Whether two vehicles are approaching the intersection at the same time does not

necessarily depend on which of the vehicles enters the intersection first. Rather, it
is determined by the imminence of collision when the relative distances and speeds
of the two vehicles are considered.74 It is said that two vehicles are approaching the
intersection at approximately the same time where it would appear to a reasonable
person of ordinary prudence in the position of the driver approaching from the left
of another vehicle that if the two vehicles continued on their courses at their speed,
a collision would likely occur, hence, the driver of the vehicle approaching from the
left must give the right of precedence to the driver of the vehicle on his
right.75 ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

Nevertheless, the rule requiring the driver on the left to yield the right of way to the
driver on the right on approach to the intersection, no duty is imposed on the driver
on the left to come to a dead stop, but he is merely required to approach the
intersection with his vehicle under control so that he may yield the right of way to a
vehicle within the danger zone on his right.76 He is not bound to wait until there is
no other vehicle on his right in sight before proceeding to the intersection but only

until it is reasonably safe to proceed.77 Thus, in Adzuara v. Court of Appeals,78 it

was established that a motorist crossing a thru-stop street has the right of way
over the one making a turn; but if the person making the turn has already
negotiated half of the turn and is almost on the other side so that he is already
visible to the person on the thru-street, he is bound to give way to the former.

Moreover, in a prosecution for reckless or dangerous driving, the negligence of the

person who was injured or who was the driver of the motor vehicle with which the
accused's vehicle collided does not constitute a defense.79 In fact, even where such
driver is said to be guilty of a like offense, proof thereof may never work favors to
the case of the accused.80 In other words, proof that the offended party was also
negligent or imprudent in the operation of his automobile bears little weight, if at
all, at least for purposes of establishing the accused's culpability beyond reasonable
doubt. Hence, even if we are to hypothesize that Arnold was likewise negligent in
neglecting to keep a proper lookout as he took a left turn at the intersection, such
negligence, contrary to petitioner's contention, will nevertheless not support an
acquittal. At best, it will only determine the applicability of several other rules
governing situations where concurring negligence exists and only for the purpose of
arriving at a proper assessment of the award of damages in favor of the private
offended party.

But it must be asked: do the facts of the case support a finding that Arnold was
likewise negligent in executing the left turn? The answer is in the negative. It is as
much unsafe as it is unjust to assume that Arnold, just because the TAIR so
indicated that he at the time had no right of way, that Arnold had performed a risky
maneuver at the intersection in failing

to keep a proper lookout for oncoming vehicles. In fact, aside from petitioner's bare
and self-serving assertion that Arnold's fault was the principal determining cause of
the mishap as well as his allegation that it was actually Arnold's car that came
colliding with his car, there is no slightest suggestion in the records that could tend
to negate what the physical evidence in this case has established. Clearly, it was
petitioner's negligence, as pointed out by the OSG, th

It is a rule that a motorist crossing a thru-stop street has the right of way over the
one making a U-turn. But if the person making a U-turn has already negotiated half
of the turn and is almost on the other side so that he is already visible to the
person on the thru-street, the latter must give way to the former. Petitioner was on
the thru-street and had already seen the Martinez car. 19 He should have stopped
to allow Martinez to complete the U-turn having, as it were, the last clear chance to
avoid the accident which he ignored. In fact, he never stopped. Rather, he claimed
that on the assumption that he was negligent, the other party was also guilty of
contributory negligence since his car had no lights on. 20 The negligence of
Martinez however has not been satisfactorily shown. Adzuara v ca

