IÑING VS.

VEGA

FACTS:

Leon Roldan, married to Rafaela, is the owner of subject land in Kalibo, Aklan Leon and Rafaela died without issue. Leon was survived
by his siblings Romana Roldan and Gregoria Roldan Ining, who are now both deceased. Romana was survived by her daughter
Anunciacion and grandson, respondent Leonardo Vega (also both deceased). Leonardo in turn is survived by his wife Lourdes and
children Restonilo I. Vega, Crispulo M. Vega, Milbuena Vega-Restituto and Lenard Vega, the substituted respondents.

Gregoria, on the other hand, was survived by her six children: petitioners Natividad Ining-Ibea (Natividad), Dolores Ining-Rimon
(Dolores), Antipolo, and Pedro; Jose; and Amando. Natividad is survived by Edilberto Ibea, Josefa Ibea, Martha Ibea, Carmen Ibea,
Amparo Ibea-Fernandez, Henry Ruiz and Pastor Ruiz. Dolores is survived by Jesus Rimon, Cesaria Rimon Gonzales and Remedios
Rimon Cordero. Antipolo is survived by Manuel Villanueva, daughter Teodora Villanueva-Francisco (Teodora), Camilo Francisco
(Camilo), Adolfo Francisco (Adolfo), Lucimo Francisco, Jr. (Lucimo Jr.), Milagros Francisco, Celedonio Francisco, and Herminigildo
Francisco (Herminigildo). Pedro is survived by his wife, Elisa Tan Ining and Pedro Ining, Jr. Amando died without issue. As for Jose, it is
not clear from the records if he was made party to the proceedings, or if he is alive at all.

In short, herein petitioners, except for Ramon Tresvalles (Tresvalles) and Roberto Tajonera (Tajonera), are Gregoria’s grandchildren or
spouses thereof (Gregoria’s heirs).

In 1997, acting on the claim that one-half of subject property belonged to him as Romana’s surviving heir, Leonardo filed with the RTC-
Kalibo for partition, recovery of ownership and possession, with damages, against Gregoria’s heirs. He alleged that on several
occasions, he demanded the partition of the property but Gregoria’s heirs refused to heed his demands; that the matter reached the
level of the Lupon Tagapamayapa, which issued a certification to file a court action sometime in 1980; that Gregoria’s heirs claimed sole
ownership of the property; that portions of the property were sold to Tresvalles and Tajonera, which portions must be collated and
included as part of the portion to be awarded to Gregoria’s heirs; that in 1979, Lucimo Francisco, Sr. (Lucimo Sr.), husband of herein
petitioner Teodora, illegally claimed absolute ownership of the property and transferred in his name the tax declaration covering the
property; that from 1988, Lucimo Sr. and Teodora have deprived him (Leonardo) of the fruits of the property estimated at ₱1,000.00 per
year; that as a result, he incurred expenses by way of attorney’s fees and litigation costs. Leonardo thus prayed that he be declared the
owner of half of the subject property; that the same be partitioned after collation and determination of the portion to which he is entitled;
that Gregoria’s heirs be ordered to execute the necessary documents or agreements.

In their Answer with counterclaim, Teodora, Camilo, Adolfo, Lucimo Jr. and Herminigildo claimed that Leonardo had no cause of action
against them; that they have become the sole owners of the subject property through Lucimo Sr. who acquired the same in good faith
by sale from Juan Enriquez (Enriquez), who in turn acquired the same from Leon, and Leonardo was aware of this fact; that they were
in continuous, actual, adverse, notorious and exclusive possession of the property with a just title; that they have been paying the taxes
on the property; that Leonardo’s claim is barred by estoppel and laches; and that they have suffered damages and were forced to
litigate as a result of Leonardo’s malicious suit. They prayed that Civil Case No. 5275 be dismissed; that Leonardo be declared to be
without any right to the property; that Leonardo be ordered to surrender the certificate of title to the property; and that they be awarded
₱20,000.00 as moral damages, ₱10,000.00 as temperate and nominal damages, ₱20,000.00 as attorney’s fees, and double costs.

The other Gregoria heirs, as well as Tresvalles and Tajonera were declared in default.9

As agreed during pre-trial, the trial court commissioned Geodetic Engineer Rafael M. Escabarte to identify the metes and bounds of the
property.10 The resulting Commissioner’s Report and Sketch,11 as well as the Supplementary Commissioner’s Report,12 were duly
approved by the parties. The parties then submitted the following issues for resolution of the trial court:

Whether Leonardo is entitled to a share in Leon’s estate;

Whether Leon sold the subject property to Lucimo Sr.; and

Whether Leonardo’s claim has prescribed, or that he is barred by estoppel or laches.13

In the meantime, Leonardo passed away and was duly substituted by his heirs, the respondents herein.14

During the course of the proceedings, the following additional relevant facts came to light:

1. In 1995, Leonardo filed against petitioners Civil Case No. 4983 for partition with the RTC Kalibo, but the case was dismissed and
referred to the Kalibo Municipal Trial Court (MTC), where the case was docketed as Civil Case No. 1366. However, on March 4, 1997,
the MTC dismissed Civil Case No. 1366 for lack of jurisdiction and declared that only the RTC can take cognizance of the partition
case;15

2. The property was allegedly sold by Leon to Enriquez through an unnotarized document dated April 4, 1943.16 Enriquez in turn
allegedly sold the property to Lucimo Sr. on November 25, 1943 via another private sale document;17

3. Petitioners were in sole possession of the property for more than 30 years, while Leonardo acquired custody of OCT RO-630;18
4. On February 9, 1979, Lucimo Sr. executed an Affidavit of Ownership of Land19 claiming sole ownership of the property which he
utilized to secure in his name Tax Declaration No. 16414 (TD 16414) over the property and to cancel Tax Declaration No. 20102 in
Leon’s name;20

5. Lucimo Sr. died in 1991; and

6. The property was partitioned among the petitioners, to the exclusion of Leonardo.21

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On November 19, 2001, the trial court rendered a Decision,22 which decreed as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:

Dismissing the complaint on the ground that plaintiffs’ right of action has long prescribed under Article 1141 of the New Civil Code;

Declaring Lot 1786 covered by OCT No. RO-630 (24071) to be the common property of the heirs of Gregoria Roldan Ining and by virtue
whereof, OCT No. RO-630 (24071) is ordered cancelled and the Register of Deeds of the Province of Aklan is directed to issue a
transfer certificate of title to the heirs of Natividad Ining, one-fourth (1/4) share; Heirs of Dolores Ining, one-fourth (1/4) share; Heirs of
Antipolo Ining, one-fourth (1/4) share; and Heirs of Pedro Ining, one-fourth (1/4) share.

For lack of sufficient evidence, the counterclaim is ordered dismissed.

With cost against the plaintiffs.

SO ORDERED.23

The trial court found the April 4, 1943 and November 25, 1943 deeds of sale to be spurious. It concluded that Leon never sold the
property to Enriquez, and in turn, Enriquez never sold the property to Lucimo Sr., hence, the subject property remained part of Leon’s
estate at the time of his death in 1962. Leon’s siblings, Romana and Gregoria, thus inherited the subject property in equal shares.
Leonardo and the respondents are entitled to Romana’s share as the latter’s successors.

However, the trial court held that Leonardo had only 30 years from Leon’s death in 1962 – or up to 1992 – within which to file the
partition case. Since Leonardo instituted the partition suit only in 1997, the same was already barred by prescription. It held that under
Article 1141 of the Civil Code,24 an action for partition and recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land is a real action
over immovable property which prescribes in 30 years. In addition, the trial court held that for his long inaction, Leonardo was guilty of
laches as well. Consequently, the property should go to Gregoria’s heirs exclusively.

Respondents moved for reconsideration25 but the same was denied by the RTC in its February 7, 2002 Order.26

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Only respondents interposed an appeal with the CA. Docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 74687, the appeal questioned the propriety of the
trial court’s dismissal of Civil Case No. 5275, its application of Article 1141, and the award of the property to Gregoria’s heirs exclusively.

