, which must be verified, that earnest efforts
towards a compromise have been made but the same have failed; and (2) whether Art. 151 applies to this case. These questions
do not require an examination of the probative value of evidence presented and the truth or falsehood of facts asserted which
questions of fact would entail. 12

On the other hand, petitioners contend that the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint when no motion to that effect was made
by any of the parties. They point out that, in opposing the motion for judgment on the pleadings, private respondents did not seek
the dismissal of the case but only the denial of petitioners' motion. Indeed, what private respondents asked was that trial be held on
the merits.

Of course, there are instances when the trial court may order the dismissal of the case even without a motion to that effect filed by
any of the parties. In Baja v. Macandog, 13 this Court mentioned these cases, to wit:

The court cannot dismiss a case motu proprio without violating the plaintiff's right to be heard, except in the
following instances: if the plaintiff fails to appear at the time of the trial; if he fails to prosecute his action for
unreasonable length of time; or if he fails to comply with the rules or any order of the court; or if the court finds that
it has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit.

However, none of these exceptions appears in this case.

Moreover, the trial court itself found that "judgment on the pleadings is inappropriate not only for the fact that [private respondents]
in their answer . . . specifically denied the claim of damages against them, but also because of the [rule] . . . that the party claiming
damages must satisfactorily prove the amount thereof. . . . " Necessarily, a trial must be held.

Rule 19 of the Rules of Court provides: 14

Sec. 1. Judgment on the pleadings. — Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material
allegation of the adverse party's pleadings, the court may, on motion of the party, direct judgment on such pleading.
But in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal separation the material facts alleged in the complaint shall
always be proved.

Under the rules, if there is no controverted matter in the case after the answer is filed, the trial court has the discretion to
grant a motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by a party. 15 When there are actual issues raised in the answer, such as
one involving damages, which require the presentation of evidence and assessment thereof by the trial court, it is improper
for the judge to render judgment based on the pleadings alone. 16 In this case, aside from the amount of damages, the
following factual issues have to be resolved, namely, (1) private respondent Teodora Ayson's participation and/or liability, if
any to petitioners and (2) the nature, extent, and duration of private respondents' possession of the subject property. The
trial court, therefore, correctly denied petitioners' motion for judgment on the pleadings.

However, the trial court erred in dismissing petitioners' complaint on the ground that, although it alleged that earnest efforts had
been made toward the settlement of the case but they proved futile, the complaint was not verified for which reason the trial court
could not believe the veracity of the allegation.

The absence of the verification required in Art. 151 does not affect the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of the
complaint. The verification is merely a formal requirement intended to secure an assurance that matters which are alleged are true
and correct. If the court doubted the veracity of the allegations regarding efforts made to settle the case among members of the
same family, it could simply have ordered petitioners to verify them. As this Court has already ruled, the court may simply order the
correction of unverified pleadings or act on it and waive strict compliance with the rules in order that the ends of justice may be
served. 17 Otherwise, mere suspicion or doubt on the part of the trial court as to the truth of the allegation that earnest efforts had
been made toward a compromise but the parties' efforts proved unsuccessful is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. Only if it
is later shown that such efforts had not really been exerted would the court be justified in dismissing the action. Thus, Art. 151
provides:

No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint or
petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed. It if is shown that
no such efforts were in fact made, the case must be dismissed.

This rule shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of compromise under the Civil Code.

Moreover, as petitioners contend, Art. 151 of the Family Code does not apply in this case since the suit is not exclusively among the
family members. Citing several cases 18 decided by this Court, petitioners claim that whenever a stranger is a party in the case
involving the family members, the requisite showing the earnest efforts to compromise is no longer mandatory. They argue that
since private respondent Ayson is admittedly a stranger to the Hontiveros family, the case is not covered by the requirements of Art.
151 of the Family Code.

9|Page
We agree with petitioners. The inclusion of private respondent Ayson as defendant and petitioner Maria Hontiveros as plaintiff takes
the case out of the ambit of Art. 151 of the Family Code. Under this provision, the phrase "members of the same family" refers to
the husband and wife, parents and children, ascendants and descendants, and brothers and sisters, whether full or half-blood. 19 As
this Court held in Guerrero v. RTC, Ilocos Norte, Br. XVI: 20

As early as two decades ago, we already ruled in Gayon v. Gayon that the enumeration of "brothers and sisters" as
member of the same family does not comprehend "sisters-in-law." In that case, then Chief Justice Concepcion
emphasized that "sisters-in-law" (hence, also "brother-in-law") are not listed under Art. 217 of the New Civil Code
as members of the same family. Since Art. 150 of the Family Code repeats essentially the same enumeration of
"members of the family," we find no reason to alter existing jurisprudence on the mater. Consequently, the court a
quo erred in ruling that petitioner Guerrero, being a brother-in-law of private respondent Hernando, was required to
exert earnest efforts towards a compromise before filing the present suit.

Religious relationship and relationship by affinity are not given any legal effect in this jurisdiction. 21 Consequently, private
respondent Ayson, who is described in the complaint as the spouse of respondent Hontiveros, and petitioner Maria
Hontiveros, who is admittedly the spouse of petitioner Augusto Hontiveros, are considered strangers to the Hontiveros
family, for purposes of Art. 151.

Petitioners finally question the constitutionality of Art. 151 of the Family Code on the ground that it in effect amends the Rules of
Court. This, according to them, cannot be done since the Constitution reserves in favor of the Supreme Court the power to
promulgate rules of pleadings and procedure. Considering the conclusion we have reached in this case, however, it is unnecessary
for present purposes to pass upon this question. Courts do not pass upon constitutional questions unless they are the very lis
mota of the case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the Order, dated November 23, 1995 of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch
25 is SET ASIDE and the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this decision.1âwphi1.nêt

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 127578 February 15, 1999

MANUEL DE ASIS, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JAIME T. HAMOY, Branch 130, RTC, Kalookan City and GLEN CAMIL ANDRES DE ASIS
represented by her mother/guardian VIRCEL D. ANDRES, respondents.

PURISIMA, J.:

Petition for certiorari under Rule 65 oft he Revised Rules of Court seeking to nullify the decision of the Court of Appeals which
affirmed the trial court's Orders, dated November 25, 1993 and February 4, 1994, respectively, denying petitioner's Motion to
Dismiss the Complaint in Civil Case No. C-16107, entitled "Glen Camil Andres de Asis, etc. vs. Manuel de Asis", and the motion for
reconsideration.

The pertinent facts leading to the filing of the petition at bar are as follows:

On October 14, 1988, Vircel D. Andres, (the herein private respondent) in her capacity as the legal guardian of the minor, Glen
Camil Andres de Asis, brought an action for maintenance and support against Manuel de Asis, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-88-
935 before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 94, alleging that the defendant Manuel de Asis (the petitioner here) is
the father of subject minor Glen Camil Andres de Asis, and the former refused and/or failed to provide for the maintenance of the
latter, despite repeated demands.

In his Answer, petitioner denied his paternity of the said minor and theorized that he cannot therefore be required to provide support
for him.

On July 4, 1989, private respondent Vircel D. Andres, through counsel, sent in a manifestation the pertinent portion of which, reads;

1. That this proposed Amended Answer, defendant (herein petitioner) has made a judicial admission/declaration
that "1). defendant denies that the said minor child (Glen Camil) is his child 2) he (petitioner) has no obligation to
the plaintiff Glen Camil . . .

2. That with the aforesaid judicial admission/declarations by the defendant, it seems futile and a useless exercise to
claim support from said defendant.

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 3. That under the foregoing circumstances it would be more practical that plaintiff withdraws the complains against
the defendant subject to the condition that the defendant should not pursue his counterclaim in the above-entitled
case, . . . 1

By virtue of the said manifestation, both the plaintiff and the defendant agreed to move for the dismissal of the case. Acting
thereupon, the Regional Trial Court a quo issued the following Order of August 8, 1989, dismissing Civil Case No. Q-88-935 with
prejudice, to wit:

Acting on the manifestation of Atty. Romualdo C. delos Santos, counsel for the defendant, that counsel for the
plaintiff Atty. Ismael J. Andres has no objection that this case be withdrawn provided that the defendant will
withdraw the counterclaim, as prayed for, let the case be dismissed with prejudice.

SO ORDERED.2

On September 7, 1995, another Complaint for maintenance and support was brought against Manuel A. de Asis, this time in the
name of Glen Camil Andres de Asis, represented by her legal guardian/mother, Vircel D. Andres. Docketed as Civil Case No. C-
16107 before Branch 130 of the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan, the said Complaint prayed, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that judgment be rendered ordering defendant:

1. To pay plaintiff the sum of not less than P2,000.00 per month for every month since June 1, 1987 as support in
arrears which defendant failed to provide plaintiff shortly after her birth in June 1987 up to present;

2. To give plaintiff a monthly allowance of P5,000.00 to be paid in advance on or before the 5th of each and every
month.

3. To give plaintiff by way of support pendente lite a monthly allowance of P5,000.00 per month, the first monthly
allowance to start retroactively from the first day of this month and the subsequent ones to be paid in advance on or
before the 5th of each succeeding month.

4. To pay the costs of suit.

Plaintiff prays for such other relief just and equitable under the premises. 3

On October 8, 1993, petitioner moved to dismiss the Complaint on the ground of res judicata, alleging that Civil Case C-16107 is
barred by the prior judgment which dismissed with prejudice Civil Case Q -88-935.

In the Order dated November 25, 1993 denying subject motion to dismiss, the trial court ruled that res judicata is inapplicable in an
action for support for the reason that renunciation or waiver of future support is prohibited by law. Petitioner's motion for
reconsideration of the said Order met the same fate. It was likewise denied.

Petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari. But on June 7, 1996, the Court of Appeals found that the said
Petition devoid of merit and dismissed the same.

Undaunted, petitioner found his way to this court via the present petition, posing the question whether or not the public respondent
acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in upholding the denial of the motion to dismiss by
the trial court, and holding that an action for support cannot be barred by res judicata.

To buttress his submission, petitioner invokes the previous dismissal of the Complaint for maintenance and support, Civil Case Q-
88-935, filed by the mother and guardian of the minor, Glen Camil Andres de Asis, (the herein private respondent). In said case, the
complainant manifested that because of the defendant's judicial declaration denying that he is the father of subject minor child, it
was "futile and a useless exercise to claim support from defendant". Because of such manifestation, and defendant's assurance
that he would not pursue his counterclaim anymore, the parties mutually agreed to move for the dismissal of the complaint. The
motion was granted by the Quezon City Regional Trial Court, which then dismissed the case with prejudice.

Petitioner contends that the aforecited manifestation, in effect admitted the lack of filiation between him and the minor child, which
admission binds the complainant, and since the obligation to give support is based on the existence of paternity and filiation
between the child and the putative parent, the lack thereof negates the right to claim for support. Thus, petitioner maintains that the
dismissal of the Complaint by the lower court on the basis of the said manifestation bars the present action for support, especially
so because the order of the trial court explicitly stated that the dismissal of the case was with prejudice.

The petition is not impressed with merit.

The right to receive support can neither be renounced nor transmitted to a third person. Article 301 of the Civil Code, the law in
point, reads:

Art. 301. The right to receive support cannot be renounced, nor can it be transmitted to a third person. Neither can
it be compensated with what the recipient owes the obligor. . . .
11 | P a g e
Furthermore, future support cannot be the subject of a compromise.

