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G.R. No. 189466 February 11, 2010
DARYL GRACE J. ABAYON vs. THE HONORABLE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, PERFECTO C. LUCABAN,
JR., RONYL S. DE LA CRUZ and AGUSTIN C. DOROGA
G.R. No. 189506
CONGRESSMAN JOVITO S. PALPARAN, JR. vs. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (HRET), DR. REYNALDO
LESACA, JR., CRISTINA PALABAY, RENATO M. REYES, JR., ERLINDA
CADAPAN, ANTONIO FLORES and JOSELITO USTAREZ
Facts:
G.R. 189466,
 Petitioner Daryl Grace J. Abayon is the first nominee of the Aangat Tayo
party-list organization that won a seat in the House of Representatives
during the 2007 elections.
 Respondents Perfecto C. Lucaban, et.al, all registered voters, filed a
petition for quo warranto with respondent HRET. They claimed that
Aangat Tayo was not eligible for a party-list seat in the House of
Representatives, since it did not represent the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors and that Abayon she did not belong to the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, she being the wife of an
incumbent congressional district representative.
 Finally, petitioner Abayon pointed out that respondent HRET had no
jurisdiction over the petition for quo warranto as it is a matter that fell
within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC. All questions involving her
eligibility as first nominee, said Abayon, were internal concerns of
Aangat Tayo.
 HRET dismissed the petition as against Aangat Tayo but upholding its
jurisdiction over the qualifications of petitioner Abayon.
G.R. 189506
 Petitioner Jovito S. Palparan, Jr. is the first nominee of the Bantay party-
list group that won a seat in the 2007 elections for the members of the
House of Representatives. Respondents Reynaldo Lesaca, Jr., Cristina
Palabay, Renato M. Reyes, Jr., Erlinda Cadapan, Antonio Flores, and
Joselito Ustarez are members of some other party-list groups.
 Shortly after the elections, respondent filed with HRET a petition for
quo warranto against Bantay and its nominee, petitioner Palparan, in
HRET. Lesaca and the others alleged that Palparan was ineligible to sit
in the House of Representatives as party-list nominee because he did
not belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors that
Bantay represented, namely, the victims of communist rebels, Civilian
Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGUs), former rebels, and
security guards.
 HRET dismissed the petition against Bantay for the reason that the
issue of the ineligibility or qualification of the party-list group fell
within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC pursuant to the Party-List
System Act. HRET, however, defended its jurisdiction over the question
of petitioner Palparan’s qualifications.
Since the two cases raise a common issue, the Court has caused their
consolidation.
Issue: WON respondent HRET has jurisdiction over the question of
qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan as nominees of Aangat
Tayo and Bantay party-list organizations, respectively, who took the seats
at the House of Representatives that such organizations won in the 2007
elections?
Held: Yes
 Once elected, both the district representatives and the party-list
representatives are treated in like manner..
 Petitioners Abayon and Palparan of course point out that the authority
to determine the qualifications of a party-list nominee belongs to the
party or organization that nominated him. This is true, initially. The
right to examine the fitness of aspiring nominees and, eventually, to
choose five from among them after all belongs to the party or
organization that nominates them. But where an allegation is made that
the party or organization had chosen and allowed a disqualified
nominee to become its party-list representative in the lower House and
enjoy the secured tenure that goes with the position, the resolution of
the dispute is taken out of its hand.
 What is inevitable is that Section 17, Article VI of the
Constitution provides that the HRET shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to, among other things, the qualifications of the
members of the House of Representatives. Since, as pointed out above,
party-list nominees are "elected members" of the House of
Representatives no less than the district representatives are, the HRET
has jurisdiction to hear and pass upon their qualifications.
 By analogy with the cases of district representatives, once the party or
organization of the party-list nominee has been proclaimed and the
nominee has taken his oath and assumed office as member of the House
of Representatives, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests
relating to his qualifications ends and the HRET’s own jurisdiction
begins.
 The Court holds that respondent HRET did not gravely abuse its
discretion when it dismissed the petitions for quo warranto against
Aangat Tayo party-list and Bantay party-list but upheld its jurisdiction
over the question of the qualifications of petitioners Abayon and
Palparan.
 WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the consolidated petitions
ROLANDO D. LAYUG vs. COMLELEC, MARIANO VELARDE (alias
"BROTHER MIKE") and BUHAY PARTY-LIST
Facts
 On March 31, 2010, petitioner Rolando D. Layug (Layug), in his capacity
as a taxpayer and concerned citizen, filed pro se a Petition to
Disqualify Buhay Party-List from participating in the May 10, 2010
elections, and Brother Mike from being its nominee.
 He argued that Buhay Party-List is a mere "extension of the El Shaddai,"
which is a religious sect. As such, it is disqualified from being a party-
list under Section 5, Paragraph 2, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, as
well as Section 6, Paragraph 1 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7941,
otherwise known as the "Party-List System Act." Neither does Brother
Mike, who is allegedly a billionaire real estate businessman and the
spiritual leader of El Shaddai, qualify as "one who belongs to the
marginalized and underrepresented sector xxx", as required of party-
list nominees under Section 6 (7) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8807, the
"Rules on Disqualification Cases Against Nominees of Party-List
Groups/Organizations Participating in the May 10, 2010 Automated
National and Local Elections."
 On June 15, 2010, the COMELEC Second Division issued a
Resolution denying the petition for lack of substantial evidence there
being no motion for reconsideration filed within the reglementary
period, said Resolution was declared final and executory. It was
entered in the Book of Entries of Judgment on July 28, 2010.
 As a consequence of such entry, the COMELEC En Banc, sitting as the
National Board of Canvassers for Party-List, proclaimed Buhay Party-
List as a winner entitled to two (2) seats in the House of
Representatives. Being the fifth nominee, however, Brother Mike was
not proclaimed as the representative of Buhay Party-List.
 In their respective Comments to the petition, respondents assail the
jurisdiction of the Court arguing that, with the proclamation of Buhay
Party-List on July 30, 2010 and the assumption into office of its
representatives, Mariano Michael DM. Velarde, Jr. and William Irwin C.
Tieng, it is now the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal that
has the sole and exclusive jurisdiction over questions relating to their
qualifications.
Issue: WON HRET has jurisdiction over the present petition?
Held: The Court not the HRET has jurisdiction over the present petition.
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 Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides that the House
of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) shall be the sole judge of
all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of its
Members. Section 5 (1) of the same Article identifies who the
"members" of the House
 Clearly, the members of the House of Representatives are of two kinds:
(1) members who shall be elected from legislative districts; and (2)
those who shall be elected through a party-list system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. In this case,
Buhay Party-List was entitled to two seats in the House that went to its
first two nominees, Mariano Michael DM. Velarde, Jr. and William Irwin
C. Tieng. On the other hand, Brother Mike, being the fifth nominee, did
not get a seat and thus had not become a member of the House of
Representatives. Indubitably, the HRET has no jurisdiction over the
issue of Brother Mike's qualifications.
 Neither does the HRET have jurisdiction over the qualifications of
Buhay Party-List, as it is vested by law, specifically, the Party-List
System Act, upon the COMELEC. Section 6 of said Act states that "the
COMELEC may motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any
interested party, remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the
registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or
coalition xxx." Accordingly, in the case ofAbayon vs. HRET, We ruled that
the HRET did not gravely abuse its discretion when it dismissed the
petitions for quo warranto against Aangat Tayo party-list
and Bantay party-list insofar as they sought the disqualifications of said
party-lists.
 Thus, it is the Court, under its power to review decisions, orders, or
resolutions of the COMELEC provided under Section 7, Article IX-A of
the 1987 Constitution and Section 1, Rule 37 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure that has jurisdiction to hear the instant petition.
 WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Certiorari is hereby DISMISSED.
ROMEO M. JALOSJOS, JR. vs. COMELEC and DAN ERASMO, SR.
Facts:
 In May 2007 Romeo M. Jalosjos, Jr. is the Mayor of Tampilisan,
Zamboanga del Norte. While serving as Tampilisan Mayor, he bought a
residential house and lot in Barangay Veterans Village, Ipil, Zamboanga
Sibugay. In September 2008 he began occupying the house.
 After eight months Jalosjos applied with the Election Registration
Board (ERB) of Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay, for the transfer of his voter’s
registration to Barangay Veterans Village.
 Dan Erasmo, Sr., respondent, opposed the application. After due
proceedings, the ERB approved Jalosjos’ application and denied
Erasmo’s opposition.
 MCTC on the otherhand rendered judgment, excluding Jalosjos from the
list of registered voters in question. The MCTC found that Jalosjos did
not abandon his domicile in Tampilisan since he continued even then to
serve as its Mayor. RTC affirmed the decision on September 11, 2009.
 Jalosjos elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals (CA)
 On November 28, 2009 Jalosjos filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC)
for the position of Representative of the Second District of Zamboanga
Sibugay for the May 10, 2010 National Elections.
 Erasmo filed a petition to or cancel his COC before the
COMELEC, claiming that Jalosjos made material misrepresentations in
that COC when he indicated in it that he resided in Ipil, Zamboanga
Sibugay. But COMELEC dismissed Erasmo’s petitions for insufficiency in
form and substance.
 While Erasmo’s motion for reconsideration was pending before the
COMELEC En Banc, the May 10, 2010 elections took place and Jalosjos
was proclaimed winner on May 13, 2010.
 Meantime, on June 2, 2010 the CA rendered judgment in the voter’s
exclusion case before it, holding Jalosjos was qualified under the
Constitution and Republic Act 8189 to vote in that place. Erasmo filed a
petition for review of the CA decision before this Court.
 Back to the COMELEC, on June 3, 2010 the En Banc granted Erasmo’s
motion for reconsideration and declared Jalosjos ineligible to seek
election as Representative of the Second District of Zamboanga Sibugay.
It held that Jalosjos did not satisfy the residency requirement since, by
continuing to hold the position of Mayor of Tampilisan, Zamboanga Del
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Norte, he should be deemed not to have transferred his residence from
that place to Barangay Veterans Village in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.
 In its comment, the OSG sought the dismissal of Erasmo’s petitions and
the grant of that of Jalosjos since all such petitions deal with the latter’s
qualifications as proclaimed Representative of the district mentioned.
The OSG claims that under Section 17, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution, jurisdiction over this issue lies with the HRET.
Issue:
WON Supreme Court has jurisdiction at this time to pass upon the
question of Jalosjos’ residency qualification for running for the position of
Representative of the Second District of Zamboanga Sibugay considering
that he has been proclaimed winner in the election and has assumed the
discharge of that office.
Held: NO
 The Court has already settled the question of when the jurisdiction of
the COMELEC ends and when that of the HRET begins. The
proclamation of a congressional candidate following the election
divests COMELEC of jurisdiction over disputes relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of the proclaimed Representative in favor of
the HRET.
 Here, when the COMELEC En Banc issued its order dated June 3, 2010,
Jalosjos had already been proclaimed on May 13, 2010 as winner in the
election. Thus, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction when it still
passed upon the issue of his qualification and declared him ineligible
for the office of Representative of the Second District of Zamboanga
Sibugay.
 Republic Act 6646. Section 6 provides:
Section 6. Effects of Disqualification Case. Any candidate who has
been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be
voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any
reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an
election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the
winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission
shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or
protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor,
may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the
proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt
is strong.
 Here, however, the fact is that on election day of 2010 the COMELEC En
Banc had as yet to resolve Erasmo’s appeal from the Second Division’s
dismissal of the disqualification case against Jalosjos. Thus, there then
existed no final judgment deleting Jalosjos’ name from the list of
candidates for the congressional seat he sought. The last standing
official action in his case before election day was the ruling of the
COMELEC’s Second Division that allowed his name to stay on that
list.1âwphi1 Meantime, the COMELEC En Banc did not issue any order
suspending his proclamation pending its final resolution of his case.
With the fact of his proclamation and assumption of office, any issue
regarding his qualification for the same, like his alleged lack of the
required residence, was solely for the HRET to consider and decide.
 The Court cannot usurp the power vested by the Constitution solely on
the HRET.
LORENZO M. TAÑADA and DIOSDADO MACAPAGAL, petitioners,
vs.
MARIANO JESUS CUENCO, FRANCISCO A. DELGADO, ALFREDO CRUZ,
CATALINA CAYETANO, MANUEL SERAPIO, PLACIDO REYES, and
FERNANDO HIPOLITO in his capacity as cashier and disbursing
officer,respondents.
 Petitioner Lorenzo M. Tañada is a member of the Senate, and
President of the Citizens Party (CP), whereas petitioner
Diosdado Macapagal, a member of the House of Rep, was one of
the official candidates of the Liberal Party (LP) for the Senate,
at the General elections held in November, 1955, in which
#799 – Paul Jared Ng (Batch 7)

Warns, Sumulong, Paredes, Rodrigo, Sabido, Recto, Alonto and
Rosales, were proclaimed elected.
 Subsequently, the elections of this Senators-elect-who
eventually assumed their respective seats in the Senate-was
contested by petitioner Macapagal, together with Osias,
Pecson, Peralta, Magalona, Pedrosa and Chiongbian-who had,
also, run for the Senate, in said election now pending before
the SET.
 The Senate, in its session of February 22, 1956, upon
nomination of Senator Cipriano Primicias, on behalf of the
Nacionalista Party, chose Senators Jose P. Laurel, Fernando
Lopez and Cipriano Primicias, as members of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal. Upon nomination of petitioner Senator
Tañada, on behalf of the Citizens Party, said petitioner was
next chosen by the Senate as member of said Tribunal. Then,
upon nomination of Senator Primicias on behalf of the
Committee on Rules of the Senate, and over the objections of
Senators Tañada and Sumulong, the Senate chose respondents
Senators Mariano J. Cuenco and Francisco A. Delgado as
members of the same Electoral Tribunal. Subsequently, the
Chairman of the latter appointed: (1) Alfredo Cruz and Catalina
Cayetano, as technical assistant and private secretary,
respectively, to Senator Cuenco, as supposed member of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal, upon his recommendation of said
respondent; and (2) Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes, as
technical assistant and private secretary, respectively to
Senator Delgado, as supposed member of said Electoral
Tribunal, and upon his recommendation.
 Petitioner alleges that the nomination by Sen. Prinicias on
behalf of the Committee on Rules for the Senate violates Sec. 2
Art 6 of the Constitution since 3 seats on the ET are reserved
for minority party representatives. Furthermore as
respondents are about to decide on Electoral Case No. 4 of
Senate, the case at bar is a violation not only of Tanada’s right
as CP member of ET but respondent Macapagal’s right to an
impartial body that will try his election protest. Petitioners
pray for a writ of preliminary injunction against respondents
to be made permanent after a judgment to oust respondents is
passed.
 Petitioners allege that on February 22, 1956, as well as at
present, the Senate consists of 23 Senators who belong to the
NP, and 1 Senator-namely, Tañada CP; that the Committee on
Rules for the Senate, in nominating Senators Cuenco and
Delgado, and the Senate, in choosing these respondents, as
members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, had "acted
absolutely without power or color of authority and in clear
violation .. of Article VI, Section 11 of the Constitution"; that "in
assuming membership in the Senate Electoral Tribunal, by
taking the corresponding oath of office therefor", said
respondents had "acted absolutely without color of
appointment or authority and are unlawfully, and in violation
of the Constitution, usurping, intruding into and exercising the
powers of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal"
 That, consequently, the appointments of respondents, Cruz,
Cayetano, Serapio and Reyes, as technical assistants and
private secretaries to Senators Cuenco and Delgado-who
caused said appointments to be made-as members of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal, are unlawful and void; and that
Senators Cuenco and Delgado "are threatening and are about
to take cognizance of Electoral Case No. 4 of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal, as alleged members thereof, in nullification
of the rights of petitioner Lorenzo M. Tañada, both as a Senator
belonging to the Citizens Party and as representative of the
Citizens Party in the Senate Electoral Tribunal, and in
deprivation of the constitutional rights of petitioner Diosdado
Macapagal and his co-protestants to have their election protest
tried and decided-by an Electoral Tribunal composed of not
more than three (3) senators chosen by the Senate upon
nomination of the party having the largest number of votes in
the Senate and not more than the (3) Senators upon
nomination of the Party having the second largest number of
votes therein, together, three (3) Justice of the Supreme Court
to be designated by the Chief Justice, instead of by an Electoral
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Tribunal packed with five members belonging to the
Nacionalista Party, which is the rival party of the Liberal Party,
to which the Petitioner Diosdado Macapagal and his co-
protestants in Electoral Case No. 4 belong, the said five (5)
Nacionalista Senators having been nominated and chosen in
the manner alleged.. hereinabove.".
 ISSUE:
 W/N this Court is without power, authority of jurisdiction to
direct or control the action of the Senate in choosing the
members of the Electoral Tribunal (if asked) (held:no,
whenever the conflicting claims of the parties to a litigation
cannot properly be settled without inquiring into the validity
of an act of Congress or of either House thereof, the courts
have, not only jurisdiction to pass upon said issue, but, also, the
duty to do so, which cannot be evaded without violating the
fundamental law and paving the way to its eventual
destruction)
 W/N the constitutional right of CP can be exercised by NP or
the committee on Rules for the Senate? NO
 HELD:
 Section 11 of Article VI of the Constitution, reads:.
 "The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have
an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be
composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of
the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and
the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or of the
House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be
chosen by each House, three upon nomination of the party
having the largest number of votes and three of the party
having the second largest number of votes therein. The Senior
Justice in each Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman."
 It appears that the Senate of the Philippines consists of twenty
three (23) members of the Nacionalista Party and one member
of the Citizens Party, namely, Senator Tañada, who is, also, the
president of said party. In the session of the Senate held on
February 21, 1956, Senator Sabido moved that Senator Tañada,
"the President of the Citizens Party, be given the privilege to
nominate three (3) members" of the Senate Electoral Tribunal,
referring to those who, according to the provision above-
quoted, should be nominated by "the party having the second
largest number of votes" in the Senate. Senator Tañada
objected formally to this motion upon the-ground: (a) that the
right to nominate said members of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal belongs, not to the Nacionalista Party of which
Senator Sabido and the other Senators are members-but to the
Citizens Party, as the one having the second largest number of
votes in the Senate, so that, being devoid of authority to
nominate the aforementioned members of said Tribunal, the
Nacionalista Party cannot give it to the Citizens Party, which,
already, has such authority, pursuant to the Constitution; and
(b) that Senator Sabido's motion would compel Senator
Tañada to nominate three (3) Senators to said Tribunal,
although as representative of the minority party in the Senate
he has "the right to nominate one, two or three to the Electoral
Tribunal," in his discretion. Senator Tañada further stated that
he reserved the right to determine how many he would
nominate, after hearing the reasons of Senator Sabido in
support of his motion. After some discussion, in which
Senators Primicias, Cea, Lim, Sumulong, Zulueta, and Rodrigo
took part, the Senate adjourned until the next morning,
February 22, 1956
 Thereupon, Senator Primicias, on behalf of the Nacionalista
Party, nominated, and the Senate elected, Senators Laurel,
Lopez and Primicias, as members of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal.
 Without an objection, this nomination was approved by the
House. Then, Senator Primicias stood up and said: "Now, Mr.
President, in order to comply with the provision in the
Constitution, the Committee on Rules of the Senate-and I am
now making this proposal not on behalf of the Nacionalista
Party but on behalf of the Committee on Rules of the Senate-I
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 Page 4 of 24