On March 14, 2006, the CA issued the questioned Decision,27 which contained the following decretal portion:

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, this appeal is GRANTED. The decision of the Regional Trial Court, Br. 8, Kalibo, Aklan in Civil
Case No. 5275 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In lieu thereof, judgment is rendered as follows:

1. Declaring 1/2 portion of Lot 1786 as the share of the plaintiffs as successors-in-interest of Romana Roldan;

2. Declaring 1/2 portion of Lot 1786 as the share of the defendants as successors-in-interest of Gregoria Roldan Ining;

3. Ordering the defendants to deliver the possession of the portion described in paragraphs 8 and 9 of the Commissioner’s Report
(Supplementary) to the herein plaintiffs;

4. Ordering the cancellation of OCT No. RO-630 (24071) in the name of Leon Roldan and the Register of Deeds of Aklan is directed to
issue transfer certificates of title to the plaintiffs in accordance with paragraphs 8 and 9 of the sketch plan as embodied in the
Commissioner’s Report (Supplementary) and the remaining portion thereof be adjudged to the defendants.

Other claims and counterclaims are dismissed.

Costs against the defendants-appellees.

The CA held that the trial court’s declaration of nullity of the April 4, 1943 and November 25, 1943 deeds of sale in favor of Enriquez
and Lucimo Sr., respectively, became final and was settled by petitioners’ failure to appeal the same. Proceeding from the premise that
no valid prior disposition of the property was made by its owner Leon and that the property – which remained part of his estate at the
time of his death – passed on by succession to his two siblings, Romana and Gregoria, which thus makes the parties herein – who are
Romana’s and Gregoria’s heirs – co-owners of the property in equal shares, the appellate court held that only the issues of prescription
and laches were needed to be resolved.

The CA did not agree with the trial court’s pronouncement that Leonardo’s action for partition was barred by prescription. The CA
declared that prescription began to run not from Leon’s death in 1962, but from Lucimo Sr.’s execution of the Affidavit of Ownership of
Land in 1979, which amounted to a repudiation of his co-ownership of the property with Leonardo. Applying the fifth paragraph of Article
494 of the Civil Code, which provides that "[n]o prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs
so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership," the CA held that it was only when Lucimo Sr. executed the Affidavit
of Ownership of Land in 1979 and obtained a new tax declaration over the property (TD 16414) solely in his name that a repudiation of
his co-ownership with Leonardo was made, which repudiation effectively commenced the running of the 30-year prescriptive period
under Article 1141.

The CA did not consider Lucimo Sr.’s sole possession of the property for more than 30 years to the exclusion of Leonardo and the
respondents as a valid repudiation of the co-ownership either, stating that his exclusive possession of the property and appropriation of
its fruits – even his continuous payment of the taxes thereon – while adverse as against strangers, may not be deemed so as against
Leonardo in the absence of clear and conclusive evidence to the effect that the latter was ousted or deprived of his rights as co-owner
with the intention of assuming exclusive ownership over the property, and absent a showing that this was effectively made known to
Leonardo. Citing Bargayo v. Camumot29 and Segura v. Segura,30 the appellate court held that as a rule, possession by a co-owner will
not be presumed to be adverse to the other co-owners but will be held to benefit all, and that a co-owner or co-heir is in possession of
an inheritance pro-indiviso for himself and in representation of his co-owners or co-heirs if he administers or takes care of the rest
thereof with the obligation to deliver the same to his co-owners or co-heirs, as is the case of a depositary, lessee or trustee.

The CA added that the payment of taxes by Lucimo Sr. and the issuance of a new tax declaration in his name do not prove ownership;
they merely indicate a claim of ownership. Moreover, petitioners’ act of partitioning the property among themselves to the exclusion of
Leonardo cannot affect the latter; nor may it be considered a repudiation of the co-ownership as it has not been shown that the partition
was made known to Leonardo.

The CA held further that the principle of laches cannot apply as against Leonardo and the respondents. It held that laches is controlled
by equitable considerations and it cannot be used to defeat justice or to perpetuate fraud; it cannot be utilized to deprive the
respondents of their rightful inheritance.

On the basis of the above pronouncements, the CA granted respondents’ prayer for partition, directing that the manner of partitioning
the property shall be governed by the Commissioner’s Report and Sketch and the Supplementary Commissioner’s Report which the
parties did not contest.

Petitioners filed their Motion for Reconsideration31 which the CA denied in its assailed September 7, 2006 Resolution.32 Hence, the
present Petition.

Issues

Petitioners raise the following arguments:

THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT
ON THE GROUND THAT LUCIMO FRANCISCO REPUDIATED THE CO-OWNERSHIP ONLY ON FEBRUARY 9, 1979.

II

THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN NOT UPHOLDING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT ON
THE GROUND OF PRESCRIPTION AND LACHES.33

Petitioners’ Arguments

Petitioners insist in their Petition and Reply34 that Lucimo Sr.’s purchase of the property in 1943 and his possession thereof amounted
to a repudiation of the co-ownership, and that Leonardo’s admission and acknowledgment of Lucimo Sr.’s possession for such length of
time operated to bestow upon petitioners – as Lucimo Sr.’s successors-in-interest – the benefits of acquisitive prescription which
proceeded from the repudiation.

Petitioners contend that Leonardo’s inaction – from Lucimo Sr.’s taking possession in 1943, up to 1995, when Leonardo filed Civil Case
No. 4983 for partition with the RTC Kalibo – amounted to laches or neglect. They add that during the proceedings before the Lupon
Tagapamayapa in 1980, Leonardo was informed of Lucimo Sr.’s purchase of the property in 1943; this notwithstanding, Leonardo did
not take action then against Lucimo Sr. and did so only in 1995, when he filed Civil Case No. 4983 – which was eventually dismissed
and referred to the MTC. They argue that, all this time, Leonardo did nothing while Lucimo Sr. occupied the property and claimed all its
fruits for himself.

Respondents’ Arguments

Respondents, on the other hand, argue in their Comment35 that –

For purposes of clarity, if [sic] is respectfully submitted that eighteen (18) legible copies has [sic] not been filed in this case for
consideration in banc [sic] and nine (9) copies in cases heard before a division in that [sic] all copies of pleadings served to the offices
concern [sic] where said order [sic] was issued were not furnished two (2) copies each in violation to [sic] the adverse parties [sic] to the
clerk of court, Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, Kalibo, Aklan, Philippines; to the Honorable Court of Appeals so that No [sic] action shall
be taken on such pleadings, briefs, memoranda, motions, and other papers as fail [sic] to comply with the requisites set out in this
paragraph.

The foregoing is confirmed by affidavit of MERIDON F. OLANDESCA, the law secretary of the Petitioner [sic] who sent [sic] by
Registered mail to Court of Appeals, Twentieth Division, Cebu City; to Counsel for Respondent [sic] and to the Clerk of Court Supreme
Court Manila [sic].

These will show that Petitioner has [sic] violated all the requirements of furnishing two (2) copies each concerned party [sic] under the
Rule of Courts [sic].36

Our Ruling

The Court denies the Petition.

The finding that Leon did not sell the property to Lucimo Sr. had long been settled and had become final for failure of petitioners to
appeal. Thus, the property remained part of Leon’s estate.

One issue submitted for resolution by the parties to the trial court is whether Leon sold the property to Lucimo Sr.1âwphi1 The trial
court, examining the two deeds of sale executed in favor of Enriquez and Lucimo Sr., found them to be spurious. It then concluded that
no such sale from Leon to Lucimo Sr. ever took place. Despite this finding, petitioners did not appeal. Consequently, any doubts
regarding this matter should be considered settled. Thus, petitioners’ insistence on Lucimo Sr.’s 1943 purchase of the property to
reinforce their claim over the property must be ignored. Since no transfer from Leon to Lucimo Sr. took place, the subject property
clearly remained part of Leon’s estate upon his passing in 1962.

Leon died without issue; his heirs are his siblings Romana and Gregoria.

Since Leon died without issue, his heirs are his siblings, Romana and Gregoria, who thus inherited the property in equal shares. In turn,
Romana’s and Gregoria’s heirs – the parties herein – became entitled to the property upon the sisters’ passing. Under Article 777 of the
Civil Code, the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of death.

Gregoria’s and Romana’s heirs are co-owners of the subject property.

Thus, having succeeded to the property as heirs of Gregoria and Romana, petitioners and respondents became co-owners thereof. As
co-owners, they may use the property owned in common, provided they do so in accordance with the purpose for which it is intended
and in such a way as not to injure the interest of the co-ownership or prevent the other co-owners from using it according to their
rights.37 They have the full ownership of their parts and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and may alienate, assign or
mortgage them, and even substitute another person in their enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved.38 Each co-owner
may demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned.39 Finally, no prescription shall
run in favor of one of the co-heirs against the others so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.40

For prescription to set in, the repudiation must be done by a co-owner.

