In 1953, Republic Act No. 920 was passed. This law appropriated P85,000.

00 “for the construction, reconstruction, repair,

extension and improvement Pasig feeder road terminals”. Wenceslao Pascual, then governor of Rizal, assailed the
validity of the law. He claimed that the appropriation was actually going to be used for private use for the terminals sought
to be improved were part of the Antonio Subdivision. The said Subdivision is owned by Senator Jose Zulueta who was a
member of the same Senate that passed and approved the same RA. Pascual claimed that Zulueta misrepresented in
Congress the fact that he owns those terminals and that his property would be unlawfully enriched at the expense of the
taxpayers if the said RA would be upheld. Pascual then prayed that the Secretary of Public Works and Communications
be restrained from releasing funds for such purpose. Zulueta, on the other hand, perhaps as an afterthought, donated the
said property to the City of Pasig.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appropriation is valid.
HELD: No, the appropriation is void for being an appropriation for a private purpose. The subsequent donation of the
property to the government to make the property public does not cure the constitutional defect. The fact that the law was
passed when the said property was still a private property cannot be ignored. “In accordance with the rule that the taxing
power must be exercised for public purposes only, money raised by taxation can be expanded only for public purposes
and not for the advantage of private individuals.” Inasmuch as the land on which the projected feeder roads were to be
constructed belonged then to Zulueta, the result is that said appropriation sought a private purpose, and, hence, was null
and void.

G.R. No. L-33713 July 30, 1975

EUSEBIO B. GARCIA, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
HON. ERNESTO S. MATA, Secretary of National Defense, and GENERAL MANUEL T. YAN, Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of
the Philippines, respondents-appellees.

Emilio Purugganan for petitioner-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Rosalio A. de Leon and Solicitor Eulogio Raquel-
Santos for respondents-appellees.

CASTRO, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, Branch IX, in civil case Q-13466,
entitled "Eusebio B. Garcia, petitioner, versus Hon. Ernesto Mata (Juan Ponce Enrile), et al., respondents," declaring paragraph 11 of
the "Special Provisions for the Armed Forces of the Philippines" of Republic Act No. 16001 unconstitutional and therefore invalid and
inoperative.

We affirm the judgment a quo.

The facts material to this case are embodied in the following stipulation submitted jointly by both parties to the lower court:

Petitioner was a reserve officer on active duty with the Armed Forces of the Philippines until his reversion to inactive
status on 15 November 1960, pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 2332. At the time of reversion, Petitioner
held the rank of Captain with a monthly emolument of P478.00, comprising his base and longevity pay, quarters and
subsistence allowances;

On June 18, 1955, the date when Republic Act No. 1382 took effect, petitioner had a total of 9 years, 4 months and 12
days of accumulated active commissioned service in the Armed Forces of the Philippines;

On July 11, 1956, the date when Republic Act 1600 took effect, petitioner had an accumulated active commissioned
service of 10 years, 5 months and 5 days in the Armed Forces of the Philippines;

Petitioner's reversion to inactive status on 15 November 1960 was pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act 2334,
and such reversion was neither for cause, at his own request, nor after court-martial proceedings;

From 15 November 1960 up to the present, petitioner has been on inactive status and as such, he has neither
received any emoluments from the Armed Forces of the Philippines, nor was he ever employed in the Government in
any capacity;
 As a consequence of his reversion to inactive status, petitioner filed the necessary petitions with the offices of the AFP
Chief of Staff, the Secretary of National Defense, and the President, respectively, but received reply only from the
Chief of Staff through the AFP Adjutant General.

On September 17, 1969 the petitioner brought an action for "Mandamus and Recovery of a Sum of Money" in the court a quo to
compel the respondents Secretary of National Defense and Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines2 to reinstate him in
the active commissioned service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to readjust his rank, and to pay all the emoluments and
allowances due to him from the time of his reversion to inactive status. On December 2, 1970 the trial court dismissed the petition.
The court ruled that paragraph 11 of the "Special Provisions for the Armed Forces of the Philippines" in Republic Act 1600 is "invalid,
unconstitutional and inoperative."

