Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Granholm v. Heald
Granholm v. Heald
Heald
In deciding Granholm v. Heald, the United States Supreme Court decided that the dormant Commerce Clause trumped a state's
right to regulate liquor under the Twenty-First Amendment, at least when the state statute was discriminatory. The Court did
analyze local interests asserted by petitioner Michigan State and respondent New York State but quickly questioned their
legitimacy. The Court construed § 2 of the Twenty-First Amendment to restore states’ powers under the Wilson Act and Webb-
Kenyon Act without superseding the Commerce Clause, or any other constitutional provision.
In one case, respondent Michigan residents, joined by an intervening out-of-state winery, filed an action against petitioner
Michigan officials claiming that the State of Michigan’s direct shipment laws violated the Commerce Clause. Petitioner, an in-state
wholesalers association, intervened in support of the State. A district court sustained the challenged laws, but the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed.
In another case, petitioners, out-of-state wineries and their New York customers, filed an action against respondent New York
officials also seeking a declaration that the State of New York’s direct shipment laws violated the Commerce Clause.
Respondents, New York State liquor wholesalers and retailers’ representatives, intervened in support of the State. A district court
granted petitioners summary judgment, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed.
The Supreme Court of the United States consolidated the cases and granted certiorari on the following question: Did a state’s
regulatory scheme that permitted in-state wineries directly to ship alcohol to consumers but restricted the ability of out-of-state
wineries to do so violate the dormant Commerce Clause in light of § 2 of the Twenty-First Amendment?
Explanation of Parties
Petitioners
In the Michigan litigation, Michigan officials were subjected to litigation regarding the State of Michigan’s direct shipment
laws after Michigan residents’ orders for wine from an out-of-state winery could not be filled.
New York customers were unable to receive attempted orders of wine from the out-of-state wineries. They joined the
wineries in an action against State officials challenging the direct shipment laws.
Respondents
In the Michigan litigation, Michigan residents’ attempts to order wine from an out-of-state winery were thwarted by the
State’s direct shipment laws.
The out-of-state winery was unable to ship wine as ordered by Michigan residents. The residents and the winery filed an
action seeking a declaration that the State’s direct shipment laws were unconstitutional.
In the New York litigation, New York State officials were sued by out-of-state wineries and New York customers thereof,
on grounds that the State’s laws regarding direct shipment of wine by out-of-state wineries to in-state customers were
unconstitutional.
New York State liquor wholesalers and retailers’ representatives intervened in support of the State.
For clarity, the Court referred to respondents in the Michigan cases and petitioners in the New York case as the wineries.
The opposing parties were referred to as the States.
Parties’ Arguments
Respondent New York defended its scheme by arguing that an out-of-state winery had the same access to the State’s
consumers as an in-state winery, as all wine had to be sold through a licensee fully accountable to New York. Link P. Arg.▼
Holding: The New York scheme granted in-state wineries access to the State’s consumers on preferential terms, as out-
of-state wineries were required to have physical presence in New York in order to become a licensee. A suggestion of a
limited exception for direct shipment did nothing to eliminate the discriminatory nature of New York’s scheme. Link P.
Arg.▼
Holding: The Court noted that the States’ position was inconsistent with prior precedents and the history of the Twenty-
First Amendment. The Court stated that the Twenty-First Amendment did not allow states to regulate the direct shipment
of wine in such a way as to discriminate in favor of in-state producers. Link P. Arg.▼
The States argued that the Webb-Kenyon Act, 27 U.S.C.S. § 122 Shepardize , removed any barrier to discriminatory state liquor
regulations by reversing the prohibition in the Wilson Act, 27 U.S.C.S. § 121 Shepardize , on discriminatory treatment of out-of-
state liquors. Link P. Arg.▼
Holding: The Court found that the States’ reading of the Webb-Kenyon Act conflicted with the Court’s reading thereof in
Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland R. Co., 242 U.S. 311 Shepardize (1917), in which the Court recognized that the
Webb-Kenyon Act simply extended that which was done by the Wilson Act. Neither act displaced the Commerce Clause
cases striking down state laws that discriminated against liquor produced out of state. Link P. Arg.▼
The States, recognizing that Bacchus Imports v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 Shepardize (1984), was fatal to their position, suggested that
the case should be overruled or limited to its facts. Link P. Arg.▼
Holding: The Court held that Bacchus did not stand alone in recognizing that the Twenty-First Amendment did not give
states complete freedom to regulate where other constitutional principles were at stake. A retreat from Bacchus would
also have undermined other cases that invalidated state liquor regulations under the Commerce Clause. Link P. Arg.▼
The States argued that any decision invalidating their direct shipment laws would call into question the constitutionality of the
three-tier distribution system, pursuant to which separate licenses were required for producers, wholesalers, and retailers. Link
P. Arg.▼
Holding: The Court held that such state policies that treated liquor produced out of state the same as its domestic
equivalent were protected by the Twenty-First Amendment. However, the statutes in this case involved straightforward
attempts to discriminate in favor of local producers, which was contrary to the Commerce Clause. The three-tier system
was not affected by the Court’s holding in this case. Link P. Arg.▼
The States claimed that allowing direct shipment from out-of-state wineries undermined their ability to police underage drinking
because minors had easy access to credit cards and the Internet and were likely to take advantage of direct wine shipments as
a means of obtaining alcohol illegally. Link P. Arg.▼
Holding: The Court found that the States provided little evidence that Internet purchases of wine by minors was a
problem. Without concrete evidence that direct shipping was likely to increase alcohol consumption by minors, the States’
assertions were unsupported and insufficient to justify discriminatory regulation. Link P. Arg.▼
The States argued that their direct shipping schemes facilitated tax collection. Link P. Arg.▼
Holding: The Court found that for Michigan, the tax collection argument was a diversion because Michigan did not rely
on wholesalers to collect taxes on imported wines. The Court further found that licensing and self-reporting provided
adequate safeguards, as could other regulatory systems; therefore, the States’ regulatory objectives could be achieved
without discriminating against interstate commerce. Link P. Arg.▼
The States offered a handful of other rationales, including facilitating orderly market conditions, protecting public health and
safety, and ensuring regulatory accountability for upholding their direct shipping schemes. Link P. Arg.▼
Holding: The Court found that all such objectives could be achieved through the alternative of an evenhanded licensing
requirement. The Court also noted that improvements in technology eased the burden of monitoring out-of-state wineries.
Link P. Arg.▼
• In order to avoid economic Balkanization, states may not enact laws that burden out-or-state producers or shippers simply to
give a competitive advantage to in-state businesses. Link Quick Holding▼
• The Wilson Act, 27 U.S.C.S. § 121 Shepardize , reaffirmed, and the Webb-Kenyon Act, 27 U.S.C.S. § 122 Shepardize , did not
displace, the line of Commerce Clause cases striking down state laws that discriminated against liquor produced out of state.