Art. 2035, ibid, provides, that:

No compromise upon the following questions shall be valid:

(1) The civil status of persons;

(2) The validity of a marriage or legal separation;

(3) Any ground for legal separation

(4) Future support;

(5) The jurisdiction of courts;

(6) Future legitime.

The raison d' etre behind the proscription against renunciation, transmission and/or compromise of the right to support is stated,
thus:

The right to support being founded upon the need of the recipient to maintain his existence, he is not entitled to
renounce or transfer the right for this would mean sanctioning the voluntary giving up of life itself. The right to life
cannot be renounce; hence, support which is the means to attain the former, cannot be renounced.

xxx xxx xxx

To allow renunciation or transmission or compensation of the family right of a person to support is virtually to allow
either suicide or the conversion of the recipient to a public burden. This is contrary to public policy. 4

In the case at bar, respondent minor's mother, who was the plaintiff in the first case, manifested that she was withdrawing the case
as it seemed futile to claim support from petitioner who denied his paternity over the child. Since the right to claim for support is
predicated on the existence of filiation between the minor child and the putative parent, petitioner would like us to believe that such
manifestation admitting the futility of claiming support from him puts the issue to rest and bars any and all future complaint for
support.

The manifestation sent in by respondent's mother in the first case, which acknowledged that it would be useless to pursue its
complaint for support, amounted to renunciation as it severed the vinculum that gives the minor, Glen Camil, the right to claim
support from his putative parent, the petitioner. Furthermore, the agreement entered into between the petitioner and respondent's
mother for the dismissal of the complaint for maintenance and support conditioned upon the dismissal of the counterclaim is in the
nature of a compromise which cannot be countenanced. It violates the prohibition against any compromise of the right to support.

Thus, the admission made by counsel for the wife of the facts alleged in a motion of the husband, in which the latter
prayed that his obligation to support be extinguished cannot be considered as an assent to the prayer, and much
less, as a waiver of the right to claim for support. 5

It is true that in order to claim support, filiation and/or paternity must first be shown between the claimant and the parent. However,
paternity and filiation or the lack of the same is a relationship that must be judicially established and it is for the court to declare its
existence or absence. It cannot be left to the will or agreement of the parties.

The civil status of a son having been denied, and this civil status, from which the right to support is derived being in
issue, it is apparent that no effect can be .given to such a claim until an authoritative declaration has been made as
to the existence of the cause. 6

Although in the case under scrutiny, the admission may be binding upon the respondent, such an admission is at most evidentiary
and does not conclusively establish the lack of filiation.

Neither are we persuaded by petitioner's theory that the dismissal with prejudice of Civil Case Q-88-935 has the effect of res
judicata on the subsequent case for support. The case of Advincula vs. Advincula 7 comes to the fore. In Advincula, the minor,
Manuela Advincula, instituted a case for acknowledgment and support against her putative father, Manuel Advincula. On motion of
both parties and for the reason that the "plaintiff has lost interest and is no longer interested in continuing the case against the
defendant and has no further evidence to introduce in support of the complaint", the case was dismissed. Thereafter, a similar case
was instituted by Manuela, which the defendant moved to dismiss, theorizing that the dismissal of the first case precluded the filing
of the second case.

In disposing such case, this Court ruled, thus:

12 | P a g e
 The new Civil Code provides that the allowance for support is provisional because the amount may be increased or
decreased depending upon the means of the giver and the needs of the recipient (Art. 297); and that the right to
receive support cannot be renounced nor can it be transmitted to a third person neither can it be compensated with
what the recipient owes the obligator (Art .301). Furthermore, the right to support can not be waived or transferred
to third parties and future support cannot be the subject of compromise (Art. 2035; Coral v. Gallego, 38 O.G. 3135,
cited in IV Civil Code by Padilla, p. 648; 1956 Ed.). This being true, it is indisputable that the present action for
support can be brought, notwithstanding the fact the previous case filed against the same defendant was
dismissed. And it also appearing that the dismissal of Civil Case No. 3553, was not an adjudication upon the merits,
as heretofore shown, the right of herein plaintiff-appellant to reiterate her suit for support and acknowledgment is
available, as her needs arise. Once the needs of plaintiff arise, she has the right to bring an action for support, for it
is only then that her cause for action is accrues.. . .

xxx xxx xxx

It appears that the former dismissal was predicated upon compromise. Acknowledgment, affecting as it does the
civil status of a persons and future support, cannot be the subject of compromise (pars. 1 & 4, Art. 2035, Civil
Code). Hence, the first dismissal cannot have force and effect and can not bar the filing of another action, asking
for the same relief against the same defendant. (emphasis supplied).

Conformably, notwithstanding the dismissal of Civil Case Q-88-935 and the lower court's pronouncement that such dismissal was
with prejudice, the second action for support may still prosper.

WHEREFORE, the petition under consideration is hereby DISMISSED and the decision of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED. No
pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Romero, Vitug, Panganiban and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 163209 October 30, 2009

SPOUSES PRUDENCIO and FILOMENA LIM, Petitioners,

vs.
MA. CHERYL S. LIM, for herself and on behalf of her minor children LESTER EDWARD S. LIM, CANDICE GRACE S. LIM,
and MARIANO S. LIM, III, Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

For review1 is the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals, dated 28 April 2003, ordering petitioners Prudencio and Filomena Lim
(petitioners) to provide legal support to respondents Cheryl, Lester Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano III, all surnamed Lim
(respondents).

The Facts

In 1979, respondent Cheryl S. Lim (Cheryl) married Edward Lim (Edward), son of petitioners. Cheryl bore Edward three children,
respondents Lester Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano III. Cheryl, Edward and their children resided at the house of petitioners in
Forbes Park, Makati City, together with Edward’s ailing grandmother, Chua Giak and her husband Mariano Lim (Mariano). Edward’s
family business, which provided him with a monthly salary of ₱6,000, shouldered the family expenses. Cheryl had no steady source
of income.

On 14 October 1990, Cheryl abandoned the Forbes Park residence, bringing the children with her (then all minors), after a violent
confrontation with Edward whom she caught with the in-house midwife of Chua Giak in what the trial court described "a very
compromising situation."3

Cheryl, for herself and her children, sued petitioners, Edward, Chua Giak and Mariano (defendants) in the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City, Branch 140 (trial court) for support. The trial court ordered Edward to provide monthly support of ₱6,000 pendente lite.4

The Ruling of the Trial Court

On 31 January 1996, the trial court rendered judgment ordering Edward and petitioners to "jointly" provide ₱40,000 monthly support
to respondents, with Edward shouldering ₱6,000 and petitioners the balance of ₱34,000 subject to Chua Giak’s subsidiary liability.5

13 | P a g e
The defendants sought reconsideration, questioning their liability. The trial court, while denying reconsideration, clarified that
petitioners and Chua Giak were held jointly liable with Edward because of the latter’s "inability x x x to give sufficient support x x x."6

Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals assailing, among others, their liability to support respondents. Petitioners argued that
while Edward’s income is insufficient, the law itself sanctions its effects by providing that legal support should be "in keeping with
the financial capacity of the family" under Article 194 of the Civil Code, as amended by Executive Order No. 209 (The Family Code
of the Philippines).7

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In its Decision dated 28 April 2003, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. On the issue material to this appeal, that is,
whether there is basis to hold petitioners, as Edward’s parents, liable with him to support respondents, the Court of Appeals held:

The law on support under Article 195 of the Family Code is clear on this matter. Parents and their legitimate children are obliged to
mutually support one another and this obligation extends down to the legitimate grandchildren and great grandchildren.

In connection with this provision, Article 200 paragraph (3) of the Family Code clearly provides that should the person obliged to
give support does not have sufficient means to satisfy all claims, the other persons enumerated in Article 199 in its order shall
provide the necessary support. This is because the closer the relationship of the relatives, the stronger the tie that binds them.
Thus, the obligation to support is imposed first upon the shoulders of the closer relatives and only in their default is the obligation
moved to the next nearer relatives and so on.8

Petitioners sought reconsideration but the Court of Appeals denied their motion in the Resolution dated 12 April 2004.

Hence, this petition.

The Issue

The issue is whether petitioners are concurrently liable with Edward to provide support to respondents.

The Ruling of the Court

We rule in the affirmative. However, we modify the appealed judgment by limiting petitioners’ liability to the amount of monthly
support needed by respondents Lester Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano III only.

Petitioners Liable to Provide Support but only to their Grandchildren

By statutory9 and jurisprudential mandate,10 the liability of ascendants to provide legal support to their descendants is beyond cavil.
Petitioners themselves admit as much – they limit their petition to the narrow question of when their liability is triggered, not if they
are liable. Relying on provisions11 found in Title IX of the Civil Code, as amended, on Parental Authority, petitioners theorize that
their liability is activated only upon default of parental authority, conceivably either by its termination12 or suspension13 during the
children’s minority. Because at the time respondents sued for support, Cheryl and Edward exercised parental authority over their
children,14 petitioners submit that the obligation to support the latter’s offspring ends with them.

Neither the text of the law nor the teaching of jurisprudence supports this severe constriction of the scope of familial obligation to
give support. In the first place, the governing text are the relevant provisions in Title VIII of the Civil Code, as amended, on Support,
not the provisions in Title IX on Parental Authority. While both areas share a common ground in that parental authority
encompasses the obligation to provide legal support,15 they differ in other concerns including the duration of the obligation and
its concurrence among relatives of differing degrees.16 Thus, although the obligation to provide support arising from parental
authority ends upon the emancipation of the child,17 the same obligation arising from spousal and general familial ties ideally lasts
during the obligee's lifetime.. Also, while parental authority under Title IX (and the correlative parental rights) pertains to parents,
passing to ascendants only upon its termination or suspension, the obligation to provide legal support passes on to ascendants not
only upon default of the parents but also for the latter’s inability to provide sufficient support. As we observed in another case raising
the ancillary issue of an ascendant’s obligation to give support in light of the father’s sufficient means:

Professor Pineda is of the view that grandchildren cannot demand support directly from their grandparents if they have parents
(ascendants of nearest degree) who are capable of supporting them. This is so because we have to follow the order of support
under Art. 199. We agree with this view.

xxxx

There is no showing that private respondent is without means to support his son; neither is there any evidence to prove that
petitioner, as the paternal grandmother, was willing to voluntarily provide for her grandson's legal support. x x x 18 (Emphasis
supplied; internal citations omitted)

Here, there is no question that Cheryl is unable to discharge her obligation to provide sufficient legal support to her children, then all
school-bound. It is also undisputed that the amount of support Edward is able to give to respondents, ₱6,000 a month, is insufficient
to meet respondents’ basic needs. This inability of Edward and Cheryl to sufficiently provide for their children shifts a portion of their

14 | P a g e
obligation to the ascendants in the nearest degree, both in the paternal (petitioners) and maternal19 lines, following the ordering in
Article 199. To hold otherwise, and thus subscribe to petitioners’ theory, is to sanction the anomalous scenario of tolerating extreme
material deprivation of children because of parental inability to give adequate support even if ascendants one degree removed are
more than able to fill the void.1avvphi1

However, petitioners’ partial concurrent obligation extends only to their descendants as this word is commonly understood to refer
to relatives, by blood of lower degree. As petitioners’ grandchildren by blood, only respondents Lester Edward, Candice Grace and
Mariano III belong to this category. Indeed, Cheryl’s right to receive support from the Lim family extends only to her husband
Edward, arising from their marital bond.20 Unfortunately, Cheryl’s share from the amount of monthly support the trial court awarded
cannot be determined from the records. Thus, we are constrained to remand the case to the trial court for this limited purpose.21

Petitioners Precluded from Availing of the Alternative Option Under

Article 204 of the Civil Code, as Amended

As an alternative proposition, petitioners wish to avail of the option in Article 204 of the Civil Code, as amended, and pray that they
be allowed to fulfill their obligation by maintaining respondents at petitioners’ Makati residence. The option is unavailable to
petitioners.