nominate two other members to complete the membership of Senators Cuenco and Delgado, if the same were sanctioned, the
the Tribunal: Senators Delgado and Cuenco.". Nacionalista Party would have five (5) members in the Senate
 Respondents allege, however, that the constitutional mandate Electoral Tribunal, as against one (1) member of the Citizens
to the effect that "each Electoral Tribunal shall be compose of Party and three members of the Supreme Court. With the
nine (9) members," six (6) of whom "shall be members of the absolute majority thereby attained by the majority party in
Senate or of the House of Representatives, as the case may be", said Tribunal, the philosophy underlying the same would be
is mandatory; that when-after the nomination of three (3) entirely upset. The equilibrium between the political parties
Senators by the majority party, and their election by the therein would be destroyed. What is worst, the decisive
Senate, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal-Senator moderating role of the Justices of the Supreme Court would be
Tañada nominated himself only, on behalf of the minority wiped out, and, in lieu thereof, the door would be thrown wide
party, he thereby "waived his right to no two more Senators;" open for the predominance of political considerations in the
that, when Senator Primicias nominated Senators Cuenco and determination of election protests pending before said
Delgado, and these respondents were chosen by the Senate, as Tribunal, which is precisely what the fathers of our
members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, Said Senator Constitution earnestly strove to forestall.
Primicias and the Senate merely complied with the  In view of the foregoing, we hold that the Senate may not elect,
aforementioned provision of the fundamental law, relative to as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, those Senators
the number of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal; and, who have not been nominated by the political parties specified
that, accordingly, Senators Cuenco and Delgado are de jure in the Constitution; that the party having the largest number of
members of said body, and the appointment of their co- votes in the Senate may nominate not more than three (3)
respondents, Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio members thereof to said Electoral Tribunal; that the party
and Placido Reyes is valid and lawful. having the second largest number of votes in the Senate has
 It is clear from the foregoing that the main objective of the the exclusive right to nominate the other three (3) Senators
framers of our Constitution in providing for the establishment, who shall sit as members in the Electoral Tribunal; that neither
first, of an Electoral Commission, 8 and then 9 of one Electoral these three (3) Senators, nor any of them, may be nominated
Tribunal for each House of Congress, was to insure the exercise by a person or party other than the one having the second
of judicial impartiality in the disposition of election contests largest number of votes in the Senate or its representative
affecting members of the lawmaking body. To achieve this therein; that the Committee on Rules for the Senate has no
purpose, two devices were resorted to, namely: (a) the party standing to validly make such nomination and that the
having the largest number of votes, and the party having the nomination of Senators Cuenco and Delgado by Senator
second largest number of votes, in the National Assembly or in Primicias, and the election of said respondents by the Senate,
each House of Congress, were given the same number of as members of said Tribunal, are null and void ab initio.
representatives in the Electoral Commission or Tribunal, so  As regards respondents Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano,
that they may realize that partisan considerations could not Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes, we are not prepared to
control the adjudication of said cases, and thus be induced to hold, however, that their appointments were null and void.
act with greater impartiality; and (b) the Supreme Court was Although recommended by Senators Cuenco and Delgado, who
given in said body the same number of representatives as each are not lawful members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, they
one of said political parties, so that the influence of the former were appointed by its Chairman, presumably, with the consent
may be decisive and endow said Commission or Tribunal with of the majority of the de jure members of said body 14 or,
judicial temper. pursuant to the Rules thereof.
 The adoption of section 11 of Article VI of the Constitution,
reveals clearly that its framers intended to prevent the
FIRDAUSI SMAIL ABBAS, HOMOBONO A. ADAZA, ALEJANDRO D.
majority party from controlling the Electoral Tribunals, and
ALMENDRAS, ABUL KAHYR D. ALONTO, JUAN PONCE ENRILE, RENE G.
that the structure thereof is founded upon the equilibrium
ESPINA, WILSON P. GAMBOA, ROILO S. GOLEZ, ROMEO G. JALOSJOS
between the majority and the minority parties therein, with
EVA R. ESTRADA-KALAW, WENCESLAO R. LAGUMBAY, VICENTE P.
the Justices of the Supreme Court, who are members of said
MAGSAYSAY, JEREMIAS U. MONTEMAYOR, BLAS F. OPLE, RAFAEL P.
Tribunals, holding the resulting balance of power. The
PALMARES, ZOSIMO JESUS M. PAREDES, JR., VICENTE G. PUYAT,
procedure prescribed in said provision for the selection of
EDITH N. RABAT, ISIDRO S. RODRIGUEZ, FRANCISCO S. TATAD,
members of the Electoral Tribunals is vital to the role they are
LORENZO G. TEVES, ARTURO M. TOLENTINO, and FERNANDO R.
called upon to play. it constitutes the essence of said Tribunals.
VELOSO, petitioners,
Hence, compliance with said procedure is mandatory, and acts
vs.
performed in violation thereof are null and void. 11.
THE SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, respondent.
 It is true that the application of the foregoing criterion would
limit the membership of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, in the
case at bar, to seven (7), instead of nine (9), members; but, it is  Petitioners filed with the respondent Tribunal a Motion for
conceded that the present composition of the Senate was not Disqualification or Inhibition of the Senators-Members thereof
foreseen by the framers of our Constitution. Furthermore, the from the hearing and resolution of SET Case No. 002-87 on the
spirit of the law prevails over its letter, and the solution herein ground that all of them are interested parties to said case, as
adopted maintains the spirit of the Constitution, for partisan respondents therein. Before that, Senator Rene A.V. Saguisag,
considerations can not be decisive in a tribunal consisting of one of the respondents in the same case, had filed a Petition to
three (3) Justices of the Supreme Court, three (3) members Recuse and later a Supplemental Petition to Recuse the same
nominated by the majority party and either one (1) or two (2) Senators-Members of the Tribunal on essentially the same
members nominated by the party having the second largest ground. Senator Vicente T. Paterno, another respondent in the
number of votes in the House concerned. same contest, thereafter filed his comments on both the
 Upon the other hand, what would be the result of respondents' petitions to recuse and the motion for disqualification or
contention if upheld? Owing to the fact that the Citizens Party inhibition. Memoranda on the subject were also filed and oral
12 has only one member in the Upper House, Senator Tañada arguments were heard by the respondent Tribunal, with the
felt he should nominate, for the Senate Electoral Tribunal, only latter afterwards issuing the Resolutions now complained of.
said member of the Citizens Party. The same is, thus,  The petitioners argue that considerations of public policy and
numerically handicapped, vis-a-vis the majority party, in said the norms of fair play and due process imperatively require the
Tribunal. Obviously, Senator Tañada did not nominate other mass disqualification sought and that the doctrine of necessity
two Senators, because, otherwise, he would worsen the already which they perceive to be the foundation petition of the
disadvantageous position, therein, of the Citizens Party. questioned Resolutions does not rule out a solution both
Indeed, by the aforementioned nomination and election of practicable and constitutionally unobjectionable, namely; the
#799 – Paul Jared Ng (Batch 7)

amendment of the respondent Tribunal's Rules of procedure so
as to permit the contest being decided by only three Members
of the Tribunal.
 ISSUE: WON the SET can function without the senator
members? NO
 HELD:
 Article VI, Section 17, creates the Senate Electoral Tribunal,
ordains its composition and defines its jurisdiction and
powers.
 Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall
each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of
all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications
of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be
composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of
the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and
the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House
of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on
the basis of proportional representation from the political
parties and the parties or organizations registered under the
party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the
Electoral Tribunal hall be its Chairman.
 It is clear that a Tribunal to be staffed by both Justices of the
Supreme Court and Members of the Senate, the Constitution
intended that both those "judicial' and 'legislative' components
commonly share the duty and authority of deciding all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of Senators.
The respondent Tribunal correctly stated one part of this
proposition when it held that said provision "... is a clear
expression of an intent that all (such) contests ... shall be
resolved by a panel or body in which their (the Senators')
peers in that Chamber are represented." 1 The other part, of
course, is that the constitutional provision just as clearly
mandates the participation in the same process of decision of a
representative or representatives of the Supreme Court.
 Said intent is even more clearly signalled by the fact that the
proportion of Senators to Justices in the prescribed
membership of the Senate Electoral Tribunal is 2 to 1-an
unmistakable indication that the "legislative component"
cannot be totally excluded from participation in the resolution
of senatorial election contests, without doing violence to the
spirit and intent of the Constitution.
 The proposed mass disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered,
would leave the Tribunal no alternative but to abandon a duty
that no other court or body can perform, but which it cannot
lawfully discharge if shorn of the participation of its entire
membership of Senators.
 To our mind, this is the overriding consideration—that the
Tribunal be not prevented from discharging a duty which it
alone has the power to perform, the performance of which is in
the highest public interest as evidenced by its being expressly
imposed by no less than the fundamental law.
 The framers of the Constitution could not have been unaware
of the possibility of an election contest that would involve all
24 Senators-elect, six of whom would inevitably have to sit in
judgment thereon. Indeed, such possibility might surface again
in the wake of the 1992 elections when once more, but for the
last time, all 24 seats in the Senate will be at stake. Yet the
Constitution provides no scheme or mode for settling such
unusual situations or for the substitution of Senators
designated to the Tribunal whose disqualification may be
sought. Litigants in such situations must simply place their
trust and hopes of vindication in the fairness and sense of
justice of the Members of the Tribunal. Justices and Senators,
singly and collectively.
 What we are merely saying is that in the light of the
Constitution, the Senate Electoral Tribunal cannot legally
function as such, absent its entire membership of Senators and
that no amendment of its Rules can confer on the three
Justices-Members alone the power of valid adjudication of a
senatorial election contest.
Page 5 of 24
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., REPRESENTATIVES MELVYN
D. EBALLE, LEONARDO Q. MONTEMAYOR, CRESENTE C.
PAEZ, LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES and PATRICIA M.
SARENAS, petitioners, vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, JUSTICES JOSE A.R. MELO, VICENTE
V. MENDOZA and JOSE C. VITUG, and REPRESENTATIVES
ASANI S. TAMMANG, RAUL M. GONZALES, DIDAGEN P.
DILANGALEN, DANTON Q. BUESER,[1] NAPOLEON R.
BERATIO, SIMEON E. GARCIA and SPEAKER MANUEL B.
VILLAR, JR., respondents.
 On May 11, 1998, in accordance with the Party-List System Act,
national elections were held which included, for the first time,
the election through popular vote of party-list groups and
organizations whose nominees would become members of the
House. Proclaimed winners were 14 party-list representatives
from 13 organizations, including petitioners from party-list
groups APEC, ABA, COOP-NATCCO, AKBAYAN, ABANSE. Due to
the votes it garnered, APEC was able to send 2 representatives
to the House, while the 12 other party-list groups had one
representative each. Also elected were district representatives
belonging to various political parties.
 Subsequently, the House constituted its HRET and CA
(commission on appointment) contingent[6] by electing its
representatives to these two constitutional bodies. In practice,
the procedure involves the nomination by the political parties
of House members who are to occupy seats in the HRET and
the CA.[7] From available records, it does not appear that the
party-list groups in the House nominated any of their
representatives to the HRET or the CA. As of the date of filing of
the instant petitions, the House contingents to the HRET and
the CA were composed solely of district representatives
belonging to the different political parties.
 On January 18, 2000, Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. wrote
two letters to cause the restructuring of the CA and the HRET,
respectively, to include party-list representatives to conform to
Sections 17 and 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
 Petitioners filed with this Court their Petitions for Prohibition,
Mandamus and Preliminary Injunction against the HRET, its
Chairman and Members,[12] and against the CA, its Chairman
and Members.[13] Petitioners contend that, under the
Constitution and the Party-List System Act, party-list
representatives should have 1.2 or at least 1 seat in the
HRET,[14] and 2.4 seats in the CA.[15]
 Petitioners cite as basis Sections 17 and 18, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution
 “Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall
each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of
all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications
of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be
composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of
the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and
the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House
of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on
the basis of proportional representation from the political
parties and the parties or organizations registered under the
party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the
Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.”
 “Sec. 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments
consisting of the President of the Senate, as ex officio Chairman,
twelve Senators and twelve Members of the House of
Representatives, elected by each House on the basis of
proportional representation from the political parties and
parties or organizations registered under the party-list system
represented therein. The Chairman of the Commission shall
not vote, except in case of a tie. The Commission shall act on all
appointments submitted to it within thirty session days of the
Congress from their submission. The Commission shall rule by
a majority vote of all the Members,”[18] (Emphasis supplied)
 Petitioners also invoke the following provision of Section 11 of
Republic Act No. 7941:
#799 – Paul Jared Ng (Batch 7)
 Page 6 of 24