Link Quick Holding▼
• Direct shipping schemes that discriminate in favor of local producers are contrary to the Commerce Clause and are not saved
by the Twenty-First Amendment. Link Quick Holding▼
• While § 2 of the Twenty-First Amendment gives the states broad power to regulate liquor, it does not allow banning or severe
limitation of direct shipment of out-of-state wine while simultaneously authorizing direct shipment by in-state producers. Link
Quick Holding▼
Enhanced Overview
Petitioner Michigan State and respondent New York State (the States) regulated the sale and importation of alcoholic
beverages through a three-tier distribution system, under which separate licenses were required for producers,
wholesalers, and retailers. The three-tier scheme was preserved by a complex set of overlapping state and federal
regulations. The States’ authority to mandate the three-tier scheme arose under U.S. Const. amend. XXI. The States’
systems in this case, however, discriminated against petitioner wineries and respondent wineries by substantially
limiting the direct sale of wine to petitioner customers and respondent residents.
B. Direct-Shipping Statutes
1. Michigan Case
In Michigan, wine producers could sell only to licensed in-state wholesalers under MCL 436.1109(1), 436.1305,
436.1403, and 436.1607(1) (2000), 1990 AC, R. 436.1705, and 2000 AC, R. 436.1719. Wholesalers could then sell
only to in-state retailers under MCL 436.1113(7) and 436.1607(1) (2001). Licensed retailers then sold alcoholic
beverages to consumers at retail locations and, subject to certain restrictions, through home delivery under MCL
436.1111(5) and 436.1203(2)-(4).
Wine producers generally had to distribute their wine through wholesalers. There was an exception for in-state
wineries, which were eligible for “wine maker” licenses allowing direct shipment to in-state consumers under MCL
436.1113(9) (2001), MCL 436.1537(2)-(3) (2004), and 2003 AC, R. 436.1011(7)(b). However, under MCL 436.1109(9)
and 436.1525(1) and 2000 AC, R. 436.1719(5), out-of-state wineries could only get licenses allowing them to sell to
New York’s licensing scheme channeled most wine sales through its three-tier system, but it too made exceptions for
in-state wineries. An out-of-state winery could ship directly to New York consumers only if it became a licensed New
York winery, which required establishment of a branch factory, office, or storeroom within the State of New York under
N.Y. Alco. Bev. Cont. Law Ann. § 3(37). A district court granted summary judgment to the wineries against the
scheme, but the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, finding the scheme to be within the ambit of the powers
granted to states by the Twenty-First Amendment.
The Court noted that in all but the narrowest circumstances state laws violated the Commerce Clause if they mandated
differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic interests that gave a competitive advantage to in-state businesses.
Allowing the States to discriminate against the wineries invited a multiplication of preferential trade areas destructive of the
purpose of the Commerce Clause. The Michigan system was obviously discriminatory because the wineries faced a complete
ban on direct shipment. New York’s system granted in-state wineries access to the State’s consumers on preferential terms.
The Court explored the history of the Commerce Clause cases, leading up to and including the Wilson Act, 27 U.S.C.S. §
121 Shepardize , in determining the constitutionality of the States’ direct-shipping schemes. The Wilson Act mandated
equality or uniformity of treatment under state laws. The right to regulate did not attach until the liquor ordered through
interstate commerce was in the hands of the customer.
2. Webb-Kenyon Act Forbade Shipment or Transportation Only When Violating States’ Generally Applicable Laws
Governing Receipt, Possession, Sale, or Use
The Webb-Kenyon Act, 27 U.S.C.S. § 122 Shepardize , closed the direct-shipment gap left open by the Wilson Act, allowing
states to forbid shipments of alcohol to consumers for personal use, provided that the states treated in-state and out-of-
state liquor on the same terms. The Court found that the Webb-Kenyon Act did not remove any barrier to discriminatory
state liquor regulations. The Court held that the Wilson Act reaffirmed and that the Webb-Kenyon Act did not displace the
Court’s line of Commerce Clause cases striking down state laws that discriminated against liquor produced out of state.
The States argued that § 2 of the Twenty-First Amendment granted the authority to discriminate against out-of-state goods.
The Court found that history provided strong support for the view that the section restored to states the powers they had under
the Wilson Act and Webb-Kenyon Act. The Court further found that recent cases confirmed that the Twenty-First Amendment
did not supersede other provisions of the Constitution and did not displace the rule that states could not give discriminatory
preference to their own producers.
1. Twenty-First Amendment Did Not Save State Laws Violative of Other Constitutional Provisions
The Court noted that state laws that violated other provisions of the Constitution were not saved by the Twenty-First
Amendment. This rule was applied in the context of the First Amendment, the Establishment Clause, the Equal Protection
Clause, the Due Process Clause, and the Import-Export Clause.
2. Twenty-First Amendment Did Not Abrogate Commerce Clause Powers with Regard to Liquor
The Court found that the argument that the Twenty-First Amendment somehow operated to repeal the Commerce Clause
for alcoholic beverages had been rejected. The argument had been described as “an absurd oversimplification,” “patently
bizarre,” and “demonstrably incorrect.”
The determination that the States’ direct-shipment laws were not authorized by the Twenty-First Amendment did not end the
inquiry. The Court had to consider whether either State regime advanced a legitimate local purpose that could not be
adequately served by reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives.
Increased direct shipping, whether originating in state or out of state, brought with it the potential for tax evasion. With regard
to Michigan, however, the Court found that the tax collection argument was a diversion because Michigan collected taxes
directly from out-of-state wineries on all wine shipped to in-state wholesalers. The Court found that, while New York’s
concerns about tax collection were not wholly illusory, its regulatory objectives could be achieved without discriminating
against interstate commerce. Furthermore, the States benefited from provisions of federal law that supplied incentives for
Shepardize
wineries to comply with state regulations under 27 U.S.C.S. §§ 122a (b), 204.
The States offered a handful of other rationales, such as facilitating orderly market conditions, protecting public health and
safety, and ensuring regulatory accountability. The Court found that such objectives could be achieved through the alternative
of an evenhanded licensing requirement. The Court further noted that improvements in technology eased the burden of
monitoring out-of-state wineries, as background checks could be done electronically, and financial records and sales data
could be mailed, faxed, or submitted via e-mail. The States failed to show that nondiscriminatory alternatives would prove
unworkable.
Link Dissent▼ Justice Stevens argued that Congress had the power to authorize states to place burdens on interstate
commerce. While he conceded that the challenged laws would have been patently invalid under the Commerce Clause if they
regulated sales of an ordinary article of commerce, Justice Stevens noted that ever since the adoption of the Eighteenth and
Twenty-First amendments, the Constitution had placed commerce in alcoholic beverages in a special category. Justice Stevens
further noted that the views of judges who lived through the debates that led to the ratification of those Amendments were entitled
to special deference. Justice Brandeis wrote at the time that construing § 2 of the Twenty-First Amendment as forbidding
discriminatory regulation would have been rewriting the Amendment. Further, as the Twenty-First Amendment was the only
Amendment in history to have been ratified by people in state conventions, it should have been broadly and colloquially
interpreted.
Link Dissent▼ In his dissent, Justice Thomas stated that the Court should have followed State Bd. of Equalization of Cal. v.
Young’s Market Co., 299 U.S. 59 Shepardize (1936), and the language of the Webb-Kenyon Act, 27 U.S.C.S. § 122 Shepardize , and the
Twenty-First Amendment. Justice Thomas argued that the Webb-Kenyon Act displaced any negative Commerce Clause barrier to
state regulation of liquor sales to in-state consumers by preventing the immunity characteristic of interstate commerce from being
used to permit the receipt of liquor through such commerce in states contrary to their laws. He further argued that “any law” as
used in the Act meant any law, including “discriminatory” ones like the ones at issue. While he felt that the Act decided the case,
Justice Thomas further argued that the challenged laws were lawful under the plain meaning of the Twenty-First Amendment as
well. Finally, Justice Thomas stated that Bacchus Imports v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 Shepardize (1984), should have been overruled.