The application of Article 204 which provides that —

The person obliged to give support shall have the option to fulfill the obligation either by paying the allowance fixed, or by receiving
and maintaining in the family dwelling the person who has a right to receive support. The latter alternative cannot be availed of in
case there is a moral or legal obstacle thereto. (Emphasis supplied)

is subject to its exception clause. Here, the persons entitled to receive support are petitioners’ grandchildren and daughter-in-law.
Granting petitioners the option in Article 204 will secure to the grandchildren a well-provided future; however, it will also force Cheryl
to return to the house which, for her, is the scene of her husband’s infidelity. While not rising to the level of a legal obstacle, as
indeed, Cheryl’s charge against Edward for concubinage did not prosper for insufficient evidence, her steadfast insistence on its
occurrence amounts to a moral impediment bringing the case within the ambit of the exception clause of Article 204, precluding its
application.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 28 April 2003, and its Resolution
dated 12 April 2004 with the MODIFICATION that petitioners Prudencio and Filomena Lim are liable to provide support only to
respondents Lester Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano III, all surnamed Lim. We REMAND the case to the Regional Trial Court
of Makati City, Branch 140, for further proceedings consistent with this ruling.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-11005 October 31, 1957

SIARI VALLEY ESTATES, INC., petitioner,

vs.
FILEMON LUCASAN and Hon. W. M. ORTEGA, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte, respondents.

Orendain and Sarmiento for petitioner.

Hon. Wenceslao M. Ortega in his own behalf.
Barrios, Barrios and Lucasan for respondents.

BENGZON, J.:

This is an offshoot of our decision in G.R. No. L-7046, Siari Valley Estate Inc, vs. Filemon Lucasan,1 wherein we affirmed, on
appeal, the judgment of Hon. Patricio Ceniza, of the Zamboanga court of first instance in its Civil Case No. 134. The dispositive part
of such affirmed judgment read as follows:

Valley Estate all the cattle that may be found in the cattle ranch ". . . judgment is hereby rendered adjudicating to the Siari
of Filemon Lucasan specially the 321 heads that had been entrusted to his care as receiver or trustee of this Court and
ordering the defendant to deliver to the plaintiff all said cattle or their value amounting to P40,000 to pay damages to the
Siari Valley Estate for the 400 heads of cattle that he sold since 1946 up to the date of the trial at the rate of P100 per head
or P40,000 plus interest at the rate of 6 per cent from the date of the trial of this case in January, 1951 and to pay the cost
of the proceeding. In addition, the defendant is hereby ordered to allow the Siari Valley Estate to round up all the buffaloes

15 | P a g e
 that may be found in his cattle ranch after the Siari Valley Estate shall have posted a bond in the amount of P5,000 to
answer for whatever damages the operation may cause to him.

With regard to the contempt proceedings, Filemon Lucasan is hereby found guilty of the charges and he is hereby sentenced to pay
a fine of P500 pursuant to section 6 Rule 64 of the Rules of Court or suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency at the rate
of one day every P2.50 that he falls to pay.

With regard to the three causes of action the counter-claim of the defendant, all of them are hereby dismissed for lack of merit.

Upon petition by the intervenors, the intervention had been dismissed in a previous order of this Court, without prejudice to the filing
of an independent action. (emphasis ours.)

After our decision had become final, the expediente was returned to the court below for execution. Thereupon a dispute arose
whether we had affirmed also that part of Judge Ceniza's judgement underlined in the above quotation (concerning buffaloes)
Lucasan pointed out that, in quoting the dispositive paragraphs of the appealed judgment, our decision had omitted the underlined
portion. Therefore, he argued, the affirmance of the judgment did not include the directive about buffaloes. As the respondent judge
sustained Lucasan's contention, this petition for mandamus and other auxiliary remedies was promptly filed.

Knowing the extent and scope of our decision in said appealed case, we issued a preliminary injunction designed to protest
petitioner's interests. And now, after the parties have been heard, we turn to the principal question, which is: did we uphold the right
given to plaintiff by the court below "to round up the buffaloes"? The answer must be: we did. In the concluding part of our decision
we found the appealed judgment to be substantially in accordance with the facts and the law; and then we adjudged: "Therefore it is
hereby affirmed with appellant."

Ordinarily the affirmed judgment is that contained in its dispositive part; in the said Siari Valley appealed case, the above-quoted
four paragraphs.

It is true that in the opening statements our decision quoted the dispositive part of the appealed judgment as follows:

Premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered, adjudicating to the Siari Valley Estate all the cattle that may be found in
the cattle ranch of Filemon Lucasan, specially the 321 heads that had been entrusted to his care as receiver or trustee of
this Court and ordering the defendant to deliver to the plaintiff all said cattle or their value amounting to P40,000, to pay
damages to the Siari Valley Estate for the 400 heads of cattle that he sold since 1946 up to the date of the trial at the rate of
P100 per head or P40,000 plus interest at the rate of 6 per cent from the date of the trial of this case in January, 1951 and
to pay the costs of the proceeding.

With regard to the contempt proceedings, Filemon Lucasan is hereby found guilty of the charges and he is hereby
sentenced to pay a fine of P500 pursuant to section 6, Rule 64, of the Rules of Court or suffer subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency at the rate of one day for every P2.50 that he fails to pay.

thereby omitting the portion regarding buffaloes. But observe that we used elliptical signs, i. e. several *'s which indicated the
omission of some portion or portions. This did not evince any intention to "modify" the judgment by eliminating the omitted
portion.2 The judgment, we decreed in concluding, "is hereby affirmed". We did not say, it is hereby modified. Neither did we say,
"the quoted portion of the judgment is hereby affirmed". For that matter, would respondents maintain likewise the last two
paragraphs of the dispositive part of the appealed judgment (regarding the counterclaim and the intervenors) were not equally
affirmed, because they were not quoted?

We explained in Contreras vs. Felix, 78 Phil., 570, 44 Off. Gaz., 4306 that "the final judgment as rendered is the judgment of the
court, irrespective of all seemingly contrary statements in the decision", and that the judgement must be distinguished from the
opinion. Our decree was one affirming the appealed judgment. If any statement in the opinion preceding the decree seemingly
excluded a portion (which we deny), it must be overlooked, because the judgment or the decree prevails over the opinion.

In construing confirmatory decisions of appellate courts the practice is to regard the whole of the appealed judgment to have been
upheld3 even if several points thereof have not been discussed "or touched upon such confirmatory decision." 4

The truth is, as may be verified from our decision itself, our statement omitted the portion concerning buffaloes because it was
immaterial for the purpose of the appeal. It was not a point necessary to understand or decide the questions then before us. 5 Indeed
the whole decision made no reference to the subject of buffaloes, even as appellant's brief (Lucasan) failed to debate such aspect
of the appealed judgment.

The argument is advanced that inasmuch as the plaintiff "never claimed the buffaloes in its amended complaint (and) the (lower)
court could not have granted that which was not prayed", therefore the Supreme Court most probably had excluded the matter (of
buffaloes) from its confirmatory order. Such reasoning has no valid foundation because Lucasan was not in default, there was trial,
and under the circumstances the plaintiff could be granted any relief that was supported by the evidence "although not specified in
his pleadings."6 The other argument addressed to the proposition that the Court shouldn't have, and couldn't have affirmed that
phase of the judgment is too late, if not impertinent. The affirmance without modification of the judgment is final. And the parties
should realize that the matter of buffaloes was not such plain error (supposing it was error) as to call for special consideration by
this Court even if ignored7 by appellant's counsel in his brief.

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All the foregoing shows the respondent judge's mistake in declining to permit Siari Valley Inc. to round up its buffaloes roaming on
Lucasan's ranch. But the latter's resistance to such rounding-up, founded on a rather technical plea, despite his knowledge that he
had complained of such buffaloes grazing on his land (R. A. in L-7046 p. 140), was not a mere mistake but a rather sharp practice
transcending the limits of good faith. However-overruling petitioner's contention-Lucasan will not be declared to have committed
contempt of court considering on the one hand that his ground of objection appeared to be not so flimsy 8 as to make his conduct a
"willful disregard or disobedience"9 or a "clear and contumacious refusal to obey"10 and on the other hand remembering that the
power to punish for contempt should be conservatively exercised.

Wherefore, the petition for mandamus is granted, the respondent judge, and whoever may be acting in his place, is hereby ordered
to enforce, and the other respondent Filemon Lucasan is ordered to obey, the aforementioned judgment in full of Judge Ceniza
which was totally affirmed by this Court on appeal. Costs of this proceeding shall be paid respondent Lucasan. So ordered.

Paras, C.J., Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Endencia, and Felix,
JJ, concur.

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 86355 May 31, 1990

JOSE MODEQUILLO, petitioner,

vs.
HON. AUGUSTO V. BREVA FRANCISCO SALINAS, FLORIPER ABELLAN-SALINAS, JUANITO CULAN-CULAN and DEPUTY
SHERIFF FERNANDO PLATA respondents.

Josefina Brandares-Almazan for petitioner.

ABC Law Offices for private respondents.

GANCAYCO, J.:

The issue in this petition is whether or not a final judgment of the Court of Appeals in an action for damages may be satisfied by
way of execution of a family home constituted under the Family Code.

The facts are undisputed.

On January 29, 1988, a judgment was rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 09218 entitled "Francisco Salinas, et
al. vs. Jose Modequillo, et al.," the dispositive part of which read as follows:

WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal should be, as it is hereby, reversed and set aside. Judgment is hereby
rendered finding the defendants-appellees Jose Modequillo and Benito Malubay jointly and severally liable to
plaintiffs-appellants as hereinbelow set forth. Accordingly, defendants-appellees are ordered to pay jointly and
severally to:

1. Plaintiffs-appellants, the Salinas spouses:

a. the amount of P30,000.00 by way of compensation for the death of their son Audie Salinas;

b. P10,000.00 for the loss of earnings by reason of the death of said Audie Salinas;

c. the sum of P5,000.00 as burial expenses of Audie Salinas; and

d. the sum of P5,000.00 by way of moral damages.

2. Plaintiffs-appellants Culan-Culan:

a. the sum of P5,000.00 for hospitalization expenses of Renato Culan- Culan; and

b. P5,000.00 for moral damages.

3. Both plaintiff-appellants Salinas and Culan-Culan, P7,000.00 for attorney's fees and litigation expenses.

All counterclaims and other claims are hereby dismissed. 1

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The said judgment having become final and executory, a writ of execution was issued by the Regional Trial Court of Davao City to
satisfy the said judgment on the goods and chattels of the defendants Jose Modequillo and Benito Malubay at Malalag, Davao del
Sur.

