TANADA VS.

TUVERA 146 S
446
Category: Civil Law Jurisprudence
Facts:

Petitioners Lorenzo M. Tanada, et. al. invoked due process in demanding the disclosure of a
number of Presidential Decrees which they claimed had not been published as required by Law. The
government argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was otherwise
provided, as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately
upon approval. The court decided on April 24, 1985 in affirming the necessity for publication of some of
the decrees. The court ordered the respondents to publish in the official gazette all unpublished
Presidential Issuances which are of general force and effect. The petitioners suggest that there should
be no distinction between laws of general applicability and those which are not. The publication means
complete publication, and that publication must be made in the official gazette. In a comment required
by the solicitor general, he claimed first that the motion was a request for an advisory opinion and
therefore be dismissed. And on the clause “unless otherwise provided” in Article 2 of the new civil code
meant that the publication required therein was not always imperative, that the publication when
necessary, did not have to be made in the official gazette.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not all laws shall be published in the official gazette.

(2) Whether or not publication in the official gazette must be in full.

Held:

(1) The court held that all statute including those of local application shall be published as
condition for their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different
effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.

(2) The publication must be full or no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public
of the content of the laws.
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 200 June 18, 1987

PROVIDING FOR THE PUBLICATION OF LAWS EITHER IN THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE OR IN A

NEWSPAPER OF GENERAL CIRCULATION IN THE PHILIPPINES AS A REQUIREMENT FOR
THEIR EFFECTIVITY

WHEREAS, Article 2 of the Civil Code partly provides that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days
following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided . .
.;"

WHEREAS, the requirement that for laws to be effective only a publication thereof in the Official
Gazette will suffice has entailed some problems, a point recognized by the Supreme Court in
Tañada. et al. vs. Tuvera, et al. (G.R. No. 63915, December 29, 1986) when it observed that "[t]here
is much to be said of the view that the publication need not be made in the Official Gazette,
considering its erratic release and limited readership";

WHEREAS, it was likewise observed that "[u]ndoubtedly, newspapers of general circulation could
better perform the function of communicating the laws to the people as such periodicals are more
easily available, have a wider readership, and come out regularly"; and

WHEREAS, in view of the foregoing premises Article 2 of the Civil Code should accordingly be
amended so the laws to be effective must be published either in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation in the country;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, CORAZON C. AQUINO, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers
vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby order:

Sec. 1. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication either in
the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise
provided.

Sec. 2. Article 2 of Republic Act No. 386, otherwise known as the "Civil Code of the Philippines," and
all other laws inconsistent with this Executive Order are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

Sec. 3. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately after its publication in the Official Gazette.

Done in the City of Manila, this 18th day of June, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and
eighty-seven.

Executive Order No. 292 July 25, 1987 “Administrative Code of 1987” sec. 18-25

CHAPTER 5
OPERATION AND EFFECT OF LAWS

Section 18. When Laws Take Effect. - Laws shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation, unless
it is otherwise provided.

Section 19. Prospectivity. - Laws shall have prospective effect unless the contrary is expressly
provided.
Section 20. Interpretation of Laws and Administrative Issuances. - In the interpretation of a law or
administrative issuance promulgated in all the official languages, the English text shall control,
unless otherwise specifically provided. In case of ambiguity, omission or mistake, the other texts
may be consulted.

Section 21. No Implied Revival of Repealed Law.- When a law which expressly repeals a prior law
itself repealed, the law first repealed shall not be thereby revived unless expressly so provided.

Section 22. Revival of Law Impliedly Repealed. - When a law which impliedly repeals a prior law is
itself repealed, the prior law shall thereby be revived, unless the repealing law provides otherwise.

Section 23. Ignorance of the Law. - Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance
therewith.

CHAPTER 6
OFFICIAL GAZETTE

Section 24. Contents. - There shall be published in the Official Gazette all legislative acts and
resolutions of a public nature; all executive and administrative issuances of general application;
decisions or abstracts of decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, or other courts of
similar rank, as may be deemed by said courts of sufficient importance to be so published; such
documents or classes of documents as may be required so to be published by law; and such
documents or classes of documents as the President shall determine from time to time to have
general application or which he may authorize so to be published.

The publication of any law, resolution or other official documents in the Official Gazette shall be
prima facie evidence of its authority.law phi 1.net

Section 25. Editing and Publications. - The Official Gazette shall be edited in the Office of the
President and published weekly in Pilipino or in the English language. It shall be sold and distributed
by the National Printing Office which shall promptly mail copies thereof to subscribers free of
postage.
Executive Order No. 4, s. 2010
Signed on July 30, 2010

Office of the President

of the Philippines
Malacañang

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 4

REORGANIZING AND RENAMING THE OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY AS

THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMUNICATIONS OPERATIONS OFFICE; CREATING THE
PRESIDENTIAL COMMUNICATIONS DEVELOPMENT AND STRATEGIC
PLANNING OFFICE; AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

WHEREAS, it is the avowed policy of this administration to ensure transparency and full and
appropriate disclosure of policies, programs, official activities, and achievements of the Office of
the President and Executive Branch which are of public concern;
WHEREAS, the task of informing and communicating to the Filipino people the policies,
programs, official activities, and achievements of the Office of the President and the Executive
Branch presently involves, aside from the Office of the Press Secretary, several offices and
agencies, the functions of some of which overlap;

WHEREAS, there is a vital need to re-organize and effect functional changes within the Office of
the Press Secretary and create an office to systemize, rationalize and complement the existing
structure to achieve a more efficient and systematic interaction between the people, the Office of
the President, and the Executive Branch;

WHEREAS, it is likewise imperative that government re-defines its efforts to integrate and
harmonize its message conceptualization, formulation and development policies and programs in
order to fully utilize the opportunities arising from the rapid development of existing and emerging
media;

WHEREAS, under Section 31, Chapter 20, Title III, Book III of the Administrative Code of 1987,
the President has the continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office
of the President.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, BENIGNO S. AQUINO III, President of the Philippines, by virtue of

the powers vested in me by law, do hereby order:

SECTION 1. THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMUNICATIONS OPERATIONS OFFICE. The

Office of the Press Secretary shall be reorganized and renamed as the Presidential Communications
Operations Office which shall be headed by the Presidential Communications and Operations
Head who shall have the rank of Cabinet Secretary with all the corresponding salaries,
emoluments, and benefits.

SECTION 2. FUNCTIONS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMUNICATIONS OPERATIONS

OFFICE. The Presidential Communications Operations Office shall perform the following
functions:

a. Develop and implement necessary guidelines and mechanisms pertaining to the delivery and
dissemination of information relating to the policies, programs, official activities and achievements
of the President and the Executive Branch;

b. Develop, manage and operate viable government-owned or controlled information

dissemination structure / facilities to provide the Office of the President in particular, and the
Executive Branch in general, access to the people as an alternative to the private mass media
entities;

c. Set up and maintain local and international field offices, where necessary, to ensure that accurate
information from the President and the Executive Branch is promptly and efficiently relayed,
delivered and disseminated to intended target audiences;
d. Manage, control or supervise, as may be necessary, the various government agencies and offices
involved in information gathering and dissemination;

e. Coordinate and cultivate relations with private media;

f. Manage and administer the OP Website and the Web Development Office;

g. Perform such other functions as the President may assign from time to time.

SECTION 3. OFFICE PROPER. The Presidential Communications Operations Office shall

maintain such deputies and assistants as may be necessary to enable performance of its functions,
including the following:

a. Undersecretary for Administration and Finance;

b. Undersecretary for Operations;

c. Chief of Staff,

d. Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs.

e. Electronic Data Processing Division Chief;

SECTION 4. AGENCIES, BUREAUS, AND OTHER OFFICES ATTACHED TO THE

PRESIDENTIAL COMMUNICATIONS OPERATIONS OFFICE. The following agencies,
bureaus, and offices shall be under the control and supervision of the Presidential Communications
Operations Office:

a. News and Information Bureau;

b. Philippine News Agency;

c. Philippine Information Agency

d. Intercontinental Broadcasting Corporation (IBC) 13;

e. RPN 9;

f. NBN 4;

g. PBS-Radio-Television Malacanang

h. Bureau of Communications Services;

i. National Printing Office;

j. APO Production Unit; and

k. OP Web Development Office.

SECTION 5. CREATION OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMUNICATIONS

DEVELOPMENT AND STRATEGIC PLANNING OFFICE. There is hereby established the
Presidential Communications Development and Strategic Planning Office.

SECTION 6. FUNCTIONS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMUNICATIONS

DEVELOPMENT AND STRATEGIC PLANNING OFFICE. The Presidential Communications
Development and Strategic Planning Office shall perform the following functions:

a. Coordinate the crafting, formulation, development and enhancement of the messaging system
under the Office of the President;

b. Design and recommend responses to issues that arise on a daily basis.

c. Ensure consistency in the messages issued by the Executive Department;

d. Assist in the formulation and implementation of new media strategies for the Office of the
President;

e. Assist in research and development of new media instruments;

f. Liase with the Malacañang Records Office;

g. Control and supervise the conduct of market research, monitoring public opinion, and gathering,
use and analysis of other relevant data as may be necessary;

h. Formulate editorial guidelines and policies for state media;

i. Ensure consistency in the implementation of the corporate identity of the Executive Department;

j. Act as custodian of the institutional memory of the Office of the President, which includes the
supervision and control of the Presidential Museum and Library, and liaison with the Malacañang
Records Office;

k. Perform editorial functions for the Official Gazette,

l. Perform such other functions as may be directed by the President.

SECTION 7. THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMUNICATIONS DEVELOPMENT AND

STRATEGIC PLANNING OFFICE MANAGEMENT. The Presidential Communications
Development and Strategic Planning Office shall be managed by the Presidential Communications
Development and Strategic Planning Head who shall have the rank of Cabinet Secretary, with all
the corresponding salaries, emoluments, and benefits.
The Presidential Communications Development and Strategic Planning Head shall be assisted by
a Deputy, who shall have the rank of Undersecretary, with all the corresponding salaries,
emoluments, and benefits, and whose functions shall be assigned by the Presidential
Communications Development and Strategic Planning Head.

The Presidential Communications Development and Strategic Planning Office shall likewise have
such other support service offices as may be necessary to enable the performance of its functions,
including the following:

a. Chief of Staff,

b. Assistant Secretary for Messaging.

c. Electronic Data Processing Division Chief;

SECTION 8. AGENCIES, BUREAUS, AND OTHER OFFICES ATTACHED TO THE

PRESIDENTIAL COMMUNICATIONS DEVELOPMENT AND STRATEGIC PLANNING
OFFICE. The following agencies, bureaus, and offices shall be attached to the Presidential
Communications Development and Strategic Planning Office.

a. Presidential Message Staff;

b. OP Correspondence Office, (previously placed under the Office of the Communications

Director from the Presidential Management Staff per E.O. No. 348, 11 August 2004)

c. Media Research and Development Staff, (as created by E.O. No. 297, 25 July 1987, from the
Office of the Press Secretary;)

d. Presidential Museum and Library

e. Official Gazette; and

f. Speech Writers Group (previously placed under the Office of the Communications Director from
the Presidential Management Staff per E.O. No. 348, 11 August 2004)

SECTION 9. STAFFING REQUIREMENTS. The Presidential Communications Operations

Office and the Presidential Communications Development and Strategic Planning Office, in
coordination with the Department of Budget and Management shall formulate and establish the
organizational structure and staffing pattern of the affected offices under this Executive Order,
composed of such administrative and technical personnel as may be deemed necessary to
efficiently and effectively carry out the functions and duties prescribed herein, subject to the
approval of the Department of Budget and Management, and the Office of the President, thru the
Executive Secretary.

SECTION 10. APPROPRIATIONS. The budget of the offices herein reorganized and created
shall be sourced from the remaining budget of the Office of the Press Secretary, and the Office of
the President, as may be appropriate, for the current year, subject to existing and applicable laws,
rules and regulations. The succeeding years’ appropriations for the said offices shall be prepared
in accordance with regular government budget procedures.

SECTION 11. DISCHARGE OF FUNCTIONS. Except as may be required under this Executive
Order, all covered officials, offices or agencies shall continue with the discharge of their respective
functions and responsibilities as defined under existing law or issuances.

SECTION 12. IMPLEMENTING RULES. The Executive Secretary is hereby authorized to

issue such rules and regulations as may be necessary to implement the provisions this Executive
Order. He is also designated to determine the functional divisions of the offices, agencies, and
bureaus herein mentioned all under the control and supervision of the Office of the President, thru
the Executive Secretary.