LexisNexis Headnotes
[HN1] In all but the narrowest circumstances, state laws violate the Commerce Clause if they mandate differential treatment of in-
state and out-of-state economic interests that benefits the former and burdens the latter. States may not enact laws that burden
out-of-state producers or shippers simply to give a competitive advantage to in-state businesses.
[HN2] States cannot require an out-of-state firm to become a resident in order to compete on equal terms.
[HN3] State laws that discriminate against interstate commerce face a virtually per se rule of invalidity.
[HN5] U.S. Const. amend. XXI, § 2, does not allow states to regulate the direct shipment of wine on terms that discriminate in
favor of in-state producers.
[HN6] The aim of the Twenty-First Amendment is to allow states to maintain an effective and uniform system for controlling liquor
by regulating its transportation, importation, and use. The Amendment does not give states the authority to pass nonuniform laws
in order to discriminate against out-of-state goods.
[HN7] State regulation of alcohol is limited by the nondiscrimination principle of the Commerce Clause. When a state statute
directly regulates or discriminates against interstate commerce, or when its effect is to favor in-state economic interests over out-
of-state interests, the U.S. Supreme Court generally strikes down the statute without further inquiry.
[HN10] The Commerce Clause demands more than mere speculation to support discrimination against out-of-state goods. The
burden is on a state to show that the discrimination is demonstrably justified. The U.S. Supreme Court upholds state regulations
that discriminate against interstate commerce only after finding, based on concrete record evidence, that the state's
nondiscriminatory alternatives will prove unworkable.
[HN11] States have broad power to regulate liquor under U.S. Const. amend XXI, § 2. This power, however, does not allow states
to ban, or severely limit, the direct shipment of out-of-state wine while simultaneously authorizing direct shipment by in-state
producers. If a state chooses to allow direct shipment of wine, it must do so on evenhanded terms.
Interpretive Headnotes
[IHN1] States can mandate a three-tier distribution scheme in the exercise of their authority under the Twenty-First Amendment.
Link Int. HN▼
[IHN2] The mere fact of nonresidence should not foreclose a producer in one state from access to markets in other states. States
may not enact laws that burden out-of-state producers or shippers simply to give a competitive advantage to in-state businesses.
Link Int. HN▼
[IHN3] State statutes requiring business operations to be performed in the home state that could more efficiently be performed
elsewhere are viewed with particular suspicion. Link Int. HN▼
[IHN4] States are not free to pass laws burdening only out-of-state products. The Commerce Clause prevents states from passing
facially neutral laws that place an impermissible burden on interstate commerce. Link Int. HN▼
[IHN5] The Wilson Act, 27 U.S.C.S. § 121 Shepardize , mandated equality or uniformity of treatment under state laws, and did not
allow a state to provide an unjust preference to its products as against similar products of other states. Link Int. HN▼
[IHN6] The Webb-Kenyon Act, 27 U.S.C.S. § 122 Shepardize , forbids shipment or transportation of out-of-state liquors only where it
runs afoul of the state’s generally applicable laws governing receipt, possession, sale, or use. Link Int. HN▼
[IHN7] State laws that violate other provisions of the Constitution are not saved by the Twenty-First Amendment. Link Int. HN▼
[IHN9] The Twenty-First Amendment grants the states virtually complete control over whether to permit importation or sale of
liquor and how to structure the liquor distribution system. States may assume direct control of liquor distribution through state-run
outlets or funnel sales through the three-tier system. Link Int. HN▼
[IHN10] The “clearest showing” is required to justify discriminatory state regulation. Link Int. HN▼
[IHN11] Licensing and self-reporting provide adequate safeguards for wine distributed through the three-tier system, and should
suffice for direct shipments. Link Int. HN▼
Jurisprudential Analysis
Prior History
Swedenburg v. Kelly, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12758 Shepardize (D.N.Y. 2000)
Plaintiffs, proprietors of two out-of-state wineries and three state consumers, filed an action against defendants, New York
State Liquor Authority officials, requesting that the court declare N.Y. Alco. Bev. Cont. Law § 102 Shepardize (1)(a), (c), (d)
unconstitutional, void, and of no effect. The officials’ motion to dismiss the complaint was denied because there was a
sufficient allegation of a cause of action for a violation of the Commerce Clause, the First Amendment, and the Privileges
and Immunities Clause.
A motion for summary judgment by defendant, Florida Attorney General’s office, was granted in an action by plaintiffs,
out-of-state wineries and others, challenging Florida’s direct shipment law, which was enacted to address perceived threat
to public health, safety, and welfare, to state revenue collections, and to the state economy, all of which fell within the
legitimate core concerns of the Twenty-First Amendment.
A motion by plaintiffs, out-of-state wine producers, for summary judgment was granted upon a finding that the State of
New York’s ban on direct shipment of out-of-state wine violated the Commerce Clause.
A finding that the State of New York’s direct shipment law violated the Commerce Clause was reversed based on the
court’s determination that the law was proper within the scope of the Twenty-First Amendment.
The petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit was granted limited to the
following question: Did a State's regulatory scheme that permitted in-state wineries directly to ship alcohol to consumers
but restricted the ability of out-of-state wineries to do so violate the dormant Commerce Clause in light of Section 2 of the
21st Amendment?
The Supreme Court of the United States granted a motion to reorder presentation of oral argument and for divided
argument.
The motion for realignment of the parties and to set a briefing schedule was denied by the United States Supreme Court.
Heald v. Engler, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24826 Shepardize (D. Mich. 2001)
A motion for summary judgment by plaintiffs, Michigan residents and an out-of-state winery, was denied, and the motion
for summary judgment by defendants, Michigan's governor, Michigan's attorney general, the chair of Michigan's Liquor
Control Commission, and a beer and wine wholesalers association, was granted. The State of Michigan’s direct shipment
law was a proper regulation of sales of out-of-state wine for purposes of tax collection and reducing underage drinking.
A district court’s finding that the State of Michigan’s direct shipment law was constitutional was reversed. The appeals
court found it to be facially discriminatory and not within the scope of the Twenty-First Amendment because it did not
promote the goals of temperance, raising revenue, or ensuring an orderly market.
Heald v. Engler, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 23001 Shepardize (6th Cir. 2003)
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals denied two petitions for rehearing en banc because the issues raised in the petitions
were fully considered upon the original submission and decision of the case.
The Supreme court of the United States granted a motion to reorder presentation of oral argument and for divided
argument.
Subsequent History
Plaintiff wineries, which prevailed in their actions against defendant state officials and intervening defendant state
wholesalers association, were not entitled to an award of attorney fees from the association. The association entered the
case to protect its own legitimate interests, and its litigation position was not frivolous, unreasonable, or without
foundation.
Holding that direct shipment law did not violate Commerce Clause where there was no discrimination against
out-of-state wineries:
Shepardize
Cherry Hill Vineyard, LLC v. Baldacci, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51657 (D. Me. 2006)
OVERVIEW: A magistrate judge recommended judgment against plaintiffs’ Commerce Clause challenge to
Maine’s prohibition against direct shipment of wine where plaintiffs failed to demonstrate the existence of any
lawful mail order or direct delivery market in Maine in which any winery could participate.
