PART I.
SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE OF According to the project of partition dated June 17,
DECEASED PERSONS
A. Codals: Rules 73-90
B. Cases:
Rule 72
1. Republic v. CA, G.R. No. 163604, May
6, 2005
2. Pacific Banking Corp. v. CA, G.R. No.
109373, March 20, 1995
3. Natcher v. CA, G.R. No. 133000,
October 2, 2001
4. Vda. de Manalo v. CA, G.R. No.
129242, January 16, 2001
5. Lee v. CA, G.R. No. 118387, October
11, 2001
6. Republic v. Sagun, G.R. No. 187567,
February 15, 2012
Rule 73
1. Vda. De Reyes v. CA, G.R. No.
L-47027, January 27, 1989
G.R. No. L-47027 January 27, 1989
BEATRIZ DE ZUZUARREGUI VDA. DE
REYES, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, PILAR
IBAÑEZ VDA. DE ZUZUARREGUI,
Administratrix, ANTONIO DE ZUZUARREGUI,
JR., ENRIQUE DE ZUZUARREGUI and PACITA
JAVIER, respondents.
Basilio H. Toquero for petitioner.
Senen S. Ceniza for respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari, We are
asked to set aside the decision of the Court of
Appeals, promulgated on September 19, 1977 in
CA-G.R. No. 53197-R which affirmed the order
1
of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch IV,
Quezon City dated March 26, 1973, issued in
Special Proceedings Q-325, entitled "Intestate
Estate of Don Antonio de Zuzuarregui, Sr.". 2
Respondent administratrix, Pilar Ibañez Vda. de
Zuzuarregui, is the surviving spouse of Antonio de
Zuzuarregui, Sr., while petitioner Beatriz de
Zuzuarregui Vda. de Reyes and the other heirs of
said estate, namely, Antonio de Zuzuarregui, Jr.,
Enrique de Zuzuarregui and Jose de Zuzuarregui,
are the illegitimate children of the decedent. The
parties herein are the only heirs of the deceased
whose estate was the subject of said settlement
proceedings. Petitioner was the daughter of the
deceased by a mother different from that of his
aforesaid three (3) sons, their mother being Pacita
Javier who was the niece of the herein respondent
administratrix. 3
1958 and approved by the probate court, the
respective shares of said heirs in the real estate
left by the deceased are as follows: Pilar Ibañez
Vda. de Zuzuarregui, 12/16 thereof, inclusive of
1/2 of said assets which pertains to her share in
the conjugal partnership; Beatriz, 1/16; Antonio,
Jr., 1/16; Enrique, 1/16; and Jose, 1/16. 4
Among the real properties in the project of
partition is a parcel of land covered by and
described in Transfer Certificate of Title No.
42643 located in Antipolo, Rizal. In said project of
partition, its area is stated as 83,781 square
meters, with an assessed value of P6,430.00.
This statement of said area was repeated in said
document four time, that is, in adjudicating the
5
corresponding portions of said land to Pilar
(12/15), Antonio, Jr. (1/15). Enrique (1/15) and
Jose (1/15). The petitioner did not have a share
6
in the aforesaid parcel of land because she
relinquished her right thereto "in lieu of her bigger
share in Antipolo, Rizal, real estate property." 7
On January 29, 1973, the respondent
administratrix and the other three distributees filed
a motion to reopen Special Proceedings No.
Q-325 for the purpose of correcting an alleged
typographical error in the description of the parcel
of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
42643 since, according to them, the correct land
area is 803,781.51 square meters and not 83,781
square meters. The heirs of Beatriz de
8
Zuzuarregui Vda. de Reyes filed their opposition
to said motion. 9
The court a quo issued the contested order, with
the following dispositive portion:
WHEREFORE,
(1) Sp. Proceeding No. Q-325 entitled, The
Intestate Estate of Don Antonio de Zuzuarregui,
Sr. is ordered opened for the purpose of
correcting a clerical error in the description of the
parcel of land covered by T.C.T. No. 42643;
(2) The area of land covered by T.C.T. No. 42643
be corrected by cancelling 83,781 sq. meters and
changing it to 803,781.51 sq. meters to conform
with the description of land area in T.C.T. No.
42643;
(3) That said corrections be made as pages 3, 6,
9, 10, and 12 of the project of Partition. 10
As already stated, the affirmance of said order by
the Court of Appeals eventuated in the elevation
of the controversy to Us under the present
recourse.
It is well settled that even if a decision has become
final, clerical errors or mistakes or omission plainly
due to inadvertence or negligence may be
corrected or supplied even after the judgment has
been entered. The correction of a clerical error is
an exception to the general rule that no
amendment or correction may be made by the
court in its judgment once the latter had become
final. The court may make this amendment ex
11
parte and, for this purpose, it may resort to the
pleadings filed by the parties, the court's findings
of facts and its conclusions of law as expressed in
the body of the decision. 12
However, according to the petitioner, there was no
such clerical error. While it is not disputed that the
area covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
42643 is 803,781.15 square meters, the petitioner
insists that "the area intended by the heirs of Don
Antonio de Zuzuarregui, Sr., in the Project of
Partition as approved by the trial court is the area
of 83,781 sq. m. and not 803,781,51 sq. m. 13
She claims that she would not have relinquished
her share in said parcel of land if the true area was
not fraudulently concealed from her at the time the
project of partition was executed. She further
14
contends that the fact that the description of the
area as 83,781 square meters was repeated
several times is sufficient evidence to show that
such was the area intended in the project of
partition.15
Such contentions are without merit. There is,
therefore, no reason to disturb, much less to
reverse, the factual finding of the lower court that
a typographical or clerical error was clearly
committed by inadvertence in the project of
partition.
That a special proceeding for the settlement of an
estate is filed and intended to settle
the entire estate of the deceased is obvious and
elementary. It would be absurd for the heirs to
intentionally excluded or leave a parcel of land or
a portion thereof undistributed or undivided
because the proceeding is precisely designed to
end the community of interests in properties held
by co-partners pro indiviso without designation or
segregation of shares.
It is readily apparent from the project of partition
that it was meant to be, as in fact it is, a full and
complete adjudication and partition of all
properties of the estate, necessarily including the
entire area of the land covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 42643. Thus as
perceptively posed by the queries of the
respondents, if the intention of the heirs was to
make only a partial adjudication and distribution of
the subject parcel of land, why is it that they did
not make any further disposition of the remaining
balance of 720,000 square meters? What sound
reason would the heirs have in holding in
suspense the distribution of the difference of
720,000 square meters? 16
Besides, petitioner suggests that she and the
male heirs could not see eye to eye because they
did not have a common mother. If so, this
17
supposed antagonism would even be a
compelling reason for the parties to insist on the
total partition of all the properties in the first
instance, rather than for them to remain as
co-owners for a long time. As hereinbefore
indicated, the project of partition is dated June 17,
1958, while the motion to re-open the
18
proceedings was filed only on January 29, 1973.
If We were to indulge petitioner in her stand that
the area of 803,781 square meters was
typewritten in the document as 83,781 square
meters, not because of the typist's error in omitting
the number "0" between the numbers "8" and "3"
in the first three digits but because the latter area
of only 83,781 square meters was the one
intended for distribution, then the irresistible
question would be how and why the parties
arrived at that particular latter figure. It will be
observed that such a portion would constitute only
10.42336% of the total land area covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42643. On top of
this, the assumed area of 83,781 square meters
has still to be divided into fifteen (15) parts to
arrive at the aliquot portions of 12/15 and 1/15 of
the other heirs in this particular property. Why
would the parties deliberately create such an
unlikely mathematical situation which would
complicate the actual physical segregation of the
area supposed to be distributed?
It is, therefore, a logical and credible explanation
that the omission of the zero between the figures
"8" and "3" converted "803,781" to "83,781", a
product purely of clerical oversight. Petitioner has
not offered any plausible contrary explanation.
Parenthetically, she had the assistance of legal
counsel in the intestate proceedings and in the
preparation of the project of partition.
19
Petitioner's lamentations of injustice in the
partition are demonstrably unfounded. It will be
observed that according to her own
computation, she received her 1/16 share in the
20
estate consisting of 279,803 square meters of
land, while her half brothers received on the
average 154,975.11 square meters each. Even if
the supposed shares of the respondents in the
remaining 720.000 square meters in the lot
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42643
were to be added, the share of each brother would
be only 202,975. 11 square meters. There would
not be a substantial difference in value since the
petitioner received 190,000 square meters of land
located also in Antipolo, Rizal; while in Balara,
Quezon City, she received more than her half
brothers, that is, 75,803 square meters as against
their individual 74,309.70 square meters. It was
only in Pasong Tamo where she received slightly
less, 14,000 square meters compared to
Enrique's and Jose's 14,115 square meters each,
but more than Antonio, Jr.'s 13,621 square
meters.
The ineluctable consequence of the foregoing
considerations is that, both in law and equity, the
court a quo and the respondent court committed
no error prejudicial to petitioner.
WHEREFORE, certiorari is DENIED and the
decision of the respondent court is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED
2. Uriarte v. CFI, G.R. Nos. L-21938-39,
October 29, 1970
G.R. Nos. L-21938-39 May 29, 1970
VICENTE URIARTE, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
NEGROS OCCIDENTAL (12th Judicial District)
THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA,
BRANCH IV, JUAN URIARTE ZAMACONA and
HIGINIO URIARTE, respondents.
Norberto J. Quisumbing for petitioner.
Tañada, Teehankee & Carreon for respondents.
DIZON, J.:
On October 3, 1963 petitioner Vicente Uriarte filed
an original petition for certiorari — docketed as
G.R. L-21938 — against the respondents Juan
Uriarte Zamacona, Higinio Uriarte, and the Courts
of First Instance of Negros Occidental and of
Manila, Branch IV, who will be referred to
hereinafter as the Negros Court and the Manila
Court, respectively — praying:
... that after due proceedings judgment be
rendered annulling the orders of 19 April 1963
(Annex 'H') and 11 July 1963 (Annex 'I') of
respondent Negros court dismissing the first
instituted Special Proceeding No. 6344, supra,
and the order of 1 July 1963 (Annex 'K') of
respondent Manila court denying
petitioner's omnibus motion to intervene and to
dismiss the later-instituted Special Proceeding
No. 51396, supra, both special proceedings
pertaining to the settlement of the same estate of
the same deceased, and consequently annulling
all proceedings had in Special Proceeding No.
51396; supra, of the respondent Manila court as
all taken without jurisdiction.
For the preservation of the rights of the parties
pending these proceedings, petitioner prays for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
enjoining respondents Manila court, Juan Uriarte
Zamacona and Higinio Uriarte from proceeding
with Special Proceeding No. 51396, supra, until
further orders of this Court.
