1.Cayetano vs.

Monsod
G.R. No. 100113, September 3, 1991
]
I. Facts:
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of Chairman of the
COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991.
Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having
been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed
the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same
day, he assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC. Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission
on Appointments of Monsod's nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and
Prohibition praying that said confirmation and consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on
Elections be declared null and void.

II. Issue:
Whether the appointment of Chairman Monsod of Comelec violates Section 1 (1), Article IX-C of the 1987
Constitution?

III. Held:

The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C, that there shall be a Commission on Elections
composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of
their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates for
any elective position in the immediately preceding elections. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall
be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. Atty. Christian
Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86-55%. He
has been dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been
paying his professional license fees as lawyer for more than ten years. At this point, it might be helpful to define private
practice. The term, as commonly understood, means "an individual or organization engaged in the business of
delivering legal services." (Ibid.). Lawyers who practice alone are often called "sole practitioners." Groups of lawyers are
called "firms." The firm is usually a partnership and members of the firm are the partners. Some firms may be organized
as professional corporations and the members called shareholders.
In either case, the members of the firm are the experienced attorneys. In most firms, there are younger or more
inexperienced salaried attorneys called "associates." Hence, the Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling
the public hearings on Monsod's
confirmation,implicitlydetermined that he possessed the necessary qualifications as required by law. The judgment re
ndered by the Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference except only
upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1
Constitution). Thus, only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the
Commission's judgment.
In the instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court's corrective power, since no abuse, much less
a grave abuse of discretion, that would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of the
writs prayed, for has been clearly shown. Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, the Court
said that, Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in which it is vested
according to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee should possess the qualifications
required by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified
who should have been preferred. This is a political question involving considerations of wisdom which only
the appointing authority can decide.

2.People vs. Maceda

G.R. Nos. 89591-96. January 24, 2000

I. Facts:
On September 8, 1999, the RTC denied the Peoples motion seeking reconsideration for its August 13, 1990’s
decision. In said resolution, the RTC held that respondent Judge Maceda committed no grave abuse of discretion in
issuing the order of August 8, 1989 giving custody over private respondent Avelino T. Javellana to the Clerk of Court of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, San Jose, Antique, Atty. Deogracias del Rosario, during the pendency of Criminal
Cases Nos. 3350-3355. At that time, sufficient reason was shown why private respondent Javellana should not be
detained at the Antique Provincial Jail. The trial courts order specifically provided for private respondents detention at
the residence of Atty. del Rosario. However, private respondent was not to be allowed liberty to roam around but was to
be held as detention prisoner in said residence.
The order of the trial court was not strictly complied with because private respondent was not detained in the
residence of Atty. Del Rosario. He went about his normal activities as if he were a free man, including engaging in the
practice of law.
On April 7, 1997, Senior State Prosecutor Guingoyon filed with the Supreme Court a motion seeking clarification.
After the RTC’s decision, Atty. Javellana filed a motion to the SC, hence this petition.
II. Issue/s:
Since it appears that Atty. (now Judge) del Rosario never really held and detained Atty. Javellana as prisoner in his
residence, is not Atty. Javellana considered an escapee or a fugitive of justice for which warrant for his arrest should
forthwith be issued?

III. Held:

RTC’s Decision:

