Republic of the Philippines v. Maria Lourdes Sereno G.R. No.

237428, 11 May 2018 Ponente: Associate

Justice Noel Tijam

Facts: The Republic of the Philippines, represented by Solicitor Genera, filed a Petition for the issuance of
the extraordinary writ of quo warranto to declare void Respondent Sereno’s appointment as Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court (SC) and to oust and altogether exclude her therefrom.

Respondent served as a member of the faculty of the UP College of Law (UP) from 1986 to 2006. She also
served as legal counsel for the Republic of the Philippines for several agencies from 1994 until 2009.
However, records show that no SALNs were filed from 2003 to 2006 when she was employed as legal
counsel for the Republic. Neither was a SALN filed when she resigned from U.P. College of Law.

When the position for Chief Justice was declared vacant in 2012, the JBC announced the opening for
applications and nominations, requiring applicants to submit all previous SALNs up to 31 December 2011,
stating that, “applicants with incomplete or out-of-date documentary requirements will not be
interviewed or considered for nomination.”

The JBC in a special meeting en banc deliberated on nominees with incomplete documentary
requirements. The minutes of the deliberation show that Respondent has not submitted her SALNs for a
period of ten years. JBC En Banc agreed to extend the deadline for submission. Respondent replied
through a letter that considering that such government records in UP are more than 15 years old, “it is
reasonable to consider it infeasible to retrieve all those files.” She also assured OSRN that UP has cleared
her of all responsibilities, accountabilities, and administrative charges in 2006. Lastly, she emphasized that
her service in the government was not continuous, having had a break between 2006 (when her service
in UP ended) and 2010 (when she was appointed to the SC). Such letter was not examined or deliberated
upon by the JBC.

Despite having submitted only three SALNs (2009-2011), the Report regarding documentary requirements
and SALNs of candidates shows that her name was annotated with “COMPLETE REQUIREMENTS”, noting
her letter that it was infeasible to retrieve all files. The same annotation was found in another list regarding
SALN submissions of 20 candidates.

Case for the Petitioner: The OSG argues that quo warranto is an available remedy in questioning the
validity of Respondent’s appointment, and that the one-year bar rule does not apply against the State. It
also argues that the SC has jurisdiction over the petition. The petition alleges that the failure of
Respondent to submit her SALNs as required by the JBC disqualifies her, at the outset, from being a
candidate for the position of Chief Justice. Lacking the required number of SALNs, Respondent has not
proven her integrity, which is a requirement under the Constitution. The Republic thus concludes that
since Respondent is ineligible for the position of Chief Justice for lack of proven integrity, she has no right
to hold office and may therefore be ousted via quo warranto.

Case for the Respondent: Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Chief Justice may only be ousted
from office by impeachment on the basis of the Constitution and a long line of jurisprudence.
Alternatively, she argues that the present petition is time-barred, as it should have been filed within one
year from the cause of ouster, and not from the discovery of the disqualification. It is likewise the
contention of Respondent that public officers without pay or those who do not receive compensation are
not required to file a SALN. Thus, Respondent argues that for the years that she was on official leave
without pay, she was actually not required to file any SALN. She adds that to require the submission of
SALNs as an absolute requirement is to expand the qualifications provided by the Constitution.
Respondent urges the Court to apply in her favor the case of Concerned Taxpayer v. Doblada, Jr., and
deem as sufficient and acceptable her statement that she “maintains that she consistently filed her
SALNs.” Respondent argues that the Court’s rationale in Doblada that one cannot readily conclude failure
to file SALNs simply because these documents are missing in the Office of the Court Administrator's files
should likewise be made applicable to her case.

In Respondent’s Reply, she also raised the issue of forum-shopping against Petitioner. Motions for
Inhibition: Respondent filed motions for the inhibition of five Justices (Bersamin, Peralta, Jardeleza, Tijam,
and Leonardode Castro), imputing actual bias for having testified in the House Committee for Justice on
the impeachment complaint and on Justice Tijam for allegedly stating, in a Manila Times article, that
Respondent is in culpable violation of the Constitution. She also sought to disqualify Justice Martires for
his insinuations during the Oral Arguments questioning her mental and psychological fitness.