Time and again, it has been held that "a co-owner cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-owners, absent any clear
repudiation of the co-ownership. In order that the title may prescribe in favor of a co-owner, the following requisites must concur: (1) the
co-owner has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the other co-owners; (2) such positive acts of
repudiation have been made known to the other co-owners; and (3) the evidence thereof is clear and convincing."41

From the foregoing pronouncements, it is clear that the trial court erred in reckoning the prescriptive period within which Leonardo may
seek partition from the death of Leon in 1962. Article 1141 and Article 494 (fifth paragraph) provide that prescription shall begin to run in
favor of a co-owner and against the other co-owners only from the time he positively renounces the co-ownership and makes known his
repudiation to the other co-owners.

Lucimo Sr. challenged Leonardo’s co-ownership of the property only sometime in 1979 and 1980, when the former executed the
Affidavit of Ownership of Land, obtained a new tax declaration exclusively in his name, and informed the latter – before the Lupon
Tagapamayapa – of his 1943 purchase of the property. These apparent acts of repudiation were followed later on by Lucimo Sr.’s act of
withholding Leonardo’s share in the fruits of the property, beginning in 1988, as Leonardo himself claims in his Amended Complaint.
Considering these facts, the CA held that prescription began to run against Leonardo only in 1979 – or even in 1980 – when it has been
made sufficiently clear to him that Lucimo Sr. has renounced the co-ownership and has claimed sole ownership over the property. The
CA thus concluded that the filing of Civil Case No. 5275 in 1997, or just under 20 years counted from 1979, is clearly within the period
prescribed under Article 1141.

What escaped the trial and appellate courts’ notice, however, is that while it may be argued that Lucimo Sr. performed acts that may be
characterized as a repudiation of the co-ownership, the fact is, he is not a co-owner of the property. Indeed, he is not an heir of
Gregoria; he is merely Antipolo’s son-in-law, being married to Antipolo’s daughter Teodora.42 Under the Family Code, family relations,
which is the primary basis for succession, exclude relations by affinity.

Art. 150. Family relations include those:

(1) Between husband and wife;

(2) Between parents and children;

(3) Among other ascendants and descendants; and

(4) Among brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood.

In point of law, therefore, Lucimo Sr. is not a co-owner of the property; Teodora is. Consequently, he cannot validly effect a repudiation
of the co-ownership, which he was never part of. For this reason, prescription did not run adversely against Leonardo, and his right to
seek a partition of the property has not been lost.

Likewise, petitioners’ argument that Leonardo’s admission and acknowledgment in his pleadings – that Lucimo Sr. was in possession of
the property since 1943 – should be taken against him, is unavailing. In 1943, Leon remained the rightful owner of the land, and Lucimo
Sr. knew this very well, being married to Teodora, daughter of Antipolo, a nephew of Leon. More significantly, the property, which is
registered under the Torrens system and covered by OCT RO-630, is in Leon’s name. Leon’s ownership ceased only in 1962, upon his
death when the property passed on to his heirs by operation of law.

In fine, since none of the co-owners made a valid repudiation of the existing co-ownership, Leonardo could seek partition of the
property at any time.

TIGGANGAY VS. JUDGE WACAS

FACTS:

Johnwell Tiggangay ran for the mayoralty position of Tanudan, Kalinga in the May 14, 2007 election but lost to Rhustom L. Dagadag
Following Dagadag's proclamation, Tiggangay filed an electoral protest which was raffled to the sala of Judge Wacas. Judge Wacas
upheld Dagadag’s proclamation. Said decision was affirmed by the Comelec, promprting Tiggangay to file a verified letter complaint
charging Judge Wacas with Impropriety and Partiality, alleging that Tiggangay is Dagadag’s second cousin by affinity because the
former’s aunt is married to an uncle of Dagadag and that Judge Wacas did not inhibit himself from hearing the said electoral case in
violation of the New Code of Judicial Conduct and Rule 137 of the Revised Rules of Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the judge is administratively liable for not inhibing himself considering that he is related by affinity to one of the parties’
relatives.

RULING:

NO! The Court can grant arguendo that the aunt of Judge Wacas is married to the uncle of Dagadag. But such reality is not a ground
for the mandatory inhibition of a Judge as required under Sec. 118 of Rule 137, Revised Rules of Procedure, since there is actually no
relation of affinity between Judge Wacas and Dagadag.

Affinity denotes "the relation that one spouse has to the blood relatives of the other spouse."19 It is a relationship by marriage or a
familial relation resulting from marriage. It is a fictive kinship, a fiction created by law in connection with the institution of marriage and
family relations. Relationship by affinity refers to a relation by virtue of a legal bond such as marriage. Relatives by affinity, therefore,
are those commonly referred to as "in-laws," or stepfather, stepmother, stepchild and the like.

Affinity may also be defined as "the relation which one spouse because of marriage has to blood relatives of the other. The connection
existing, in consequence of marriage between each of the married persons and the kindred of the other. The doctrine of affinity grows
out of the canonical maxim that marriage makes husband and wife one. The husband has the same relation by affinity to his wife's
blood relatives as she has by consanguinity and vice versa."

Indeed, "there is no affinity between the blood relatives of one spouse and the blood relatives of the other. A husband is related by
affinity to his wife's brother, but not to the wife of his wife's brother. There is no affinity between the husband's brother and the wife's
sister; this is called affinitas affinitatis."

In the instant case, considering that Judge Wacas is related to his aunt by consanguinity in the third degree, it follows by virtue of the
marriage of his aunt to the uncle of Dagadag that Judge Wacas is the nephew-in-law of the uncle of Dagadag, i.e., a relationship by
affinity in the third degree. But Judge Wacas is not related by affinity to the blood relatives of the uncle of Dagadag as they are not his
in-laws and, thus, are not related in any way to Dagadag. In like manner, Dagadag is the nephew-in-law of the aunt of Judge Wacas but
is not related by affinity to the blood relatives of Judge Wacas' aunt, like Judge Wacas. In short, there is no relationship by affinity
between Judge Wacas and Dagadag as they are not in-laws of each other. Thus, Judge Wacas is not disqualified under Sec. 1 of Rule
137 to hear Election Case No. 40.
 HONTIVEROS VS. RTC ILOILO

FACTS:

On 03 December 1990, petitioners, spouses Augusto and Maria Hontiveros, filed a complaint for damages against Gregorio Hontiveros
and Teodora Ayson before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo. The spouses alleged that they are the owners of a parcel of land and also
alleged that they were deprived of income from the said lands consisting of rentals from tenants of the land and that Gregorio and
Ayson withheld possession of the land in bad faith.

Gregorio denied the allegations and invoked that he and Teodora were not married. On the contrary, they alleged that the possession of
the subject property had already been transferred to the spouses Hontiveros since 1985 by virtue of writ of possession. Moreover,
respondents assert petitioners were receiving rentals from the lands, hence, the complaint has no cause of action since it did not allege
that earnest efforts towards a compromise had been made, considering that Augusto and Gregorio are brothers.

On 16 May 1991 petitioners filed an Amended Complaint to insert the allegation that “earnest efforts towards a compromise have been
made between the parties but the same were unsuccessful”. Respondents answered the Amended Complaint and denied the same. On
19 July 1995, petitioners moved for a judgment of pleadings on the ground that respondents did not tender an issue.

On 23 November 1995, the Regional Trial Court denied the petitioner’s motion and at the same time dismissed the case on the ground
of unverified complaint pursuant to Article 151 of the Family Code and therefore, it did not believe that earnest efforts had been made to
arrive at a compromise. Petitioners moved for a reconsideration but was denied. Hence, this present case.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the RTC erred in dismissing the complaint on the ground that it does not allege under oath that earnest efforts toward
a compromise were made prior to the filing as required by Article 151 of the Family Code.
2. Whether or not Article 151 of the Family Code applies in this case.

RULING:

1. YES! The Court erred in dismissing the complaint on the ground that verified complaint of earnest efforts to a compromise only
because the trial court could not believe the veracity of the allegation. The Court emphasized that the absence of the verification
required in Article 151 does not affect the jurisdiction of the Court over the subject matter of the complaint. Such verification is merely a
formal requirement intended to secure assurance that matters which are alleged are true and correct. If the court doubted the veracity
of the allegations regarding efforts made to settle the case among members of the same family, it could simply have ordered petitioners
to verify them.

