Villanueva vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.

143286 April 14, 2004

FACTS: Since the subject properties, including Lot No. 152, were acquired during the marriage of
On 13 October 1988, Eusebia Retuya filed a complaint before the trial court against her Nicolas and Eusebia, the presumption under Article 116 of the Family Code is that all these
husband Nicolas Retuya, Pacita Villanueva and Nicolas’ son with Pacita, Procopio Villanueva. are conjugal properties of Nicolas and Eusebia.
Eusebia sought the reconveyance from Nicolas and Pacita of several properties (subject
properties), claiming that such are her conjugal properties with Nicolas. Plaintiff Eusebia, is
the legal wife of defendant Nicolas, having been married on October 7, 1926. Out of the
lawful wedlock, they begot five (5) children. Spouses Retuya resided at Mandaue City. During
their marriage, they acquired real properties and all improvements situated in Mandaue City,
and Consolacion, Cebu. Nicolas is the co-owner of a parcel of land situated in Mandaue City
which he inherited from his parents Esteban Retuya and Balbina Solon as well as the
purchasers of hereditary shares of approximately eight (8) parcels of land in Mandaue City.
Some of the properties earn income from coconuts leased to corporations

In 1945, Nicolas no longer lived with his legitimate family and cohabited with defendant,
Pacita Villanueva, wherein Procopio Villanueva, is their illegitimate son. Nicolas, then, was
the only person who received the income of the properties. Pacita, from the time she started
living in concubinage with Nicolas, has no occupation. She had no properties of her own from
which she could derive income. From the time Nicolas suffered stroke until the present, his
illegitimate son is already the one who has been receiving the income of his properties

Settlement between parties was asked but not met. Trial court in favor of Eusebia Natuya.
Petitioners appealed. Eusebia died, and was then substituted by her heirs. CA upheld trial
court’s decision

ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject properties acquired during the marriage between Eusebia and
Procopio are conjugal

HELD:
YES, they are conjugal. Petition denied; decision of CA affirmed

RATIO: The Family Code provisions on conjugal partnerships govern the property relations
between Nicolas and Eusebia even if they were married before the effectivity of Family Code.

Article 105 of the Family Code explicitly mandates that the Family Code shall apply to
conjugal partnerships established before the Family Code without prejudice to vested rights
already acquired under the Civil Code or other laws. Thus, under the Family Code, if the
properties are acquired during the marriage, the presumption is that they are conjugal. The
burden of proof is on the party claiming that they are not conjugal. This is counter-balanced
by the requirement that the properties must first be proven to have been acquired during
the marriage before they are presumed conjugal.

Nicolas and Eusebia were married on 7 October 1926. Nicolas and Pacita started cohabiting
in 1936. Eusebia died on 23 November 1996. Pacita and Nicolas were married on 16
December 1996. Petitioners themselves admit that Lot No. 152 was purchased on 4 October
1957. The date of acquisition of Lot No. 152 is clearly during the marriage of Nicolas and
Eusebia.
Article 27. annulment. Therefore, the married couple should not suffer for the omission of Father
Arsenio De Loria and Ricarda De Loria v. Felipe Apellan Felix Bautista.
G.R. No. L-9005, 20 June 1958
Felipe is the rightful claimant to the estate of Matea -being the husband. As such, the claims
Facts: of the petitioner was denied.
Before World War II, Matea dela Cruz and Felipe Apellan Felix were living for quite some time
as husband and wife though without the sanctity of marriage. They acquired properties
together but had no children.

Right after the liberation of Manila, Matea got ill. While being doing a confession to Father
Gerardo Bautista,a Catholic priest, she admitted that she and Felipe were never married.
Upon strong urging of the priest, they agreed. After the confession, Holy Communion,
Sacrament of Extreme Unction, Father Bautista solemnized the union of the two, in articulo
mortis, with Carmen Ordiales and Judith Vizcarra as sponsors or witness . The date was either
29 or 30 January 1945.

Matea recovered from her illness for a few months but eventually died on January 1946, with
Fr. Bautista performing the burial ceremonies.

