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Can Religion Really Evolve? (And What Is It Anyway?)
Can Religion Really Evolve? (And What Is It Anyway?)
Luther H. Martin
selection are not new. Already in 1882, the Dublin anatomist Alexander Macalister (1882)
35). Subsequently, proposals have been made for understanding the evolution of the
“mental capacities” for religious ideas and practice (Harrison, 1909, pp. 497-498); for the
evolution of religious groups themselves (Wilson, 2002) and even for religion itself
(Richerson & Boyd, 2005)—all employing a Darwinian model. The methodological issue
developed to explain the data of one domain, organic speciation, to those of another, the
the question remains of whether any “useful work is done by substituting the metaphor of
evolution for history” (Fracchia & Lewontin, 1999, pp. 52, 78)? And whether this
the pros and cons of its evolution. To those within the field of religious studies, however,
discussions about the evolution of religion seem curiously quaint since scholars in that
academic field, over its one-hundred-plus years of existence, have yet to produce
religion now insist, “religion” is a Western academic (and political) category and not a
“natural kind” with any independent existence that might be presumed to have evolved
Some scholars wish to argue more specifically that it is not religions themselves
but religious groups that evolve. However, neither the internal coherence of any social
formation nor the definition of its boundaries would seem to be sufficiently stable over
time to conclude that they could function as adaptive units which might evolve in ways
that are either isomorphic with or analogous to biological species. Joseph Bulbulia
(2006), nevertheless, contends that religious groups are adaptive because they reduce “the
However, alternative social formations perform the same function. That is to say, “co-
conventions of swingers’ clubs. But no one has argued that any of these groups represent
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an evolutionary adaptation—especially the latter. That “religions” (if I too may beg the
categorical question) supports group solidarity—at least among their own members—is
an observation that is, in other words, true but trivial since any number of other social
formations may, and do, contribute also to social solidarity. Such considerations
invariably slide, in other words, into an affirmation of the assumed category on the basis
of correlate functions.
scale cooperation among non-kin (Richerson & Boyd, 2005, pp. 203-236). Such
which, for example, one small-scale society may find it expedient to cooperate with
another in competition with a third for, for example, resources insufficient to support all
intermarriage, that allowed all members of the new alliance to be represented as trusted
kin. Such sociopolitical intrigues were, of course, characteristic of much European feudal
history.
preserved in Hebrew epic, whatever one concludes about its facticity. According to this
compete with neighboring tribes for the “milk and honey”, i.e., the scarce resources, of
their rather barren environment (Ex. 3; 13; 23; 33-34). The basis often given for the
“solidarity” of this alliance is religious, i.e., their collective faith in a single deity. Rather,
the success of this epic endeavor was made possible by their construction of a descent
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myth identifying these disparate groups as being “in fact” descendents of a common
ancestor (Gen. 12-25). It was this ex post facto “discovery” of common kinship that
single deity in the first place rather than any acceptance of a single deity providing a basis
for the federation. Thus, even if we accept the argument that groups, large or small,
evolve by adaptation—a plausible position for which should not simply be dismissed
(Wilson, 2002, pp. 12-25)—these arguments tells us nothing about “religion” itself unless
the claimed adaptations can be shown to be dependent upon at least one of its distinctive
aspects.
“fractionated” or dissected into its constitutive behaviors, ideas, or traits, each of which
has (or may have) its own evolutionary (or adaptive) history (à la Harrison, 1909)
(Bering, 2005, p. 412; Bulbulia 2005, p. 36). But you can’t carve up a turkey without
having a bird and since religion is not a natural thing to dissect, evolutionary discussions
of its aspects seem rather quickly to digress into those of a presumed category.
One of the traits most commonly associated with religion is, for example,
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and religion are largely a legacy of the Judeo-Christian tradition and its modern colonial
psychologists and cognitive scientists in stipulating the theoretical object for their
Similarly some experimental psychologists have shown that many of the traits
traits characterizes, of course, all such evidence adduced experimentally and would seem
to present a confound for those who argue an adaptive story for aspects of “religion”. In
other words, those human traits often taken to be religious are, in fact, ordinary
can be established between such capacities and the target category, nothing has been
that assume the category and that, consequently, privilege its various contents, what
what is not to be considered religious and a “bottom-up” study of whether or not such a
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any kind of essentializing definition for religion but simply an attempt to discern what
makes “religion” a distinctive (and predicative) category at all—no matter how “fuzzy”
its boundaries. Daniel Dennett (2006) counseled that the starting point for such a
consideration might initially be based on “common sense and tradition” (p. 8)—though I
might suggest that the insights from the comparative study of religion might better inform
such initial inquiries. Whatever else might differentiate the religious from the non-
religious, claims to the authority of superhuman agency that recruit and legitimate
otherwise ordinary human behaviors and ideas and that motivate their practice and
perseverance would seem to characterize all religions. The question of the “evolution of
religion” would seem, therefore, to turn, at the outset, on that of the adaptive efficacy of
representations as authoritative.