As this Court has already ruled, the court may simply order the correction of unverified pleadings or act on it and waive strict
compliance with the rules in order that the ends of justice may be served.17 Otherwise, mere suspicion or doubt on the part of the trial
court as to the truth of the allegation that earnest efforts had been made toward a compromise but the parties efforts proved
unsuccessful is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. Only if it is later shown that such efforts had not really been exerted would
the court be justified in dismissing the action.

Under Article 151 of the Family Code, “No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the
verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts towards a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed. If it is shown
that no such efforts were in fact made, the case must be dismissed.”

2. NO! Article 151 of the FC does not apply in this case since the suit is not exclusively among the family members. Under the subject
provision, the phrase “members of the same family” refers to the husband and wife; parents and children; ascendants and
descendants; and brothers and sisters.

Respondent Ayson and Petitioner Hontiveros (Maria) are considered strangers to the Hontiveros family for purposes of Art. 151,
therefore, they are not members of the family. In several jurisprudence, the Court already decided that “whenever a stranger is a party
in the case involving the family members, the requisit showing the earnest efforts to compromise is no longer mandatory”.

As early as two decades ago, we already ruled in Gayon v. Gayon that the enumeration of brothers and sisters as members of the
same family does not comprehend sisters-in-law. In that case, then Chief Justice Concepcion emphasized that sisters-in-law (hence,
also brothers-in-law) are not listed under Art. 217 of the New Civil Code as members of the same family. Since Art. 150 of the Family
Code repeats essentially the same enumeration of members of the family, we find no reason to alter existing jurisprudence on the
mater. Consequently, the court a quo erred in ruling that petitioner Guerrero, being a brother-in-law of private respondent Hernando,
was required to exert earnest efforts towards a compromise before filing the present suit.

SILVA VS. CA

FACTS:

Carlitos E. Silva, a married businessman, and Suzanne T. Gonzales, an unmarried local actress, cohabited without the benefit of
marriage. The union saw the birth of two children: Ramon Carlos and Rica Natalia. Not very long after, a rift in their relationship
surfaced. It began, according to Silva, when Gonzales decided to resume her acting career over his vigorous objections. The assertion
was quickly refuted by Gonzales who claimed that she, in fact, had never stopped working throughout their relationship. At any rate, the
two eventually parted ways. Gonzales refused to allow Silva, in apparent contravention of a previous understanding, to have the
children in his company on weekends. Silva filed a petition for custodial rights over the children before the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 78, of Quezon City. The petition was opposed by Gonzales who averred that Silva often engaged in "gambling and womanizing"
which she feared could affect the moral and social values of the children.

The Trial Court judgment is rendered directing respondent to allow herein petitioner visitorial rights to his children during Saturdays
and/or Sundays, but in no case should he take out the children without the written consent of the mother or respondent herein. No
pronouncement as to costs. Silva appeared somehow satisfied with the judgment for only Gonzales interposed an appeal from the
RTCs order to the Court of Appeals. In the meantime, Gonzales got married to a Dutch national. The newly weds emigrated to Holland
with Ramon Carlos and Rica Natalia.

On 23 September 1993, the appellate tribunal ruled in favor of Gonzales. The RTC decision had been reversed and Petitioner-
appellee's petition for visitorial rights is denied as the children concerned are still in their early formative years of life. The molding of the
character of the child starts at home. A home with only one parent is more normal than two separate houses.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the father is entitled to visitorial rights to his children. (The right to access of a non-custodial parent to his child)

RULING:

YES! The biological father has visitorial right over his illegitimate children in view of the constitutionally protected inherent and natural
right of parents over their children). This right is personal to the father; no other person, like grandparents, can exercise this right for
him.

Article 150 of the Family Code expresses that "(f)amily relations include those between parents and children; Article 209, in relation to
Article 220, of the Code states that it is the natural right and duty of parents and those exercising parental authority to, among other
things, keep children in their company and to give them love and affection, advice and counsel, companionship and understanding. The
Constitution itself speaks in terms of the "natural and primary rights of parents in the rearing of the youth. There is nothing conclusive to
indicate that these provisions are meant to solely address themselves to legitimate relationships.

Indeed, although in varying degrees, the laws on support and successional rights, by way of examples, clearly go beyond the legitimate
members of the family and so explicitly encompass illegitimate relationships as well. Then, too, and most importantly, in the declaration
of nullity of marriages, a situation that presupposes a void or inexistent marriage, Article 49 of the Family Code provides for appropriate
visitation rights to parents who are not given custody of their children.

The allegations of respondent against the character of petitioner, even assuming as true, cannot be taken as sufficient basis to render
petitioner an unfit father. The fears expressed by respondent to the effect that petitioner shall be able to corrupt and degrade their
children once allowed to even temporarily associate with petitioner is but the product of respondent's unfounded imagination, for no
man, bereft of all moral persuasions and goodness, would ever take the trouble and expense in instituting a legal action for the purpose
of seeing his illegitimate children. It can just be imagined the deep sorrows of a father who is deprived of his children of tender ages.

Although the Supreme Court’s granted Silva (the father) the visitation rights, but this favorable decision did not prevent Suzanne (the
mother), in the exercise of her parental authority, from immigrating to Holland with her two children.

SALAZAR VS. ELIAS

FACTS:

On February 28, 1990, Remedios Felias, representing the heirs of Nivera filed a Complaint for Recovery of Ownership, Possession and
Damages against the Spouses Romualdo and Felisa Lastimosa. over four parcels of land located in Agno, Pangasinan. On March 3,
1997, during the trial of the case, Spouse Romualdo died. On July 6, 1998, a Motion for Substitution was filed by Felisa, and their
children(Heirs of Lastimosa).

On March 16, 2004, the RTC declared the Heirs of Nivera as the absolute owners of the parcels of land in question, and thereby
ordering the Heirs of Lastimosa to vacate the lands and to surrender possession thereof. The Heirs of Lastimosa did not file an appeal
against the trial court's ruling. Meanwhile, Felicitas Salazar (Felicitas), daughter of Romualdo, along with Recto and Rizalina filed a
Petition for Annulment of Judgment dated June 22, 2006 with the CA which was dismissed. On June 3, 2009, this SC affirmed the CA
decision.

Meanwhile, the Heirs of Lastimosa filed with the RTC an Urgent Motion to Order the Sheriff to Desist from Making Demolition on the
fact that the Sheriff cannot execute the court's decision considering that Felicitas had an aliquot share over the property. On July 9,
2010, the RTC granted the Motion for Execution and Demolition, and denying the Motion to Desist.

The Heirs of Lastimosa filed an appeal before the CA, questioning the Writ of Execution and Demolition, which was dismissed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the family home is exempt from execution under Art. 155 of the Family Code.

RULING:
NO! Felicita claims that the execution cannot proceed, as the subject property is her family home and is therefore exempt from
execution.

Indeed, the family home is a real right which is gratuitous, inalienable and free from attachment, constituted over the dwelling place and
the land on which it is situated. It confers upon a particular family the right to enjoy such properties. It cannot be seized by creditors
except in certain special cases.35

However, the claim that the property is exempt from execution for being the movant's family home is not a magic wand that will freeze
the court's hand and forestall the execution of a final and executory ruling. It must be noted that it is not sufficient for the claimant to
merely allege that such property is a family home. Whether the claim is premised under the Old Civil Code or the Family Code, the
claim for exemption must be set up and proved.

No doubt, a family home is generally exempt from execution provided it was duly constituted as such. There must be proof that the
alleged family home was constituted jointly by the husband and wife or by an unmarried head of a family. It must be the house where
they and their family actually reside and the lot on which it is situated. The family home must be part of the properties of the absolute
community or the conjugal partnership, or of the exclusive properties of either spouse with the latter's consent, or on the property of the
unmarried head of the family. The actual value of the family home shall not exceed, at the time of its constitution, the amount of
₱300,000 in urban areas and ₱200,000 in rural areas.

In addition, residence in the family home must be actual. The law explicitly mandates that the occupancy of the family home, either by
the owner thereof, or by any of its beneficiaries must be actual. This occupancy must be real, or actually existing, as opposed to
something merely possible, or that which is merely presumptive or constructive.