The RTC denied the motion for reconsideration on September 8, 1999, the trial court resumed hearing Criminal
Cases Nos. 3350-3355. Earlier, on August 2, 1999, Rolando Mijares filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, San
Jose, Antique, a motion seeking the revocation of the trial courts custody order and the imprisonment of private
respondent Javellana in the provincial jail.
SC’s Decision:
Private respondent Javellana has been arrested based on the filing of criminal cases against him. By such arrest, he
is deemed to be under the custody of the law.
Regarding his continued practice of law, as a detention prisoner private respondent Javellana is not allowed to
practice his profession as a necessary consequence of his status as a detention prisoner.
As a matter of law, when a person indicted for an offense is arrested, he is deemed placed under the custody of the
law. He is placed in actual restraint of liberty in jail so that he may be bound to answer for the commission of the offense.
He must be detained in jail during the pendency of the case against him, unless he is authorized by the court to be
released on bail or on recognizance. Let it be stressed that all prisoners whether under preventive detention or serving
final sentence can not practice their profession nor engage in any business or occupation, or hold office, elective or
appointive, while in detention. This is a necessary consequence of arrest and detention. Consequently, all the accused
in Criminal Cases Nos. 3350-3355 must be confined in the Provincial Jail of Antique.
Considering that the pendency of Criminal Cases Nos. 3350-3355 has dragged on for more than ten (10) years, the
presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, San Jose, Antique, is ordered to continue with the trial of said
criminal cases with all deliberate dispatch and to avoid further delay.
Wherefore, the August 8, 1989 order of the trial court is hereby SET ASIDE. All accused in Criminal Cases Nos.
3350-3355, including Javellana and Pacificador are ordered detained at the Provincial Jail of Antique, San Jose,
Antique, effective immediately, and shall not be allowed to go out of the jail for any reason or guise, except upon prior
written permission of the trial court for a lawful purpose.

3,Office of the Court Administrator vs Atty. Misael M. Ladaga

A.M. No. P-99-1287, January 26, 2001

I. Facts:
Atty. Misael Ladaga, Branch Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, appeared as counsel for and in
behalf of his cousin, Narcisa Naldoza Ladaga, an accused in Criminal Case No. 84-885 for “Falsification of Public
Documents” before the METC of Quezon City. It is also denied that the appearance of said respondent in said case was
without the previous permission of the Court. During the occasions that the respondent appeared as such counsel
before the METC of Quezon City, he was on official leave of absence. Moreover, his Presiding Judge, Judge Napoleon
Inoturan was aware of the case he was handling. Respondent appeared as pro bono counsel for his cousin-client
Narcisa Ladaga. Respondent did not receive a single centavo from her. Helpless as she was andrespondent being the
only lawyer in the family, he agreed to represent her out of his compassion and high regard for her.
 This is the first time that respondent ever handled a case for a member of his family who is like a bigsister to him. He
appeared for free and for the purpose of settling the case amicably. Furthermore, his Presiding Judge was aware of his
appearance as counsel for his cousin. On top of this, during all the years that he has been in government service, he has
maintained his integrity and independence. He failed to obtain a prior permission from the head of the Department. The
presiding judge of the court to which respondent is assigned is not the head of the Department contemplated by law.

II. Issue:
WON Atty. Ladaga, upon such several appearances, was engages into private practice?

III. Held:
Respondent is charged under Sec. 7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees which prohibits civil servants from engaging in the private practice of their profession. A similar prohibition is
found under Sec. 35, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court which disallows certain attorneys from engaging in the
private practice of their profession. THERE WAS NO PRIVATE PRACTICE: In People vs. Villanueva: Practice is more
than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In
other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State vs. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, N.S. 768).
Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one’s
self out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S. E. 522, 98 N. C. 644,
647). The appearance as counsel on one occasion, is not conclusive as determinative of engagement in the private
practiceof law. Based on the foregoing, it is evident that the isolated instances when respondent appeared as pro bono
counsel of his cousin in Criminal Case No. 84885 does not constitute the “private practice” of the law profession
contemplated by law.

4.Bar Matter No. 914, October 1, 1999

Re: Application for Admission to the Philippine Bar
vs.
Vicente D. Ching, petitioner

I. Facts:

Vicente D. Ching, a legitimate child of a Filipino mother and an alien Chinese father, was born on April 11, 1964 in
Tubao La Union, under the 1935 Constitution. He has resided in the Philippines. He completed his Bachelor of Laws at SLU
in Baguio on July 1998, filed an application to take the 1998 Bar Examination.