Holding that Residency requirement for liquor license violated dormant Commerce Clause:
Peoples Super Liquor Stores, Inc. v. Jenkins, 432 F. Supp. 2d 200 Shepardize (D. Mass. 2006)
OVERVIEW: Where a liquor retailer claimed that the portion of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 138, § 15 Shepardize (2005),
which restricted the awarding of liquor licenses based on residency violated the dormant Commerce Clause, U.S.
Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 3, the state's motion to dismiss was denied because the requirement was not redeemed by
the Twenty-First Amendment.
Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. Whitman, 437 F.3d 313 Shepardize (3d Cir. 2006)
OVERVIEW: Trucking regulations that favored instate businesses over those out-of-state businesses that were
neither buying nor selling goods in New Jersey by imposing economic burdens on the out-of-state interests while
not imposing similar burdens on the instate interests, discriminated against interstate commerce and violated the
Commerce Clause.
Action Wholesale Liquors v. Okla. Alcoholic Bev. Laws Enforcement Comm'n, 463 F. Supp. 2d 1294 Shepardize (D. Okla.
2006)
OVERVIEW: Because Okla. Const. art. 28, § 3, Okla. Stat. tit. 37 Shepardize § 518.1 (2001), Okla. Stat. tit. 37
Shepardize
§ 521 (Supp. 2005), and Okla. Stat. tit. 37, § 537 Shepardize (Supp. 2005) preferentially exempted in-state
wineries but not out-of-state wineries from the state's three-tier distribution, the laws violated the Commerce
Clause, U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Hoen, 407 F. Supp. 2d 1247 Shepardize (D. Wash. 2005)
OVERVIEW: Wash. Rev. Code §§ 66.24.170 Shepardize (3), .240(2), which allowed in-state wineries and breweries
to "self-distribute" directly to retailers but required out-of-state producers to sell to distributor, violated the
Commerce Clause, U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
Holding that Pennsylvania’s successor liability statute, 15 Pa.C.S. § 1929, provided court found tort to be article
of commerce, would only be considered to have incidental effects on interstate commerce:
Mauger v. A.W. Chesterton, Inc., 2007 Phila. Ct. Com. Pl. LEXIS 193 (Phila. Com. P. LEXIS 2007)
OVERVIEW: In support of its judgment granting summary judgment to an asbestos manufacturer's successor, a
trial court held that 15 Pa.C.S. § 1929.1 did not violate the federal Commerce or Equal Protection Clauses as the
statute did not treat foreign corporations differently than domestic corporations nor did it alter the direct liability of
any defendant.
Holding that Maine’s real estate taxing statute, which expressly distinguished between entities that served
principally in-state clientele and those that served principally out-of-state clientele, was facially invalid under
Commerce Clause:
OVERVIEW: A real estate tax on a non-profit camp that served primarily out of state students violated the
Commerce Clause because non-profit camps that served primarily in state students were exempt from paying the
tax.
• Even though petitioner's camp did not make a profit, it was unquestionably engaged in commerce, not
only as a purchaser, but also as a provider of goods and services. It marketed those services, together
with an opportunity to enjoy the natural beauty of an inland lake in Maine, to campers who were attracted
to its facility from all parts of the Nation. The attendance of these campers necessarily generated the
transportation of persons across state lines that had long been recognized as a form of "commerce."
• The services that petitioner provided to its principally out-of-state campers clearly had a substantial effect
on commerce, as did state restrictions on making those services available to nonresidents.
• A State's power to lay and collect taxes, comprehensive and necessary as that power might be, could not
be exerted in a way which involved a discrimination against interstate commerce.
• Discriminatory burdens on interstate commerce imposed by regulation or taxation may also violate the
Commerce Clause.
• The Maine statute facially discriminated against interstate commerce, and was all but per se invalid.
• The Court had no doubt that if petitioner's camp were a profit-making entity, the discriminatory tax
exemption would be impermissible.
• The argument in favor of a categorical exemption for nonprofits from the dormant Commerce Clause was
unpersuasive.
• A tax exemption was not the sort of direct state involvement in the market that fell within the market-
participation doctrine.
Holding that liquor regulation was constitutional under Twenty-First Amendment where not discriminatory:
OVERVIEW: Delaware statute requiring out-of-state wineries to ship direct orders through a wholesaler or retailer
was not unconstitutional where in-state wineries were treated the same with respect to direct wine shipments to
state residents.
Holding that Twenty-First Amendment did not give states authority to pass nonuniform laws to discriminate
against out-of-state businesses:
OVERVIEW: Because the Twenty-First Amendment granted states virtually complete control over how to
structure the liquor distribution system, and because the dormant Commerce Clause only prevented a state from
enacting regulation that favored in-state producers, Va. Code Ann. § 4.1-310 Shepardize (E)(i) did not violate the
Commerce Clause.
Holding that direct shipment laws not facially discriminatory were constitutional under Twenty-First Amendment:
Cherry Hill Vineyards, LLC v. Hudgins, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93266 Shepardize (D. Ky. 2006)
OVERVIEW: An in-person provision in Kentucky’s amended licensing provisions was struck as not narrowly-
tailored to achieve a proper goal. The rest of the provisions were not facially discriminatory, as they applied
equally to in-state and out-of-state wineries.
Legal Analysis
This treatise mentioned state laws, particularly those in the Granholm v. Heald case, regarding wine distribution governed
by the Commerce Clause.
This treatise discussed court decisions affecting regulation of alcoholic beverage licensing.
Except as it was limited by statute, the Michigan Liquor Control Commission had plenary power to regulate the liquor
traffic.
In a supplement to the section, it was noted that a divided Court favored recent cases holding that the dormant Commerce
Clause doctrine’s nondiscrimination principle applied to state regulation of wine, as the Twenty-First Amendment did not
displace the rule that states could not give discriminatory preference to their own producers.
After a lengthy review of the history of alcohol regulation and Congress's response to the Court's use of the dormant
Commerce Clause doctrine to invalidate state liquor regulations through the Wilson and Webb-Kenyon Acts, Justice
Kennedy concluded that far from allowing any type of discrimination, the Wilson Act reaffirmed, and the Webb-Kenyon Act
did not displace, the Court's line of cases striking down state laws that discriminated against liquor produced out of state
even though they removed dormant Commerce Clause barriers to facially neutral laws that were held to "directly regulate"
interstate commerce or otherwise burden it.
Michael A. Chichester, Jr., The Twenty-First Amendment Accommodates the Dormant Commerce Clause: Did the Supreme
Shepardize
Court Awaken a Sleeping Giant with Its Decision in Granholm v. Heald?, 84 U. Det. Mercy L. Rev. 161 (Winter 2007).
The Supreme Court held that the Twenty-First Amendment did not give the states plenary power to discriminate against
out-of-state entities in violation of the Commerce Clause.
Michael A. Pasahow, Constitutional Law: Note, Granholm v. Heald: Shifting the Boundaries of California Reciprocal Wine
Shipping Laws, 21 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 569 Shepardize (2006).
Harris Danow, Recent Development: History Turned "Sideways": Granholm v. Heald and the Twenty-First Amendment, 23
Cardozo Arts & Ent LJ 761 Shepardize (2006).