SECTION 13. REPEALING CLAUSE. All orders, circulars, rules, regulations, and/ or
issuance/s, or parts thereof, which are inconsistent with the provision of this Executive Order are
hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

SECTION 14. SEVERABILITY. If any provision of this Executive Order shall be held
unconstitutional, the remainder not otherwise affected shall remain in full force and effect.

SECTION 12. EFFECTIVITY. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately.

DONE in the City of Manila, this 30th day of July, in the year of our Lord, Two Thousand and
Ten.

(Sgd.) BENIGNO S. AQUINO III

President of the Philippines

By the President:

(Sgd.) PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.

Executive Secretary

THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE

OF THE PHILIPPINES

BOOK IV
MISCELLANEOUS AND FINAL PROVISIONS
TITLE ONE. - PENAL PROVISIONS
SEC. 511. Posting and Publication of Ordinances with Penal Sanctions. - (a)
ordinances with penal sanctions shall be posted at prominent places in the provincial
capitol, city, municipal or barangay hall, as the case may be, for a minimum period
of three (3) consecutive weeks. Such ordinances shall also be published in a
newspaper of general circulation, where available, within the territorial jurisdiction of
the local government unit concerned, except in the case of barangay ordinances.
Unless otherwise provided therein, said ordinances shall take effect on the day
following its publication, or at the end of the period of posting, whichever occurs
later.

(b) Any public officer or employee who violates an ordinance may be meted
administrative disciplinary action, without prejudice to the filing of the appropriate
civil or criminal action.cralaw
(c) The secretary to the sanggunian concerned shall transmit official copies of such
ordinances to the chief executive officer of the Official Gazette within seven (7) days
following the approval of the said ordinance for publication purposes. The Official
Gazette may publish ordinances with penal sanctions for archival and reference
purposes.cralaw

FELISA P. DE ROY v. CA, GR No. 80718, 1988-01-29

Facts:
The firewall of a burned-out building owned by petitioners collapsed and destroyed the
tailoring shop occupied by the family of private respondents, resulting in injuries to private
respondents and the death of Marissa Bernal, a daughter.
Private respondents had been warned by petitioners to vacate their shop in view of its
proximity to the weakened wall but the former failed to do so.
On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals in a
decision promulgated on August 17, 1987, copy of... which was received by petitioners on
August 25, 1987. On September 9, 1987, the last day of the fifteen-day period to file an
appeal, petitioners filed a motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration,
which was eventually denied by the appellate court in the
Resolution of September 30, 1987. Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration on
September 24, 1987, but this was denied in the Resolution of October 27, 1987.
Issues:
Court of Appeals committed no grave abuse of discretion in affirming the trial court's
decision
Ruling:
This Court likewise finds that the Court of Appeals committed no grave abuse of discretion
in affirming the trial court's decision holding petitioner liable under Article 2190 of the Civil
Code, which provides that "the proprietor of a building or structure is responsible for... the
damage resulting from its total or partial collapse, if it should be due to the lack of necessary
repairs."
Nor was there error in rejecting petitioners' argument that private respondents had the "last
clear chance" to avoid the accident if only they heeded the warning to vacate the tailoring
shop and, therefore, petitioners' prior negligence should be disregarded, since the
doctrine... of "last clear chance", which has been applied to vehicular accidents, is
inapplicable to this case.

DIVISION

[ GR No. 209324, Dec 09, 2015 ]

REPUBLIC v. PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION +

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Assailed in this petition for review under Rule 45 are the Decision[1] dated February 13, 2013 and
Resolution[2] dated June 3, 2013 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 95436 which
affirmed the Orders[3] dated April 28, 2010 and July 2, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila, Branch 49 in Civil Case No. 02-103191.

Factual Antecedents

Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (PSPC), a domestic corporation registered with the Board
of Investments (BOI), is engaged in the importation, refining and sale of petroleum products in
the country. For its importations, PSPC was assessed and required to pay customs duties and
internal revenue taxes.

Under Deed of Assignment[4] dated May 7, 1997, Filipino Way Industries (FWI) assigned the
following Tax Credit Certificates[5] (TCCs) to PSPC:

TCC#
P 2,542,918.00
006889
TCC #
2,573,422.00
006977
TCC#
2,559,493.00
006978
TCC #
2,413,079.00
006979
TOTAL P10,088,912.00[6]
On the belief that the TCCs were actually good and valid, the Bureau of Customs (BOC) accepted
and allowed PSPC to use the above TCCs to pay the customs duties and taxes due on its oil
importations.

The One-Stop Shop Inter-Agency Tax Credit and Duty Drawback Center[7] ("Center") undertakes
the processing of TCCs and approval of their transfers. It is composed of a representative from
the Department of Finance (DOF) as its chairperson; and the members thereof are
representatives of the BOI, BOC and Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR).

On November 3, 1999 the Center, through then Finance Secretary Edgardo B. Espiritu, informed
BIR Commissioner Beethoven L. Rualo that pursuant to EXCOM Resolution No. 03-05-99, it
has cancelled various Tax Debit Memos (TDMs) issued to PSPC and Petron Corporation against
their TCCs which were found to have been fraudulently issued and transferred. These include
the subject TCCs sold by FWI to PSPC. The Center thus advised that it will be demanding from
the said oil companies payment corresponding to the amount of the TCCs as evidenced by the
TDMs, and accordingly directed the BIR to collect the amount utilized on the TCCs, including
the related penalties, surcharges and interests.[8] A similar letter was sent to Customs
Commissioner Nelson Tan regarding the cancellation of TDMs issued to PSPC based on the
Center's finding that the TCCs utilized by PSPC have been fraudulently issued and transferred.[9]

On April 3, 2002, the Republic of the Philippines represented by the BOC filed the present
collection suit in the RTC (Civil Case No. 02-103191) for the payment of P10,088,912.00 still
owed by PSPC after the invalidation of the subject TCCs.

Meanwhile, PSPC filed with the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA Case No. 6484) a petition for review
questioning the factual and legal bases of BOC's collection efforts.

Subsequently, PSPC moved to dismiss Civil Case No. 02-103191 on the ground that the RTC had
no jurisdiction over the subject matter and that the complaint for collection was prematurely
filed in view of its pending petition for review in the CTA. The RTC denied the motion to dismiss
and PSPC eventually filed its answer questioning the RTC's jurisdiction. When the RTC issued a
notice of pre-trial, PSPC moved for reconsideration of the order denying its motion to dismiss.
The RTC denied the motion for reconsideration, prompting PSPC to elevate the matter to the CA
via a petition for certiorari (CA-G.R. SP No. 71756). On October 23, 2003, the CA rendered
decision denying PSPC's petition. With the denial of its motion for reconsideration, PSPC sought
recourse from this Court in a petition for review on certiorari (G.R. No. 161953). In a
Decision[10] dated March 6, 2008, this Court denied PSPC's petition, viz.:

Inasmuch as the present case did not involve a decision of the Commissioner of Customs in any
of the instances enumerated in Section 7(2) of RA 1125, the CTA had no jurisdiction over
the subject matter. It was the RTC that had jurisdiction under Section 19(6) of the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended:

xxxx

In view of the foregoing, the RFC should forthwith proceed with Civil Case No. 02-103191 and
determine the extent of petitioner's liability.

We are not unmindful of petitioner's pending petition for review in the CTA where it is
questioning the validity of the cancellation of the TCCs. However, respondent cannot and should
not await the resolution of that case before it collects petitioner's outstanding customs duties
and taxes for such delay will unduly restrain the performance of its functions. Moreover, if the
ultimate outcome of the CTA case turns out to be favorable to petitioner, the law affords it the
adequate remedy of seeking a refund.

WHEREFORE, this petition is hereby DENIED. The Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 19
is ordered to proceed expeditiously with the pre-trial conference and trial of Civil Case No. 02-
103191.
Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.[11] (Emphasis supplied)

As to CTA Case No. 6484, the CTA denied BOC's motion to dismiss on the ground of
prescription. When the CTA denied the BOC's motion for reconsideration, the BOC appealed to
the CA, which reversed the questioned CTA resolutions. PSPC again sought recourse from this
Court via a petition for review on certiorari (G.R. No. 176380). By Decision[12] dated June 18,
2009, we denied the petition and held that the present case does not involve a tax protest case
within the jurisdiction of the CTA to resolve. Citing our previous ruling in Pilipinas Shell
Petroleum Corporation v. Republic[13] we ruled that the appropriate forum to resolve the issues
raised by PSPC before the CTA, which were all related to the fact and efficacy of the payments
made, should be the collection case before the RTC where PSPC can put up the fact of its
payment as a defense.

With the resumption of proceedings in the RTC, the BOC filed an Amended Complaint, to which
PSPC filed a Second Amended Answer. Pre-trial was terminated and the RTC summarized the
issues in its Pre-Trial Order[14] dated September 9, 2009, to wit:

The following issues raised by the plaintiffs:

a. Whether or not plaintiff Republic has cause of action against defendants;

b. Whether or not defendant Pilipinas Shell is [a] transferee in good faith [of] Tax Credit
Certificates;

c. Whether or not defendants are liable to pay the Republic the amount of
Php10,088,912.00 represents unpaid taxes;

d. Whether or not the Tax Credit Certificate was spurious and fraudulent.

The following issues raised by the defendant Pilipinas Shell:

a. Whether the defendants PSPC is liable for the amount of Php10,088,912.00 in customs
duties and taxes covered by cancelled subject Tax Credit Certificates, However, there are
sub-issues. These are include[d] in our pre-trial brief;

b. Whether or not plaintiff is liable for moral and exemplary and Attorney's fees; and

c. Whether or not defendant Filipino Way is liable to defendant PSPC in case of successful
collection of customs taxes against PSPC.[15]

On November 16, 2009, PSPC filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that there is no
basis for the Republic's claims considering that the subject TCCs were already fully utilized for
the payment of PSPC's customs duties and taxes, and that EXCOM Resolution No. 03-05-99, the
basis of the cancellation of the TCCs, was declared void and invalid in Pilipinas Shell Petroleum
Corporation v. CIR,[16] where this Court likewise ruled that the subject TCCs cannot be cancelled
on the basis of post-audit since a post-audit is not allowed and not a suspensive condition. PSPC
further contended that the Republic's cause of action had already prescribed when it attempted
to collect PSPC's customs duties and taxes only four years later, beyond the one-year
prescriptive period to file a collection case. Lastly, PSPC asserted that even assuming the TCCs
were fraudulently obtained by FWI, an innocent purchaser for value like PSPC cannot be
prejudiced as held in the aforementioned case.

In its Comment/Opposition, BOC argued that rendition of summary judgment is inappropriate

in this case in view of disputed facts that necessitate a full-blown trial where both parties can
present evidence on their respective claims. BOC pointed out that PSPC cannot rely on the Deed
of Assignment as proof that it had no participation in the issuance of the TCCs. PSPC should
prove at the trial that there was a valid transfer in good faith and for value of the subject TCCs.
As to the rulings in the case of Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation v. CIR,[17] these are
inapplicable here because first, what is involved therein are taxes owed to the BIR and there was
no finding of fraud against PSPC whereas in the present case the BOC can readily prove during
trial that PSPC committed fraud.

On February 22, 2010, the RTC denied the motion for summary judgment in view of factual
disputes which can only be resolved by trial on the merits. Specifically, it stated that
presentation of evidence is necessary to determine if PSPC is a mere transferee in good faith and
for value of the subject TCCs and that there was a valid transfer/assignment between PSPC and
FWI.[18]

However, on motion for reconsideration by PSPC, the RTC reversed its earlier ruling and
granted the motion for summary judgment under its Order[19] dated April 28, 2010. The RTC
cited Pilipinas Shell Corporation v. Republic[20] which supposedly settled factual and legal
issues raised by BOC in its pleadings and arguments, specifically PSPC's not having committed
fraud. As there are no more disputed matters, the RTC held that there is no more need for a trial
to prove that the subject TCCs have been fully utilized by PSPC and that they were cancelled due
to an invalid post-audit under the authority of EXCOM Resolution No. 03-05-99.

The RTC thus decreed:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Order dated February 22, 2010 is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The instant case against defendant PSPC is DISMISSED. However, the case
against defendant Filipino Way still SUBSISTS.

Let the trial of this case continue against the other Defendant namely, Filipino Way Industries,
as previously scheduled on May 19, 2010 at 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon.