The Resolution in this Court, he was allowed to take the bar if he submit to the Court the following documents as
proof of his Philippine Citizenship:
1. Certification issued by the PRC Board of Accountancy that Ching is a certified accountant;
2. Voter Certification issued COMELEC in Tubao La Union showing that Ching is a registered voter of his place; and
3. Certification showing that Ching was elected as member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Tubao, La Union

On April 5, 1999, Ching was one of the bar passers. The oath taking ceremony was scheduled on May 5, 1999.

Because of his questionable status of Ching's citizenship, he was not allowed to take oath.He was required to
submit further proof of his citizenship.The Office of the Solicitor General was required to file a comment on Ching's petition
for admission to the Philippine Bar.
In his report:

1. Ching, under the 1935 Constitution, was a Chinese citizen and continue to be so, unless upon reaching the age of
majority he elected Philippine citizenship, under the compliance with the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 265 "an act
providing for the manner in which the option to elect Philippine citizenship shall be declared by a person whose mother is a
Filipino citizen"
2. He pointed out the Ching has not formally elected Philippine citizenship, and if ever he does, it would already be beyond
the "reasonable time" allowed by the present jurisprudence.

IV. Issue:

Whether or not he has elected Philippine citizenship within "a reasonable time".

III. Rulings:
 1. No. Ching, despite the special circumstances, failed to elect Philippine citizenship within a reasonable
time. The reasonable time means that the election should be made within 3 years from "upon reaching the age of
majority", which is 21 years old. Instead, he elected Philippine citizenship 14 years after reaching the age of majority
which the court considered not within the reasonable time. Ching offered no reason why he delayed his election of
Philippine citizenship, as procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is not a tedious and painstaking process. All
that is required is an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and file the same with the nearest civil registry.

5.IN THE MATTER OF THE DISQUALIFICATION OF BAR EXAMINEE HARON S. MELING IN THE 2002 BAR
EXAMINATIONS AND FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AS MEMBER OF THE PHILIPPINE SHARI’A BAR,ATTY.
FROILAN R. MELENDREZ, petitioner,
B.M. No. 1154. June 8, 2004
I. Facts:
On October 14, 2002, Atty. Froilan R. Melendrez (Melendrez) filed with the Office of the Bar Confidant
(OBC) a Petition to disqualify Haron S. Meling (Meling) from taking the 2002 Bar Examinations and to impose on
him the appropriate disciplinary penalty as a member of the Philippine Shari’a Bar.In the Petition, Melendrez alleges
that Meling did not disclose in his Petition to take the 2002 Bar Examinations that he has three (3) pending criminal
cases before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Cotabato City, namely: Criminal Cases Noa. 15685 and
15686, both for Grave Oral Defamation, and Criminal Case No. 15687 for Less Serious Physical Injuries.
The above-mentioned cases arose from an incident which occurred on May 21, 2001, when Meling
allegedly uttered defamatory words against Melendrez and his wife in front of media practitioners and other
people. Meling also purportedly attacked and hit the face of Melendrez’ wife causing the injuries to the
latter.Furthermore, Melendrez alleges that Meling has been using the title “Attorney” in his communications, as
Secretary to the Mayor of Cotabato City, despite the fact that he is not a member of the Bar. Attached to the Petition
is an indorsement letter which shows that Meling used the appellation and appears on its face to have been
received by the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cotabato City on November 27, 2001.
Pursuant to this Court’s Resolution dated December 3, 2002, Meling filed his Answer with the OBC.In his
Answer, Meling explains that he did not disclose the criminal cases filed against him by Melendrez because retired
Judge Corocoy Moson, their former professor, advised him to settle his misunderstanding with
Melendrez. Believing in good faith that the case would be settled because the said Judge has moral ascendancy
over them, he being their former professor in the College of Law, Meling considered the three cases that actually
arose from a single incident and involving the same parties as “closed and terminated.” Moreover, Meling denies
the charges and adds that the acts complained of do not involve moral turpitude.
II. Issue:
WON the imposition of appropriate sanctions upon Haron S. Meling is proper and shall subsequently barred him
from taking his lawyer’s oath and signing on the Roll of Attorneys
III. Held:
The Petition is GRANTED insofar as it seeks the imposition of appropriate sanctions upon Haron S. Meling as a
member of the Philippine Shari’a Bar. Accordingly, the membership of Haron S. Meling in the Philippine Shari’a Bar is
hereby SUSPENDED until further orders from the Court, the suspension to take effect immediately. Insofar as the
Petition seeks to prevent Haron S. Meling from taking the Lawyer’s Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys as a member
of the Philippine Bar, the same is DISMISSED for having become moot and academic.
Rationale:
Practice of law, whether under the regular or the Shari’a Court, is not a matter of right but merely a privilege
bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in the law but who are also known to possess good moral
character. The requirement of good moral character is not only a condition precedent to admission to the practice of
law, its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law.The disclosure requirement is
imposed by the Court to determine whether there is satisfactory evidence of good moral character of the applicant. The
nature of whatever cases are pending against the applicant would aid the Court in determining whether he is endowed
with the moral fitness demanded of a lawyer.