On 12 May 1952, Arsenio de Loria and Ricarda de Loria, grand nephew and niece,
respectively, of Matea by her sister Adriana dela Cruz, filed a complaint against Felipe to
compel him to account and turnover the properties left by their grand aunt Matea. Felipe
responded that he was the widower of the late Matea, therefore, the rightful claimant. The
Court of First Instance gave a favorable judgment for the petitioners, but on appeal to the
Court of Appeals (CA) reversed and dismissed the complaint.

The petitioners appealed the decision of the CA citing that the marriage of Felipe and Matea,
though solemnized by a Catholic priest, was not registered to the local civil registrar.

Issue:
Is a marriage between two parties legal though no marriage license were issued?

Ruling:
Yes, according to the Supreme Court. In the old Marriage Law, failure to sign the marriage
contract is not a cause of annulment.

Bearing in mind that the "essential requisites for marriage are the legal capacity of the
contracting parties and their consent" (section 1 of the old Marriage Law), the latter being
manifested by the declaration of "the parties" "in the presence of the person solemnizing the
marriage and of two witnesses of legal age that they take each other as husband and wife" —
which in this case actually occurred. The Supreme Court opined that the signing of the
marriage contract or certificate was required by the statute simply for the purpose of
evidencing the act. No statutory provision or court ruling has been cited making it an
essential requisite — not the formal requirement of evidentiary value. The fact of marriage is
one thing; the proof by which it may be established is quite another.

Father Bautista was at fault for not registering the formal union of the couple to the local civil
registrar. This does not mean that the non-registration of the marriage is a ground for
Facts: Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado died intestate and without descendants.
Guillermo outlived Josefa by two years. Petitioners and respondents are their respective
relatives claiming rights to their intestate estate.
The petition for letters of administration stated that Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia
were never married. According to petitioners, sometime in 1917, Guillermo proposed
marriage to Josefa. Josefa and Guillermo eventually lived together as husband and wife but
were never married. To prove their assertion, petitioners point out that no record of the
contested marriage existed in the civil registry. Moreover, a baptismal certificate naming
Josefa Delgado as one of the sponsors referred to her as "Señorita" or unmarried woman.
Josefa was the daughter of Felisa Delgado by one Lucio Ocampo with five other children
without the benefit of marriage. Felisa had another son by way of Ramon Osorio who is Luis
Delgado, one of the claimants in Josefa‘s estate. But, unlike her relationship with Lucio
Campo which was admittedly one without the benefit of marriage, the legal status of Ramon
Osorio’s and Felisa Delgado’s union is in dispute.
The question of whether Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio ever got married is crucial to the
claimants because if Ramon Osorio and Felisa Delgado had been validly married, then their
only child Luis Delgado was a legitimate half-blood brother of Josefa Delgado and therefore
excluded from the latter’s intestate estate. He and his heirs would be barred by the principle
of absolute separation between the legitimate and illegitimate families. Conversely, if the
couple were never married, Luis Delgado and his heirs would be entitled to inherit from
Josefa Delgado’s intestate estate, as they would all be within the illegitimate line.
Issue: Whether or not there was a valid marriage between Guillermo and Josefa and
between Felisa and Ramon.
Held:
The marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado
Rule 131, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions. — The following presumptions are satisfactory if
uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence: xxx xxx xxx
(aa) That a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into
a lawful contract of marriage;
In this case, several circumstances give rise to the presumption that a valid marriage existed
between Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado. Their cohabitation of more than 50 years
cannot be doubted. Their family and friends knew them to be married. Their reputed status
as husband and wife was such that even the original petition for letters of administration
filed by Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao in 1975 referred to them as "spouses."
Yet, petitioners maintain that Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia had simply lived together
as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. They make much of the absence of a
record of the contested marriage, the testimony of a witness attesting that they were not
married, and a baptismal certificate which referred to Josefa Delgado as "Señorita" or
unmarried woman.
We are not persuaded.
First, although a marriage contract is considered a primary evidence of marriage, its absence
is not always proof that no marriage in fact took place. Once the presumption of marriage
arises, other evidence may be presented in support thereof. The evidence need not
necessarily or directly establish the marriage but must at least be enough to strengthen the
presumption of marriage. Here, the certificate of identity issued to Josefa Delgado as Mrs.
Guillermo Rustia, the passport issued to her as Josefa D. Rustia, the declaration under oath of
no less than Guillermo Rustia that he was married to Josefa Delgado and the titles to the
properties in the name of "Guillermo Rustia married to Josefa Delgado," more than
adequately support the presumption of marriage. These are public documents which are
prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. No clear and convincing evidence sufficient
to overcome the presumption of the truth of the recitals therein was presented by
petitioners.
Second, Elisa vda. de Anson, petitioners’ own witness whose testimony they primarily relied
upon to support their position, confirmed that Guillermo Rustia had proposed marriage to
Josefa Delgado and that eventually, the two had "lived together as husband and wife." This
again could not but strengthen the presumption of marriage.
Third, the baptismal certificate was conclusive proof only of the baptism administered by the
priest who baptized the child. It was no proof of the veracity of the declarations and
statements contained therein, such as the alleged single or unmarried ("Señorita") civil status
of Josefa Delgado who had no hand in its preparation.
Petitioners failed to rebut the presumption of marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa
Delgado. In this jurisdiction, every intendment of the law leans toward legitimizing
matrimony. Persons dwelling together apparently in marriage are presumed to be in fact
married. This is the usual order of things in society and, if the parties are not what they hold
themselves out to be, they would be living in constant violation of the common rules of law
and propriety. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. Always presume marriage.
The marriage of Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio
Presumptions of law are either conclusive or disputable. Conclusive presumptions are
inferences which the law makes so peremptory that no contrary proof, no matter how
strong, may overturn them. On the other hand, disputable presumptions, one of which is the
presumption of marriage, can be relied on only in the absence of sufficient evidence to the
contrary.
Little was said of the cohabitation or alleged marriage of Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio.
The oppositors (now respondents) chose merely to rely on the disputable presumption of
marriage even in the face of such countervailing evidence as (1) the continued use by Felisa
and Luis (her son with Ramon Osorio) of the surname Delgado and (2) Luis Delgado’s and
Caridad Concepcion’s Partida de Casamiento identifying Luis as "hijo natural de Felisa
Delgado" (the natural child of Felisa Delgado).
All things considered, we rule that these factors sufficiently overcame the rebuttable
presumption of marriage. Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio were never married. (Dela Rosa
vs Heirs of Rustia Vda De Guzman, G.R. No. 155733, January 27, 2006).
MARTINEZ V. TAN 12 PHIL. 237