Reasons in support of said petition are stated
therein as follows:
6. Respondent Negros court erred in dismissing
its Special Proceeding No. 6344, supra, and
failing to declare itself 'the court first taking
cognizance of the settlement of the estate of' the
deceased Don Juan Uriarte y Goite as prescribed
in Rule 75 section 1 of the Rules of Court.
Respondent Manila court erred in failing to
dismiss its Special Proceeding No. 51396, supra,
notwithstanding proof of prior filing of Special
Proceeding No. 6344, supra, in the Negros court.
The writ of preliminary injunction prayed for was
granted and issued by this Court on October 24,
1963.
On April 22, 1964 petitioner filed against the same
respondents a pleading entitled
SUPPLEMENTAL PETITION FOR MANDAMUS
— docketed in this Court as G.R. No. L-21939 —
praying, for the reasons therein stated, that
judgment be rendered annulling the orders issued
by the Negros Court on December 7, 1963 and
February 26, 1964, the first disapproving his
record on appeal and the second denying his
motion for reconsideration, and further
commanding said court to approve his record on
appeal and to give due course to his appeal. On
July 15, 1964 We issued a resolution deferring
action on this Supplemental Petition until the
original action for certiorari (G.R. L-21938) is
taken up on the merits.
On October 21, 1963 the respondents in G.R.
L-21938 filed their answer traversing petitioner's
contention that the respondent courts had
committed grave abuse of discretion in relation to
the matters alleged in the petition for certiorari.
It appears that on November 6, 1961 petitioner
filed with the Negros Court a petition for the
settlement of the estate of the late Don Juan
Uriarte y Goite (Special Proceeding No. 6344)
alleging therein, inter alia, that, as a natural son of
the latter, he was his sole heir, and that, during the
lifetime of said decedent, petitioner had instituted
Civil Case No. 6142 in the same Court for his
compulsory acknowledgment as such natural son.
Upon petitioner's motion the Negros Court
appointed the Philippine National Bank as special
administrator on November 13, 1961 and two
days later it set the date for the hearing of the
petition and ordered that the requisite notices be
published in accordance with law. The record
discloses, however, that, for one reason or
another, the Philippine, National Bank never
actually qualified as special administrator.
On December 19, 1961, Higinio Uriarte, one of the
two private respondents herein, filed an
opposition to the above-mentioned petition
alleging that he was a nephew of the deceased
Juan Uriarte y Goite who had "executed a Last
Will and Testament in Spain, a duly authenticated
copy whereof has been requested and which shall
be submitted to this Honorable Court upon receipt
thereof," and further questioning petitioner's
capacity and interest to commence the intestate
proceeding.
On August 28, 1962, Juan Uriarte Zamacona, the
other private respondent, commenced Special
Proceeding No. 51396 in the Manila Court for the
probate of a document alleged to be the last will of
the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite, and on the
same date he filed in Special Proceeding No.
6344 of the Negros Court a motion to dismiss the
same on the following grounds: (1) that, as the
deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite had left a last will,
there was no legal basis to proceed with said
intestate proceedings, and (2) that petitioner
Vicente Uriarte had no legal personality and
interest to initiate said intestate proceedings, he
not being an acknowledged natural son of the
decedent. A copy of the Petition for Probate and of
the alleged Will were attached to the Motion to
Dismiss.
Petitioner opposed the aforesaid motion to
dismiss contending that, as the Negros Court was
first to take cognizance of the settlement of the
estate of the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite, it had
acquired exclusive jurisdiction over same
pursuant to Rule 75, Section 1 of the Rules of
Court.
On April 19, 1963, the Negros Court sustained
Juan Uriarte Zamacona's motion to dismiss and
dismissed the Special Proceeding No. 6344
pending before it. His motion for reconsideration
of said order having been denied on July 27,
1963, petitioner proceeded to file his notice of
appeal, appeal bond and record on appeal for the
purpose of appealing from said orders to this court
on questions of law. The administrator with the will
annexed appointed by the Manila Court in Special
Proceeding No. 51396 objected to the approval of
the record on appeal, and under date of
December 7, 1963 the Negros Court issued the
following order:
Oppositor prays that the record on appeal filed by
the petitioner on July 27, 1963, be dismissed for
having been filed out of time and for being
incomplete. In the meantime, before the said
record on appeal was approved by this Court, the
petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the
Supreme Court entitled Vicente Uriarte,
Petitioner, vs. Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental, et al., G.R. No. L-21938, bringing this
case squarely before the Supreme Court on
questions of law which is tantamount to
petitioner's abandoning his appeal from this Court.
WHEREFORE, in order to give way to the
certiorari, the record on appeal filed by the
petitioner is hereby disapproved.
In view of the above-quoted order, petitioner filed
the supplemental petition for mandamus
mentioned heretofore.
On April 15, 1963 Vicente Uriarte filed an
Omnibus Motion in Special Proceeding No. 51396
pending in the Manila Court, asking for leave to
intervene therein; for the dismissal of the petition
and the annulment of the proceedings had in said
special proceeding. This motion was denied by
said court in its order of July 1 of the same year.
It is admitted that, as alleged in the basic petition
filed in Special Proceeding No. 6344 of the
Negros Court, Vicente Uriarte filed in the same
court, during the lifetime of Juan Uriarte y Goite,
Civil Case No. 6142 to obtain judgment for his
compulsory acknowledgment as his natural child.
Clearly inferrable from this is that at the time he
filed the action, as well as when he commenced
the aforesaid special proceeding, he had not yet
been acknowledged as natural son of Juan Uriarte
y Goite. Up to this time, no final judgment to that
effect appears to have been rendered.
The record further discloses that the special
proceeding before the Negros Court has not gone
farther than the appointment of a special
administrator in the person of the Philippine
National Bank who, as stated heretofore, failed to
qualify.
On the other hand, it is not disputed that, after
proper proceedings were had in Special
Proceeding No. 51396, the Manila Court admitted
to probate the document submitted to, it as the
last will of Juan Uriarte y Goite, the petition for
probate appearing not to have been contested. It
appears further that, as stated heretofore, the
order issued by the Manila Court on July 1, 1963
denied petitioner. Vicente Uriarte's Omnibus
Motion for Intervention, Dismissal of Petition and
Annulment of said proceedings.
Likewise, it is not denied that to the motion to
dismiss the special proceeding pending before the
Negros Court filed by Higinio Uriarte were
attached a copy of the alleged last will of Juan
Uriarte y Goite and of the petition filed with the
Manila Court for its probate. It is clear, therefore,
that almost from the start of Special Proceeding
No. 6344, the Negros Court and petitioner Vicente
Uriarte knew of the existence of the aforesaid last
will and of the proceedings for its probate.
The principal legal questions raised in the petition
for certiorari are (a) whether or not the Negros
Court erred in dismissing Special Proceeding No.
6644, on the one hand, and on the other, (b)
whether the Manila Court similarly erred in not
dismissing Special Proceeding No. 51396
notwithstanding proof of the prior filing of Special
Proceeding No. 6344 in the Negros Court.
Under the Judiciary Act of 1948 [Section 44,
paragraph (e)], Courts of First Instance have
original exclusive jurisdiction over "all matters of
probate," that is, over special proceedings for the
settlement of the estate of deceased persons —
whether they died testate or intestate. While their
jurisdiction over such subject matter is beyond
question, the matter of venue, or the particular
Court of First Instance where the special
proceeding should be commenced, is regulated
by former Rule 75, Section 1 of the Rules of Court,
now Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of
Court, which provides that the estate of a
decedent inhabitant of the Philippines at the time
of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, shall be
in the court of first instance in the province in
which he resided at the time of his death, and if he
is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the court of
first instance of any province in which he had
estate. Accordingly, when the estate to be settled
is that of a non-resident alien — like the deceased
Juan Uriarte y Goite — the Courts of First Instance
in provinces where the deceased left any property
have concurrent jurisdiction to take cognizance of
the proper special proceeding for the settlement of
his estate. In the case before Us, these Courts of
First Instance are the Negros and the Manila
Courts — province and city where the deceased
Juan Uriarte y Goite left considerable properties.
From this premise petitioner argues that, as the
Negros Court had first taken cognizance of the
special proceeding for the settlement of the estate
of said decedent (Special Proceeding No. 6344),
the Manila Court no longer had jurisdiction to take
cognizance of Special Proceeding No. 51396
intended to settle the estate of the same decedent
in accordance with his alleged will, and that
consequently, the first court erred in dismissing
Special Proceeding No. 6344, while the second
court similarly erred in not dismissing Special
Proceeding No. 51396.
It can not be denied that a special proceeding
intended to effect the distribution of the estate of a
deceased person, whether in accordance with the
law on intestate succession or in accordance with
his will, is a "probate matter" or a proceeding for
the settlement of his estate. It is equally true,
however, that in accordance with settled
jurisprudence in this jurisdiction, testate
proceedings, for the settlement of the estate of a
deceased person take precedence over intestate
proceedings for the same purpose. Thus it has
been held repeatedly that, if in the course of
intestate proceedings pending before a court of
first instance it is found it hat the decedent had left
a last will, proceedings for the probate of the latter
should replace the intestate proceedings even if at
that stage an administrator had already been
appointed, the latter being required to render final
account and turn over the estate in his possession
to the executor subsequently appointed. This,
however, is understood to be without prejudice
that should the alleged last will be rejected or is
disapproved, the proceeding shall continue as an
intestacy. As already adverted to, this is a clear
indication that proceedings for the probate of a will
enjoy priority over intestate proceedings.
Upon the facts before Us the question arises as to
whether Juan Uriarte Zamacona should have filed
the petition for the probate of the last will of Juan
Uriarte y Goite with the Negros Court —
particularly in Special Proceeding No. 6344 — or
was entitled to commence the corresponding
separate proceedings, as he did, in the Manila
Court.
The following considerations and the facts of
record would seem to support the view that he
should have submitted said will for probate to the
Negros Court, either in a separate special
proceeding or in an appropriate motion for said
purpose filed in the already pending Special
Proceeding No. 6344. In the first place, it is not in
accord with public policy and the orderly and
inexpensive administration of justice to
unnecessarily multiply litigation, especially if
several courts would be involved. This, in effect,
was the result of the submission of the will
aforesaid to the Manila Court. In the second place,
when respondent Higinio Uriarte filed an
opposition to Vicente Uriarte's petition for the
issuance of letters of administration, he had
already informed the Negros Court that the
deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite had left a will in
Spain, of which a copy had been requested for
submission to said court; and when the other
respondent, Juan Uriarte Zamacona, filed his
motion to dismiss Special Proceeding No. 6344,
he had submitted to the Negros Court a copy of
the alleged will of the decedent, from which fact it
may be inferred that, like Higinio Uriarte, he knew
before filing the petition for probate with the
Manila Court that there was already a special
proceeding pending in the Negros Court for the
settlement of the estate of the same deceased
person. As far as Higinio Uriarte is concerned, it
seems quite clear that in his opposition to
petitioner's petition in Special Proceeding No.