 “Sec. 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. - The party-list  Moreover, they do not possess the personal and substantial
representatives shall constitute twenty per centum (20%) of interest required to confer them with locus standi and finally,
the total number of the members of the House of the issues raised in the petitions have been rendered academic
Representatives including those under the party-list. xxx”[19] by subsequent events. On May 14, 2001, a new set of district
 ISSUES: and party-list representatives were elected to the House.
 1. WHETHER THE PRESENT COMPOSITION OF THE HOUSE
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL AND IN THE COMMISSION ON
APPOINTMENTS VIOLATE THE CONSTITUTIONAL Angara vs. Electoral Commission 63 Phil 139
REQUIREMENT OF PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION
BECAUSE THERE ARE NO PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES IN
THE HRET AND CA.
FACTS:
 2. WHETHER THE REFUSAL OF THE HRET AND THE CA TO
RECONSTITUTE THEMSELVES TO INCLUDE PARTY-LIST
REPRESENTATIVES CONSTITUTES GRAVE ABUSE OF  In the elections of Sept. 17, 1935, petitioner Jose A. Angara and
DISCRETION.
 HELD: the respondents Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo, and Dionisio
 The Constitution expressly grants to the House of Mayor were candidates for the position of members of the
Representatives the prerogative, within constitutionally National Assembly for the first district of Tayabas.
defined limits, to choose from among its district and party-list
representatives those who may occupy the seats allotted to the
House in the HRET and the CA. Section 18, Article VI of the  On Oct. 7, 1935, the provincial board of canvassers proclaimed
Constitution[24] explicitly confers on the Senate and on the
House the authority to elect among their members those who Angara as member-elect of the National Assembly and on Nov.
would fill the 12 seats for Senators and 12 seats for House 15, 1935, he took his oath of office.
members in the Commission on Appointments. Under Section
17, Article VI of the Constitution,[25] each chamber of Congress
exercises the power to choose, within constitutionally defined  On Dec. 3, 1935, the National Assembly passed Resolution No.
limits, who among their members would occupy the allotted 6 8, which in effect, fixed the last date to file election protests.
seats of each chamber’s respective electoral tribunal.
 Thus, even assuming that party-list representatives comprise a  On Dec. 8, 1935, Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a
sufficient number and have agreed to designate common "Motion of Protest" against Angara and praying, among other
nominees to the HRET and the CA, their primary recourse things, that Ynsua be named/declared elected Member of the
clearly rests with the House of Representatives and not with
this Court. Under Sections 17 and 18, Article VI of the National Assembly or that the election of said position be
Constitution, party-list representatives must first show to the nullified.
House that they possess the required numerical strength to be
entitled to seats in the HRET and the CA. Only if the House fails
to comply with the directive of the Constitution on  On Dec. 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted a
proportional representation of political parties in the HRET
resolution (No. 6) stating that last day for filing of protests is
and the CA can the party-list representatives seek recourse to
this Court under its power of judicial review. Under the on Dec. 9. Angara contended that the Constitution confers
doctrine of primary jurisdiction, prior recourse to the House is exclusive jurisdiction upon the Electoral Commission solely as
necessary before petitioners may bring the instant case to the
court. Consequently, petitioners’ direct recourse to this Court regards the merits of contested elections to the National
is premature. Assembly and the Supreme Court therefore has no jurisdiction
 The discretion of the House to choose its members to the HRET
to hear the case.
and the CA is not absolute, being subject to the mandatory
constitutional rule on proportional
representation.[26] However, under the doctrine of separation ISSUES:
of powers, the Court may not interfere with the exercise by the
House of this constitutionally mandated duty, absent a clear
violation of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.[27] Otherwise, ‘the the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the controversy upon
doctrine of separation of powers calls for each branch of
government to be left alone to discharge its duties as it sees the foregoing related facts, and in the affirmative,
fit.[28] Neither can the Court speculate on what action the House
may take if party-list representatives are duly nominated for
RULING:
membership in the HRET and the CA.
 The instant petitions are bereft of any allegation that
respondents prevented the party-list groups in the House from  In the case at bar, here is then presented an actual controversy
participating in the election of members of the HRET and the
involving as it does a conflict of a grave constitutional nature
CA. Neither does it appear that after the May 11, 1998
elections, the House barred the party-list representatives from between the National Assembly on one hand, and
seeking membership in the HRET or the CA. Rather, it appears the Electoral Commission on the other. Although the
from the available facts that the party-list groups in the House
at that time simply refrained from participating in the election Electoral Commission may not be interfered with, when and
process. The party-list representatives did not designate their while acting within the limits of its authority, it does not follow
nominees even up to the time they filed the instant petitions,
that it is beyond the reach of the constitutional mechanism
with the predictable result that the House did not consider any
party-list representative for election to the HRET or the CA. As adopted by the people and that it is not subject to
the primary recourse of the party-list representatives lies with constitutional restrictions. The Electoral Commission is not a
the House of Representatives, ‘the Court cannot resolve the
issues presented by petitioners at this time. separate department of the government, and even if it were,
#799 – Paul Jared Ng (Batch 7)

conflicting claims of authority under the fundamental law
between departmental powers and agencies of the government
are necessarily determined by the judiciary in justiciable and
appropriate cases.
 
The court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and
the subject matter of the present controversy for the purpose
of determining the character, scope, and extent of the
constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly."
 The Electoral Commission was created to transfer in its totality
all the powers previously exercised by the legislature in
matters pertaining to contested elections of its members, to an
independent and impartial tribunal. The express lodging of
that power in the Electoral Commission is an implied denial in
the exercise of that power by the National Assembly. And thus,
it is as effective a restriction upon the legislative power as an
express prohibition in the Constitution.
 Therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules
necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive power to
judge all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly, must be
deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in
the Electoral Commission.
 It appears that on Dec. 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission met
for the first time and approved a resolution fixing said date as
the last day for the filing of election protests. When, therefore,
the National Assembly passed its resolution of Dec. 3, 1935,
confirming the election of the petitioner to the National
Assembly, the Electoral Commission had not yet met; neither
does it appear that said body had actually been organized.
While there might have been good reason for the legislative
practice of confirmation of the election of members of the
legislature at the time the power to decide election contests
was still lodged in the legislature, confirmation alone by the
legislature cannot be construed as depriving
the Electoral Commission of the authority incidental to its
constitutional power to be "the sole judge of all contests...", to
fix the time for the filing of said election protests.
 The Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate
exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to take
cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent, Pedro Ynsua
against the election of the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and
that the resolution of the National Assembly on Dec. 3, 1935,
cannot in any manner toll the time for filing protest against the
election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the
Page 7 of 24
National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of protests within
such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission might
prescribe.
The petition for a writ of prohibition against the electoral
commission is hereby denied, with cost against the petitioner.
Bondoc vs. Pineda
201 SCRA 792 G.R. No. 97710
September 26, 1991
Facts:
 In the elections held on May 11, 1987, Marciano Pineda of the
LDP and Emigdio Bondoc of the NP were candidates for the
position of Representative for the Fourth District of Pampanga.
 Pineda was proclaimed winner. Bondoc filed a protest in the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), which is
composed of 9 members, 3 of whom are Justices of the SC and
the remaining 6 are members of the House of Representatives
(5 members belong to the LDP and 1 member is from the NP).
 Thereafter, a decision had been reached in which Bondoc won
over Pineda. Congressman Camasura of the LDP voted with the
SC Justices and Congressman Cerilles of the NP to proclaim
Bondoc the winner of the contest.
 On the eve of the promulgation of the Bondoc decision,
Congressman Camasura received a letter informing him that he
was already expelled from the LDP for allegedly helping to
organize the Partido Pilipino of Eduardo Cojuangco and for
allegedly inviting LDP members in Davao Del Sur to join said
political party.
 On the day of the promulgation of the decision, the Chairman of
HRET received a letter informing the Tribunal that on the basis
of the letter from the LDP, the House of Representatives
decided to withdraw the nomination and rescind the election
of Congressman Camasura to the HRET.
Issue: Whether or not the House of Representatives, at the request of the
dominant political party therein, may change that party’s representation
in the HRET to thwart the promulgation of a decision freely reached by
the tribunal in an election contest pending therein
Held:
 The purpose of the constitutional convention creating the
Electoral Commission was to provide an independent and
impartial tribunal for the determination of contests to
legislative office, devoid of partisan consideration.
 To be able to exercise exclusive jurisdiction, the House
Electoral Tribunal must be independent. Its jurisdiction to hear
and decide congressional election contests is not to be shared
by it with the Legislature nor with the Courts.
#799 – Paul Jared Ng (Batch 7)

 The Electoral Commission is a body separate from and
independent of the legislature and though not a power in the
tripartite scheme of government, it is to all intents and
purposes, when acting within the limits of its authority, an
independent organ; while composed of a majority of members
of the legislature it is a body separate from and independent of
the legislature
 The Electoral Commission, a constitutional organ created for
the specific purpose of determining contests relating to
election returns and qualifications of members of the National
Assembly may not be interfered with by the judiciary when and
while acting within the limits of its authority, but the Supreme
Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission for the
purpose of determining the character, scope and extent of the
constitutional grant to the commission as sole judge of all
contests relating to the election and qualifications of the
members of the National Assembly.
 As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan.
They must discharge their functions with complete
detachment, impartiality and independence even
independence from the political party to which they belong.
 Hence, disloyalty to party and breach of party discipline are
not valid grounds for the expulsion of a member of the
tribunal. In expelling Congressman Camasura from the HRET
for having cast a “conscience vote” in favor of Bondoc, based
strictly on the result of the examination and appreciation of the
ballots and the recount of the votes by the tribunal, the House
of Representatives committed a grave abuse of discretion, an
injustice and a violation of the Constitution. Its resolution of
expulsion against Congressman Camasura is, therefore, null
and void.
 Another reason for the nullity of the expulsion resolution of the
House of Representatives is that it violates Congressman
Camasura’s right to security of tenure. Members of the HRET,
as sole judge of congressional election contests, are entitled to
security of tenure just as members of the Judiciary enjoy
security of tenure under the Constitution.
 Therefore, membership in the HRET may not be terminated
except for a just cause, such as, the expiration of the member’s
congressional term of office, his death, permanent disability,
resignation from the political party he represents in the
tribunal, formal affiliation with another political party or
removal for other valid cause.
 A member may not be expelled by the House of
Representatives for party disloyalty, short of proof that he has
formally affiliated with another.
MARCELINO C. LIBANAN vs. HRET
G.R. No. 129783. December 22, 1997
FACTS:
 Petitioner Libanan filed an election protest before the HRET
claiming, among other things, that the 08th May 1995 elections
in Eastern Samar were marred by massive electoral
irregularities perpetrated or instigated by respondent
Ramirez, as well as his leaders and followers.
Page 8 of 24
 Ramirez denied the charges. He counter-protested the results
of the elections in certain precincts where, he claimed, Libanan
engaged in massive vote buying, lansadera, terrorism and
tearing of the list of voters to disenfranchise voters therein
listed.
 In its assailed decision, the HRET ruled in favor of respondent
Ramirez
 The HRET, denied with finality petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
 Petitioner Libanan contends that the three hundred eleven
(311) ballots (265 of which have been for private respondent
Ramirez) without the signature of the Chairman of the BEI, but
which had the COMELEC water-marks and/or colored fibers,
should be invalidated.
Issue: Whether or not the ballots without the BEI Chairman’s signature
are valid.
HELD:
 A ballot without BEI chairman’s signature at the back is valid
and not spurious, provided that it bears any one of these other
authenticating marks, to wit: (a) the COMELEC watermark; and
(b) in those cases where the COMELEC watermarks are blurred
or not readily apparent, the presence of red and blue fibers in
the ballots.
 What should, instead, be given weight is the consistent rule
laid down by the HRET that a ballot is considered valid and
genuine for as long as it bears any one of these authenticating
marks, to wit: (a) the COMELEC watermark, or (b) the
signature or initials, or thumbprint of the Chairman of the BEI;
and (c) in those cases where the COMELEC watermarks are
blurred or not readily apparent to the naked eye, the presence
of red or blue fibers in the ballots.
 It is only when none of these marks appears extant that the
ballot can be considered spurious and subject to rejection.

The Constitutions mandates that the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal and the Senate Electoral Tribunal shall each,
respectively, be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of their respective
members.
 The Court has stressed that ". . . so long as the Constitution
grants the HRET the power to be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members
of the House of Representatives, any final action taken by the
HRET on a matter within its jurisdiction shall, as a rule, not be
reviewed by this Court . . . the power granted to the Electoral
Tribunal . . . excludes the exercise of any authority on the part
of this Court that would in any wise restrict it or curtail it or
even affect the same."
 In the old, but still relevant, case of Morrero vs. Bocar, the Court
has ruled that the power of the Electoral Commission "is
beyond judicial interference except, in any event, upon a clear
showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of power as
will constitute a denial of due process."
 The Court does not, to paraphrase it in Co vs.HRET, venture
into the perilous area of the correcting perceived errors of
independent branches of the Government; it comes in only
when it has to vindicate a denial of due process or correct an
abuse of discretion so grave or glaring that no less than the
Constitution itself calls for remedial action.
#799 – Paul Jared Ng (Batch 7)

PERLA GARCIA, PAZ CRUZ and GERALDINE PADERNAL, petitioners,
vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
(HRET) and REP. HARRY ANGPING (3rd DISTRICT
MANILA), respondents.
FACTS:
 Within the prescribed ten (10) day period from respondent Harry
Angping’s proclamation as duly elected Representative for the 3rd
District of Manila, petitioners, all duly registered voters in the
district, filed a petition for quo warranto before the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) against Congressman
Harry Angping.
 Petitioner questioned the eligibility of Congressman Angping to hold
office in the House of Representatives, claiming that the latter was
not a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a constitutional
requirement.
 They prayed that Congressman Angping be declared ineligible to
assume or hold office as member of the House of Representatives
and for the candidate who received the highest number of votes
from among the qualified candidates to be proclaimed the winner.
 Upon filing of the their petition, petitioners duly paid the required
P5,000.00 filing fee.
 However, the HRET issued a Resolution dismissing the petition
for quo warranto for failure to pay the P5,000.00 cash deposit
required by its Rules.
 Petitioner filed their Reply stressing that according to Rule 21 of the
1998 Rules of the HRET, summary dismissals may be ordered by the
HRET in case of non-payment of the required cash deposit within
the prescribed time only in election protest cases and not in quo
warranto proceedings.
 Petitioners also assert that this Court can very well resolve the
merits of their petition for quo warranto inasmuch as the Alien
Certificate of Registration attached to their petition, being a public
document, is admissible as proof of Congressman Angping’s
ineligibility to hold office, without need for proof as to its
authenticity and due execution.
ISSUE: May a petition for quo warranto before the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal be summarily dismissed for failure to
pay cash deposit, notwithstanding that petitioner rectified payment
thereof?
HELD:
 Under the Constitution, the HRET shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of its
members. This does not, however, bar us from entertaining
petitions which charge the HRET with grave abuse of discretion.
 That this Court may very well inquire into the issue of whether the
complained act of the HRET has been made with grave abuse of
discretion may be inferred from Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution which has expanded judicial power to include the
determination of “whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the Government.”
 In the case at bar, the required cash deposit of P5,000.00 was paid
only on June 26, 1998, which was after the dismissal of the petition
and only after an unreasonable delay of twenty-eight (28) days.
 Indeed, in dismissing the petition the HRET acted judiciously,
correctly and certainly within its jurisdiction. It was a judgment call
of the HRET which is clearly authorized under its Rules. As long as
the exercise of discretion is based on well-founded factual and legal
Page 9 of 24
basis, as in this case, no abuse of discretion can be imputed to the
Tribunal.
 In view of the delicate nature and importance of this charge, the
observance of the HRET Rules of Procedure must be taken seriously
if they are to attain their objective, i.e., the speedy and orderly
determination of the true will of the electorate.
 Therefore, we find that the HRET did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in applying its Rules strictly and in dismissing the petition
for quo warranto. Accordingly, the instant petition
for certiorari cannot prosper.
CELESTINO A. MARTINEZ III vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL AND BENHUR L. SALIMBANGON
FACTS:
 In the May 14, 2007 elections, petitioner Martinez and private
respondent Salimbangon were among the candidates for
Representative in the Fourth Legislative District of Cebu Province.
 Edilito C. Martinez, a resident of Barangay Tambongon, Daan-
Bantayan, Cebu, filed his certificate of candidacy for the same
position.
 Martinez filed a petition to declare Edilito C. Martinez a nuisance
candidate.
 However, the Commission on Elections Second Division issued its
Resolution declaring Edilito C. Martinez a nuisance candidate only
on June 12, 2007 or almost 1 month after the elections.
 Salimbangon was proclaimed winner in the congressional elections
for the Fourth Legislative District of Cebu. Martinez filed an Election
Protest
 The HRET resolved each of the claims and objections respectively
raised by protestant and protestee applying the rules for
appreciation of ballots.
 Ruling on the issue, the HRET sustained the BEI in considering the
ballots as stray.
 Since the name of Edilito C. Martinez was still included in the official
list of candidates on election day, the HRET held that 5,401 ballots
with "MARTINEZ" or "C. MARTINEZ" only written on the line for
Representative were properly denied on the ground that there was
no way of determining the real intention of the voter.
 Petitioner alleges that the HRET gravely abused its discretion when
it failed to credit the "MARTINEZ" or "C. MARTINEZ" votes in his
favor despite the finality of the COMELEC resolution declaring
Edilito C. Martinez a nuisance candidate.
 Petitioner further alleges that the HRET invalidated ballots for him
without stating the legal and factual bases therefor, and on grounds
other than the objections raised by private respondent.
 Private respondent assails the apparent desire of petitioner for this
Court to review the physical appreciation of ballots conducted by
the HRET when he assigned as issues the alleged erroneous
invalidation by the HRET of petitioner's ballots which were ruled as
written by 2 persons, and when he even appreciated ballots that
were declared by the HRET as marked ballots.
ISSUE: WON HRET gravely abused its discretion
HELD:
 The Court finds the petition meritorious.
 What needs to be stressed at this point is the apparent failure of the
HRET to give weight to relevant circumstances that make the will of
the electorate determinable.
#799 – Paul Jared Ng (Batch 7)