On July 7, 1988, the sheriff levied on a parcel of residential land located at Poblacion Malalag, Davao del Sur containing an area of
600 square meters with a market value of P34,550.00 and assessed value of P7,570.00 per Tax Declaration No. 87008-01359,
registered in the name of Jose Modequillo in the office of the Provincial Assessor of Davao del Sur; and a parcel of agricultural land
located at Dalagbong Bulacan, Malalag, Davao del Sur containing an area of 3 hectares with a market value of P24,130.00 and
assessed value of P9,650.00 per Tax Declaration No. 87-08-01848 registered in the name of Jose Modequillo in the office of the
Provincial Assessor of Davao del Sur. 2

A motion to quash and/or to set aside levy of execution was filed by defendant Jose Modequillo alleging therein that the residential
land located at Poblacion Malalag is where the family home is built since 1969 prior to the commencement of this case and as such
is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment under Articles 152 and 153 of the Family Code except for liabilities mentioned
in Article 155 thereof, and that the judgment debt sought to be enforced against the family home of defendant is not one of those
enumerated under Article 155 of the Family Code. As to the agricultural land although it is declared in the name of defendant it is
alleged to be still part of the public land and the transfer in his favor by the original possessor and applicant who was a member of a
cultural minority was not approved by the proper government agency. An opposition thereto was filed by the plaintiffs.

In an order dated August 26, 1988, the trial court denied the motion. A motion for reconsideration thereof was filed by defendant
and this was denied for lack of merit on September 2, 1988.

Hence, the herein petition for review on certiorari wherein it is alleged that the trial court erred and acted in excess of its jurisdiction
in denying petitioner's motion to quash and/or to set aside levy on the properties and in denying petitioner' motion for
reconsideration of the order dated August 26, 1988. Petitioner contends that only a question of law is involved in this petition. He
asserts that the residential house and lot was first occupied as his family residence in 1969 and was duly constituted as a family
home under the Family Code which took effect on August 4, 1988. Thus, petitioner argues that the said residential house and lot is
exempt from payment of the obligation enumerated in Article 155 of the Family Code; and that the decision in this case pertaining to
damages arising from a vehicular accident took place on March 16, 1976 and which became final in 1988 is not one of those
instances enumerated under Article 155 of the Family Code when the family home may be levied upon and sold on execution. It is
further alleged that the trial court erred in holding that the said house and lot became a family home only on August 4, 1988 when
the Family Code became effective, and that the Family Code cannot be interpreted in such a way that all family residences are
deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time of their occupancy prior to the effectivity of the said Code and that
they are exempt from execution for the payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of said Code; and that it also erred
when it declared that Article 162 of the Family Code does not state that the provisions of Chapter 2, Title V have a retroactive effect.

Articles 152 and 153 of the Family Code provide as follows:

Art. 152. The family home, constituted jointly by the husband and the wife or by an unmarried head of a family, is
the dwelling house where they and their family reside, and the land on which it is situated.

Art. 153. The family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family
residence. From the time of its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein, the family
home continues to be such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except as hereinafter provided
and to the extent of the value allowed by law.

Under the Family Code, a family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence.
There is no need to constitute the same judicially or extrajudicially as required in the Civil Code. If the family actually resides in the
premises, it is, therefore, a family home as contemplated by law. Thus, the creditors should take the necessary precautions to
protect their interest before extending credit to the spouses or head of the family who owns the home.

Article 155 of the Family Code also provides as follows:

Art. 155. The family home shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except:

(1) For non-payment of taxes;

(2) For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home;

(3) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such constitution; and

(4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, material men and others who have rendered service
or furnished material for the construction of the building.

The exemption provided as aforestated is effective from the time of the constitution of the family home as such, and lasts so long as
any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein.

In the present case, the residential house and lot of petitioner was not constituted as a family home whether judicially or
extrajudicially under the Civil Code. It became a family home by operation of law only under Article 153 of the Family Code. It is
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deemed constituted as a family home upon the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 not August 4, one year after its
publication in the Manila Chronicle on August 4, 1987 (1988 being a leap year).

The contention of petitioner that it should be considered a family home from the time it was occupied by petitioner and his family in
1969 is not well- taken. Under Article 162 of the Family Code, it is provided that "the provisions of this Chapter shall also govern
existing family residences insofar as said provisions are applicable." It does not mean that Articles 152 and 153 of said Code have a
retroactive effect such that all existing family residences are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time of their
occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and are exempt from execution for the payment of obligations incurred before
the effectivity of the Family Code. Article 162 simply means that all existing family residences at the time of the effectivity of the
Family Code, are considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the
Family Code. Article 162 does not state that the provisions of Chapter 2, Title V have a retroactive effect.

Is the family home of petitioner exempt from execution of the money judgment aforecited No. The debt or liability which was the
basis of the judgment arose or was incurred at the time of the vehicular accident on March 16, 1976 and the money judgment
arising therefrom was rendered by the appellate court on January 29, 1988. Both preceded the effectivity of the Family Code on
August 3, 1988. This case does not fall under the exemptions from execution provided in the Family Code.

As to the agricultural land subject of the execution, the trial court correctly ruled that the levy to be made by the sheriff shall be on
whatever rights the petitioner may have on the land.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa (Chairman), Cruz and Medialdea, JJ., concur. Griño-Aquino, J., is on leave.

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 108532 March 9, 1999

PABLITO TANEO, JR., JOSE TANEO, NENA T. CATUBIG and HUSBAND, CILIA T. MORING and HUSBAND, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ABDON GILIG, respondents.

KAPUNAN, J.:

The issues in this case are not novel: whether or not the conveyance made by way of the sheriff's sale pursuant to the writ of
execution issued by the trial court in Civil Case No. 590 is prohibited under Sec. 118 of Commonwealth Act No. 141; and whether or
not the family home is exempt from execution.

As a result of a judgment in Civil Case No. 590 (for recovery of property) in favor of private respondent, two (2) of petitioners'
properties were levied to satisfy the judgment amount of about P5,000.00: one was a parcel of land located in Barrio Igpit,
Municipality of Opol, Misamis Oriental with an area of about five (5) hectares, and the other was the family home also located at
Igpit, Opol, Misamis Oriental. The subject properties were sold at public auction on February 12, 1966 to the private respondent as
the highest bidder. Consequently, after petitioners' failure to redeem the same, a final deed of conveyance was executed on
February 9, 1968, definitely selling, transferring, and conveying said properties to the private respondent.

To forestall such conveyance, petitioners filed an action on November 5, 1985 (docketed as Civil Case No. 10407) to declare the
deed of conveyance void and to quiet title over the land with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. In their complaint, it was
alleged that petitioners are the children and heirs of Pablo Taneo and Narcisa Valaceras who died on February 12, 1977 and
September 12, 1984, respectively. Upon their death, they left the subject property covered by OCT No. P-12820 and Free Patent
No. 548906. Considering that said property has been acquired through free patent, such property is therefore inalienable and not
subject to any encumbrance for the payment of debt, pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. 141. Petitioners further alleged that they
were in continuous, open and peaceful possession of the land and that on February 9, 1968. Deputy Provincial Sheriff Jose V.
Yasay issued a Sheriffs Deed of Conveyance in favor of the private respondent over the subject property including their family
home which was extrajudicially constituted in accordance with law. As a result of the alleged illegal deed of conveyance, private
respondent was able to obtain in his name Tax Declaration No. 851920 over the land, thus casting a cloud of doubt over the title
and ownership of petitioners over said property.

Private respondent refuted petitioners' contentions alleging that he lawfully acquired the subject properties described as Lot No.
5545, Cad. 237 which was a private land, by virtue of a Sheriffs Sale on February 12, 1996. Said sale has become final as no
redemption was made within one year from the registration of the Sheriffs Certificate of Sale. The validity of the sale in favor of
Abdon Gilig was even confirmed by the Court of Appeals in a related case (CA No. 499965-R) entitled "Arriola v. Gilig," where one
Rufino Arriola also claimed ownership over the subject property.

19 | P a g e
Private respondent averred that the subject land was originally owned by Lazaro Ba-a who sold the land to Pablo Taneo on
September 18, 1941, as evidenced by an Escritura de Venta. Despite it being a private land, Pablo Taneo filed an application for
free patent which was final only in 1979.

As counterclaim, private respondent alleged that since petitioners are still in possession of the subject property, he has been
deprived of acts of ownership and possession and therefore, prayed for payment of rentals from February, 1968 until possession
has been restored to them.

In its decision of March 27, 1989, the RTC dismissed the complaint.

The dispositive portion thereof reads as follows:

Premises considered, Judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiffs, ordering the
dismissal of the complaint filed by the plaintiffs;

a) Declaring OCT No. P-12820 and Free Patent No 548906 both in the name of Pablo Taneo as
null and void and directing the Register of Deeds to cancel the same, without prejudice however on
the part of the defendant to institute legal proceedings for the transfer of the said title in the name
of defendant Abdon Gilig;

b) Declaring Abdon Gilig as the absolute and legal owner of the land covered by OCT No. P-12820,
and covered by Tax Declaration No. 851920, and hence entitled to the possession of the same and
as a necessary concomitant, admonishing the plaintiffs to refrain from disturbing the peaceful
possession of the defendant over the land in question.

c) Likewise declaring the defendant Abdon Gilig as the true and absolute owner of the house in
question formerly declared under Tax Declaration No. 4142 in the name of Pablo Taneo and
presently declared under Tax Declaration No 851916 in the name of Abdon Gilig; ordering the
plaintiffs or any of their representatives to vacate and return the possession of the same to
defendant Abdon Gilig;

d) Ordering the plaintiffs, except the nominal parties herein, to pay to defendant Abdon Gilig the
amount of P500.00 a month as reasonable rental of the house in question to be reckoned from
February 9, 1968 until the possession of the same is returned to the defendant.

e) To pay to defendant the amount of P5,000.00 as attorney's fees and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED. 1

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC.

Hence, this petition.

The petition is devoid of merit.

In resolving the issues, the lower court made the following findings of fact which this Court finds no cogent reason to disturb:

1. That the land in question originally belonged to Lazaro Ba-a who sold the same to the late
Pablito (sic) Taneo father of the herein plaintiff on September 18, 1941, by virtue of an Escritura de
Venta identified as Reg. Not. 50; pages 53, Foleo Not. V, Series of 1941 of the Notarial Register of
Ernie Pelaez (Exh. 10);

2. That on July 19, 1951 Abdon Gilig with his wife filed a Civil Case No. 590 for recovery of
property against Pablo Taneo, et al., wherein Judgment was rendered on June 24, 1964, in favor of
Abdon Gilig and against Pablo Taneo ordering the latter to pay damages in the amount of
P5,000.00 (Exh. 2);

3. That by virtue of said decision, a writ of Execution was issued on November 22, 1965 against the
properties of Pablo Taneo and on December 1, 1965, a Notice of Levy was executed by the Clerk
of Court Pedro Perez wherein the properties in question were among the properties levied by the
Sheriff (Exh 3);

4. That the said properties were sold at public auction wherein the defendant Abdon Gilig came out
as the highest bidder and on February 12, 1965, a Sheriffs Certificate of Sale was executed by Ex-
Oficio Provincial Sheriff Pedro Perez (Exh. 1) ceding the said properties in favor of Abdon Gilig and
which Certificate of Sale was registered with the Register of Deeds on March 2, 1966;

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 5. That for failure to redeem the said property within the reglementary period, a Sheriffs final Deed
of Conveyance was executed by same Provincial Sheriff Jose V. Yasay on February 1968, (Exhs.
4, 4-A) conveying the property definitely to Abdon Gilig.