As a number of cognitive scientists have argued, the human brain easily and
agents (Boyer, 2001)—from fairies, trolls, and leprechauns to the imaginary friends of
young children and even to those of adults, as poignantly portrayed by Jimmy Stewart’s 6
foot, 3½ inch invisible rabbit companion in the 1950 film Harvey. This ready
representation of agency is likely an adaptive response “from the wild” in which survival
would depend upon quick identification, on the basis of ambiguous perceptual input, of
possible agents in the environment as either friend or foe, predator or protein. Such a
response can still be noted, for example, in the common reactive representations of a
stick, semi-concealed in the high grass, as a potentially dangerous serpent, even though
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poisonous snakes may well be known to be absent from the present environment.
Selection for such a survivalistic response has resulted in a cognitive bias towards
identifying agency even where there is none—as in the suggestive formations of clouds,
on the surface features of the moon, or in the lonely shadows of the night.
superhuman beings that might authorize or motivate shared behaviors and ideas. It would
the service of sociopolitical interests. Because of the universal human bias towards the
accepted, transmitted and developed—along with, of course, the social structures and
While it is undeniable that human beings have evolved capacities for producing
with religion, it does not follow that religions are themselves adaptive simply because
they exist nor that change in religious traditions over time are evolutionary. Rather, most
cognitive scientists have concluded that religion is “not an evolutionary adaptation per se,
but a recurring cultural by-product of the complex evolutionary landscape that set
cognitive, emotional, and material conditions for ordinary human interactions” (Atran &
Norenzayan, 2004, p. 713). The persistence into the modern world of the counterintuitive
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would seem to provide yet another confound for those who would argue that religion (or
Conclusion
in no way minimize the impact they have had—and continue to have—for human
human capacities and behaviors in service of historically contingent social interests may
offer a better explanation for its benevolent as well as its malevolent uses throughout
human history than do such arguments for religions as manifestations of some sui generis
spiritual trait of Homo religiosus (Eliade, 1969, p. 9). It might be asked, consequently,
what evolutionary theory might contribute to the work of the historian qua historian. As
Richerson and Boyd (2005) rightly concluded, “well-studied models and well-tested
for the work of historians, not only because of “the complexity of the problems” (p. 248)
to be solved but also—I might add—because of the fragmented, incomplete, and pre-
interpreted evidence with which the historian is confronted. The problem of historians, in
other words, is less one of complexity than of deficiency, that is, of how best to connect
The historian John Bury (1909) has argued that while general principles may
embody the necessary conditions for any particular sequence, they do not provide
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sufficient conditions, either in biology or in history (p. 539). And the anthropologist
Donald Brown (1999) has cautioned that an “attention to particulars” is required if the
influence of evolution for human affairs is not simply to become a “vacuous truism” (p.
155). What is required, then, are well-tested theories that might inform and constrain
while not imposing upon historiographical method. Even as the historical sciences
employ constraining theories for dealing with the complexities and incomplete records of
(Edelman, 2006, pp. 80-88)—evolutionary theory can constrain the proximate as well as
general explanations of historians. But the courses of human history can—and do—
fluctuate widely within these constraints. The multiple variables governing the
biological generalization nor should any one theory—no matter how powerful for its
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References
(Eds.), Origins of the social mind (pp. 411-437). New York: Guilford Press.
Brown, D. E. (1999). Human nature and history. History and Theory, 38(4), 138-157.
Bulbulia, J. (2005). Are there any religions? Method & Theory in the Study of Religion,
17(2), 71-100.
Bury, John B. (1909). Darwinism and history. In A. C. Seward (Ed.), Darwin and
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Dennett, D. (2006). Breaking the spell. New York: Viking.
Edelman, G. M. (2006): Second nature. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Fracchia, J., & Lewontin, R. C. (1999). Does culture evolve? History and Theory,
38(4), 52-78.
Seward (Ed.), Darwin and modern science (pp. 494-511). Cambridge, England:
Richerson, P. L., & Boyd, R. (2005). Not by genes alone. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
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