6.Alawi vs. Alauya

AM No. SDC-97-2-P, Feb. 4, 1997

I. Facts:
 Sophia Alawi was a sales representative of E.B. Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd. of Davao City, a real estate and
housing company. Ashari M. Alauya is the incumbent executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Shari’a District in
Marawi City, They were classmates, and used to be friends.

Through Alawi’s agency, a contract was executed for the purchase on installments by Alauya of one of the
housing units of Villarosa. In connection, a housing loan was also granted to Alauya by the National Home Mortgage
Finance Corporation (NHMFC).

Not long afterwards, Alauya addressed a letter to the President of Villarosa & Co. advising of the termination of
his contract with the company. He claimed that his consent was vitiated because Alawi had resorted to gross
misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence. He laso wrote similar letters to the Vice President
of Villarosa and the Vice President of NHMFC.

On learning of Alauya’s letters, Alawi filed an administrative complaint against him. One of her grounds was
Alauya’s usurpation of the title of “attorney,” which only regular members of the Philippine Bar may properly use.

Alauya justified his use of the title, “attorney,” by the assertion that it is “lexically synonymous” with
“Counsellors-at-law.” a title to which Shari’a lawyers have a rightful claim, adding that he prefers the title of “attorney”
because “counsellor” is often mistaken for “councilor,” “konsehal” or the Maranao term “consial,” connoting a local
legislator beholden to the mayor. Withal, he does not consider himself a lawyer.

II. Issue:

Whether or not Alauya, a member of the Shari’a bar, can use the title of Attorney

III. Held:

He can’t. The title is only reserved to those who pass the regular Philippine bar.

As regards Alauya’s use of the title of “Attorney,” this Court has already had occasion to declare that persons
who pass the Shari’a Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar, hence may only practice law before Shari’a
courts. While one who has been admitted to the Shari’a Bar, and one who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may
both be considered “counsellors,” in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the latter
is an “attorney.” The title of “attorney” is reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law
and successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain
members thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction.
 7.EMILIO GRANDE VS ATTY. EVANGELINE DE SILVA