Facts
It is claimed by the plaintiff that what took place before the justice of the peace, even
admitting all that the witnesses for the defendant testified to, did not constitute a legal
marriage.Lower court ruled ruled in favor of the defendant Angel Tan that Tan and Martinez
were married on Sept. 25, 1907. Evidence supporting this were: document signed by plaintiff,
testimony of defendant that he and plaintiff appeared before the justice of peace along with
their witnesses (by Ballori and Esmero), testimony of Esmero that he, the defendant, plaintiff
and Ballori appeared before the justice of peace and signed the document, the testimony of
Ballori who also testified to the same effect, and the testimony of the bailiff of court that
defendant, appellant, justice of peace and two witnesses were all present during the
ceremony.

Issue
Whether or not the plaintiff and the defendant were married on the 25th day of September,
1907, before the justice of the peace

Held
The judgment of the court below acquitting the defendant of the complaint is affirmed.

The petition signed the plaintiff and defendant contained a positive statement that they had
mutually agreed to be married and they asked the justice of the peace to solemnize the
marriage. The document signed by the plaintiff, the defendant, and the justice of the peace,
stated that they ratified under oath, before the justice, the contents of the petition and that
witnesses of the marriage were produced. A mortgage took place as shown by the certificate
of the justice of the peace, signed by both contracting parties, which certificates gives rise to
the presumption that the officer authorized the marriage in due form, the parties before the
justice of the peace declaring that they took each other as husband and wife, unless the
contrary is proved, such presumption being corroborated in this case by the admission of the
woman to the effect that she had contracted the marriage certified to in the document
signed by her, which admission can only mean the parties mutually agreed to unite in
marriage when they appeared and signed the said document which so states before the
justice of the peace who authorized the same. It was proven that both the plaintiff and the
defendant were able to read and write the Spanish language, and that they knew the
contents of the document which they signed; and under the circumstances in this particular
case were satisfied, and so hold, that what took place before the justice of the peace on this
occasion amounted to a legal marriage.
FABIAN PUGEDA, vs.RAFAEL TRIAS,
Date: March 31, 1962
The case in a nutshell: Maria Ferrer was married twice: first to Mariano Trias, then to Fabian
Pugeda, whom she was married to until her death. She had children with both husbands.
After she died, Pugeda sought the partition of certain properties which he claimed he and
Ferrer had acquired during their message using conjugal funds. He claimed that after Ferrer’s
death, he and her children from both marriages became co-owners of such properties,
managing them in trust. He asked for ½ thereof as his share. The Trias children denied his
claim, questioning the existence of his marriage to Ferrer. The CFI ruled against them. On
appeal, the SC affirmed. The evidence submitted shows conclusively that Pugeda was in
fact married to Ferrer, said marriage subsisting until her death. Pugeda presented as his
witnesses the justice of the peace who officiated their wedding as well as others who
testified that he and Ferrer lived as husband and wife after the wedding. He also submitted
the birth and baptismal certificates of his first child with Ferrer, which named her and him as
the parents. Lastly, a document entitled “Project of Partition” signed by both the Trias and
Pugeda children which referred to Ferrer’s “second marriage” to Pugeda. All the evidence
submitted was competent to prove the marriage. Generally, no proof other than a certificate
of record in the civil registrar shall be admitted to prove the existence of a marriage. But if
such books have never been kept, or have disappeared, or the question arises in litigation,
the marriage may be proved by evidence of any kind.
Facts:
1 The defendants Rafael, Miguel, Soledad, Clara, Constancia and Gabriel, all surnamed Trias,
are the children of the deceased Maria C. Ferrer with her first husband, the deceased
Mariano Trias, while the defendants Teofilo and Virginia Pugeda are Maria’s children with her
second husband, Fabian Pugeda.
2 Ferrer and Pugeda were married in January 1916.
3 Ferrer died on February 11, 1934. Sometime after, Pugeda filed an action against the Trias
and Pugeda children in the CFI of Cavite for the partition of certain properties, which he
claimed he and Ferrer had acquired during their marriage using conjugal funds, with ½
thereof going to him as his share.
a The properties included varying interests in 5 lots 15 in the San Francisco de Malabon