SO ORDERED.[21]
With the denial of its motion for reconsideration, BOC appealed to the CA. By Decision dated
February 13, 2013, the CA denied the appeal and affirmed the questioned orders of the RTC.
BOC's motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the CA.

According to the CA, BOC adopted a wrong mode of appeal because whether the RTC erred in
rendering summary judgment is purely a legal issue, jurisdiction over which is vested only in
this Court. Even assuming that the CA can entertain BOC's appeal, the CA said it found no
genuine issues raised by the parties' pleadings and arguments that necessitate a fullblown trial.
The CA further held that the rule on stare decisis applies in the present case considering that the
legal and factual issues have been previously discussed and resolved by this Court in Pilipinas
Shell Petroleum Corporation v. CIR.[22]
 Issues

The following issues clearly emerge from the present controversy: (1) Does the Republic's
(petitioner) appeal involve purely questions of law and hence a wrong remedy from the assailed
RTC orders?; (2) Whether or not summary judgment is proper; (3) Does the ruling inPilipinas
Shell Petroleum Corporation v. CIR[23] apply to this case under the doctrine of stare decisis?;
and (4) Whether or not petitioner's claim is barred by prescription.

Petitioner's Arguments

Citing the cases of Nocom v. Camerino[24] and Heirs of Baldomero Roxas v. Garcia[25] petitioner
argues that since a summary judgment has the effect of adjudication on the merits, appeal under
Rule 41 of the Rules of Court is the proper remedy.

As to the propriety of summary judgment rendered by the RTC, petitioner underscores that the
collection case it filed against PSPC is founded on the fact that the latter utilized the
fraudulently-secured TCCs for payment of customs duties and taxes that arose from its various
oil importations, and their cancellation did not extinguish its liability to the government. The
matter of whether or not PSPC is a transferee in good faith and for value is a genuine issue to be
resolved, and must be ventilated in a full trial. The issue of whether or not PSPC is guilty of
fraud likewise calls for the presentation of evidence at the trial.

Petitioner mentions other factual inquiries which it said arose in this case, such as the manner
by which FWI acquired the subject TCCs; the legality of their transfer to PSPC; the results of the
post-audit conducted on the subject TCCs; whether PSPC claimed a return of the consideration
from FWI upon the cancellation of the TCCs; the veracity of the letter from Equitable Banking
Corporation stating that the credit memos, supposedly used by FWI in securing the TCCs, do not
conform to the bank's records; and what are the company papers and export documents
submitted for the claim of tax credits.

Petitioner also argues that Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation v. CIR[26] is not applicable as
said case involves the assessment of deficiency taxes which was filed before the CTA, hence a tax
case, whereas here it is a civil case for collection of sum of money which was filed in a regular
court. More important, the facts in the aforesaid case did not clearly establish the fraudulent
acts committed by the original grantees of tax credits in the procurement of TCCs from the
Center, whereas in the present case, petitioner can sufficiently prove that the documents
submitted by the original grantee (FWI) for the claim of tax credits were forgeries and the TCCs
subsequently issued had absolutely no monetary value to back up their issuance. Thus, where
the facts in the two cases under consideration are different, stare decisis finds no application.

On other legal issues that were previously settled in Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation v.
CIR,[27] petitioner submits there is an extreme urgency to revisit this Court's ruling —

x x x because of the great danger and prejudice it had caused to the several collection cases filed
by the government which are pending before several regular courts involving TCCs in the
hundreds of millions of pesos. Most defendants in these cases assert to be "buyers or transferees
in good faith" and capitalize on the ruling of this Honorable Court in the Shell case. However, if
the only basis for finding good faith on the part of the transferee of TCCs is the mere approval of
the transfer by the DOF One Stop Shop Center, then all these pending cases, as above-
mentioned, must be dismissed, since all the transfers of the TCCs were approved by the Center.
This is precisely the very reason why the government filed several cases before the Office of the
Ombudsman against the personnel and officers of the One Stop Shop Center, including private
individuals, because of the collusion and conspiracy they contrived in order to defraud the
government of several billions of pesos involving the issuance and transfers of TCCs. This is now
infamously known as the "tax credit scam" because it was committed in grandiose style by a
crime syndicate.

In the final analysis, the ultimate victim in this scheme is not the Republic but the Filipino
people who did not commit mistake or wrongdoing, but rather, its agents. Hence, the State
cannot be made to bear the loss of revenues on account of scheming individuals or entities that
are out to defraud the government or evade the payment of tax liabilities.[28]
Respondent's Arguments

PSPC contends that the assailed orders of the RTC granting summary judgment has already
attained finality since petitioner availed of the wrong remedy before the CA. It asserts that the
CA did not err in upholding the RTC's ruling that there exists no genuine issues of fact in the
present case.

On the alleged fraudulent issuance of the subject TCCs, PSPC maintains that it cannot be
prejudiced by such fraud which, by petitioner's own admission, was committed by FWI. Being a
transferee in good faith and for value of the subject TCCs, these matters raised by petitioner are
thus irrelevant. That PSPC is a transferee in good faith and for value was admitted by petitioner
during the pre-trial hearing held on September 9, 2009.

PSPC argues that, contrary to petitioner's claims, the CA correctly applied this Court's rulings
in Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation v. CIR[29] under the doctrine of stare decisis. In any
event, it asserts that petitioner's cause of action had already prescribed since the subject TCCs
were already fully utilized as payment for PSPC's customs duties and taxes on November 17,
1997, while petitioner attempted to collect only on February 15, 2002 or four years later, beyond
the one year period to file the present case.

Our Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

Propriety of Summary Judgment a Question of Law, hence, the Remedy is a

Petition for Review Under Rule 45

Section 2, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, provides for two remedies
from the final orders or judgments of the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, viz.:

Section 2. Modes of appeal. -

(a) Ordinary appeal. - The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional
Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal
with the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and serving a copy
thereof upon the adverse party. No record on appeal shall be required except in special
proceedings and other cases of multiple or separate appeals where the law or these Rules so
require. In such cases, the record on appeal shall be filed and served in like manner.

(b) Petition for review. - The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional
Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction shall be by petition for review in
accordance with Rule 42.

(c) Appeal by certiorari. - In all cases where only questions of law are raised or
involved, the appeal shall be to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari
in accordance with Rule 45.

(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, when an appeal raises only pure questions of law, it is this Court that has the sole
jurisdiction to entertain the same. On the other hand, appeals involving both questions of law
and fact fall within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the CA.[30]

A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts,
while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged
facts. For a question to be one of law, the same must not involve an examination of the probative
value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. The resolution of the issue must
rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it is clear that the
issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact. Thus, the test
of whether a question is one of law or of fact is not the appellation given to such question by the
party raising the same; rather, it is whether the appellate court can determine the issue raised
without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise it
is a question of fact.[31]

We have held that the question of whether the RTC erred in rendering summary judgment is one
of law, thus:

Any review by the appellate court of the propriety of the summary judgment rendered by the
trial court based on these pleadings would not involve an evaluation of the probative value of
any evidence, but would only limit itself to the inquiry of whether the law was properly applied
given the facts and these supporting documents. Therefore, what would inevitably arise from
such a review are pure questions of law, and not questions of fact, which are not proper in an
ordinary appeal under Rule 41, but should be raised by way of a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45.[32]
Petitioner raised as sole issue in its brief filed with the CA the RTC's erroneous grant of
summary judgment in favor of PSPC based on its finding that there exists no genuine factual
issue. Obviously, it availed of the wrong mode of appeal when it filed a notice of appeal in the
RTC under Section 2(a), Rule 41, instead of a petition for review on certiorari in this Court under
Rule 45.

Relaxation of the Rule on Appeal

However, despite such lapse, a relaxation of the rule on appeal is justified under the
circumstances. The CA found no reversible error in the grant of summary judgment in favor of
PSPC. Accordingly, it affirmed the assailed orders of the RTC.

Considering the Republic's stake in the outcome of the proceedings in Civil Case No. 02-103191,
among the several collection suits it has instituted in the drive to recover huge revenue losses
from spurious tax credit certificates that proliferated in the 1990s, we cannot accede to PSPC's
contention that petitioner's erroneous appeal has rendered the Orders dated April 28, 2010 and
July 2, 2010 of the RTC final and executory.

In Barangay Sangalang v. Barangay Maguihan[33] we ratiocinated:

In any case, as in the past, this Court has recognized the emerging trend towards a liberal
construction of the Rules of Court. In Ong him Sing, Jr. v. FEB Leasing and Finance
Corporation, this Court stated:

Courts have the prerogative to relax procedural rules of even the most mandatory character,
mindful of the duty to reconcile both the need to speedily put an end to litigation and the parties'
right to due process. In numerous cases, this Court has allowed liberal construction of the rules
when to do so would serve the demands of substantial justice and equity. In Aguam v. Court of
Appeals, the Court explained:

The court has the discretion to dismiss or not to dismiss an appellant's appeal. It is a power
conferred on the court, not a duty. The "discretion must be a sound one, to be exercised in
accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play, having in mind the circumstances obtaining
in each case." Technicalities, however, must be avoided. The law abhors technicalities that
impede the cause of justice. The court's primary duty is to render or dispense justice. "A
litigation is not a game of technicalities." "Lawsuits, unlike duels, are not to be won by a rapier's
thrust. Technicality, when it deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its great
hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant consideration from courts." Litigations must be
decided on their merits and not on technicality. Every party-litigant must be afforded the
amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the
unacceptable plea of technicalities. Thus, dismissal of appeals purely on technical grounds is
frowned upon where the policy of the court is to encourage hearings of appeals on their merits
and the rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense; rules of
procedure are used only to help secure, not override substantial justice. It is a far better and
more prudent course of action for the court to excuse a technical lapse and afford the parties a
review of the case on appeal to attain the ends of justice rather than dispose of the case on
technicality and cause a grave injustice to the parties, giving a false impression of speedy
disposal of cases while actually resulting in more delay, if not a miscarriage of justice.
Thus, notwithstanding petitioner's wrong mode of appeal, the CA should not have so easily
dismissed the petition, considering that the parties involved are local government units and that
what is involved is the determination of their respective territorial jurisdictions. x x x[34]
Summary Judgment Not Proper

Under Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, except as to the amount of
damages, when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law, summary judgment may be allowed:

Section 1. Summary Judgment for claimant. - A party seeking to recover upon a claim,
counterclaim, or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory relief may, at any time after the pleading
in answer thereto has been served, move with supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions
for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part thereof.
Summary judgment is a procedural device resorted to in order to avoid long drawn out
litigations and useless delays. When the pleadings on file show that there are no genuine issues
of fact to be tried, the Rules allow a party to obtain immediate relief by way of summary
judgment, that is, when the facts are not in dispute, the court is allowed to decide the case
summarily by applying the law to the material facts.[35] Even if on their face the pleadings appear
to raise issues, when the affidavits, depositions and admissions show that such issues are not
genuine, then summary judgment as prescribed by the Rules must ensue as a matter of law. The
determinative factor, therefore, in a motion for summary judgment, is the presence or absence
of a genuine issue as to any material fact.[36]

For a full-blown trial to be dispensed with, the party who moves for summary judgment has the
burden of demonstrating clearly the absence of genuine issues of fact, or that the issue posed is
patently insubstantial as to constitute a genuine issue. Genuine issue means an issue of fact
which calls for the presentation of evidence as distinguished from an issue which is fictitious or
contrived.[37]

Petitioner's complaint is premised mainly on the alleged fraudulent issuance and transfer of the
subject TCCs. As stated in the pre-trial order, petitioner submitted for trial the issue of whether
or not PSPC is a transferee in good faith.

In Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation v. CIR,[38] we ruled that "[t]he transferee in good faith
and for value may not be unjustly prejudiced by the fraud committed by the claimant or
transferor in the procurement or issuance of the TCC from the Center."

A transferee in good faith and for value of a TCC who has relied on the Center's representation of
the genuineness and validity of the TCC transferred to it may not be legally required to pay again
the tax covered by the TCC which has been belatedly declared null and void, that is, after the
TCCs have been fully utilized through settlement of internal revenue tax liabilities. Conversely,
when the transferee is party to the fraud as when it did not obtain the TCC for value or was a
party to or has knowledge of its fraudulent issuance, said transferee is liable for the taxes and for
the fraud committed as provided for by law.[39]
The RTC found no genuine factual issue as far as PSPC's status as innocent purchaser in good
faith and for value, relying on the following underlined portion of this Court's decision
in Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation v. Republic[40] (March 6, 2008):

THE FILING OF THE COLLECTION CASE WAS A PROPER REMEDY

Assessments inform taxpayers of their tax liabilities. Under the TCCP, the assessment is in the
form of a liquidation made on the face of the import entry return and approved by the Collector
of Customs. Liquidation is the final computation and ascertainment by the Collector of
Customs of the duties due on imported merchandise based on official reports as to the
quantity, character and value thereof, and the Collector of Customs' own finding as to the
applicable rate of duty. A liquidation is considered to have been made when the entry is officially
stamped "liquidated."