I. FACTS

A. Factual Antecedent

Emilio Grande, the complainant in this case, is the private offended party in Criminal Cases Nos. 96-1346 to 96-1353,
People of the Philippines vs Sergio Natividad filed before RTC-Branch 273 Marikina City for Estafa and Violation of BP Blg
22.
During the proceedings of the cases in the preceding paragraph, Atty. Evangeline de Silva, respondent in the case at
bar, tendered to Emilio Grande check no. 0023638 in the amount of P144,768.00, drawn against her account with the
Philippine National Bank, as settlement. Emilio Grande refused to accept the check. Atty. de Silva assured him that the
same will be paid upon its presentment. She manifested that as a lawyer, she would not issue a check which is not
sufficiently funded. Thus, respondent was prevailed upon by Emilio Grande to accept the check.
Consequently, Emilio Grande desisted from prosecuting the cases thus, said criminal cases were dismissed. Accused
Sergio Natividad was then released. Upon deposit of the check, the same was returned unpaid by the drawee bank for the
reason that the account is closed. Emilio Grande then wrote a letter to Atty. de Silva demanding that she pay the face value
of the check. His demand was ignored by Atty. de Silva. This prompted Emilio Grande to institute a criminal complaint
against Atty. de Silva for Estafa and Violation of BP Blg 22 with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Marikina. The City
Prosecutor of Marikina filed the necessary Information for Violation of BP Blg 22 against Atty. de Silva.
Emilio Grande filed the instant administrative complaint for disbarment of respondent for deceit and violation of the
Lawyer’s Oath.
On February 2, 1998, a Resolution was sent to respondent requiring her to comment on the complaint within ten (10)
days from notice. The same was returned unserved with the notation: “Moved”.
On June 20, 2001, another Resolution requiring respondent to comment on the administrative complaint filed against
her was served. This was again returned unserved with the notation: “Refused”. Thus, the case was referred to the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) for investigation, report and recommendation.
B. Recommendation of IBP Commission on Bar Discipline
Investigating Commissioner Florimond C. Rous found respondent Atty. de Silva guilty of deceit, gross misconduct and
violation of the Lawyer’s Oath in a Report dated December 6, 2001. Thus, he recommended that respondent be suspended
from the practice of law for two (2) years.
C. Recommendation of IBP Board of Governors
On October 19, 2002, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution NO. XV-2002-554 which adopted the
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two (2)
years.

II. ISSUE
Whether or not Atty. de Silva should be suspended.

III. RULING
The office of an Attorney’s nature requires that a lawyer shall be a person of good moral character. Gross misconduct
which puts the lawyer’s moral character in serious doubt may render her unfit to continue in the practice of law. A lawyer
may be disciplined for evading payment of a debt validly incurred. The loss of moral character of a lawyer for any reason
whatsoever shall warrant her suspension or disbarment.

Any wrongdoing which indicates moral unfitness for the profession, whether it be professional or non-professional
justifies disciplinary action. For a lawyer’s professional and personal conduct must at all times be kept beyond reproach
and above suspicion.

Her deliberate refusal to accept the notices served on her stains the nobility of the profession. How else would a
lawyer endeavor to serve justice and uphold the law when she disdains to follow simple directives? Canon 1 expressly
states that: “A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for legal processes.”

8.RE: PETITION OF AL ARGOSINO TO TAKE THE LAWYER’S OATH

I. FACTS
A. Factual Antecedent
This is a matter for admission to the bar and oath taking of a successful bar applicant. Petitioner Al Caparros Argosino
passed the bar examinations held in 1993. The Court however deferred his oath-taking due to his previous conviction for
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide.
 Argosino was previously involved with hazing that caused the death of Raul Camaligan but was sentenced with
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide after he pleaded guilty. He was sentenced with two (2) years imprisonment
where he applied for a probation thereafter which was granted by the Court with a two (2) year probation. He took the Bar
Exam and passed but was not allowed to take oath. He filed a petition to allow him to take the attorney’s oath of office
averring that his probation was already terminated. The Court notes that he spent only ten (10) months of the probation
period before it was terminated.

B. Resolution of the Court

The Court issued a Resolution requiring petitioner Al C. Argosino to submit to the Court evidence that he may ow be
regarded as complying with the requirement of good moral character imposed upon those seeking admission to the bar.
The Court required Atty. Gilbert Camaligan, father of Raul to comment on petitioner’s prayer to be allowed to take the
lawyer’s oath.
In his comment, Atty. Camaligan states that:
B. He still believes that the infliction of severe physical injuries which led to the death of his son was deliberate
rather than accidental. The offense therefore was not only homicide but murder since the accused took
advantage of the neophyte's helplessness implying abuse of confidence, taking advantage of superior
strength and treachery.
C. xxx
D. As a Christian, he has forgiven petitioner and his co-accused for the death of his son. However, as a loving
father who had lost a son whom he had hoped would succeed him in his law practice, he still feels the pain of
an untimely demise and the stigma of the gruesome manner of his death.
E. He is not in a position to say whether petitioner is now morally fit for admission to the bar. He therefore
submits the matter to the sound discretion of the Court.
F. xxx
II. ISSUE
Whether or not Argosino may take oath of office.

