EUTHYPHRO SUMMARY

by: Plato

Summary

Socrates encounters euthyphro outside the court of athens. Socrates has been called to
court on charges of impiety by meletus, and euthyphro has come to prosecute his own father
for having unintentionally killed a murderous hired hand. Socrates flatters euthyphro, suggesting
that euthyphro must be a great expert in religious matters if he is willing to prosecute his own
father on so questionable a charge. Euthyphro concurs that he does indeed know all there is to
be known about what is holy. Socrates urges euthyphro to instruct him and to teach him what
holiness is, since euthyphro's teaching might help socrates in his trial against meletus.

First, euthyphro suggests that holiness is persecuting religious offenders. Socrates finds
this definition unsatisfying, since there are many holy deeds aside from that of persecuting
offenders. He asks euthyphro instead to give him a general definition that identifies that one
feature that all holy deeds share in common. Euthyphro suggests that what is holy is what is
agreeable to the gods, in response to which socrates points out that the gods often quarrel, so
what is agreeable to one might not be agreeable to all.

Euthyphro's most important attempt to define holiness comes with his suggestion that
what is holy is what is approved of by all the gods. Socrates sets up a rather elaborate argument
to show that the two cannot be equivalent. What is holy gets approved of by the gods because
it is holy, so what is holy determines what gets approved of by the gods. And what gets
approved of by the gods in turn determines what is approved of by the gods. It follows from this
reasoning that what is holy cannot be the same thing as what is approved of by the gods, since
one of these two determines what gets approved of by the gods and the other is determined by
what gets approved of by the gods.

Euthyphro is next led to suggest that holiness is a kind of justice, specifically, that kind
which is concerned with looking after the gods. Socrates wonders what euthyphro means by
"looking after the gods." surely, the gods are omnipotent, and don't need us to look after them
or help them in any way. Euthyphro's final suggestion is that holiness is a kind of trading with
the gods, where we give them sacrifices and they grant our prayers. Our sacrifices do not help
them in any way, but simply gratify them. But, socrates points out, to say that holiness is
gratifying the gods is similar to saying that holiness is what is approved of by the gods, which
lands us back in our previous conundrum. Rather than try to find a better definition, euthyphro
leaves in a huff, frustrated by socrates' questioning.

Euthyphro Dilemma
 The Euthyphro Dilemma is a philosophical problem concenred with a view of morality
related to theism.

The Euthyphro Dilemma asks: do the gods love good action because it is good, or is good
action good because it is loved by the gods?

The problem comes from Plato’s Euthyphro, and is asked by Socrates to Euthyphro.

Euthyphro’s dilemma is a challenge to the moral absolutist position of divine command

theory in meta-ethics. Divine command theory, which is generally held by many monotheistic
religions, holds that ethical statements such as “charity is good” obtain their truth values from
attributes of God. That is, the statement “charity is good” if and only if God loves charity.

Euthyphro’s dilemma challenges this position by questioning whether this means that
what is morally correct is merely an arbitrary choice by God, or whether or not these things
have greater, eternal truth. Each position has problems:

The first position is to state that God loves good things because they are good. This claim
is generally a denial of divine command theory — it states that there is goodness that is
determined independantly of God. The major problem with this view is that it holds that there
is something outside of God, over which God has no control — that is, God is not fully
omnipotent. It’s also worth pointing out that taking this position denies that God is necessary
for morality.

The second position is to assert that what is good is good merely because God says that
it is good. If God’s choices are arbitrary, then morality is not objective. This view holds that
anything, at any time, could become good or bad. Phrases like “murder is wrong” are contingent
on how God feels about any particular action. For instance, if God commands a murder, then it
is a just murder. It may be that, tomorrow, God changes the rules. If God’s choices are arbitrary,
then they are not rational, and there is no reaon to make assumptions about what God wants.
There seems to be no reason to say that it is necessary that one obey God, other than that
obedience may bring reward while disobedience may bring punishment.

Under the second position, it would also be misleading to say something like “God is
good”. Under divine command theory, that amounts to “God loves God”, which is not what is
normally intended by religious claims of that nature.