The petitioner had a total of 9 years, 4 months and 12 days of accumulated active commissioned service in the AFP when Republic
Act 1382 took effect on June 18, 1955. Section I of this law provided:

Reserve officers with at least ten years of active accumulated commissioned service who are still on active duty at the
time of the approval of this Act shall not be reverted into inactive status except for cause after proper court-martial
proceedings or upon their own request: Provided, That for purposes of computing the length of service, six months or
more of active service shall be considered one year. (emphasis supplied)

The petitioner's accumulated active commissioned service was thus short of the minimum service requirement prescribed in the
aforequoted provision of R.A. 1382.

On July 11, 1956,3 while the petitioner was yet in the active service, Republic Act 1600 was enacted into law. Paragraph 11 of the
SPECIAL PROVISIONS FOR THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES (on page 892 of the Act) provided as follows:

11. After the approval of this Act, and when there is no emergency, no reserve officer of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines may be called to a tour of active duty for more than two years during any period of five consecutive years:
PROVIDED, That hereafter reserve officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines on active duty for more than two
years on the date of the approval of this Act except those whose military and educational training, experience and
qualifications are deemed essential to the needs of the service, shall be reverted to inactive status within one year
from the approval of this Act: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That reserve officers with at least ten years of active
accumulated commissioned service who are still on active duty at the time of the approval of this Act shall not be
reverted to inactive status except for cause after proper court-martial proceedings or upon their request; PROVIDED,
FURTHER, That any such reserve officer reverted to inactive status who has at least five of active commissioned
service shall be entitled to a gratuity equivalent to one month's authorized base and longevity pay in the rank held at
the time of such reversion for every year of active commissioned service; PROVIDED, FURTHER, That any reserve
 officer who receives a gratuity under the provisions of this Act shall not except during a National emergency or
mobilization, be called to a tour of active duty within five years from the date of reversion: PROVIDED, FURTHER,
That the Secretary of National Defense is authorized to extend the tour of active duty of reserve officers who are
qualified military pilots and doctors; PROVIDED, FURTHER, That any savings in the appropriations authorized in this
Act for the Department of National Defense notwithstanding any provision of this Act to the contrary and any
unexpended balance of certification to accounts payable since 1 July 1949 regardless of purpose of the appropriation
shall be made available for the purpose of this paragraph: AND PROVIDED, FINALLY, That the Secretary of National
Defense shall render a quarterly report to Congress as to the implementation of the provisions of this paragraph. ( pp.
892-893, RA 1600) (emphasis supplied)

The petitioner consequently argues that his reversion to inactive status on November 15, 1960 was in violation of the abovequoted
provision which prohibits the reversion to inactive status of reserve officers on active duty with at least ten years of accumulated
active commissioned service.

On the other hand, the respondents contend that the said provision has no relevance or pertinence whatsoever to the budget in
question or to any appropriation item contained therein, and is therefore proscribed by Art. VI, Sec. 19, par. 24 of the 1935
Constitution of the Philippines, which reads:

No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general appropriation bill unless it relates specifically to some
particular appropriation therein; and any such provision or enactment shall be limited in its operation to such
appropriation.

A perusal of the challenged provision of R.A. 1600 fails to disclose its relevance or relation to any appropriation item therein, or to the
Appropriation Act as a whole. From the very first clause of paragraph 11 itself, which reads,

After the approval of this Act, and when there is no emergency, no reserve officer of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines may be called to a tour of active duty for more than two years during any period of five consecutive years:

the incongruity and irrelevancy are already evident. While R.A. 1600 appropriated money for the operation of the Government for the
fiscal year 1956-1957, the said paragraph 11 refers to the fundamental government policy matters of the calling to active duty and
the reversion to inactive status of reserve officers in the AFP. The incongruity and irrelevancy continue throughout the entire
paragraph.

In the language of the respondents-appellees, "it was indeed a non-appropriation item inserted in an appropriation measure in
violation of the constitutional inhibition against "riders" to the general appropriation act." It was indeed a new and completely
unrelated provision attached to the Appropriation Act.
The paragraph in question also violated Art. VI, Sec. 21, par. 15 of the 1935 Constitution of the Philippines which provided that "No
bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill." This
constitutional requirement nullified and rendered inoperative any provision contained in the body of an act that was not fairly included
in the subject expressed in the title or was not germane to or properly connected with that subject.