6344, he had expressly promised to submit said
will for probate to the Negros Court.
But the fact is that instead of the aforesaid will
being presented for probate to the Negros Court,
Juan Uriarte Zamacona filed the petition for the
purpose with the Manila Court. We can not accept
petitioner's contention in this regard that the latter
court had no jurisdiction to consider said petition,
albeit we say that it was not the proper
venue therefor.
It is well settled in this jurisdiction that wrong
venue is merely a waiveable procedural defect,
and, in the light of the circumstances obtaining in
the instant case, we are of the opinion, and so
hold, that petitioner has waived the right to raise
such objection or is precluded from doing so by
laches. It is enough to consider in this connection
that petitioner knew of the existence of a will
executed by Juan Uriarte y Goite since December
19, 1961 when Higinio Uriarte filed his opposition
to the initial petition filed in Special Proceeding
No. 6344; that petitioner likewise was served with
notice of the existence (presence) of the alleged
last will in the Philippines and of the filing of the
petition for its probate with the Manila Court since
August 28, 1962 when Juan Uriarte Zamacona
filed a motion for the dismissal of Special
Proceeding No. 6344. All these notwithstanding, it
was only on April 15, 1963 that he filed with the
Manila Court in Special Proceeding No. 51396 an
Omnibus motion asking for leave to intervene and
for the dismissal and annulment of all the
proceedings had therein up to that date; thus
enabling the Manila Court not only to appoint an
administrator with the will annexed but also to
admit said will to probate more than five months
earlier, or more specifically, on October 31, 1962.
To allow him now to assail the exercise of
jurisdiction over the probate of the will by the
Manila Court and the validity of all the
proceedings had in Special Proceeding No. 51396
would put a premium on his negligence.
Moreover, it must be remembered that this Court
is not inclined to annul proceedings regularly had
in a lower court even if the latter was not
the proper venue therefor, if the net result would
be to have the same proceedings repeated in
some other court of similar jurisdiction; more so in
a case like the present where the objection
against said proceedings is raised too late.
In his order of April 19, 1963 dismissing Special
Proceeding No. 6344, Judge Fernandez of the
Negros Court said that he was "not inclined to
sustain the contention of the petitioner that
inasmuch as the herein petitioner has instituted
Civil Case No. 6142 for compulsory
acknowledgment by the decedent such action
justifies the institution by him of this proceedings.
If the petitioner is to be consistent with the
authorities cited by him in support of his
contention, the proper thing for him to do would be
to intervene in the testate estate proceedings
entitled Special Proceedings No. 51396 in the
Court of First Instance of Manila instead of
maintaining an independent action, for indeed his
supposed interest in the estate of the decedent is
of his doubtful character pending the final decision
of the action for compulsory acknowledgment."
We believe in connection with the above matter
that petitioner is entitled to prosecute Civil Case
No. 6142 until it is finally determined, or intervene
in Special Proceeding No. 51396 of the Manila
Court, if it is still open, or to ask for its reopening if
it has already been closed, so as to be able to
submit for determination the question of his
acknowledgment as natural child of the deceased
testator, said court having, in its capacity as a
probate court, jurisdiction to declare who are the
heirs of the deceased testator and whether or not
a particular party is or should be declared his
acknowledged natural child (II Moran on Rules of
Court, 1957 Ed., p. 476; Conde vs. Abaya, 13 Phil.
249; Severino vs. Severino, 44 Phil. 343; Lopez
vs. Lopez, 68 Phil. 227, and Jimoga-on vs.
Belmonte, 47 O. G. 1119).
Coming now to the supplemental petition
for mandamus (G.R. No. L-21939), We are of the
opinion, and so hold, that in view of the
conclusions heretofore stated, the same has
become moot and academic. If the said
supplemental petition is successful, it will only
result in compelling the Negros Court to give due
course to the appeal that petitioner was taking
from the orders of said court dated December 7,
1963 and February 26, 1964, the first being the
order of said court dismissing Special Proceeding
No. 6344, and the second being an order denying
petitioner's motion for the reconsideration of said
order of dismissal. Said orders being, as a result
of what has been said heretofore beyond
petitioner's power to contest, the conclusion can
not be other than that the intended appeal would
serve no useful purpose, or, worse still, would
enable petitioner to circumvent our ruling that he
can no longer question the validity of said orders.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING
CONSIDERATIONS, judgment is hereby
rendered denying the writs prayed for and, as a
result, the petition for certiorari filed in G.R. No.
L-21938, as well as the supplemental petition
for mandamus docketed as G.R. No. L-21939, are
hereby dismissed. The writ of preliminary
injunction heretofore issued is set aside. With
costs against petitioner.
3. Intestate Estate of Rosina Marguerite
Wolfson, G.R. No. L-28054, June 15,
1972
G.R. No. L-28054 June 15, 1972
INTESTATE ESTATE OF ROSINA
MARGUERITE WOLFSON, deceased,
RICARDO VITO CRUZ, petitioner-appellee.
TESTATE ESTATE of ROSINA MARGUERITE
WOLFSON, deceased, MANUEL Y.
MACIAS, petitioner-appellant, ARTURO M. DEL
ROSARIO, oppositor-appellee.
Quijano & Arroyo for petitioner-appellee.
Manuel Y. Macias in his own behalf.
Ross, Salcedo, Del Rosario, Bito, Misa & Lozada
for oppositor-appellee.
MAKASIAR, J.:p
Rosina Marguerite Wolfson died on September 14, 1965 in San
Francisco, California, U.S.A.
On January 10, 1966, Atty. Manuel Y. Macias,
herein petitioner-appellant, unaware that Rosina
died with a will and testament, filed in behalf of
Ricardo Vito Cruz a petition for the issuance of
letters of administration in his favor over the estate
in the Philippines of the late Rosina, which was
docketed as Special Proceedings No. 63866,
titled "Intestate Estate of Rosina Marguerite
Wolfson, deceased," and was assigned to Branch
VIII of the Manila Court of First Instance, then
presided over by then Judge, now Court of
Appeals Justice, Manuel P. Barcelona.
Accordingly, Ricardo Vito Cruz was appointed
Special Administrator for the estate of Rosina,
qualified thereto, took his oath and assumed the
duties thereof.
It turned out that Rosina left a will executed in
accordance with the laws of the State of New York
and through codicils executed in accordance with
the laws of the State of California, U.S.A., naming
therein the Wells Fargo Bank as sole executor
and the University of Michigan as the residuary
beneficiary.
On September 24, 1965, said will and codicils of
Rosina were presented for probate in the Superior
Court of the State of California, U.S.A.
On October 11, 1965, the said will and codicils
were duly probated by said California court
(Annex 4-A, pp. 28-35, rec. on appeal).
In a document dated November 10, 1965, duly
notarized and authenticated, the Wells Fargo
Bank, as the sole executor designated in Rosina's
will and codicils, appointed lawyers James M.
Ross, Ewald Selph, Rafael D. Salcedo, Arturo del
Rosario, Jesus Bito, Joaquin L. Misa and Mariano
Lozada, all of Manila, Philippines, as its
attorney-infact, with authority among others to file
ancillary administration proceedings for the estate
of Rosina and to act as administrator or
administrators of the estate (Annex "4-A", pp.
28-35, rec. on appeal).
Pursuant to his appointment as attorney-in-fact of
executor Wells Fargo Bank, Atty. Arturo del
Rosario filed on August 13, 1966, a petition in
Special Proceedings No. 63866 before Branch
VIII of the Manila Court of First Instance, praying
that, inasmuch as the decedent left a will and
codicils which were duly probated by the Superior
Court of California, U.S.A., the intestate
proceedings in Special Proceedings No. 63866 be
converted into a petition for the probate of
Rosina's will and codicils (Annex "4-C", pp. 38-42,
rec. on appeal).
On October 25, 1966, petitioner-appellant Macias,
in his own behalf and without informing his client
Ricardo Vito Cruz, filed a similar but separate and
independent petition, which was docketed as
Special Proceedings No. 67302 and assigned to
Branch VI of the Manila Court of First Instance,
then presided by Judge Gaudencio Cloribel,
alleging that he has a legal interest in Rosina's
estate and praying for the probate of Rosina's will
and codicils as well as for his (Macias')
appointment as special administrator (pp. 12-17,
ROA).
Because of petitioner-appellant's claim that he
has a legal interest in Rosina's estate, Judge
Cloribel of Branch VI in an order dated October
27, 1966 set the hearing of the petition on
December 17, 1966 and appointed Macias special
administrator (Annex "2", pp. 18-20, ROA).
Accordingly, petitioner-appellant Macias was
issued letters of special administration on
November 12, 1966 (Annex "3", pp. 21-22, ROA).
In a pleading dated December 9, 1966, Atty.
Arturo del Rosario filed an opposition to the
petition of petitioner-appellant for the probate of
the will and codicils of Rosina Marguerite Wolfson
in Special Proceedings No. 67302 on the grounds,
among others, that Rosina's estate is the subject
of Special Proceedings No. 63866 before Branch
VIII previously filed by petitioner-appellant Macias
in behalf of respondent Ricardo Vito Cruz and
before which he (Atty. Arturo del Rosario) filed on
August 13, 1966 a petition for the conversion of
the said intestate proceedings into one for the
probate of Rosina's will and codicils, which was
then pending resolution (Annexes "4", "4-A" &
"4-B", pp. 23-27, ROA).
Likewise, special administrator Ricardo Vito Cruz
filed a motion dated December 13, 1966 to
dismiss the said petition of petitioner-appellant in
Special Proceedings No. 67302 on the grounds,
among others:
(1) that Rosina's estate is already the subject of
Special Proceedings No. 63866 before Branch
VIII (invoking Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised
Rules of Court);
(2) that on August 13, 1966, Atty. Arturo del
Rosario filed in behalf of Wells Fargo Bank a
petition to convert the intestate proceeding in
Special Proceedings No. 63866 into a testate
proceeding for the probate of the last will and
codicils of Rosina;
(3) that two proceedings over the same estate will
only complicate matters and delay its closure; and
(4) that in filing his petition for the probate of the
will and codicils of Rosina in Special Proceedings
No. 67302 before Branch VI, petitioner-appellant
concealed from the presiding judge of Branch VI
the fact that appellant previously filed Special
Proceedings No. 63866 in his (Ricardo Vito Cruz)
behalf as well as the fact that Arturo del Rosario
had already filed his pleading of August 13, 1966
for the conversion of the intestate proceedings
into a testate one (Annex "6", pp. 48-59 ROA).