6. That on April 20, 1966, after his third-party claim which he filed with the Sheriff in Civil Case No.
590 was not given due course, Rufino Arriola filed Civil Case No. 2667 entitled Arriola vs. Abdon
Gilig, et al., for Recovery of Property and/or annulment of Sale with Damages;

7. That Judgment was rendered by the Court thru Judge Bernardo Teves dismissing the case with
costs on February 21, 1969;

8. That said decision was appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision in toto on
June 20, 979, declaring the alleged Deed of Sale executed by Abdon Gilig in favor of the plaintiff as
null and void for being simulated or fictitious and executed in fraud or (sic) creditors;

9. That on March 7, 1964, Pablo Taneo constituted the house in question erected on the land of
Plutarco Vacalares as a family home (Exh. F) but was however, notarized only on May 2, 1965 and
registered with the Register of Deeds on June 24, 1966.

10. That in the meanwhile, unknown to the defendant, Pablo Taneo applied for a free patent on the
land in question which was approved on October 13, 1973, (Exh. B) and the Patent and Title
issued on December 10, 1980 (Oct No. P-12820 - Exh. 12);

11. On November 3, 1985, the plaintiff filed the present action. 2

Petitioners contend that under Section 118 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, the subject land which they inherited from their father
under free patent cannot be alienated or encumbered in violation of the law. Citing in particular the cases of Oliveros v.
Porciongcola 3 and Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals, 4 the execution or auction sale of the litigated land falls within the prohibited
period and is. likewise, a disavowal of the rationale of the law which is to give the homesteader or patentee every chance to
preserve for himself and his family the land which the State had gratuitously given to him as a reward for his labor in cleaning and
cultivating it. 5

We are not unmindful of the intent of the law. In fact, in Republic v. Court of Appeals, 6 the Court elucidated, to wit:

It is well-known that the homestead laws were designed to distribute disposable agricultural lots of the State to
land-destitute citizens for their home and cultivation. Pursuant to such benevolent intention the State prohibits the
sale or encumbrance of the homestead (Section 116) within five years after the grant of the patent. After that five-
year period the law impliedly permits alienation of the favor homestead; but in line with the primordial purpose to
favor the homesteader and his family the statute provides that such alienation or conveyance (Section 117) shall be
subject to the right of repurchase by the homesteader, his widow of heirs within five years. This Section 117 is
undoubtedly a complement of Section 116. It aims to preserve and keep in the family of the homesteader that
portion of public land which the State had gratuitously given to him. It would, therefore, be in keeping with this
fundamental idea to hold, as we hold, that the right to repurchase exists not only when the original homesteader
makes the conveyance, but also when it is made by his widow or heirs. This construction is clearly deducible from
the terms of the statute.

The intent of the law is undisputable but under the facts of the case, the prohibition invoked by the petitioners under Section 118
does not apply to them.

Sec. 118 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 reads:

Except in favor of the Government or any of its branches, units or institution, or legally constituted banking
corporations, lands acquired under free patent or homestead provisions shall not be subject to encumbrance or
alienation from the date of the approval of the application and for a term of five years from and after the date of
issuance of the patent or grant, nor shall they become liable to the satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to the
expiration of said period, but the improvements or crops on the land may be mortgaged or pledged to qualified
persons, associations, or corporations.

xxx xxx xxx

The prohibition against alienation of lands acquired by homestead or free patent commences on the date of the approval of the
application for free patent and the five-year period is counted from the issuance of the patent. The reckoning point is actually the
date of approval of the application. In Amper v. Presiding Judge, 7 the Court held that:

. . . The date when the prohibition against the alienation of lands acquired by homesteads or free patents
commences is "the date of the approval of the application" and the prohibition embraces the entire five-year period
"from and after the date of issuance of the patent or, grant." As stated in Beniga v. Bugas, (35 SCRA 111), the
provision would make no sense if the prohibition starting "from the date of the approval of the application" would
have no termination date.
21 | P a g e
 The specific period of five years within which the alienation or encumbrance of a homestead is restricted starts to
be computed from the date of the issuance of the patent. But the prohibition of alienation commences from the date
the application is approved which comes earlier. (Emphasis ours.)

Following this ruling, we agree with the respondent court that the conveyance made by way of the sheriff's sale was not violative of
the law. The judgment obligation of the petitioners against Abdon Gilig arose on June 24, 1964. The properties were levied and sold
at public auction with Abdon Gilig as the highest bidder on February 12, 1966. On February 9, 1968, the final deed of conveyance
ceding the subject property to Abdon Gilig was issued after the petitioners failed to redeem the property after the reglementary
period. Pablo Taneo`s application for free parent was approved only on October 19, 1973.

The sequence of the events leads us to the inescapable conclusion that even before the application for homestead had been
approved, Pablo Taneo was no longer the owner of the land. The deed of conveyance issued on February 9, 1968 finally
transferred the property to Abdon Gilig. As of that date, Pablo Taneo did not actually have transferred to herein petitioners. The
petitioners are not the owners of the land and cannot claim to be such by invoking Commonwealth Act No. 141. The prohibition
does not apply since it is clear from the records that the judgment debt and the execution sale took place prior to the approval of the
application for free patent. We quote with favor the respondent court's valid observation on the matter:

. . . the application of Pablo Taneo for a free patent was approved only on 19 October 1973 and Free Patent was
issued on 10 December 1980. Under the aforecited provision, the subject land could not be made liable for the
satisfaction of any debt contracted from the time of the application and during the 5-year period following 10
December 1980, or until 10 December 1985. However, debts contracted prior to the approval of the application for
free patent, that is prior to 18 October 1973, are not covered by the prohibition. This is because they do not fall
within the scope of the prohibited period. In this case, the judgment debt in favor of defendant-appellee was
rendered on 24 June 1964, the writ of execution issued on 22 November 1965, notice of levy made on 1 December
1965, the execution sale held on 12 February 1966, and the certificate of sale registered on 2 March 1966, all
before Pablo Taneo's application for free patent was approved on 19 October 1973. The execution, therefore, was
not violative of the law. 8

Anent the second issue, petitioners aver that the house which their father constituted as family home is exempt from execution. In a
last ditch effort to save their property, petitioners invoke the benefits accorded to the family home under the Family Code.

A family home is the dwelling place of a person and his family. It is said, however, that the family home is a real right, which is
gratuitous, inalienable and free from attachment, constituted over the dwelling place and the land on which it is situated, which
confers upon a particular family the right to enjoy such properties, which must remain with the person constituting it and his
heirs. 9 It cannot be seized by creditors except in certain specials cases.

Under the Civil Code (Articles 224 to 251), a family home may be constituted judicial and extrajudicially, the former by the filing of
the petition and with the approval of the proper court, and the latter by the recording of a public instrument in the proper registry of
property declaring the establishment of the family home. The operative act then which created the family home extrajudicially was
the registration in the Registry of Property of the declaration prescribed by Articles 240 and 241 of the Civil Code. 10

Under the Family Code, however. registration was no longer necessary Article 153 of the Family Code provides that the family
home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied in the family. It reads:

The family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as family residence. From
the time of its constitution and so long as its beneficiaries actually resides therein, the family home continues to be
such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment, except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of
the value allowed by law.

It is under the foregoing provision which petitioners seek refuge to avert execution of the family home arguing that as early as 1964,
Pablo Taneo had already constituted the house in question as their family home. However, the retroactive effect of the Family
Code, particularly on the provisions on the family home has been clearly laid down by the court as explained in the case
of Manacop v. Court of Appeals 11 to wit:

Finally, the petitioner insists that the attached property is a family home, having been occupied by him and his
family since 1972, and is therefore exempt from attachment.

The contention is not well-taken.

While Article 153 of the Family Code provides that the family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from
the time it is occupied as a family residence, it does not mean that said article has a retroactive effect such that all
existing family residences, petitioner's included, are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time
of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and henceforth, are exempt from execution for the
payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 (Mondequillo vs. Breva,
185 SCRA 766). Neither does Article 162 of said Code state that the provisions of Chapter 2, Title V thereof have
retroactive effect. It simply means that all existing family residences at the time of the effectivity of the Family Code
are considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the
Family Code (Modequillo vs. Breva, supra). Since petitioner's debt was incurred as early as November 25, 1987, it
preceded the effectivity of the Family Code. His property is therefore not exempt from attachment (Annex "O,"

22 | P a g e
 Plaintiff's Position Paper and Memorandum of Authorities, p. 78)." (pp. 5-6, Decision; pp. 64-65, Rollo) (emphasis
ours)

The applicable law, therefore. in the case at bar is still the Civil Code where registration of the declaration of a family home is a
prerequisite. Nonetheless, the law provides certain instances where the family home is not exempted from execution, forced sale or
attachment.

Art. 243 reads:

The family home extrajudicially formed shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment, except:

(1) For nonpayment of taxes;

(2) For debts incurred before the declaration was recorded in the Registry of Property;

(3) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such record of the declaration;

(4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, material-men and others who have rendered service
or furnished material for the construction of the building. 12

The trial court found that on March 7, 1964, Pablo Taneo constituted the house in question, erected on the land of Plutarco
Vacalares, as the family home. The instrument constituting the family home was registered only on January 24, 1966. The money
judgment against Pablo Taneo was rendered on January 24, 1964. Thus, at that time when the "debt" was incurred, the family
home was not yet constituted or even registered. Clearly, petitioners' alleged family home, as constituted by their father is not
exempt as it falls under the exception of Article 243 (2).

Moreover, the constitution of the family home by Pablo Taneo is even doubtful considering that such constitution did not comply
with the requirements of the law. The trial court found that the house was erected not on the land which the Taneos owned but on
the land of one Plutarco Vacalares. By the very definition of the law that the "family home is the dwelling house where a person and
his family resides and the land on which it is situated," 13 it is understood that the house should be constructed on a
land not belonging to another. Apparently, the constitution of a family home by Pablo Taneo in the instant case was merely an
afterthought in order to escape execution of their property but to no avail.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Melo and Pardo, JJ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-28248 March 12, 1975

LEONORA PERIDO, joined by husband MANUEL PIROTE, INOCENCIA PERIDO, ALBENIO PERIDO, PAULINO PERIDO,
LETIA PERIDO, joined by husband BIENVENIDO BALYAO, LETICIA PERIDO, joined by husband FELIX VILLARUZ,
EUFEMIA PERIDO, CONSOLACION PERIDO, ALFREDO PERIDO, GEORGE PERIDO, AMPARO PERIDO, WILFREDO
PERIDO, MARGARITA PERIDO, ROLANDO SALDE and EDUARDO SALDE, petitioners,
vs.
MARIA PERIDO, SOFRONIO PERIDO, JUAN A. PERIDO, GONZALO PERIDO, PACITA PERIDO, MAGDALENA PERIDO,
ALICIA PERIDO, JOSEFINA PERIDO, FE PERIDO, TERESA PERIDO and LUZ PERIDO, respondents.

Januario L. Jison, Jr. for petitioners.

Antonio T. de Jesus for respondents.

MAKALINTAL, C.J.:ñé+.£ªwph!1

This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals in its CA-G.R. No. 37034-R, affirming the decision of the
Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental in Civil Case No. 6529.

Lucio Perido of Himamaylan, Negros Occidental, married twice during his lifetime. His first wife was Benita Talorong, with whom he
begot three (3) children: Felix, Ismael, and Margarita. After Benita died Lucio married Marcelina Baliguat, with whom he had five (5)
children: Eusebio, Juan, Maria, Sofronia and Gonzalo. Lucio himself died in 1942, while his second wife died in 1943.