Petitioner claims that it paid the duties due on its importations. Section 1603 of the old TCCP
stated:

Section 1603. Finality of Liquidation. When articles have been entered and passed free of duty
or final adjustments of duties made, with subsequent delivery, such entry and passage free of
duty or settlement of duties will, after the expiration of one year from the date of the final
payment of duties, in the absence of fraud or protest, be final and conclusive upon all parties,
unless the liquidation of the import entry was merely tentative.
An assessment or liquidation by the BoC attains finality and conclusiveness one year from the
date of the final payment of duties except when:

(a) there was fraud;

(b) there is a pending protest or

(c) the liquidation of import entry was merely tentative.

None of the foregoing exceptions is present in this case. There was no fraud as petitioner
claimed (and was presumed) to be in good faith. Respondent does not, dispute this. Moreover,
records show that petitioner paid those duties without protest using its TCCs. Finally, the
liquidation was not a tentative one as the assessment had long become final and incontestable.
Consequently, pursuant to Yabes and because of the cancellation of the TCCs, respondent had
the right to file a collection case. (Underscoring supplied)
Upon reading the entire text of the above decision, it can be gleaned that PSPC (petitioner
therein) had questioned the jurisdiction of the RTC, arguing that said court has no jurisdiction
over Civil Case No. 02-103191 (collection case) in view of the pendency of PSPC's petition for
review in the CTA challenging the BOC's assessment of the customs duties and taxes covered by
the same TCCs involved in this case. Citing Yabes v. Flojo,[41] PSPC contended that the RTC
acquires jurisdiction over a collection case only if an assessment made by the CIR has become
final and incontestable.

Addressing the issue of prematurity of BOC's collection case in the RTC, we cited three
exceptions from the rule that an assessment becomes final and conclusive one year from the
date of final payment of duties: among which is when there is fraud. The decision then declares
that none of the cited exceptions are present, specifically stating that there was no fraud as
petitioner claimed (and was presumed) to be in good faith, and the BOC does not dispute it. It is
this statement which the RTC deemed as establishing PSPC's status as transferee in good faith
and for value of the subject TCCs. However, we find the RTC's reliance on this statement in the
earlier case involving the issue of jurisdiction of the RTC as misplaced and erroneous. Such
statement pertained to fraud in the computation or accuracy of the customs duties and taxes due
on the subject importations, which concerns the correctness of the quantity and class of goods
declared by the importer PSPC as basis for the assessment by the BOC. There may have been
preconceived courses of action purposely adopted by importers to evade the payment of the
correct customs duties. Clearly, the fraud mentioned in the said decision does not refer to the
fraud in the issuance and transfer of TCCs for which the petitioner seeks to recover unpaid
customs duties and taxes, subject matter of the present controversy. The latter has to do with
presentation of spurious documents that would render the TCCs worthless, resulting in non-
payment of the assessed customs duties and taxes.

It bears stressing also that the collection case is not based on any revised or new assessment of
customs duties and taxes on PSPC's oil importations. As we noted in Pilipinas Shell Petroleum
Corporation v. Commissioner of Customs[42] BOC's demand letters to PSPC merely reissued the
original assessments that were previously settled by it with the use of the TCCs. But since the
TCCs were cancelled, the tax liabilities of PSPC under the original assessments were considered
unpaid; hence, the demand letters and actions for collection.

Moreover, it would be absurd to interpret such statement in our decision in Pilipinas Shell
Petroleum Corporation v. Republic[43] (March 6, 2008) as a judicial declaration of PSPC's status
as a transferee in good faith and for value of the subject TCCs when in the same decision we
ordered the case remanded to the RTC for proceeding with the pre-trial where issues for trial
still have to be determined by the parties. Neither should such statement be regarded as an
admission by petitioner because the latter's complaint was anchored chiefly on the alleged fraud
and irregularity in the issuance and transfer of the TCCs, with both the transferee (PSPC) and
transferor (FWI) impleaded as defendants.

In its Comment, PSPC claims that during the pre-trial hearing, the Solicitor General's
representative admitted that PSPC had no participation in the issuance of the subject TCCs.
However, perusal of the transcript of stenographic notes (TSN) reveals that what was admitted
by petitioner was only the fact of issuance and eventual transfer/assignment to PSPC of the
TCCs. The succeeding portions of the TSN, omitted in the Comment, clearly showed that Sr.
State Solicitor Bustria repeatedly denied Atty. Lopez's (PSPC's counsel) proposed stipulations on
the valuable consideration for the TCCs, the approval by the concerned agencies of the deed of
the said assignment/transfer and related matters.[44]

Fraud, in its general sense, is deemed to comprise anything calculated to deceive, including all
acts, omissions, and concealment involving a breach of legal or equitable duty, trust or
confidence justly reposed, resulting in the damage to another, or by which an undue and
unconscionable advantage is taken of another. It is a question of fact and the circumstances
constituting it must be alleged and proved in the court below.[45] Petitioner's allegations of fraud
and irregularity in the issuance to FWI and eventual transfer to PSPC of the subject TCCs
require presentation of evidence in a full-blown trial. PSPC, in turn, can present its own
evidence to prove the status of a purchaser or transferee in good faith and for value. The solidary
liability of PSPC and FWI for the amount covered by the TCCs depends on the good faith or lack
of it on the part of PSPC.

In ascertaining good faith, or the lack of it, which is a question of intention, courts are
necessarily controlled by the evidence as to the conduct and outward acts by which alone the
inward motive may, with safety, be determined.[46] Good faith connotes an honest intention to
abstain from taking undue advantage of another, even though the forms and technicalities of
law, together with the absence of all information or belief of facts, would render the transaction
unconscientious.[47] The ascertainment of good faith, or lack of it, and the determination of
whether due diligence and prudence were exercised or not, are questions of fact.[48]

Trial courts have limited authority to render summary judgments and may do so only when
there is clearly no genuine issue as to any material fact. When the facts as pleaded by the parties
are disputed or contested, proceedings for summary judgment cannot take the place of
trial.[49] As certain facts pleaded are contested by the parties in this case, rendition of summary
judgment is not proper.

Prescription

As already mentioned, BOC's collection suit is not based on any new or revised assessment
because the original assessments which had long become final and uncontestable, were already
settled by PSPC with the use of the subject TCCs.

With the cancellation of the TCCs, the tax liabilities of PSPC under the original assessments
were considered unpaid, hence BOC's demand letters and the action for collection in the RTC.
To repeat, these assessed customs duties and taxes were previously assessed and paid by the
taxpayer, only that the TCCs turned out to be spurious and hence worthless certificates that did
not extinguish PSPC's tax liabilities.
The applicable provision is Section 1204 of the Tariff and Customs Code, which states:

Section 1204. Liability of Importer for Duties. — Unless relieved by laws or regulations,
the liability for duties, taxes, fees and other charges attaching on importation constitutes a
personal debt due from the importer to the government which can be discharged
only by payment in full of all duties, taxes, fees and other charges legally accruing. It also
constitutes a lien upon the articles imported which may be enforced while such articles are in
the custody or subject to the control of the government. (Emphasis supplied)
As we held in Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation v. Republic[50]:

Under this provision, import duties constitute a personal debt of the importer that must be paid
in full. The importer's liability therefore constitutes a lien on the article which the government
may choose to enforce while the imported articles are either in its custody or under its control.

When respondent released petitioner's goods, its (respondent's) lien over the imported goods
was extinguished. Consequently, respondent could only enforce the payment of petitioner's
import duties in full by filing a case for collection against petitioner.[51]
Stare Decisis

The doctrine of stare decisis is based on the principle that once a question of law has been
examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further
argument.[52] Accordingly, when a court has laid down a principle of law as applicable to a
certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases in which the
facts are substantially the same. Thus, where the same questions relating to the same event have
been put forward by the parties similarly situated as in a previous case litigated and decided by a
competent court, the rule of stare decisis is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issue.[53]

The RTC and CA both ruled that Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation v. CIR[54] applies to the
present case, stating that the legal issues have already been settled by this Court such as the
ineffective cancellation by the Center of TCCs which have been fully utilized by the
importer/taxpayer and the sole responsibility under the Liability Clause in the TCC of the
original grantee for its fraudulent issuance by the Center.

We disagree.

Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation v. CIR[55] involved TCCs used by PSPC that were also
cancelled for alleged fraud in their issuance and transfer. However, in the said case, there was a
finding, on the basis of evidence presented before the CTA, that PSPC is a transferee in good
faith and for value and that no evidence was adduced that it participated in any way in the
issuance of the TCCs to the corporations who in turn conveyed the same to PSPC.

PSPC's status as transferee in good faith of the TCCs assigned to it by FWI is yet to be
established or proven at the trial. In fact, this Court in upholding the jurisdiction of the RTC
directed it to proceed with the pre-trial and trial proper. Petitioner should be given the
opportunity to substantiate its allegations of fraud in the issuance and transfer of the TCCs
which PSPC used to pay for the customs duties and taxes due on its oil importations.
Whether Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation v. CIR[56] applies squarely to the present case
may be determined only after such trial. If it is shown that PSPC was a party to the fraud as
when it did not obtain the TCC for value or has knowledge of its fraudulent issuance, it will be
liable for the taxes and for the fraud committed as provided for by law.

As to the full utilization of the TCCs being claimed by PSPC, our ruling in Pilipinas Shell
Petroleum Corporation v. CIR is clear that the taxpayer must have no participation in the
fraud, viz.:

Sec. 3, letter 1. of AO 266, in relation to letters a. and g., does give ample authority to the Center
to cancel the TCCs it issued. Evidently, the Center cannot carry out its mandate if it cannot
cancel the TCCs it may have erroneously issued or those that were fraudulently issued. It is
axiomatic that when the law and its implementing rules are silent on the matter of cancellation
while granting explicit authority to issue, an inherent and incidental power resides on the
issuing authority to cancel that which was issued. A caveat however is required in that while the
Center has authority to do so, it must bear in mind the nature of the TCCs immediate
effectiveness and validity for which cancellation may only be exercised before a
transferred TCC has been fully utilizedor cancelled by the BIR after due application of the
available tax credit to the internal revenue tax liabilities of an innocent transferee for
value, unless of course the claimant or transferee was involved in the perpetration
of the fraud in the TCCs issuance, transfer, or utilization. The utilization of the
TCC will not shield a guilty party from the consequences of the fraud
committed.[57] (Emphasis supplied)
In sum, the CA erred in affirming the RTC orders granting summary judgment in favor of PSPC
considering that there exists a genuine issue of fact and that stare decisis finds no application in
this case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated February 13, 2013 and
Resolution dated June 3, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 95436
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

The case is hereby REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 49 for the
conduct of trial proceedings in Civil Case No. 02-103191 with utmost DELIBERATE
DISPATCH.

No pronouncement as to costs.

COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS v. HYPERMIX FEEDS CORPORATION, GR No. 179579,

2012-02-01
Facts:
On 7 November 2003, petitioner Commissioner of Customs issued CMO 27-2003. Under
the Memorandum, for tariff purposes, wheat was classified according to the following: (1)
importer or consignee; (2) country of origin; and (3) port of discharge.[5] The... regulation
provided an exclusive list of corporations, ports of discharge, commodity descriptions and
countries of origin. Depending on these factors, wheat would be classified either as food
grade or feed grade. The corresponding tariff for food grade wheat was 3%, for feed...
grade, 7%.
CMO 27-2003 further provided for the proper procedure for protest or Valuation and
Classification Review Committee (VCRC) cases. Under this procedure, the release of the
articles that were the subject of protest required the importer to post a cash bond to cover
the tariff... differential.[6]
A month after the issuance of CMO 27-2003, on 19 December 2003, respondent filed a
Petition for Declaratory Relief[7] with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Piñas City. It
anticipated the implementation of the regulation on its imported and perishable
Chinese milling wheat in transit from China.[8] Respondent contended that CMO 27-2003
was issued without following the mandate of the Revised Administrative Code on public
participation, prior notice, and publication or registration with the University of... the
Philippines Law Center.
Respondent also alleged that the regulation summarily adjudged it to be a feed grade
supplier without the benefit of prior assessment and examination; thus, despite having
imported food grade wheat, it would be subjected to the 7% tariff upon the arrival of the
shipment, forcing... them to pay 133% more than was proper.
Furthermore, respondent claimed that the equal protection clause of the Constitution was
violated when the regulation treated non-flour millers differently from flour millers for no
reason at all.
Lastly, respondent asserted that the retroactive application of the regulation was
confiscatory in nature.
Issues:
discuss the propriety of an action for declaratory relief.
Ruling:
The requirements of an action for declaratory relief are as follows: (1) there must be a
justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are
adverse; (3) the party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the
controversy; and
(4) the issue involved must be ripe for judicial determination.[15] We find that the Petition
filed by respondent before the lower court meets these requirements.
First, the subject of the controversy is the constitutionality of CMO 27-2003 issued by
petitioner Commissioner of Customs.
Second, the controversy is between two parties that have adverse interests. Petitioners are
summarily imposing a tariff rate that respondent is refusing to pay.
Third, it is clear that respondent has a legal and substantive interest in the implementation
of CMO 27-2003. Respondent has adequately shown that, as a regular importer of wheat,
on 14 August 2003, it has actually made shipments of wheat from China to Subic.
Finally, the issue raised by respondent is ripe for judicial determination, because litigation is
inevitable[19] for the simple and uncontroverted reason that respondent is not included in
the enumeration of flour millers classified as food grade wheat... importers. Thus, as the trial
court stated, it would have to file a protest case each time it imports food grade wheat and
be subjected to the 7% tariff.
It is therefore clear that a petition for declaratory relief is the right remedy given the
circumstances of the case.
When an administrative rule is merely interpretative in nature, its applicability needs nothing
further than its bare issuance, for it gives no real consequence more than what the law itself
has already prescribed. When, on the other hand, the administrative rule goes beyond...
merely providing for the means that can facilitate or render least cumbersome the
implementation of the law but substantially increases the burden of those governed, it
behooves the agency to accord at least to those directly affected a chance to be heard, and
thereafter to be... duly informed, before that new issuance is given the force and effect of
law.
Because petitioners failed to follow the requirements enumerated by the Revised
Administrative Code, the assailed regulation must be struck down.
Going now to the content of CMO 27-3003, we likewise hold that it is unconstitutional for
being violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
The equal protection clause means that no person or class of persons shall be deprived of
the same protection of laws enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same place in
like circumstances. Thus, the guarantee of the equal protection of laws is not violated if
there... is a reasonable classification. For a classification to be reasonable, it must be
shown that (1) it rests on substantial distinctions; (2) it is germane to the purpose of the law;
(3) it is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it applies equally to all members... of
the same class.
Unfortunately, CMO 27-2003 does not meet these requirements. We do not see how the
quality of wheat is affected by who imports it, where it is discharged, or which country it
came from.
The regulation, therefore, does not become disadvantageous to respondent only, but even
to the state.
It is also not clear how the regulation intends to "monitor more closely wheat importations
and thus prevent their misclassification."
Petitioner Commissioner of Customs also went beyond his powers when the regulation
limited the customs officer's duties mandated by Section 1403 of the Tariff and Customs
Law, as amended.
The provision mandates that the customs officer must first assess and determine the
classification of the imported article before tariff may be imposed. Unfortunately, CMO 23-
2007 has already classified the article even before the customs officer had the chance to
examine it. In... effect, petitioner Commissioner of Customs diminished the powers granted
by the Tariff and Customs Code with regard to wheat importation when it no longer required
the customs officer's prior examination and assessment of the proper classification of the
wheat.
It is well-settled that rules and regulations, which are the product of a delegated power to
create new and additional legal provisions that have the effect of law, should be within the
scope of the statutory authority granted by the legislature to the administrative agency. It...
is required that the regulation be germane to the objects and purposes of the law; and that it
be not in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by law.
In summary, petitioners violated respondent's right to due process in the issuance of CMO
27-2003 when they failed to observe the requirements under the Revised Administrative
Code. Petitioners likewise violated respondent's right to equal protection of laws when they
provided... for an unreasonable classification in the application of the regulation. Finally,
petitioner Commissioner of Customs went beyond his powers of delegated authority when
the regulation limited the powers of the customs officer to examine and assess imported
articles.

NAGKAKAISANG MARALITA NG SITIO MASIGASIG v. MILITARY SHRINE SERVICES –

PHILIPPINE VETERANS AFFAIRS OFFICE, GR No. 187587, 2013-06-05
Facts:
By virtue of Proclamation 423, Former President Carlos P. Garcia reserved parcels of land in
the Municipalities of Pasig, Taguig, Paranaque, Province of Rizal and Pasay City for military
reservation. Later on, Former President Marcos issued a proclamation amending such
publication, which excludes certain area of the reserved land. Again, President Marcos issued
Proclamation No. 2476 that further amended the proclamation that excluded the barangays of
Lower Bicutan, Upper Bicutan and Signal Village and a handwritten addendum which includes
Western Bicutan for the disposition of the area. The proclamation was published in the Official
Gazette without the handwritten addendum. Demolition of illegal structures existed to prevent
the area from the increasing number of informal settlers. Members of petitioner Nagkakaisang
Maralita ng Sitio Masigasig, Inc. (NMSMI) and Western Bicutan Lot Owners Association, Inc.
(WBLOAI) filed for a Petition with Commission on Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP)
praying for the reclassification of the areas they are occupying as is already alienable and
disposable. COSLAP ruled that the handwritten addendum of President Marcos was not
published thus the areas occupied by the petitioners are in question alienable and disposable.

NMSMI and WBLOAI filed Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Issues:
whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the subject lots were not alienable and
disposable by virtue of Proclamation No. 2476 on the ground that the handwritten
addendum of President Marcos was not included in the... publication of the said law.
Ruling:
Applying the foregoing ruling to the instant case, this Court cannot rely on a handwritten
note that was not part of Proclamation No. 2476 as published. Without publication, the note
never had any legal force and effect.
whether or not President Marcos intended to include
Western Bicutan is not only irrelevant but speculative. Simply put, the courts may not
speculate as to the probable intent of the legislature apart from the words appearing in the
law.[17] This Court cannot rule that a word appears in the law when,... evidently, there is
none.
Principles:
The resolution of whether the subject lots were declared as reclassified and disposable lies
in the determination of whether the handwritten addendum of President Marcos has the
force and effect of law. In relation thereto, Article 2 of the Civil Code expressly provides:
ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication
in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year
after such publication.
Under the above provision, the requirement of publication is indispensable to give effect to
the law, unless the law itself has otherwise provided. The phrase "unless otherwise
provided" refers to a different effectivity date other than after fifteen days following the...
completion of the law's publication in the Official Gazette, but does not imply that the
requirement of publication may be dispensed with. The issue of the requirement of
publication was already settled in the landmark case Tañada v. Hon. Tuvera,[16]... in which
we had the occasion to rule thus:
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide
that the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended. An example, as pointed out
by the present Chief Justice in his separate concurrence in the original... decision, is the
Civil Code which did not become effective after fifteen days from its publication in the
Official Gazette but "one year after such publication." The general rule did not apply
because it was "otherwise provided."... he subject of such law is a matter of public interest
which... any member of the body politic may question in the political forums or, if he is a
proper party, even in the courts of justice. In fact, a law without any bearing on the public
would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires act of...
the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest even if it might
be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only, and not to the
public as a whole.
We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws,
shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after
publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the
President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by
the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution.
RAMONITO O. ACAAC v. MELQUIADES D. AZCUNA, GR No. 187378, 2013-09-30
Facts:
The Facts
Petitioner People's Eco-Tourism and Livelihood Foundation, Inc. (PETAL) is a non-
governmental organization, founded by petitioner Ramonito O. Acaac, which is engaged in
the protection and conservation of ecology, tourism, and livelihood projects within Misamis
Occidental.
PETAL built some cottages... on Capayas Island... in 1995 as well as a seminar cottage in
2001
On April 11 and May 20, 2002, however, respondents Mayor Melquiades D. Azcuna, Jr.
(Azcuna) and Building Official Marietes B. Bonalos issued separate Notices of Illegal
Construction against PETAL for its failure to apply for a building permit prior to the
construction of its... buildings in violation of Presidential Decree No. 1096,[8] otherwise
known as the "National Building Code of the Philippines
PETAL failed to comply with the requirements for the... issuance of a building permit, a
Third and Final Notice of Illegal Construction was issued by respondents against it on July
8, 2002... on July 8, 2002 that the Sangguniang Bayan of Lopez Jaena (SB) adopted
Municipal Ordinance No. 02, Series of 2002... which prohibited, among others... the entry of
any entity, association, corporation or... organization inside the sanctuaries;[11] and (b) the
construction of any structures, permanent or temporary, on the premises, except if
authorized by the local government.
On August 23, 2002,... a Notice of Voluntary Demolition was served upon PETAL directing it
to remove the structures it built on Capayas Island. Among the reasons cited was its
violation of the subject ordinance. A similar notice was also served against individual
petitioners on
October 25, 2002.
On October 29, 2002, petitioners filed an action praying for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order, injunction and damages[15] against respondents before the RTC,
docketed as Civil Case No. 4684, alleging that they have prior vested rights to occupy... and
utilize Capayas Island. PETAL claimed that its predecessors-in-interest have been in
possession thereof since 1961
PETAL assailed the validity of the subject ordinance on the following grounds: (a) it was
adopted without public consultation; (b) it was not published in a... newspaper of general
circulation in the province as required by Republic Act No. 7160,[16] otherwise known as
"The Local Government Code of 1991" (LGC); and (c) it was not approved by the SP.
Therefore, its implementation should be... enjoined.
Issues:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari[1] are the Decision[2] dated September 30,
2008 and Resolution[3] dated March 9, 2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV
No.
00284-MIN which reversed and set aside the Decision[4] dated November 26, 2004 of the
Regional Trial Court of Oroquieta City, Branch 2 (RTC) in Civil Case No. 4684 for injunction.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue in this case is whether or not the subject ordinance is valid and
enforceable against petitioners.
Ruling:
The RTC Ruling... the RTC rendered a Decision[19] declaring the subject ordinance as
invalid/void based on the following grounds: (a) PETAL's protest has not been resolved and
that the subject ordinance was not duly approved by the SP; (b)... the said ordinance was
not published in a newspaper of general circulation nor was it posted in public places; (c)
Capayas Island is classified as timberland, hence, not suited to be a bird or fish sanctuary;
and (d) the authority and control over timberlands... belong to the national government,
through the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
However, the petitioners were ordered to remove the structures they built thereon without
valid building permits
The Proceedings Before the CA
Contrary to the RTC's ruling, it held that the subject ordinance was deemed approved upon
failure of the SP to declare the same invalid within 30 days after its submission in
accordance with Section 56 of the LGC.
Moreover, public consultations were conducted with various groups before the subject
ordinance was passed.
The CA further ruled that the Municipality of Lopez Jaena was vested with sufficient power
and authority to pass and adopt the subject ordinance under Section 447 in relation to
Section 16 of the LGC.
CA pronounced that the subject ordinance is valid.
CA upheld the RTC's finding that petitioners have no proprietary rights over the Capayas
Island, thereby rendering their action for injunction improper.
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration[32] therefrom was denied by the CA in a
Resolution[33] dated March 9, 2009
The Court's Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
petitioners failed to present any evidence to show that no publication or posting of the
subject ordinance was made. In contrast,... Azcuna had testified that they have complied
with the publication and posting requirements.[40] While it is true that he likewise failed to
submit any other evidence thereon, still, in accordance with the presumption of validity in
favor of an ordinance,... its constitutionality or legality should be upheld in the absence of
any controverting evidence that the procedure prescribed by law was not observed in its
enactment. Likewise, petitioners had the burden of proving their own allegation, which they,
however, failed to do... the Court upheld the presumptive validity of the ordinance therein
despite the lack of controverting evidence on the part of the local government... to show that
public hearings were conducted... petitioner Figuerres has not presented any evidence to
show that no public hearings were conducted prior to the enactment of the ordinances in
question. On the other hand, the Municipality of Mandaluyong... claims that public hearings
were indeed conducted before the subject ordinances were adopted, although it likewise
failed to submit any evidence to establish this allegation.
However, in accordance with the presumption of validity in favor of an ordinance, their...
constitutionality or legality should be upheld in the absence of evidence showing that the
procedure prescribed by law was not observed in their enactment.
We have a right to assume that officials have done that which the law requires them to do,
in the absence of positive proof to the... contrary.
Furthermore, the lack of a public hearing is a negative allegation essential to petitioner's
cause of action in the present case. Hence, as petitioner is the party asserting it, she has
the burden of proof.
In any event, petitioners have not shown any valid title[44] to the property in dispute to be
entitled to its possession. Besides, the RTC's order directing the removal of the structures
built by petitioners on Capayas Island without building permits was... not appealed. As such,
the same should now be deemed as final and conclusive upon them.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated September 30, 2008 and
Resolution dated March 9, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 00284-MIN are
hereby AFFIRMED.
Principles:
Section 56 of the LGC provides:
SEC. 56. Review of Component City and Municipal Ordinances or Resolutions by the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan. (a) Within three (3) days after approval, the secretary to the
Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan shall forward to the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan for... review, copies of approved ordinances and the resolutions approving the
local development plans and public investment programs formulated by the local
development councils.
(b) Within thirty (30) days after receipt of copies of such ordinances and resolutions, the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan shall examine the documents or transmit them to the provincial
attorney, or if there be none, to the provincial prosecutor for prompt examination. The
provincial... attorney or provincial prosecutor shall, within a period of ten (10) days from
receipt of the documents, inform the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in writing his comments or
recommendations, which may be considered by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in making
its decision.
(c) If the Sangguniang Panlalawigan finds that such an ordinance or resolution is beyond
the power conferred upon the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan concerned,
it shall declare such ordinance or resolution invalid in whole or in part. The Sangguniang
Panlalawigan... shall enter its action in the minutes and shall advise the corresponding city
or municipal authorities of the action it has taken.
(d) If no action has been taken by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan within thirty (30) days
after submission of such an ordinance or resolution, the same shall be presumed consistent
with law and therefore valid.