In a pleading dated December 16, 1966,
petitioner-appellant filed his reply and opposition
respectively to the opposition of Atty. Arturo del
Rosario and the motion to dismiss of Ricardo Vito
Cruz, contending:
(1) that the grounds advanced by Atty. Arturo del
Rosario and Ricardo Vito Cruz are not legal
grounds for the dismissal of Special Proceedings
No. 67302, because he is seeking in this Special
Proceedings No. 67302 his own appointment as
regular, not ancillary, administrator of Rosina's
estate, based simply on his interest in the estate,
without need of any authority from Wells Fargo
Bank, which does not and cannot possibly have
anything to do with these proceedings because its
(WelIs Fargo Bank) appointment by the California
Superior Court as executor of Rosina's estate
does not extend ex proprio vigore to the
Philippines;
(2) that it is enough that a person has an interest in
the will or in the property either as executor or
otherwise to justify his intervention in the
proceedings, citing Section 1 of Rule 76 of the
Revised Rules of Court and Santos vs.
Castillo; (3) that Special Proceedings No. 63866,
1 same (Annex "13", pp. 97-105, ROA).
which is an intestate proceeding merely for the
administration of Rosina's estate, is not a probate
proceeding; and
(4) that to dismiss and/or consolidate Special
Proceedings No. 67302 with Special Proceedings
No. 63866, would frustrate the implementation of
Rosina's will to provide a suitable memorial in the
City of Manila to her parents and to provide help
and assistance to her former Filipino dependents
and those of their parents (Annex "7", pp. 70-85,
ROA).
In an order dated December 17, 1966, Judge
Cloribel of Branch VI postponed the hearing of
Special Proceedings No. 67302 on the ground
that the oppositors had raised a prejudicial
question to the effect that another case involving
the very same matter is pending in Branch VIII
presided over by Judge Barcelona (Annex "8", p.
86, ROA).
In a pleading dated December 21, 1966,
petitioner-appellant filed in both Special
Proceedings Nos. 63866 and 67302, a motion for
the consolidation and joint hearing of both cases
as they relate to the same estate of Rosina
(Annex "9", pp. 87-90, ROA).
In a pleading dated December 22, 1966 filed in
both Special Proceedings Nos. 63866 and 67302,
Severino Baron, Anselmo A. Reyes, Paulino
Andrada, Alfredo V. Walcott, Narciso S.
Villanueva, Leonardo Baron, Godofredo L. Duaño
and Catalino S. Calimutan — all mentioned in
Julian's memorandum to Rosina — endorsed
petitioner-appellant's petition for his appointment
as regular administrator with the will annexed of
Rosina's estate (Annex "10", pp. 91-95, ROA).
In a manifestation dated December 23, 1966,
Ricardo Vito Cruz stated that he does not object to
the transfer of Special Proceedings No. 67302 to
Branch VIII, with the qualification that he does not
agree with the allegations in the rest of the prayer
of petitioner-appellant in his urgent motion for
consolidation of cases filed on December 21,
1966 for the reasons he (Ricardo Vito Cruz) stated
in his motion to dismiss filed on December 13,
1966 (Annex "11", pp. 94-95, ROA).
In an order dated December 23, 1966, Judge
Cloribel of Branch VI ordered the transfer of
Special Proceedings No. 67302 to Branch VIII if
"the Presiding Judge therein has no objection to
said transfer" (Annex "12", p. 96, ROA).
On January 21, 1967, petitioner-appellant filed his
opposition to the petition of Ricardo Vito Cruz for
appointment as regular administrator of Rosina's
estate in Special Proceedings No. 63866,
because, among others, of the alleged corrupt
practices of Ricardo Vito Cruz with a view to his
unjust enrichment at the expense of the estate
and his alleged wasteful administration of the
On January 12, 1967, petitioner-appellant filed an
urgent motion for the resolution of his urgent
motion for consolidation of the two cases and for
their joint hearing on January 14, 1967 and of his
urgent ex parte motion for the probate of the will
and codicils of Rosina (Annex "14", pp. 106-109,
ROA).
Respondent Ricardo Vito Cruz, through counsel,
filed an opposition thereto in a pleading dated
January 12, 1967 claiming that he did not agree to
the consolidation of Special Proceedings No.
67302 nor to its joint hearing with Special
Proceedings No. 63866, and praying that Special
Proceedings No. 67302 be dismissed outright
(Annex "15", pp. 110-114, ROA).
In a manifestation dated January 17, 1967,
respondent Ricardo Vito Cruz stated that the
order of Judge Cloribel of Branch VI dated
December 23, 1966 directing the transfer of
Special Proceedings No. 67302 to Branch VIII if
the presiding judge therein has no objection to
said transfer, is not an order for the consolidation
of the two cases and that on January 14, 1967
respondent Judge Manuel Barcelona of Branch
VIII directed the transfer of Special Proceedings
No. 67302 from Branch VI to Branch VIII; and
moved that, the two cases being the same,
Special Proceedings No. 67302 should be
dismissed, otherwise there will be duplicity even if
it will be heard jointly with Special Proceedings
No. 63866 and will complicate matters and violate
the prohibition against multiplicity of suits (Annex
"15-A", pp. 115-118, ROA).
On January 21, 1967, petitioner-appellant filed his
opposition to the petition of Arturo M. del Rosario
dated August 11, 1966 and filed on August 13,
1966 for his appointment as ancillary
administrator on the ground that he has no legal
interest in the estate, invoking Section 2 of Rule
79 of the Rules of Court and the case of Testate
Estate of Rosalia Saquitan, Eulogio S. Eusebio
vs. Domingo Valmores, Vicenta Siscar,
oppositor-appellant (Annex "16", pp. 119-126,
2
ROA).
In an order dated February 11, 1967, pursuant to
the agreement of the parties and the order dated
December 23, 1966 in Special Proceedings No.
67302 for the transfer of said special proceedings
from Branch VI, Honorable Manuel Barcelona,
then Presiding Judge of Branch VIII allowed its
consolidation with Special Proceedings No. 63866
in his Branch VIII (Annex "17", pp. 127-128, ROA).
On the same day, February 11, 1967, Arturo M.
del Rosario and Ricardo Vito Cruz filed before
Branch VIII a joint motion for an order authorizing
the clerk of court to receive the evidence relative
to the probate of the will (Annex "18", pp. 129-130,
ROA).
On February 13, 1967, respondent Ricardo Vito
Cruz, thru counsel, filed a written manifestation
before Branch VIII praying for the resolution of his
motion to dismiss Special Proceedings No. 67302
since it is now transferred to Branch VIII (Annex
"18-A", p. 131, ROA).
In a well-reasoned order dated February 20, 1967,
Honorable Manuel Barcelona, then Presiding
Judge of Branch VIII, dismissed Special
Proceedings No. 67302 (Annex "19", pp. 132-142,
ROA).
On March 8, 1967, petitioner-appellant filed a
motion for the reconsideration of the aforesaid
order of February 20, 1967, followed by an urgent
motion dated March 2, 1967 for suspension of
hearings until after resolution of his motion for
reconsideration (Annexes "20" & "21", pp.
143-158, ROA).
On March 9, 1967, respondent Ricardo Vito Cruz
filed his opposition to the motion for the
reconsideration of the order of February 20, 1967
1 (Annex "22", pp. 159-172, ROA), to which
petitioner-appellant filed his reply dated March 15,
1967 (Annex "23", pp. 173-188, ROA).
On April 6, 1967, respondent Ricardo Vito Cruz
filed a rejoinder to the reply (Annex "24", pp.
189-193, ROA), to which petitioner-appellant filed
a surrejoinder dated April 16, 1967 (Annex "25",
pp. 194-203, ROA).
In an order dated April 22, 1967, the Court denied
the motion for reconsideration of
petitioner-appellant (Annex "26", pp. 204-208,
ROA), who filed his notice of appeal therefrom
dated May 19, 1967 (Annex "27", pp. 209-210,
ROA).
The appeal is devoid of merit.
Only last May 30, 1972, in Macias vs. Uy Kim, et
al., WE reiterated the rule that "Under Section 1
3 proceeding for the estate of Rosina and to act as
of Rule 73, Rules of Court, 'the court first taking
cognizance of the settlement of the estates of the
deceased, shall exercise jurisdiction to the
exclusion of all other courts.' Pursuant to this
provision, therefore all questions concerning the
settlement of the estate of the deceased Rosina
Marguerite Wolfson should be filed before Branch
VIII of the Manila Court of First Instance, then
presided over by former Judge, now Justice of the
Court of Appeals, Manuel Barcelona, where
Special Proceedings No. 63866 for the settlement
of the testate estate of the deceased Rosina
Marguerite Wolfson was filed and is still pending."
Paraphrasing the jurisprudence on this score, the
salutary purpose of the rule is to prevent
confusion and delay. It is not inserted in the law for
the benefit of the parties litigant but in the public
interest for the better administration of justice, for
which reason the parties have no control over
it. Consequently, every challenge to the validity of
4
the will, any objection to its authentication, every
demand or claim by any heir, legatee or party in
interest in intestate or testate succession must be
acted upon and decided within the same special
proceedings, not in a separate action, and the
same judge having jurisdiction in the
administration of the estate should take
cognizance of the question raised, for he will be
called upon to distribute or adjudicate the property
to the interested parties. WE stressed that the
5
main function of a probate court is to settle and
liquidate the estates of the deceased either
summarily or through the process of
administration; and towards this end the probate
court has to determine who the heirs are and their
respective shares in the net assets of the
estate. Section 1 of Rule 73, speaking as it does
6
of "settlement of the estates of the deceased,"
applies equally to both testate and intestate
proceedings. And the conversion of an intestate
proceedings into a testate one is "entirely a matter
of form and lies within the sound discretion of the
court." Special Proceedings No. 63866 was first
7
instituted on January 10, 1966 by
petitioner-appellant himself as an intestate
proceedings because he did not know then that
Rosina Marguerite Wolfson died with a will and
three codicils, in behalf of Ricardo Vito Cruz
praying for the issuance of letters of
administration in favor of the said Ricardo Vito
Cruz. Said proceedings was raffled to Brannch
VIII of the Manila Court of First Instance. By virtue
of said petition, appellee Ricardo Vito Cruz was
appoint special administrator and assumed the
duties thereof after qualifying therefor. On
October 11, 1965, the will and dicils of the
deceased Rosina were duly probated by to
superior court of the State of California, U.S.A.
(Annex "4-A", pp. 28-35, ROA). The Wells Fargo
Bank, the sole executor designated in Rosina's
will and codicils, appoint local lawyers James M.
Ross, Ewald Selph, Rafael Salcedo, Arturo del
Rosario, Jesus Bito, Joaquin L. Misa and Mariano
Lozada, as its attorney-in-fact, duly authorize
among others, to file ancillary administration
administrator or administrators of the estate
(Annex "4-A", pp. 28-35, ROA). Pursuant to this
appointment as such attorney-in-fact of the
executor Wells Fargo Bank, Atty. Arturo del
Rosario instituted on August 13, 1966 a petition in
Special Proceedings No. 63866, praying that the
intestate proceedings be converted into a petition
for probate of Rosina's will and codicils (Annex
"4-C", pp. 38-42, ROA). On October 25, 1966,
petitioner-appellant Macias, in his own behalf and
without advising his former client Ricardo Vito
Cruz, filed an independent petition for the probate
of Rosina's will and codicils, which was docketed
as Special Proceedings No. 67302 and assigned
to Branch VI of the Manila Court of First Instance.