In determining whether a provision contained in an act is embraced in the subject and is properly connected therewith, the subject to
be considered is the one expressed in the title of the act, and every fair intendment and reasonable doubt should be indulged in favor
of the validity of the legislative enactment. But when an act contains provisions which are clearly not embraced in the subject of the
act, as expressed in the title, such provisions are inoperative and without effect.

We are mindful that the title of an act is not required to be an index to the body of the act. Thus, in Sumulong vs. Comelec, 73 Phil.
288, 291, this Court held that it is "a sufficient compliance with such requirement if the title expresses the general subject and all the
provisions of the statute are germane to that general subject." The constitutional provision was intended to preclude the insertion of
riders in legislation, a rider being a provision not germane to the subject-matter of the bill.6

The subject of R.A. 1600, as expressed in its title, is restricted to "appropriating funds for the operation of the government." Any
provision contained in the body of the act that is fairly included in this restricted subject or any matter properly connected therewith is
valid and operative. But, if a provision in the body of the act is not fairly included in this restricted subject, like the provision relating to
the policy matters of calling to active duty and reversion to inactive duty of reserve officers of the AFP, such provision is inoperative
and of no effect.

To quote the respondents-appellees on this point:

It is obvious that the statutory provision in question refers to security of reserve officers from reversion to inactive
status, whereas the subject or title of the statute from which it derives its existence refers to appropriations. Verily, it
runs contrary to or is repugnant to the above-quoted injunctive provision of the Constitution. Where a conflict arises
between a statute and the Constitution, the latter prevails. It should be emphasized that a Constitution is superior to a
statute and is precisely called the "supreme law of the land" because it is the fundamental or organic law which states
the general principles and builds the substantial foundation and general framework of law and government, and for
that reason a statute contrary to or in violation of the Constitution is null and void (Talabon vs. Iloilo Provincial Warden,
78 Phil. 599). If a law, therefore, happens to infringe upon or violate the fundamental law, courts of justice may step
1äwphï1.ñët

in to nullify its effectiveness (Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1).

Upon the foregoing dissertation, we declare Paragraph 11 of the SPECIAL PROVISIONS FOR THE ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES as unconstitutional, invalid and inoperative. Being unconstitutional, it confers no right and affords no protection. In
legal contemplation it is as though it has never been passed.7
Verily, not having shown a clear legal right to the position to which he desires to be restored, the petitioner cannot compel the
respondents to reinstate and/or call him to active duty, promote or readjust his rank, much less pay him back emoluments and
allowances.

ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition is denied, and the decision of the lower court dismissing the complaint is hereby affirmed. No
pronouncement as to costs.

PHILCONSA VS ENRIQUEZ
Posted by kaye lee on 9:14 AM
G.R. No. 113105 August 19 1994 [Article VI Section 25 - Appropriations]

FACTS:
Petitioners assailed the validity of RA 7663 or General Appropriations Act of 1994.
GAA contains a special provision that allows any members of the Congress the REalignment of Allocation for Operational Expenses,
provided that the total of said allocation is not exceeded.
Philconsa claims that only the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of Representatives are the ones authorized under the
Constitution to realign savings, not the individual members of Congress themselves.
President signed the law, but Vetoes certain provisions of the law and imposed certain provisional conditions: that the AFP Chief of
Staff is authorized to use savings to augment the pension funds under the Retirement and Separation Benefits of the AFP.

ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 7663 is violative of Article VI, Section 25 (5) of 1987 Constitution.

RULING:
Yes. Only the Senate President and the Speaker of the House are allowed to approve the realignment.
Furthermore, two conditions must be met: 1) the funds to be realigned are actually savings, and 2) the transfer is for the purpose of
augmenting the items of expenditures to which said transfer to be made.