Chapter 5
OPERATION AND EFFECT OF LAWS

Sec. 18. When Laws Take Effect. - Laws shall take effect after fifteen (15) days
following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper
of general circulation, unless it is otherwise provided.chanrobles virtual law library
Sec. 19. Prospectivity. - Laws shall have prospective effect unless the contrary is
expressly provided.chanrobles virtual law library
 Sec. 20. Interpretation of Laws and Administrative Issuances. - In the
interpretation of a law or administrative issuance promulgated in all the official
languages, the English text shall control, unless otherwise specifically provided. In
case of ambiguity, omission or mistake, the other texts may be consulted.chanrobles
virtual law library
Sec. 21. No Implied Revival of Repealed Law.- When a law which expressly repeals
a prior law itself repealed, the law first repealed shall not be thereby revived unless
expressly so provided.chanrobles virtual law library
Sec. 22. Revival of Law Impliedly Repealed. - When a law which impliedly repeals
a prior law is itself repealed, the prior law shall thereby be revived, unless the
repealing law provides otherwise.chanrobles virtual law library
Sec. 23. Ignorance of the Law. - Ignorance of the law excuses no one from
compliance therewith.chanrobles virtual law library

FELISA P. DE ROY v. CA, GR No. 80718, 1988-01-29

Facts:
The firewall of a burned-out building owned by petitioners collapsed and destroyed the
tailoring shop occupied by the family of private respondents, resulting in injuries to private
respondents and the death of Marissa Bernal, a daughter.
Private respondents had been warned by petitioners to vacate their shop in view of its
proximity to the weakened wall but the former failed to do so.
On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals in a
decision promulgated on August 17, 1987, copy of... which was received by petitioners on
August 25, 1987. On September 9, 1987, the last day of the fifteen-day period to file an
appeal, petitioners filed a motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration,
which was eventually denied by the appellate court in the
Resolution of September 30, 1987. Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration on
September 24, 1987, but this was denied in the Resolution of October 27, 1987.
Issues:
Court of Appeals committed no grave abuse of discretion in affirming the trial court's
decision
Ruling:
This Court likewise finds that the Court of Appeals committed no grave abuse of discretion
in affirming the trial court's decision holding petitioner liable under Article 2190 of the Civil
Code, which provides that "the proprietor of a building or structure is responsible for... the
damage resulting from its total or partial collapse, if it should be due to the lack of necessary
repairs."
Nor was there error in rejecting petitioners' argument that private respondents had the "last
clear chance" to avoid the accident if only they heeded the warning to vacate the tailoring
shop and, therefore, petitioners' prior negligence should be disregarded, since the
doctrine... of "last clear chance", which has been applied to vehicular accidents, is
inapplicable to this case.
Principles:
Consunji v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 137873 April 20, 2001
D. M. CONSUNJI, INC., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and MARIA J. JUEGO, respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:
FACTS: Jose A. Juego was crushed to death when the platform he was then on board and performing
work, fell. And the falling of the platform was due to the removal or getting loose of the pin which was
merely inserted to the connecting points of the chain block and platform but without a safety lock.1
Jose Juego’s widow, Maria, filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig a complaint for damages
against the deceased’s employer, D.M. Consunji, Inc. The employer raised, among other defenses, the
widow’s prior availment of the benefits from the State Insurance Fund. RTC rendered a decision in favor
of the widow Maria Juego. On appeal by D. M. Consunji, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the
decision of the RTC in toto. D. M. Consunji now seeks the reversal of the CA decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not Maria Juergo can still claim damages with D.M. Consunji apart from the death
benefits she claimed in the State Insurance Fund.
HELD: Yes. The respondent is not precluded from recovering damages under the civil code.
As a general rule a claimant has a choice of either to recover from the employer the fixed amounts set by
the Workmen’s Compensation Act or to prosecute an ordinary civil action against the tort fees or for
higher damages but he cannot pursue both courses of action simultaneously. But There is an exception is
where a claimant who has already been paid under the Workmen’s Compensation Act may still sue for
damages under the Civil Code on the basis of supervening facts or developments occurring after he opted
for the first remedy. The choice of the first remedy based on ignorance or a mistake of fact, nullifies the
choice as it was not an intelligent choice.
Here, the CA held that private respondent’s case came under the exception because private respondent
was unaware of petitioner’s negligence when she filed her claim for death benefits from the State
Insurance Fund. Private respondent filed the civil complaint for damages using the police investigation
report to support her complaint may just be an afterthought after receiving a copy of the Memorandum of
the Prosecutor’s Office dismissing the criminal complaint for insufficiency of evidence. This court is
more inclined to believe appellee’s allegation that she learned about appellant’s negligence only after she
applied for and received the benefits under ECC. This is a mistake of fact that will make this case fall
under the exception
Payments already made to private respondent pursuant to the Labor Code shall be deducted therefrom. In
all other respects, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
DEL CASTILLO, J.:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] seeks to set aside the December 11, 2009 Decision[2] of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 94426 affirming the July 6, 2005 Decision[3] of the Civil Service
Commission-Cordillera Administrative Region (CSC-CAR) in CAR-05-034DC, as well as its March 17, 2010
Resolution[4] denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.[5]

Factual Antecedents

The facts are as follows:

Petitioner Macario U. Catipon, Jr. is the holder of a Bachelor's Degree in Commerce from the Baguio
Colleges Foundation. When applying for graduation, he was allowed to join the graduation ceremonies
despite a deficiency of 1.5 units in Military Science, pursuant to a school policy allowing students with
deficiencies of not more than 12 units to be included in the list of graduates. However, a restriction
came after, which is, that the deficiency must be cured before the student can be considered a
graduate.

ha 1985, petitioner found employment with the Social Security System (SSS) in Bangued, Abra.

Sometime in September 1993, the personnel head of the SSS in Bangued, Abra informed petitioner that
the Civil Service Commission was conducting a Career Service Professional Examination (CSPE) in
October of the same year. Petitioner filed an application to take the examination, believing that the CSC
still allowed CSPE applicants to substitute the length of their government service for any academic
deficiency which they may have. However, the above-mentioned policy of the CSC had been
discontinued since January 1993 pursuant to Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 42,
Series of 1991 and Office Memo. No. 63, Series of 1992.

Nevertheless, petitioner took the CSPE tests on October 17, 1993 and obtained a rating of 80.52%.
Eventually, petitioner was promoted to Senior Analyst and Officer-in-Charge Branch Head of the SSS at
Bangued, Abra. hi October 1995, he finally eliminated his deficiency of 1.5 units in Military Science.

On March 10, 2003, respondent Jerome Japson, a former Senior Member Services Representative of SSS
Bangued, filed a letter-complaint with the Civil Service Commission-CAR Regional Director, alleging that
petitioner made deliberate false entries in his CSPE application, specifically, that he obtained his college
degree in 1993 when actually he graduated in 1995 only, after removing his deficiency of 1.5 units in
Military Education. Also, that petitioner was not qualified to take the CSPE examination in 1993 since he
was not yet then a graduate of a four-year college course, contrary to the entry in his application form.

After preliminary investigation, petitioner was charged with Dishonesty, Falsification of Official
documents, Grave Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service by the CSC-
CAR.[6]

Respondent's Letter-Complaint[7] against petitioner was docketed as CSC Disciplinary Administrative

Case No. BB-03-006.

In his Answer,[8] petitioner essentially pleaded good faith, lack of malice, and honest mistake. He
maintained that at the time of his application to take the CSPE, he was of the honest belief that the
policy of the CSC - that any deficiency in the applicant's educational requirement may be substituted by
his length of service - was still subsisting.

On July 6, 2005, the CSC-CAR, through Director IV Atty. Lorenzo S. Danipog, rendered a
Decision[9] containing the following pronouncements:

Clearly, respondent Catipon is not without any fault under the foregoing circumstances. The only issue
now left is with respect to the particular offense for which Catipon may be held responsible. Respondent
Catipon is charged (with) four offenses: Dishonesty, Falsification of Official Documents, Grave
Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service.

The key document allegedly falsified in this case is the Application Form x x x of respondent Catipon for
the purpose of taking the CS Professional Examination scheduled on October 17, 1993. Close and careful
perusal of the said application form reveals that most of the entries filled up by respondent are
typewritten. The only entries handwritten by respondent are those corresponding to "Year Graduated"
and "School Where Graduated" which were answered by Macario with "1984" and "BCF" respectively.
Another handwritten entry is with respect to "Degree Finished", the handwritten "BSC entry, however,
was just superimposed on the typewritten "Commerce".

The fact that majority of the entries or data in the application form is typewritten suggests that the said
application form was consciously drafted and meticulously prepared before its actual submission to the
CSC for processing. They are relevant and material entries or data sought from respondent. It is worth
emphasizing however that the pre-drafted application form, considering the typewritten entries, shows
respondent's confusion on how to make entries thereat. Respondent answered both the IF YES column
and IF NO column corresponding to the question "Are you a college graduate" in Item 8. x x x

xxxx

The manner that Item 8 was filled up by respondent Catipon shows lack of deliberate intent to defraud
the government. He manifested in his application his uncertainty on how to take the fact that he only
lacks 1.5 units Military Science to be conferred a graduate status, vis-a-vis the CSC policy on educational
requirement. Though the entry "undergrad" was erased, the CSC employee who processed the
application would have doubted the truthfulness and authenticity of respondent's entries in Item 8 of
the Application Form, and thus the educational status of Macario. x x x

xxxx
Catipon had tried to show the real state of the matter regarding his educational attainment as can be
deduced from the manner he answered Item No. 8 in the application form. This may be taken as good
faith, which will serve to mitigate any liability incurred by respondent Catipon. The premeditated intent
to deceive or willfully distort the facts in this case is not present. The acts of Catipon do not even show
blatant disregard of an established rule or a clear intent to violate the law if at all, there was attempt to
reveal the truth to the examination division processing the application.

xxxx

With [regard] to the eligibility earned by respondent Macario in view of his passing the October 17, 1993
Career Service Professional Examination, the same needs to be revoked being the fruit of a poisonous
tree, so to speak. Paragraph 2 of Sec. 6, Rule n, Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order
No. 292 states:

Provided that when an applica[nt] for examination is found to have xxx intentionally made any false
statement of any material fact in his application, x x x the Commission shall invalidate such examination
xxx.

With the foregoing, respondent Macario U. Catipon, Jr., Senior Analyst and OIC Branch Head, Social
Security System, Bangued, Abra, is hereby exonerated of the charges Dishonesty, Falsification of Official
Documents and Grave Misconduct. However, respondent is found guilty of Conduct Prejudicial to the
Best Interest of the Service.

Under the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, the imposable penalty on the first
offense of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service is suspension of six months and one day
to one year.