Claiming that he has a legal interest in Rosina's
estate, he also prayed for his appointment as
special administrator (pp. 12- 17, ROA).
It is thus patent that the second petition filed on
October 25, 1966 by petitioner-appellant was
about nine (9) months subsequent to the first
petition he filed in behalf of appellee Ricardo Vito
Cruz, now docketed as Special Proceedings No.
63866 and over two months after Arthur del
Rosario filed on August 13, 1966 his petition to
convert Special Proceedings No. 63866 from
intestate to testate.
As above recounted, petitioner-appellant, on
January 21, 1967, filed his opposition to the
petition of Atty. Arturo del Rosario for his
appointment as ancillary administrator in Special
Proceedings No. 63866 of Rosina's estate, on the
ground that del Rosario lacks legal interest, while
he, petitioner-appellant, has legal interest and
represents the bigger interest in Rosina's estate
and therefore should be appointed regular
administrator (Annex "16", pp. 119-126, ROA).
Hence, the appealed orders dated February 20
and April 22, 1967 (Annexes "19" & "26", pp.
132-142, ROA) of the Presiding Judge of Branch
VIII dismissing Special Proceedings No. 67302
after the same was transferred from Branch VI to
Branch VIII and consolidated with Special
Proceedings No. 63866 pursuant to the order date
February 11, 1967 (Annex "17", pp. 127-128,
ROA), should be sustained.
Petitioner-appellant insists that after ordering its
consolidation with Special Proceedings No.
63866, the Presiding Judge of Branch VIII has no
authority to dismiss Special Proceedings No.
67302 and should hear jointly said Special
Proceedings No. 67302 and Special Proceedings
No. 63866.
Generally, consolidation and joint hearing of the
two cases would have been proper if they do not
involve settlement of the estate of a decedent,
which is covered by a special provision of the
Rules of Court, namely Section 1 of Rule 73, the
specific command of which should be obeyed. At
any rate, motions for consolidation are addressed
to the sound discretion of the court; and WE do not
find that the trial judge gravely abused his
discretion in reconsidering the prior order for the
consolidation of the two special proceedings for
the settlement of the same estate and dismissing
Special Proceedings No. 67302, to warrant the
excercise of Our supervisory authority over the
lower court which has wide discretion in this
regard. As a matter of fact, the Honorable
8
Presiding Judge of Branch VIII exercised sound
discretion in directing the dismissal of Special
Proceedings No. 67302. The trial court is not
precluded from dismissing one case after ordering
the consolidation and joint hearing of the two
cases; because under Section 1 of Rule 31, after
ordering consolidation, the court "may make such
orders concerning proceedings therein as may
tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay."
As stated by the trial court in its order dated April
22, 1967 —
... Moreover, even if there was a consolidation,
this Court, perforce, had to dismiss the instant
proceedings, otherwise there will be multiplicity of
suits.
... It needs no elaboration that a court can never
be deprived of its power to dismiss a case pending
before it if the subject-matter of such case is the
same as the subject-matter of another case also
pending before it. As this Court had pointed out in
the order sought to be reconsidered, the filing of
Special Proceedings No. 67302 violated that
basic and elementary rule on multiplicity of suits
which must be avoided. There is no difference
between the two proceedings. Both refer to the
Philippine estate of the late Rosina Marguerite
Wolfson of which a special administrator has been
appointed to temporarily administer this estate
pending the appointment of a regular
administrator. Although Special Proceedings No.
63866 is entitled "Re Intestate Estate of Rosina
Marguerite Wolfson, etc.", the fact remains that
the hearing on the allowance of the last will and
codicils left by the decedent was already
terminated in said proceedings and, in fact,
petitioner Macias participated therein. If such will
and codicils are allowed to probate, all that would
be needed is to change the title of said
proceedings from Intestate to Testate. Special
Proceedings No. 67302 (the instant proceedings),
therefore, is of no moment and would serve no
purpose.
The record that in Special Proceedings No.
63866, petitioner Macias not only participated but
presented evidence supporting the admission to
probate the decedent's will and codicils thereto. In
the same Special Proceedings No. 63866, Macias
also participated by opposing the appointment of
Ricardo Vito Cruz as regular administrator and
proposing his own appointment to the position.
Viewed in this light, the Court sees no reason to
proceed with Special Proceedings No. 67302. If
petitioner Macias wants to be the administrator,
he can do so by applying, as in fact he has, in
Special Proceedings No. 63866. (Annex "26," pp.
204, 205-207, ROA).
As hinted in the aforequoted portion of the
appealed order of April 22, 1967, if
petitioner-appellant wants to be appointed as
regular administrator, he can file his petition
therefor, as he in fact did, in Special Proceedings
No. 63866.
Even if it were true that appellee Vito Cruz intends
to suppress, as claimed by petitioner-appellant,
Julian's memorandum to his sister Rosina wherein
Julian expressed the hope that Rosina will deliver
at her convenience to petitioner-appellant the sum
of P500.00 minus taxes, such a design cannot
prevent him from presenting the said
memorandum in Special Proceedings No. 63866,
a copy of which he apparently possesses because
he attached the same as Appendix "A" to his brief
(p. 225, appellant's brief).
As a matter of fact, Julian's memorandum was
presented in Special Proceedings No. 57405 over
his estate by Severino Baron and Faustino Reis
also named therein as favored recipients of the
bounty of Julian (see order of Judge Conrado
Vasquez in Special Proceedings No. 57405 on pp.
25-27 of appellant's brief in G.R. No. L-28947).
Appellant himself already presented said
memorandum as his Exhibit B-Macias in said
Special Proceedings No. 57405 over Julian's
estate, which is the subject of his appeal in G.R.
No. L-28947.
It would seem presumptuous on the part of
petitioner-appellant that Rosina's desire as
expressed in her will to provide a suitable
memorial in the City of Manila to her parents and
to provide help and assistance to her former
Filipino dependents and those of their parents,
could not be adequately implemented by the
probate court.
It should be noted from his said memorandum that
the late Julian Wolfson expressly hoped that his
sister will deliver to petitioner-appellant at her
convenience only the comparatively meager sum
of P500.00, the lowest accorded to his former
employees by the late Julian A. Wolfson, who
expressed the same hope that Rosina at her
convenience will deliver to three of his employees
P10,000 each and to two remaining employees
Pl,000.00 each, less taxes. It is likewise significant
that the deceased Julian Wolfson preferred to
leave his last instructions to Ricardo Vito Cruz, his
accountant, and not to petitioner-appellant, an
experienced lawyer of long standing and Julian's
former assistant for several years in his law firm.
Considering these circumstances, the unusual
interest on the part of petitioner-appellant in
insisting in filing a separate probate proceeding
and in seeking his own appointment as
administrator of Rosina's estate is rather curious,
to say the least.
A respectable and self-respecting member of the
Bar would consider indelicate such an act and
would restrain his hand in being too officious
under the circumstance. He would not institute
several actions to protect his interest, when one
suit will suffice, thus minimizing the clogging of the
dockets of the courts.
Petitioner-appellant's pretension that he was not
aware of the petition filed on August 13, 1966 by
Atty. Arturo del Rosario for the probate of the will
and codicils of Rosina in the same Special
Proceedings No. 63866, even if true, does not
justify his initiating another proceeding for the
same purpose, separate from and independent of
Special Proceedings No. 63866. In this
connection, his pretense cannot be believed;
because he was the one who filed on January 10,
1966, Special Proceedings No. 63866 in behalf of
appellee Ricardo Vito Cruz whose appointment as
official administrator he secured and whose
appointment as regular administrator he prayed
for. Upon knowing of the existence of Rosina's will
and codicils, petitioner-appellee would reasonably
be expected to examine and study the records of
Special Proceedings No. 63866 long before filed
on October 25, 1966 his separate petition for
probate of the same will and codicils assigned to
Branch VI, and consequently he must have
necessarily discovered the existence in the record
of Special Proceedings No. 63866 the petition for
probate filed by Atty. Arturo del Rosario. Because
such a petition would nullify his obvious desire to
have a hand in the administration of Rosina's
estate through his former client, appellee Ricardo
Vito Cruz, feigning ignorance of the petition of
Atty. Arturo del Rosario, he filed a separate
independent petition for probate which is
docketed as Special Proceedings No. 67302
hoping thereby to preserve the chances of his
claim being recognized by the court and of being
appointed regular administrator, instead of filing
the same petition in special Proceedings No.
63866 for the conversion of the said proceedings
from intestate to testate. This act on his part
reveals a motive that is hardly flattering to him as a
member of the bar and as an officer of the court.
WHEREFORE, the appealed orders dated
February 20, 1967 and April 22, 1967 are hereby
affirmed and the appeal is hereby dismissed, with
costs against petitioner-appellant.
4. Roberts v. Leonidas, G.R. No. L-55509,
April 27, 1984
G.R. No. L-55509 April 27, 1984
ETHEL GRIMM ROBERTS, petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE TOMAS R. LEONIDAS, Branch 38,
Court of First Instance of Manila; MAXINE
TATE-GRIMM, EDWARD MILLER GRIMM II and
LINDA GRIMM, respondents.
N. J. Quisumbing and Associates for petitioners.
Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz for
respondents.
AQUINO, J.: ñ é+. £ªw ph !1
The question in this case is whether a petition for
allowance of wills and to annul a partition,
approved in an intestateproceeding by Branch
20 of the Manila Court of First Instance, can be
entertained by its Branch 38 (after a probate in the
Utah district court).
Antecedents. — Edward M. Grimm an American
resident of Manila, died at 78 in the Makati
Medical Center on November 27, 1977. He was
survived by his second wife, Maxine Tate Grimm
and their two children, named Edward Miller
Grimm II (Pete) and Linda Grimm and by Juanita
Grimm Morris and Ethel Grimm Roberts
(McFadden), his two children by a first marriage
which ended in divorce (Sub-Annexes A and B.
pp. 36-47, Rollo).
He executed on January 23, 1959 two wills in San
Francisco, California. One will disposed of his
Philippine estate which he described as conjugal
property of himself and his second wife. The
second win disposed of his estate outside the
Philippines.
In both wills, the second wife and two children
were favored. The two children of the first
marriage were given their legitimes in the will
disposing of the estate situated in this country. In
the will dealing with his property outside this
country, the testator said:têñ.£î hq wâ£
I purposely have made no provision in this will for
my daughter, Juanita Grimm Morris, or my
daughter, Elsa Grimm McFadden (Ethel Grimm
Roberts), because I have provided for each of
them in a separate will disposing of my Philippine
property. (First clause, pp. 43-47, Rollo).