As to the certain condition given to the AFP Chief of Staff, it is violative of of Sections 25(5) and 29(1) of the Article VI of the
Constitution. The list of those who may be authorized to transfer funds is exclusive. the AFP Chief of Staff may not be given
authority.
Categories: Constitutional Law 1
This case is consolidated with G.R. No. 208493 and G.R. No. 209251.
The so-called pork barrel system has been around in the Philippines since about 1922. Pork Barrel is commonly known as
the lump-sum, discretionary funds of the members of the Congress. It underwent several legal designations from
“Congressional Pork Barrel” to the latest “Priority Development Assistance Fund” or PDAF. The allocation for the pork
barrel is integrated in the annual General Appropriations Act (GAA).
Since 2011, the allocation of the PDAF has been done in the following manner:
a. P70 million: for each member of the lower house; broken down to – P40 million for “hard projects” (infrastructure
projects like roads, buildings, schools, etc.), and P30 million for “soft projects” (scholarship grants, medical assistance,
livelihood programs, IT development, etc.);
b. P200 million: for each senator; broken down to – P100 million for hard projects, P100 million for soft projects;
c. P200 million: for the Vice-President; broken down to – P100 million for hard projects, P100 million for soft projects.
The PDAF articles in the GAA do provide for realignment of fundswhereby certain cabinet members may request for the
realignment of funds into their department provided that the request for realignment is approved or concurred by the
legislator concerned.
Presidential Pork Barrel
The president does have his own source of fund albeit not included in the GAA. The so-called presidential pork barrel
comes from two sources: (a) the Malampaya Funds, from the Malampaya Gas Project – this has been around since
1976, and (b) the Presidential Social Fund which is derived from the earnings of PAGCOR – this has been around since
about 1983.
Pork Barrel Scam Controversy
Ever since, the pork barrel system has been besieged by allegations of corruption. In July 2013, six whistle blowers,
headed by Benhur Luy, exposed that for the last decade, the corruption in the pork barrel system had been facilitated by
Janet Lim Napoles. Napoles had been helping lawmakers in funneling their pork barrel funds into about 20 bogus NGO’s
(non-government organizations) which would make it appear that government funds are being used in legit existing
projects but are in fact going to “ghost” projects. An audit was then conducted by the Commission on Audit and the results
thereof concurred with the exposes of Luy et al.
Motivated by the foregoing, Greco Belgica and several others, filed various petitions before the Supreme Court
questioning the constitutionality of the pork barrel system.
ISSUES:
I. Whether or not the congressional pork barrel system is constitutional.
II. Whether or not presidential pork barrel system is constitutional.
HELD:
I. No, the congressional pork barrel system is unconstitutional. It is unconstitutional because it violates the following
principles:
a. Separation of Powers
As a rule, the budgeting power lies in Congress. It regulates the release of funds (power of the purse). The executive, on
the other hand, implements the laws – this includes the GAA to which the PDAF is a part of. Only the executive may
implement the law but under the pork barrel system, what’s happening was that, after the GAA, itself a law, was enacted,
the legislators themselves dictate as to which projects their PDAF funds should be allocated to – a clear act of
implementing the law they enacted – a violation of the principle of separation of powers. (Note in the older case
of PHILCONSA vs Enriquez, it was ruled that pork barrel, then called as CDF or the Countrywide Development Fund, was
constitutional insofar as the legislators only recommend where their pork barrel funds go).
This is also highlighted by the fact that in realigning the PDAF, the executive will still have to get the concurrence of the
legislator concerned.
b. Non-delegability of Legislative Power