Guided by the foregoing jurisprudential tenets, it becomes all too apparent that Felicitas cannot conveniently claim that the subject
property is her family home, sans sufficient evidence proving her allegation. It bears emphasis that it is imperative that her claim must
be backed with evidence showing that the home was indeed (i) duly constituted as a family home, (ii) constituted jointly by the husband
and wife or by an unmarried head of a family, (iii) resided in by the family (or any of the family home's beneficiaries), (iv) forms part of
the properties of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership, or of the exclusive properties of either spouse with the latter's
consent, or property of the unmarried head of the family, and (v) has an actual value of P300,000 in urban areas, and O200,000 in rural
areas.

A perusal of the petition, however, shows that aside from her bare allegation, Felicitas adduced no proof to substantiate her claim that
the property sought to be executed is indeed her family home.Interestingly, Felicitas admitted in her Motion for Reconsideration dated
December 23, 2013, and her Petition for Annulment of Judgment dated June 22, 2006, that she is, and has always been a resident of
Muñoz, Nueva Ecija. Similarly, the address indicated in Felicitas' petition for review on certiorari is Muñoz, Nueva Ecija.

Equally important, the Court takes judicial notice of the final ruling of the RTC Branch 55 in the case for recovery of ownership that the
subject property has belonged to the Heirs of Nivera since the l950s. This automatically negates Felicitas' claim that the property is her
family home. Undoubtedly, Felicitas' argument that the property subject of the writ of execution is a family home, is an unsubstantiated
allegation that cannot defeat the binding nature of a final and executory judgment.

EULOGIO VS. BELL, SR.

FACTS:

Paterno William Bell, Jr., Florence Felicia Victoria Bell, Paterno Ferdinand Bell III, and Paterno Benerano IV (the Bell siblings) are the
unmarried children of Spouses Paterno and Rogelia Bell. In 1995, the Bell sibling filed a complaint against the Eulogios at the RTC-
Batangas City for the annulment of the contract of sale executed by Spouses Bell over their 329-square-meter residential house and lot,
as well the as the cancellation of the title obtained by the Eulogios by virtue of the Deed. The RTC granted respondents’ prayers, but
declared Spouses Bell liable to petitioners in the amount of 1 million plus 12% interest per annum.

Accordingly, (1) the Register of Deeds of Batangas City is hereby ordered to cancel Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-131472 in the
name of defendants Enrico S. Eulogio and Natividad Eulogio and to re-constitute (sic) Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-680-(5997) as
"family home" of the plaintiffs Florence Felicia Victoria C. Bell, Paterno William C. Bell Jr., Paterno Ferdinand C. Bell III, Paterno
Benerano C. Bell IV and fourth party plaintiffs Paterno C. Bell Sr. and Rogelia Calingasan Bell; or in the alternative to issue a new
Transfer Certificate of Title under the same tenor;

2. The City Assessor of Batangas City is hereby directed to issue a tax declaration covering the said subject property as family home for
the said plaintiffs and fourth party plaintiffs Paterno C. Bell and Rogelia Calingasan Bell; and

3. Defendants Enrico Eulogio and Natividad Eulogio are ordered to pay the plaintiffs attorney’s fees and litigation expenses of
35,000.00 as the plaintiffs have been compelled to litigate to protect their property right, and costs,3

Both petitioners and respondent appealed to the CA, but the trial court’s Decision was affirmed en too. Spouses Bell later brought the
case to this Court to question their liability to petitioners in the amount of 1 million plus interest. The Court, however, dismissed their
Petition for failure to show any reversible error committed by the CA.4 Thereafter, entry of judgment was made.5
On 9 June 2004 the RTC issued a Writ of Execution as a result of which respondents’ property covered by the newly reconstituted
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 54208 [formerly RT-680 (5997)] was levied on execution. Upon motion by respondents, trial court,
on 31 August 2004, ordered the lifting of the writ of the execution on the ground that the property was a family home.6

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the lifting of the writ of execution. Invoking Article 160 of the Family Code, they posited
that the current market value of the property exceeded the statutory limit of 300,000 considering that it was located in a commercial
area, and that Spouses Bell had even sold it to them for 1million.7

The RTC, on 13 October 2004, set the case for hearing to determine the present value of the family hoe of respondents. It also
appointed a Board of Appraisers to conduct a study on the prevailing market value of their house and lot.8

Respondents sought reconsideration of the above directives and asked the RTC to cite petitioners for contempt because of forum-
shopping.9 they argued that petitioners’ bid to determine the present value of the subject property was just a ploy to re-litigate an issue
that had long been settled with finality.

The RTC, however, denied the Motion for Reconsideration10 of respondents and directed the commissioners to canvass prospective
buyers of their house and lot.11

On 23 November 2004, respondents filed a Petition for Certiorari and Injunction before the CA.12 where it was docketed as CA-G.R.
SP. No. 87531.

Subsequently, the RTC issued on 25 November 2004 an Order13 dispensing with the valuation report of the commissioners and
directing the issuance of a writ of execution. Consequently, respondents filed before the CA a Supplemental Petition with an urgent
prayer for a temporary restraining order.14

The CA eventually enjoined.15 the execution sale set on 22 December 200416 by the RTC.

On 31 July 2008, the CA rendered it Decision granting respondent’s Petition for Certiorari, but it rejected their theory that res judicata
had already set in.

The appellate court ruled that the RTC Decision, which had become final and executory, only declared respondents’ house and lot as a
family home. Since the issue of whether it may be sold in execution was incidental to the execution of the aforesaid Decision, there was
as yet no res judicata.

Still, the CA found that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the execution sale of the subject family home after
finding its present value exceeded the statutory limit. The basis for the valuation of a family home under Article 160, according to the
appellate court, is its actual value at the time of its constitution and not the market/present value; therefore, the trial court’s order was
contrary to law.17

On 09 February 2009,18 the CA denied petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration. Hence, this Petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Bell’s family home may be sold on execution under Article 160 of the Family Code.

RULING:

NO! Bell’s family home cannot be sold on execution under Article 160 of Family Code. Unquestionably, the family home is exempt from
execution as expressly provided for in Article 153 of the Family Code.

It has been said that the family home is a real right that is gratuitous, inalienable and free from attachment. The great controlling
purpose and policy of the Constitution is the protection or the preservation of the homestead - the dwelling place. A houseless,
homeless population is a burden upon the energy, industry, and morals of the community to which it belongs. No greater calamity, not
tainted with crime, can befall a family than to be expelled from the roof under which it has been gathered and sheltered. The family
home cannot be seized by creditors except in special cases.

The nature and character of the property that debtors may claim to be exempt, however, are determined by the exemption statute. The
exemption is limited to the particular kind of property of the specific articles prescribed by the statute; the exemption cannot exceed the
statutory limit.

Articles 155 and 160 of the Family Code specify the exceptions mentioned in Article 153, to wit:

ARTICLE 155. the family home shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except;

1. For nonpayment of taxes;

2. For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home;

3. For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such constitution; and
4. For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, materialmen and others who have rendered service or furnished material
for the construction of the building.

ARTICLE 160. when a creditor whose claims is not among those mentioned in Article 155 obtains a judgment in his favor, and he has
reasonable grounds to believe that the family home is actually worth more than the maximum amount fixed in Article 157, he may apply
to the court which rendered the judgment for an order directing the sale of the property under execution. The court shall so order if it
finds that the actual value of the family home exceeds the maximum amount allowed by law as of the time of its constitution. If the
increased actual value exceeds the maximum allowed in Article 157 and results from subsequent voluntary improvements introduced by
the person or persons constituting the family home, by the owners of the property, or by any of the beneficiaries, the same rule and
procedure shall apply.

At the execution sale, no bid below the value allowed for a family home shall be considered. The proceeds shall be applied first to the
amount mentioned in Article 157, and then to the liabilities under the judgment and the costs. The excess, is any, shall be delivered to
the judgment debtor.

Related to the foregoing is Article 157 of the Family Code, which provides:

ARTICLE 157. the actual value of the family home shall not exceed, at the same time of its constitution, the amount of three hundred
thousand pesos in urban areas, and two hundred thousand pesos in rural areas, or such amounts as may hereafter be fixed by law.

In any event, if the value of the currency changes after the adoption of this Code, the value most favorable for the constitutions of a
family home shall be the basis of evaluation.