23 | P a g e
Of the three (3) children belonging to the first marriage only Margarita Perido is still living. Her deceased brother, Felix Perido, is
survived by his children Inocencia, Leonora, Albinio, Paulino, Letia, Leticia, and Eufemia, all surnamed Perido. Nicanora Perido,
another daughter of Felix, is also deceased, but is survived by two (2) sons, Rolando and Eduardo Salde.

Margarita's other deceased brother, Ismael Perido, is survived by his children, namely: Consolacion, Alfredo, Wilfredo, and Amparo.
Susano Perido, another son of Ismael, is dead, but survived by his own son George Perido.

Of Lucio Perido's five (5) children by his second wife, two are already dead, namely: Eusebio and Juan. Eusebio is survived by his
children Magdalena Perido, Pacita Perido, Alicia Perido, Josefina Perido, Fe Perido, Teresa Perido, and Luz Perido, while Juan is
survived by his only child, Juan A. Perido.

On August 15, 1960 the children and grandchildren of the first and second marriages of Lucio Perido executed a document
denominated as "Declaration of Heirship and Extra-judicial Partition," whereby they partitioned among themselves Lots Nos. 458,
471, 506, 511, 509, 513-B, 807, and 808, all of the Cadastral Survey of Himamaylan, Occidental Negros.

Evidently the children belonging to the first marriage of Lucio Perido had second thoughts about the partition. On March 8, 1962
they filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, which complaint was later amended on February 22,
1963, against the children of the second marriage, praying for the annulment of the so-called "Declaration of Heirship and Extra-
Judicial Partition" and for another partition of the lots mentioned therein among the plaintiffs alone. They alleged, among other
things, that they had been induced by the defendants to execute the document in question through misrepresentation, false
promises and fraudulent means; that the lots which were partitioned in said document belonged to the conjugal partnership of the
spouses Lucio Perido and Benita Talorong, and that the five children of Lucio Perido with Marcelina Baliguat were all illegitimate
and therefore had no successional rights to the estate of Lucio Perido, who died in 1942. The defendants denied the foregoing
allegations.

After trial the lower court rendered its decision dated July 31, 1965, annulling the "Declaration of Heirship and Extra-Judicial
Partition." However, it did not order the partition of the lots involved among the plaintiffs exclusively in view of its findings that the
five children of Lucio Perido with his second wife, Marcelina Baliguat, were legitimate; that all the lots, except Lot No. 458, were the
exclusive properties of Lucio Perido; and that 11/12 of Lot No. 458 belonged to the conjugal partnership of Lucio Perido and his
second wife, Marcelina Baliguat. The dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:têñ.£îhqwâ£

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court renders judgment as follows: declaring the following as the
legitimate children and grandchildren and heirs of Lucio Perido and Benita Talorong: Felix Perido, deceased;
grandchildren: Inocencia Perido, Leonora Perido, Albinio Perido, Paulino Perido, Letia Perido, Leticia Perido,
Eufemia Perido; Nicanora Perido, deceased; great grandchildren: Rolando Salde and Eduardo Salde; Ismael
Perido, deceased; grandchildren: Consolacion Perido, Alfredo Perido, Susano Perido, deceased; great grandson:
George Perido; Amparo Perido and Wilfredo Perido; and, Margarita Perido; (2) declaring the following as the
legitimate children and grandchildren and heirs of Lucio Perido and Marcelina Baliguat: Eusebio Perido, deceased;
grandchildren: Pacita Perido, Magdalena Perido, Alicia Perido, Josefina Perido, Fe Perido, Teresa Perido, and Luz
Perido; Juan B. Perido, deceased; grandson, Juan A. Perido; Maria Perido; Sofronia Perido; and Gonzalo Perido;
(3) declaring all lots (471, 506, 511, 509, 513-part, 807, and 808) except Lot No. 458 as exclusive properties of
Lucio Perido so that each of them should be divided into eight (8) equal parts: 1/8 belongs to Felix Perido, but
because of his death leaving eight (8) children, the same should be divided and alloted as follows: 1/64 to
Inocencia Perido of age, widow; 1/64 to Leonora Perido, of age, married to Manuel Pirote; 1/64 to Albinio Perido, of
age, married to Honorata Villasana; 1/64 to Paulino Perido, of age, married to Norma Villalba 1/64 to Letia Perido,
of age, married to Bienvenido Balyac; 1/64 to Leticia Perido, of age, married to Felix Villaruz; 1/64 to Eufemia
Perido, of age, single; 1/64 to Nicanora Perido, but because she is now dead the same should be divided and
alloted as follows: 1/128 to Rolando Salde, of age, single; and 1/128 to Eduardo Salde, of age, single; 1/8 belongs
to Ismael Perido, but because he is already dead leaving five children, the same should be divided and alloted as
follows: 1/40 to Consolacion Perido, of age, widow; 1/40 to Alfredo Perido, of age married to Trinidad Tamargo;
1/40 to Susano Perido, but he is already dead with one son, the same goes to George Perido, of age, single; 1/40
to Wilfredo Perido, of age, single; 1/8 belongs to Margarita Perido, of age, widow; 1/8 belongs to Eusebio Perido,
but because he is already dead with seven children, the same should be divided and alloted as follows: 1/56 goes
to Pacita Perido, of age, single; 1/56 goes to Magdalena Perido, of age, single; 1/56 goes to Alicia Perido, of age,
married to Isaias Ruiz; 1/56 goes to Josefina Perido, of age, married to Leopoldo Doloroso; 1/56 goes to Fe Perido,
of age, single; 1/56 goes to Teresa Perido, of are single; 1/56 goes to Luz Perido, of age, married to Fidel de la
Cruz; 1/8 belongs to Juan B. Perido, but because he is already dead with one child, the same 1/8 goes to Juan A.
Perido, of age, married to Salud Salgado 1/8 goes to Maria Perido. of age, married to Julio Pirote; 1/8 goes to
Sofronia Perido, of age, widow; and, 1/8 goes to Gonzalo Perido, of age, married to Lacomemoracion Estiller; (4)
declaring the 11/12 shares in Lot No. 458 as conjugal partnership property of Lucio Perido and Marcelina Baliguat,
which should be divided and alloted as follows: 11/24 goes to Lucio Perido to be divided into eight (8) equal shares
and 11/24 goes to Marcelina Baliguat to be divided into five (5) equal shares or 11/120 for each of the children and
again to be divided by the children of each child now deceased; (6) declaring Fidel Perido owner of 1/12 share in
Lot 458 to be divided among his heirs to be determined accordingly later; and (6) declaring null and void Exhibit "J"
of the plaintiffs which is Exhibit "10" for the defendants, without costs and without adjudication with respect to the
counterclaim and damages, they being members of the same family, for equity and justice.

The plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals, alleging that the trial court erred: (1) in declaring that Eusebio Perido, Juan Perido,
Maria Perido, Sofronia Perido and Gonzalo Perido, were the legitimate children of Lucio Perido and his second wife, Marcelina
Baliguat; (2) in declaring that Lucio Perido was the exclusive owner of Lots Nos. 471, 506, 511, 509, 513-Part, 807, and 808 of

24 | P a g e
Cadastral Survey of Himamaylan, Negros Occidental, and in not declaring that said lots were the conjugal partnership property of
Lucio Perido and his first wife, Benita Talorong; and (3) in holding that 11/12 of Lot 458 was the conjugal partnership property of
Lucio Perido and Marcelina Baliguat.

Finding no reversible error in the decision of the lower court, the Court of Appeals affirmed it in toto. The appellants moved to
reconsider but were turned down. Thereupon they instituted he instant petition for review reiterating in effect the assignments of
error and the arguments in the brief they submitted to the appellate court.

The first issue pertains to the legitimacy of the five children of Lucio Perido with Marcelina Baliguat. The petitioners insist that said
children were illegitimate on the theory that the first three were born out of wedlock even before the death of Lucio Perido's first
wife, while the last two were also born out of wedlock and were not recognized by their parents before or after their marriage. In
support of their contention they allege that Benita Talorong died in 1905, after the first three children were born, as testified to by
petitioner Margarita Perido and corroborated by petitioner Leonora Perido; that as late as 1923 Lucio Perido was still a widower, as
shown on the face of the certificates of title issued to him in said year; and Lucio Perido married his second wife, Marcelina
Baliguat, only in 1925, as allegedly established through the testimony of petitioner Leonora Perido.

The petition cannot be sustained. The Court of Appeals found that there was evidence to show that Lucio Perido's wife, Benita
Talorong, died during the Spanish regime. This finding conclusive upon us and beyond our power of review. Under the
circumstance, Lucio Perido had no legal impediment to marry Marcelina Baliguat before the birth of their first child in 1900.

With respect to the civil status of Lucio Perido as stated in the certificates of title issued to him in 1923, the Court of Appeals
correctly held that the statement was not conclusive to show that he was not actually married to Marcelina Baliguat. Furthermore, it
is weak and insufficient to rebut the presumption that persons living together husband and wife are married to each other. This
presumption, especially where legitimacy of the issue is involved, as in this case, may be overcome only by cogent proof on the part
of those who allege the illegitimacy. In the case of Adong vs. Cheong Seng Gee1 this Court explained the rationale behind this
presumption, thus: "The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not
only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested. Consequently,
every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in
the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the
common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would he living in the
constant violation of decency and of law. A presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is "that a man and woman
deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage." (Sec. 334, No. 28) Semper praesumitur
pro matrimonio — Always presume marriage."

While the alleged marriage ceremony in 1925, if true, might tend to rebut the presumption of marriage arising from previous
cohabitation, it is to be noted that both the trial court and the appellate court did not even pass upon the uncorroborated testimony
of petitioner Leonora Perido on the matter. The reason is obvious. Said witness, when asked why she knew that Marcelina Baliguat
was married to Lucio Perido only in 1925, merely replied that she knew it because "during the celebration of the marriage by the
Aglipayan priest (they) got flowers from (their) garden and placed in the altar." Evidently she was not even an eyewitness to the
ceremony.

In view of the foregoing the Court of Appeals did not err in concluding that the five children of Lucio Perido and Marcelina Baliguat
were born during their marriage and, therefore, legitimate.

The second assignment of error refers to the determination of whether or not Lots Nos. 471, 506, 511, 509-513-Part, 807 and 808
were the exclusive properties of Lucio Perido. In disposing of the contention of the petitioners that said lots belong to the conjugal
partnership of spouses Lucio Perido and Benita Talorong, the Court of Appeals said:têñ.£îhqwâ£

... We cannot agree again with them on this point. It is to be noted that the lands covered by the certificates of title
(Exhs. B to G) were all declared in the name of Lucio Perido. Then there is evidence showing that the lands were
inherited by Lucio Perido from his grandmother (t.s.n., p. 21, Feb. 20, 1964). In other words, they were the
exclusive properties of the late Lucio Perido which he brought into the first and second marriages. By fiat of law
said Properties should be divided accordingly among his legal heirs.

The petitioners take exception to the finding of the appellate court that the aforementioned lots were inherited by Lucio Perido from
his grandmother and contend that they were able to establish through the testimonies of their witnesses that the spouses Lucio
Perido and Benita Talorong acquired them during their lifetime. Again, the petitioners cannot be sustained. The question involves
appreciation of the evidence, which is within the domain of the Court of Appeals, the factual findings of which are not reviewable by
this Court.