) YES. The principle of holding the registered owner of a vehicle liable for quasi-delictsresulting from its
use is wellestablished in jurisprudence. As explained in the case of Erezo v. Jepte, thus: Registration is
required not to make said registration the operative act by which ownership in vehicles is transferred, as
in land registration cases, because the administrative proceeding of registration does not bear any
essential relation to the contract of sale between the parties (Chinchilla vs. Rafael and Verdaguer, 39
Phil. 888), but to permit the use and operation of the vehicle upon any public highway (section 5 [a], Act
No. 3992, as amended.) The main aim of motor vehicle registration is to identify the owner so that if any
accident happens, or that any damage or injury is caused by the vehicle on the public highways,
responsibility therefor can be fixed on a definite individual, the registered owner. Instances are
numerous where vehicles running on public highways caused accidents or injuries to pedestrians or
other vehicles without positive identification of the owner or drivers, or with very scant means of
identification. It is to forestall these circumstances, so inconvenient or prejudicial to the public, that the
motor vehicle registration is primarily ordained, in the interest of the determination of persons
responsible for damages or injuries caused on public highways.

Reckless Driving – the act of operating a motor vehicle without reasonable caution considering the
width, traffic, grades, crossing, curvatures, visibility and other conditions of the highway and the
conditions of the atmosphere and weather, or so as to endanger the property or the safety or rights of
any person, or so as to cause excessive or unreasonable damage to the highway.

Reckless imprudence generally defined by our penal law consists in voluntarily but without
malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage results by reason of
inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such
act, taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical
condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place
. Over-speeding Section 35 of R.A. 4136 prescribes maximum allowable speeds for different types of
roads, which take into account their width, the flow of traffic in them and the fact that they pass
through high-risk zones. The proper speed prescribed by the law can be described as: (1) a speed that is
careful and prudent, not greater or less than what is reasonable and proper considering traffic, road and
other existing conditions, (2) a speed that will not endanger the life, limb and property of any person,
and (3) a speed that will permit a driver to bring his vehicle to a stop within the assured clear distance
ahead.

2. Drunk driving Intoxication diminishes a person’s alertness and ability to focus. Thus, under the
definition in R.A. 4136, the mere act of driving a motor vehicle while under a state of intoxication, even
without causing any harm, already qualifies as “reckless driving” because a drunk driver operates his
motor vehicle in such manner as to endanger properties and persons on the road.

already ruled that the relationship of taxi owners and taxi drivers is the same
as that between jeepney owners and jeepney drivers under the “boundary system.” In both cases,
the employer-employee relationship was deemed to exist, viz.:
“The relationship between jeepney owners/operators on one hand and jeepney drivers on the
other under the boundary system is that of employer-employee and not of lessor-lessee. In the
lease of chattels the lessor loses complete control over the chattel leased. In the case of
jeepney owners/operators and jeepney drivers, the former exercise supervision and control over
the latter. The fact that the drivers do not receive fixed wages but get only the excess of that
socalled boundary they pay to the owner/operator is not sufficient to withdraw the relationship
between them from that of employer and employee. The doctrine is applicable in the present case.
Thus, private respondents were employees because they had been engaged to perform activities
which were usually necessary or desirable in the usual trade or business of the employer

n the boundary system, the driver pays the jeepney owner or bus company a fixed amount
(the “boundary”) for driving a passenger vehicle for certain hours paguio

system the driver is engaged to drive the owner/operator’s unit and pays the latter a fee commonly
called boundary for the use of the unit. Whatever he earned in excess of that amount is his
income. (Paguio Transport Corp. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 119500, Aug. 28, 1998)

What kind of relationship exists between the owner of the vehicle and the driver under a "boundary
system" arrangement?

The relationship between jeepney owners/operators on one hand and jeepney drivers on the other
under the boundary system is that of employer-employee and not of lessor-lessee. (Martinez v.
NLRC, G.R. No. 117495, May 29, 1997).

The features which characterize, the "boundary system" – namely, the fact that the driver does not
receive a fixed wage but gets only the excess of the amount of fares collected by him over the
amount he pays to the jeep- owner, and that the gasoline consumed by the jeep is for the account of
the driver – are not sufficient to withdraw, the relationship between them from that of the
employer and employee. (National Labor Union v. Dinglasan