In Granholm v. Heald, discriminatory regulatory practices were found to violate the Interstate Commerce Clause and
therefore deemed unconstitutional. Notwithstanding the positive effects the decision may have for wine lovers, the
decision runs contrary to the meaning, spirit, and history of the Twenty-First Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Matthew B. Millis, Note, Let History Be Our Guide: Using Historical Analogies to Analyze State Response to a Post-Granholm
Era, 81 Ind. L.J. 1097 Shepardize (Summer 2006).
By prohibiting facial discrimination against out-of-state wineries to protect the interests of in-state wineries, the Supreme
Court handed small winery owners a victory. However, this is only one victory in a battle that will continue to rage.
Aaron Nielson, The Supreme Court of the United States, 2004 Term: Good History, Good Law (and by Coincidence Good Policy
Too): Granholm v. Heald, 125 S. Ct. 1885 (2005), 29 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 743 Shepardize (Spring 2006).
Although the decision advanced domestic free trade, a sound policy outcome, there might be reasons to fear that the case
was incorrectly decided as a matter of law. Such fears, however, were unnecessary as there was no conflict between the
correct constitutional interpretation and freer trade.
Ryan Eddings, Wine Lovers Win Battle, Could Lose War, 18 Loy. Consumer L. Rev. 115 Shepardize (2005).
The equal treatment that consumers and producers sought when challenging direct shipment laws might also completely
shut them out of new markets altogether.
Nancy Williams, Constitutional Law--The Dormant Commerce Clause and the Twenty-First Amendment--Reconciling the Two
Constitutional Provisions to Allow the Direct Shipment of Wine, 75 Miss. L.J. 619 Shepardize (Winter 2006).
The Supreme Court, in deciding Granholm v. Heald, confronted many prior cases, statutes, and other sources that
proposed a variety of ways to interpret the Twenty-First Amendment, as the majority and two dissenting opinions illustrate.
Nonetheless, the Court determined that a state regulation favoring in-state liquor over out-of-state liquor was
unconstitutional under the dormant Commerce Clause.
Amanda C. Grafstrom, Case Comment, Commerce - Intoxicating Liquors: Wine Lovers Rejoice! Why Vineyards Can Now Ship
Directly to Consumers and Why Everyone Else Should Care, 82 N. Dak. L. Rev. 557 Shepardize (2006).
Elizabeth Norton, Note, The Twenty-First Amendment in the Twenty-First Century: Reconsidering State Liquor Controls in Light of
Granholm v. Heald, 67 Ohio St. L.J. 1465 Shepardize (2006).
This note briefly reviewed the history of state liquor controls, prohibition and its repeal, and the progression of the Court's
Twenty-First Amendment jurisprudence. This note acknowledged that under the Granholm v. Heald reasoning, states
could continue to regulate the alcoholic beverage industry in a way unlike the state regulation of most other ordinary
articles of commerce, and it suggested several paths for both Congress and state legislatures that were considering
action in the aftermath of Granholm v. Heald.
Rebekah G. Ballard, Note, "Dormant" No More: The Supreme Court Awakens the Dormant Commerce Clause in Granholm v.
Heald, 41 Wake Forest L. Rev. 303 Shepardize (Spring 2006).
Leading up to the Granholm v. Heald decision, commentators recognized that reconciling the conflict between the
dormant Commerce Clause and the Twenty-First Amendment would be difficult, in light of the historical support for the
view that states were unrestrained in their regulation of importation and transportation of alcohol within their borders, and
the more recent support for the notion that the Commerce Clause would serve as a limit on this authority. In the end, the
seemingly clear textual command of the Twenty-First Amendment did not provide the tiebreaker. The Supreme Court
instead reinforced the central tenet of the dormant commerce clause that states may not enact laws that favor local
economic interests simply to create a competitive advantage, notwithstanding a seeming constitutional grant to do so.
Gregory E. Durkin, Note, What Does Granholm v. Heald Mean for the Future of the Twenty-First Amendment, the Three-Tier
Shepardize
System, and Efficient Alcohol Distribution?, 63 Wash & Lee L. Rev. 1095 (Summer 2006).
This note focused on the implications of Granholm v. Heald for state regulatory systems currently under attack and for
other state systems that were vulnerable to attack. This note argued that despite language in Granholm v. Heald
suggesting that state alcohol regulations were subject to the same Commerce Clause limitations as state laws regulating
other articles of commerce, the Twenty-First Amendment still insulated some nondiscriminatory state laws from
Commerce Clause invalidation.
Matthew Dickson, Note & Comment, All or Nothing: State Reaction in the Wake of Granholm v. Heald, 28 Whittier L. Rev. 491
Shepardize
(Fall 2006).
In order to comply with the Court's decision, states now had a choice of either allowing direct shipment of wine by both in-
state and out-of-state producers on "evenhanded terms," or, conversely, prohibiting all direct shipment to consumers in
Tania K. M. Lex, Note & Comment, Case Note, Of Wine and War: The Fall of State Twenty-First Amendment Power at the Hands
of the Dormant Commerce Clause - Granholm v. Heald, 32 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 1145 Shepardize (2006).
This note argued that the reasoning employed by the majority in Granholm v. Heald defied existing law and led to results
most likely never intended by those who ratified the Twenty-First Amendment. Nevertheless, the result the majority
imposed might be appropriate for modern society. This article concluded by proposing an alternate line of analysis that
had to be undertaken before straying from well-established precedent.
Khalil Nicholas Maalouf, Impediments to Financial Development in the Banking Sector: A Comparison of the Impact of Federalism
in the United States and Germany, 28 Mich. J. Int'l L. 431 Shepardize (Winter 2007).
Shirlene Love, Napa to New York with the Click of a Mouse: The Dormant Commerce Clause and the Direct Shipment of Wine to
Consumers as Discussed in Granholm v. Heald, 26 J. NAALJ 205 Shepardize (Spring 2006).
States maintained the right to mandate specific distribution schemes as they saw fit under the authority of the Twenty-First
Amendment. These regulations, however, could not discriminate between in-state and out-of-state wineries.
Jason Miller, Law That Discriminates against Out-of-State Liquor Makers Rejected, 7 Lawyers J. 2 Shepardize (June 24, 2005).
In a thorough opinion by Justice Kennedy in Granholm v. Heald, a divided United States Supreme Court held that state
liquor laws that discriminated against out-of-state liquor producers violated the Commerce Clause. Moreover, Section 2 of
the 21st Amendment did not save the states' discriminatory regulations.
Drew D. Massey, Dueling Provisions: The 21st Amendment's Subjugation to the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 7
Transactions 71 Shepardize (Fall 2005).
The Twenty-First Amendment limiting the power of the federal government was slowly eroding away with the aid and
compliance of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court, however, had modified, altered, and rendered meaningless this
seemingly unambiguous language through the use of the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine.
Jeff Bleich, Anne Voigts, & Michelle Friedland, A Practical Era: The Beginning (or the End) of Pragmatism, 65 Or. St. B. Bull. 19
Shepardize
(Aug./Sept. 2005).
Charles H. Whitebread, Civil High Court Pronouncements, 47 Orange County Lawyer 10 Shepardize (Nov. 2005).