III. RULING
The Court understands and shares the sentiment of Atty. Gilbert Camaligan. The death of one’s child is, for a parent, a
most traumatic experience. The suffering becomes even more pronounced and profound in cases where the death is due
to causes other than natural or accidental but due to the reckless imprudence of third parties. Atty. Camaligan’s statement
before the Court manifesting his having forgiven the accused is no less than praiseworthy and commendable. it is
exceptional for a parent, given the circumstances in these cases, to find room for forgiveness. However, Atty. Camaligan
admits that he is still not in a position to state if petitioner is now morally fit to be a lawyer.
After a very careful evaluation of this case, we resolve to allow petitioner Al Caparros Argosino to take the lawyer’s
oath, sign the Roll of Attorneys and practice the legal profession with the following admonition:
In allowing Mr. Argosino to take the lawyer’s oath, the Court recognizes that Mr. Argosino is not inherently bad moral
fiber. On the contrary, the various certifications show that he is a devout Catholic with a genuine concern for civic duties
and public service.
The Court is persuaded that Mr. Argosino has exerted all efforts to atone for the death of Raul Camaligan. The Court
stresses to Mr. Argosino that the lawyer’s oath is not a mere ceremony or formality for practicing law. Every lawyer should
at all times weigh his actions according tot he sworn promises he makes when taking the lawyer’s oath. If all lawyers
conducted themselves strictly according to the lawyer’s oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility, the
administration of justice will undoubtedly be faster, fairer and easier for everyone concerned.

9.REMEDIOS RAMIREZ VS ATTY. LAURO L. TAPUCAR

I. FACTS
A.Facts
In a letter-complaint dated November 22, 1993, complainant Remedios Ramirez Tapucar sought the disbarment of her
husband, Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar, on the ground of continuing grossly immoral conduct for cohabiting with a certain Elena
Pena under scandalous circumstances.
Prior to this complaint, respondent was already administratively charged four (4) times for conduct unbecoming an
officer of the Court. In AM No. 1740, resolved on April 11, 1980, respondent, at that time the Judge of Butuan City, was
meted the penalty of six (6) months suspension without pay, while in AM Nos. 1720, 1911 and 2300-CFI, which were
consolidated, this Court on January 31, 1981 ordered the separation from service of respondent.

B. Recommendation of the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline

Consistent with Section 20, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, the matter was referred to the Commission on Bar
Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation. After conducting a
thorough investigation, the Commission through Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez recommended that respondent be
disbarred, and his name be stricken off the roll of attorneys. Mainly, this was premised on the ground that, notwithstanding
sanctions previously imposed upon him by the Honorable Supreme Court, respondent continued the illicit liaison with
Elena.
In his report Commissioner Fernandez noted that, instead of contradicting the charges against him, respondent
displayed arrogance, and even made a mockery of the law and the Court, as when he said:
I have been ordered suspended by Supreme Court for two months without pay in 1980 for having a mistress, the same girl
Ms. Elena (Helen) Pea, now my wife. Being ordered separated in later administrative case constitute double jeopardy. If
now disbarred for marrying Ms. Elena Pea will constitute triple jeopardy. If thats the law so be it.
C. Recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation
of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-titled case, herein made part of the Resolution/Decision as Annex A; and,
finding the recommendation therein to be fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules,
Respondent Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar is hereby DISBARRED and that his name be stricken off the roll of attorneys.
We find the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner Fernandez, as approved and adopted by the Board of
Governors of IBP, more than sufficient to justify and support the foregoing Resolution, herein considered as the
recommendation to this Court by said Board pursuant to Rule 139-B, Sec. 12(b), of the Rules of Court. We are in
agreement that respondents actuations merit the penalty of disbarment.