Under Section 53 of the same Rules, good faith is enumerated as one mitigating circumstance. Thus,
respondent Macario Catipon, Jr. is hereby meted a penalty of six months and one day suspension,
without pay, which is the minimum period of the penalty attached to the offense committed. The Career
Service Professional eligibility of respondent is also ordered revoked, without prejudice however to
retaking of the said examination. Thus, Catipon, after serving suspension herein provided should not be
allowed to go back to his current position without CS Professional eligibility. Consequently, in case
respondent Catipon fails to retake or pass CSPE, after serving his suspension, he may be demoted to any
available position that fits his subprofessional eligibility.[10]

Petitioner moved for reconsideration,[11] but the CSC-CAR sustained its judgment in a March 23, 2006
Decision,[12] which contained the following pronouncement:

Catipon also asserted that in view of his exoneration of Dishonesty, Falsification of Official Documents
and Grave Misconduct, there is no longer any basis to hold respondent guilty of Conduct Prejudicial to
the Best Interest of the Service. This contention is without legal basis. In the case of Philippine
Retirement Authority vs. Rupa 363 SCRA 480, the Honorable Supreme Court held as follows:
Under the Civil Service laws and rules, there is no description of what specific acts constitute the grave
offense of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service.

As alluded to previously in Decision No. CAR-05-034DC, Catipon is not without fault under the
circumstances. To completely exonerate respondent would be inequitable and iniquitous considering
the totality of events surrounding this case. Though there was no deliberate intent to falsify or to make
dishonest entry in the Application Form as deduced from the manner that the said form was
accomplished, the fact that there was indeed such dishonest or false entry in the CSPE Application Form
is undisputedly established. In view of such an established fact, the integrity of the Civil Service
Examination, particularly the CSPE has been blemished which is sufficient to constitute Conduct
Prejudicial to the Interest of the Service.[13]

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In a Petition for Review docketed with the CA as CA-G.R. SP No. 94426, petitioner prayed for injunctive
relief and the reversal of the above CSC-CAR decision. He argued that the CSC-CAR incorrectly found him
guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service when he has been declared innocent of
the charges of dishonesty, falsification of official documents, and grave misconduct; that while the
Supreme Court has held that making false entries in public documents may be considered as conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service, such act must be accompanied by deliberate intent or a
willful desire to defy or disregard established rules or norms in the service;[14] and that with the finding
that he merely committed an innocent mistake in filling up the application form for the CSPE, he may
not be found guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.

On December 11, 2009, the CA rendered the assailed Decision denying the petition, decreeing thus:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision [sic]
of the Civil Service Commission-Cordillera Administrative Region dated July 6, 2005 and March 23, 2006
is [sic] AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.[15]

The CA held that instead of filing a petition for review directly with it, petitioner should have interposed
an appeal with the Civil Service Commission (CSC), pursuant to Sections 5(A)(1), 43 and 49 of the CSC
Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases;[16] that by filing a petition directly with it, petitioner violated the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies; that petitioner's case is not exceptional as would
exempt it from the application of the doctrine; that per the ruling in Bayaca v. Judge Ramos,[17] the
absence of deliberate intent or willful desire to defy or disregard established rules or norms in the
service does not preclude a finding of guilt for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service; and
that petitioner did not act with prudence and care, but instead was negligent, in the filling up of his CSPE
application form and in failing to verify beforehand the requirements for the examination.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the CA stood its ground. Hence, the instant recourse.
Issues

Petitioner raises the following issues for resolution:

(A)

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT FAILED TO REALIZE
THAT GIVEN THE IMMEDIATE EFFECT OF THE SUSPENSION IMPOSED BY THE CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION-CORDILLERA ADMINISTRATIVE REGION AGAINST THE PETITIONER, HE WAS JUSTIFIED IN
SEEKING JUDICIAL RECOURSE BEFORE (THE COURT OF APPEALS);

(B)

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT MISAPPLIED IN THE
ABOVE-ENTITLED CASE THE RULE ON PRIOR EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES;

(C)

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT FAILED TO CONSIDER
THAT THE PETITIONER ACTED IN GOOD FAITH AND THIS NEGATES GUILT FOR CONDUCT PREJUDICIAL TO
THE BEST INTEREST OF THE SERVICE.[18]

Petitioner's Arguments

In his Petition and Reply[19] seeking a reversal of the assailed CA dispositions and, consequently,
exoneration from the charge of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, petitioner argues
that he was constrained to file the petition for review with the CA as his decreed six-month suspension
was imminent as a consequence of the executory nature of the CSC-CAR decision; that immediate
judicial intervention was necessary to "prevent serious injury and damage" to him, which is why his CA
petition included a prayer for injunctive relief; that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies should not have been applied strictly in his case, given the special circumstance that his
suspension would mean loss of his only source of income;[20] that he should be completely exonerated
from the charges against him, since conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service must be
accompanied by deliberate intent or a willful desire to defy or disregard established rules or norms in
the service - which is absent in his case; and that his career service professional eligibility should not be
revoked in the interest of justice and in the spirit of the policy which promotes and preserves civil
service eligibility.

Respondent's Arguments

In his Comment[21] seeking denial of the petition, respondent counters that completion of all the
academic requirements - and not merely attendance at graduation rites - confers the necessary degree
which qualifies a student to take the CSPE; that petitioner's claim that he is a graduate as of 1984 is
belied by his Transcript of Records[22] and other pieces of evidence submitted, which reflect the date of
his graduation as October 1995 - or after completion of his 1.5-unit deficiency in Military Science; that
petitioner cannot claim to suffer irreparable injury or damage as a result of the CSC-CAR's Decision,
which is valid and binding; that the revocation of petitioner's eligibility is only proper, since he was then
not qualified when he took the CSPE; that the CSC-CAR was correct in finding that petitioner's act
compromised the image and integrity of the civil service, which justified the imposition of a
corresponding penalty; that this Court in the Rupa case made it clear that the act of making false entries
in public documents constitutes conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, a grave offense
punishable by suspension for six months and one day to one year for the first offense, and dismissal for
the second offense; and that indeed, petitioner violated the doctrines of primary jurisdiction and
exhaustion of administrative remedies when he proceeded directly to the CA, instead of filing an appeal
with the CSC.

Our Ruling

The Court denies the Petition.

Our fundamental law, particularly Sections 2 (1) and 3 of Article DC-B, state that -

Section 2. (1) The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies of the
Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters.

Section 3. The Civil Service Commission, as the central personnel agency of the Government, shall
establish a career service and adopt measures to promote morale, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness,
progressiveness, and courtesy in the civil service. It shall strengthen the merit and rewards system,
integrate all human resources development programs for all levels and ranks, and institutionalize a
management climate conducive to public accountability. It shall submit to the President and the
Congress an annual report on its personnel programs.

Thus, "the CSC, as the central personnel agency of the Government, has jurisdiction over disputes
involving the removal and separation of all employees of government branches, subdivisions,
instrumentalities and agencies, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original
charters. Simply put, it is the sole arbiter of controversies relating to the civil service."[23]

In line with the above provisions of the Constitution and its mandate as the central personnel agency of
government and sole arbiter of controversies relating to the civil service, the CSC adopted
Memorandum Circular No. 19, series of 1999 (MC 19), or the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative
Cases in the Civil Service, which the CA cited as the basis for its pronouncement. Section 4 thereof
provides:

Section 4. Jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission. — The Civil Service Commission shall hear and
decide administrative cases instituted by, or brought before it, directly or on appeal, including contested
appointments, and shall review decisions and actions of its offices and of the agencies attached to it.

Except as otherwise provided by the Constitution or by law, the Civil Service Commission shall have the
final authority to pass upon the removal, separation and suspension of all officers and employees in the
civil service and upon all matters relating to the conduct, discipline and efficiency of such officers and
employees.

As pointed out by the CA, pursuant to Section 5(A)(1) of MC 19, the Civil Service Commission Proper, or
Commission Proper, shall have jurisdiction over decisions of Civil Service Regional Offices brought before
it on petition for review. And under Section 43, "decisions of heads of departments, agencies, provinces,
cities, municipalities and other instrumentalities imposing a penalty exceeding thirty days suspension or
fine in an amount exceeding thirty days salary, may be appealed to the Commission Proper within a
period of fifteen days from receipt thereof."[24] "Commission Proper" refers to the Civil Service
Commission-Central Office.[25]

It is only the decision of the Commission Proper that may be brought to the CA on petition for review,
under Section 50 of MC 19, which provides thus:

Section 50. Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals. - A party may elevate a decision of the
Commission before the Court of Appeals by way of a petition for review under Rule 43 of the 1997
Revised Rules of Court.[26]

Thus, we agree with the CA's conclusion that in filing his petition for review directly with it from the CSC-
CAR Regional Director, petitioner failed to observe the principle of exhaustion of administrative
remedies. As correctly stated by the appellate court, non-exhaustion of administrative remedies renders
petitioner's CA petition premature and thus dismissible.

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that "before a party is allowed to seek
the intervention of the court, he or she should have availed himself or herself of all the means of
administrative processes afforded him or her. Hence, if resort to a remedy within the administrative
machinery can still be made by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide
on a matter that comes within his or her jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted first before
the court's judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of the intervention of the court is
fatal to one's cause of action. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is based on
practical and legal reasons. The availment of administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides
for a speedier disposition of controversies. Furthermore, the courts of justice, for reasons of comity and
convenience, will shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been
completed and complied with, so as to give the administrative agency concerned every opportunity to
correct its error and dispose of the case."[27] Indeed, the administrative agency concerned - in this case
the Commission Proper - is in the "best position to correct any previous error committed in its
forum."[28]

The CA is further justified in refusing to take cognizance of the petition for review, as "[t]he doctrine of
primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a
controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special
competence."[29] When petitioner's recourse lies in an appeal to the Commission Proper in accordance
with the procedure prescribed in MC 19, the CA may not be faulted for refusing to acknowledge
petitioner before it.

We likewise affirm the CA's pronouncement that petitioner was negligent in filling up his CSPE
application form and in failing to verify beforehand the specific requirements for the CSPE examination.
Petitioner's claim of good faith and absence of deliberate intent or willful desire to defy or disregard the
rules relative to the CSPE is not a defense as to exonerate him from the charge of conduct prejudicial to
the best interest of the service; under our legal system, ignorance of the law excuses no one from
compliance therewith.[30] Moreover, petitioner - as mere applicant for acceptance into the professional
service through the CSPE - cannot expect to be served on a silver platter; the obligation to know what is
required for the examination falls on him, and not the CSC or his colleagues in office. As aptly ruled by
the appellate court:

In Bacaya[31] v. Ramos, the Supreme Court found respondent judge guilty of both negligence and
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service when he issued an arrest warrant despite the
deletion of the penalty of imprisonment imposed on an accused in a particular criminal case.
Respondent judge in the said case claimed that the issuance of the warrant was a mistake, done in good
faith and that it has been a practice in his office for the Clerk of Court to study motions and that he
would simply sign the prepared order. The Supreme Court rejected his defense and stated that
negligence is the failure to observe such care as a reasonably prudent and careful person would use
under ordinary circumstances. An act of the will is necessary&r deliberate intent to exist; such is not
necessary in an act of negligence.