The two wills and a codicil were presented for
probate by Maxine Tate Grimm and E. LaVar Tate
on March 7, 1978 in Probate No. 3720 of the Third
Judicial District Court of Tooele County, Utah.
Juanita Grimm Morris of Cupertino, California and
Mrs. Roberts of 15 C. Benitez Street, Horseshoe
Village, Quezon City were notified of the probate
proceeding (Sub-Annex C, pp. 48-55, Rollo).
Maxine admitted that she received notice of
the intestate petition filed in Manila by Ethel in
January, 1978 (p. 53, Rollo). In its order dated
April 10, 1978, the Third Judicial District Court
admitted to probate the two wills and the codicil It
was issued upon consideration of the stipulation
dated April 4, 1978 "by and between the attorneys
for Maxine Tate Grimm, Linda Grimm, Edward
Miller Grimm II, E. LaVar Tate, Juanita Kegley
Grimm (first wife), Juanita Grimm Morris and Ethel
Grimm Roberts" (Annex C, pp. 48-51, Rollo).
Two weeks later, or on April 25, 1978, Maxine and
her two children Linda and Pete, as the first
parties, and Ethel, Juanita Grimm Morris and their
mother Juanita Kegley Grimm as the second
parties, with knowledge of the intestate
proceeding in Manila, entered into a compromise
agreement in Utah regarding the estate. It was
signed by David E. Salisbury and Donald B.
Holbrook, as lawyers of the parties, by Pete and
Linda and the attorney-in-fact of Maxine and by
the attorney-in-fact of Ethel, Juanita Grimm Morris
and Juanita Kegley Grimm.
In that agreement, it was stipulated that Maxine,
Pete and Ethel would be designated as personal
representatives (administrators) of Grimm's
Philippine estate (par. 2). It was also stipulated
that Maxine's one-half conjugal share in the estate
should be reserved for her and that would not be
less than $1,500,000 plus the homes in Utah and
Santa Mesa, Manila (par. 4). The agreement
indicated the computation of the "net distributable
estate". It recognized that the estate was liable to
pay the fees of the Angara law firm (par. 5).
It was stipulated in paragraph 6 that the
decedent's four children "shall share equally in the
Net Distributable Estate" and that Ethel and
Juanita Morris should each receive at least
12-1/2% of the total of the net distributable estate
and marital share. A supplemental memorandum
also dated April 25, 1978 was executed by the
parties (Sub-Annex F, pp. 49-61, Annex, F-1, pp.
75-76, Testate case).
Intestate proceeding No. 113024.-At this juncture,
it should be stated that forty- three days after
Grimm's death, or January 9, 1978, his daughter
of the first marriage, Ethel, 49, through lawyers
Deogracias T. Reyes and. Gerardo B. Macaraeg,
filed with Branch 20 of the Manila Court of First
Instance intestate proceeding No. 113024 for the
settlement of his estate. She was named special
administratrix.
On March 11, the second wife, Maxine, through
the Angara law office, filed an opposition and
motion to dismiss the intestate proceeding on the
ground of the pendency of Utah of a proceeding
for the probate of Grimm's will. She also moved
that she be appointed special administratrix, She
submitted to the court a copy of Grimm's will
disposing of his Philippine estate. It is found in
pages 58 to 64 of the record.
The intestate court in its orders of May 23 and
June 2 noted that Maxine, through a new lawyer,
William C. Limqueco (partner of Gerardo B.
Macaraeg, p. 78, testate case withdrew that
opposition and motion to dismiss and, at the
behest of Maxine, Ethel and Pete, appointed them
joint administrators. Apparently, this was done
pursuant to the aforementioned Utah compromise
agreement. The court ignored the will already
found in the record.
The three administrators submitted an inventory.
With the authority and approval of the court, they
sold for P75,000 on March 21, 1979 the so-called
Palawan Pearl Project, a business owned by the
deceased. Linda and Juanita allegedly conformed
with the sale (pp. 120-129, Record). It turned out
that the buyer, Makiling Management Co., Inc.,
was incorporated by Ethel and her husband, Rex
Roberts, and by lawyer Limqueco (Annex L, p. 90,
testate case).
Also with the court's approval and the consent of
Linda and Juanita, they sold for P1,546,136 to
Joseph Server and others 193,267 shares of RFM
Corporation (p. 135, Record).
Acting on the declaration of heirs and project of
partition signed and filed by lawyers Limqueco
and Macaraeg (not signed by Maxine and her two
children), Judge Conrado M. Molina in his order of
July 27, 1979 adjudicated to Maxine onehalf (4/8)
of the decedent's Philippine estate and one-eighth
(1/8) each to his four children or 12-1/2% (pp.
140-142, Record). No mention at all was made of
the will in that order.
Six days later, or on August 2, Maxine and her two
children replaced Limqueco with Octavio del
Callar as their lawyer who on August 9, moved to
defer approval of the project of partition. The court
considered the motion moot considering that it
had already approved the declaration of heirs and
project of partition (p. 149, Record).
Lawyer Limqueco in a letter to Maxine dated
August 2, 1979 alleged that he was no longer
connected with Makiling Management Co., Inc.
when the Palawan Pearl Project was sold: that it
was Maxine's son Pete who negotiated the sale
with Rex Roberts and that he (Limqueco) was
going to sue Maxine for the lies she imputed to
him (Annex H, p. 78, testate case).
Ethel submitted to the court a certification of the
Assistant Commissioner of Internal Revenue
dated October 2, 1979. It was stated therein that
Maxine paid P1,992,233.69 as estate tax and
penalties and that he interposed no objection to
the transfer of the estate to Grimm's heirs (p. 153,
Record). The court noted the certification as in
conformity with its order of July 27, 1979.
After November, 1979 or for a period of more than
five months, there was no movement or activity in
the intestate case. On April 18, 1980 Juanita
Grimm Morris, through Ethel's lawyers, filed a
motion for accounting "so that the Estate
properties can be partitioned among the heirs and
the present intestate estate be closed." Del Callar,
Maxine's lawyer was notified of that motion.
Before that motion could be heard, or on June 10,
1980, the Angara law firm filed again its
appearance in collaboration with Del Callar as
counsel for Maxine and her two children, Linda
and Pete. It should be recalled that the firm had
previously appeared in the case as Maxine's
counsel on March 11, 1978, when it filed a motion
to dismiss the intestate proceeding and furnished
the court with a copy of Grimm's will. As already
noted, the firm was then superseded by lawyer
Limqueco.
Petition to annul partition and testate proceeding
No. 134559. — On September 8, 1980, Rogelio A.
Vinluan of the Angara law firm in behalf of Maxine,
Pete and Linda, filed in Branch 38 of the lower
court a petition praying for the probate of Grimm's
two wills (already probated in Utah), that the 1979
partition approved by the intestate court be set
aside and the letters of administration revoked,
that Maxine be appointed executrix and that Ethel
and Juanita Morris be ordered to account for the
properties received by them and to return the
same to Maxine (pp. 25-35, Rollo).
Grimm's second wife and two children alleged that
they were defraud due to the machinations of the
Roberts spouses, that the 1978 Utah compromise
agreement was illegal, that the intestate
proceeding is void because Grimm died testate
and that the partition was contrary to the
decedent's wills.
Ethel filed a motion to dismiss the petition. Judge
Leonidas denied it for lack of merit in his order of
October 27, 1980. Ethel then filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition in this Court, praying that
the testate proceeding be dismissed, or.
alternatively that the two proceedings be
consolidated and heard in Branch 20 and that the
matter of the annulment of the Utah compromise
agreement be heard prior to the petition for
probate (pp. 22-23, Rollo).
Ruling. — We hold that respondent judge did not
commit any grave abuse of discretion, amounting
to lack of jurisdiction, in denying Ethel's motion to
dismiss.
A testate proceeding is proper in this case
because Grimm died with two wills and "no will
shall pass either real or personal property unless it
is proved and allowed" (Art. 838, Civil Code; sec.
1, Rule 75, Rules of Court).
The probate of the will is mandatory (Guevara vs.
Guevara, 74 Phil. 479 and 98 Phil. 249; Baluyot
vs. Panio, L-42088, May 7, 1976, 71 SCRA 86). It
is anomalous that the estate of a person who
died testate should be settled in an intestate
proceeding. Therefore, the intestate case should
be consolidated with the testate proceeding and
the judge assigned to the testate proceeding
should continue hearing the two cases.
Ethel may file within twenty days from notice of the
finality of this judgment an opposition and answer
to the petition unless she considers her motion to
dismiss and other pleadings sufficient for the
purpose. Juanita G. Morris, who appeared in the
intestate case, should be served with copies of
orders, notices and other papers in the testate
case.
WHEREFORE the petition is dismissed. The
temporary restraining order is dissolved. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
5. Advincula v. Teodoro, G.R. No.
L-9282, May 31, 1956
6. Consolidated Bank v. IAC, G.R. No.
75017, June 3, 1991
 7. Fule v. CA, G.R. No. L-40502,
November 29, 1976
8. Jao v. CA, G.R. No. 128314, May 29,
2002
9. In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of
Ismael B. Reyes, G.R. No. 139587,
November 22, 2000
10. PCIB v. CA, G.R. No. 103149,
November 15, 2000
11. De Leon v. CA, G.R. No. 128781,
August 6, 2002
12. Uy v. Capulong, A.M. No. RTJ-91-776,
April 7, 1993
13. Cortes v. CA, G.R. No.
117417, September 21, 2000
14. Solivio v. CA, G.R. No. 83484, February
12, 1990 Vita v. Montano, G.R. No.
L-50553 February 19, 1991
Rule 74
1. Vda. De Reyes v. CA, G.R. No. 92436,
July 26, 1991
2. Rodriguez v. Tan, G.R. No. L-6044,
November 24, 1952 (92 Phil 273)
3. Pereira v. CA, G.R. No. L-81147 June
20, 1989 (174 SCRA 154)
4. Cease v. CA, G.R. No. L-33172 October
18, 1979 (93 SCRA 483)
5. Sampilo v. CA, G.R. No. L-10474,
February 28, 1958 (103 Phil 71)
6. Amerol v. Bagumbaran, G.R. No.
September 30, 1987 (154 SCRA 396)
7. Marquez v. CA, G.R. No. 125715,
December 29, 1998 (300 SCRA 653)
8. GSIS v. Santiago, G.R. No. 155206,
October 28, 2008 (414 SCRA 563)
Rule 75
1. Mang-oy v. CA, G.R. No. L-27421,
September 12, 1986 (144 SCRA 33)
2. Nufable v. Nufable, G.R. No. 126950,
July 2, 1999 (309 SCRA 692)
3. Nuguid v. Nuguid, G.R. No. L-23445,
June 23, 1966 (17 SCRA 449)
4. Alvarado v. Gaviola, G.R. No. 74695,
September 14, 1993 (226 SCRA 347)
5. Pastor v. CA, G.R. No. L-56340, June
24, 1983 (122 SCRA 85)
6. Maninang v. CA, G.R. No. L-57848m
June 19, 1982 (114 SCRA 473)
G.R. No. L-57848 June 19, 1982
RAFAEL E. MANINANG and SOLEDAD L.