II. ISSUE
Whether or not respondent violated Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

III. RULING
Yes. The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that:
Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Rule 7.03. A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he,
whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
A lawyer us expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession by faithfully performing his
duties to society, to the bar, to the Courts and to his clients. Exacted from him, as a member of the profession charged with
the responsibility to stand as a shield in the defense of what is right, are such positive qualities of decency, truthfulness and
responsibility that have been compendiously described as “moral character.” To achieve such end, every lawyer needs to
strive at all times to honor and maintain the dignity of his profession, and thus improve not only the public regard for the Bar
but also the administration of justice.
10. Maelotesia Garrido vs Atty. Angel E. Garrido and Atty. Romana P.Valencia
A.C.No.6593

I. Facts:
Maelotisea Garrido filed a disbarment case against Atty. Angel Garrido and Atty.Romana Valencia before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines Committee on Discipline charging them with gross immorality.
By way of defense Atty. Angel Garrido denied that Maelotesia Garrido is his legal wife, as he was already married to a
certain Constancia David when he married the complainant. Further, Atty. Garrido emphasized that all his marriages were
contracted before he was admitted to the bar.
On her counter-affidavit Atty. Valencia contended that she never was a mistress of Atty. Garrido since the former’s
marriage to the complainant is void ab initio due to the then existing marriage of Atty. GArrido to a certain Constancia
David. Therefore, the complainant had no cause of action against her.
In the course of the hearings, the parties filed the following motions before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline:
(1) The respondents filed a Motion for Suspension of Proceedings in view of the criminal complaint for concubinage
Maelotisea filed against them, and the Petition for Declaration of Nullity(of marriage) Atty. Garrido filed to nullify his
marriage to Maelotisea. The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline denied this motion for lack of merit.
(2) The respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaints after the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City declared the
marriage between Atty. Garrido and Maelotisea an absolute nullity. Since Maelotisea was never the legal wife of
Atty. Garrido, the respondents argued that she had no personality to file her complaints against them. The
respondents also alleged that they had not committed any immoral act since they married when Atty. Garrido was
already a widower, and the acts complained of were committed before his admission to the bar. The IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline also denied this motion.
(3) Maelotisea filed a motion for the dismissal of the complaints she filed against the respondents, arguing that she
wanted to maintain friendly relations with Atty. Garrido, who is the father of her six (6) children. The IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline likewise denied this motion
Atty. Garrido moved to reconsider this resolution, but the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline denied his motion
under Resolution No. XVII-2007-038 dated January 18, 2007. Hence, seeking relief with the Supreme Court through
the present petition for review.
II. ISSUE/S:
 Whether or not Atty. Garrido and Atty.Valencia’s action constitutes violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility
and thus a good enough cause for their disbarment, despite the offense was being committed when they were not yet
lawyers.
III. SUPREME COURT RULING:
Yes. Membership of the Bar is a privilege, and as a privilege it can be withdrawn where circumstances show the
lawyer’s lack of essential qualifications required of lawyers, be it academic or moral.
In this present case, the Supreme Court resolved to withdraw this privilege from Atty. Garrido and Atty. Valencia
respectively. The contention of the respondent that they got married when they were not yet lawyers will not afford them
exemptions from sanctions: good moral character was already a condition required precedent to the admission to the bar.
As a lawyer, both the respondents were shouldered with the expectation to uphold the Constitution and obey the laws of
the land and set as an example to others to do the same. When they violated the law and distorted it to cater to his own
personal needs and selfish motives, not only did their actions discredit the legal profession. Such actions by themselves,
without even including the fact of Garrido’s abandonment of paternal responsibility, to the detriment of his children by the
petitioner; or the fact that Valencia married Garrido despite knowing of his other marriages to two other women including
the petitioner, are clear indications of a lack of moral values not consistent with the proper conduct of practicing lawyers
within the country. As, such their disbarment is affirmed.