 The HRET likewise failed to mention the total number of votes
actually cast for Edilito C. Martinez, which can support petitioner's
contention that the "MARTINEZ" and "C. MARTINEZ" votes could not
have been intended as votes for Edilito C. Martinez.
 Petitioner should not be prejudiced by COMELEC's inefficiency and
lethargy. Nor should the absence of objection over straying of votes
during the actual counting bar petitioner from raising the issue in
his election protest.
 Had the Commission timely resolved the petition to declare Edilito
C. Martinez a nuisance candidate, all such ballots with "MARTINEZ"
or "C. MARTINEZ" would have been counted in favor of petitioner
and not considered stray
 We held in several cases that the judgments of the Electoral
Tribunals are beyond judicial interference, unless rendered without
or in excess of their jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.
 The power of judicial review may be invoked in exceptional cases
upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use by the
Tribunal of its power as constitutes a clear denial of due process of
law, or upon a demonstration of a very clear unmitigated error,
manifestly constituting such grave abuse of direction that there has
to be a remedy for such abuse.
 Respondent HRET gravely abused its discretion in affirming the
proclamation of respondent Salimbangon as the duly elected
Representative of the Fourth Legislative District of Cebu despite the
final outcome of revision showing 5,401 ballots with only
"MARTINEZ" or "C. "MARTINEZ" written on the line for
Representative, votes which should have been properly counted in
favor of petitioner and not nullified as stray votes, after considering
all relevant circumstances clearly establishing that such votes could
not have been intended for "Edilito C. Martinez" who was declared a
nuisance candidate in a final judgment.
REPRESENTATIVE ALVIN S. SANDOVAL (Lone District of Navotas-
Malabon) vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL,
JOSEPHINE VERONIQUE R. LACSON-NOEL, and HON. SPEAKER
PROSPERO NOGRALES
FACTS:
 On 19 May 2007, after the canvass of votes, as evidenced by
the Certificate of Canvass of Votes and Proclamation of the Winning
Candidates for the Member of the House of Representatives, the Board
of Canvassers of the Legislative District of Malabon City-Navotas
proclaimed protestee Sandoval [herein petitioner] the winning
candidate for the Office of the Member of the House of
Representatives with 71,490 votes as against protestant Lacson-
Noel who obtained the second highest number of votes with 70,331
votes.
 Refusing to concede defeat, protestant Lacson-Noel filed the
instant Petition of Protest on 29 May 2007, and alleged in substance
that "the results [of the election] do not reflect the true will of the
voters as they are but products of various fraudulent and illegal acts,
schemes and machinations employed by [protestee] Sandoval, his
agents and supporters, with the connivance or conspiracy of the
BEIs, which defrauded and deprived [her] of lawful votes cast at the
precinct level."
 She posits that "[t]here is a need for a recount, revision and due
appreciation of the ballots and examination or scrutiny of election
documents in the [623] protested precincts," as the result thereof
"will affect the presumptive results of the congressional elections in
the Malabon City-Navotas Legislative District in a very substantial
degree as to overcome protestee Sandoval's presumptive lead."
Page 10 of 24
 On the last day of the scheduled hearing, Sandoval filed a Motion for
Leave. The Tribunal resolved to grant protestee Sandoval's motion
with the necessary warning that no further extension shall be given.
 After a series of hearings, the Tribunal DECLARES that protestant
Josephine Veronique Lacson-Noel is the duly elected Representative
of the Lone District of Malabon City-Navotas in the election held on
14 May 2007, with a winning margin of 542 votes, with the right to
assume the duties of her office. Consequently, protestee Alvin
Sandoval is hereby declared unseated.
 Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the same was denied.
Hence, this petition alleging that the HRET committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by not
admitting petitioner's formal offer of evidence, thereby denying him
due process.
ISSUE: WON the HRET gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction
HELD:
 The petition lacks merit.
 It is hornbook principle that this Court's jurisdiction to review
decisions and orders of electoral tribunals is exercised only upon a
showing of grave abuse of discretion committed by the tribunal.
Absent such grave abuse of discretion, this Court shall not interfere
with the electoral tribunal’s exercise of its discretion or jurisdiction.
 Petitioner mainly assails the Tribunal's denial of his pleas for an
additional period of time within which to make his formal offer of
evidence. However, a review of the proceedings will reveal that the
HRET acted in accordance with its rules of procedure and well
within its jurisdiction.
 Nevertheless, in utter disregard of the Tribunal's warning, petitioner
again filed on December 18, 2008 a Manifestation and Motion (with
Prayer for Suspension of the Period to File Protestee's Formal Offer
of Evidence), praying for more time to present more witnesses, and
that he be allowed to file his Formal Offer of Evidence upon
completion of presentation of his evidence.
 Since the last day of the extension granted to him was on December
23, 2008 and said period lapsed without petitioner completing
presentation of his evidence including formal offer thereof, he was
deemed to have waived the same. Such action of the HRET was not a
denial of petitioner's right to due process.
 It is quite clear from the foregoing narration of how the proceedings
were conducted that petitioner was given all the opportunity to be
heard.
 So many hearing dates were set for his presentation of evidence, but
he merely wasted a good number of those days.
 He was granted an extension of time so he could file his formal offer
of evidence, but he still failed to fulfill his responsibility.
 The instant petition is DISMISSED.
Vilando vs. HRET
FACTS:
Limkaichong ran as a representative in the 1st District of Negros Oriental.
Because of this, her opponent, Paras and some other concerned citizens
filed disqualification cases against Limkaichong. They alleged that
Limkaichong was not a natural born citizen of the Philippines because
when she was born her father was still a Chinese and that her
mother, lost her Filipino citizenship by virtue of her marriage to
Limkaichong’s father. During the pendency of the case against
Limkaichong before the COMELEC, Election day came and votes were
cast. Results came in and Limkaichong won over her rival Paras.
COMELEC after due hearing declared Limkaichong as disqualified. Few
days after the counting of votes, COMELEC declared Limkaichong as a
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 Page 11 of 24

disqualified candidate. On the following days however, notwithstanding not disqualified as Member of the House of Representatives representing
their proclamation disqualifying Limkaichong, the COMELEC issued a the First District, Negros Oriental.
proclamation announcing Limkaichong as the winner of the recently
conducted elections. This is in compliance with Resolution No.
8062 adopting the policy-guidelines of not suspending the
proclamation of winning candidates with pending disqualification Guingona vs Gonzales (1991 and 1993)
cases which shall be without prejudice to the continuation of the hearing
and resolution of the involved cases. Paras countered the proclamation  This is a petition for Prohibition to prohibit respondents Senator
and she filed a petition before the COMELEC. Limkaichong asailed Paras’ Alberto Romulo and Wigberto Tañada from sitting and assuming the
petition arguing that since she is now the proclaimed winner, it should be position of members of the Commission on Appointments and to
the HRET which has the jurisdiction over the matter and not the prohibit Senators Neptali Gonzales, as ex-officio Chairman, of said
COMELEC. COMELEC agreed with Limkaichong. Commission from recognizing and allowing the respondent senators
to sit as members thereof.
ISSUES:  As a result of the national elections held last May 11, 1992, the
WON the proclamation done by the COMELEC is valid. Senate is composed of the following members or Senators
WON the HRET already acquired jurisdiction over the case. representing the respective political affiliations:
WON Limkaichong is qualified to hold an office in the Republic of the
Philippines
Held: LDP –– 15 senators
NPC –– 5 senators
1. The proclamation of Limkaichong was valid. Limkaichong timely LAKAS-NUCD –– 3 senators
filed with the COMELEC En Banc her motion for reconsideration as well LP-PDP-LABAN –– 1 senator
as for the lifting of the incorporated directive suspending her
proclamation. The filing of the motion for reconsideration effectively Applying the mathematical formula agreed to by the parties as follow as:
suspended the execution of the COMELEC’s Joint Resolution. Since the
execution of the Joint Resolution was suspended, there was no
No. of senators of a political
impediment to the valid proclamation of Limkaichong as the winner
pursuant to Section 2, Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. party x 12 seats
––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Total no. of senators elected
2. The HRET must exercise jurisdiction after Limkaichong’s
proclamation. The SC has invariably held that once a winning
candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a the resulting composition of the senate based on the rule of
Member of the House of Representatives the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over proportional representation of each political party with elected
election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, representatives in the Senate, is as follows:
and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins. It follows then that the
proclamation of a winning candidate divests the COMELEC of its
Political Party/ Proportional
jurisdiction over matters pending before it at the time of the
proclamation. The party questioning his qualification should now
present his case in a proper proceeding before the HRET, the Political Coalition Membership Representatives
constitutionally mandated tribunal to hear and decide a case involving a
Member of the House of Representatives with respect to the latter’s
LDP 15 7.5 members
election, returns and qualifications. The use of the word “sole” in
NPC 5 2.5 members
Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution and in Section 250 of the OEC
LAKAS-NUCD 3 1.5
underscores the exclusivity of the Electoral Tribunals’ jurisdiction over
members
election contests relating to its members.
LP-PDP-LABAN
1 .5
3. Records disclose that Limkaichong was born in Dumaguete City on
members
November 9, 1959. The governing law is thecitizenship provision of the
1935 Constitution. The HRET, therefore, correctly relied on the
presumption of validity of the July 9, 1957 and September 21, 1959  Romulo, as the majority floor leader, nominated 8 senators from
Orders of the Court of First Instance (CFI) Negros Oriental, which granted their party because he rounded off 7.5 to 8 and that Taňada from LP-
the petition and declared Julio Sy a naturalized Filipino absent any PDP-LABAN should represent the same party to the CoA. This is also
evidence to the contrary. Respondent Limkaichong falls under the pursuant to the proposition compromise by Sen Tolentino who
category of those persons whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines. proposed that the elected members of the CoA should consist of
(Section 1(3), Article IV, 1935 Constitution) It matters not whether the eight LDP, one LP-PDP-LABAN, two NPC and one LAKAS-NUCD.
father acquired citizenship by birth or by naturalization. Therefore, Guingona, a member of LAKAS-NUCD, opposed the said
following the line of transmission through the father under the 1935 compromise. He alleged that the compromise is against
Constitution, the respondent has satisfactorily complied with the proportional representation.
requirement for candidacy and for holding office, as she is a natural-born
Filipino citizen. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not rounding off is allowed in determining a
party’s representation in the CoA.
Respondent participated in the barangay elections as a young voter in 2. Whether or not there is a violation of Art. VI, Sec. 18
1976, accomplished voter's affidavit as of 1984, and ran as a candidate
and was elected as Mayor of La Libertad, Negros Oriental in 2004. These HELD: 1. No. 2. Yes.
are positive acts of election of Philippine citizenship. The case of In
re: Florencio Mallare, elucidates how election of citizenship is manifested
in actions indubitably showing a definite choice. We note that respondent  The respondents' claim to membership in the Commission on
had informally elected citizenship after January 17, 1973 during which Appointments by nomination and election of the LDP majority in the
time the 1973 Constitution considered as citizens of the Philippines all Senate as not in accordance with Section 18 of Article VI of the 1987
those who elect citizenship in accordance with the 1935 Constitution. Constitution and therefore violative of the same because it is not in
compliance with the requirements that twelve senators shall be
The present petition filed by Vilando was DISMISSED. The Court affirms elected on the basis of proportional representation of the resulting
the March 24, 2010 Decision of the HRET declaring that Limkaichong is fractional membership of the political parties represented therein.

#799 – Paul Jared Ng (Batch 7)


To disturb the resulting fractional membership of the political
parties in the Commission on Appointments by adding together two
halves to make a whole is a breach of the rule on proportional
representation because it will give the LDP an added member in the
Commission by utilizing the fractional membership of the minority
political party, who is deprived of half a representation.
 The provision of Section 18 on proportional representation is
mandatory in character and does not leave any discretion to the
majority party in the Senate to disobey or disregard the rule on
proportional representation; otherwise, the party with a majority
representation in the Senate or the House of Representatives can by
sheer force of number impose its will on the hapless minority. By
requiring a proportional representation in the Commission on
Appointments, Section 18 in effect works as a check on the majority
party in the Senate and helps to maintain the balance of power. No
party can claim more than what it is entitled to under such rule. To
allow it to elect more than its proportional share of members is to
confer upon such a party a greater share in the membership in the
Commission on Appointments and more power to impose its will on
the minority, who by the same token, suffers a diminution of its
rightful membership in the Commission.
 Section 18, also assures representation in the Commission on
Appointments of any political party who succeeds in electing
members to the Senate, provided that the number of senators so
elected enables it to put a representative in the Commission on
Appointments. Drawing from the ruling in the case of Coseteng
vs. Mitra, Jr., 12 a political party must have at least two senators in
the Senate to be able to have a representatives in the Commission on
Appointments, so that any number less than 2 will not entitle such a
party a membership in the Commission on Appointments. This
applies to the respondent Senator Tañada.
 The Court does not agree with respondents' claim that it is
mandatory to elect 12 Senators to the Commission on
Appointments. The Constitution does not contemplate that the
Commission on Appointments must necessarily include twelve (12)
senators and twelve (12) members of the House of Representatives.
What the Constitution requires is that there be at least a majority of
the entire membership. Under Section 18, the Commission shall rule
by majority vote of all the members and in Section 19, the
Commission shall meet only while congress is in session, at the call
of its Chairman or a majority of all its members "to discharge such
powers and functions herein conferred upon it".
PIMENTEL vs HRET (2002)
FACTS:
 On March 3, 1995, the Party-List System Act took effect. The
Act sought to “promote proportional representation in the
election of representatives, to the House of Representatives
through a party-list system of registered national, regional and
sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which
will enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who
lack well-defined political constituencies but who could
contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate
legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become
members of the House of Representatives.”
 On May 11, 1998, in accordance with the Party-List System Act,
national elections were held which included, for the first time,
the election through popular vote of party-list groups and
organizations whose nominees would become members of the
House. Proclaimed winners were 14 party-list representatives
from 13 organizations.
 On January 18, 2000, Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. wrote
two letters addressed to then Senate President Blas F. Ople, as
Chairman of the CA, and to Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court Jose A. R. Melo (now retired), as Chairman of the HRET.
The letters requested Senate President Ople and Justice Melo
to cause the restructuring of the CA and the HRET,
respectively, to include party-list representatives to conform to
Sections 17 and 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
Page 12 of 24
 Petitioners filed with this Court their Petitions for Prohibition,
Mandamus and Preliminary Injunction (with Prayer for
Temporary Restraining Order) against the HRET, its Chairman
and Members, and against the CA, its Chairman and Members.
Petitioners contend that, under the Constitution and the Party-
List System Act, party-list representatives should have 1.2 or at
least 1 seat in the HRET, and 2.4 seats in the CA.
 Petitioners cite as basis Sections 17 and 18, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution, to wit:
o “Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of
Representatives shall each have an Electoral
Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal
shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom
shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be
designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining
six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of
Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be
chosen on the basis of proportional representation
from the political parties and the parties or
organizations registered under the party-list system
represented therein. The senior Justice in the
Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.”
o “Sec. 18. There shall be a Commission on
Appointments consisting of the President of the
Senate, as ex officio Chairman, twelve Senators and
twelve Members of the House of Representatives,
elected by each House on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties and parties
or organizations registered under the party-list
system represented therein. The Chairman of the
Commission shall not vote, except in case of a tie.
The Commission shall act on all appointments
submitted to it within thirty session days of the
Congress from their submission. The Commission
shall rule by a majority vote of all the Members,”
ISSUES:
 WHETHER THE PRESENT COMPOSITION OF THE HOUSE
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTIONAL
REQUIREMENT OF PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION
BECAUSE THERE ARE NO PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES IN
THE HRET.
 WHETHER THE PRESENT MEMBERSHIP OF THE HOUSE IN
THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS VIOLATES THE
CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT OF PROPORTIONAL
REPRESENTATION BECAUSE THERE ARE NO PARTY-LIST
REPRESENTATIVES IN THE CA.
 Note: The issues cannot be answered as of this moment, it is
not the proper recourse)
RULING:
 Petitioners urge the Court to rule on the issues raised in the
petitions under review, citing the following pronouncement
in Guingona Jr. v. Gonzales:
o “Where constitutional issues are properly raised in
the context of the alleged facts, procedural questions
acquire a relatively minor significance, and the
transcendental importance to the public of the case
demands that they be settled promptly and
definitely brushing aside xxx technicalities of
procedure.”
 Petitioners’ reliance on Guingona, Jr. v. Gonzales is misplaced.
The “procedural questions” that petitioners want the Court to
brush aside are not mere technicalities but substantive matters
that are specifically provided for in the constitutional
provisions cited by petitioners.
 The Constitution expressly grants to the House of
Representatives the prerogative, within constitutionally
defined limits, to choose from among its district and party-list
representatives those who may occupy the seats allotted to the
House in the HRET and the CA. Section 18, Article VI of the
Constitution explicitly confers on the Senate and on the House
#799 – Paul Jared Ng (Batch 7)