PRELIMINARY ISSUES:

1. Whether the grant of the motions to intervene is proper.

Motions to intervene of the IBP and several groups were denied.
a. intervention is not a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion
b. movant intervenors have no legal interest in the case, as required in order to qualify a person
to intervene
c. remedy of quo warranto is vested in the people, and not in a particular group.
d. The individuals do not claim a right to the questioned position, which is the only time when
an individual himself/herself may commence an action for quo warranto. In this case, the
movants-intervenors are neither individuals claiming to be entitled to the questioned position
nor are they the ones charged with the usurpation thereof.

2. Whether the grant of the motions for inhibition against the Associate Justices on the basis of
actual bias is proper.
There is no basis for the Associate Justices to inhibit. Movant must prove bias and prejudice by
clear and convincing evidence to disqualify a judge. The mere fact that some of the Associate
Justices participated in the hearings of the Committee on Justice determining probable cause for
the impeachment of Respondent does not disqualify them to hear the instant petition. Their
appearance was in deference to the House of Representatives whose constitutional duty to
investigate the impeachment complaint filed against Respondent. Their appearance was with the
prior consent of the Supreme Court En Banc and they faithfully observed the parameters that the
Court set for the purpose.

SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES:

1. a) Whether the SC can assume jurisdiction b) given that the case is against an impeachable
officer and c) an impeachment case was already filed in the House of Representatives.
YES
 a. SC has original jurisdiction over an action for quo warranto. Section 5, Article VIII of the
Constitution states that the SC has original jurisdiction over petitions for quo warranto. This
jurisdiction is concurrent with the Court of Appeals (CA) and the Regional Trial Court (RTC).
Section 7, Rule 66 of Rules of Court provides that the venue for an action for quo warranto is
in the RTC of Manila, CA, or SC when commenced by the Solicitor General.

While the hierarchy of courts serves as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for
petitions for the extraordinary writs, a direct invocation of the SC’s original jurisdiction in this
case is justified considering that the qualification of a Member of the Court is in question,
and the issue is of public concern. The petition for quo warranto is of transcendental
importance. The instant petition is one of first impression and of paramount importance to
the public in the sense that the qualification, eligibility and appointment of an incumbent
Chief Justice, the highest official of the Judiciary, are being scrutinized through an action for
quo warranto.

b. While both impeachment and quo warranto may result in the ouster of the public official, the
two proceedings materially differ. At its most basic, impeachment proceedings are political in
nature; while an action for quo warranto is judicial or a proceeding traditionally lodged in the
courts.

FORUM SHOPPING:

There is no forum-shopping, as alleged by the Respondent, because quo warranto and

impeachment can proceed independently and simultaneously, as they differ as to:

(1) jurisdiction (2) grounds, (3) applicable rules pertaining to initiation, filing and
dismissal, and (4) limitations.

QUO WARRANTO vs. IMPEACHMENT

1. In quo warranto, the cause of action lies on the usurping, intruding, or unlawfully holding or
exercising of a public office, while in impeachment, it is the commission of an impeachable
offense.
2. The reliefs sought in the two proceedings are different. Respondent in a quo warranto proceeding
shall be ordered to cease holding a public office, which he/she is ineligible to hold. On the other
hand, in impeachment, a conviction shall result in the removal of the Respondent from the public
office that he/she is legally holding.

c. The impeachment case is yet to be initiated by the filing of the Articles of Impeachment before
the Senate. Thus, there is no pending impeachment case against the Respondent. The
proceedings in the House are merely in the nature of a preliminary investigation whereby
probable cause is sought to be determined.
IMPEACHMENT NOT AN EXCLUSIVE REMEDY

Impeachment is not an exclusive remedy by which an invalidly appointed or invalidly elected impeachable
official may be removed from office.

 Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) Rules expressly provide for the remedy of either an election
protest or a petition for quo warranto to question the eligibility of the President and the Vice-
President, both of whom are impeachable officers.
 This would not be the first time the Court shall take cognizance of a quo warranto petition against
an impeachable officer (see cases of Estrada v. Desierto, et al. and Estrada v. Macapagal Arroyo)
 Language of Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution does not foreclose a quo warranto action
against impeachable officers: “[T]he Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the
Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office ...” The provision
uses the permissive term “may” which, in statutory construction, denotes discretion and cannot
be construed as having a mandatory effect. An option to remove by impeachment admits of an
alternative mode of effecting the removal.
 That the enumeration of “impeachable offenses” is made absolute such that only those
enumerated offenses are treated as grounds for impeachment does not mean that it is to be taken
as a complete statement of the causes of removal from office.
 The word “may” cannot also be understood to qualify only the imposable penalties because it
would lead to the conclusion that other lesser penalties may be imposed — a situation not
contemplated in the language of the Constitutional provision.
 The courts should be able to inquire into the validity of appointments even of impeachable
officers. To hold otherwise is to allow an absurd situation where the appointment of an
impeachable officer cannot be questioned, clear abdication of the Court’s duty to settle an actual
controversy squarely presented before it.

NOT VIOLATIVE OF THE DOCTRINE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS

 An action for quo warranto does not try a person’s culpability of an impeachment offense, neither
does a writ of quo warranto conclusively pronounce such culpability.
 The Court’s exercise of its jurisdiction over quo warranto proceedings does not preclude the
House of Representatives from enforcing its own prerogative of determining probable cause for
impeachment

NOTE: Act or omission committed prior to or at the time of appointment or election relating to an
official’s qualifications to hold office as to render such appointment or election invalid is properly the
subject of a quo warranto petition, provided that the requisites for the commencement thereof are
present. On the contrary, acts or omissions, even if it relates to the qualification of integrity, being
a continuing requirement but nonetheless committed during the incumbency of a validly appointed
and/or validly elected official, cannot be the subject of a quo warranto proceeding, but of something
else, which may either be impeachment if the public official concerned is impeachable and the act or
omission constitutes an impeachable offense, or disciplinary, administrative or criminal action, if
otherwise.
SEEKING AFFIRMATIVE RELIEF = VOLUNTARY APPEARANCE

Seeking affirmative relief from the Court is tantamount to voluntary appearance. Respondent in fact
invoked and sought affirmative relief from the Court by praying for the inhibition of several Members of
this Court and by moving that the case be heard on Oral Arguments, albeit ad cautelam.

2. Whether the petition is dismissible outright on the ground of prescription.

NO
a. Prescription does not lie against the State. The Solicitor General is mandated under the Rules
to commence the necessary quo warranto petition, as seen in the use of the word “must.” In
Agcaoili v. Suguitan, “As a general principle it may be stated that ordinary statutes of
limitation, civil or penal, have no application to quo warranto proceeding brought to enforce
a public right.”
b. The Republic, then, cannot be faulted for questioning Respondent’s qualification for office
only upon discovery of the cause of ouster.
c. Lastly, the Court finds it more important to rule on the merits of the novel issues imbued with
public interest presented before Us than to dismiss the case outright merely on technicality.

3. Whether Respondent is eligible for the position of Chief Justice.

NO
a. Whether the determination of a candidate’s eligibility for nomination is the sole and
exclusive function of the JBC
NO
The Court’s supervisory authority over the JBC includes ensuring that the JBC complies with
its own rules. While a certain leeway must be given to the JBC in screening aspiring
magistrates, the same does not give it an unbridled discretion to ignore Constitutional and
legal requirements. Qualifications under the Constitution cannot be waived or bargained
away by the JBC — one such qualification is the requirement of possession of proven
integrity required not only in the Constitution, but also mentioned in administrative cases, in
the Canons of the New Code of Judicial Conduct as a continuing requirement, the Code of
Professional Integrity, and in the JBC009 Rules.