Perry A. Craft & Michael G. Sheppard, Supreme Court Review: What the U.S. Supreme Court's 2004-2005 Decisions Mean to
Tennessee Lawyers, 41 Tenn. B.J. 16 Shepardize (Sept. 2005).
Charles H. Whitebread, Recent Civil Decisions of the United States Supreme Court: The 2004-2005 Term, 42 Court Review 14
Shepardize
(Summer 2005).
What Constitutes Commerce; Other Activities and Products; Agriculture, Food, and Beverages; Alcoholic
Beverages
State's regulation of out-of-state wineries could not escape Commerce Clause scrutiny because it had not shown that its
regulatory scheme was closely related to core concern of raising revenue and State could not look to Webb-Kenyon Act
for help. Bainbridge v Turner (2002, CA11 Fla) 311 F3d 1104, Shepardize 16 FLW Fed C 16 (criticized in Swedenburg v Kelly
(2004, CA2 NY) 358 F3d 223 Shepardize ).
Twenty First Amendment does not entirely remove state regulation of alcoholic beverages from ambit of Commerce
clause; question in determining validity of state liquor tax that discriminates against interstate commerce is whether
principles underlying Twenty First Amendment are sufficiently implicated to outweigh Commerce clause principles that
would otherwise be offended. Bacchus Imports v Dias (1984) 468 US 263 Shepardize , 82 L Ed 2d 200 Shepardize , 104 S Ct
3049 Shepardize (criticized in Ala. Alcoholic Bev. Control Bd. v Henri-Duval Winery, L.L.C. (2003, Ala) 890 So 2d 70 Shepardize ).
States' power to regulate importation of intoxicating liquor under U.S. Const. amend XXI, § 2, does not allow states to ban,
or severely limit, direct shipment of out-of-state wine while simultaneously authorizing direct shipment by in-state
producers in violation of prohibition against discrimination in interstate commerce under U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
Granholm v Heald (2005, US) 161 L Ed 2d 796 Shepardize , 125 S Ct 1885, Shepardize 18 FLW Fed S 263.
Validity of State Regulation; Particular Matters; Other Particular Matters; Beverages; Alcoholic Beverages
Validity of State Regulation; Particular Matters; Other Particular Matters; Beverages; Alcoholic Beverages; Effect
of 21st Amendment
State law authorizing sale of newly defined wine product in grocery stores if produced exclusively from grapes grown in
state is clearly protectionist measure which violates commerce clause and which cannot be saved by § 2 of Twenty-first
Amendment. Loretto Winery, Ltd. v Duffy (1985, CA2 NY) 761 F2d 140 Shepardize .
Texas Alcoholic Beverage Code's durational residency and citizenship requirements for permit holders amount to simple
economic protectionism and therefore run afoul of commerce clause; 21st Amendment provides no sanctuary for statutes
since state's interest in facilitating background checks of permit applicants by discriminating against nonresidents is not
within amendment's "core concerns." Cooper v McBeath (1994, CA5 Tex) 11 F3d 547 Shepardize , cert den (1994) 512 US
1205 Shepardize , 129 L Ed 2d 810 Shepardize , 114 S Ct 2675 Shepardize .
Validity of State Regulation; Particular Matters; Other Particular Matters; Beverages; Alcoholic Beverages;
Manufacture and Sale
Although 21st Amendment empowered state to regulate alcoholic beverage sales within its borders, provision did not
empower state to favor local liquor industries by erecting barriers to competition in violation of Commerce Clause; hence,
state's three-tier alcohol distribution system which banned direct shipment to customers of alcohol from out-of-state sellers
was unconstitutional because it did not promote 21st Amendment's core goals of temperance, raising revenue, and
ensuring orderly market. Heald v Engler (2003, CA6 Mich) 342 F3d 517 Shepardize , 2003 FED App 308P, reh, en banc, den
(2003, CA6) 2003 US App LEXIS 23001 Shepardize and (criticized in Swedenburg v Kelly (2004, CA2 NY) 358 F3d 223
Shepardize
) and affd (2005, US) 161 L Ed 2d 796 Shepardize , 125 S Ct 1885, Shepardize 18 FLW Fed S 263.
Twenty-first Amendment conferred upon state power to forbid all intoxicating liquor importations which do not comply with
conditions which state prescribes; state may adopt lesser degree of regulation than total prohibition. State Bd. of
Equalization v Young's Market Co. (1936) 299 US 59 Shepardize , 81 L Ed 38 Shepardize , 57 S Ct 77 Shepardize , reh den (1936)
Twenty-First Amendment requires presumption in favor of validity of state regulation of establishments licensed to sell
intoxicating liquors; wide latitude as to choice of means to accomplish permissible end must be accorded to state agency
which is depository of states' power under Twenty-first Amendment. California v La Rue (1972) 409 US 109 Shepardize , 34 L
Ed 2d 342 Shepardize , 93 S Ct 390 Shepardize , reh den (1973) 410 US 948 Shepardize , 35 L Ed 2d 615 Shepardize , 93 S Ct 1351
Shepardize
and (ovrld in part by 44 Liquormart v Rhode Island (1996) 517 US 484 Shepardize , 134 L Ed 2d 711 Shepardize , 116 S
Ct 1495, Shepardize 96 CDOS 3338, 24 Media L R 1673, 9 FLW Fed S 569) and (ovrld in part as stated in J&B Social Club #
1 v City of Mobile (1996, SD Ala) 966 F Supp 1131 Shepardize ) and (ovrld in part as stated in WFO Corp. v Ohio Liquor
Control Comm'n (1996, Ohio App, Franklin Co) 1996 Ohio App LEXIS 4788 Shepardize ) and (ovrld in part as stated in
Goldrush II v City of Marietta (1997) 267 Ga 683 Shepardize , 482 SE2d 347 Shepardize , 97 Fulton County D R 874 Shepardize ) and
(ovrld as stated in J.L. Spoons, Inc. v City of Brunswick (1998, ND Ohio) 181 FRD 354 Shepardize ) and (ovrld in part as
stated in Purple Orchid v Pennsylvania State Police, Bureau of Liquor Control Enforcement (1998, Pa Cmwlth) 721 A2d
84 Shepardize ) and (ovrld in part as stated in Salt Lake City v Wood (1999, Utah App) 991 P2d 595, 381 Shepardize Utah Adv
Rep 33) and (ovrld in part as stated in El Marocco Club, Inc. v Richardson (2000, RI) 746 A2d 1228 Shepardize ) and
(criticized in Giovani Carandola, Ltd. v Bason (2002, CA4 NC) 303 F3d 507 Shepardize ) and (ovrld in part as stated in Rising
Sun Entm't, Inc. v Bureau of Liquor Control Enforcement (2003, Pa Cmwlth) 829 A2d 1214 Shepardize ).
Although case for upholding state regulation in area covered by Twenty-first Amendment is undoubtedly strengthened by
Amendment, other constitutional provisions are not rendered inapplicable by amendment. White v Fleming (1975, CA7
Wis) 522 F2d 730, Shepardize 11 BNA FEP Cas 619, 10 CCH EPD P 10313.