the authority to elect among their members those who would
fill the 12 seats for Senators and 12 seats for House members
in the Commission on Appointments. Under Section 17, Article
VI of the Constitution, each chamber of Congress exercises the
power to choose, within constitutionally defined limits, who
among their members would occupy the allotted 6 seats of
each chamber’s respective electoral tribunal.
 These constitutional provisions are reiterated in Rules 3 and 4
(a) of the 1998 Rules of the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal, to wit:
o “Rule 3. Composition. - The Tribunal shall be
composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be
Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by
the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be
Members of the House of Representatives who shall
be chosen on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties and the
parties or organizations registered under the party-
list system represented therein. The Senior Justice in
the Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
o Rule 4. Organization. - (a) Upon the designation of
the Justices of the Supreme Court and the election of
the Members of the House of Representatives who
are to compose the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal pursuant to Sections 17 and 19 of
Article VI of the Constitution, the Tribunal shall meet
for its organization and adoption of such resolutions
as it may deem proper.” (Emphasis supplied)
 Likewise, Section 1 of the Rules of the Commission on
Appointments provides:
o “Section 1. Composition of the Commission On
Appointments. Within thirty (30) days after both
Houses of Congress shall have organized themselves
with the election of the Senate President and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, the
Commission on Appointments shall be constituted.
It shall be composed of twelve (12) Senators and
twelve (12) members of the House of
Representatives, elected by each House on the basis
of proportional representation from the political
parties and parties or organizations registered
under the party-list system represented herein.
 Thus, even assuming that party-list representatives comprise a
sufficient number and have agreed to designate common
nominees to the HRET and the CA, their primary recourse
clearly rests with the House of Representatives and not with
this Court. Under Sections 17 and 18, Article VI of the
Constitution, party-list representatives must first show to the
House that they possess the required numerical strength to be
entitled to seats in the HRET and the CA. Only if the House fails
to comply with the directive of the Constitution on
proportional representation of political parties in the HRET
and the CA can the party-list representatives seek recourse to
this Court under its power of judicial review.
CITY OF DAVAO vs RTC
POLICY: The plenary powers of Congress cannot be limited by passage of
un-repealable laws
FACTS:
GSIS Davao City branch office received a Notice of Public Auction,
scheduling public bidding of its properties for non-payment of realty
taxes from 1992-1994, amounting to the sum total of Php 295, 721.61.
The auction was, however, subsequently reset by virtue of a deadline
extension given by Davao City.
On July 28, 1994, GSIS received Warrants of Levy and Notices of Levy on
three parcels of land it owned and another Notice of Public Auction. In
September of that same year, GSIS filed a petition for Certiorari,
Prohibition, Mandamus and/or Declaratory Relief with the Davao City
RTC.
Page 13 of 24
During pre-trial, the only issue raised was whether sec. 234 and 534 of
the Local Government Code, which have withdrawn real property tax
from GOCCs, have also withdrawn from the GSIS its right to be exempted
from payment of realty tax.
RTC rendered decision in favor of GSIS. Hence this petition.
ISSUE/S:
Whether the GSIS tax exemptions can be deemed as withdrawn by the
LGC
W/N sec. 33 of P.D. 1146 has been repealed by the LGC
HELD:
Reading together sec. 133, 232, and 234 of the LGC, as a general rule: the
taxing powers of LGUs cannot extend to the levy of “taxes, fees, and
charges of any kind on the National Government, its agencies and
instrumentalities, and LGUs.”
However, under sec. 234, exemptions from payment of real property
taxes granted to natural or juridical persons, including GOCCs, except as
provided in said section, are withdrawn upon effectivity of LGC. GSIS
being a GOCC, then it necessarily follows that its exemption has been
withdrawn.
Regarding P.D. 1146 which laid down requisites for repeal on the laws
granting exemption, Supreme Court found a fundamental flaw in Sec. 33,
particularly the amendatory second paragraph.
Said paragraph effectively imposes restrictions on the competency of the
Congress to enact future legislation on the taxability of GSIS. This places
an undue restraint on the plenary power of the legislature to amend or
repeal laws.
Only the Constitution may operate to preclude or place restrictions on the
amendment or repeal laws. These conditions imposed under P.D. 1146, if
honored, have the precise effect of limiting the powers of Congress.
Supreme Court held that they cannot render effective the amendatory
second paragraph of sec. 33, for by doing so, they would be giving
sanction to a disingenuous means employed through legislative power to
bind subsequent legislators to a subsequent mode of repeal. Thus, the
two conditions under sec. 33 cannot bear relevance whether the LGC
removed the tax-exempt status of GSIS.
Furthermore, ec. 5 on the rules of interpretation of LGC states that “any
tax exemption, incentive or relief granted by any LGU pursuant to the
provision of this Code shall be construed strictly against the person
claiming it.”
The GSIS tax-exempt status, in sum, was withdrawn in 1992 by the LGC
but restored by the GSIS Act of 1997, sec. 39. The subject real property
taxes for the years 1992-1994 were assessed against GSIS while the LGC
provisions prevailed and thus may be collected by the City of Davao.
HON. WALDO FLORES, in his capacity as Senior capacity as Senior
Deputy Executive Secretary in the Office of the President, HON. ARTHUR P.
AUTEA, in his capacity as Deputy Executive Secretary in the Office of the
President, and the PRESIDENTIAL ANTI-GRAFT COMMISSION (PAGC) vs
ATTY. ANTONIO MONTEMAYOR
FACTS:
 (I sincerely apologize na taas ni, procedural ang case. Please
focus on the Doctrine of Non-delegation of Powers)
 Respondent Atty. Antonio F. Montemayor was appointed by
the President as Regional Director II of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR), Region IV, in San Fernando, Pampanga.
 On January 30, 2003, the Office of the President received a
letter from “a concerned citizen” dated January 20,
2003 relating Montemayor’s ostentatious lifestyle which is
apparently disproportionate to his income as a public official.
#799 – Paul Jared Ng (Batch 7)

The letter was referred to Dario C. Rama, Chairman of the
Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) for appropriate
action. The Investigating Office of the PAGC immediately
conducted a fact-finding inquiry into the matter and
issued subpoenas duces tecum to the responsible personnel of
the BIR and the Land Transportation Office (LTO). In
compliance with the subpoena, BIR Personnel Division Chief
Estelita Datu submitted to the PAGC a copy of Montemayor’s
appointment papers along with a certified true copy of the
latter’s Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities (SSAL) for
the year 2002. Meanwhile, the LTO, through its Records Section
Chief, Ms. Arabelle O. Petilla, furnished the PAGC with a record of
vehicles registered to Montemayor, to wit: a 2001 Ford
Expedition, a 1997 Toyota Land Cruiser, and a 1983 Mitsubishi
Galant.
 During the pendency of the investigation, the Philippine Center
for Investigative Journalism, a media organization which had
previously published an article on the unexplained wealth of
certain BIR officials, also submitted to the PAGC copies of
Montemayor’s SSAL for the years 1999, 2000 and 2001. In
Montemayor’s 1999 and 2000 SSAL, the PAGC noted that
Montemayor declared his ownership over several motor
vehicles, but failed to do the same in his 2001 SSAL.
 On the basis of the said documents, the PAGC issued a Formal
Charge against Montemayor on May 19, 2003 for violation of
Section 7 of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019in relation to Section 8 (A)
of RA No. 6713 due to his failure to declare the 2001 Ford
Expedition with a value ranging from 1.7 million to 1.9 million
pesos, and the 1997 Toyota Land Cruiser with an estimated value
of 1 million to 1.2 million pesos in his 2001 and 2002 SSAL. The
charge was docketed as PAGC-ADM-0149-03. On the same date,
the PAGC issued an Order directing Montemayor to file his
counter-affidavit or verified answer to the formal charge against
him within ten (10) days from the receipt of the Order.
Montemayor, however, failed to submit his counter-affidavit or
verified answer to the formal charge lodged against him.
 On June 4, 2003, during the preliminary conference,
Montemayor, through counsel, moved for the deferment of the
administrative proceedings explaining that he has filed a
petition for certiorari before the CA questioning the PAGC’s
jurisdiction to conduct the administrative investigation against
him. The PAGC denied Montemayor’s motion for lack of merit,
and instead gave him until June 9, 2003 to submit his counter-
affidavit or verified answer. Still, no answer was filed.
 On June 23, 2003, the CA issued a Temporary Restraining
Order (TRO) in CA-G.R. SP No. 77285 enjoining the PAGC from
proceeding with the investigation for sixty (60)
days. On September 12, 2003, shortly after the expiration of
the sixty (60)-day TRO, the PAGC issued a Resolution finding
Montemayor administratively liable as charged and
recommending to the Office of the President Montemayor’s
dismissal from the service.
 On March 23, 2004, the Office of the President, through Deputy
Executive Secretary Arthur P. Autea, issued a Decision
adopting in toto the findings and recommendation of the PAGC.
 Montemayor sought reconsideration of the said decision. This
time, he argued that he was denied his right to due process
when the PAGC proceeded to investigate his case
notwithstanding the pendency of his petition
for certiorari before the CA, and its subsequent elevation to the
Supreme Court. The motion was eventually denied.
 Aggrieved, Montemayor brought the matter to the CA via a
petition for review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended.
ISSUE:
 WHETHER THE PAGC HAS THE AUTHORITY TO RECOMMEND
RESPONDENT’S DISMISSAL FROM THE SERVICE;
 WHETHER THE ASSUMPTION BY THE OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN OF ITS JURISDICTION TO INVESTIGATE
RESPONDENT FOR THE SAME OFFENSE DEPRIVED THE PAGC
[WITH ITS JURISDICTION] FROM PROCEEDING WITH ITS
INVESTIGATION.
RULING:
Page 14 of 24
 The PAGC was created by virtue of EO No. 12, signed on April
16, 2001 to speedily address the problem on corruption and
abuses committed in the government, particularly by officials
appointed by the President. Under Section 4 (b) of EO No. 12,
the PAGC has the power to investigate and hear administrative
complaints provided (1) that the official to be investigated
must be a presidential appointee in the government or any of
its agencies or instrumentalities, and (2) that the said official
must be occupying the position of assistant regional director,
or an equivalent rank, or higher.
 Respondent contends that he was deprived of his right to due
process when the PAGC proceeded to investigate him on the
basis of an anonymous complaint in the absence of any
documents supporting the complainant’s assertions.
 Section 4 (c) of EO No. 12 states that the PAGC has the power to
give due course to anonymous complaints against presidential
appointees if there appears on the face of the complaint or based
on the supporting documents attached to the anonymous
complaint a probable cause to engender a belief that the
allegations may be true. Respondent also assails the PAGC’s
decision to proceed with the investigation process without
giving him the opportunity to present controverting evidence.
 We find nothing irregular with the PAGC’s decision to proceed
with its investigation notwithstanding the pendency of
Montemayor’s petition for certiorari before the CA. The filing of
a petition for certiorari with the CA did not divest the PAGC of
its jurisdiction validly acquired over the case before it.
 First, it must be remembered that the PAGC’s act of issuing the
assailed resolution enjoys the presumption of regularity
particularly since it was done in the performance of its official
duties. Mere surmises and conjectures, absent any proof
whatsoever, will not tilt the balance against the presumption, if
only to provide constancy in the official acts of authorized
government personnel and officials. Simply put, the timing of
the issuance of the assailed PAGC resolution by itself cannot be
used to discredit, much less nullify, what appears on its face to
be a regular performance of the PAGC’s duties.
 Second, Montemayor’s argument, as well as the CA’s
observation that respondent was not afforded a “second”
opportunity to present controverting evidence, does not hold
water. The essence of due process in administrative
proceedings is an opportunity to explain one’s side or an
opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. So long as the party is given the opportunity to
explain his side, the requirements of due process are
satisfactorily complied with.
 Significantly, the records show that the PAGC issued an order
informing Montemayor of the formal charge filed against him
and gave him ten (10) days within which to present a counter-
affidavit or verified answer. When the said period lapsed
without respondent asking for an extension, the PAGC gave
Montemayor a fresh ten (10)-day period to file his answer, but
the latter chose to await the decision of the CA in his petition
for certiorari. During the preliminary conference, Montemayor
was again informed that he is given a new ten (10)-day period,
or until June 19, 2003 within which to file his
memorandum/position paper as well as supporting evidence
with a warning that if he still fails to do so, the complaint shall
be deemed submitted for resolution on the basis of available
documentary evidence on record. Again, the deadline lapsed
without any evidence being presented by Montemayor in his
defense.
 We stress that the PAGC’s findings and recommendations
remain as recommendations until finally acted upon by the
Office of the President. Montemayor, therefore, had two (2)
choices upon the issuance of the PAGC resolution: to move for
a reconsideration thereof, or to ask for another opportunity
before the Office of the President to present his side
particularly since the assailed resolution is merely
recommendatory in nature. Having failed to exercise any of
these two (2) options, Montemayor cannot now be allowed to
seek recourse before this Court for the consequences of his
own shortcomings.
#799 – Paul Jared Ng (Batch 7)