Here, petitioner failed to verify the requirements before filing his application to take the CSPE exam. He
simply relied on his prior knowledge of the rules, particularly, that he could substitute his deficiency in
Military Science with the length of his government service. He cannot lay blame on the personnel head
of the SSS-Bangued, Abra, who allegedly did not inform him of the pertinent rules contained in Civil
Service Memorandum Circular No. 42, Series of 1991. For, [if] he were truly a reasonably prudent and
careful person, petitioner himself should have verified from the CSC the requirements imposed on
prospective examinees. In so doing, he would certainly have been informed of the new CSC policy
disallowing substitution of one's length of government service for academic deficiencies. Neither should
petitioner have relied on an unnamed Civil Service employee's advice since it was not shown that the
latter was authorized to give information regarding the examination nor that said employee was
competent and capable of giving correct information. His failure to verify the actual CSPE requirements
which a reasonably prudent and careful person would have done constitutes negligence. Though his
failure was not a deliberate act of the will, such is not necessary in an act of negligence and, as in
Bacaya, negligence is not inconsistent with a finding of guilt for conduct prejudicial to the best interest
of the service.[32]

The corresponding penalty for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service may be imposed
upon an erring public officer as long as the questioned act or conduct taints the image and integrity of
the office; and the act need not be related to or connected with the public officer's official functions.
Under our civil service laws, there is no concrete description of what specific acts constitute conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service, but the following acts or omissions have been treated as
such: misappropriation of public funds; abandonment of office; failure to report back to work without
prior notice; failure to safekeep public records and property; making false entries in public documents;
falsification of court orders; a judge's act of brandishing a gun, and threatening the complainants during
a traffic altercation; a court interpreter's participation in the execution of a document conveying
complainant's property which resulted in a quarrel in the latter's family; selling fake Unified Vehicular
Volume Program exemption cards to his officemates during office hours; a CA employee's forging of
receipts to avoid her private contractual obligations; a Government Service Insurance System (GSIS)
employee's act of repeatedly changing his IP address, which caused network problems within his office
and allowed him to gain access to the entire GSIS network, thus putting the system in a vulnerable state
of security;[33] a public prosecutor's act of signing a motion to dismiss that was not prepared by him, but
by a judge;[34] and a teacher's act of directly selling a book to her students in violation of the Code of
Ethics for Professional Teachers.[35] In petitioner's case, his act of making false entries in his CSPE
application undoubtedly constitutes conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service; the absence
of a willful or deliberate intent to falsify or make dishonest entries in his application is immaterial, for
conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service "may or may not be characterized by
corruption or a willful intent to violate the law or to disregard established rules."[36]

Finally, the Court cannot consider petitioner's plea that "in the interest of justice and in the spirit of the
policy which promotes and preserves civil service eligibility," his career service professional eligibility
should not be revoked. The act of using a fake or spurious civil service eligibility for one's benefit not
only amounts to violation of the civil service examinations or CSPE; it also results in prejudice to the
government and the public in general. It is a transgression of the law which has no place in the public
service.[37] "Assumption of public office is impressed with the paramount public interest that requires
the highest standards of ethical conduct. A person aspiring for public office must observe honesty,
candor, and faithful compliance with the law. Nothing less is expected."[38]

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The December 11, 2009 Decision and March 17, 2010 Resolution of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 94426 are AFFIRMED.

FAMILY CODE – Article 256

TITLE XII

FINAL PROVISIONS

Art. 254. Titles III, IV, V, VI, VIII, IX, XI, and XV of Book 1 of Republic Act No. 386, otherwise known as the
Civil Code of the Philippines, as amended, and Articles 17, 18, 19, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 39, 40, 41, and 42
of Presidential Decree No. 603, otherwise known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, as amended, and
all laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, rules and regulations, or parts thereof, inconsistent
herewith are hereby repealed.

Art. 255. If any provision of this Code is held invalid, all the other provisions not affected thereby shall
remain valid.

Art. 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or
acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.

Art. 257. This Code shall take effect one year after the completion of its publication in a newspaper of
general circulation, as certified by the Executive Secretary, Office of the President.

Done in the City of Manila, this 6th day of July, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and eighty-
seven.

Albino Co vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 100776. October 28, 1993)

31MAY

ALBINO S. CO, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Antonio P. Barredo for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for the people.
Ponente: NARVASA
FACTS:
A criminal complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 was filed by the salvage company
against petitioner with the Regional Trial Court. The case eventuated in petitioner’s conviction of
the crime charged on the basis that a check issued merely to guarantee the performance of an
obligation is nevertheless covered by B.P. Blg. 22. Pending litigation, Ministry of Justice Circular
No. 4 (which excludes guarantee check from application of B.P. Blg. 22) was subsequently
reversed by Ministry Circular No. 12 which ruled that a check issued merely to guarantee the
performance of an obligation is nevertheless covered by B.P. Blg. 22. Petitioner appealed to the
Court of Appeals. There he sought exoneration upon the theory that it was reversible error for the
Regional Trial Court but the Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ministry Circular No. 12 dated August 8, 1984 declaring the guarantee check will
no longer be considered as a valid defense be retroactively applied.

HELD:
NO. Decision of the Court of Appeals and RTC were set aside. Criminal prosecution against
accused-petitioner was dismissed.
RATIO:
It would seem that the weight of authority is decidedly in favor of the proposition that the Court’s
decision of September 21, 1987 in Que v. People, 154 SCRA 160 (1987) that a check issued
merely to guarantee the performance of an obligation is nevertheless covered by B.P. Blg. 22 —
should not be given retrospective effect to the prejudice of the petitioner and other persons
situated, who relied on the official opinion of the Minister of Justice that such a check did not fall
within the scope of B.P. Blg. 22.
This is after all a criminal action all doubts in which, pursuant to familiar, fundamental doctrine,
must be resolved in favor of the accused. Everything considered, the Court sees no compelling
reason why the doctrine of mala prohibita should override the principle of prospectivity, and its
clear implications as herein above set out and discussed, negating criminal liability.

CASE DIGEST: ARTICLE 4 OF THE CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES BY JOY

DE LOYOLA
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ALFONSO PATALIN, JR., ALEX MIJAQUE, AND NESTOR RAS, accused-appellants.
G.R. No. 125539 July 27, 1999

MELO, J.:
Facts:

Accused-appellants Alex Mijaque and Alfonso Patalin, Jr, were charged before Branch 25 of the
Regional Trial Court of the 6th Judicial Region stationed in Iloilo City, with the crime of robbery.
The Amended information was dated October 11, 1985.

In a Second Amended Information also dated October 11, 1985 and docketed as Criminal Case
No. 18305, accused-appellants Alex Mijaque, Alfonso Patalin, Jr., and Nestor Ras were charged
before the same court with the crime of robbery with multiple rape.

They were convicted of robbery with multiple rape committed in the evening of August 11, 1984
against the Aliman family. They were meted the death penalty. At the time the crimes were
committed in 1984, robbery with rape was punishable by death, however, by virtue of the
ratification of the 1987 Constitution, the death penalty was abolished and all death penalties
already imposed were reduced to reclusion perpetua. In 1987, when the 1987 Constitution
suspended the imposition of the death penalty, the trial has not yet been finished, hence, it was
overtaken by the Death Penalty Law effective January 1, 1994. Appellants now opposed that
the trial court erred in imposing the death penalty as the same was suspended upon ratification
of the constitution.

Issue:

Whether or not the death penalty can be imposed upon the accused.

Held:
No. The Supreme Court ruled that before the 1987 Constitution, death penalty as a capital
punishment could be imposed on certain heinous crimes like robbery with rape (Article 294,
Revised Penal Code). From 1987, however, until the passage of the death penalty law or on
January 1, 1994, the imposition of death penalty was suspended. In the case of the three
convicts, an issue came up regarding the imposition of death penalty. Although the time of the
effectivity of the 1987 Constitution the present case was still its trial stage.

According to Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, the penal laws shall have a retroactive effect
only insofar as they favor a person guilty of a felony who is not a habitual criminal, although at
the time of the publication of such a law a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict
is serving the same.

The abolition of the death penalty benefits herein accused by virtue of Art 22 of the RPC which
provides that penal laws shall have retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of
the felony who is not a habitual criminal. Hence, they are subject to a reduction of penalty from
death to reclusion perpetua. A subsequent statute cannot be applied retroactively as to impair a
right that accrued under the old law.

People vs. Damaso, GR No. 93516, digested

(Constitutional Law – Search and Seizure)
Facts: Accsused-appellant charged in an information of violation of PD 1866 in connection with the crime of
subversion assailed the legality of a search and seizure conducted at his house at night time when he was not
around, on the ground that it violated constitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizure.
Issue: Whether or not a search on a house of a person without the owner’s presence is valid.
Held: No. The search in the dwelling of the accused-appellant without his knowledge is a violation of
the constitutional immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures.

HEIRS OF EDUARDO SIMON v. ELVIN* CHAN, GR No. 157547, 2011-02-23

Facts:
Issues:
whether or not Chan's civil action to recover the amount of the unfunded check (Civil Case
No. 915-00) was an independent civil action.
Ruling:
Principles:
There is no independent civil action to recover the civil liability arising from the issuance of
an unfunded check prohibited and punished under Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22).
Regardless, therefore, of whether or not a special law so provides, indemnification of the
offended party may be had on account of the damage, loss or injury directly suffered as a
consequence of the wrongful act of another. The indemnity which a person is sentenced to
pay... forms an integral part of the penalty imposed by law for the commission of a crime
Every crime gives rise to a penal or criminal action for the punishment of the guilty party,
and... also to civil action for the restitution of the thing, repair of the damage, and
indemnification for the losses
Civil liability to the offended party cannot thus be denied. The payee of the check is entitled
to receive the payment of money for which the worthless check was issued. Having been
caused the damage, she is entitled to recompense.
However, there is no independent civil action to recover the value of a bouncing check
issued in contravention of BP 22.
Home Bankers Savings and Trust Company v. CA (G.R. No. 115412)

Date: June 3, 2016Author: jaicdn0 Comments

Facts:
Victor Tancuan issued Petitioner Home Bankers Savings and Trust Company a check while Eugene
Arriesgado issued Private Respondent Far East Bank and Trust Company three checks; both checks
totaling the amount of P25,250,000.00. Tancuan and Arriesgado exchanged each other’s checks and
deposited them with their respective banks for collection. When FEBTC presented Tancuan’s HBSTC
check for clearing, it was dishonored for being DAIF. Meanwhile, HBSTC sent Arriesgado’s 3 FEBTC
checks through the Philippine Clearing House Corporation (PCHC) to FEBTC but was returned for being
DAIF. HBSTC receive the notice of dishonor but refused to accept the checks and returned them to
FEBTC through the PCHC for the reason “Beyond Reglementary Period,” implying that HBSTC already
treated the 3 checks as cleared and allowed the proceeds thereof to be withdrawn. FEBTC demanded
reimbursement for the returned checks and inquired from HBSTC whether it had permitted any
withdrawal of funds against the unfunded checks. HBSTC, however refused to make any reimbursement
and to provide FEBTC with the needed information. Thus, FEBTC submitted the dispute for arbitration
before the PCHC Arbitration Committee, under its Supplementary Rules on Regional Clearing to which
FEBTC and HBSTC are bound as participants in the regional clearing operations administered by the
PCHC. While the arbitration proceeding was still pending, FEBTC filed an action for sum of money and
damages with preliminary attachment against HBSTC. HBSTC moved to dismiss on the ground that there
is no cause of action and because it seeks to enforce an arbitral award which as yet does not exist. The
trial court denied the motion to dismiss and the motion for reconsideration. Petitioner then filed a petition
for certiorari with respondent CA to which it had dismissed.
Issue:
Whether or not private respondent which commenced an arbitration proceeding under the auspices of the
PCHC may subsequently file a separate case in court over the same subject matter despite the pendency
of that arbitration, simply to obtain the provisional remedy of attachment against the adverse party in the
arbitration proceeding.
Ruling:
We find no merit in the petition. Section 14 of Republic Act 876, otherwise known as the Arbitration
Law, allows any party to the arbitration proceeding to petition the court to take measures to safeguard
and/or conserve any matter which is the subject of the dispute in arbitration.
Petitioner’s exposition of the foregoing provision deserves scant consideration. Section 14 simply grants
an arbitrator the power to issue subpoena and subpoena duces tecum at any time before rendering the
award. The exercise of such power is without prejudice to the right of a party to file a petition in court to
safeguard any matter which is the subject of the dispute in arbitration. In the case at bar, private
respondent filed an action for a sum of money with prayer for a writ of preliminary attachment.
Undoubtedly, such action involved the same subject matter as that in arbitration, i.e., the sum of
P25,200,000.00 which was allegedly deprived from private respondent in what is known in banking as a
“kiting scheme.” However, the civil action was not a simple case of a money claim since private
respondent has included a prayer for a writ of preliminary attachment, which is sanctioned by section 14
of the Arbitration Law.
Simply put, participants in the regional clearing operations of the Philippine Clearing House
Corporation cannot bypass the arbitration process laid out by the body and seek relief directly from the
courts. In the case at bar, undeniably, private respondent has initiated arbitration proceedings as required
by the PCHC rules and regulations, and pending arbitration has sought relief from the trial court for
measures to safeguard and/or conserve the subject of the dispute under arbitration, as sanctioned by
section 14 of the Arbitration Law, and otherwise not shown to be contrary to the PCHC rules and
regulations.
At this point, we emphasize that arbitration, as an alternative method of dispute resolution, is encouraged
by this Court. Aside from unclogging judicial dockets, it also hastens solutions especially of commercial
disputes. The Court looks with favor upon such amicable arrangement and will only interfere with great
reluctance to anticipate or nullify the action of the arbitrator. Wherefore, premises considered, the petition
is hereby dismissed and the decision of the court a quo is affirmed.