Analysis of validity of state law regulating liquor does not proceed via traditional route for testing constitutionality of state
statutes, rather courts must proceed from vantage point of presumed state power and then ask whether there are any
limitations to that power, always keeping in mind that where intoxicating liquors are concerned, great deference must be
accorded comprehensive state regulatory scheme; federal laws have prevailed over state regulation of intoxicating liquors
in only 2 circumstances: (1) where state regulation was repugnant to overriding national concern with due process and
equal protection, and (2) where state had sought to invade area of exclusive federal concern such as federally owned
installations, regulation of commerce with foreign nations, and taxation of imports from foreign countries. Castlewood
International Corp. v Simon (1979, CA5 Fla) 596 F2d 638 Shepardize , vacated on other grounds (1980) 446 US 949 Shepardize ,
64 L Ed 2d 806 Shepardize , 100 S Ct 2914 Shepardize .
State law dealing with sale of alcoholic beverages has priority, under Twenty-First Amendment, when in conflict with
federal regulation placing burden on commerce and alcohol which state wishes to avoid, absent federal interest of
sufficient magnitude. Wine Industry of Florida, Inc. v Miller (1980, CA5 Fla) 609 F2d 1167 Shepardize .
Twenty-first Amendment sanctions right of state to legislate concerning intoxicating liquors brought from without,
unfettered by commerce clause of Constitution (Art I, § 8, cl 3). Ziffrin, Inc. v Reeves (1939) 308 US 132 Shepardize , 84 L Ed
128 Shepardize , 60 S Ct 163 Shepardize (criticized in Granholm v Heald (2005, US) 2005 US LEXIS 4174 Shepardize ); Jones v
State (1939) 198 Ark 354 Shepardize , 129 SW2d 249 Shepardize ; Hardin v Spiers (1941) 202 Ark 804 Shepardize , 152 SW2d 1010
Shepardize
; State v Andre (1936) 101 Mont 366 Shepardize , 54 P2d 566 Shepardize .
Like other provisions of Federal Constitution, Twenty-first Amendment and commerce clause must each be considered in
light of other and in context of issues and interests at stake in any concrete case. Hostetter v Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor
Corp. (1964) 377 US 324 Shepardize , 12 L Ed 2d 350 Shepardize , 84 S Ct 1293 Shepardize .
State of New York could not prohibit sale at airport of liquor purchased outside of state to departing international travelers
for delivery at their foreign destinations; although state, by virtue of provisions of Twenty-first Amendment, is totally
unconfined by traditional commerce clause limitations when it restricts importation of intoxicants destined for use,
distribution, or consumption within its borders, nevertheless Twenty-first Amendment does not obliterate commerce clause
so far as to empower state to prohibit absolutely passage of liquor through its territory, under supervision of United States
Bureau of Customs, for delivery to consumers in foreign countries; state may not totally prevent transactions carried on
under aegis of law passed by Congress in exercise of its explicit power under Federal Constitution to regulate commerce
with foreign nations. Hostetter v Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. (1964) 377 US 324 Shepardize , 12 L Ed 2d 350 Shepardize ,
84 S Ct 1293 Shepardize .
By virtue of Twenty-first Amendment, state is totally unconfined by traditional commerce clause limitations when it restricts
importation of intoxicants destined for use, distribution, or consumption within its borders. Heublein, Inc. v South Carolina
Tax Comm'n (1972) 409 US 275 Shepardize , 34 L Ed 2d 472 Shepardize , 93 S Ct 483 Shepardize ; United States v State Tax Com.
(1973) 412 US 363 Shepardize , 37 L Ed 2d 1 Shepardize , 93 S Ct 2183 Shepardize .
Although Twenty-first Amendment primarily creates exception to normal operation of commerce clause (Art I, § 8, cl 3),
nevertheless Twenty-first Amendment does not pro tanto repeal commerce clause, but merely requires that each
provision be considered in light of the other, and in context of issues and interests at stake in any concrete case. Craig v
Boren (1976) 429 US 190 Shepardize , 50 L Ed 2d 397 Shepardize , 97 S Ct 451 Shepardize , reh den (1977) 429 US 1124 Shepardize ,
51 L Ed 2d 574 Shepardize , 97 S Ct 1161 Shepardize and (ovrld as stated in Wilson v McBeath (1991, WD Tex) 1991 US Dist
LEXIS 21124 Shepardize ) and (criticized in UPS Worldwide Forwarding v United States Postal Serv. (1995, CA3 Del) 66 F3d
621 Shepardize ) and (criticized in North Shore Concrete & Assoc. v City of New York (1998, ED NY) 1998 US Dist LEXIS
6785 Shepardize ).
There is no bright line between federal and state powers over liquor; although the Twenty-first Amendment grants states
virtually complete control over whether to permit importation or sale of liquor and how to structure the liquor distribution
News
Correy E. Stephenson, Law of the Vine: The Practice of Wine Law, Kan. City Daily Rec. (Kansas City, Mo.), Dec. 6, 2005.
This article discussed the status of states’ wine laws, with specific attention paid to Granholm v. Heald.
Dan & Krista Stockman, Wineries Get Hearing on Ship Ban, Fort Wayne J.-Gazette (Ind.), Nov. 17, 2005.
Larry Downes, The Commerce Clause Wakes Up, Harvard Bus. Rev., Sept. 2005.
The decision in Granholm v. Heald suggested a Supreme Court that was prepared to use the dormant Commerce Clause
to protect electronic commerce, a growing sector of the economy threatened by a patchwork of state regulations, and the
failure of the federal government to take sufficient action on the global front.
Amy Rinard, Getting a Bigger Glass for Out-of-State Wines, Milwaukee J. Sentinel (Wis.), July 17, 2005.
Jessica Fender, Wineries Say Law Will Hurt Business; Blanco Signs Bill, Promises Protection, The Advocate, July 15, 2005.
Donna Walter, Missouri Law Professors Dissect U.S. Supreme Court's Recent Term, Kan. City Daily Rec. (Kansas City, Mo.), July
14, 2005.
High Court Strikes Down State Limitations on Internet Wine Sales, Computer & Internet Law., July 2005.
Brian Dickerson, Follow Money on Wine Trail, Detroit Free Press, July 1, 2005.
The Supreme Court's Granholm v. Heald Decision: What It Means for Interstate Wine Shipping, Mondaq Bus. Briefing, June 24,
2005.
Morain Michael, Up for Something Different? Buy Out-of-State Wines Online, Thanks to Supreme Court Decision, Des Moines
Register (Iowa), June 8, 2005.
Ron Browning, Wine Lovers Hail High Court Ruling; Impact on Indiana Remains Unclear, Ind. Law., June 1, 2005.
K. Lloyd Billingsley, Toast to the Supreme Court, Wash. Times, May 22, 2005.
Supreme Court; State Wine-Shipping Bans Struck Down Facts on File, World News Dig., May 19, 2005.
Wine Laws Gone Sour; Bans by Florida and Other States Are Behind the Times, Sarasota Herald-Trib. (Fla.), May 19, 2005.
Peter Schroeder & Andrew Ackerman, Kentucky Files Davis Case Brief; Nine Market Groups Add Their Support, Bond Buyer, July
23, 2007.
Briefs were filed in a case the Supreme Court consented to hear, challenging state tax laws which imposed income tax
liabilities on bonds from out of state municipalities but not in state municipalities.
As Wine Bills Ferment, Balance Elusive, Ark. Democrat-Gazette (Little Rock), Feb. 28, 2007.
The legislative debate on the future on the state's wine laws began with a committee hearing arguments on whether
lawmakers should revoke Arkansas wineries' special marketing privileges in order to conform to a U.S. Supreme Court
decision.