As a rule, the Constitution vests legislative power in Congress alone. (The Constitution does grant the people legislative
power but only insofar as the processes of referendum and initiative are concerned). That being, legislative power cannot
be delegated by Congress for it cannot delegate further that which was delegated to it by the Constitution.
Exceptions to the rule are:
(i) delegated legislative power to local government units but this shall involve purely local matters;
(ii) authority of the President to, by law, exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy in
times of war or other national emergency, or fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as
Congress may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts
within the framework of the national development program of the Government.
In this case, the PDAF articles which allow the individual legislator to identify the projects to which his PDAF money
should go to is a violation of the rule on non-delegability of legislative power. The power to appropriate funds is solely
lodged in Congress (in the two houses comprising it) collectively and not lodged in the individual members. Further,
nowhere in the exceptions does it state that the Congress can delegate the power to the individual member of Congress.
c. Principle of Checks and Balances
One feature in the principle of checks and balances is the power of the president to veto items in the GAA which he may
deem to be inappropriate. But this power is already being undermined because of the fact that once the GAA is approved,
the legislator can now identify the project to which he will appropriate his PDAF. Under such system, how can the
president veto the appropriation made by the legislator if the appropriation is made after the approval of the GAA –
again, “Congress cannot choose a mode of budgeting which effectively renders the constitutionally-given power of the
President useless.”
d. Local Autonomy
As a rule, the local governments have the power to manage their local affairs. Through their Local Development Councils
(LDCs), the LGUs can develop their own programs and policies concerning their localities. But with the PDAF, particularly
on the part of the members of the house of representatives, what’s happening is that a congressman can either bypass or
duplicate a project by the LDC and later on claim it as his own. This is an instance where the national government (note, a
congressman is a national officer) meddles with the affairs of the local government – and this is contrary to the State
policy embodied in the Constitution on local autonomy. It’s good if that’s all that is happening under the pork barrel system
but worse, the PDAF becomes more of a personal fund on the part of legislators.
II. Yes, the presidential pork barrel is valid.
The main issue raised by Belgica et al against the presidential pork barrel is that it is unconstitutional because it violates
Section 29 (1), Article VI of the Constitution which provides:
No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
Belgica et al emphasized that the presidential pork comes from the earnings of the Malampaya and PAGCOR and not
from any appropriation from a particular legislation.
The Supreme Court disagrees as it ruled that PD 910, which created the Malampaya Fund, as well as PD 1869 (as
amended by PD 1993), which amended PAGCOR’s charter, provided for the appropriation, to wit:
(i) PD 910: Section 8 thereof provides that all fees, among others, collected from certain energy-related ventures shall
form part of a special fund (the Malampaya Fund) which shall be used to further finance energy resource development
and for other purposes which the President may direct;
(ii) PD 1869, as amended: Section 12 thereof provides that a part of PAGCOR’s earnings shall be allocated to a General
Fund (the Presidential Social Fund) which shall be used in government infrastructure projects.
These are sufficient laws which met the requirement of Section 29, Article VI of the Constitution. The appropriation
contemplated therein does not have to be a particular appropriation as it can be a general appropriation as in the case of
PD 910 and PD 1869.