For purposes of the Article, urban areas are deemed to include chartered cities and municipalities whose annual income at least equals
that legally required for chartered cities. All others are deemed to be rural area. [underscoring supplied]

The minutes of the deliberation by the drafters of Family Code on Article 160 are enlightening, to wit:

Justice Puno inquired if the above Article [160] is still necessary. In reply, Judge Diy opined that the above Article is intended to cover a
situation where the family home is already worth 500,000 or IM.

Justice Reyes stated that it is possible that a family home, originally valued at 300,000, later appreciated to almost IM because of
improvements made, like roads and plazas. Justice Caguioa, however, made a distinction between voluntary and involuntary
improvements in the sense that if the value of the family home exceeded the maximum amount because of voluntary improvements by
the one establishing the family home, the Article will apply; but if it is through an involuntary improvement, like conversion into a
residential area or the establishment of roads and other facilities, the one establishing the family home should not be punished by
making his home liable to creditors. He suggested that the matter be clarified in the provision.

Prof. Bautista objected to the phrase "is worth" since if they will specify that the family home is worth more than the maximum amount
at the time it was constituted, they will avoid the suit because the creditor will be given proper warning. Justice Puno opined that this is
a question of fact. Justice Caguioa added that, under the second sentence, there will be a preliminary determination as to whether the
family home exceeds the maximum amount allowed by the law.

Justice Caguia accordingly modified the last sentence as follows:

If the excess in actual value over that allowed in Article 157 is due to subsequent voluntary improvements by the person or persons
constituting the family home or by the owner or owners of the property, the same rules and procedure shall apply.

Prof. Bautista objected to the above provision, because it will in effect penalize the owner for improving the family home. On the other
hand, Justice Puno opined that the provision covers only the excess in actual value over that allowed by law. Judge Diy added that the
owner may improve the family home up to 300,000. Justice Caguioa stated that without the above provision, one can borrow money,
put it all on improvement of the family home even beyond the maximum value of a family home and, thereby, exempt it from levy on the
part of the creditor. He added that anyway, if one voluntarily improves his family home out of his money, nobody can complain because
there are no creditors.

Justice Puno posed the question: what is "due to the subsequent improvement?" is it the "excess" or is it the "increase", or is it the
"increase", which constitutes the "excess"? in reply, Justice Reyes opined that it is the "increase" which constituted the "excess".
Justice Puno, Justice Reyes and Justice Caguioa modified the last sentence as follows:

If the increase in actual value exceeds that maximum allowed in Article 157 and results from subsequent voluntary improvements
introduced by the person or persons constituting the family home or by the owner or owners of the property, the same rule and
procedure shall apply.

Prof. Bautista commented that the phrase "increase in actual value" does not include the original value. Justice Puno suggested that
they just say "increased actual value", which the Committee approved.44

To summarize, the exemption of the family home from execution, forced sale or attachment is limited to 300,000 in urban areas and
200,000 in rural areas, unless those maximum values are adjusted by law. If it is shown, though, that those amounts do not match the
present value of the peso because of currency fluctuations, the amount of exemption shall be based on the value that is most favorable
to the constitution of a family home. Any amount in excess of those limits can be applied to the payment of any of the obligations
specified in Articles 155 and 160.

Any subsequent improvement or enlargement of the family home by the persons constituting it, its owners, or any of its beneficiaries will
still be exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment provided the following conditions obtain: (a) the actual value of the property at
the time of its constitution has been determined to fall below the statutory limit; and (b) the improvement or enlargement does not result
in an increase in its value exceeding the statutory limit.45 Otherwise, the family home can be the subject of a forced sale, and any
amount above the statutory limit is applicable to the obligations under Articles 155 and 160.

Certainly, the humane considerations for which the law surrounds the family home with immunities from levy do not include the intent to
enable debtors to thwart the just claims of their creditors.46

Petitioners maintain that this case falls under the exceptions to the exemption of the family home from execution or forced sale. They
claim that the actual value of respondents’ family home exceeds the 300,000 limit in urban areas. This fact is supposedly shown by the
Deed of Sale whereby private respondents agreed to sell the property for 1 million way back in 1995. Therefore, the RTC only properly
ordered the execution sale of the property under Article 160 to satisfy the money judgment awarded to them in Civil Case No. 4581.47

As earlier discussed, it has been judicially determined with finality that the property in dispute is a family home, and that its value at the
time of its constitution was within the statutory limit. Moreover, respondents have timely claimed the exemption of the property from
execution.48 On the other hand, there is no question that the money judgment awarded to petitioners falls under the ambit of Article
160.

Notwithstanding petitioners’ right to enforce the trial court’s money judgment, however, they cannot obtain its satisfaction at the expense
of respondents’ rights over their family home. It is axiomatic that those asserting the protection of an exception from an exemption must
bring themselves clearly within the terms of the exception and satisfy any statutory requirement for its enforcement.49

To warrant the execution sale of respondents’ family home under Article 160, petitioners needed to establish these facts: (1) there was
an increase in its actual value; (2) the increase resulted from voluntary improvements on the property introduced by the persons
constituting the family home, its owners or any of its beneficiaries; and (3) the increased actual value exceeded the maximum allowed
under Article 157.

DE MESA VS. ACERO

DOCTRINE:

Rules on constitution of family homes, for purposes of exemption from execution:

First, family residences constructed before theeffectivity of the Family Code or before August 3, 1988 must be constituted as a family
home either judicially or extrajudicially in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code in order to be exempt from execution;

Second, family residences constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 are automatically deemed to be family
homes and thus exempt from execution from the time it was constituted and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides
therein;

Third, family residences which were not judicially orextrajudicially constituted as a family home prior to the effectivity of the Family
Code, but were existing thereafter, are considered as family homes by operation of law and are prospectively entitled to the benefits
accorded to a family home under the Family Code.

The settled rule is that the right to exemption or forced sale under Article 153 of the Family Code is a personal privilege granted to the
judgment debtor and as such, it must be claimed not by the sheriff, but by the debtor himself before the sale of the property at public
auction. It is not sufficient that the person claiming exemption merely alleges that such property is a family home. This claim for
exemption must be set up and proved to the Sheriff.

FACTS:

Araceli De Mesa is married to Ernesto De Mesa.They purcahsed a parcel of land located in Meycauayan, Bulacan. A house was
contracted in the said property, which became their family home. A year after, Arceli contracted a loan in the amount of P100,000 from
Claudio Acero, which was secured by a mortgage on the said parcel of land and house. Araceli issued a check for the payment of the
loan. When Acero presented the check to the bank it was dishonored because the checking account was already closed. Acero
demanded payment. However, Spouses De Mesa still failed to pay. Acero filed a complaint for violation of B.P. 22 in the RTC. The RTC
acquitted the Spouses but ordered them to pay Acero P100,000 plus legal interest. A writ of execution was issued to levy on the said
property.

The house and lot was sold in the public auction and Acero was the highest bidder. Acero leased the property to Juanito Oliva, who
defaulted payment for several years. Oliva contends that the Acero spouses are not the owners of the property.

The MTC rendered a Decision, giving due course to Spouses Acero’s complaint and ordering the Spouses De Mesa and Oliva to
vacate the subject property. Spouses De Mesa contend that they are the rightful owners of the property. The MTC also stated that from
the time a Torrens title over the subject property was issued in Claudio’s name up to the time the complaint for ejectment was filed, the
petitioners never assailed the validity of the levy made by the Sheriff, the regularity of the public sale that was conducted thereafter and
the legitimacy of Acero’s Torrens title that was resultantly issued.

Spouses De Mesa filed an action to nullify the TCT issued to Acero. Spouses De Mesa contend that the subject property is a family
home, which is exempt from execution under the Family Code and, thus, could not have been validly levied upon for purposes of
satisfying the writ of execution. RTC dismissed the complaint. CA affirmed RTC’s decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the subject property, as a family home, may be subject to execution in this case.

RULING:

YES! The subject property is family home but is subject to execution. In general, the family home is exempt from execution. However,
the person claiming this privilege must assert it at the time it was levied or within a reasonable time thereafter.

For the family home to be exempt from execution, distinction must be made as to what law applies based on when it was constituted
and what requirements must be complied with by the judgment debtor or his successors claiming such privilege.

The foregoing rules on constitution of family homes, for purposes of exemption from execution, could be summarized as follows:

First, family residences constructed before the effectivity of the Family Code or before August 3, 1988 must be constituted as a family
home either judicially or extrajudicially in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code in order to be exempt from execution;

Second, family residences constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 are automatically deemed to be family
homes and thus exempt from execution from the time it was constituted and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides
therein;

Third, family residences which were not judicially or extrajudicially constituted as a family home prior to the effectivity of the Family
Code, but were existing thereafter, are considered as family homes by operation of law and are prospectively entitled to the benefits
accorded to a family home under the Family Code.