estate in General Trias, Cavite, a house of strong materials, a barn (camarin) of strong
materials, a store of strong materials, and sets of household furniture.
b Pugeda alleged that upon Ferrer’s death in 1934, he and the Trias and Pugeda children
became co-owners of the properties, with the children managing the properties in trust as
co-owners.
4 The Trias children denied Pugeda’s claim to the properties, or that said properties had been
administered by them in trust as co-owners.
By way of special and affirmative defense, they alleged that they had inherited the properties
from their deceased father (Mariano Trias) and mother, and had been in possession and full
enjoyment thereof for more than 10 years, peacefully, uninterruptedly, quietly, and
adversely under a claim of ownership to the exclusion of all others, and that Pugeda is
estopped from claiming or asserting any rights or participation in the said properties.
b They also denied, for lack of knowledge and belief, Pugeda’s claim that he was married to
Ferrer up to her death in 1934.
c They filed a counterclaim against Pugeda for the sum of Php40,000, this amount being what
was contributed by them in support of the candidacies of Pugeda when running for the office
of provincial governor of Cavite.
d They also filed a counterclaim for 30 pieces of Spanish gold coins and Php5,000 in cash
amounting in value to the total sum of Php50,000, and another counterclaim for Php100,000,
which is the value of 4 big parcels of land belonging to the defendants which Pugeda had
appropriated for his own use. The Pugeda children joined in their father’s claim that the
properties were joint properties of him and the Trias children.
a They also alleged that the properties had gone to the management and control of the Trias
children, who should be required to answer for the fruits and profits thereof.
b As cross-claim against the Trias children, they alleged that they are each entitled to 1/8 of
the properties in Pugeda’s complaint, as well as a share of 1/8 each in 2 more lots in the San
Francisco de Malabon estate, a parcel of land in Silang, Cavite, and 60 heads of cattle. Pugeda
denied the Trias children’s counterclaim. The Trias children answered the Pugeda children’s
cross-claim by denying the allegations contained in the answer of the Pugeda children, and
further alleged that the cross-claim is improper as the same should be the subject of probate
proceedings.
a They alleged that the Pugeda children estopped and barred by prescription from claiming
any further right to the properties left by their deceased mother.
The CFI ruled against the Trias children, so they appealed to the SC.
Issue: Were Pugeda and Ferrer married? YES. (Note: the case discussed other issues, but I
only included the one relevant to the topic in the syllabus.)
Held: FOR ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the plaintiff's complaint is hereby
dismissed, and the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cavite, Hon. Antonio C. Lucero,
presiding, decreeing the division of the properties of the deceased Maria C. Ferrer among her
eight children and plaintiff, is hereby modified in the sense that all of her properties be
divided among her eight children at the rate of one-eight per child. As thus modified, the
judgment of Judge Lucero is hereby affirmed. Without costs.
Ratio:
1) The evidence submitted shows conclusively that Pugeda was in fact married to Ferrer, said
marriage subsisting from 1916 until 1934, upon the death of the latter.
a. Pugeda and his witness Ricardo Ricafrente testified that on the afternoon of January 5,
1916, Pugeda and Ferrer went to the office of Ricafrente, who was then Justice of the Peace,
to ask the latter to marry them.
i. Accordingly, Ricafrente celebrated the marriage in the presence of 2 witnesses. After the
ceremony, Ricafrente asked the parties to sign 2 copies of a marriage contract, after which
he delivered 1 copy to Pugeda and Ferrer and another to the President of the Sanitary
Division, who was then the keeper of the records of the civil register.
ii. Pugeda and his witnesses explained that no celebration of the marriage was held in spite
of his and Ferrer’s prominence, because he was then busy campaigning for the office of
Member of the Provincial Board, while Ferrer was already pregnant.
b. The Trias children denied the existence of the marriage by introducing a photostatic copy
of the record of marriages in the municipality of Rosario, Cavite, in the month of January
1916, which showed no record of the alleged marriage.
i. However, this absence was explained by the Justice of the Peace, that perhaps the
person who kept the register forgot to make an entry of the marriage in the registry.
c. Pugeda also submitted the ff.:
i. He introduced other witnesses who testified that after getting married, he lived in
Ferrer’s house.