b. Whether Respondent failed to file her SALNs as mandated by the Constitution and required
by the law and its implementing rules and regulations; and if so, whether the failure to file
SALNs voids the nomination and appointment of Respondent as Chief Justice.
YES.
Compliance with the Constitutional and statutory requirement of filing of SALN intimately
relates to a person’s integrity. The filing of SALN itself is a Constitutional and statutory
requirement, under Section 17, Article XI of the Constitution, R.A. No. 3019, and the Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees. Failure to file the SALN is
clearly a violation of the law. The offense is penal in character and is a clear breach of the
ethical standards set for public officials and employees. It disregards the requirement of
transparency as a deterrent to graft and corruption.
1) The Doblada doctrine does not persuade because in that case Doblada was able to present contrary
proof that the missing SALNs were, in fact, transmitted to the OCA, thus rendering inaccurate the OCA
report that she did not file SALNs for a number of years, as opposed to the present case where no proof
of existence and filing were presented;

2) Being on leave from government service is not equivalent to separation from service such that she was
still required to submit SALNs during her leave;

3) While Respondent is not required by law to keep a record of her SALNs, logic dictates that she should
have obtained a certification to attest to the fact of filing;

4) That UP HRDO never asked Respondent to comply with the SALN laws holds no water as the duty to
comply with such is incumbent with the Respondent, and because there was no duty for the UP HRDO to
order compliance under the rules implemented at that time;

5) That Respondent’s compliance with the SALN requirement was reflected in the matrix of requirements
and shortlist prepared by the JBC is dispelled by the fact that the appointment goes into her qualifications
which were mistakenly believed to be present, and that she should have been disqualified at the outset.

FAILURE TO SUBMIT THE SALN VOIDS THE NOMINATION

 The JBC En Banc decided to require only the submission of the past ten (10) SALNs, or from 2001-
2011, for applicants to the Chief Justice position. It is clear that the JBC En Banc did not do away
with the requirement of submission of SALNs, only that substantial compliance therewith, i.e., the
submission of the SALNs for the immediately preceding 10 years instead of all SALNs, was deemed
sufficient.
 Respondent submitted only three SALNs, i.e., 2009, 2010 and 2011, even after extensions of the
deadline for the submission to do so.
 Her justifications do not persuade. Contrary to her argument that the SALNs are old and are
infeasible to retrieve, the Republic was able to retrieve some of the SALNs dating back to 1985.
 The Certificate of Clearance issued by the U.P. HRDO hardly suffice as a substitute for SALNs.
 Respondent curiously failed to mention that she, in fact, did not file several SALNs during the
course of her employment in U.P. Such failure to disclose a material fact and the concealment
thereof from the JBC betrays any claim of integrity especially from a Member of the Supreme
Court.

c. Whether the subsequent nomination by the JBC and the appointment by the President
cured such ineligibility.
NO

Respondent’s ineligibility for lack of proven integrity cannot be cured by her nomination
and subsequent appointment as Chief Justice. The qualification of proven integrity goes into
the barest standards set forth under the Constitution to qualify as a Member of the Court.
The subsequent nomination and appointment to the position will not qualify an otherwise
 excluded candidate. The inclusion of Respondent in the shortlist of nominees submitted to
the President cannot override the minimum Constitutional qualifications.

o The Court has ample jurisdiction to void the JBC nomination without the necessity of
impleading the JBC as the Court can take judicial notice of the explanations from the JBC
members and the Office of the Executive Officer (OEO)
o When the JBC mistakenly or wrongfully accepted and nominated Respondent, the
President, through his alter egos in the JBC, commits the same mistake and the
President’s subsequent act of appointing Respondent cannot have any curative effect.
o While the Court surrenders discretionary appointing power to the President, the
exercise of such discretion is subject to the non-negotiable requirements that the
appointee is qualified and all other legal requirements are satisfied, in the absence of
which, the appointment is susceptible to attack.