W hen President Benigno Aquino III took office, his administration noticed the sluggish growth of the economy. The

World Bank advised that the economy needed a stimulus plan. Budget Secretary Florencio “Butch” Abad then came up
with a program called the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP).
The DAP was seen as a remedy to speed up the funding of government projects. DAP enables the Executive to realign
funds from slow moving projects to priority projects instead of waiting for next year’s appropriation. So what happens
under the DAP was that if a certain government project is being undertaken slowly by a certain executive agency, the
funds allotted therefor will be withdrawn by the Executive. Once withdrawn, these funds are declared as “savings” by the
Executive and said funds will then be reallotted to other priority projects. The DAP program did work to stimulate the
economy as economic growth was in fact reported and portion of such growth was attributed to the DAP (as noted by the
Supreme Court).
Other sources of the DAP include the unprogrammed funds from the General Appropriations Act (GAA). Unprogrammed
funds are standby appropriations made by Congress in the GAA.
Meanwhile, in September 2013, Senator Jinggoy Estrada made an exposé claiming that he, and other Senators, received
Php50M from the President as an incentive for voting in favor of the impeachment of then Chief Justice Renato Corona.
Secretary Abad claimed that the money was taken from the DAP but was disbursed upon the request of the Senators.
This apparently opened a can of worms as it turns out that the DAP does not only realign funds within the Executive. It
turns out that some non-Executive projects were also funded; to name a few: Php1.5B for the CPLA (Cordillera People’s
Liberation Army), Php1.8B for the MNLF (Moro National Liberation Front), P700M for the Quezon Province, P50-P100M
for certain Senators each, P10B for Relocation Projects, etc.
This prompted Maria Carolina Araullo, Chairperson of the Bagong Alyansang Makabayan, and several other concerned
citizens to file various petitions with the Supreme Court questioning the validity of the DAP. Among their contentions was:
DAP is unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional rule which provides that “no money shall be paid out of the
Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.”
Secretary Abad argued that the DAP is based on certain laws particularly the GAA (savings and augmentation provisions
thereof), Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the Constitution (power of the President to augment), Secs. 38 and 49 of Executive Order
292 (power of the President to suspend expenditures and authority to use savings, respectively).
Issues:
I. Whether or not the DAP violates the principle “no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law” (Sec. 29(1), Art. VI, Constitution).
II. Whether or not the DAP realignments can be considered as impoundments by the executive.
III. Whether or not the DAP realignments/transfers are constitutional.
IV. Whether or not the sourcing of unprogrammed funds to the DAP is constitutional.
V. Whether or not the Doctrine of Operative Fact is applicable.
HELD:
I. No, the DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. DAP was merely a program by the Executive and
is not a fund nor is it an appropriation. It is a program for prioritizing government spending. As such, it did not violate the
Constitutional provision cited in Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. In DAP no additional funds were withdrawn from
the Treasury otherwise, an appropriation made by law would have been required. Funds, which were already appropriated
for by the GAA, were merely being realigned via the DAP.
II. No, there is no executive impoundment in the DAP. Impoundment of funds refers to the President’s power to refuse to
spend appropriations or to retain or deduct appropriations for whatever reason. Impoundment is actually prohibited by the
GAA unless there will be an unmanageable national government budget deficit (which did not happen). Nevertheless,
there’s no impoundment in the case at bar because what’s involved in the DAP was the transfer of funds.
III. No, the transfers made through the DAP were unconstitutional. It is true that the President (and even the heads of the
other branches of the government) are allowed by the Constitution to make realignment of funds, however, such transfer
or realignment should only be made “within their respective offices”. Thus, no cross-border transfers/augmentations may
be allowed. But under the DAP, this was violated because funds appropriated by the GAA for the Executive were being
transferred to the Legislative and other non-Executive agencies.
Further, transfers “within their respective offices” also contemplate realignment of funds to an existing project in the GAA.
Under the DAP, even though some projects were within the Executive, these projects are non-existent insofar as the GAA
is concerned because no funds were appropriated to them in the GAA. Although some of these projects may be
legitimate, they are still non-existent under the GAA because they were not provided for by the GAA. As such, transfer to
such projects is unconstitutional and is without legal basis.
On the issue of what are “savings”
These DAP transfers are not “savings” contrary to what was being declared by the Executive. Under the definition of
“savings” in the GAA, savings only occur, among other instances, when there is an excess in the funding of a certain
project once it is completed, finally discontinued, or finally abandoned. The GAA does not refer to “savings” as funds
withdrawn from a slow moving project. Thus, since the statutory definition of savings was not complied with under the
DAP, there is no basis at all for the transfers. Further, savings should only be declared at the end of the fiscal year. But
under the DAP, funds are already being withdrawn from certain projects in the middle of the year and then being declared
as “savings” by the Executive particularly by the DBM.
IV. No. Unprogrammed funds from the GAA cannot be used as money source for the DAP because under the law, such
funds may only be used if there is a certification from the National Treasurer to the effect that the revenue collections have
exceeded the revenue targets. In this case, no such certification was secured before unprogrammed funds were used.
V. Yes. The Doctrine of Operative Fact, which recognizes the legal effects of an act prior to it being declared as
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, is applicable. The DAP has definitely helped stimulate the economy. It has funded
numerous projects. If the Executive is ordered to reverse all actions under the DAP, then it may cause more harm than
good. The DAP effects can no longer be undone. The beneficiaries of the DAP cannot be asked to return what they
received especially so that they relied on the validity of the DAP. However, the Doctrine of Operative Fact may not be
applicable to the authors, implementers, and proponents of the DAP if it is so found in the appropriate tribunals (civil,
criminal, or administrative) that they have not acted in good faith.