The third assignment of error is with regard to the ruling of the Court of Appeals sustaining the finding of the trial court that 11/12 of
Lot 458 was the conjugal partnership property of Lucio Perido and his second wife, Marcelina Baliguat. Said the appellate
court:têñ.£îhqwâ£

With respect to Lot No. 458 which is now covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 21769 issued in 1925 the same
should be considered conjugally owned by Lucio Perido and his second wife, Marcelina Baliguat. The finding of the
lower court on this point need not be disturbed. It is expressly stated in the certificate of title (Exh. L) that Lucio
Perido, the registered owner, was married to Marcelina Baliguat unlike in the previous land titles. If the law
presumes a property registered in the name of only one of the spouses to be conjugal (Guinguing vs. Abutin, 48
Phil. 144; Flores vs. Flores, 48 Phil. 288, Escutin vs. Escutin, 60 Phil. 922), the presumption becomes stronger
25 | P a g e
 when the document recites that the spouse in whose name the land is registered is married to somebody else, like
in the case at bar. It appearing that the legal presumption that the No. 458 belonged to the conjugal partnership had
not been overcome by clear proofs to the contrary, we are constrained to rule, that the same is the conjugal
property of the deceased spouses Lucio Perido and Marcelina Baliguat.

In impugning the foregoing ruling, the petitioners maintain that they were able to prove that 6/12 of said Lot 458 was the conjugal
property of spouses Lucio Perido and his first wife, Benita Talorong, and that the purchase price of the additional 5/12 of said lot
came from the proceeds of sale of a lot allegedly belonging to Lucio Perido and his three children of the first marriage. As in the
second assignment of error, the issue raised here also involves appreciation of the evidence and, consequently, the finding of the
appellate court on the matter is binding on this Court. Indeed, a review of that finding would require an examination of all the
evidence introduced before the trial court, a consideration of the credibility of witnesses and of the circumstances surrounding the
case, their relevancy or relation to one another and to the whole, as well as an appraisal of the probabilities of the entire situation. It
would thus abolish the distinction between an ordinary appeal on the one hand and review on certiorari on the other, and thus
defeat the purpose for which the latter procedure has been established. 2

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed, with costs against the petitioners.

Castro, Teehankee, Makasiar and Esguerra, JJ., concur.1äwphï1.ñët

Muñoz Palma, J., is on leave.

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 138961 March 7, 2002

WILLIAM LIYAO, JR., represented by his mother Corazon Garcia, petitioner,

vs.
JUANITA TANHOTI-LIYAO, PEARL MARGARET L. TAN, TITA ROSE L. TAN AND LINDA CHRISTINA LIYAO, respondents.

DECISION

DE LEON, JR., J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision dated June 4, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. C.V. No.
453941 which reversed the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig, Metro Manila, Branch 167 in declaring William
Liyao, Jr. as the illegitimate (spurious) son of the deceased William Liyao and ordering Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, Pearl Margaret L.
Tan, Tita Rose L. Tan and Linda Christina Liyao to recognize and acknowledge William Liyao, Jr. as a compulsory heir of the
deceased William Liyao and entitled to all successional rights as such and to pay the costs of the suit.

On November 29,1976, William Liyao, Jr., represented by his mother Corazon G. Garcia, filed Civil Case No. 24943 before the RTC
of Pasig, Branch 167 which is an action for compulsory recognition as "the illegitimate (spurious) child of the late William Liyao"
against herein respondents, Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, Pearl Margaret L. Tan, Tita Rose L. Tan and Linda Christina Liyao.2 The
complaint was later amended to include the allegation that petitioner "was in continuous possession and enjoyment of the status of
the child of said William Liyao," petitioner having been "recognized and acknowledged as such child by the decedent during his
lifetime."3

The facts as alleged by petitioner are as follows:

Corazon G. Garcia is legally married to but living separately from Ramon M. Yulo for more than ten (10) years at the time of the
institution of the said civil case. Corazon cohabited with the late William Liyao from 1965 up to the time of William’s untimely demise
on December 2, 1975. They lived together in the company of Corazon’s two (2) children from her subsisting marriage, namely:

Enrique and Bernadette, both surnamed Yulo, in a succession of rented houses in Quezon City and Manila. This was with the
knowledge of William Liyao’s legitimate children, Tita Rose L. Tan and Linda Christina Liyao-Ortiga, from his subsisting marriage
with Juanita Tanhoti Liyao. Tita Rose and Christina were both employed at the Far East Realty Investment, Inc. of which Corazon
and William were then vice president and president, respectively.

Sometime in 1974, Corazon bought a lot from Ortigas and Co. which required the signature of her husband, Ramon Yulo, to show
his consent to the aforesaid sale. She failed to secure his signature and, had never been in touch with him despite the necessity to
meet him. Upon the advice of William Liyao, the sale of the parcel of land located at the Valle Verde Subdivision was registered
under the name of Far East Realty Investment, Inc.

On June 9, 1975, Corazon gave birth to William Liyao, Jr. at the Cardinal Santos Memorial Hospital. During her three (3) day stay at
the hospital, William Liyao visited and stayed with her and the new born baby, William, Jr. (Billy). All the medical and hospital
expenses, food and clothing were paid under the account of William Liyao. William Liyao even asked his confidential secretary, Mrs.
Virginia Rodriguez, to secure a copy of Billy’s birth certificate. He likewise instructed Corazon to open a bank account for Billy with
the Consolidated Bank and Trust Company4 and gave weekly amounts to be deposited therein.5 William Liyao would bring Billy to
the office, introduce him as his good looking son and had their pictures taken together. 6

26 | P a g e
During the lifetime of William Liyao, several pictures were taken showing, among others, William Liyao and Corazon together with
Billy’s godfather, Fr. Julian Ruiz, William Liyao’s legal staff and their wives while on vacation in Baguio.7 Corazon also presented
pictures in court to prove that that she usually accompanied William Liyao while attending various social gatherings and other
important meetings.8 During the occasion of William Liyao’s last birthday on November 22, 1975 held at the Republic Supermarket,
William Liyao expressly acknowledged Billy as his son in the presence of Fr. Ruiz, Maurita Pasion and other friends and said, "Hey,
look I am still young, I can still make a good looking son." 9 Since birth, Billy had been in continuous possession and enjoyment of
the status of a recognized and/or acknowledged child of William Liyao by the latter’s direct and overt acts. William Liyao supported
Billy and paid for his food, clothing and other material needs. However, after William Liyao’s death, it was Corazon who provided
sole support to Billy and took care of his tuition fees at La Salle, Greenhills. William Liyao left his personal belongings, collections,
clothing, old newspaper clippings and laminations at the house in White Plains where he shared his last moments with Corazon.

Testifying for the petitioner, Maurita Pasion declared that she knew both Corazon G. Garcia and William Liyao who were
godparents to her children. She used to visit Corazon and William Liyao from 1965-1975. The two children of Corazon from her
marriage to Ramon Yulo, namely, Bernadette and Enrique (Ike), together with some housemaids lived with Corazon and William
Liyao as one family. On some occasions like birthdays or some other celebrations, Maurita would sleep in the couple’s residence
and cook for the family. During these occasions, she would usually see William Liyao in sleeping clothes. When Corazon, during the
latter part of 1974, was pregnant with her child Billy, Maurita often visited her three (3) to four (4) times a week in Greenhills and
later on in White Plains where she would often see William Liyao. Being a close friend of Corazon, she was at the Cardinal Santos
Memorial Hospital during the birth of Billy. She continuously visited them at White Plains and knew that William Liyao, while living
with her friend Corazon, gave support by way of grocery supplies, money for household expenses and matriculation fees for the two
(2) older children, Bernadette and Enrique. During William Liyao’s birthday on November 22, 1975 held at the Republic
Supermarket Office, he was carrying Billy and told everybody present, including his two (2) daughters from his legal marriage,
"Look, this is my son, very guapo and healthy."10 He then talked about his plan for the baptism of Billy before Christmas. He
intended to make it "engrande" and "make the bells of San Sebastian Church ring."11 Unfortunately, this did not happen since
William Liyao passed away on December 2, 1975. Maurita attended Mr. Liyao’s funeral and helped Corazon pack his clothes. She
even recognized a short sleeved shirt of blue and gray12 which Mr. Liyao wore in a photograph13 as well as another shirt of lime
green14 as belonging to the deceased. A note was also presented with the following inscriptions: "To Cora, Love From
William."15 Maurita remembered having invited the couple during her mother’s birthday where the couple had their pictures taken
while exhibiting affectionate poses with one another. Maurita knew that Corazon is still married to Ramon Yulo since her marriage
has not been annulled nor is Corazon legally separated from her said husband. However, during the entire cohabitation of William
Liyao with Corazon Garcia, Maurita had not seen Ramon Yulo or any other man in the house when she usually visited Corazon.

Gloria Panopio testified that she is the owner of a beauty parlor and that she knew that Billy is the son of her neighbors, William
Liyao and Corazon Garcia, the latter being one of her customers. Gloria met Mr. Liyao at Corazon’s house in Scout Delgado,
Quezon City in the Christmas of 1965. Gloria had numerous occasions to see Mr. Liyao from 1966 to 1974 and even more so when
the couple transferred to White Plains, Quezon City from 1974-1975. At the time Corazon was conceiving, Mr. Liyao was worried
that Corazon might have another miscarriage so he insisted that she just stay in the house, play mahjong and not be bored. Gloria
taught Corazon how to play mahjong and together with Atty. Brillantes’ wife and sister-in-law, had mahjong sessions among
themselves. Gloria knew that Mr. Liyao provided Corazon with a rented house, paid the salary of the maids and food for Billy. He
also gave Corazon financial support. Gloria knew that Corazon is married but is separated from Ramon Yulo although Gloria never
had any occasion to see Mr. Yulo with Corazon in the house where Mr. Liyao and Corazon lived.

Enrique Garcia Yulo testified that he had not heard from his father, Ramon Yulo, from the time that the latter abandoned and
separated from his family. Enrique was about six (6) years old when William Liyao started to live with them up to the time of the
latter’s death on December 2, 1975. Mr. Liyao was very supportive and fond of Enrique’s half brother, Billy. He identified several
pictures showing Mr. Liyao carrying Billy at the house as well as in the office. Enrique’s testimony was corroborated by his sister,
Bernadette Yulo, who testified that the various pictures showing Mr. Liyao carrying Billy could not have been superimposed and that
the negatives were in the possession of her mother, Corazon Garcia.

Respondents, on the other hand, painted a different picture of the story.

Linda Christina Liyao-Ortiga stated that her parents, William Liyao and Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, were legally married.16 Linda grew up
and lived with her parents at San Lorenzo Village, Makati, Metro Manila until she got married; that her parents were not separated
legally or in fact and that there was no reason why any of her parents would institute legal separation proceedings in court. Her
father lived at their house in San Lorenzo Village and came home regularly. Even during out of town business trips or for
conferences with the lawyers at the office, her father would change his clothes at home because of his personal hygiene and habits.
Her father reportedly had trouble sleeping in other people’s homes. Linda described him as very conservative and a strict
disciplinarian. He believed that no amount of success would compensate for failure of a home. As a businessman, he was very
tough, strong, fought for what he believed in and did not give up easily. He suffered two strokes before the fatal attack which led to
his death on December 2, 1975. He suffered a stroke at the office sometime in April-May 1974 and was attended by Dr. Santiago
Co. He then stayed in the house for two (2) to three (3) months for his therapy and acupuncture treatment. He could not talk, move,
walk, write or sign his name. In the meantime, Linda and her sister, Tita Rose Liyao-Tan, ran the office. She handled the collection
of rents while her sister referred legal matters to their lawyers. William Liyao was bedridden and had personally changed. He was
not active in business and had dietary restrictions. Mr. Liyao also suffered a milder stroke during the latter part of September to
October 1974. He stayed home for two (2) to three (3) days and went back to work. He felt depressed, however, and was easily
bored. He did not put in long hours in the office unlike before and tried to spend more time with his family.