ii. He submitted evidence to show that his and Ferrer’s first child was baptized on August
26, 1917, with Ferrer’s sister-in-law acting as sponsor. The baptismal certificate stated
that the baptized child was the child of Pugeda and Ferrer.
iii. He submitted the birth certificate of his and Ferrer’s first child, which states that his
father was Pugeda and his mother was Ferrer.
d. The Trias children did not deny that after the marriage, Pugeda cohabited with Ferrer,
publicly and openly, as husband and wife, for 18 years (1916-1934).
e. A document entitled “Project of Partition,” signed by the Trias and Pugeda children,
contains the following significant statement or admission:

WHEREAS the parties hereto are the only children and forced heirs of
the said deceased: Rafael, Miguel, Soledad, Clara, Constancia, and Gabriel, all surnamed Trias
y Ferrer, are the children of her first marriage with Mariano Trias, now deceased; and Teofilo
and Virginia, both surnamed Pugeda y Ferrer, are the children of her second marriage with
Fabian Pugeda..
f.
The SC agreed with the CFI’s finding that the evidence submitted was competent to prove
themarriage.
i. Art. 53 of the Civil Code provides the general rule for proving the existence of a marriage:
ii.Art. 53. — As to marriages contracted subsequently, no proof other than a certificate of the
record in the civil register shall be admitted, unless such books have never been kept, or have
disappeared, or the question arises in litigation, in which cases the marriage may be proved
by evidence of any kind.
1. Failure to send a copy of the marriage certificate to the municipal secretary does
not invalidate a marriage, as long as in the celebration thereof all requisites for its
validity were present, the forwarding of a copy of the marriage certificate not
being one of said requisites. (Madridejo v. De Leon)
2. Testimony by one of the parties to the marriage, or by one of the witnesses to the
marriage, has been held to be admissible to prove the fact of marriage. The
person who officiated at the solemnization is also competent to testify as an
eyewitness to the fact of marriage. (C.J.S.)
Republic vs. CA and Castro
GR No. 103047, September 12, 1994