Raft of Bills Due to Fix Wine Laws Crippled by Court Ruling, Ark. Democrat-Gazette (Little Rock), Feb. 14, 2007.
New legislation could head off litigation pending in state and federal courts between wine and liquor merchants who
sought to protect their franchises from incursion by the out-of-state wineries and oenophiles who could not find boutique
wines in Arkansas liquor stores.
Missouri Laws on Wine-Shipping Challenged, Daily Rec. (St. Louis, Mo./St. Louis Countian), Nov. 29, 2006.
Missouri laws restricting direct shipping of out-of-state wine to Missouri customers only to states with reciprocal
agreements were challenged as unconstitutional. The article discussed how Granholm v. Heald might or might not apply.
Arkansas Attorney General Issues Opinion to State Sen. Thompson, US St. News, Mar. 15, 2007.
Wine Sales to Grocers Gets 90-1 House OK, Ark. Democrat-Gazette (Little Rock), Mar. 6, 2007.
Treasurers' Group Urges Supreme Court to Hear Kentucky Case, Bond Buyer, Jan. 23, 2007.
Cheryl Ursin, Less Is More: The Division of Liquor Control of the Ohio Department of Commerce Runs a Lean, Highly Efficient
Control System, StateWays, Jan. 1, 2007.
Family Winemakers Partners with WineCompliancePro to Offer Its Members Direct Shipping Compliance Tools, Bus. Wire, Dec.
20, 2006.
Regulations Have Industry Officials in Oklahoma Whining about Wine, J. Rec. (Oklahoma City, Okla.), Oct. 18, 2006.
Daniel Nasaw, A Black Market for Reds and Whites Wine Aficionados Flout State Law Banning Shipments to Consumers, Ark.
Democrat-Gazette (Little Rock), Oct. 1, 2006.
Jim Small, Out-of-State Winery Challenges Arizona's New Shipping Law, Ariz. Capitol Times, Sept. 29, 2006.
Julie Gallagher, Retailers Sober about Licensing Laws, Supermarket News, Sept. 25, 2006.
Family Winemakers Sues Massachusetts to Overturn Law Limiting Direct Wine Sales by Winery Size; Many Small Wineries
Forced to Choose One Sales Approach, Bus. Wire, Sept. 18, 2006.
Linda Satter, Wine Distribution Battle Opens State-Court Phase, Ark. Democrat-Gazette (Little Rock), Aug. 16, 2006.
Millions of Kids Buy Internet Alcohol, Landmark Survey Reveals; Related Audit Confirms States Loosening Internet Alcohol Sales
Laws with Little Monitoring or Enforcement Online, PR Newswire U.S., Aug. 11, 2006.
Tim Martin, Granholm Continues to Protest School Budget Cuts, Associated Press St. & Loc. Wire, Mar. 26, 2007.
This article discussed Gov. Jennifer Granholm asking educators from across Michigan to tell state lawmakers they
opposed proposed spending cuts to schools.
This article discussed the potential of raising deposits on beer kegs and the Michigan Beer & Wine Wholesalers
Association’s opinion thereon.
Laurie Daniel, Superior Wines Are Made from Edna Valley Grapes, San Luis Obispo Trib. (Cal.), Feb. 28, 2007.
This article discussed the Domaine Alfred winery in California and its excellent wines.
Jack Berninger, Local Wine Winners, Richmond Times Dispatch (Va.), Nov. 1, 2006.
US Free Trade Receives Blow from Woman Winemaker, Indo-Asian News Service, Sept. 18, 2006.
Larry Walker, Blue Collar Boutiques: Lessons Learned by Five Hard-Working Lodi Wineries, Wines & Vines, Jan. 1, 2007.
Reed Fujii, Wineries Beginning to See Markets Open, The Rec., May 14, 2006.
Michael Doyle, Firm in Wine-Shipment Case Scores $150k Payday, Modesto Bee, Mar. 28, 2006.
Reed Fujii, California Wineries Still Waiting on Flood of Sales, The Rec., Nov. 9, 2005.
Mike Dunne, After Court Ruling, Wineries Say the Glass Is Half-Full, Scripps Howard News Service, May 18, 2005.
Alan Wechsler, $1.6M Deal Halts Liquor Inquiry; Wholesalers Make Payment to Resolve Attorney General's Investigation into
Gifts, Payments to Favored Customers, Times Union (Albany, N.Y.), Aug. 31, 2006.
R.B. Stuart, State Tells Wineries to Lay off the Soft Stuff, N.Y. Times, Feb. 5, 2006.
Joe Mahoney, Gov Axes Embattled Liquor Agency Big, Daily News (N.Y.), Nov. 29, 2005.
Chris Christoff, Services Tax Gets Meager Support: More for Tobacco, Alcohol Is All Residents Would Swallow, Detroit Free
Press (Mich.), Mar. 18, 2007.
Briefs 2
Briefs 3
Transcripts
JENNIFER M. GRANHOLM, GOVERNOR OF MICHIGAN, et al., Petitioners v. ELEANOR HEALD, et al. MICHIGAN BEER & WINE
WHOLESALERS ASSOCIATION, Petitioner v. ELEANOR HEALD, et al. JUANITA SWEDENBURG, et al., Petitioners v. EDWARD D. KELLY,
CHAIRMAN, NEW YORK DIVISION OF ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE CONTROL, STATE LIQUOR AUTHORITY, et al.
544 U.S. 460 Shepardize ; 125 S. Ct. 1885 Shepardize ; 161 L. Ed. 2d 796 Shepardize ; 2005 U.S. LEXIS 4174 Shepardize; 73 U.S.L.W. 4321 Shepardize; 18 Fla. L.
Weekly Fed. S 263 Shepardize
December 7, 2004, Argued May 16, 2005, * Decided * Together with No. 03-1120, Michigan Beer & Wine Wholesalers Assn. v. Heald et al.,
also on certiorari to the same court, and No. 03-1274, Swedenburg et al. v. Kelly, Chairman, New York Division of Alcoholic Beverage Control,
State Liquor Authority, et al., on certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
The LEXIS pagination of this document is subject to change pending DECISION: [***796]
release of the final published version. State laws that allowed in-state wineries to sell wine directly to in-
state consumers but barred out-of-state wineries from doing so--or
SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: Motion denied by, Motion to strike made such sales economically impractical--held to violate Federal
denied by, Costs and fees proceeding at Heald v. Granholm, 2006 Constitution's commerce clause (Art I, § 8, cl 3).
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74646 Shepardize ( E.D. Mich., Sept. 28, 2006)
COUNSEL:
PRIOR HISTORY: ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED Clint Bolick argued the cause for petitioners in No. 03-1274.
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT. ON Thomas L. Casey argued the cause for petitioners in No. 03-1116
WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF and in No. 03-1120.
APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT. Swedenburg v. Kelly, 358 Kathleen Sullivan argued the cause for respondents in No. 03-1116
F.3d 223 Shepardize, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 2337 Shepardize (2d Cir. N.Y., and No. 03-1120.
2004) Caitlin Halligan argued the cause for respondents in No. 03-1274.
Heald v. Engler, 342 F.3d 517 Shepardize, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 17965
Shepardize
(6th Cir.) (6th Cir. Mich., 2003)