(8) FABRE vs.

CA The above article makes no distinction between one whose principal business activity is the
carrying of persons or goods or both, and one who does such carrying only as an ancillary
FACTS: activity (in local idiom, as "a sideline").

Petitioners Engracio Fabre, Jr. and his wife were owners of a Mazda minibus. They used the
bus principally in connection with a bus service for school children which they operated in
Manila. It was driven by Porfirio Cabil.
On November 2, 1984 private respondent Word for the World Christian Fellowship Inc.
(WWCF) arranged with the petitioners for the transportation of 33 members of its Young
Adults Ministry from Manila to La Union and back in consideration of which private
respondent paid petitioners the amount of P3,000.00.
Article 1732 also carefully avoids making any distinction between a person or enterprise
offering transportation service on a regular or scheduled basis and one offering such service
on an occasional, episodic or unscheduled basis. Neither does Article 1732 distinguish
between a carrier offering its services to the "general public," i.e., the general community or
population, and one who offers services or solicits business only from a narrow segment of
the general population.
We think that Article 1732 deliberately refrained from making such distinctions.

The usual route to Caba, La Union was through Carmen, Pangasinan. However, the bridge
at Carmen was under repair, so that petitioner Cabil, who was unfamiliar with the area (it
being his first trip to La Union), was forced to take a detour through the town of Ba-ay in
Lingayen, Pangasinan. At 11:30 that night, petitioner Cabil came upon a sharp curve on the
highway. The road was slippery because it was raining, causing the bus, which was running
at the speed of 50 kilometers per hour, to skid to the left road shoulder.

The bus hit the left traffic steel brace and sign along the road and rammed the fence of one
Jesus Escano, then turned over and landed on its left side, coming to a full stop only after a
series of impacts. The bus came to rest off the road. A coconut tree which it had hit fell on it
and smashed its front portion. Because of the mishap, several passengers were injured
particularly Amyline Antonio.

Criminal complaint was filed against the driver and the spouses were also made jointly liable.
Spouses Fabre on the other hand contended that they are not liable since they are not a
common carrier. The RTC of Makati ruled in favor of the plaintiff and the defendants were
ordered to pay jointly and severally to the plaintiffs. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the trial court.

Issue: Whether the spouses Fabre are common carriers?

Held: Petition was denied. Spouses Fabre are common carriers.

The Supreme Court held that this case actually involves a contract of carriage. Petitioners,
the Fabres, did not have to be engaged in the business of public transportation for the
provisions of the Civil Code on common carriers to apply to them.

As this Court has held:

Art. 1732, Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or associations

engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both,
by land, water, or air for compensation, offering their services to the public.
MR. & MRS. ENGRACIO FABRE, JR. VS. CA, ET AL.
259 SCRA 426
FACTS:
Petitioners Fabre and his wife were owners of a minibus which they used principally in
connection with a bus service for school children which they operated. The couple had a
driver, Porfirio Cabil, whom they hired after trying him out for two weeks. His job was to take
school children to and from the St. Scholastica’s College.
On November 2, 1984, private respondent Word for the World Christian Fellowship Inc.
arranged with petitioners for the transportation of 33 members from Manila to La Union and
back in consideration of which they paid P3,000 to petitioners.
The group left at 8:00 in the evening, petitioner Cabil drove the minibus. The usual route to
Caba, La Union was through Carmen, Pangasinan. However, the bridge at Carmen was
under repair, so that petitioner Cabil, who was unfamiliar with the area (it being his first trip
to La Union), was forced to take a detour through the town of Ba-ay in Lingayen,
Pangasinan.
At 11:30 that night, petitioner Cabil came upon a sharp curve on the highway, running on a
south to east direction. The road was slippery because it was raining, causing the bus, which
was running at the speed of 50 kilometers per hour, to skid to the left road shoulder.
The bus hit the left traffic steel brace and sign along the road and rammed the fence of one
Jesus Escano, then turned over and landed on its left side, coming to a full stop only after a
series of impacts. The bus came to rest off the road. A coconut tree which it had hit fell on
it and smashed its front portion.
Several passengers were injured. Private respondent Amyline Antonio was thrown on the
floor of the bus and pinned down by a wooden seat which came off after being unscrewed. It
took three persons to safely remove her from this position. She was in great pain and could
not move.
A case was filed by the respondents against Fabre and Cabil. Amyline Antonio was found to
be suffering from paraplegia and is permanently paralyzed from the waist down.
The RTC ruled in favor of respondents. Mr. & Mrs. Fabre and Cabil were ordered to pay
jointly and severally actual, moral and exemplary damages, and as well as amount of loss of
earning capacity of Antonio and attorney’s fees. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision
of the trial court with modification on the award of damages.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not petitioners were negligent.
2. Whether or not petitioners were liable for the injuries suffered by private
respondents.
3. Whether or not damages can be awarded and in the positive, up to what extent.
HELD:
SC affirmed the decision of the CA but reverted the amount of the award of damages
to that ordered by the RTC.
1. The finding that Cabil drove his bus negligently, while his employer, the Fabres, who
owned the bus, failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of the family in the
selection and supervision of their employee is fully supported by the evidence on record.
Indeed, it was admitted by Cabil that on the night in question, it was raining, and, as a
consequence, the road was slippery, and it was dark. However, it is undisputed that
Cabil drove his bus at the speed of 50 kilometers per hour and only slowed down when
he noticed the curve some 15 to 30 meters ahead. Given the conditions of the road and
considering that the trip was Cabil’s first one outside of Manila, Cabil should have driven
his vehicle at a moderate speed. There is testimony that the vehicles passing on that
portion of the road should only be running 20 kilometers per hour, so that at 50 kilometers
per hour, Cabil was running at a very high speed. Cabil was grossly negligent and should
be held liable for the injuries suffered by private respondent Amyline Antonio.
Pursuant to Arts. 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code his negligence gave rise to the
presumption that his employers, the Fabres, were themselves negligent in the selection
and supervision of their employee. Due diligence in selection of employees is not
satisfied by finding that the applicant possessed a professional driver’s license. The
employer should also examine the applicant for his qualifications, experience and record
of service. In the case at bar, the Fabres, in allowing Cabil to drive the bus to La Union,
apparently did not consider the fact that Cabil had been driving for school children only,
from their homes to the St. Scholastica’s College in Metro Manila. They had hired him
only after a two-week apprenticeship.
2. This case involves a contract of carriage. Petitioners, the Fabres, did not have to be
engaged in the business of public transportation for the provisions of the Civil Code on
common carriers to apply to them.
Art. 1732. Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or associations engaged
in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water,
or air for compensation, offering their services to the public.
The above article makes no distinction between one whose principal business activity is
the carrying of persons or goods or both, and one who does such carrying only as an
ancillary activity. Neither does Article 1732 distinguish between a carrier offering its
services to the “general public,” i.e., the general community or population, and one who
offers services or solicits business only from a narrow segment of the general population.
As common carriers, the Fabres were bound to exercise “extraordinary diligence” for the
safe transportation of the passengers to their destination. This duty of care is not
excused by proof that they exercised the diligence of a good father of the family in the
selection and supervision of their employee.
As Art. 1759 of the Code provides:
Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the
negligence or wilful acts of the former’s employees, although such employees may have
acted beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the orders of the common
carriers.