MANINANG, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. RICARDO L.
PRONOVE, JR., as Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal and BERNARDO S.
ASENETA, respondents.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
A Petition to Review the Decision of April 28, 1981
of respondent Appellate Court in CA-G.R. No.
12032-R entitled "Rafael E. Maninang and
Soledad L. Maninang vs. Hon. Ricardo Pronove,
Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Pasig, Branch XI, and Bernardo S. Aseneta".
Pertinent to the controversy are the following
antecedental facts:
On May 21, 1977, Clemencia Aseneta, single,
died at the Manila Sanitarium Hospital at age 81.
She left a holographic will, the pertinent portions
of which are quoted hereunder:
xxx xxx xxx
It is my will that all my real properties located in
Manila, Makati, Quezon City, Albay and Legaspi
City and all my personal properties shagllbe
inherited upon my death by Dra. Soledad L.
Maninang with whose family I have lived
continuously for around the last 30 years now.
Dra. Maninang and her husband Pamping have
been kind to me. ... I have found peace and
happiness with them even during the time when
my sisters were still alive and especially now when
I am now being troubled by my nephew Bernardo
and niece Salvacion. I am not incompetent as
Nonoy would like me to appear. I know what is
right and wrong. I can decide for myself. I do not
consider Nonoy as my adopted son. He has made
me do things against my will.
xxx xxx xxx
On June 9, 1977, petitioner Soledad Maninang
filed a Petition for probate of the Will of the
decedent with the Court of First Instance-Branch
IV, Quezon City (Sp. Proc. No. Q-23304,
hereinafter referred to as the Testate Case).
On July 25, 1977, herein respondent Bernardo
Aseneta, who, as the adopted son, claims to be
the sole heir of decedent Clemencia Aseneta,
instituted intestate proceedings with the Court of
First Instance-Branch XI, Pasig, Rizal (Sp. Proc.
No. 8569, called hereinafter the Intestate Case"
for brevity).
On December 23, 1977, the Testate and Intestate
Cases were ordered consolidated before Branch
XI, presided by respondent Judge.
Respondent Bernardo then filed a Motion to
Dismiss the Testate Case on the ground that the
holographic will was null and void because he, as
the only compulsory heir, was preterited and,
therefore, intestacy should ensue. In support of
said Motion to Dismiss, respondent Bernardo
cited the cases of Neri vs. Akutin (72 Phil.
322); Nuguid vs. Nuguid (17 SCRA 449),
and Ramos vs. Baldovino (2 CA Rep. 2nd, 878). 1
In her Opposition to said Motion to Dismiss,
petitioner Soledad averred that it is still the rule that
in a case for probate of a Will, the Court's area of
inquiry is limited to an examination of and resolution
on the extrinsic validity of the will; and that
respondent Bernardo was effectively disinherited by
the decedent. 2
On September 8, 1980, the lower Court ordered
the dismissal of the Testate Case in this wise:
For reasons stated in the motion to dismiss filed
by petitioner Bernardo S. Aseneta which the Court
finds meritorious, the petition for probate of will
filed by Soledad L. Maninang and which was
docketed as Sp. Proc. No. Q-23304 is
DISMISSED, without pronouncement as to costs.
On December 19, 1980, the lower Court denied
reconsideration for lack of merit and in the same
Order appointed Bernardo as the administrator of
the intestate estate of the deceased Clemencia
Aseneta "considering that he is a forced heir of
said deceased while oppositor Soledad Maninang
is not, and considering further that Bernardo
Aseneta has not been shown to be unfit to perform
the duties of the trust. "
Petitioners Maninang resorted to a certiorari
Petition before respondent Court of Appeals
alleging that the lower Court exceeded its
jurisdiction in issuing the Orders of dismissal of
the Testate Case (September 8, 1980) and denial
of reconsideration (December 19, 1980).
On April 28, 1981, respondent Court 3 denied
certiorari and ruled that the trial Judge's Order of
dismissal was final in nature as it finally disposed of
the Testate Case and, therefore, appeal was the
proper remedy, which petitioners failed to avail of.
Continuing, it said that even granting that the lower
Court committed errors in issuing the questioned
Orders, those are errors of judgment reviewable only
by appeal and not by Certiorari. 'Thus, this Petition
before us.
We find that the Court a quo a quo acted in
excess of its jurisdiction when it dismissed the
Testate Case. Generally, the probate of a Will is
mandatory.
No will shall pass either real or personal property
unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with
the Rules of Court. 4
The law enjoins the probate of the Will and public
policy requires it, because unless the Will is
probated and notice thereof given to the whole
world, the right of a person to dispose of his property
by Will may be rendered nugatory. 5
Normally, the probate of a Will does not look into its
intrinsic validity.
... The authentication of a will decides no other
question than such as touch upon the capacity of
the testator and the compliance with those
requisites or solemnities which the law prescribes
for the validity of wills. It does not determine nor
even by implication prejudge the validity or
efficiency (sic) of the provisions, these may be
impugned as being vicious or null,
notwithstanding its authentication. The que0stions
relating to these points remain entirely unaffected,
and may be raised even after the will has been
authenticated .... 6
Opposition to the intrinsic validity or legality of the
provisions of the will cannot be entertained in
Probate proceeding because its only purpose is
merely to determine if the will has been executed
in accordance with the requirements of the law. 7
Respondent Bernardo, however, relies on the
pronouncement in Nuguid vs. Nuguid 8, reading:
In a proceeding for the probate of a will, the
Court's area of inquiry is limited to an examination
of, and resolution on, the extrinsic validity of the
will, the due execution thereof, the testatrix's
testamentary capacity and the compliance with
the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law.
The intrinsic validity of the will normally comes
only after the court has declared that the will has
been duly authenticated. However, where
practical considerations demand that the intrinsic
validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is
probated, the Court should meet that
issue. (Emphasis supplied)
Our ruling in Balanay vs. Hon. Martinez 9 had a
similar thrust:
The trial court acted correctly in passing upon the
will's intrinsic validity even before its formal validity
had been established. The probate of a will might
become an Idle ceremony if on its face it appears
to be intrinsically void. Where practical
considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of
the will be passed upon, even before it is
probated, the court should meet the issue.
The Nuguid and the Balanay cases provide the
exception rather than the rule. The intrinsic validity
of the Wills in those cases was passed upon even
before probate because "practical considerations"
so demanded. Moreover, for the parties in
the Nuguid case, the "meat of the controversy"
was the intrinsic validity of the Will; in fact, the
parties in that case "shunted aside the question of
whether or not the Will should be allowed
probate." Not so in the case before us now where
the probate of the Will is insisted on by petitioners
and a resolution on the extrinsic validity of the Will
demanded.
Moreover, in the Nuguid case, this Court ruled
that the Will was intrinsically invalid as it
completely preterited the parents of the testator.
In the instant case, a crucial issue that calls for
resolution is whether under the terms of the
decedent's Will, private respondent had been
preterited or disinherited, and if the latter, whether
it was a valid disinheritance. Preterition and
disinheritance are two diverse concepts.
... Preterition "consists in the omission in the
testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of
them, either because they are not mentioned
therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither
instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited."
(Neri vs. Akutin, 72 Phil. 325). Disinheritance, in
turn, "is a testamentary disposition depriving any
compulsory heirs of his share in the legitimate for
a cause authorized by law." (Justice J.B.L. Reyes
and R.C. Puno, "An Outline of Philippine Civil
Law", 1956 ed., Vol. III, p. 8, citing cases)
Disinheritance is always "voluntary", preterition
upon the other hand, is presumed to be
"involuntary" (Sanchez Roman, Estudios de
Derecho Civil 2nd edition, Volume 2.o p. 1131). 10
The effects of preterition and disinheritance are also
totally different.
... The effects flowing from preterition are totally
different from those of disinheritance. Pretention
under Article 854 of the New Civil Code shall
annul the institution of heir. This annulment is in
toto, unless in the wail there are, in addition,
testamentary dispositions in the form of devises or
legacies. In ineffective disinheritance under Article
918 of the same Code, such disinheritance shall
also "annul the institution of heirs", but only
"insofar as it may prejudice the person
disinherited", which last phrase was omitted in the
case of preterition (III Tolentino, Civil Code of the
Philippines, 1961 Edition, p. 172). Better stated
yet, in disinheritance the nullity is limited to that
portion of the estate of which the disinherited heirs
have been illegally deprived. 11
By virtue of the dismissal of the Testate Case, the
determination of that controversial issue has not
been thoroughly considered. We gather from the
assailed Order of the trial Court that its conclusion
was that respondent Bernardo has been preterited
We are of opinion, however, that from the face of the
Will, that conclusion is not indubitable.
As held in the case of Vda. de Precilla vs.
Narciso 12
... it is as important a matter of public interest that
a purported will is not denied legalization on
dubious grounds. Otherwise, the very institution of
testamentary succession will be shaken to its
foundation, ...
Coming now to the procedural aspect, suffice it to
state that in view of our finding that respondent
Judge had acted in excess of his jurisdiction in
dismissing the Testate Case, certiorari is a proper
remedy. An act done by a Probate Court in excess
of its jurisdiction may be corrected
by Certiorari. 13 And even assuming the existence of
the remedy of appeal, we harken to the rule that in
the broader interests of justice, a petition for
certiorari may be entertained, particularly where
appeal would not afford speedy and adequate relief.
WHEREFORE, the Decision in question is set
aside and the Orders of the Court of First
Instance-Branch XI, Rizal, dated September 8,
1980 and December 19, 1980, are nullified.
Special Proceeding No. Q-23304 is hereby
remanded to said Court of First Instance-Branch
XI. Rizal, therein to be reinstated and
consolidated with Special Proceeding No. 8569
for further proceedings.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
7. Coronado v. CA, G.R. No. 78778,
December 3, 1990 (191 SCRA 894)
8. Balanay v. Martinez, G.R. No. L-39247,
June 27, 1975
9. Ajero v. CA, G.R. No. 106720,
September 15, 1994 (236 SCRA 488)
10. Acain v. IAC, G.R. No. 72706, October
27, 1987
11. Manahan v. Manahan, G.R. No. 38050,
September 22, 1933 (58 Phil 448)
12. Heirs of Fran v. Salas, G.R. No.
L-53546, June 25, 1992 (210 SCRA
303)
Rule 76
1. Leviste v. CA, G.R. No. L-29184,
January 30, 1989 (169 SCRA 580)
2. Rodriguez v. Borja, G.R. No. L-21993,
June 21, 1966 (17 SCRA 418)
3. Maravilla v. Maravilla, G.R. No.
L-23225, February 27, 1971 (37 SCRA
672)
4. Labrador v. CA, G.R. Nos. 83843-44,
April 5, 1990 (184 SCRA 170)
5. De Jesus v. De Jesus, G.R. No.
L-38338, January 28, 1985 (134 SCRA
245)
6. Ajero v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
106720, September 15, 1994 (236
SCRA 488)
7. Kalaw v. Relova, G.R. No. L-40207
September 28, 1984 (132 SCRA 237)
8. Vda. de Perez v. Tolete, G.R. No.
76714, June 2, 1994.