Here, the subject property became a family residence sometime in January 1987 when Spouses De Mesa got married. There was no
showing, however, that the same was judicially or extrajudicially constituted as a family home in accordance with the provisions of the
Civil Code. Still, when the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988, the subject property became a family home by operation of law
and was thus prospectively exempt from execution. The petitioners were thus correct in asserting that the subject property was a family
home.

Despite the fact that the subject property is a family home and, thus, should have been exempt from execution, Spouses De Mesa
should have asserted the subject property being a family home and its being exempted from execution at the time it was levied or within
a reasonable time thereafter. They are stopped from claiming the exemption of the property from execution.

ARRIOLA VS. ARRIOLA

FACTS:

John Nabor C. Arriola (respondent) filed Special Civil Action No. 03-0010 with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 254, Las Piñas City
(RTC) against Vilma G. Arriola and Anthony Ronald G. Arriola (petitioners) for judicial partition of the properties of decedent Fidel Arriola
(the decedent Fidel). Respondent is the son of decedent Fidel with his first wife Victoria C. Calabia, while petitioner Anthony is the son
of decedent Fidel with his second wife, petitioner Vilma.

On February 16, 2004, the RTC rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Ordering the partition of the parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 383714 (84191) left by the decedent Fidel S.
Arriola by and among his heirs John Nabor C. Arriola, Vilma G. Arriola and Anthony Ronald G. Arriola in equal shares of one-third (1/3)
each without prejudice to the rights of creditors or mortgagees thereon, if any;

2. Attorney's fees in the amount of TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS is hereby awarded to be reimbursed by the defendants to
the plaintiff;

3. Costs against the defendants.

SO ORDERED.3

The decision became final on March 15, 2004.4

As the parties failed to agree on how to partition among them the land covered by TCT No. 383714 (subject land), respondent sought
its sale through public auction, and petitioners acceded to it.5 Accordingly, the RTC ordered the public auction of the subject land.6 The
public auction sale was scheduled on May 31, 2003 but it had to be reset when petitioners refused to include in the auction the house
(subject house) standing on the subject land.7 This prompted respondent to file with the RTC an Urgent Manifestation and Motion for
Contempt of Court,8 praying that petitioners be declared in contempt.

The RTC denied the motion in an Order9 dated August 30, 2005, for the reason that petitioners were justified in refusing to have the
subject house included in the auction, thus:

The defendants [petitioners] are correct in holding that the house or improvement erected on the property should not be included in the
auction sale.

A cursory reading of the aforementioned Decision and of the evidence adduced during the ex-parte hearing clearly show that nothing
was mentioned about the house existing on the land subject matter of the case. In fact, even plaintiff's [respondent's] initiatory
Complaint likewise did not mention anything about the house. Undoubtedly therefore, the Court did not include the house in its
adjudication of the subject land because it was plaintiff himself who failed to allege the same. It is a well-settled rule that the court can
not give a relief to that which is not alleged and prayed for in the complaint.

To hold, as plaintiff argued, that the house is considered accessory to the land on which it is built is in effect to add to plaintiff's [a] right
which has never been considered or passed upon during the trial on the merits.

In the absence of any other declaration, obvious or otherwise, only the land should be partitioned in accordance to[sic] the
aforementioned Decision as the house can not be said to have been necessarily adjudicated therein. Thus, plaintiff can not be declared
as a co-owner of the same house without evidence thereof and due hearing thereon.

The Decision of the Court having attained its finality, as correctly pointed out, judgment must stand even at the risk that it might be
erroneous.

WHEREFORE, the Urgent Manifestation and Motion for Contempt of Court filed by plaintiff is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.10

The RTC, in its Order dated January 3, 2006, denied respondent's Motion for Reconsideration.11

Respondent filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari12 where he sought to have the RTC Orders set aside, and prayed that he be
allowed to proceed with the auction of the subject land including the subject house.

In its November 30, 2006 Decision, the CA granted the Petition for Certiorari, to wit:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed orders dated August 30, 2005 and January 3, 2006 issued by the RTC, in Civil
Case No. SCA 03-0010, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the sheriff is ordered to proceed with the public auction sale of the
subject lot covered by TCT No. 383714, including the house constructed thereon.

SO ORDERED.13 (Emphasis supplied.)

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but the CA denied the same in its Resolution14 of April 30, 2007.

Hence, the present petition on the sole ground that the CA erred in holding that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in
denying the motion for contempt of court.

The assailed CA Decision and Resolution must be modified for reasons other than those advanced by petitioners.

The contempt proceeding initiated by respondent was one for indirect contempt. Section 4, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court prescribes the
procedure for the institution of proceedings for indirect contempt, viz:

Sec. 4. How proceedings commenced. – Proceedings for indirect contempt may be initiated motu proprio by the court against which the
contempt was committed by an order or any other formal charge requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not be
punished for contempt.

In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a verified petition with supporting particulars and certified true
copies of documents or papers involved therein, and upon full compliance with the requirements for filing initiatory pleadings for civil
actions in the court concerned. If the contempt charges arose out of or are related to a principal action pending in the court, the petition
for contempt shall allege that fact but said petition shall be docketed, heard and decided separately, unless the court in its discretion
orders the consolidation of the contempt charge and the principal action for joint hearing and decision. (Emphases supplied.)

Under the aforecited second paragraph of the Rules, the requirements for initiating an indirect contempt proceeding are a) that it be
initiated by way of a verified petition and b) that it should fully comply with the requirements for filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions.
In Regalado v. Go,15 we held:
As explained by Justice Florenz Regalado, the filing of a verified petition that has complied with the requirements for the filing of
initiatory pleading, is mandatory x x x:

This new provision clarifies with a regularity norm the proper procedure for commencing contempt proceedings. While such proceeding
has been classified as special civil action under the former Rules, the heterogenous practice tolerated by the courts, has been for any
party to file a motion without paying any docket or lawful fees therefore and without complying with the requirements for initiatory
pleadings, which is now required in the second paragraph of this amended section.

xxxx

Henceforth, except for indirect contempt proceedings initiated motu propio by order of or a formal charge by the offended court, all
charges shall be commenced by a verified petition with full compliance with the requirements therefore and shall be disposed in
accordance with the second paragraph of this section.

xxxx

Even if the contempt proceedings stemmed from the main case over which the court already acquired jurisdiction, the rules direct that
the petition for contempt be treated independently of the principal action. Consequently, the necessary prerequisites for the filing of
initiatory pleadings, such as the filing of a verified petition, attachment of a certification on non-forum shopping, and the payment of the
necessary docket fees, must be faithfully observed.

xxxx

The provisions of the Rules are worded in very clear and categorical language. In case where the indirect contempt charge is not
initiated by the courts, the filing of a verified petition which fulfills the requirements on initiatory pleadings is a prerequisite. Beyond
question now is the mandatory requirement of a verified petition in initiating an indirect contempt proceeding. Truly, prior to the
amendment of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, mere motion without complying with the requirements for initiatory pleadings was
tolerated by the courts. At the onset of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, however, such practice can no longer be
countenanced.16 (Emphasis ours.)

The RTC erred in taking jurisdiction over the indirect contempt proceeding initiated by respondent. The latter did not comply with any of
the mandatory requirements of Section 4, Rule 71. He filed a mere Urgent Manifestation and Motion for Contempt of Court, and not a
verified petition. He likewise did not conform with the requirements for the filing of initiatory pleadings such as the submission of a
certification against forum shopping and the payment of docket fees. Thus, his unverified motion should have been dismissed outright
by the RTC.

It is noted though that, while at first the RTC overlooked the infirmities in respondent's unverified motion for contempt, in the end, it
dismissed the motion, albeit on substantive grounds. The trouble is that, in the CA decision assailed herein, the appellate court
committed the same oversight by delving into the merits of respondent's unverified motion and granting the relief sought therein. Thus,
strictly speaking, the proper disposition of the present petition ought to be the reversal of the CA decision and the dismissal of
respondent's unverified motion for contempt filed in the RTC for being in contravention of Section 4, Rule 71.

