Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Cases On Trespass
Cases On Trespass
1. Every citizen has a duty to arrest without a warrant if he reasonably suspects the arrested
person to have committed a felony. Reasonable suspicion is equated to prima facie proof
but must be beyond mere suspicion. In the instant case, the arrest was lawful.
2. After arrest, the defendants handed the plaintiffs to police who detained them. The
defendant was thus not liable for police actions thus the action for false imprisonment
fails.
3. The prosecution proceedings wee instituted by the police after investigation of the
information given by the defendant. It was also not proved that the defendant was
actuated by spite and malice. More so., there was reasonable and proper cause to suspect
the plaintiffs.
NERVOUS SHOCK
Alcock V Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police. Sixteen people, some of whom were
present at the match where a disaster happened and all of whom were relatives, in one case, a
fiancée sued the chief constable of eth force for having negligently failed to control the crowds
leading to nervous shock to the plaintiffs that resulted in psychiatric illness on seeing and hearing
news about the disaster. The scene was broadcast on T.V live during the match and after the
match and over the radio. Thirteen of the plaintiffs lost relatives and friends, two had their
relative and friends injured and one had his relative escape unhurt. The chief constable admitted
liability in negligence in respect of those who were killed and injured in the disaster but denied
any duty of care to the plaintiffs. On the preliminary trial, the judge found in favor of the
plaintiffs and against six of them. The defendant appealed in respect of the nine successful
plaintiffs and the six unsuccessful cross appealed. The court of appeal allowed his appeal and
dismissed the cross appeals which prompted ten of them to appeal to the house of lords claiming
that the tests for establishing liability for nervous shock of a psychiatric nature was whether the
illness was reasonably foreseeable. The house of lords held that recovery of damages for nervous
shock entails proving that the defendants’ negligent act caused the physical injury or the risk to
the primary victim and that it was reasonably foreseeable that the plaintiff would be affected as a
result of eth acts because of his or her close relationship of love and affection with the primary
victim and the proximity to the incident in time and space. Conversely, a plaintiff who suffered
through seeing or hearing the accident or its immediate aftermath or who was informed about the
accident by a third party did not satisfy the test of reasonable foreseeability and proximity to
enable him to recover and given the broadcasting guidelines, the plaintiffs who saw the events on
T.V did not suffer shock induced by sight or hearing of the event since they were not in
proximity with the events. None of eth plaintiffs was entitled to succeed.
TRESPASS TO LAND
Khatibu bin Mamadi V Issayi Nurbhai. The defendant bought immovable property from a seller
which was subject to execution proceedings. By order of a court, the property was put up for sale
and bought by the plaintiff. He placed his marks on the trees which the defendant removed. The
plaintiff raised an action in trespass which the lower court awarded. On appeal, it was held that
the question in issue is of title not trespass as for trespass, a person is only needed to be in
possession of immovable property not in ownership. The defendant was in possession of the
property in question much as the plaintiff was in ownership. If a person in actual but not physical
possession of immovable property finds his possession challenged by the occupation of his
property by some person without any right, title or claim to the property, the latter is a trespasser.
The appeal was allowed and no trespass was found.
Aden Port Trustee V Ishi. The appellant owned a foreshore upon which for some years the
respondent had dumped scrap under license from the appellant. The aplenty terminated this
license an August 15, 1960 and on April 27, 1961 filed a suit for injunction restraining the
respondent form continuing the trespass and obstruction fees by way of damages at the rate of
shs. 115/= per week from November 5, 1960 to the date of filing the suit and further damages at
the same rate for that until the removal of the scrap. The plaintiff alleged a continuing cause of
action so long as the trespass continued. The judge granted the injunction and awarded shs.40/=
nominal damages. On appeal, it was held that the appellant was seeking damages in respect of
causes of action which might arise after judgment. On the absence of a legislative provision
enabling damages to be given in respect of a cause of action, arising after commencement of the
suit, all that can be recovered are damages to compensate for the injury which resulted form the
cause of action or causes of action in respect of which the suit had been brought. The appeal was
dismissed.