o The cases filed against respondent before the
Ombudsman were initiated after the Office of the
President decided to dismiss Montemayor. More
importantly, the proceedings before the PAGC were
already finished even prior to the initiation and
filing of cases against him by the Ombudsman. In
fact, it was the PAGC’s findings and
recommendations which served as the basis in the
Office of the President’s decision to dismiss
Montemayor from government service. Clearly then,
the exercise by the Office of the President of its
concurrent investigatory and prosecutorial power
over Montemayor had already been terminated even
before the Ombudsman could take cognizance over
the matter. The Ombudsman, therefore, cannot take
over a task that is already a fait accompli.
 As to the substantive aspect, i.e., whether the PAGC’s
recommendation to dismiss Montemayor from government
service is supported by substantial evidence, we find in favor of
petitioners.
REVIEW CENTER ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES,
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARYEDUARDO ERMITA
FACTS:
• There was a report that handwritten copies of two sets of 2006
Nursing Board examination were circulated during the examination
period among examinees reviewing at the R.A. Gapuz Review Center and
Inress Review Center. The examinees were provided with a list of 500
questions and answers in two of the examinations’ five subjects,
particularly Tests III (Psychiatric Nursing) and V (Medical-Surgical
Nursing). The PRC later admitted the leakage and traced it to two Board
of Nursing members. Exam results came out but Court of Appeals
restrained the PRC from proceeding with the oath-taking of the successful
examinees.
• President GMA ordered for a re-examination and issued EO
566 which authorized the CHED to supervise the establishment and
operation of all review centers and similar entities in the Philippines.
CHED Chairman Puno approved CHED Memorandum Order No. 49 series
of 2006 (Implementing Rules and Regulations).
• Review Center Association of the Philippines (petitioner), an
organization of independent review centers, asked the CHED to "amend, if
not withdraw" the IRR arguing, among other things, that giving permits to
operate a review center to Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) or
consortia of HEIs and professional organizations will effectively abolish
independent review centers. CHED Chairman Puno however believed that
suspending the implementation of the IRR would be inconsistent with the
mandate of EO 566.
• A dialogue between the petitioner and CHED took place.
Revised IRR was approved. Petitioner filed before the CHED a Petition to
Clarify/Amend RIRR praying to exclude independent review center from
the coverage of the CHED; to clarify the meaning of the requirement for
existing review centers to tie-up with HEIs; to revise the rules to make it
conform with RA 7722 limiting the CHED’s coverage to public and private
institutions of higher education.
• In 2007, then CHED Chairman Neri responded to the petitioner
that: to exclude the operation of independent review centers from the
coverage of CHED would clearly contradict the intention of the said
Executive Order No.566; As to the request to clarify what is meant by tie-
up/be integrated with an HEI, tie-up/be integrated simply means, to be in
partner with an HEI.
• Petitioner filed a petition for Prohibition and Mandamus before
this Court praying for the annulment of the RIRR, the declaration of EO
566 as invalid and unconstitutional exercise of legislative power, and the
prohibition against CHED from implementing the RIRR. Motion to
intervene filed by other organizations/institutions were granted by the
Court.
• On 21 May 2008, CHED issued CHED Memorandum Order No.
21, Series of 2008 (CMO 21, s. 2008) extending the deadline for six
months from 27 May 2008 for all existing independent review centers to
tie-up or be integrated with HEIs in accordance with the RIRR. On 25
November 2008 Resolution, SC resolved torequire the parties to observe
Page 15 of 24
the status quo prevailing before the issuance of EO 566, the RIRR, and
CMO 21, s.2008.
ISSUES:
1. Whether EO 566 is an unconstitutional exercise by the
Executive of legislative power as it expands theCHED’s jurisdiction; and
2. Whether the RIRR is an invalid exercise of the Executive’s rule-
making power.
HELD:
1. Yes, it expands CHED’s jurisdiction, hence unconstitutional. The
scopes of EO 566 and the RIRR clearly expand the CHED’s coverage under
RA 7722. The CHED’s coverage under RA 7722 is limited to public and
private institutions of higher education and degree-granting programs in
all public and private post-secondary educational institutions. EO 566
directed the CHED to formulate a framework for the regulation of review
centers and similar entities. The definition of a review center under EO
566 shows that it refers to one which offers "a program or course of study
that is intended to refresh and enhance the knowledge or competencies
and skills of reviewees obtained in the formal school setting in
preparation for the licensure examinations" given by the PRC. It does not
offer a degree-granting program that would put it under the jurisdiction
of the CHED.
A review course is only intended to "refresh and enhance the knowledge
or competencies and skills of reviewees." Thus, programs given by review
centers could not be considered "programs x x x of higher learning" that
would put them under the jurisdiction of the CHED. "Higher education," is
defined as "education beyond the secondary level” or "education provided
by a college or university." Further, the "similar entities" in EO 566 cover
centers providing "review or tutorial services" in areas not covered by
licensure examinations given by the PRC, which include, although not
limited to, college entrance examinations, Civil Services examinations, and
tutorial services. These review and tutorial services hardly qualify as
programs of higher learning.
2. Yes, it is invalid. The exercise of the President’s residual powers
under Section 20, Title I of Book III of EO (invoked by theOSG to justify
GMA’s action) requires legislation; as the provision clearly states that the
exercise of the President’s other powers and functions has to be
"provided for under the law." There is no law granting the President the
power to amend the functions of the CHED. The President has no inherent
or delegated legislative power to amend the functions of the CHED under
RA 7722. The line that delineates Legislative and Executive power is not
indistinct. Legislative power is "the authority, under the Constitution, to
make laws, and to alter and repeal them."
The Constitution, as the will of the people in their original, sovereign and
unlimited capacity, has vested this power in the Congress of the
Philippines. Any power, deemed to be legislative by usage and tradition, is
necessarily possessed by Congress, unless the Constitution has lodged it
elsewhere.The President has control over the executive department,
bureaus and offices. Meaning, he has the authority to assume directly the
functions of the executive department, bureau and office, or interfere with
the discretion of itsofficials. Corollary to the power of control, he is
granted administrative power. Administrative power is concerned with
the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as determined by
proper governmental organs. It enables the President to fix a uniform
standard of administrative efficiency and check the official conduct of his
agents. To this end, he can issue administrative orders, rules and
regulations.
An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which
relates to specific aspects in the administrative operation of government.
It must be in harmony with the law and should be for the sole purpose of
implementing the law and carrying out the legislative policy. Since EO 566
is an invalid exercise of legislative power, the RIRR is also an invalid
exercise of the CHED’s quasi-legislative power.
Administrative agencies exercise their quasi-legislative or rule-making
power through the promulgation of rules and regulations. The CHED may
only exercise its rule-making power within the confines of its jurisdiction
under RA 7722. But The RIRR covers review centers and similar entities.
#799 – Paul Jared Ng (Batch 7)

FORT BONIFACIO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
vs.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
FACTS:
• Before us is respondents’ Motion for Reconsideration of our
Decision dated April 2, 2009 which granted the consolidated petitions of
petitioner Fort Bonifacio Development Corporation, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. The
assailed decisions of the Court of Tax Appeals and
the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Respondents are hereby (1) restrained from
collecting from petitioner the amount of
P28,413,783.00 representing the transitional input
tax credit due it for the fourth quarter of 1996; and
(2) directed to refund to petitioner the amount of
P347,741,695.74 paid as output VAT for the third
quarter of 1997 in light of the persisting transitional
input tax credit available to petitioner for the said
quarter, or to issue a tax credit corresponding to
such amount. No pronouncement as to costs.
• The Motion for Reconsideration raises the following
arguments:
1. Section 100 of the Old National Internal Revenue
Code (old NIRC), as amended by Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 7716, could not have supplied the distinction
between the treatment of real properties or real
estate dealers on the one hand, and the treatment of
transactions involving other commercial goods on
the other hand, as said distinction is found in Section
105 and, subsequently, Revenue Regulations No. 7-
95 which defines the input tax creditable to a real
estate dealer who becomes subject to vat for the first
time.
2. Section 4.105.1 and paragraph (a) (iii) of the
transitory provisions of revenue regulations no. 7-95
validly limit the 8% transitional input tax to the
improvements on real properties.
3. Revenue Regulations no. 6-97 did not repeal
Revenue Regulations No. 7-95.
ISSUE: Whether or not allowable transitional input tax credit is limited to
improvements on real properties.
HELD: The instant motion for reconsideration lacks merit.
• The first VAT law, found in Executive Order (EO) No. 273
[1987], took effect on January 1, 1988. It amended several provisions of
the National Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (Old NIRC). EO 273 likewise
accommodated the potential burdens of the shift to the VAT system by
allowing newly VAT-registered persons to avail of a transitional input tax
credit as provided for in Section 105 of the Old NIRC.
• RA 7716 took effect on January 1, 1996. It amended Section
100 of the Old NIRC by imposing for the first time value-added-tax on sale
of real properties. The amendment reads:
Sec. 100. Value-added-tax on sale of goods or properties.
— (a) Rate and base of tax. — There shall be levied,
assessed and collected on every sale, barter or
exchange of goods or properties, a value-added tax
equivalent to 10% of the gross selling price or gross
value in money of the goods, or properties sold,
bartered or exchanged, such tax to be paid by the
seller or transferor.(1) The term 'goods or
properties' shall mean all tangible and intangible
objects which are capable of pecuniary estimation
and shall include: (A) Real properties held primarily
for sale to customers or held for lease in the ordinary
course of trade or business; xxx
• The provisions of Section 105 of the NIRC, on the transitional
Page 16 of 24
input tax credit, remain intact despite the enactment of RA 7716. Section
105 however was amended with the passage of the new National Internal
Revenue Code of 1997 (New NIRC), also officially known as Republic Act
(RA) 8424. The provisions on the transitional input tax credit are now
embodied in Section 111(A) of the New NIRC.
• The Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) disallowed Fort
Bonifacio Development Corporation’s (FBDC) presumptive input tax
credit arising from the land inventory on the basis of Revenue Regulation
7-95 (RR 7-95) and Revenue Memorandum Circular 3-96 (RMC 3-96).
• However, in the case of real estate dealers, the basis of the
presumptive input tax shall be the improvements, such as buildings,
roads, drainage systems, and other similar structures, constructed on or
after the effectivity of EO 273 (January 1, 1988). The transitional input tax
shall be 8% of the value of the inventory or actual VAT paid, whichever is
higher, which amount may be allowed as tax credit against the output tax
of the VAT-registered person.
• In the April 2, 2009 Decision sought to be reconsidered, the
Court struck down Section 4.105-1 of RR 7-95 for being in conflict with
the law. It held that the CIR had no power to limit the meaning and
coverage of the term "goods" in Section 105 of the Old NIRC sans
statutory authority or basis and justification to make such limitation. This
it did when it restricted the application of Section 105 in the case of real
estate dealers only to improvements on the real property belonging to
their beginning inventory.
• A law must not be read in truncated parts; its provisions must
be read in relation to the whole law. It is the cardinal rule in statutory
construction that a statute’s clauses and phrases must not be taken as
detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part thereof
must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts in order to
produce a harmonious whole. Every part of the statute must be
interpreted with reference to the context, i.e., that every part of the
statute must be considered together with other parts of the statute and
kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment.
• In construing a statute, courts have to take the thought
conveyed by the statute as a whole; construe the constituent parts
together; ascertain the legislative intent from the whole act; consider
each and every provision thereof in the light of the general purpose of the
statute; and endeavor to make every part effective, harmonious and
sensible.
• The statutory definition of the term "goods or properties"
leaves no room for doubt. It states: Sec. 100. Value-added tax on sale of
goods or properties. – (a) Rate and base of tax. – xxx. (1) The term ‘goods
or properties’ shall mean all tangible and intangible objects which are
capable of pecuniary estimation and shall include: (A) Real properties
held primarily for sale to customers or held for lease in the ordinary
course of trade or business; xxx.
• The term "goods or properties" by the unambiguous terms of
Section 100 includes "real properties held primarily for sale to costumers
or held for lease in the ordinary course of business." Having been defined
in Section 100 of the NIRC, the term "goods" as used in Section 105 of the
same code could not have a different meaning. Goods, as commonly
understood in the business sense, refers to the product which the VAT-
registered person offers for sale to the public. With respect to real estate
dealers, it is the real properties themselves which constitute their
"goods." Such real properties are the operating assets of the real estate
dealer.
• However, in the case of real estate dealers, the basis of the
presumptive input tax shall be the improvements, such as buildings,
roads, drainage systems, and other similar structures, constructed on or
after the effectivity of EO 273 (January 1, 1988).
• As mandated by Article 7 of the Civil Code, an administrative
rule or regulation cannot contravene the law on which it is based. RR 7-95
is inconsistent with Section 105 insofar as the definition of the term
"goods" is concerned. This is a legislative act beyond the authority of the
CIR and the Secretary of Finance. The rules and regulations that
administrative agencies promulgate, which are the product of a delegated
legislative power to create new and additional legal provisions that have
the effect of law, should be within the scope of the statutory authority
granted by the legislature to the objects and purposes of the law, and
should not be in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards
prescribed by law.
#799 – Paul Jared Ng (Batch 7)

• To be valid, an administrative rule or regulation must conform,
not contradict, the provisions of the enabling law. An implementing rule
or regulation cannot modify, expand, or subtract from the law it is
intended to implement. Any rule that is not consistent with the statute
itself is null and void. While administrative agencies, such as the Bureau
of Internal Revenue, may issue regulations to implement statutes, they are
without authority to limit the scope of the statute to less than what it
provides, or extend or expand the statute beyond its terms, or in any way
modify explicit provisions of the law. Indeed, a quasi-judicial body or
an administrative agency for that matter cannot amend an act of
Congress. Hence, in case of a discrepancy between the basic law and an
interpretative or administrative ruling, the basic law prevails.
• To recapitulate, RR 7-95, insofar as it restricts the definition of
"goods" as basis of transitional input tax credit under Section 105 is a
nullity. It is clear, therefore, that the allowable transitional input tax credit
is not limited to improvements on real properties. The particular
provision of RR 7-95 has effectively been repealed by RR 6-97 which is
now in consonance with Section 100 of the NIRC, insofar as the definition
of real properties as goods is concerned. The failure to add a specific
repealing clause would not necessarily indicate that there was no intent
to repeal RR 7-95. The fact that the aforequoted paragraph was deleted
created an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy between the
provisions of RR 6-97 and RR 7-95.
VICTORIA GUTIERREZ
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT (DBM)
FACTS:
• These consolidated cases question the inclusion of certain
allowances and fringe benefits into the standardized salary rates for
offices in the national government, state universities and colleges, and
local government units as required by the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989 and implemented through the challenged
National Compensation Circular 59 (NCC 59).
• Congress enacted in 1989 Republic Act (R.A.) 6758, called the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 to rationalize the
compensation of government employees. Its Section 12 directed the
consolidation of allowances and additional compensation already being
enjoyed by employees into their standardized salary rates. But it
exempted certain additional compensations that the employees may be
receiving from such consolidation.
• Pursuant thereto, the Department of Budget and Management
(DBM) issued NCC 59 dated September 30, 1989, covering the offices of
the national government, state universities and colleges, and local
government units. NCC 59 enumerated the specific allowances and
additional compensations which were deemed integrated in the basic
salaries and these included the Cost of Living Allowance (COLA) and
Inflation Connected Allowance (ICA). The DBM re-issued and published
NCC 59 on May 3, 2004.
• The DBM also issued Corporate Compensation Circular (CCC)
10 dated October 2, 1989, covering all government-owned or controlled
corporations and government financial institutions. The DBM re-issued
this circular on February 15, 1999 and published it on March 16, 1999.
Accordingly, the Commission on Audit (COA) disallowed the payments of
honoraria and other allowances which were deemed integrated into the
standardized salary rates. Employees of government-owned or controlled
corporations questioned the validity of CCC 10 due to its non-publication.
• Meanwhile, the DBM also issued Budget Circular 2001-03
dated November 12, 2001, clarifying that only the exempt allowances
under Section 12 of R.A. 6758 may continue to be granted the employees;
all others were deemed integrated in the standardized salary rates. Thus,
the payment of allowances and compensation such as COLA, amelioration
allowance, and ICA, among others, which were already deemed integrated
in the basic salary were unauthorized.
• On May 16, 2002 employees of the Office of the Solicitor
General filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus in G.R. 153266,
questioning the propriety of integrating their COLA into their
standardized salary rates. Employees of other offices of the national
government followed suit. In addition, petitioners in G.R. 159007
questioned the disallowance of the allowances and fringe benefits that the
Page 17 of 24
COA auditing personnel assigned to the Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS) used to get. Petitioners in G.R. 173119 questioned the
disallowance of the ICA that used to be paid to the officials and employees
of the Insurance Commission.
• On October 26, 2005 the DBM issued National Budget Circular
2005-502 which provided that all Supreme Court rulings on the
integration of allowances, including COLA, of government employees
under R.A. 6758 applied only to specific government-owned or controlled
corporations since the consolidated cases covering the national
government employees are still pending with this Court. Consequently,
the payment of allowances and other benefits to them, such as COLA and
ICA, remained prohibited until otherwise provided by law or ruled by this
Court. The circular further said that all agency heads and other
responsible officials and employees found to have authorized the grant of
COLA and other allowances and benefits already integrated in the basic
salary shall be personally held liable for such payment.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the non-publication of NCC 59 dated September 30, 1989
in the Official Gazette or newspaper of general circulation nullifies the
integration of the COLA into the standardized salary rates; and
HELD:
1. Petitioners argue that since CCC 10 dated October 2, 1989
covering all government-owned or controlled corporations and
government financial institutions was ineffective until its re-issuance and
publication on March 16, 1999, its counterpart, NCC 59 dated September
30, 1989 covering the offices of the national government, state
universities and colleges, and local government units should also be
regarded as ineffective until its re-issuance and publication on May 3,
2004. Thus, the COLA should not be deemed integrated into the
standardized salary rates from 1989 to 2004. Respondents counter that
the fact that NCC 59 was not published should not be considered as an
obstacle to the integration of COLA into the standardized salary rates.
Accordingly, Budget Circular 2001-03, insofar as it reiterates NCC 59,
should not be treated as ineffective since it merely reaffirms the fact of
consolidation of COLA into the employees’ salary as mandated by Section
12 of R.A. 6758.
It is a settled rule that publication is required as a condition precedent to
the effectivity of a law to inform the public of its contents before their
rights and interests are affected by the same. Administrative rules and
regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or
implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.
Nonetheless, as previously discussed, the integration of COLA into the
standardized salary rates is not dependent on the publication of CCC 10
and NCC 59. This benefit is deemed included in the standardized salary
rates of government employees since it falls under the general rule of
integration—“all allowances.”
More importantly, the integration was not by mere legal fiction since it
was factually integrated into the employees’ salaries. Records show that
the government employees were informed by their respective offices of
their new position titles and their corresponding salary grades when they
were furnished with the Notices of Position Allocation and Salary
Adjustment (NPASA). The NPASA provided the breakdown of the
employee’s gross monthly salary as of June 30, 1989 and the composition
of his standardized pay under R.A. 6758. Notably, the COLA was
considered part of the employee’s monthly income.
In truth, petitioners never really suffered any diminution in pay as a
consequence of the consolidation of COLA into their standardized salary
rates. There is thus nothing in these cases which can be the subject of a
back pay since the amount corresponding to COLA was never withheld
from petitioners in the first place.
Consequently, the non-publication of CCC 10 and NCC 59 in the Official
Gazette or newspaper of general circulation does not nullify the
integration of COLA into the standardized salary rates upon the effectivity
#799 – Paul Jared Ng (Batch 7)