FACTS:

Angelina Castro, with her parents unaware, contracted a civil marriage with Edwin Cardenas.
They did not immediately live together and it was only upon Castro found out that she was
pregnant that they decided to live together wherein the said cohabitation lasted for only 4
months. Thereafter, they parted ways and Castro gave birth that was adopted by her
brother with the consent of Cardenas.

The baby was brought in the US and in Castro’s earnest desire to follow her daughter wanted
to put in order her marital status before leaving for US. She filed a petition seeking a
declaration for the nullity of her marriage. Her lawyer then found out that there was no
marriage license issued prior to the celebration of their marriage proven by the certification
issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the documentary and testimonial evidence resorted to by Castro is sufficient
to establish that no marriage license was issued to the parties prior to the solemnization of
their marriage.

HELD:

The court affirmed the decision of CA that the certification issued by the Civil Registrar
unaccompanied by any circumstances of suspicion sufficiently prove that the office did not
issue a marriage license to the contracting parties. Albeit the fact that the testimony of
Castro is not supported by any other witnesses is not a ground to deny her petition because
of the peculiar circumstances of her case. Furthermore, Cardenas was duly served with
notice of the proceedings, which he chose to ignore.

Under the circumstances of the case, the documentary and testimonial evidence presented
by private respondent Castro sufficiently established the absence of the subject marriage
license.
VERONICO TENEBRO, petitioner, v. validity of marriage were satisfied by petitioner and Ancajas. Both were over eighteen years
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondent. of age, and they voluntarily contracted the second marriage with the required license before
G.R. No. 150758. February 18, 2004. Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, in the presence of at least
two witnesses. The decision of the Court of Appeals convicting petitioner Veronico Tenebro
Facts: of the crime of Bigamy is AFFIRMED.

Petitioner Veronico Tenebro contracted marriage with private complainant Leticia Ancajas on
April 10, 1990. The two were wed by Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of
Lapu-lapu City. Tenebro and Ancajas lived together continuously and without interruption
until the latter part of 1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been previously
married to a certain Hilda Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Tenebro showed Ancajas a
photocopy of a marriage contract between him and Villareyes. Invoking this previous
marriage, petitioner thereafter left the conjugal dwelling which he shared with Ancajas,
stating that he was going to cohabit with Villareyes.

On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage, this one with a certain
Nilda Villegas, before Judge German Lee, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch
15. When Ancajas learned of this third marriage, she verified from Villareyes whether the
latter was indeed married to petitioner. In a handwritten letter, Villareyes confirmed that
petitioner, Veronico Tenebro, was indeed her husband.

Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner.

The trial court rendered a decision finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of bigamy. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.

Issue:

Whether or not the court erred in convicting the accused for the crime of bigamy despite
clear proof that the marriage between the accused and private complainant had been
declared null and void ab initio and without legal force and effect

Ruling:

As such, an individual who contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence
of a valid marriage is criminally liable for bigamy, notwithstanding the subsequent
declaration that the second marriage is void ab initio on the ground of psychological
incapacity.

As a second or subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of petitioner’s valid

marriage to Villareyes, petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab initio
completely regardless of petitioner’s psychological capacity or incapacity. Since a marriage
contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this
second marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy.

Thus, as soon as the second marriage to Ancajas was celebrated on April 10, 1990, during the
subsistence of the valid first marriage, the crime of bigamy had already been consummated.
Moreover, the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity is not an indicator that petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas lacks the
essential requisites for validity. In this case, all the essential and formal requisites for the