Visram and Karsam V Bhatt. The plaintiffs demised to the defendant an undefined area within
one or tow plots owned by the plaintiff’s measuring 525 ft to 325 ft for quarrying purposes at a
monthly rent. The defendants covenanted to fence the area but failed to do so. From time to time
the plaintiffs observed the quarrying operation of the defendants but only complained at the use
of the land allegedly outside the demised area for quarrying and ancillary purposes when the
lease had nearly expired. On a claim for special and general damages and trespass for wrongful
quarrying, the trial judge awarded shs. 98,285/= which exceeded the total value of the lot though
the trespass was innocent. On appeal, it was held that the defendant need not intend to trespass as
long as he intends the act that constitutes the interference with possession of the land. On
damages, the aim of damages is to compensate thus they were reduced to shs. 9,396/= as the first
sum awarded sum was excessive.
The six carpenters case. Carpenters entered a public inn and on being at their request supplied
with wine, they refused to pay for it. It was held that although they had authority by law to enter
the inn being a public one, non payment being a non feasance not a misfeasance they could not
be regarded as trespassers ab initio.
Sheikh Lubowa V Kitara Enterprises. The plaintiff, a legal owner of the land seeks an eviction
and damages for trespass against the defendant who entered the land without consent of the
plaintiff, put up a fence and constructed two houses on it. When the plaintiff wrote to him to
vacate, he offered to buy the land but failed to pay. Court held that entry on land of the defendant
constituted a trespass as it was without the consent of the plaintiff. A subsequent negotiation of
an offer to buy the land doesn’t change the status of the defendant.
Mendoca V Malik. The plaintiff brought an action to eject the defendant from the room on the
grounds that he was a trespasser. He also claimed damages for the trespass. It was held that
damages fall under two heads; i.e. actual loss suffered and general damages for trespass. The
plaintiff is entitled for the rent of shs. 100/= per month in rent for the rooms during the time the
defendant had deprived him of them. Since there is neither excuse nor justifications for the
defendant’s conduct of taking the rooms such as an agreement of tenancy, punitive damages are
awarded at shs. 3.000/=.
DC Hunter V Wanendeya. The defendant sought permission for an access road on the plaintiff’s
land which the latter refused. The former started excavation works on the boundary of the
plaintiff’s land thus an action against him for trespass to land. It was held that the defendant was
liable for trespass as entry to the land of the plaintiff was without consent.
Hajati Nagawa V Paul Kajubi. The workers of the defendant while felling a tree on her land,
negligently let the tree fall on the plaintiff’s land damaging two rooms that she was renting. The
defendant was held liable in trespass to the plaintiff’s land.
Esso Petroleum V South Corporation. The defendants were held liable in trespass to land for
allowing oil from their own land to enter the plaintiff’s land.
Laurensio Lumu V Lindo Musoke. The plaintiff was the registered owner of the land and the
defendant purportedly had agreed with him to collect rent and own the land but the interest
wasn’t registered. The plaintiff now sought to recover the collected rent, restrain the defendant
from collecting more and entering the land. It was held that the land belonged to the plaintiff thus
the acts of the defendant to the land to collect rent without the plaintiff’s permission amounted to
trespass. He was thus asked to stop interfering with the land and hand over the collected rent and
pay shs. 400/= damages.
Abdu Karim V Lt. Kabareebe. The plaintiff with a title of the suit land issued under the
Registration of Titles Act returned form exile and found defendants trespassing on his land. He
sued seeking an eviction order and damages for trespass. It was held that a legal title is evidence
for damages for trespass and an eviction order as issued.
Amosi Yaya V Attorney General. The plaintiff’s house was raided by soldiers who occupied it
for some days and later left it. It was held on the suit for trespass to land that the Attorney
General was vicariously liable for the soldiers’ trespass on the plaintiff’s land.
Mc Donald V Associated Fuel. Court held that removing gas onto the land of another constitutes
trespass to land.
Elias V Passmore. Police officers who entered the plaintiff’s premises to effect an arrest and
seized documents were held liable as trespassers ab initio because what they did is not what they
had been permitted to do on the land.
Kitumba V Uganda. Occupancy of land which was unconsented to from 1977 to 1994
constituted trespass and was a continuing tort unaffected by the limitation period.
Kelsen V Imperial Tobacco Co. Ltd. The defendants erected an advertising sign which projected
eight inches above the plaintiff’s land. It was held that trespass on the land can be through
wrongful entry in the airspace.