Rule 77 – Rule 91
1. Ventura v. Ventura, G.R. No. L-26306
April 27, 1988 (160 SCRA 810)
2. Corona v. CA, G.R. No. L-59821 August
30, 1982 (116 SCRA 316)
3. Gabriel v. CA, G.R. No. 101512 August
7, 1992 (212 SCRA 413)
4. De Parreño v. Aranzanso, G.R. No.
L-27657, August 30, 1992 (116 SCRA
157)
5. Saguinsin v. Lindayag, G.R. No.
L-17759, December 17, 1962 (6 SCRA
874)
6. Pilipinas Shell v. Dumlao, G.R. No.
L-44888 February 7, 1992
7. De Guzman v. Angeles, G.R. No. 78590
June 20, 1988 (162 SCRA 347)
8. Cuenco v. CA, G.R. No. L-24742,
October 26, 1973 (53 SCRA 360)
9. Roberts v. Leonidas, G.R. No. L-55509
April 27, 1984 (129 SCRA 33)
10. Ruiz v. CA, G.R. No. 118671, January
29, 1996
 11. Mananquil v. Villegas, A.M. No. 2430
August 30, 1990 (189 SCRA 335)
12. Kalaw v. IAC, G.R. No. 74618,
September 2, 1992
13. De Guzman v. De Guzman-Carillo, G.R.
No. L-29276 May 18, 1978
14. Dizon v. CA, G.R. No. 96296 June 18,
1992 (210 SCRA 107)
15. Peneyra v. IAC, G.R. No. L-68935
January 22, 1990 (181 SCRA 244)
16. Salazar v. CA, G.R. No. 121510
November 23, 1995 (250 SCRA 305)
17. Benavidez v. CA, G.R. No.
125848, September 6, 1999 313 SCRA
715
18. Mendoza v. CA, G.R. No. 86302
September 24, 1991 (201 SCRA 675)
19. Alipio v. CA, G.R. No.
134100. September 29, 2000 (341
SCRA 441)
20. Cerna v. CA, G.R. No. L-48359, March
30, 1993 (220 SCRA 517)
21. De Jacob v. CA, G.R. No. 88602 April 6,
1990 (184 SCRA 294)
22. Maglaque v. PDB, G.R. No.
109472. May 18, 1999 (307 SCRA 156)
23. PNB v. CA, G.R. No. 121597, June 29,
2001 (360 SCRA 370)
24. Gochan v. Young, G.R. No. 131889,
March 12, 2001 (354 SCRA 207)
25. Rioferio v. CA, G.R. No.
129008, January 13, 2004 (419 SCRA
59)
26. Chua v. Absolute Mgt. Corp., G.R. No.
144881, October 16, 2003 (413 SCRA
547)
27. Maneclang v. Baun, G.R. No. L-27876
April 22, 1992 (208 SCRA 179)
28. Lee v. RTC, Quezon City, G.R. No.
146006, February 23, 2004
29. Acebedo v. Abesamis, G.R. No.
102380, January 18, 1993 (217 SCRA
180)
30. Sandejas v. Lina, G.R. No.
141634. February 5, 2001 (351 CRA
183)
31. Natcher v. CA, G.R. No. 133000,
October 2, 2001 (366 SCRA 385)
32. Estate of Ruiz v. CA, G.R. No.
118671, January 29, 1996 (252 SCRA
541)
33. Solivio v. CA, G.R. No. 83484, February
12, 1990 (182 SCRA 119)
34. Vda. Kilayco v. Tengco, G.R. No.
45425, March 27, 1992 (207 SCRA 600)
35. Pagkatipunan v. IAC, G.R. No. 70722
July 3, 1991 (198 SCRA 719)
36. Heirs of Fran v. Salas, G.R. No. L-53546
June 25, 1992 (210 SCRA 303)
PART II. GUADIANSHIP
A. Codals:
1. Rules 92-97 (Guardianship of
incompetents)
2. A.M. 03-02-05-SC (Guardianship of
minors)
B. Cases:
1. Nery v. Lorenzo, G.R. No. L-23376,
April 1, 1972 (S8, A.M. 03-02-05)
2. Francisco v. CA, G.R. No. L-57438,
January 3, 1984 (S2, R97, in relation to
S5, A.M.)
3. Uy v. CA, G.R. No. 109557, November
29, 2000 (S2, R92 in rel. S1, R95)
4. Vda. de Baluyot v. Luciano, G.R. No.
L-42215, July 13, 1976
5. Panlilio v. Salonga, G.R. No. 113087,
June 27, 1994
6. Luna v. IAC, G.R. No. 68374, June 18,
1985
7. Inton v. Quintana, G.R. No. L-1236, May
26, 1948
8. Margate v. Rabacal, G.R. No. L-14302,
April 30, 1963
9. San Diego v. Nombre, G.R. No.
L-19265, May 29, 1964
10. Viloria v. Administrator of Veteran’s
Affairs, G.R. No. L-9620, June 28, 1957
11. Liom [Lim] Siok Huey v. Lapiz, G.R. No.
L-12289, May 28, 1958
12. Cui v. Piccio, G.R. No. L-5131, July 31,
1952
13. Vancil v. Helmes, G.R. No.
132223, June 19, 2001
14. Vda. de Chua v. CA, G.R. No.
116835. March 5, 1998
15. Pineda v. CA, G.R. No. 105562,
September 27, 1993
PART III. ADOPTION
A. Codals:
1. R.A. 8552 (Domestic Adoption Act of
1998)
2. R.A. 9253 (amending R.A. 8552, re
authority of DSWD to declare child
legally available for adoption)
3. A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC, the Rule on
Domestic and Inter-Country Adoption
4. OCA Circular No. 213-2017 (Re
Resolution No. 02-2017 of SC En Banc)
B. Cases:
1. Lahom v. Sibulo, G.R. No. 143989, July
14, 2003
2. Republic v. Elepano, G.R. No. 92542,
October 15, 1991
3. Duncan v. CFI-Rizal, G.R. No. L-30576,
February 10, 1976
4. Cang v. CA, G.R. No. 105308,
September 25, 1998
5. Badua v. CA, G.R. No. 105625, January
24, 1994
6. Lazatin v. Campos, G.R. No.
L-43955-56, July 30, 1979
7. Republic v. Toledano, G.R. No. 94147,
June 8, 1994
8. Cruz v. Republic, G.R. No. L-20927,
July 26, 1966
9. Republic v. CA, G.R. No. 103695,
March 15, 1996
10. Republic v. CA, G.R. No. 92326,
January 24, 1992
11. Tamargo v. CA, G.R. No. 85044, June
3, 1992
12. Dela Puerta v. CA, G.R. No. 77867,
February 6, 1990
 13. Santos v. Aranzanso, G.R. No. L-23828, 1. Rules 103 and 108
February 28, 1966 2. R.A. 9048, which amended Art. 376 and
14. Republic v. CA, G.R. No. L-97906, May 412 of the Civil Code, as further
21, 1992 amended by R.A. 10172
3. R.A. 9225 (Citizenship Retention and
Re-acquisition Act of 2003)
PART IV. HABEAS CORPUS
B. Cases
A. Codals 1. Republic v. CA and Wong, G.R. No.
1. Rule 102 97906, May 21, 1992
2. A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC, May 15, 2003 2. Republic v. Lim, G.R. No. 15388,
(The Rule on Custody of Minors and January 13, 2004
Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to 3. Yasin v. Hon. Judge, Shari’a District
Custody of Minors) Court, G.R. No. 94986, February 23,
1995
B. Cases: 4. Republic v. Zosa, G.R. No. L-48762,
1. Feria v. CA, G.R. No. 122954, February September 12, 1988
15, 2000 5. Republic v. Marcos, G.R. No. L-31065,
2. Ilusorio v. Bildner [should be Court of February 15, 1990 (compare with
Appeals], G.R. No. 139789, May 12, Calderon v. Republic, G.R. No.
2000 L-18127, April 5, 1967)
3. De Villa v. Director of New Bilibid 6. Lee v. CA, G.R. No. 118387, October
Prisons, G.R. No. 158802, November 11, 2001
17, 2004 7. Republic v. Valencia, G.R. No. L-32181
4. De Guzman [should be Ordoñez] v. March 5, 1986
Vinarao, G.R. No. L-117376 December 8. Eleosida v. LCR of Quezon City, G.R.
8, 1994 No. 130277, May 9, 2002
5. Tijing v. CA, G.R. No. 125901, March 8, 9. Barco v. CA, G.R. No. 120587, January
2001 20, 2004
6. Calvan v. CA, G.R. No. 10. Co v. The Civil Registrar of Manila, G.R.
140823, October 3, 2000 No. 138496, February 24, 2004
7. Martin v. Guerrero, A.M. No.
RTJ-99-1499, October 22, 1999
8. Thornton v. Thornton, G.R. No. 154598,
August 16, 2004
9. Velasco v. CA, G.R. No. 118644, July 7,
1995
10. Jackson v. Macalino, G.R. No. 139255,
November 23, 2003
11. In re Azucena Garcia, G.R. No.
141443, August 30, 2000
12. Moncupa v. Enrile, G.R. No. L-63345,
January 30, 1986
13. Alimpoos v. CA, G.R. No. L-27331, July
30, 1981
14. Sombong v. CA, G.R. No. 111876,
January 31, 1996
15. Suarez v. CA, G.R. No. 83251, January
23, 1991
16. Eugenio v. Velez, G.R. No. 85140, May
17, 1990
17. Galvez v. CA, G.R. No. 114046,
October 24, 1994
18. Ngaya-an v. Balweg, G.R. No. 80591
August 5, 1991
19. Ilagan v. Enrile, G.R. No. 70748 October
21, 1985
20. Rodriguez v. Bonifacio, A.M. No.
RTJ-99-1510, November 6, 2000
21. Enrile v. Salazar, G.R. No. 92163, June
5, 1990
22. Tung Chin Hui v. Rodriguez, G.R. No.
141938, April 2, 2001
23. Elepante v. Madayag, G.R. No. 93559
April 26, 1991

PART V. CHANGE OF NAME & CORRECTION OF

ENTRIES

A. Codals: