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G.R. No. 178411 June 23, 2010

OFFICE OF THE CITY MAYOR OF PARAÑAQUE CITY, OFFICE OF THE CITY ADMINISTRATOR OF
and MYRNA P. ROSALES,Petitioners,
vs.
MARIO D. EBIO AND HIS CHILDREN/HEIRS namely, ARTURO V. EBIO, EDUARDO V. EBIO, RENATO V.
EBIO, LOURDES E. MAGTANGOB, MILA V. EBIO, and ARNEL V. EBIO,Respondents.

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, assailing
the January 31, 2007 Decision1 and June 8, 2007 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 91350
allegedly for being contrary to law and jurisprudence. The CA had reversed the Order3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Parañaque City, Branch 196, issued on April 29, 2005 in Civil Case No. 05-0155.

Below are the facts.

Respondents claim that they are the absolute owners of a parcel of land consisting of 406 square meters, more or less,
located at 9781 Vitalez Compound in Barangay Vitalez, Parañaque City and covered by Tax Declaration Nos. 01027 and
01472 in the name of respondent Mario D. Ebio. Said land was an accretion of Cut-cut creek. Respondents assert that the
original occupant and possessor of the said parcel of land was their great grandfather, Jose Vitalez. Sometime in 1930,
Jose gave the land to his son, Pedro Vitalez. From then on, Pedro continuously and exclusively occupied and possessed
the said lot. In 1966, after executing an affidavit declaring possession and occupancy,4 Pedro was able to obtain a tax
declaration over the said property in his name.5 Since then, respondents have been religiously paying real property taxes
for the said property.6

Meanwhile, in 1961, respondent Mario Ebio married Pedro’s daughter, Zenaida. Upon Pedro’s advice, the couple
established their home on the said lot. In April 1964 and in October 1971, Mario Ebio secured building permits from the
Parañaque municipal office for the construction of their house within the said compound.7 On April 21, 1987, Pedro
executed a notarized Transfer of Rights8 ceding his claim over the entire parcel of land in favor of Mario Ebio.
Subsequently, the tax declarations under Pedro’s name were cancelled and new ones were issued in Mario Ebio’s name.9

On March 30, 1999, the Office of the Sangguniang Barangay of Vitalez passed Resolution No. 08, series of
199910 seeking assistance from the City Government of Parañaque for the construction of an access road along Cut-cut
Creek located in the said barangay. The proposed road, projected to be eight (8) meters wide and sixty (60) meters long,
will run from Urma Drive to the main road of Vitalez Compound11traversing the lot occupied by the respondents. When
the city government advised all the affected residents to vacate the said area, respondents immediately registered their
opposition thereto. As a result, the road project was temporarily suspended.12

In January 2003, however, respondents were surprised when several officials from the barangay and the city planning
office proceeded to cut eight (8) coconut trees planted on the said lot. Respondents filed letter-complaints before the
Regional Director of the Bureau of Lands, the Department of Interior and Local Government and the Office of the Vice
Mayor.13 On June 29, 2003, the Sangguniang Barangay of Vitalez held a meeting to discuss the construction of the
proposed road. In the said meeting, respondents asserted their opposition to the proposed project and their claim of
ownership over the affected property.14 On November 14, 2003, respondents attended another meeting with officials from
the city government, but no definite agreement was reached by and among the parties.15

On March 28, 2005, City Administrator Noli Aldip sent a letter to the respondents ordering them to vacate the area within
the next thirty (30) days, or be physically evicted from the said property.16 Respondents sent a letter to the Office of the
City Administrator asserting, in sum, their claim over the subject property and expressing intent for a further
dialogue.17 The request remained unheeded.1avvphi1

Threatened of being evicted, respondents went to the RTC of Parañaque City on April 21, 2005 and applied for a writ of
preliminary injunction against petitioners.18 In the course of the proceedings, respondents admitted before the trial court
that they have a pending application for the issuance of a sales patent before the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR).19

On April 29, 2005, the RTC issued an Order20 denying the petition for lack of merit. The trial court reasoned that
respondents were not able to prove successfully that they have an established right to the property since they have not
instituted an action for confirmation of title and their application for sales patent has not yet been granted. Additionally,
they failed to implead the Republic of the Philippines, which is an indispensable party.

Respondents moved for reconsideration, but the same was denied.21

Aggrieved, respondents elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals. On January 31, 2007, the Court of Appeals issued its
Decision in favor of the respondents. According to the Court of Appeals--
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The issue ultimately boils down to the question of ownership of the lands adjoining Cutcut Creek particularly Road Lot
No. 8 (hereinafter RL 8) and the accreted portion beside RL 8.

The evidentiary records of the instant case, shows that RL 8 containing an area of 291 square meters is owned by
Guaranteed Homes, Inc. covered by TCT No. S-62176. The same RL 8 appears to have been donated by the Guaranteed
Homes to the City Government of Parañaque on 22 March 1966 and which was accepted by the then Mayor FLORENCIO
BERNABE on 5 April 1966. There is no evidence however, when RL 8 has been intended as a road lot.

On the other hand, the evidentiary records reveal that PEDRO VITALEZ possessed the accreted property since 1930 per
his Affidavit dated 21 March 1966 for the purpose of declaring the said property for taxation purposes. The property then
became the subject of Tax Declaration No. 20134 beginning the year 1967 and the real property taxes therefor had been
paid for the years 1966, 1967, 1968, 1969, 1970, 1972, 1973, 1974, 1978, 1980, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000,
2001, 2002, 2003, and 2004. Sometime in 1964 and 1971, construction permits were issued in favor of Appellant MARIO
EBIO for the subject property. On 21 April 1987, PEDRO VITALEZ transferred his rights in the accreted property to
MARIO EBIO and his successors-in-interest.

Applying [Article 457 of the Civil Code considering] the foregoing documentary evidence, it could be concluded that
Guaranteed Homes is the owner of the accreted property considering its ownership of the adjoining RL 8 to which the
accretion attached. However, this is without the application of the provisions of the Civil Code on acquisitive prescription
which is likewise applicable in the instant case.

xxxx

The subject of acquisitive prescription in the instant case is the accreted portion which [was] duly proven by the
Appellants. It is clear that since 1930, Appellants together with their predecessor-in-interest, PEDRO VITALEZ[,] have
been in exclusive possession of the subject property and starting 1964 had introduced improvements thereon as evidenced
by their construction permits. Thus, even by extraordinary acquisitive prescription[,] Appellants have acquired ownership
of the property in question since 1930 even if the adjoining RL 8 was subsequently registered in the name of Guaranteed
Homes. x x x.

xxxx

Further, it was only in 1978 that Guaranteed Homes was able to have RL 8 registered in its name, which is almost fifty
years from the time PEDRO VITALEZ occupied the adjoining accreted property in 1930. x x x.

xxxx

We likewise note the continuous payment of real property taxes of Appellants which bolster their right over the subject
property. x x x.

xxxx

In sum, We are fully convinced and so hold that the Appellants [have] amply proven their right over the property in
question.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby GRANTED. The challenged Order of the court a quo is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.22

On June 8, 2007, the appellate court denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition raising the
following assignment of errors:

I. WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION AND RESOLUTION OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF

APPEALS THAT RESPONDENTS HAVE A RIGHT IN ESSE IS IN ACCORD WITH THE LAW
AND ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE[;]

II. WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION AND RESOLUTION OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS THAT THE SUBJECT LOT IS AVAILABLE FOR ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION IS IN
ACCORD WITH THE LAW AND ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE[;] AND

III. WHETHER OR NOT THE STATE IS AN INDISPENSABLE PARTY TO THE COMPLAINT …

FILED BY RESPONDENTS IN THE LOWER COURT.23
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The issues may be narrowed down into two (2): procedurally, whether the State is an indispensable party to respondents’
action for prohibitory injunction; and substantively, whether the character of respondents’ possession and occupation of
the subject property entitles them to avail of the relief of prohibitory injunction.

The petition is without merit.

An action for injunction is brought specifically to restrain or command the performance of an act.24 It is distinct from the
ancillary remedy of preliminary injunction, which cannot exist except only as part or as an incident to an independent
action or proceeding. Moreover, in an action for injunction, the auxiliary remedy of a preliminary prohibitory or
mandatory injunction may issue.25

In the case at bar, respondents filed an action for injunction to prevent the local government of Parañaque City from
proceeding with the construction of an access road that will traverse through a parcel of land which they claim is owned
by them by virtue of acquisitive prescription.

Petitioners, however, argue that since the creek, being a tributary of the river, is classified as part of the public domain,
any land that may have formed along its banks through time should also be considered as part of the public domain. And
respondents should have included the State as it is an indispensable party to the action.

We do not agree.

It is an uncontested fact that the subject land was formed from the alluvial deposits that have gradually settled along the
banks of Cut-cut creek. This being the case, the law that governs ownership over the accreted portion is Article 84 of
the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, which remains in effect,26 in relation to Article 457 of the Civil Code.

Article 84 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 specifically covers ownership over alluvial deposits along the banks of a
creek. It reads:

ART. 84. Accretions deposited gradually upon lands contiguous to creeks, streams, rivers, and lakes, by accessions or
sediments from the waters thereof, belong to the owners of such lands.27

Interestingly, Article 457 of the Civil Code states:

Art. 457. To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the
effects of the current of the waters.

It is therefore explicit from the foregoing provisions that alluvial deposits along the banks of a creek do not form part of
the public domain as the alluvial property automatically belongs to the owner of the estate to which it may have been
added. The only restriction provided for by law is that the owner of the adjoining property must register the same under
the Torrens system; otherwise, the alluvial property may be subject to acquisition through prescription by third persons. 28

In contrast, properties of public dominion cannot be acquired by prescription. No matter how long the possession of the
properties has been, there can be no prescription against the State regarding property of public domain.29 Even a city or
municipality cannot acquire them by prescription as against the State.30

Hence, while it is true that a creek is a property of public dominion,31 the land which is formed by the gradual and
imperceptible accumulation of sediments along its banks does not form part of the public domain by clear provision of
law.

Moreover, an indispensable party is one whose interest in the controversy is such that a final decree would necessarily
affect his/her right, so that the court cannot proceed without their presence.32 In contrast, a necessary party is one whose
presence in the proceedings is necessary to adjudicate the whole controversy but whose interest is separable such that a
final decree can be made in their absence without affecting them.33

In the instant case, the action for prohibition seeks to enjoin the city government of Parañaque from proceeding with its
implementation of the road construction project. The State is neither a necessary nor an indispensable party to an action
where no positive act shall be required from it or where no obligation shall be imposed upon it, such as in the case at bar.
Neither would it be an indispensable party if none of its properties shall be divested nor any of its rights infringed.

We also find that the character of possession and ownership by the respondents over the contested land entitles them to the
avails of the action.
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A right in esse means a clear and unmistakable right.34 A party seeking to avail of an injunctive relief must prove that he
or she possesses a right in esse or one that is actual or existing.35 It should not be contingent, abstract, or future rights, or
one which may never arise.36

In the case at bar, respondents assert that their predecessor-in-interest, Pedro Vitalez, had occupied and possessed the
subject lot as early as 1930. In 1964, respondent Mario Ebio secured a permit from the local government of Parañaque for
the construction of their family dwelling on the said lot. In 1966, Pedro executed an affidavit of possession and occupancy
allowing him to declare the property in his name for taxation purposes. Curiously, it was also in 1966 when Guaranteed
Homes, Inc., the registered owner of Road Lot No. 8 (RL 8) which adjoins the land occupied by the respondents, donated
RL 8 to the local government of Parañaque.

From these findings of fact by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals, only one conclusion can be made: that for
more than thirty (30) years, neither Guaranteed Homes, Inc. nor the local government of Parañaque in its corporate or
private capacity sought to register the accreted portion. Undoubtedly, respondents are deemed to have acquired ownership
over the subject property through prescription. Respondents can assert such right despite the fact that they have yet to
register their title over the said lot. It must be remembered that the purpose of land registration is not the acquisition of
lands, but only the registration of title which the applicant already possessed over the land. Registration was never
intended as a means of acquiring ownership.37 A decree of registration merely confirms, but does not confer, ownership.38

Did the filing of a sales patent application by the respondents, which remains pending before the DENR, estop them from
filing an injunction suit?

We answer in the negative.

Confirmation of an imperfect title over a parcel of land may be done either through judicial proceedings or through
administrative process. In the instant case, respondents admitted that they opted to confirm their title over the property
administratively by filing an application for sales patent.

Respondents’ application for sales patent, however, should not be used to prejudice or derogate what may be deemed as
their vested right over the subject property. The sales patent application should instead be considered as a mere superfluity
particularly since ownership over the land, which they seek to buy from the State, is already vested upon them by virtue of
acquisitive prescription. Moreover, the State does not have any authority to convey a property through the issuance of a
grant or a patent if the land is no longer a public land.39

Nemo dat quod dat non habet. No one can give what he does not have. Such principle is equally applicable even against a
sovereign entity that is the State.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The January 31, 2007 Decision, as well as the July 8, 2007
Resolution, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 91350 are hereby AFFIRMED.

With costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
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G.R. No. 160453 November 12, 2012

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,Petitioner,

vs.
ARCADIO IVAN A. SANTOS III, and ARCADIO C. SANTOS, JR.,Respondents.

By law, accretion - the gradual and imperceptible deposit made through the effects of the current of the water- belongs to
the owner of the land adjacent to the banks of rivers where it forms. The drying up of the river is not accretion. Hence, the
dried-up river bed belongs to the State as property of public dominion, not to the riparian owner, unless a law vests the
ownership in some other person.

Antecedents

Alleging continuous and adverse possession of more than ten years, respondent Arcadio Ivan A. Santos III (Arcadio Ivan)
applied on March 7, 1997 for the registration of Lot 4998-B (the property) in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in
Parafiaque City. The property, which had an area of 1,045 square meters, more or less, was located in Barangay San
Dionisio, Parañaque City, and was bounded in the Northeast by Lot 4079 belonging to respondent Arcadio C. Santos, Jr.
(Arcadio, Jr.), in the Southeast by the Parañaque River, in the Southwest by an abandoned road, and in the Northwest by
Lot 4998-A also owned by Arcadio Ivan.1

On May 21, 1998, Arcadio Ivan amended his application for land registration to include Arcadio, Jr. as his co-applicant
because of the latter’s co-ownership of the property. He alleged that the property had been formed through accretion and
had been in their joint open, notorious, public, continuous and adverse possession for more than 30 years. 2

The City of Parañaque (the City) opposed the application for land registration, stating that it needed the property for its
flood control program; that the property was within the legal easement of 20 meters from the river bank; and that
assuming that the property was not covered by the legal easement, title to the property could not be registered in favor of
the applicants for the reason that the property was an orchard that had dried up and had not resulted from accretion.3

Ruling of the RTC

On May 10, 2000,4 the RTC granted the application for land registration, disposing:

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby declares the applicants, ARCADIO IVAN A. SANTOS, III and ARCADIO C.
SANTOS, JR., both Filipinos and of legal age, as the TRUE and ABSOLUTE OWNERS of the land being applied for
which is situated in the Barangay of San Dionisio, City of Parañaque with an area of one thousand forty five (1045) square
meters more or less and covered by Subdivision Plan Csd-00-000343, being a portion of Lot 4998, Cad. 299, Case 4,
Parañaque Cadastre, LRC Rec. No. and orders the registration of Lot 4998-B in their names with the following technical
description, to wit:

xxxx

Once this Decision became (sic) final and executory, let the corresponding Order for the Issuance of the Decree be issued.

SO ORDERED.

The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), appealed.

Ruling of the CA

In its appeal, the Republic ascribed the following errors to the RTC,5 to wit:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PROPERTY SOUGHT TO BE REGISTERED IS AN
ACCRETION TO THE ADJOINING PROPERTY OWNED BY APPELLEES DESPITE THE ADMISSION OF
APPELLEE ARCADIO C. SANTOS JR. THAT THE SAID PROPERTY WAS NOT FORMED AS A RESULT OF THE
GRADUAL FILLING UP OF SOIL THROUGH THE CURRENT OF THE RIVER.
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II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE APPLICATION FOR LAND REGISTRATION DESPITE
APPELLEE’S FAILURE TO FORMALLY OFFER IN EVIDENCE AN OFFICIAL CERTIFICATION THAT THE
SUBJECT PARCEL OF LAND IS ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE.

III

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT APPELLEES HAD SUFFICIENTLY ESTABLISHED THEIR
CONTINUOUS, OPEN, PUBLIC AND ADVERSE OCCUPATION OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY FOR A PERIOD
OF MORE THAN THIRTY (30) YEARS.

On May 27, 2003, the CA affirmed the RTC.6

The Republic filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CA denied the motion on October 20, 2003.7

Issues

Hence, this appeal, in which the Republic urges that:8

RESPONDENTS’ CLAIM THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTY IS AN ACCRETION TO THEIR ADJOINING LAND
THAT WOULD ENTITLE THEM TO REGISTER IT UNDER ARTICLE 457 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE IS
CONTRADICTED BY THEIR OWN EVIDENCE.

II

ASSUMING THAT THE LAND SOUGHT TO BE REGISTERED WAS "PREVIOUSLY A PART OF THE
PARAÑAQUE RIVER WHICH BECAME AN ORCHARD AFTER IT DRIED UP," THE REGISTRATION OF SAID
PROPERTY IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENTS CANNOT BE ALTERNATIVELY JUSTIFIED UNDER ARTICLE 461
OF THE CIVIL CODE.

III

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT RULING THAT THE FAILURE OF
RESPONDENTS TO FORMALLY OFFER IN EVIDENCE AN OFFICIAL CERTIFICATION THAT THE SUBJECT
PROPERTY IS ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE IS FATAL TO THEIR APPLICATION FOR LAND
REGISTRATION.

IV

THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT RESPONDENTS HAVE CONTINUOUSLY, OPENLY,
PUBLICLY AND ADVERSELY OCCUPIED THE SUBJECT PROPERTY FOR MORE THAN THIRTY (30) YEARS
IS NOT SUPPORTED BY WELL-NIGH INCONTROVERTIBLE EVIDENCE.

To be resolved are whether or not Article 457 of the Civil Code was applicable herein; and whether or not respondents
could claim the property by virtue of acquisitive prescription pursuant to Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529
(Property Registration Decree).

Ruling

The appeal is meritorious.

I.

The CA grossly erred in applying Article 457 of the Civil Code to respondents’ benefit

Article 457 of the Civil Code provides that "(t)o the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion
which they gradually receive from the effects of the currents of the waters."

In ruling for respondents, the RTC pronounced as follows:

 Page 7 of 26

On the basis of the evidence presented by the applicants, the Court finds that Arcadio Ivan A. Santos III and Arcadio C.
Santos, Jr., are the owners of the land subject of this application which was previously a part of the Parañaque River
which became an orchard after it dried up and further considering that Lot 4 which adjoins the same property is owned by
applicant, Arcadio C. Santos, Jr., after it was obtained by him through inheritance from his mother, Concepcion Cruz, now
deceased. Conformably with Art. 457 of the New Civil Code, it is provided that:

"Article 457. To the owners of the lands adjoining the bank of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive
from the effects of the current of the waters."9

The CA upheld the RTC’s pronouncement, holding:

It could not be denied that "to the owners of the lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they
gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters" (Article 457 New Civil Code) as in this case, Arcadio Ivan
Santos III and Arcadio Santos, Jr., are the owners of the land which was previously part of the Parañaque River which
became an orchard after it dried up and considering that Lot 4 which adjoins the same property is owned by the applicant
which was obtained by the latter from his mother (Decision, p. 3; p. 38 Rollo).10

The Republic submits, however, that the application by both lower courts of Article 457 of the Civil Code was erroneous
in the face of the fact that respondents’ evidence did not establish accretion, but instead the drying up of the Parañaque
River.

The Republic’s submission is correct.

Respondents as the applicants for land registration carried the burden of proof to establish the merits of their application
by a preponderance of evidence, by which is meant such evidence that is of greater weight, or more convincing than that
offered in opposition to it.11 They would be held entitled to claim the property as their own and apply for its registration
under the Torrens system only if they established that, indeed, the property was an accretion to their land.

Accretion is the process whereby the soil is deposited along the banks of rivers.12 The deposit of soil, to be considered
accretion, must be: (a) gradual and imperceptible; (b) made through the effects of the current of the water; and (c) taking
place on land adjacent to the banks of rivers.13

Accordingly, respondents should establish the concurrence of the elements of accretion to warrant the grant of their
application for land registration.

However, respondents did not discharge their burden of proof. They did not show that the gradual and imperceptible
deposition of soil through the effects of the current of the river had formed Lot 4998-B. Instead, their evidence revealed
that the property was the dried-up river bed of the Parañaque River, leading both the RTC and the CA to themselves hold
that Lot 4998-B was "the land which was previously part of the Parañaque River xxx (and) became an orchard after it
dried up."

Still, respondents argue that considering that Lot 4998-B did not yet exist when the original title of Lot 4 was issued in
their mother’s name in 1920, and that Lot 4998-B came about only thereafter as the land formed between Lot 4 and the
Parañaque River, the unavoidable conclusion should then be that soil and sediments had meanwhile been deposited near
Lot 4 by the current of the Parañaque River, resulting in the formation of Lot 4998-B.

The argument is legally and factually groundless. For one, respondents thereby ignore that the effects of the current of the
river are not the only cause of the formation of land along a river bank. There are several other causes, including the
drying up of the river bed. The drying up of the river bed was, in fact, the uniform conclusion of both lower courts herein.
In other words, respondents did not establish at all that the increment of land had formed from the gradual and
imperceptible deposit of soil by the effects of the current. Also, it seems to be highly improbable that the large volume of
soil that ultimately comprised the dry land with an area of 1,045 square meters had been deposited in a gradual and
imperceptible manner by the current of the river in the span of about 20 to 30 years – the span of time intervening between
1920, when Lot 4 was registered in the name of their deceased parent (at which time Lot 4998-B was not yet in existence)
and the early 1950s (which respondents’ witness Rufino Allanigue alleged to be the time when he knew them to have
occupied Lot 4988-B). The only plausible explanation for the substantial increment was that Lot 4988-B was the dried-up
bed of the Parañaque River. Confirming this explanation was Arcadio, Jr.’s own testimony to the effect that the property
was previously a part of the Parañaque River that had dried up and become an orchard.

We observe in this connection that even Arcadio, Jr.’s own Transfer Certificate of Title No. 44687 confirmed the uniform
conclusion of the RTC and the CA that Lot 4998-B had been formed by the drying up of the Parañaque River. Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 44687 recited that Lot 4 of the consolidated subdivision plan Pcs-13-002563, the lot therein
described, was bounded "on the SW along line 5-1 by Dried River Bed."14
 Page 8 of 26

That boundary line of "SW along line 5-1" corresponded with the location of Lot 4998-B, which was described as
"bounded by Lot 4079 Cad. 299, (Lot 1, Psu-10676), in the name of respondent Arcadio Santos, Jr. (Now Lot 4, Psd-13-
002563) in the Northeast."15

The RTC and the CA grossly erred in treating the dried-up river bed as an accretion that became respondents’ property
pursuant to Article 457 of the Civil Code. That land was definitely not an accretion. The process of drying up of a river to
form dry land involved the recession of the water level from the river banks, and the dried-up land did not equate to
accretion, which was the gradual and imperceptible deposition of soil on the river banks through the effects of the current.
In accretion, the water level did not recede and was more or less maintained. Hence, respondents as the riparian owners
had no legal right to claim ownership of Lot 4998-B. Considering that the clear and categorical language of Article 457 of
the Civil Code has confined the provision only to accretion, we should apply the provision as its clear and categorical
language tells us to. Axiomatic it is, indeed, that where the language of the law is clear and categorical, there is no room
for interpretation; there is only room for application.16 The first and fundamental duty of courts is then to apply the law.17

The State exclusively owned Lot 4998-B and may not be divested of its right of ownership. Article 502 of the Civil Code
expressly declares that rivers and their natural beds are public dominion of the State.18 It follows that the river beds that
dry up, like Lot 4998-B, continue to belong to the

State as its property of public dominion, unless there is an express law that provides that the dried-up river beds should
belong to some other person.19

II

Acquisitive prescription was

not applicable in favor of respondents

The RTC favored respondents’ application for land registration covering Lot 4998-B also because they had taken
possession of the property continuously, openly, publicly and adversely for more than 30 years based on their
predecessor-in-interest being the adjoining owner of the parcel of land along the river bank. It rendered the following
ratiocination, viz:20

In this regard, the Court found that from the time the applicants became the owners thereof, they took possession of the
same property continuously, openly, publicly and adversely for more than thirty (30) years because their predecessors-in-
interest are the adjoining owners of the subject parcel of land along the river bank. Furthermore, the fact that applicants
paid its realty taxes, had it surveyed per subdivision plan Csd-00-000343 (Exh. "L") which was duly approved by the
Land Management Services and the fact that Engr. Chito B. Cainglet, OIC–Chief, Surveys Division Land Registration
Authority, made a Report that the subject property is not a portion of the Parañaque River and that it does not fall nor
overlap with Lot 5000, thus, the Court opts to grant the application.

Finally, in the light of the evidence adduced by the applicants in this case and in view of the foregoing reports of the
Department of Agrarian Reforms, Land Registration Authority and the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources, the Court finds and so holds that the applicants have satisfied all the requirements of law which are essential to
a government grant and is, therefore, entitled to the issuance of a certificate of title in their favor. So also, oppositor failed
to prove that the applicants are not entitled thereto, not having presented any witness.

In fine, the application is GRANTED.

As already mentioned, the CA affirmed the RTC.

Both lower courts erred.

The relevant legal provision is Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree), which
pertinently states:

Section 14. Who may apply. — The following persons may file in the proper [Regional Trial Court] an application for
registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:

(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

xxxx
 Page 9 of 26

Under Section 14(1), then, applicants for confirmation of imperfect title must prove the following, namely: (a) that the
land forms part of the disposable and alienable agricultural lands of the public domain; and (b) that they have been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership
either since time immemorial or since June 12, 1945.21

The Republic assails the findings by the lower courts that respondents "took possession of the same property
continuously, openly, publicly and adversely for more than thirty (30) years."22

Although it is well settled that the findings of fact of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the CA, are accorded the
highest degree of respect, and generally will not be disturbed on appeal, with such findings being binding and conclusive
on the Court,23 the Court has consistently recognized exceptions to this rule, including the following, to wit: (a) when the
findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures; (b) when the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (c) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (d) when the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (e) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (f) when in making its findings the CA went
beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (g)
when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (h) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based; (i) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply
briefs are not disputed by respondent; and (j) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence
and contradicted by the evidence on record.24

Here, the findings of the RTC were obviously grounded on speculation, surmises, or conjectures; and that the inference
made by the RTC and the CA was manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible. Hence, the Court should now review the
findings.

In finding that respondents had been in continuous, open, public and adverse possession of the land for more than 30
years, the RTC declared:

In this regard, the Court found that from the time the applicant became the owners thereof, they took possession of the
same property continuously, openly, publicly and adversely for more than thirty years because their predecessor in interest
are the adjoining owners of the subject parcel of land along the river banks. Furthermore, the fact that the applicant paid
its realty taxes, had it surveyed per subdivision plan Csd-00-000343 (Exh. "L") which was duly approved by the Land
Management Services and the fact that Engr. Chito B. Cainglet, OIC – Chief, Surveys Division Land Registration
Authority, made a Report that the subject property is not a portion of the Parañaque River and that it does not fall nor
overlap with Lot 5000, thus, the Court opts to grant the application.

The RTC apparently reckoned respondents’ period of supposed possession to be "more than thirty years" from the fact
that "their predecessors in interest are the adjoining owners of the subject parcel of land." Yet, its decision nowhere
indicated what acts respondents had performed showing their possession of the property "continuously, openly, publicly
and adversely" in that length of time. The decision mentioned only that they had paid realty taxes and had caused the
survey of the property to be made. That, to us, was not enough to justify the foregoing findings, because, firstly, the
payment of realty taxes did not conclusively prove the payor’s ownership of the land the taxes were paid for,25 the tax
declarations and payments being mere indicia of a claim of ownership;26 and, secondly, the causing of surveys of the
property involved was not itself an of continuous, open, public and adverse possession.

The principle that the riparian owner whose land receives the gradual deposits of soil does not need to make an express act
of possession, and that no acts of possession are necessary in that instance because it is the law itself that pronounces the
alluvium to belong to the riparian owner from the time that the deposit created by the current of the water becomes
manifest27 has no applicability herein. This is simply because Lot 4998-B was not formed through accretion. Hence, the
ownership of the land adjacent to the river bank by respondents’ predecessor-in-interest did not translate to possession of
Lot 4998-B that would ripen to acquisitive prescription in relation to Lot 4998-B.

On the other hand, the claim of thirty years of continuous, open, public and adverse possession of Lot 4998-B was not
even validated or preponderantly established. The admission of respondents themselves that they declared the property for
taxation purposes only in 1997 and paid realty taxes only from 199928 signified that their alleged possession would at most
be for only nine years as of the filing of their application for land registration on March 7, 1997.

Yet, even conceding, for the sake of argument, that respondents possessed Lot 4998-B for more than thirty years in the
character they claimed, they did not thereby acquire the land by prescription or by other means without any competent
proof that the land was already declared as alienable and disposable by the Government. Absent that declaration, the land
still belonged to the State as part of its public dominion.

Article 419 of the Civil Code distinguishes property as being either of public dominion or of private ownership. Article
420 of the Civil Code lists the properties considered as part of public dominion, namely: (a) those intended for public use,
such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of
similar character; and (b) those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public
 Page 10 of 26

service or for the development of the national wealth. As earlier mentioned, Article 502 of the Civil Code declares that
rivers and their natural beds are of public dominion.

Whether the dried-up river bed may be susceptible to acquisitive prescription or not was a question that the Court resolved
in favor of the State in Celestial v. Cachopero,29a case involving the registration of land found to be part of a dried-up
portion of the natural bed of a creek. There the Court held:

As for petitioner’s claim of ownership over the subject land, admittedly a dried-up bed of the Salunayan Creek, based on
(1) her alleged long term adverse possession and that of her predecessor-in-interest, Marcelina Basadre, even prior to
October 22, 1966, when she purchased the adjoining property from the latter, and (2) the right of accession under Art. 370
of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 and/or Article 461 of the Civil Code, the same must fail.

Since property of public dominion is outside the commerce of man and not susceptible to private appropriation and
acquisitive prescription, the adverse possession which may be the basis of a grant of title in the confirmation of an
imperfect title refers only to alienable or disposable portions of the public domain. It is only after the Government has
declared the land to be alienable and disposable agricultural land that the year of entry, cultivation and exclusive and
adverse possession can be counted for purposes of an imperfect title.

A creek, like the Salunayan Creek, is a recess or arm extending from a river and participating in the ebb and flow of the
sea. As such, under Articles 420(1) and 502(1) of the Civil Code, the Salunayan Creek, including its natural bed, is
property of the public domain which is not susceptible to private appropriation and acquisitive prescription. And, absent
any declaration by the government, that a portion of the creek has dried-up does not, by itself, alter its inalienable
character.

xxxx

Had the disputed portion of the Salunayan Creek dried up after the present Civil Code took effect, the subject land would
clearly not belong to petitioner or her predecessor-in-interest since under the aforementioned provision of Article 461,
"river beds which are abandoned through the natural change in the course of the waters ipso facto belong to the owners of
the land occupied by the new course," and the owners of the adjoining lots have the right to acquire them only after paying
their value.

And both Article 370 of the Old Code and Article 461 of the present Civil Code are applicable only when "river beds are
abandoned through the natural change in the course of the waters." It is uncontroverted, however, that, as found by both
the Bureau of Lands and the DENR Regional Executive Director, the subject land became dry as a result of the
construction an irrigation canal by the National Irrigation Administration. Thus, in Ronquillo v. Court of Appeals, this
Court held:

The law is clear and unambiguous. It leaves no room for interpretation. Article 370 applies only if there is a natural
change in the course of the waters. The rules on alluvion do not apply to man-made or artificial accretions nor to
accretions to lands that adjoin canals or esteros or artificial drainage systems. Considering our earlier finding that the
dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub was actually caused by the active intervention of man, it follows that Article 370 does
not apply to the case at bar and, hence, the Del Rosarios cannot be entitled thereto supposedly as riparian owners.

The dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub should thus be considered as forming part of the land of the public domain which
cannot be subject to acquisition by private ownership. xxx (Emphasis supplied)

Furthermore, both provisions pertain to situations where there has been a change in the course of a river, not where the
river simply dries up. In the instant Petition, it is not even alleged that the Salunayan Creek changed its course. In such a
situation, commentators are of the opinion that the dry river bed remains property of public dominion. (Bold emphases
supplied)

Indeed, under the Regalian doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed
to belong to the State.30 No public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied, from the
Government. It is indispensable, therefore, that there is a showing of a title from the State.31 Occupation of public land in
the concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title.32

Subject to the exceptions defined in Article 461 of the Civil Code (which declares river beds that are abandoned through
the natural change in the course of the waters as ipso facto belonging to the owners of the land occupied by the new
course, and which gives to the owners of the adjoining lots the right to acquire only the abandoned river beds not ipso
facto belonging to the owners of the land affected by the natural change of course of the waters only after paying their
value), all river beds remain property of public dominion and cannot be acquired by acquisitive prescription unless
previously declared by the Government to be alienable and disposable. Considering that Lot 4998-B was not shown to be
 Page 11 of 26

already declared to be alienable and disposable, respondents could not be deemed to have acquired the property through
prescription.

Nonetheless, respondents insist that the property was already classified as alienable and disposable by the Government.
They cite as proof of the classification as alienable and disposable the following notation found on the survey plan, to
wit:33

NOTE

ALL CORNERS NOT OTHERWISE DESCRIBED ARE OLD BL CYL. CONC. MONS 15 X 60CM

All corners marked PS are cyl. conc. mons 15 x 60 cm

Surveyed in accordance with Survey Authority NO. 007604-48 of the Regional Executive Director issued by the CENR-
OFFICER dated Dec. 2, 1996.

This survey is inside L.C. Map No. 2623, Proj. No. 25 classified as alienable/disposable by the Bureau of Forest Dev’t. on
Jan. 3, 1968.

Lot 4998-A = Lot 5883} Cad 299

Lot 4998-B = Lot 5884} Paranaque Cadastre.

Was the notation on the survey plan to the effect that Lot 4998-B was "inside" the map "classified as alienable/disposable
by the Bureau of Forest Development on 03 Jan. 1968" sufficient proof of the property’s nature as alienable and
disposable public land?

To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant must conclusively establish the
existence of a positive act of the Government, such as a presidential proclamation, executive order, administrative action,
investigation reports of the Bureau of Lands investigator, or a legislative act or statute. Until then, the rules on
confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.

As to the proofs that are admissible to establish the alienability and disposability of public land, we said in Secretary of
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources v. Yap34 that:

The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the person
applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or
disposable. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land subject of the
application (or claim) is alienable or disposable.There must still be a positive act declaring land of the public domain as
alienable and disposable. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, the applicant must
establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an
administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. The
applicant may also secure a certification from the government that the land claimed to have been possessed for the
required number of years is alienable and disposable.

In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative action, report, statute, or certification was
presented to the Court. The records are bereft of evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of Boracay occupied
by private claimants were subject of a government proclamation that the land is alienable and disposable. Absent such
well-nigh incontrovertible evidence, the Court cannot accept the submission that lands occupied by private claimants were
already open to disposition before 2006. Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot be assumed. They call for
proof." (Emphasis supplied)

In Menguito v. Republic,35 which we reiterated in Republic v. Sarmiento,36we specifically resolved the issue of whether
the notation on the survey plan was sufficient evidence to establish the alienability and disposability of public land, to wit:

To prove that the land in question formed part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, petitioners
relied on the printed words which read: "This survey plan is inside Alienable and Disposable Land Area, Project No. 27-B
as per L.C. Map No. 2623, certified by the Bureau of Forestry on January 3, 1968," appearing on Exhibit "E" (Survey Plan
No. Swo-13-000227).

This proof is not sufficient. Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, provides: "All lands of the public domain,
waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber,
wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. x x x."
 Page 12 of 26

For the original registration of title, the applicant (petitioners in this case) must overcome the presumption that the land
sought to be registered forms part of the public domain. Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified or alienated
to a private person by the State, it remains part of the inalienable public domain. Indeed, "occupation thereof in the
concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title." To overcome such
presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be shown by the applicant. Absent such evidence, the land sought to be
registered remains inalienable.

In the present case, petitioners cite a surveyor-geodetic engineer’s notation in Exhibit "E" indicating that the survey was
inside alienable and disposable land. Such notation does not constitute a positive government act validly changing the
classification of the land in question. Verily, a mere surveyor has no authority to reclassify lands of the public domain. By
relying solely on the said surveyor’s assertion, petitioners have not sufficiently proven that the land in question has been
declared alienable. (Emphasis supplied)

In Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,37 we dealt with the sufficiency of the certification by the Provincial Environmental
Officer (PENRO) or Community Environmental Officer (CENRO) to the effect that a piece of public land was alienable
and disposable in the following manner, viz:

x x x it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and disposable. The applicant for land
registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of the public
domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the application for registration falls within the approved
area per verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land registration must
present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal
custodian of the official records. These facts must be established to prove that the land is alienable and disposable.
Respondent failed to do so because the certifications presented by respondent do not, by themselves, prove that the land is
alienable and disposable.

Only Torres, respondent’s Operations Manager, identified the certifications submitted by respondent.1âwphi1 The
government officials who issued the certifications were not presented before the trial court to testify on their contents. The
trial court should not have accepted the contents of the certifications as proof of the facts stated therein. Even if the
certifications are presumed duly issued and admissible in evidence, they have no probative value in establishing that the
land is alienable and disposable.

xxxx

The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, certifications do not prove that Lot 10705-B falls within the
alienable and disposable land as proclaimed by the DENR Secretary. Such government certifications do not, by their mere
issuance, prove the facts stated therein. Such government certifications may fall under the class of documents
contemplated in the second sentence of Section 23 of Rule 132. As such, the certifications are prima facie evidence of
their due execution and date of issuance but they do not constitute prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.
(Emphasis supplied)

These rulings of the Court indicate that the notation on the survey plan of Lot 4998-B, Cad-00-000343 to the effect that
the "survey is inside a map classified as alienable/disposable by the Bureau of Forest Dev’t" did not prove that Lot 4998-B
was already classified as alienable and disposable. Accordingly, respondents could not validly assert acquisitive
prescription of Lot 4988-B.

WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on May 27,
2003; DISMISSES the application for registration of Arcadio C. Santos, Jr. and Arcadio Ivan S. Santos III respecting Lot
4998-B with a total area of 1,045 square meters, more or less, situated in Barangay San Dionisio, Parañaque City, Metro
Manila; and DECLARES Lot 4998-B as exclusively belonging to the State for being part of the dried--up bed of the
Parat1aque River.

Respondents shall pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.
 Page 13 of 26

G.R. No. 184746 August 8, 2012

SPOUSES CRISPIN GALANG and CARlOAD GALANG, Petitioners,

vs.
SPOUSES CONRADO S. REYES AND FE DE KASTRO REYES (As substituted by their legal heir:
Hermenigildo K. Reyes),Respondents.

This petition for review on certiorariunder Rule 45 seeks to reverse and set aside the April 9, 2008 Decision1of the Court
of Appeals (CA) and its October 6, 2008 Resolution,2 in CA-G.R. CV. No. 85660.

The Facts

On September 4, 1997, spouses Conrado S. Reyes and Fe de Kastro Reyes (the Reyeses) filed a case for the annulment of
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-928 against spouses Crispin and Caridad Galang (the Galangs) with the
Regional Trial Court, Antipolo, Rizal (RTC),docketed as Civil Case No. 97-4560.

In their Complaint,3 the Reyeses alleged that they owned two properties: (1) a subdivision project known as Ponderosa
Heights Subdivision (Ponderosa), and (2) an adjoining property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
185252, with an area of 1,201 sq.m.;4 that the properties were separated by the Marigman Creek, which dried up sometime
in 1980 when it changed its course and passed through Ponderosa; that the Galangs, by employing manipulation and
fraud, were able to obtain a certificate of title over the dried up creek bed from the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR), through its Provincial Office (PENRO); that, specifically, the property was denominated as
Lot 5735, Cad 29 Ext., Case-1, with an area of 1,573 sq.m. covered by OCT No. P-928; that they discovered the existence
of the certificate of title sometime in March 1997 when their caretaker, Federico Enteroso (Enteroso), informed them that
the subject property had been fraudulently titled in the names of the Galangs; that in 1984, prior to such discovery,
Enteroso applied for the titling of the property, as he had been occupying it since 1968 and had built his house on it; that,
later, Enteroso requested them to continue the application because of financial constraints on his part; 5that they continued
the application, but later learned that the application papers were lost in the Assessor’s Office; 6 and that as the owners of
the land where the new course of water passed, they are entitled to the ownership of the property to compensate them for
the loss of the land being occupied by the new creek.

The Galangs in their Answer7 denied that the land subject of the complaint was part of a creek and countered that OCT
No. P-928 was issued to them after they had complied with the free patent requirements of the DENR, through the
PENRO; that they and their predecessor-in-interest had been in possession, occupation, cultivation, and ownership of the
land for quite some time; that the property described under TCT No. 185252 belonged to Apolonio Galang, their
predecessor-in-interest, under OCT No. 3991; that the property was transferred in the names of the Reyeses through
falsified document;8 that assuming ex gratia argumenti that the creek had indeed changed its course and passed through
Ponderosa, the Reyeses had already claimed for themselves the portion of the dried creek which adjoined and co-existed
with their property; that Enteroso was able to occupy a portion of their land by means of force, coercion, machinations,
and stealth in 1981; that such unlawful entry was then the subject of an Accion Publiciana before the RTC of Antipolo
City (Branch 72); and that at the time of the filing of the Complaint, the matter was still subject of an appeal before the
CA, under CA-G.R. CV No. 53509.
 Page 14 of 26

The RTC Decision

In its Decision,9 dated July 16, 2004, the RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action and for being an
erroneous remedy. The RTC stated that a title issued upon a patent may be annulled only on grounds of actual and
intrinsic fraud, which much consist of an intentional omission of fact required by law to be stated in the application or
willful statement of a claim against the truth. In the case before the trial court, the Reyeses presented no evidence of fraud
despite their allegations that the Galangs were not in possession of the property and that it was part of a dried creek. There
being no evidence, these contentions remained allegations and could not defeat the title of the Galangs. The RTC wrote:

A title issued upon patent may be annulled only on ground of actual fraud.

Such fraud must consist [of] an intentional omission of fact required by law to be stated in the application
or willful statement of a claim against the truth. It must show some specific facts intended to deceive and
deprive another of his right. The fraud must be actual and intrinsic, not merely constructive or intrinsic;
the evidence thereof must be clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant, because the
proceedings which are being assailed as having been fraudulent are judicial proceedings, which by law,
are presumed to have been fair and regular. (Libudan v. Palma Gil 45 SCRA 17)

However, aside from allegations that defendant Galang is not in possession of the property and that the
property was part of a dried creek, no other sufficient evidence of fraud was presented by the plaintiffs.
They have, thus, remained allegations, which cannot defeat the defendants title.10

The RTC added that the land, having been acquired through a homestead patent, was presumably public land. Therefore,
only the State can institute an action for the annulment of the title covering it.

It further opined that because the Reyeses claimed to have acquired the property by right of accretion, they should have
filed an action for reconveyance, explaining "[t]hat the remedy of persons whose property had been wrongly or
erroneously registered in another’s name is not to set aside the decree/title, but an action for reconveyance, or if the
property has passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value, an action for damages." 11

The Court of Appeals Decision

In its Decision, dated April 9, 2008, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision and ordered the cancellation of OCT
No. P-928 and the reconveyance of the land to the Reyeses.

The CA found that the Reyeses had proven by preponderance of evidence that the subject land was a portion of the creek
bed that was abandoned through the natural change in the course of the water, which had now traversed a portion of
Ponderosa. As owners of the land occupied by the new course of the creek, the Reyeses had become the owners of the
abandoned creek bed ipso facto. Inasmuch as the subject land had become private, a free patent issued over it was null and
void and produced no legal effect whatsoever. A posteriori, the free patent covering the subject land, a private land, and
the certificate of title issued pursuant thereto, are null and void.12

The Galangs moved for a reconsideration,13 but their motion was denied in a Resolution dated October 6, 2008.

Hence, this petition.

Issues

The Galangs present, as warranting a review of the questioned CA decision, the following grounds:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION

AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN NOT RESOLVING THAT THE OFFICE OF
THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, NOT THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS, HAS THE SOLE
AUTHORITY TO FILE [CASES FOR] ANNULMENT OF TITLE INVOLVING PUBLIC LAND.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION

AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS
HAVE [A] CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST PETITIONERS EVEN WITHOUT EXHAUSTION
OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMED[IES].

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION

AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN DEVIATING FROM THE FINDINGS OF
FACT OF THE TRIAL COURT AND INTERPRETING ARTICLE 420 IN RELATION TO
 Page 15 of 26

ARTICLE 461 OF THE CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES BY SUBSTITUTING ITS OWN
OPINION BASED ON ASSUMPTION OF FACTS.14

A reading of the records discloses that these can be synthesized into two principal issues, to wit: (1) whether the Reyeses
can file the present action for annulment of a free patent title and reconveyance; and (2) if they can, whether they were
able to prove their cause of action against the Galangs.

The Court’s Ruling

Regarding the first issue, the Galangs state that the property was formerly a public land, titled in their names by virtue of
Free Patent No. 045802-96-2847 issued by the DENR. Thus, they posit that the Reyeses do not have the personality and
authority to institute any action for annulment of title because such authority is vested in the Republic of the Philippines,
through the Office of the Solicitor General.15

In this regard, the Galangs are mistaken. The action filed by the Reyeses seeks the transfer to their names of the title
registered in the names of the Galangs. In their Complaint, they alleged that: first, they are the owners of the land, being
the owners of the properties through which the Marigman creek passed when it changed its course; and second, the
Galangs illegally dispossessed them by having the same property registered in their names. It was not an action for
reversion which requires that the State be the one to initiate the action in order for it to prosper. The distinction between
the two actions was elucidated in the case of Heirs of Kionisala v. Heirs of Dacut,16where it was written:

An ordinary civil action for declaration of nullity of free patents and certificates of title is not the
same as an action for reversion. The difference between them lies in the allegations as to the character
of ownership of the realty whose title is sought to be nullified. In an action for reversion, the pertinent
allegations in the complaint would admit State ownership of the disputed land. Hence in Gabila v.
Barriga where the plaintiff in his complaint admits that he has no right to demand the cancellation or
amendment of the defendant’s title because even if the title were cancelled or amended the ownership of
the land embraced therein or of the portion affected by the amendment would revert to the public domain,
we ruled that the action was for reversion and that the only person or entity entitled to relief would be the
Director of Lands.

On the other hand, a cause of action for declaration of nullity of free patent and certificate of title
would require allegations of the plaintiff’s ownership of the contested lot prior to the issuance of
such free patent and certificate of title as well as the defendant’s fraud or mistake; as the case may
be, in successfully obtaining these documents of title over the parcel of land claimed by plaintiff. In
such a case, the nullity arises strictly not from the fraud or deceit but from the fact that the land is beyond
the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands to bestow and whatever patent or certificate of title obtained
therefor is consequently void ab initio. The real party in interest is not the State but the plaintiff who
alleges a pre-existing right of ownership over the parcel of land in question even before the grant of
title to the defendant. In Heirs of Marciano Nagano v. Court of Appeals we ruled –

x x x x from the allegations in the complaint x x x private respondents claim ownership

of the 2,250 square meter portion for having possessed it in the concept of an owner,
openly, peacefully, publicly, continuously and adversely since 1920. This claim is an
assertion that the lot is private land x x x x Consequently, merely on the basis of the
allegations in the complaint, the lot in question is apparently beyond the jurisdiction of
the Director of the Bureau of Lands and could not be the subject of a Free Patent. Hence,
the dismissal of private respondents’ complaint was premature and trial on the merits
should have been conducted to thresh out evidentiary matters. It would have been entirely
different if the action were clearly for reversion, in which case, it would have to be
instituted by the Solicitor General pursuant to Section 101 of C.A. No. 141 x x x x

It is obvious that private respondents allege in their complaint all the facts necessary to seek the
nullification of the free patents as well as the certificates of title covering Lot 1015 and Lot 1017. Clearly,
they are the real parties in interest in light of their allegations that they have always been the owners and
possessors of the two (2) parcels of land even prior to the issuance of the documents of title in petitioners’
favor, hence the latter could only have committed fraud in securing them –

x x x x That plaintiffs are absolute and exclusive owners and in actual possession and
cultivation of two parcels of agricultural lands herein particularly described as follows
[technical description of Lot 1017 and Lot 1015 x x x x 3. That plaintiffs became
absolute and exclusive owners of the abovesaid parcels of land by virtue of inheritance
from their late father, Honorio Dacut, who in turn acquired the same from a certain
Blasito Yacapin and from then on was in possession thereof exclusively, adversely and in
the concept of owner for more than thirty (30) years x x x x 4. That recently, plaintiff
 Page 16 of 26

discovered that defendants, without the knowledge and consent of the former,
fraudulently applied for patent the said parcels of land and as a result thereof certificates
of titles had been issued to them as evidenced by certificate of title No. P-19819 in the
name of the Hrs. of Ambrocio Kionisala, and No. P- 20229 in the name of Isabel
Kionisala x x x x 5. That the patents issued to defendants are null and void, the same
having been issued fraudulently, defendants not having been and/or in actual possession
of the litigated properties and the statement they may have made in their application are
false and without basis in fact, and, the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources not having any jurisdiction on the properties the same not being anymore
public but already private property x x x x

It is not essential for private respondents to specifically state in the complaint the actual date when they
became owners and possessors of Lot 1015 and Lot 1017. The allegations to the effect that they were so
preceding the issuance of the free patents and the certificates of title, i.e., "the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources not having any jurisdiction on the properties the same not being
anymore public but already private property," are unquestionably adequate as a matter of pleading to oust
the State of jurisdiction to grant the lots in question to petitioners. If at all, the oversight in not alleging
the actual date when private respondents’ ownership thereof accrued reflects a mere deficiency in details
which does not amount to a failure to state a cause of action. The remedy for such deficiency would not
be a motion to dismiss but a motion for bill of particulars so as to enable the filing of appropriate
responsive pleadings.

With respect to the purported cause of action for reconveyance, it is settled that in this kind of action the
free patent and the certificate of title are respected as incontrovertible. What is sought instead is the
transfer of the property, in this case the title thereof, which has been wrongfully or erroneously
registered in the defendant’s name. All that must be alleged in the complaint are two (2) facts which
admitting them to be true would entitle the plaintiff to recover title to the disputed land, namely, (1)
that the plaintiff was the owner of the land and, (2) that the defendant had illegally dispossessed
him of the same.

We rule that private respondents have sufficiently pleaded (in addition to the cause of action for
declaration of free patents and certificates of title) an action for reconveyance, more specifically, one
which is based on implied trust. An implied trust arises where the defendant (or in this case petitioners)
allegedly acquires the disputed property through mistake or fraud so that he (or they) would be bound to
hold and reconvey the property for the benefit of the person who is truly entitled to it. In the complaint,
private respondents clearly assert that they have long been the absolute and exclusive owners and in
actual possession and cultivation of Lot 1015 and Lot 1017 and that they were fraudulently deprived of
ownership thereof when petitioners obtained free patents and certificates of title in their names. These
allegations certainly measure up to the requisite statement of facts to constitute an action for
reconveyance.17 [Emphases supplied]

In this case, the complaint instituted by the Reyeses before the RTC was for the annulment of the title issued to the
Galangs, and not for reversion. Thus, the real party in interest here is not the State but the Reyeses who claim a right of
ownership over the property in question even before the issuance of a title in favor of the Galangs. Although the Reyeses
have the right to file an action for reconveyance, they have failed to prove their case. Thus, on the second issue, the Court
agrees with the RTC that the Reyeses failed to adduce substantial evidence to establish their allegation that the Galangs
had fraudulently registered the subject property in their names.

The CA reversed the RTC decision giving the reason that the property was the former bed of Marigman Creek, which
changed its course and passed through their Ponderosa property, thus, ownership of the subject property was automatically
vested in them.

The law in this regard is covered by Article 461 of the Civil Code, which provides:

Art. 461. River beds which are abandoned through the natural change in the course of the waters ipso
facto belong to the owners whose lands are occupied by the new course in proportion to the area lost.
However, the owners of the lands adjoining the old bed shall have the right to acquire the same by paying
the value thereof, which value shall not exceed the value of the area occupied by the new bed.

If indeed a property was the former bed of a creek that changed its course and passed through the property of the claimant,
then, pursuant to Article 461, the ownership of the old bed left to dry by the change of course was automatically acquired
by the claimant.18 Before such a conclusion can be reached, the fact of natural abandonment of the old course must be
shown, that is, it must be proven that the creek indeed changed its course without artificial or man-made intervention.
Thus, the claimant, in this case the Reyeses, must prove three key elements by clear and convincing evidence. These are:
 Page 17 of 26

(1) the old course of the creek, (2) the new course of the creek, and (3) the change of course of the creek from the old
location to the new location by natural occurrence.

In this regard, the Reyeses failed to adduce indubitable evidence to prove the old course, its natural abandonment and
the new course. In the face of a Torrens title issued by the government, which is presumed to have been regularly issued,
the evidence of the Reyeses was clearly wanting. Uncorroborated testimonial evidence will not suffice to convince the
Court to order the reconveyance of the property to them. This failure did not escape the observation of the Office of the
Solicitor General. Thus, it commented:

In the case at bar, it is not clear whether or not the Marigman Creek dried-up naturally back in
1980. Neither did private respondents submit any findings or report from the Bureau of Lands or the
DENR Regional Executive Director, who has the jurisdiction over the subject lot, regarding the nature of
change in the course of the creek’s waters. Worse, what is even uncertain in the present case is
the exact location of the subject matter of dispute. This is evident from the decision of the Regional Trial
Court which failed to specify which portion of the land is actually being disputed by the contending
parties.

xxx

Since the propriety of the remedy taken by private respondents in the trial court and their legal personality
to file the aforesaid action depends on whether or not the litigated property in the present case still forms
part of the public domain, or had already been converted into a private land, the identification of the
actual portion of the land subject of the controversy becomes necessary and indispensable in
deciding the issues herein involved.

xxx

Notably, private respondents failed to submit during trial any convincing proof of a similar declaration by
the government that a portion of the Marigman Creek had already dried-up and that the same is already
considered alienable and disposable agricultural land which they could acquire through acquisitive
prescription.

Indeed, a thorough investigation is very imperative in the light of the conflicting factual issues as to the
character and actual location of the property in dispute. These factual issues could properly be resolved by
the DENR and the Land Management Bureau, which have the authority to do so and have the duty to
carry out the provisions of the Public Land Act, after both parties have been fully given the chance to
present all their evidence.19[Emphases supplied]

Moreover, during cross-examination, Conrado S. Reyes admitted that the plan surveyed for Fe de Castro Reyes and Jose
de Castro, marked before the RTC as Exhibit "A-2," was prepared by a geodetic engineer without conducting an actual
survey on the ground:

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS:

I am showing to you Exhibit "A-2" which is a plan surveyed for Fe de Kastro Reyes and Jose de Kastro.
This plan was prepared by the geodetic engineer without conducting actual survey on the ground, is it
not?

A: I cannot agree to that question.

Q: But based on the certification of the geodetic engineer, who prepared this it appears that this plan was
plotted only based on the certification on this plan marked as Exhibit "A-2", is it not?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: So, based on this certification that the geodetic engineer conducted the survey of this plan based on the
technical description without conducting actual survey on the ground?

A: Yes, sir.20

At some point, Mr. Reyes admitted that he was not sure that the property even existed:

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS:

 Page 18 of 26

The subject matter of this document Exhibit I is that, that property which at present is titled in the name of
Fe de Castro Reyes married to Conrado Reyes, et.al. is that correct?

A: Yes. Q: The subject matter of this case now is the adjoining lot of this TCT 185252, is that correct? A:
I do not know. Q: You mean you do not know the lot subject matter of this case?

A: I do not know whether it really exists.

Q: Just answer the question, you do not know?

A: Yes.21

The conflicting claims here are (1) the title of the Galangs issued by the DENR, through the PENRO, and (2) the claim of
the Reyeses, based on unsubstantiated testimony, that the land in question is the former bed of a dried up creek. As
between these two claims, this Court is inclined to decide in favor of the Galangs who hold a valid and subsisting title to
the property which, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the Court presumes to have been issued by the PENRO in
the regular performance of its official duty.

The bottom line here is that, fraud and misrepresentation, as grounds for cancellation of patent and annulment of title,
should never be presumed, but must be proved by clear and convincing evidence, with mere preponderance of evidence
not being adequate. Fraud is a question of fact which must be proved.22

In this case, the allegations of fraud were never proven. There was no evidence at all specifically showing actual fraud or
misrepresentation. Thus, the Court cannot sustain the findings of the CA.

WHEREFORE, the petition 1s GRANTED. The April 9, 2008 Decision and the October 6, 2008 Resolution .of the
Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CV. No. -85660, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. 97-4560 of the
Regional Trial Court of Anti polo City, Branch 73, is hereby ordered DISMISSED for lack of merit.SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 142595. October 15, 2003.]

RACHEL C. CELESTIAL, Petitioner, v. JESSE CACHOPERO, Respondent.

In the instant appeal by petition for review on certiorari, 1 petitioner Rachel Cachopero Celestial assails the February 15,
1999 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 45927, "Jesse C. Cachopero v. Regional Executive Director of
DENR, Region XII and Rachel C. Celestial," which reversed and set aside the Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Midsayap, Cotabato, Branch 18 dismissing respondent’s petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, and mandated
the Regional Executive Director of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Region XII to
process the Miscellaneous Sales Application (MSA) of respondent Jesse Cachopero in DENR Claim No. XII-050-90 to
which petitioner filed a protest.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Respondent, brother of petitioner, filed an MSA (Plan No. (XII-6)-1669) with the Bureau of Lands covering a 415 square
meter parcel of land located at Barrio 8, Midsayap, Cotabato and formerly part of the Salunayan Creek in Katingawan,
Midsayap.

In his MSA, respondent alleged that he had, since 1968, been occupying the land whereon he built a residential house and
introduced other improvements.

Petitioner filed a protest against respondent’s MSA, claiming preferential right over the land subject thereof since it is
adjacent to, and is the only outlet from, her residential house situated at Lot No. 2586-G-28 (LRC) Psd-105462, Poblacion
8, Midsayap.

Following an ocular inspection, the Bureau of Lands, finding the land subject of respondent’s MSA to be outside the
commerce of man, dismissed petitioner’s protest and denied respondent’s MSA, to wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

In the ocular inspection, it was verified that the land in dispute with an area of 415 square meters was formerly a part of
the Salunayan Creek that became dry as a result of the construction of an irrigation canal by the National Irrigation
Administration. However, it was certified by Project Engineer Reynaldo Abeto of the said office in his certification dated
May 19, 1982, that only a portion of the same containing an area of 59.40 square meters more or less was taken as part of
the National Irrigation Administration service road. It was also ascertained that the P20,000.00 residential house wherein
Jesse Cachopero and his family are living is not within the 69-meters width of the national highway. However, per the
 Page 19 of 26

certification of the local office of the District Engineer for Public Works and Highways, the government may need the
area where the house stands for expansion in the future. Moreover, it was also certified by the Office of Municipal Mayor
that the whole area covered by the miscellaneous sales application of Jesse Cachopero is needed by the municipal
government for future public improvements.

From the foregoing facts, it is clear that the subject land is outside the commerce of man and therefore, not susceptible of
private acquisition under the provision of the Public Land Act. However, in keeping with the policy of our compassionate
society in tilting the balance of social forces by favoring the disadvantaged in life, we may allow Jesse Cachopero to
temporarily occupy the land in dispute, after excluding therefrom the portion needed for the existing right of way being
claimed by Rachel Celestial to be [the] only adequate outlet to the public highway until such time that the land is needed
by the government for expansion of the road.

WHEREFORE, it is ordered that this case, be, as hereby it is, dismissed and this case (sic), dropped from the records. The
Miscellaneous Sales Application (New) of Jesse Cachopero is hereby rejected and in lieu thereof, he shall file a revocable
permit application for the land in question after excluding from the southern part of the land the area of five (5) meters for
right of way purposes as shown in the sketch drawn at the back of this order. The segregation survey of the area shall be at
the pro-rata expense of the parties.

SO ORDERED. 2 (Emphasis and Italics supplied)

Petitioner thereafter instituted an action for ejectment against respondent and his wife before the Municipal Trial Court of
Midsayap, Cotabato, docketed as Civil Case No. 711. A judgment based on a compromise was rendered in said case under
the following terms and conditions:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

That Spouses Jesse Cachopero and Bema Cachopero, defendants in this case, are going to vacate the premises in question
and transfer the old house subject of this ejectment case at the back of Lot No. 2586-G-28 (LRC) Psd-105462, located at
8, Midsayap, Cotabato, within eight (8) months from today, but not later than April 30, 1990;

x x x

That plaintiff is willing to give a two (2)-meter wide exit alley on the eastern portion of said lot as road-right-of-way up to
the point of the NIA road on the west of Lot No. 2586-G-28, (LRC) Psd-105462;

That defendants hereby promise to remove all their improvements introduced fronting the residence of the plaintiff before
August 31, 1989; and the plaintiff shall likewise remove all her existing improvements on the same area;

x x x 3 (Emphasis supplied)

Subsequently or on May 21, 1991, respondent filed another MSA with the DENR Regional Office of Cotabato involving a
portion of the same lot subject of his first MSA, covering an area of 334 square meters, more or less (the subject land),
and docketed as DENR-XII-Claim No. 050-90. This time, the MSA was supported by a certification 4 dated January 9,
1989 issued by the Office of the Mayor of Midsayap and an Indorsement 5 dated January 16, 1989 by the District
Engineer of the Department of Public Works and Highways stating that the subject land is suitable for residential purposes
and no longer needed by the municipal government.

Petitioner likewise filed a protest against her brother-respondent’s second MSA, alleging a preferential right over the
subject land, she being the adjacent and riparian owner, and maintaining that it is her only access to the national highway.
She thus reiterated her demand for a five (5)-meter road right of way through the land.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

After another investigation of the subject land, DENR Regional Executive Director Macorro Macumbal issued an Order
dated February 17, 1994 stating that it was suitable for residential purposes but that, in light of the conflicting interest of
the parties, it be sold at public auction. Respondent’s second MSA was accordingly dismissed, viz:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library

In the ocular investigation of the premises, it was established that the said property is a dried bed of Salunayan Creek
resulting from the construction of the irrigation canal by the National Irrigation Administration; that it is suitable for
residential purpose . . .

x x x
 Page 20 of 26

It is evident that under the law, property of the public domain situated within the first (1st) to fourth class municipalities
are disposable by sales only. Since municipality of Midsayap, Cotabato is classified as third (3rd) class municipality and
the property in dispute, Lot no. (MSA-XII-6)-1669, is situated in the poblacion of Midsayap, Cotabato, and considering
the conflicting interest of the herein parties, it is therefore equitable to dispose the same by sale at a public auction
pursuant to Section 67, C.A. No. 141, as amended, pertinent clause of which provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

. . . sale shall be made through oral bidding; and adjudication shall be made to the highest bidder, . . .

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, it is ordered as hereby is ordered that the instant protest is dismissed and
dropped from the records, and the Miscellaneous Sales Application (New) of Jesse C. Cachopero is rejected and returned
unrecorded. Accordingly, the CENR Officer of CENRO XII-4B shall cause the segregation survey of a portion of five (5)
meters in width running parallel to line point C-1 of the approved survey plan (MSA-XII-6)-1669, sketch is shown at the
dorsal side hereof, as a permanent easement and access road for the occupants of Lot No. 2386-G-28, (LRC) Psd-105462
to the national highway. Thereafter, and pursuant to paragraph G.2.3 of Department Administrative Order No. 38, Series
of 1990, the CENRO XII 4B shall dispose the remaining area of the lot in question through oral bidding.

SO ORDERED." 6 (Emphasis and Italics supplied)

Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the above-said order of the DENR Regional Executive Director, but it
was denied by Order of February 27, 1995 by the OIC Regional Executive Director of Region XII, Cotabato City in this
wise:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

A meticulous scrutiny of the records disclosed that Civil Case No. 711 for ejectment, decided on the basis of compromise
agreement of the parties dated August 10, 1989, involved "transfer of the house from Lot No. MSA XII-6-1669 to the
litigant’s parents’ property situated at the back of protestant property, Lot No. 2586-G-28 (LRC), Psd-105462." Whereas
the issue in DENR XII Claim No. 050-90 involved the disposition of lot no. (MSA II-6)-1669 a residential public land
being exclusively vested with the Director of Lands (Sec. 4, C.A. 141).

The two (2) meters wide exit alley provided in the compromise agreement was established by the protestant from her
private property (Lot No. 2586-G-28 (LRC), Psd-105462) for the benefit of her brother, herein respondent, upon his
transfer to their parents property at the back of Lot No. 2586-G-28 (LRC), Psd-105462. Whereas the five (5) meters wide
easement imposed on Lot No. (MSA-XII-6)-1669, a public land, provided in the decision in DENR Claim No. 050-90 is
in accordance with Article 670 of the New Civil Code . . .

x x x

With all the above foregoing, we find no reversible error to reconsider our Order of February 17, 1994.

WHEREFORE, the instant motion for reconsideration is DENIED. 7

Respondent thereupon filed on April 3, 1995 with the RTC of Midsayap, Cotabato a petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus with preliminary mandatory injunction and temporary restraining order assailing the Orders dated
February 17, 1994 and February 27, 1995 of the DENR Regional Executive Director and OIC Regional Executive
Director of Region XII, Cotabato, attributing grave abuse of discretion in the issuance thereof.

Petitioner moved for the dismissal of the petition, alleging lack of jurisdiction and non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies.

By Order of March 26, 1997, the RTC denied respondent’s petition for certiorari for lack of merit and non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies, as it did deny his motion for reconsideration.

The Court of Appeals, before which respondent assailed the RTC orders by petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus, granted said petition, and accordingly reversed and set aside the assailed orders of the RTC and ordered the
DENR to process the MSA of Respondent. 8

Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration 9 of the appellate court’s decision having been denied by Resolution of March 2,
2000, 10 she lodged the present petition, alleging that the Court of Appeals acted contrary to law and jurisprudence 1) in
holding that the RTC of Midsayap had jurisdiction over respondent’s petition, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
 Page 21 of 26

remedies was not applicable to the instant case, and the contested land is public land; and 2) in ordering the processing of
respondent’s MSA pursuant to R.A. 730. 11

Petitioner contends that the RTC of Midsayap had no jurisdiction over respondent’s petition for certiorarias (a) it "is in
the nature of an appeal" 12 falling within the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals under Section 9(3) 13 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129 (B.P. 129), as amended; and (b) respondent failed to exhaust administrative remedies when he failed
to appeal the questioned Orders to the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources. 14

Petitioner’s petition fails.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Petitioner has apparently confused the separate and distinct remedies of an appeal (i.e. through a petition for review of a
decision of a quasi judicial agency under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court) and a special civil action for certiorari (i.e.
through a petition for review under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court). In Silverio v. Court of Appeals, 15 this Court,
speaking through then Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee, distinguished between these two modes of judicial review as
follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

The provisions of the Rules of Court permit an aggrieved party, in the general types of cases, to take a cause and apply for
relief to the appellate courts by way of either of two distinctly different and dissimilar modes — through the broad process
of appeal or the limited special civil action of certiorari. An appeal brings up for review errors of judgment committed by
a court with jurisdiction over the subject of the suit and the persons of the parties or any such error committed by the court
in the exercise of its jurisdiction amounting to nothing more than an error of judgment. On the other hand, the writ
of certiorari issues for the correction of errors of jurisdiction only or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. The writ of certiorari "cannot legally be used for any other purpose." In terms of its function, the
writ of certiorari serves "to keep an inferior court within the bounds of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing
such a grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction" or to relieve parties from arbitrary acts of courts —
acts which courts have no power or authority in law to perform. 16 (Italics, emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Concomitantly, appellate jurisdiction is separate and distinct from the jurisdiction to issue the prerogative writ
of certiorari. An appellate jurisdiction refers to a process which is a continuation of the original suit and not a
commencement of a new action. In contrast, to invoke a court’s jurisdiction to issue the writ of certiorari requires the
commencement of a new and original action therefor, independent of the proceedings which gave rise to the questioned
decision or order. 17 As correctly held by the Court of Appeals, 18 the RTCs have concurrent jurisdiction with the Court
of Appeals and the Supreme Court over original petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus 19 under Section 21
20 of B.P. 129.

A perusal of respondent’s Petition dated April 3, 1995 filed before the RTC clearly shows that it alleged that the DENR
Regional Executive Director and OIC Regional Executive Director acted with "grave abuse of discretion and without or in
excess of jurisdiction amounting to lack of jurisdiction" when they issued the questioned Orders dated February 17, 1994
and February 27, 1995. Evidently, respondent sought a judicial review of the questioned Orders through a special civil
action for certiorari which, as aforementioned, was within the jurisdiction of the RTC of Midsayap, Cotabato. 21

Additionally, this Court finds no reason to disturb the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that the instant case falls under the
recognized exceptions to the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies, to wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

The rule of exhaustion of administrative remedies is inapplicable if it should appear that an irreparable injury or damage
will be suffered by a party if he should await, before taking court action, the final action of the administrative official
concerned on the matter as a result of a patently illegal order (Vivo v. Cloribel, 18 SCRA 713; De Lara v. Cloribel, 14
SCRA 269); or where appeal would not prove to be speedy and adequate remedy. 22

True, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies calls for resort first to the appropriate administrative
authorities in the resolution of a controversy falling under their jurisdiction before the same may be elevated to the courts
of justice for review, and non-observance thereof is a ground for the dismissal of the complaint, 23 the rationale
being:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

The thrust of the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies is that the courts must allow the administrative agencies to
carry out their functions and discharge their responsibilities within the specialized areas of their respective competence. It
is presumed that an administrative agency, if afforded an opportunity to pass upon a matter, will decide the same
correctly, or correct any previous error committed in its forum. Furthermore, reasons of law, comity and convenience
prevent the courts from entertaining cases proper for determination by administrative agencies. Hence, premature resort to
the courts necessarily becomes fatal to the cause of action of the petitioner. 24
 Page 22 of 26

However, this requirement of prior exhaustion of administrative remedies is not absolute, there being instances when it
may be dispensed with and judicial action may be validly resorted to immediately, among which are: 1) when the question
raised is purely legal; 2) when the administrative body is in estoppel; 3) when the act complained of is patently illegal; 4)
when there is urgent need for judicial intervention; 5) when the claim involved is small; 6) when irreparable damage will
be suffered; 7) when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; 8) when strong public interest is involved; and
9) in quo warranto proceedings.25cralaw:red

Hence, where the act complained of is patently illegal since the administrative body acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with such grave abuse of discretion as to be tantamount to lack of jurisdiction, as was alleged in
respondent’s petition before the RTC, prior exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required and resort to the courts
through a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 is permitted:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

We hold that it was an error for the court a quo to rule that the petitioners should have exhausted its remedy of appeal
from the orders denying their application for waiver/suspension to the Board of Trustees and thereafter to the Court of
Appeals pursuant to the Rules. Certiorari is an appropriate remedy to question the validity of the challenged issuances of
the HDMF which are alleged to have been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

Moreover, among the accepted exceptions to the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies are: (1) where the question
in dispute is purely a legal one; and (2) where the controverted act is patently illegal or was performed without jurisdiction
or in excess of jurisdiction. Moreover, while certiorari as a remedy may not be used as a substitute for an appeal,
especially for a lost appeal, this rule should not be strictly enforced if the petition is genuinely meritorious. It has been
said that where the rigid application of the rules would frustrate substantial justice, or bar the vindication of a legitimate
grievance, the courts are justified in exempting a particular case from the operation of the rules. 26 (Emphasis supplied)

To justify the issuance of the writ of certiorari, however, it must be clearly shown that there is a patent and grave abuse of
discretion amounting to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at
all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility. 27

The crux of the case at bar is, therefore, whether the DENR Regional Executive Director and OIC Regional Director acted
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the questioned Orders dated February
17, 1994 and February 27, 1995, respectively.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

In resolving respondent’s second MSA and petitioner’s protest thereto, the DENR Regional Executive Director, after
considering the conflicting interest of the parties, found it equitable to resolve the same by directing the sale of the subject
land at public auction pursuant to Section 67, C.A. No. 141, as amended.

Section 67 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as "The Public Land Act," provides the procedure for the
disposition of lands of the public domain which are open to disposition or concession and intended to be used for
residential, commercial, industrial or other productive purposes other than agricultural, to wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library

SEC. 67. The lease or sale shall be made through oral bidding; and adjudication shall be made to the highest bidder.
However, where an applicant has made improvements on the land by virtue of a permit issued to him by competent
authority, the sale or lease shall be made by sealed bidding as prescribed in Section twenty-six of this Act, the provisions
of which shall be applied wherever applicable. If all or part of the lots remain unleased or unsold, the Director of Lands
shall from time to time announce in the Official Gazette or in any other newspapers of general circulation, the lease or sale
of those lots, if necessary. (Emphasis supplied)

With the enactment of Republic Act No. 730 28 on June 18, 1952, however, an exception to the foregoing procedure was
created by authorizing disposition of lands of the public domain by private sale, instead of bidding, provided that: (1) the
applicant has in his favor the conditions specified therein and (2) the area applied for is not more than 1,000 square
meters. 29 The pertinent provision of R.A. 730 thus provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

SEC. 1. Notwithstanding the provisions of Sections 61 and 67 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Republic
Act No. 293, any Filipino citizen of legal age who is not the owner of a home lot in the municipality or city in which he
resides and who has in good faith established his residence on a parcel of the public land of the Republic of the
Philippines which is not needed for the public service, shall be given preference to purchase at a private sale of which
reasonable notice shall be given to him not more than one thousand square meters at a price to be fixed by the Director of
Lands with the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. It shall be an essential condition of this
sale that the occupant has constructed his house on the land and actually resided therein. Ten percent of the purchase price
 Page 23 of 26

shall be paid upon the approval of the sale and the balance may be paid in full, or in ten equal annual installments.

SEC. 2. Land acquired under the provisions of this Act shall not be subject to any restrictions against encumbrance or
alienation before and after the issuance of the patents thereon. 30

SEC. 3. The provisions of the Public Land Act with respect to the sale of lands for residential purposes which are not
inconsistent herewith shall be applicable.

SEC. 4. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

Approved, June 18, 1952. (Emphasis supplied)

Given the foregoing provisions of R.A. 730 which took effect on June 18, 1952, and the DENR Regional Executive
Director’s February 17, 1994 finding that the subject land was "suitable for residential purposes," it was incumbent upon
him to determine whether the provisions of R.A. 730 were applicable to respondent’s MSA. As held by the Court of
Appeals:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Finally, petitioner contends that the DENR Regional Executive Director and OIC Regional Executive Director gravely
erred in ordering the sale of the subject lot through oral bidding applying Section 67, Commonwealth Act No. 141 and not
Republic Act 730 authorizing the sale of public land without bidding.

We agree with the petitioner.

x x x

Apropos is the case of Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 125 SCRA 785, ruling that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"When public land lots of not more than 1,000 sq. ms. are used, or to be used as a residence . . . they can be sold on
private sales under the provisions of Republic Act No. 730."cralaw virtua1aw library

In Agura v. Serfino, Sr., (204 SCRA 569), the Supreme Court held that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"R.A. 730 authorizes a sale by private sale, as an exception to the general rule that it should be by bidding, if the area
applied for does not exceed 1,000 square meters, . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library

We see no reason why these ruling should not be applied in this case which involves 415 [should have been 334] square
meters only. 31

The Regional Director, however, summarily chose to apply Section 67 of the Public Land Act upon a finding that it was
more "equitable" in light of the "conflicting interest" of the parties. In his "Answer" to respondent’s petition before the
RTC, the Director justified his non-application of R.A. 730 in this wise:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

. . . Republic Act No. 730 is not applicable to the case at bar, the land being disputed, Republic Act No. 730 requisite (sic)
vas not meet (sic) that for this law to apply to a particular case, the land must be in the first place not a land in conflict.
There being a pending protest for final adjudication, the said conflict continues to exist thus an impediment to the
application of Republic Act 730 32 (Emphasis supplied)

which justification he reiterated in his Opposition 33 to respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration of the RTC decision.

The Director’s reliance on equity as basis for his action was misplaced, however. It is well-settled that "equity follows the
law." 34 Described as "justice outside legality," it is applied only in the absence of, and never against, statutory law or
legal pronouncements. 35 Where pertinent positive rules are present, they should pre-empt and prevail over all abstract
arguments based only on equity. 36

A reading of R.A. 730 (or of the Public Land Act for that matter) shows nothing therein to support the Director’s
contention that the pendency of a protest is a bar to the application of R.A. 730 to an MSA. Indeed, that Section 1 of R.A.
730 gives a qualified applicant preference to purchase alienable public land suitable for residential purposes implies that
there may be more than one party interested in purchasing it.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw library

What is more, under Section 91 of the Public Land Act, it is the duty of the Director of the Lands Management Bureau
 Page 24 of 26

(formerly the Director of Lands) to determine whether the material facts set forth in an MSA are true:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library

SEC. 91. The statements made in the application shall be considered as essential conditions and parts of any concession,
title, or permit issued on the basis of such application, and any false statement therein or omission of facts altering,
changing, or modifying the consideration of the facts set forth in such statements, and any subsequent modification,
alteration, or change of the material facts set forth in the application shall ipso facto produce the cancellation of the
concession, title, or permit granted. It shall be the duty of the Director of Lands, from time to time and whenever he may
deem it advisable, to make the necessary investigations for the purpose of ascertaining whether the material facts set out in
the application are true, or whether they continue to exist and are maintained and preserved in good faith, and for the
purposes of such investigation, the Director of Lands is hereby empowered to issue subpoenas and subpoenas duces tecum
and, if necessary, to obtain compulsory process from the courts. In every investigation made in accordance with this
section, the existence of bad faith, fraud, concealment, or fraudulent and illegal modification of essential facts shall be
presumed if the grantee or possessor of the land shall refuse or fail to obey a subpoena or subpoena duces tecum lawfully
issued by the Director of Lands or his authorized delegates or agents, or shall refuse or fail to give direct and specific
answers to pertinent questions, and on the basis of such presumption, an order of cancellation may issue without further
proceedings. (Emphasis supplied)

Likewise, under Section 102 of the same Public Land Act, it is the duty of the Director of the Lands Management Bureau
to, after due hearing, verify whether the grounds of a protest or objection to an MSA are well founded, and, if so, to cancel
the MSA:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

SEC. 102. Any person, corporation, or association may file an objection under oath to any application or concession under
this Act, grounded on any reason sufficient under this Act for the denial or cancellation of the application or the denial of
the patent or grant. If, after the applicant or grantee has been given suitable opportunity to be duly heard, the objection is
found to be well founded, the Director of Lands shall deny or cancel the application or deny patent or grant, and the
person objecting shall, if qualified, be granted a prior right of entry for a term of sixty days from the date of the notice.
(Emphasis supplied)

There was thus clearly a positive duty on the part of the DENR Director to process respondent’s MSA, and to ascertain,
particularly in light of petitioner’s protest, whether respondent was qualified to purchase the subject land at a private sale
pursuant to R.A. 730. This, he did not do.

In fine, by abdicating his duty to process respondent’s MSA and summarily ordering, without factual or legal basis, that
the subject land be disposed of via oral bidding pursuant to Section 67 of the Public Land Act, the Director acted with
patent grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. As the Court of Appeals held:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library

Considering that the assailed Orders of public respondent DENR Regional Executive Director applying Section 67 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141 and ordering the sale of the subject lot by oral bidding are patently erroneous, the authority
of the court to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is warranted. 37

The Director’s commission of grave abuse of discretion does not, however, mean that respondent automatically has the
better right to the subject land. As mandated by law, the Director must process respondent’s MSA, conduct an
investigation, and determine whether the material facts set forth therein are true to bring it within the coverage of R.A.
730.

A thorough investigation is all the more imperative considering that petitioner’s protest raises serious factual issues
regarding respondent’s qualification to purchase the subject land — in particular, whether he already owns a home lot in
Midsayap and whether he has, in good faith, constructed his house on the subject land and actually resided therein. These
factual issues are properly within the authority of the DENR and the Land Management Bureau, which are tasked with
carrying out the provisions of the Public Land Act and R.A. 730, 38 do determine, after both parties have been given an
opportunity to fully present their evidence.

As for petitioner’s claim of ownership over the subject land, admittedly a dried-up bed of the Salunayan Creek, based on
(1) her alleged long term adverse possession and that of her predecessor-in-interest, Marcelina Basadre, even prior to
October 22, 1966, when she purchased the adjoining property from the latter, and (2) the right of accession under Art. 370
of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 and/or Article 461 of the Civil Code, the same must fail.

Since property of public dominion is outside the commerce of man 39 and not susceptible to private appropriation and
acquisitive prescription, 40 the adverse possession which may be the basis of a grant of title in the confirmation of an
 Page 25 of 26

imperfect title refers only to alienable or disposable portions of the public domain. 41 It is only after the Government has
declared the land to be alienable and disposable agricultural land that the year of entry, cultivation and exclusive and
adverse possession can be counted for purposes of an imperfect title. 42

A creek, like the Salunayan Creek, is a recess or arm extending from a river and participating in the ebb and flow of the
sea. 43 As such, under Articles 420(1) 44 and 502(1) 45 of the Civil Code, the Salunayan Creek, including its natural bed,
is property of the public domain which is not susceptible to private appropriation and acquisitive prescription. 46 And,
absent any declaration by the government, that a portion of the creek has dried-up does not, by itself, alter its inalienable
character.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

This, in fact, was the very reason behind the denial of respondent’s first MSA, the District Engineer having certified that
the government may need the subject land for future expansion, and the office of the Municipal Mayor having certified
that it was needed by t he municipal government for future public improvements. 47 Consequently, it was only after the
same offices subsequently certified 48 that the subject land was suitable for residential purposes and no longer needed by
the municipal government that it became alienable and disposable. Confronted with similar factual circumstances, this
Court in Bracewell v. Court of Appeals 49 held:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Clear from the above is the requirement that the applicant must prove that the land is alienable public land. On this score,
we agree with respondents that petitioner failed to show that the parcels of land subject of his application are alienable or
disposable. On the contrary, it was conclusively shown by the government that the same were only classified as alienable
or disposable on March 27, 1972. Thus, even granting that petitioner and his predecessors-in-interest had occupied the
same since 1908, he still cannot claim title thereto by virtue of such possession since the subject parcels of land were not
yet alienable land at that time nor capable of private appropriation. The adverse possession which may be the basis of a
grant of title or confirmation of an imperfect title refers only to alienable or disposable portions of the public domain. 50
(Emphasis supplied)

With respect to petitioner’s invocation of the principle of accession under either Article 370 of the Spanish Civil Code of
1889 or Article 461 of the Civil Code, the same does not apply to vest her with ownership over subject land.

Under Article 370 51 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 which took effect in the Philippines on December 7, 1889, 52 the
beds of rivers which remain abandoned because the course of the water has naturally changed belong to the owners of the
riparian lands throughout their respective lengths. If the abandoned bed divided estates belonging to different owners, the
new dividing line shall run at equal distance therefrom. 53

When the present Civil Code took effect on August 30, 1950, 54 the foregoing rule was abandoned in favor of the present
Article 461, which provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

ART. 461. River beds which are abandoned through the natural change in the course of the waters ipso facto belong to the
owners whose lands are occupied by the new course in proportion to the area lost. However, the owners of the lands
adjoining the old bed shall have the right to acquire the same by paying the value thereof, which value shall not exceed the
value of the area occupied by the new bed. (Emphasis supplied)

Article 461 provides for compensation for the loss of the land occupied by the new bed since it is believed more equitable
to compensate the actual losers than to add land to those who have lost nothing. 55 Thus, the abandoned river bed is given
to the owner(s) of the land(s) onto which the river changed its course instead of the riparian owner(s). 56

Petitioner claims that on October 22, 1966, when she purchased the property adjoining the subject land from Marcelina
Basadre, the said subject land was already a dried-up river bed such that "almost one-half portion of the residential house .
. . was so already built and is still now situated at the said dried-up portion of the Salunayan Creek bed . . ." 57 She failed
to allege, however, when the subject portion of the Salunayan Creek dried up, a fact essential to determining whether the
applicable law is Article 370 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 or Article 461 of the Civil Code.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw
1ibrary

Had the disputed portion of the Salunayan Creek dried up after the present Civil Code took effect, the subject land would
clearly not belong to petitioner or her predecessor-in-interest since under the aforementioned provision of Article 461,
"river beds which are abandoned through the natural change in the course of the waters ipso facto belong to the owners of
the land occupied by the new course," and the owners of the adjoining lots have the right to acquire them only after paying
their value. 58

And both Article 370 of the Old Code and Article 461 of the present Civil Code are applicable only when" [r]iver beds are
abandoned through the natural change in the course of the waters." It is uncontroverted, however, that, as found by both
 Page 26 of 26

the Bureau of Lands and the DENR Regional Executive Director, the subject land became dry as a result of the
construction of an irrigation canal by the National Irrigation Administration. Thus, in Ronquillo v. Court of Appeals, 59
this Court held:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

The law is clear and unambiguous. It leaves no room for interpretation. Article 370 applies only if there is a natural
change in the course of the waters. The rules on alluvion do not apply to man-made or artificial accretions nor to
accretions to lands that adjoin canals or esteros or artificial drainage systems. Considering our earlier finding that the
dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub was actually caused by the active intervention of man, it follows that Article 370 does
not apply to the case at bar and, hence, the Del Rosarios cannot be entitled thereto supposedly as riparian owners.

The dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub should thus be considered as forming part of the land of the public domain which
cannot be subject to acquisition by private ownership. . . 60 (Emphasis supplied)

Furthermore, both provisions pertain to situations where there has been a change in the course of a river, not where the
river simply dries up. In the instant Petition, it is not even alleged that the Salunayan Creek changed its course. In such a
situation, commentators are of the opinion that the dry river bed remains property of public dominion. 61

Finally, while this Court notes that petitioner offered to purchase the subject land from the government, 62 she did so
through an informal letter dated August 9, 1989 63 instead of the prescribed form. By such move, she is deemed to have
acknowledged that the subject land is public land, for it would be absurd for her to have applied for its purchase if she
believed it was hers. She is thus stopped from claiming otherwise. 64

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.