Linda testified that she knew Corazon Garcia is still married to Ramon Yulo. Corazon was not legally separated from her husband
and the records from the Local Civil Registrar do not indicate that the couple obtained any annulment17 of their marriage. Once in
1973, Linda chanced upon Ramon Yulo picking up Corazon Garcia at the company garage. Immediately after the death of Linda’s
father, Corazon went to Linda’s office for the return of the former’s alleged investments with the Far East Realty Investment, Inc.
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including a parcel of land sold by Ortigas and Company. Linda added that Corazon, while still a Vice-President of the company, was
able to take out documents, clothes and several laminated pictures of William Liyao from the office. There was one instance when
she was told by the guards, "Mrs. Yulo is leaving and taking out things again."18 Linda then instructed the guards to bring Mrs. Yulo
to the office upstairs but her sister, Tita Rose, decided to let Corazon Garcia go. Linda did not recognize any article of clothing
which belonged to her father after having been shown three (3) large suit cases full of men’s clothes, underwear, sweaters, shorts
and pajamas.

Tita Rose Liyao-Tan testified that her parents were legally married and had never been separated. They resided at No. 21
Hernandez Street, San Lorenzo Village, Makati up to the time of her father’s death on December 2, 1975. 19 Her father suffered two
(2) minor cardio-vascular arrests (CVA) prior to his death. During the first heart attack sometime between April and May 1974, his
speech and hands were affected and he had to stay home for two (2) to three (3) months under strict medication, taking aldomet,
serpadil and cifromet which were prescribed by Dr. Bonifacio Yap, for high blood pressure and cholesterol level control. 20 Tita Rose
testified that after the death of Mr. Liyao, Corazon Garcia was paid the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱100,000.00)
representing her investment in the Far East Realty Investment Inc. Tita Rose also stated that her family never received any formal
demand that they recognize a certain William Liyao, Jr. as an illegitimate son of her father, William Liyao. After assuming the
position of President of the company, Tita Rose did not come across any check signed by her late father representing payment to
lessors as rentals for the house occupied by Corazon Garcia. Tita Rose added that the laminated photographs presented by
Corazon Garcia are the personal collection of the deceased which were displayed at the latter’s office.

The last witness who testified for the respondents was Ramon Pineda, driver and bodyguard of William Liyao from 1962 to 1974,
who said that he usually reported for work at San Lorenzo Village, Makati to pick up his boss at 8:00 o’clock in the morning. At past
7:00 o’clock in the evening, either Carlos Palamigan or Serafin Villacillo took over as night shift driver. Sometime between April and
May 1974, Mr. Liyao got sick. It was only after a month that he was able to report to the office. Thereafter, Mr. Liyao was not able to
report to the office regularly. Sometime in September 1974, Mr. Liyao suffered from another heart attack. Mr. Pineda added that as
a driver and bodyguard of Mr. Liyao, he ran errands for the latter among which was buying medicine for him
like capasid and aldomet. On December 2, 1975, Mr. Pineda was called inside the office of Mr. Liyao. Mr. Pineda saw his employer
leaning on the table. He tried to massage Mr. Liyao’s breast and decided later to carry and bring him to the hospital but Mr. Liyao
died upon arrival thereat. Mrs. Liyao and her daughter, Linda Liyao-Ortiga were the first to arrive at the hospital.

Mr. Pineda also declared that he knew Corazon Garcia to be one of the employees of the Republic Supermarket. People in the
office knew that she was married. Her husband, Ramon Yulo, would sometimes go to the office. One time, in 1974, Mr. Pineda saw
Ramon Yulo at the office garage as if to fetch Corazon Garcia. Mr. Yulo who was also asking about cars for sale, represented
himself as car dealer.

Witness Pineda declared that he did not know anything about the claim of Corazon. He freely relayed the information that he saw
Mr. Yulo in the garage of Republic Supermarket once in 1973 and then in 1974 to Atty. Quisumbing when he went to the latter’s law
office. Being the driver of Mr. Liyao for a number of years, Pineda said that he remembered having driven the group of Mr. Liyao,
Atty. Astraquillo, Atty. Brillantes, Atty. Magno and Atty. Laguio to Baguio for a vacation together with the lawyers’ wives. During his
employment, as driver of Mr. Liyao, he does not remember driving for Corazon Garcia on a trip to Baguio or for activities like
shopping.

On August 31, 1993, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants as follows:

(a) Confirming the appointment of Corazon G. Garcia as the guardian ad litem of the minor William Liyao, Jr.;

(b) Declaring the minor William Liyao, Jr. as the illegitimate (spurious) son of the deceased William Liyao;

(c) Ordering the defendants Juanita Tanhoti Liyao, Pearl Margaret L. Tan, Tita Rose L. Tan and Christian Liyao, to
recognize, and acknowledge the minor William Liyao, Jr. as a compulsory heir of the deceased William Liyao, entitled to all
succesional rights as such; and

(d) Costs of suit.21

In ruling for herein petitioner, the trial court said it was convinced by preponderance of evidence that the deceased William Liyao
sired William Liyao, Jr. since the latter was conceived at the time when Corazon Garcia cohabited with the deceased. The trial court
observed that herein petitioner had been in continuous possession and enjoyment of the status of a child of the deceased by direct
and overt acts of the latter such as securing the birth certificate of petitioner through his confidential secretary, Mrs. Virginia
Rodriguez; openly and publicly acknowledging petitioner as his son; providing sustenance and even introducing herein petitioner to
his legitimate children.

The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the ruling of the trial court saying that the law favors the legitimacy rather than the
illegitimacy of the child and "the presumption of legitimacy is thwarted only on ethnic ground and by proof that marital intimacy
between husband and wife was physically impossible at the period cited in Article 257 in relation to Article 255 of the Civil Code."
The appellate court gave weight to the testimonies of some witnesses for the respondents that Corazon Garcia and Ramon Yulo
who were still legally married and have not secured legal separation, were seen in each other’s company during the supposed time
that Corazon cohabited with the deceased William Liyao. The appellate court further noted that the birth certificate and the
baptismal certificate of William Liyao, Jr. which were presented by petitioner are not sufficient to establish proof of paternity in the

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absence of any evidence that the deceased, William Liyao, had a hand in the preparation of said certificates and considering that
his signature does not appear thereon. The Court of Appeals stated that neither do family pictures constitute competent proof of
filiation. With regard to the passbook which was presented as evidence for petitioner, the appellate court observed that there was
nothing in it to prove that the same was opened by William Liyao for either petitioner or Corazon Garcia since William Liyao’s
signature and name do not appear thereon.

His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed the present petition.

It must be stated at the outset that both petitioner and respondents have raised a number of issues which relate solely to the
sufficiency of evidence presented by petitioner to establish his claim of filiation with the late William Liyao. Unfortunately, both
parties have consistently overlooked the real crux of this litigation: May petitioner impugn his own legitimacy to be able to claim from
the estate of his supposed father, William Liyao?

We deny the present petition.

Under the New Civil Code, a child born and conceived during a valid marriage is presumed to be legitimate. 22 The presumption of
legitimacy of children does not only flow out from a declaration contained in the statute but is based on the broad principles of
natural justice and the supposed virtue of the mother. The presumption is grounded in a policy to protect innocent offspring from the
odium of illegitimacy.23

The presumption of legitimacy of the child, however, is not conclusive and consequently, may be overthrown by evidence to the
contrary. Hence, Article 255 of the New Civil Code24 provides:

Article 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty days following the celebration of the marriage, and before three hundred
days following its dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate.

Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other than that of the physical impossibility of the husband having access to
his wife within the first one hundred and twenty days of the three hundred which preceded the birth of the child.

This physical impossibility may be caused:

1) By the impotence of the husband;

2) By the fact that husband and wife were living separately in such a way that access was not possible;

3) By the serious illness of the husband.

Petitioner insists that his mother, Corazon Garcia, had been living separately for ten (10) years from her husband, Ramon Yulo, at
the time that she cohabited with the late William Liyao and it was physically impossible for her to have sexual relations with Ramon
Yulo when petitioner was conceived and born. To bolster his claim, petitioner presented a document entitled, "Contract of
Separation,"25 executed and signed by Ramon Yulo indicating a waiver of rights to any and all claims on any property that Corazon
Garcia might acquire in the future.26

The fact that Corazon Garcia had been living separately from her husband, Ramon Yulo, at the time petitioner was conceived and
born is of no moment. While physical impossibility for the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife is one of the grounds for
impugning the legitimacy of the child, it bears emphasis that the grounds for impugning the legitimacy of the child mentioned in
Article 255 of the Civil Code may only be invoked by the husband, or in proper cases, his heirs under the conditions set forth under
Article 262 of the Civil Code.27 Impugning the legitimacy of the child is a strictly personal right of the husband, or in exceptional
cases, his heirs for the simple reason that he is the one directly confronted with the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his
wife produces and he should be the one to decide whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it in view of the moral and economic
interest involved.28 It is only in exceptional cases that his heirs are allowed to contest such legitimacy. Outside of these cases, none
- even his heirs - can impugn legitimacy; that would amount o an insult to his memory.29

It is therefor clear that the present petition initiated by Corazon G. Garcia as guardian ad litem of the then minor, herein petitioner, to
compel recognition by respondents of petitioner William Liyao, Jr, as the illegitimate son of the late William Liyao cannot prosper. It
is settled that a child born within a valid marriage is presumed legitimate even though the mother may have declared against its
legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.30 We cannot allow petitioner to maintain his present petition and subvert
the clear mandate of the law that only the husband, or in exceptional circumstances, his heirs, could impugn the legitimacy of a
child born in a valid and subsisting marriage. The child himself cannot choose his own filiation. If the husband, presumed to be the
father does not impugn the legitimacy of the child, then the status of the child is fixed, and the latter cannot choose to be the child of
his mother’s alleged paramour. On the other hand, if the presumption of legitimacy is overthrown, the child cannot elect the
paternity of the husband who successfully defeated the presumption. 31

Do the acts of Enrique and Bernadette Yulo, the undisputed children of Corazon Garcia with Ramon Yulo, in testifying for herein
petitioner amount to impugnation of the legitimacy of the latter?

We think not. As earlier stated, it is only in exceptional cases that the heirs of the husband are allowed to contest the legitimacy of
the child. There is nothing on the records to indicate that Ramon Yulo has already passed away at the time of the birth of the
petitioner nor at the time of the initiation of this proceedings. Notably, the case at bar was initiated by petitioner himself through his
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mother, Corazon Garcia, and not through Enrique and Bernadette Yulo. It is settled that the legitimacy of the child can be impugned
only in a direct action brought for that purpose, by the proper parties and within the period limited by law.1âwphi1

Considering the foregoing, we find no reason to discuss the sufficiency of the evidence presented by both parties on the petitioner’s
claim of alleged filiation with the late William Liyao. In any event, there is no clear, competent and positive evidence presented by
the petitioner that his alleged father had admitted or recognized his paternity.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 45394 is hereby
AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Quisumbing, and Buena, JJ., concur.

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