of R.A. 6758. The validity of R.A. 6758 should not be made to depend on
the validity of its implementing rules.
COCOFED VS REPUBLIC 663 SCRA 514 (2012)
FACTS:
In 1971, Republic Act No. 6260 was enacted creating the
Coconut Investment Fund (CIF). The source of the CIF was a P0.55 levy on
the sale of every 100 kg. of copra. The Philippine Coconut Administration
was tasked to collect and administer the Fund. Out of the 0.55 levy, P0.02
was placed at the disposition of the COCOFED, the recognized national
association of coconut producers declared by the PCA. Cocofund receipts
were ought to be issued to every copra seller. During the Martial Law
regime, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued several Presidential
Decrees purportedly for the improvement of the coconut industry. The
most relevant among these is P.D. No. 755 which permitted the use of the
Fund for the―acquisition of a commercial bank for the benefit of coconut
farmers and the distribution of the shares of the stock of the bank it [PCA]
acquired free to the coconut farmers‖ (Sec.2).
Thus, the PCA acquired the First United Bank, later renamed
the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB). The PCA bought the 72.2% of
PUB’s outstanding capital stock or 137,866 shares at P200 per share
(P27, 573,200.00) from Pedro Cojuangco in behalf of the coconut
farmers.” The rest of the Fund was deposited to the UCPB interest free.
Farmers who had paid the CIF and registered their receipts with PCA
were given their corresponding UCPB stock certificates. Only 16 million
worth of COCOFUND receipts were registered and a large number of the
coconut farmers opted to sell all/part of their UCPB shares to private
individuals. Simply put, parts of the coconut levy funds went directly or
indirectly to various projects and/or was converted into different assets
or investments through the years.
After the EDSA Revolution, President Corazon Aquino issued
Executive Order 1which created the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG).The PCGG aimed to assist the President in the
recovery of ill-gotten wealth accumulated by the Marcoses and their
cronies. PCGG was empowered to file cases for sequestration in the
Sandiganbayan. Among the sequestered properties were the shares of
stock in the UCPB registered in the name of ―over a million coconut
farmers‖ held in trust by the PCA. TheSandiganbayan allowed the
sequestration by ruling in a Partial Summary Judgment that the Coconut
Levy Funds are prima facie public funds and that Section 1 and 2 of PD
No. 755 (and some other PDs) were unconstitutional.
Now, petitioners come to this Court contending that, the
Sandiganbayan gravely erred in concluding that Section 1 of PD No. 755
constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power insofar as it
authorizes the PCA to promulgate rules and regulations governing the
distribution of the UCPB shares to the coconut farmers. Section 1 of PD
755 was complete in itself, prescribed sufficient standards that
circumscribed the discretion of the PCA and merely authorized the PCA to
fill matters of detail an execution through promulgated rules and
regulations
ISSUE: WON Section 1 of P.D. No. 755 is an invalid delegation of
legislative power.
RULING: YES. Section 1 of P.D. No. 755 is an invalid delegation of
legislative power.
Page 18 of 24
Two tests determine the validity of delegation of legislative
power: (1) the completeness test and (2) the sufficient standard test. A
law is complete when it sets forth therein the policy to be executed,
carried out or implemented by the delegate. It lays down a sufficient
standard when it provides adequate guidelines or limitations in the law
to map out the boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent the
delegation from running riot. To be sufficient, the standard must specify
the limits of the delegate’s authority, announce the legislative policy and
identify the conditions under which it is to be implemented.
In this case, the requisite standards or criteria are absent in
P.D. No. 755. This decree authorizes PCA to distribute to coconut farmers,
for free, the shares of stocks of UCPB and to pay from the CCSF levy the
financial commitments of the coconut farmers under the Agreement for
the acquisition of such bank. Yet, the decree does not even state who are
to be considered as coconut farmers. Would, say, one who plants a single
coconut tree be already considered a coconut farmer and, therefore,
entitled to own UCPB shares? If so, how many shares shall be given to
him? The definition of a coconut farmer and the basis as to the number of
shares a farmer is entitled to receive for free are important variables to
be determined by law and cannot be left to the discretion of the
implementing agency.
Moreover, P.D. No. 755 did not identify or delineate any clear
condition as to how the disposition of the UCPB shares or their
conversion into private ownership will redound to the advancement of
the national policy declared under it. P.D. No. 755 seeks to “accelerate the
growth and development of the coconut industry and achieve a vertical
integration thereof so that coconut farmers will become participants in,
and beneficiaries of, such growth and development.” The said law
gratuitously gave away public funds to private individuals, and converted
them exclusively into private property without any restriction as to its
use that would reflect the avowed national policy or public purpose.
Conversely, the private individuals to whom the UCPB shares were
transferred are free to dispose of them by sale or any other mode from
the moment of their acquisition. P.D. No. 755 did not provide for any
guideline, standard, condition or restriction by which the said shares
shall be distributed to the coconut farmers that would ensure that the
same will be undertaken to accelerate the growth and development of the
coconut industry pursuant to its national policy. Thus, P.D. No. 755,
insofar as it grants PCA a veritable carte blanche to distribute to coconut
farmers UCPB shares at the level it may determine, as well as the full
disposition of such shares to private individuals in their private capacity
without any conditions or restrictions that would advance the law’s
national policy or public purpose, present a case of undue delegation of
legislative power.
Commissioner of Customs and the District Collector of the Port of
Subic vs Hypermix Feeds Corporation G.R. No 179579,
February 1, 2012
Facts:
The Commissioner of Customs issued CM 27-2003 classifying
wheat as (1)importer or consignee; (2) country of origin; and (3) port of
discharge and depending on these factors, wheat would be classified
further as either food grade with a tariff rate of 3% or feed grade with a
tariff rate of 7%.
The regulation also provides for an exclusive list of
corporations, ports of discharge, commodity descriptions and countries
of origin. On December 19, 2003, the respondent filed a Petition for
#799 – Paul Jared Ng (Batch 7)

Declaratory Relief with the Regional Trial Court of Las Pinas contending
the following: (1) the regulation was issued without following the
mandate of the Revised Administrative Code, (2) that the regulation
classified them to be a feed grade supplier without prior assessment and
examination, (3)the equal protection clause of the Constitution was
violated when the regulation treated the non-flour millers differently
from flour millers for no reason at all, and(4) the retroactive application
of the regulation is confiscatory. The petitioners thereafter filed a motion
to dismiss contending that: (1) the RTC does not have jurisdiction of the
subject matter, (2) an action for declaratory relief was improper,(3) CM
27-2003 was an internal administrative rule and not legislative in nature;
and (4) the claims of the respondent were speculative and premature.
On March10, 2005, the Regional Trial Court rendered a
decision ruling in favour of the respondent. It held that, on matters
relating to the validity of the regulation, the court held that the regulation
is invalid because the basic requirements of hearing and publication were
not complied with. The petitioners then appealed to Court of Appeals but
it was, however, dismissed. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Issue: WON the issuance of CMO 27-2003 is valid?
Held:
Customs Memorandum Order No. 27-2003 (CMO 23-2007) is
invalid. The Commissioner of Customs (1) violated the right to due
process in the issuance of CMO 27-2003 when he failed to observe the
requirements under the Revised Administrative Code, (2) violated the
right to equal protection of laws when he provided for an unreasonable
classification in the application of the regulation, and (3) went beyond his
powers of delegated authority when the regulation limited the powers of
the customs officer to examine and assess imported articles.
CMO 27-2003 was issued without following the mandate of the
Revised Administrative Code on public participation, prior notice, and
publication or registration with the University of the Philippines Law
Center. For tariff purposes, CMO 27-2003 classified wheat according to
the following: (1) importer or consignee; (2) country of origin; and (3)
port of discharge. This is a violation of the equal protection clause under
the Constitution. The Court does not see how the quality of wheat is
affected by who imports it, where it is discharged, or which country it
came from.
Thus, on the one hand, even if other millers excluded from
CMO 27-2003 have imported food grade wheat, the product would still be
declared as feed grade wheat, a classification subjecting them to 7% tariff.
On the other hand, even if the importers listed under CMO 27-2003 have
imported feed grade wheat, they would only be made to pay 3% tariff,
thus depriving the state of the taxes due. The regulation, therefore, does
not become disadvantageous to respondent only, but even to the state.
Section 1403 of the Tariff and Customs Law, as amended mandates that
the customs officer must first assess and determine the classification of
the imported article before tariff may be imposed.
Unfortunately, CMO 23-2007 has already classified the article
even before the customs officer had the chance to examine it. Finally,
Commissioner of Customs diminished the powers granted by the Tariff
and Customs Code with regard to wheat importation when it no longer
required the customs officer’s prior examination and assessment of the
proper classification of the wheat.
Arroyo vs. De Venecia G.R. No. 127255
Page 19 of 24
Facts:
A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA 8240, which
amends certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code.
Petitioners, who are members of the House of Representatives, charged
that there is violation of the rules of the House which petitioners claim
are constitutionally-mandated so that their violation is tantamount to a
violation of the Constitution.
The law originated in the House of Representatives. The Senate
approved it with certain amendments. A bicameral conference committee
was formed to reconcile the disagreeing provisions of the House and
Senate versions of the bill. The bicameral committee submitted its report
to the House. During the interpellations, Rep. Arroyo made an
interruption and moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. But after a roll
call, the Chair declared the presence of a quorum.
The interpellation then proceeded. After Rep. Arroyo’s
interpellation of the sponsor of the committee report, Majority Leader
Albano moved for the approval and ratification of the conference
committee report. The Chair called out for objections to the motion. Then
the Chair declared: “There being none, approved.” At the same time the
Chair was saying this, Rep. Arroyo was asking, “What is that…Mr.
Speaker?” The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were talking simultaneously. Thus,
although Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the Majority Leader’s
motion, the approval of the conference committee report had by then
already been declared by the Chair.
On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the
House of Representatives and the President of the Senate and certified by
the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress. The enrolled bill
was signed into law by President Ramos.
Issue: Whether or not RA 8240 is null and void because it was passed in
violation of the rules of the House
Held:
Rules of each House of Congress are hardly permanent in
character. They are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the
pleasure of the body adopting them as they are primarily procedural.
Courts ordinarily have no concern with their observance. They may be
waived or disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure
to conform to them does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if
the requisite number of members has agreed to a particular measure. But
this is subject to qualification. Where the construction to be given to a
rule affects person other than members of the legislative body, the
question presented is necessarily judicial in character. Even its validity is
open to question in a case where private rights are involved.
In the case, no rights of private individuals are involved but
only those of a member who, instead of seeking redress in the House,
chose to transfer the dispute to the Court.
The matter complained of concerns a matter of internal
procedure of the House with which the Court should not be concerned.
The claim is not that there was no quorum but only that Rep. Arroyo was
effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum. Rep.
Arroyo’s earlier motion to adjourn for lack of quorum had already been
defeated, as the roll call established the existence of a quorum. The
question of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly especially when the
quorum is obviously present for the purpose of delaying the business of
the House.
#799 – Paul Jared Ng (Batch 7)

ABAKADA vs PURISIMA
FACTS: This petition for prohibition1 seeks to prevent respondents from
implementing and enforcing Republic Act (RA) 9335 (Attrition Act of
2005).
RA 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and
collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of
Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and
employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of
rewards and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives
Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board). It
covers all officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six
months of service, regardless of employment status.
The Fund is sourced from the collection of the BIR and the BOC in excess
of their revenue targets for the year, as determined by the Development
Budget and Coordinating Committee (DBCC). Any incentive or reward is
taken from the fund and allocated to the BIR and the BOC in proportion to
their contribution in the excess collection of the targeted amount of tax
revenue.
The Boards in the BIR and the BOC are composed of the Secretary of the
Department of Finance (DOF) or his/her Undersecretary, the Secretary of
the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) or his/her
Undersecretary, the Director General of the National Economic
Development Authority (NEDA) or his/her Deputy Director General, the
Commissioners of the BIR and the BOC or their Deputy Commissioners,
two representatives from the rank-and-file employees and a
representative from the officials nominated by their recognized
organization.
Each Board has the duty to (1) prescribe the rules and guidelines for the
allocation, distribution and release of the Fund; (2) set criteria and
procedures for removing from the service officials and employees whose
revenue collection falls short of the target; (3) terminate personnel in
accordance with the criteria adopted by the Board; (4) prescribe a system
for performance evaluation; (5) perform other functions, including the
issuance of rules and regulations and (6) submit an annual report to
Congress.
The DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and the Civil Service Commission (CSC)
were tasked to promulgate and issue the implementing rules and
regulations of RA 9335, to be approved by a Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee created for such purpose.
Petitioners assail the creation of a congressional oversight committee on
the ground that it violates the doctrine of separation of powers. While the
legislative function is deemed accomplished and completed upon the
enactment and approval of the law, the creation of the congressional
oversight committee permits legislative participation in the
implementation and enforcement of the law.
In their comment, respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor
General, argues that the creation of the congressional oversight
committee under the law enhances, rather than violates, separation of
powers. It ensures the fulfillment of the legislative policy and serves as a
check to any over-accumulation of power on the part of the executive and
the implementing agencies.
ISSUE: WON Section 12 of RA 9335 is constitutional.
RULING:
Page 20 of 24
Section 12 of RA 9335 provides:
SEC. 12. Joint Congressional Oversight Committee. – There is
hereby created a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee
composed of seven Members from the Senate and seven
Members from the House of Representatives. The Members
from the Senate shall be appointed by the Senate President,
with at least two senators representing the minority. The
Members from the House of Representatives shall be
appointed by the Speaker with at least two members
representing the minority. After the Oversight Committee will
have approved the implementing rules and regulations (IRR) it
shall thereafter become functus officio and therefore cease to
exist.
The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee in RA 9335 was created for
the purpose of approving the implementing rules and regulations (IRR)
formulated by the DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and CSC. On May 22, 2006,
it approved the said IRR.
The requirement that the implementing rules of a law be subjected to
approval by Congress as a condition for their effectivity violates the
cardinal constitutional principles of bicameralism and the rule on
presentment.52
Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution states:
Section 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the
Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate
and a House of Representatives, except to the extent
reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and
referendum. (emphasis supplied)
Legislative power (or the power to propose, enact, amend and repeal
laws)53 is vested in Congress which consists of two chambers, the Senate
and the House of Representatives. A valid exercise of legislative power
requires the act of both chambers. Corrollarily, it can be exercised neither
solely by one of the two chambers nor by a committee of either or both
chambers. Thus, assuming the validity of a legislative veto, both a single-
chamber legislative veto and a congressional committee legislative veto
are invalid.
Additionally, Section 27(1), Article VI of the Constitution provides:
Section 27. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall,
before it becomes a law, be presented to the President. If
he approves the same, he shall sign it, otherwise, he shall veto
it and return the same with his objections to the House where
it originated, which shall enter the objections at large in its
Journal and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such
reconsideration, two-thirds of all the Members of such House
shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the
objections, to the other House by which it shall likewise be
reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of all the Members
of that House, it shall become a law. In all such cases, the votes
of each House shall be determined by yeas or nays, and the
names of the members voting for or against shall be entered in
its Journal. The President shall communicate his veto of any bill
to the House where it originated within thirty days after the
date of receipt thereof; otherwise, it shall become a law as if he
had signed it. (emphasis supplied)
Every bill passed by Congress must be presented to the President for
approval or veto. In the absence of presentment to the President, no bill
passed by Congress can become a law. In this sense, law-making under
the Constitution is a joint act of the Legislature and of the Executive.
Assuming that legislative veto is a valid legislative act with the force of
law, it cannot take effect without such presentment even if approved by
both chambers of Congress.
#799 – Paul Jared Ng (Batch 7)