OTHER ACTS COMMITTED

a. Caused the procurement of a brand-new Toyota Land Cruiser worth at least Php5,000,000.00;

b. Caused the hiring of Ms. Helen Macasaet without the requisite public bidding and who received
excessive compensation amounting to more than Php 11,000,000.00;

c. Misused at least Php3,000,000.00 of government funds for hotel accommodation at Shangri-La Boracay
as the venue of the 3rd ASEAN Chief Justices meeting;

d. Created the Judiciary Decentralized Office (JDO) in the guise of reopening the Regional Court
Administration Office (RCAO) without being sanctioned by the Court En Banc;

e. Issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) in Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the
Philippines v. COMELEC contrary to the Supreme Court's internal rules misrepresented that the TRO was
issued upon the recommendation of the Member-incharge;

f. Manipulated the disposition of the DOJ request to transfer the venue of the Maute cases outside of
Mindanao;

g. Ignored rulings of the Supreme Court with respect to the grant of survivorship benefits which caused
undue delay to the release of survivorship benefits to spouses of deceased judges and Justices;

h. Appointed Geraldine Econg as Head of the JDO and Brenda Jay Angeles-Mendoza as Chief of the
Philippine Mediation Center Office (PMCO) without the approval of the Court En Banc;

i. Failed and refused to appoint qualified applicants to several highranking positions in the Supreme Court;

j. Ordered the dissemination of erroneous information on what transpired during the Supreme Court En
Banc deliberations in A.M. No. 16-08-04-SC on the alleged involvement of four (4) incumbent judges in
illegal drugs and undermined the co-equal power of the Executive Department by ordering the Executive
Secretary himself to file cases against the judges;

k. Manipulated the processes of the JBC to exclude then Solicitor General, now Associate Justice Francis
Jardeleza, by using highly confidential document involving national security against the latter;
l. Clustered the nominees for the six (6) vacant positions of Associate Justice in the Sandiganbayan without
legal basis and in so doing, impaired the power of the President to appoint members of the Judiciary;

m. Misrepresented to the members of the Supreme Court En Banc that there were Justices who requested
to do away with the voting of recommended applicants to the vacant positions in the Supreme Court;

n. Manipulated the processes .of the JBC to exclude Court of Appeals Associate Justice Fernanda Lampas-
Peralta from the shortlist of nominees for the position of Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals;

o. Interfered with the investigation conducted by the House of Representatives on the alleged misuse of
the tobacco funds in the Province of llocos Norte by unilaterally preparing a Joint Statement, asking the
House of Representatives to reconsider its show cause order against the Justices of the Court of Appeals,
and then pressuring then Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals, now Associate Justice Andres B. Reyes,
Jr. to likewise sign the same; and

p. Undermined and disrespected the impeachment proceedings conducted by the House of

Representatives against her

4. Whether Respondent is a de jure or de facto officer.

DE FACTO
For lack of a Constitutional qualification, Respondent is ineligible to hold the position of Chief
Justice and is merely holding a colorable right or title thereto. As such, Respondent has never
attained the status of an impeachable official and her removal from the office, other than by
impeachment, is justified. The remedy, therefore, of a quo warranto at the instance of the State
is proper to oust Respondent.

BLATANT DISREGARD AND OPEN DEFIANCE OF THE SUB JUDICE RULE:

 The sub judice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to judicial proceedings in order
to avoid prejudging the issue, influencing the court, or obstructing the adm.inistration of justice.
 Respondent and her spokespersons chose to litigate Respondent's case, apart from her Ad
Cautelam submissions to the Court, before several media-covered engagements.
 Such actions, indeed, resulted in the obfuscation of the issues on hand, camouflaging the charges
against her with assaults to judicial independence, and falsely conditioning the public's mind that
this is a fight for democracy.

FALLO: WHEREFORE, the Petition for Quo warranto is GRANTED. Respondent Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno
is found DISQUALIFIED from and is hereby adjudged GUILTY of UNLAWFULLY HOLDING and EXERCISING
the OFFICE OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE. Accordingly, Respondent Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno is OUSTED and
EXCLUDED therefrom. The position of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court is declared vacant and the
Judicial and Bar Council is directed to commence the application and nomination process. This Decision is
immediately executory without need of further action.