In sum, two steps are required before a bill becomes a law. First, it must
be approved by both Houses of Congress.54 Second, it must be presented
to and approved by the President.55 As summarized by Justice Isagani
Cruz56 and Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J.57, the following is the procedure for
the approval of bills:
A bill is introduced by any member of the House of
Representatives or the Senate except for some measures that
must originate only in the former chamber.
The first reading involves only a reading of the number and
title of the measure and its referral by the Senate President or
the Speaker to the proper committee for study.
The bill may be "killed" in the committee or it may be
recommended for approval, with or without amendments,
sometimes after public hearings are first held thereon. If there
are other bills of the same nature or purpose, they may all be
consolidated into one bill under common authorship or as a
committee bill.
Once reported out, the bill shall be calendared for second
reading. It is at this stage that the bill is read in its entirety,
scrutinized, debated upon and amended when desired. The
second reading is the most important stage in the passage of a
bill.
The bill as approved on second reading is printed in its final
form and copies thereof are distributed at least three days
before the third reading. On the third reading, the members
merely register their votes and explain them if they are
allowed by the rules. No further debate is allowed.
Once the bill passes third reading, it is sent to the other
chamber, where it will also undergo the three readings. If there
are differences between the versions approved by the two
chambers, a conference committee58 representing both Houses
will draft a compromise measure that if ratified by the Senate
and the House of Representatives will then be submitted to the
President for his consideration.
The bill is enrolled when printed as finally approved by the
Congress, thereafter authenticated with the signatures of the
Senate President, the Speaker, and the Secretaries of their
respective chambers…59
The President’s role in law-making.
The final step is submission to the President for approval. Once
approved, it takes effect as law after the required publication.
Where Congress delegates the formulation of rules to implement the law
it has enacted pursuant to sufficient standards established in the said law,
the law must be complete in all its essential terms and conditions when it
leaves the hands of the legislature. And it may be deemed to have left the
hands of the legislature when it becomes effective because it is only upon
effectivity of the statute that legal rights and obligations become available
to those entitled by the language of the statute. Subject to the
indispensable requisite of publication under the due process clause, 61 the
determination as to when a law takes effect is wholly the prerogative of
Congress.62 As such, it is only upon its effectivity that a law may be
executed and the executive branch acquires the duties and powers to
execute the said law. Before that point, the role of the executive branch,
particularly of the President, is limited to approving or vetoing the law.
From the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that
empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role in the
implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of
Page 21 of 24
separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional. Under this principle, a
provision that requires Congress or its members to approve the
implementing rules of a law after it has already taken effect shall be
unconstitutional, as is a provision that allows Congress or its members to
overturn any directive or ruling made by the members of the executive
branch charged with the implementation of the law.
Following this rationale, Section 12 of RA 9335 should be struck down as
unconstitutional. While there may be similar provisions of other laws that
may be invalidated for failure to pass this standard, the Court refrains
from invalidating them wholesale but will do so at the proper time when
an appropriate case assailing those provisions is brought before us
SENATE vs ERMITA
FACTS: The present consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition
proffer that the President has abused such power by issuing Executive
Order No. 464 (E.O. 464) last September 28, 2005. They thus pray for its
declaration as null and void for being unconstitutional.
In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines,
through its various Senate Committees, conducts inquiries or
investigations in aid of legislation which call for, inter alia, the attendance
of officials and employees of the executive department, bureaus, and
offices including those employed in Government Owned and Controlled
Corporations, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the
Philippine National Police (PNP).
On September 21 to 23, 2005, the Committee of the Senate as a whole
issued invitations to various officials of the Executive Department for
them to appear on September 29, 2005 as resource speakers in a public
hearing on the railway project of the North Luzon Railways Corporation
with the China National Machinery and Equipment Group (hereinafter
North Rail Project). The public hearing was sparked by a privilege speech
of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile urging the Senate to investigate the alleged
overpricing and other unlawful provisions of the contract covering the
North Rail Project.
The Senate Committee on National Defense and Security likewise issued
invitations2 dated September 22, 2005 to the officials of the AFP. Also
invited to the above-said hearing scheduled on September 28 2005 was
the AFP Chief of Staff, General Generoso S. Senga.
On September 28, 2005, the President issued E.O. 464, "Ensuring
Observance of the Principle of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the
Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials
Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the
Constitution, and For Other Purposes,"7 which, pursuant to Section 6
thereof, took effect immediately.
The salient provisions of the Order are as follows:
SECTION 1. Appearance by Heads of Departments Before Congress.
– In accordance with Article VI, Section 22 of the Constitution and to
implement the Constitutional provisions on the separation of
powers between co-equal branches of the government, all heads of
departments of the Executive Branch of the government shall secure
the consent of the President prior to appearing before either House
of Congress.
When the security of the State or the public interest so requires and
the President so states in writing, the appearance shall only be
conducted in executive session.
Also on September 28, 2005, Senate President Drilon received from
Executive Secretary Ermita a copy of E.O. 464, and another
#799 – Paul Jared Ng (Batch 7)

letter informing him "that officials of the Executive Department invited to
appear at the meeting [regarding the NorthRail project] will not be able
to attend the same without the consent of the President, pursuant to [E.O.
464]" and that "said officials have not secured the required consent from
the President."
On even date which was also the scheduled date of the hearing on the
alleged wiretapping, Gen. Senga sent a letter to Senator Biazon informing
him "that per instruction of [President Arroyo], thru the Secretary of
National Defense, no officer of the [AFP] is authorized to appear before
any Senate or Congressional hearings without seeking a written approval
from the President" and "that no approval has been granted by the
President to any AFP officer to appear before the public hearing of the
Senate Committee on National Defense and Security scheduled [on] 28
September 2005."
Despite the communications received from Executive Secretary Ermita
and Gen. Senga, the investigation scheduled by the Committee on
National Defense and Security pushed through, with only Col. Balutan and
Brig. Gen. Gudani among all the AFP officials invited attending.
For defying President Arroyo’s order barring military personnel from
testifying before legislative inquiries without her approval, Brig. Gen.
Gudani and Col. Balutan were relieved from their military posts and were
made to face court martial proceedings.
On October 3, 2005, three petitions, docketed as G.R. Nos. 169659,
169660, and 169667, for certiorari and prohibition, were filed before this
Court challenging the constitutionality of E.O. 464.
On October 11, 2005, Petitioner Senate of the Philippines, alleging that it
has a vital interest in the resolution of the issue of the validity of E.O. 464
for it stands to suffer imminent and material injury, as it has already
sustained the same with its continued enforcement since it directly
interferes with and impedes the valid exercise of the Senate’s powers and
functions and conceals information of great public interest and concern,
filed its petition for certiorari and prohibition, docketed as G.R. No.
169777 and prays that E.O. 464 be declared unconstitutional.
In another investigation conducted jointly by the Senate Committee on
Agriculture and Food and the Blue Ribbon Committee on the alleged
mismanagement and use of the fertilizer fund under the Ginintuang
Masaganang Ani program of the Department of Agriculture (DA), several
Cabinet officials were invited to the hearings but most of them failed to
attend having invoked E.O. 464.
Petitioners submit that E.O. 464 violates Article VII, Section 21 and 22 of
the Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether E.O. 464 violates Article VII, Section 22 of the
Constitution
RULING:
Section 1 is similar to Section 3 in that both require the officials covered
by them to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before
Congress. There are significant differences between the two provisions,
however, which constrain this Court to discuss the validity of these
provisions separately.
Section 1 specifically applies to department heads. It does not, unlike
Section 3, require a prior determination by any official whether they are
covered by E.O. 464. The President herself has, through the challenged
order, made the determination that they are. Further, unlike also Section
3, the coverage of department heads under Section 1 is not made to
Page 22 of 24
depend on the department heads’ possession of any information which
might be covered by executive privilege. In fact, in marked contrast to
Section 3 vis-à-vis Section 2, there is no reference to executive privilege at
all. Rather, the required prior consent under Section 1 is grounded on
Article VI, Section 22 of the Constitution on what has been referred to as
the question hour.
SECTION 22. The heads of departments may upon their own
initiative, with the consent of the President, or upon the request of
either House, as the rules of each House shall provide, appear before
and be heard by such House on any matter pertaining to their
departments. Written questions shall be submitted to the President
of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of Representatives at least
three days before their scheduled appearance. Interpellations shall
not be limited to written questions, but may cover matters related
thereto. When the security of the State or the public interest so
requires and the President so states in writing, the appearance shall
be conducted in executive session.
Determining the validity of Section 1 thus requires an examination of the
meaning of Section 22 of Article VI. Section 22 which provides for the
question hour must be interpreted vis-à-vis Section 21 which provides for
the power of either House of Congress to "conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation." An excerpt of the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission shows that the framers were aware that these two
provisions involved distinct functions of Congress.
In the context of a parliamentary system of government, the "question
hour" has a definite meaning. It is a period of confrontation initiated by
Parliament to hold the Prime Minister and the other ministers
accountable for their acts and the operation of the government,
corresponding to what is known in Britain as the question period. There
was a specific provision for a question hour in the 1973
Constitution which made the appearance of ministers mandatory. The
same perfectly conformed to the parliamentary system established by
that Constitution, where the ministers are also members of the legislature
and are directly accountable to it.
An essential feature of the parliamentary system of government is the
immediate accountability of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet to the
National Assembly. They shall be responsible to the National Assembly
for the program of government and shall determine the guidelines of
national policy. Unlike in the presidential system where the tenure of
office of all elected officials cannot be terminated before their term
expired, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet remain in office only as long
as they enjoy the confidence of the National Assembly. The moment this
confidence is lost the Prime Minister and the Cabinet may be changed.
The framers of the 1987 Constitution removed the mandatory nature of
such appearance during the question hour in the present Constitution so
as to conform more fully to a system of separation of powers. To that
extent, the question hour, as it is presently understood in this jurisdiction,
departs from the question period of the parliamentary system. That
department heads may not be required to appear in a question hour does
not, however, mean that the legislature is rendered powerless to elicit
information from them in all circumstances. In fact, in light of the absence
of a mandatory question period, the need to enforce Congress’ right to
executive information in the performance of its legislative function
becomes more imperative.
As Schwartz observes:
Indeed, if the separation of powers has anything to tell us on the
subject under discussion, it is that the Congress has the right to
obtain information from any source – even from officials of
departments and agencies in the executive branch. In the United
States there is, unlike the situation which prevails in a
parliamentary system such as that in Britain, a clear separation
#799 – Paul Jared Ng (Batch 7)

between the legislative and executive branches. It is this very
separation that makes the congressional right to obtain information
from the executive so essential, if the functions of the Congress as
the elected representatives of the people are adequately to be
carried out. The absence of close rapport between the legislative
and executive branches in this country, comparable to those which
exist under a parliamentary system, and the nonexistence in the
Congress of an institution such as the British question period have
perforce made reliance by the Congress upon its right to obtain
information from the executive essential, if it is intelligently to
perform its legislative tasks. Unless the Congress possesses the right
to obtain executive information, its power of oversight of
administration in a system such as ours becomes a power devoid of
most of its practical content, since it depends for its effectiveness
solely upon information parceled out ex gratia by the executive.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Sections 21 and 22, therefore, while closely related and complementary
to each other, should not be considered as pertaining to the same power
of Congress. One specifically relates to the power to conduct inquiries in
aid of legislation, the aim of which is to elicit information that may be
used for legislation, while the other pertains to the power to conduct a
question hour, the objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit
of Congress’ oversight function.
When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads
are implementing the statutes which it has issued, its right to such
information is not as imperative as that of the President to whom, as
Chief Executive, such department heads must give a report of their
performance as a matter of duty. In such instances, Section 22, in keeping
with the separation of powers, states that Congress may only request
their appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry in which Congress
requires their appearance is "in aid of legislation" under Section 21, the
appearance is mandatory for the same reasons stated in Arnault.
In fine, the oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by
compulsory process only to the extent that it is performed in pursuit of
legislation. This is consistent with the intent discerned from the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.
Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive
officials under Section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22 find their
basis in the principle of separation of powers. While the executive branch
is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of
Congress to legislate by refusing to comply with its demands for
information.
When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for
department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of
privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are department
heads. Only one executive official may be exempted from this power —
the President on whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond the
reach of Congress except through the power of impeachment. It is based
on her being the highest official of the executive branch, and the due
respect accorded to a co-equal branch of government which is sanctioned
by a long-standing custom.
By the same token, members of the Supreme Court are also exempt from
this power of inquiry. Unlike the Presidency, judicial power is vested in a
collegial body; hence, each member thereof is exempt on the basis not
only of separation of powers but also on the fiscal autonomy and the
constitutional independence of the judiciary. This point is not in dispute,
as even counsel for the Senate, Sen. Joker Arroyo, admitted it during the
oral argument upon interpellation of the Chief Justice.
SENATE BLUE RIBBON vs MAJADUCON
FACTS:
Page 23 of 24
On August 28, 1998, Senator Blas F. Ople filed Senate Resolution No. 157
directing the Committee on National Defense and Security to conduct an
inquiry, in aid of legislation, into the charges of then Defense Secretary
Orlando Mercado that a group of active and retired military officers were
organizing a coup d’etat to prevent the administration of then President
Joseph Estrada from probing alleged fund irregularities in the Armed
Forces of the Philippines.1
On the same date, Senator Vicente C. Sotto III also filed Resolution No.
160, "directing the appropriate senate committee to conduct an inquiry,
in aid of legislation, into the alleged mismanagement of the funds and
investment portfolio of the Armed Forces Retirement and Separation
Benefits System (AFP-RSBS) xxx." 2
The Senate President referred the two resolutions to the Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations (Blue Ribbon
Committee) and the Committee on National Defense and Security.
During the public hearings conducted by the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee (hereafter called the Committee), it appeared that the AFP-
RSBS purchased a lot in General Santos Cityfor P10,500.00 per square
meter from private respondent Atty. Nilo J. Flaviano. However, the deed
of sale filed with the Register of Deeds indicated that the purchase price
of the lot was only P3,000.00 per square meter.
The Committee thereafter caused the service of a subpoena to respondent
Atty. Flaviano, directing him to appear and testify before it. Respondent
refused to appear at the hearing. Instead, he filed a petition for
prohibition and preliminary injunction with prayer for temporary
restraining order with the RTC of General Santos City.
The trial court issued a Temporary Restraining Order directing the
Committee "to CEASE and DESIST from proceeding with the inquiry in
P.S. 160 particularly in General Santos City and/or anywhere in Region XI
or Manila on matters affecting the patenting/titling and sale of the Lot,"
and "from issuing subpoenas to witnesses from Region XI, particularly
from General Santos City, pending the hearing of the petition for
prohibition and injunction."
On November 11, 1998, the Committee filed a motion to dismiss the
petition which the lower court denied.
Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner Committee contends that courts have no jurisdiction to
restrain Congress from performing its constitutionally vested function to
conduct investigations in aid of legislation, following the principle of
separation of powers.
On the other hand, respondent Flaviano contends that the trial court may
properly intervene into investigations by Congress pursuant to the power
of judicial review vested in it by the Constitution.
ISSUE: whether or not respondent Judge Jose Majaducon committed
grave abuse of discretion when he dismissed petitioner’s motion to
dismiss the petition for prohibition and issued the writ of preliminary
injunction
RULING:
We find for petitioner. There is grave abuse of discretion when the
respondent acts in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner
in the exercise of his judgment, as when the assailed order is bereft of any
factual and legal justification. In this case, the assailed resolution of
respondent Judge Majaducon was issued without legal basis.
#799 – Paul Jared Ng (Batch 7)
 Page 24 of 24

The principle of separation of powers essentially means that legislation

belongs to Congress, execution to the Executive, and settlement of legal
controversies to the Judiciary. Each is prevented from invading the
domain of the others. When the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee served
subpoena on respondent Flaviano to appear and testify before it in
connection with its investigation of the alleged misuse and
mismanagement of the AFP-RSBS funds, it did so pursuant to its authority
to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. This is clearly provided in Article
VI, Section 21 of the Constitution, thus:

The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective

committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance
with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons
appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.

Hence, the Regional Trial Court of General Santos City, or any court for
that matter, had no authority to prohibit the Committee from requiring
respondent to appear and testify before it.

The ruling in Bengzon, cited by respondent, does not apply in this case.
We agree with petitioner Committee that the factual circumstances
therein are different from those in the case at bar. In Bengzon, no
intended legislation was involved and the subject matter of the inquiry
was more within the province of the courts rather than of the legislature.
More specifically, the investigation in the said case was an offshoot of the
privilege speech of then Senator Enrile, who urged the Senate to look into
a possible violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act by the
relatives of then President Corazon Aquino, particularly Mr. Ricardo Lopa,
in connection with the alleged sale of 36 to 39 corporations belonging to
Benjamin Romualdez.

On the other hand, there was in this case a clear legislative purpose, as
stated in Senate Resolution No. 160, and the appropriate Senate
Committee was directed to look into the reported misuse and
mismanagement of the AFP-RSBS funds, with the intention of enacting
appropriate legislation to protect the rights and interests of the officers
and members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Further, in Bengzon,
the validity of the sale of Romualdez’s corporations was pending with the
Sandiganbayan when the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee decided to
conduct its investigation. In short, the issue had already been pre-empted
by the court.

In the instant case, the complaint against respondent Flaviano regarding

the anomaly in the sale of the Lot was still pending before the Office of the
Ombudsman when the Committee served subpoena on him. In other
words, no court had acquired jurisdiction over the matter. Thus, there
was as yet no encroachment by the legislature into the exclusive
jurisdiction of another branch of the government. Clearly, there was no
basis for the respondent Judge to apply the ruling in Bengzon. Hence, the
denial of petitioner’s motion to dismiss the petition for prohibition
amounted to grave abuse of discretion.

#799 – Paul Jared Ng (Batch 7)