However, such simplistic disposition will not put an end to the dispute between the parties. A seed of litigation has already been sown
that will likely sprout into another case between them at a later time. We refer to the question of whether the subject house should be
included in the public auction of the subject land. Until this question is finally resolved, there will be no end to litigation between the
parties. We must therefore deal with it squarely, here and now.

The RTC and the CA differed in their views on whether the public auction should include the subject house. The RTC excluded the
subject house because respondent never alleged its existence in his complaint for partition or established his co-ownership thereof.17
On the other hand, citing Articles 440,18 44519 and 44620 of the Civil Code, the CA held that as the deceased owned the subject land,
he also owned the subject house which is a mere accessory to the land. Both properties form part of the estate of the deceased and
are held in co-ownership by his heirs, the parties herein. Hence, the CA concludes that any decision in the action for partition of said
estate should cover not just the subject land but also the subject house.21 The CA further pointed out that petitioners themselves
implicitly recognized the inclusion of the subject house in the partition of the subject land when they proposed in their letter of August 5,
2004, the following swapping-arrangement:

Sir:

Thank you very much for accommodating us even if we are only poor and simple people. We are very much pleased with the decision
of Presiding Judge Manuel B. Fernandez, Jr., RTC Br. 254, Las Piñas, on the sharing of one-third (1/3) each of a land covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 383714 (84191) in Las Piñas City.

However, to preserve the sanctity of our house which is our residence for more than twenty (20) years, we wish to request that the 1/3
share of John Nabor C. Arriola be paid by the defendants depending on the choice of the plaintiff between item (1) or item (2), detailed
as follows:

(1) Swap with a 500-square meters [sic] lot located at Baras Rizal x x x.

(2) Cash of P205,700.00 x x x.

x x x x.22

We agree that the subject house is covered by the judgment of partition for reasons postulated by the CA. We qualify, however, that this
ruling does not necessarily countenance the immediate and actual partition of the subject house by way of public auction in view of the
suspensive proscription imposed under Article 159 of The Family Code which will be discussed forthwith.

It is true that the existence of the subject house was not specifically alleged in the complaint for partition. Such omission
notwithstanding, the subject house is deemed part of the judgment of partition for two compelling reasons.

First, as correctly held by the CA, under the provisions of the Civil Code, the subject house is deemed part of the subject land. The
Court quotes with approval the ruling of the CA, to wit:

The RTC, in the assailed Order dated August 30, 2005 ratiocinated that since the house constructed on the subject lot was not alleged
in the complaint and its ownership was not passed upon during the trial on the merits, the court cannot include the house in its
adjudication of the subject lot. The court further stated that it cannot give a relief to[sic] which is not alleged and prayed for in the
complaint.

We are not persuaded.

To follow the foregoing reasoning of the RTC will in effect render meaningless the pertinent rule on accession. In general, the right to
accession is automatic (ipso jure), requiring no prior act on the part of the owner or the principal. So that even if the improvements
including the house were not alleged in the complaint for partition, they are deemed included in the lot on which they stand, following
the principle of accession. Consequently, the lot subject of judicial partition in this case includes the house which is permanently
attached thereto, otherwise, it would be absurd to divide the principal, i.e., the lot, without dividing the house which is permanently
attached thereto.23 (Emphasis supplied)

Second, respondent has repeatedly claimed that the subject house was built by the deceased.24 Petitioners never controverted such
claim. There is then no dispute that the subject house is part of the estate of the deceased; as such, it is owned in common by the
latter's heirs, the parties herein,25 any one of whom, under Article 49426 of the Civil Code, may, at any time, demand the partition of
the subject house.27 Therefore, respondent's recourse to the partition of the subject house cannot be hindered, least of all by the mere
technical omission of said common property from the complaint for partition.

That said notwithstanding, we must emphasize that, while we treat the subject house as part of the co-ownership of the parties, we stop
short of authorizing its actual partition by public auction at this time. It bears emphasis that an action for partition involves two phases:
first, the declaration of the existence of a state of co-ownership; and second, the actual termination of that state of co-ownership
through the segregation of the common property.28 What is settled thus far is only the fact that the subject house is under the co-
ownership of the parties, and therefore susceptible of partition among them.

Whether the subject house should be sold at public auction as ordered by the RTC is an entirely different matter, depending on the
exact nature of the subject house.

Respondent claims that the subject house was built by decedent Fidel on his exclusive property.29 Petitioners add that said house has
been their residence for 20 years.30 Taken together, these averments on record establish that the subject house is a family home within
the contemplation of the provisions of The Family Code, particularly:

Article 152. The family home, constituted jointly by the husband and the wife or by an unmarried head of a family, is the dwelling house
where they and their family reside, and the land on which it is situated.

Article 153. The family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence. From the time
of its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein, the family home continues to be such and is exempt
from execution, forced sale or attachment except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value allowed by law. (Emphasis
supplied.)

One significant innovation introduced by The Family Code is the automatic constitution of the family home from the time of its
occupation as a family residence, without need anymore for the judicial or extrajudicial processes provided under the defunct Articles
224 to 251 of the Civil Code and Rule 106 of the Rules of Court. Furthermore, Articles 152 and 153 specifically extend the scope of the
family home not just to the dwelling structure in which the family resides but also to the lot on which it stands. Thus, applying these
concepts, the subject house as well as the specific portion of the subject land on which it stands are deemed constituted as a family
home by the deceased and petitioner Vilma from the moment they began occupying the same as a family residence 20 years back.31

It being settled that the subject house (and the subject lot on which it stands) is the family home of the deceased and his heirs, the
same is shielded from immediate partition under Article 159 of The Family Code, viz:

Article 159. The family home shall continue despite the death of one or both spouses or of the unmarried head of the family for a period
of ten years or for as long as there is a minor beneficiary, and the heirs cannot partition the same unless the court finds compelling
reasons therefor. This rule shall apply regardless of whoever owns the property or constituted the family home. (Emphasis supplied.)
The purpose of Article 159 is to avert the disintegration of the family unit following the death of its head. To this end, it preserves the
family home as the physical symbol of family love, security and unity by imposing the following restrictions on its partition: first, that the
heirs cannot extra-judicially partition it for a period of 10 years from the death of one or both spouses or of the unmarried head of the
family, or for a longer period, if there is still a minor beneficiary residing therein; and second, that the heirs cannot judicially partition it
during the aforesaid periods unless the court finds compelling reasons therefor. No compelling reason has been alleged by the parties;
nor has the RTC found any compelling reason to order the partition of the family home, either by physical segregation or assignment to
any of the heirs or through auction sale as suggested by the parties.

More importantly, Article 159 imposes the proscription against the immediate partition of the family home regardless of its ownership.
This signifies that even if the family home has passed by succession to the co-ownership of the heirs, or has been willed to any one of
them, this fact alone cannot transform the family home into an ordinary property, much less dispel the protection cast upon it by the law.
The rights of the individual co-owner or owner of the family home cannot subjugate the rights granted under Article 159 to the
beneficiaries of the family home.

Set against the foregoing rules, the family home -- consisting of the subject house and lot on which it stands -- cannot be partitioned at
this time, even if it has passed to the co-ownership of his heirs, the parties herein. Decedent Fidel died on March 10, 2003.32 Thus, for
10 years from said date or until March 10, 2013, or for a longer period, if there is still a minor beneficiary residing therein, the family
home he constituted cannot be partitioned, much less when no compelling reason exists for the court to otherwise set aside the
restriction and order the partition of the property.

The Court ruled in Honrado v. Court of Appeals33 that a claim for exception from execution or forced sale under Article 153 should be
set up and proved to the Sheriff before the sale of the property at public auction. Herein petitioners timely objected to the inclusion of
the subject house although for a different reason.

To recapitulate, the evidence of record sustain the CA ruling that the subject house is part of the judgment of co-ownership and
partition. The same evidence also establishes that the subject house and the portion of the subject land on which it is standing have
been constituted as the family home of decedent Fidel and his heirs. Consequently, its actual and immediate partition cannot be
sanctioned until the lapse of a period of 10 years from the death of Fidel Arriola, or until March 10, 2013.

It bears emphasis, however, that in the meantime, there is no obstacle to the immediate public auction of the portion of the subject land
covered by TCT No. 383714, which falls outside the specific area of the family home.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED and the November 30, 2006 Decision and April 30, 2007 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals are MODIFIED in that the house standing on the land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 383714 is DECLARED part of
the co-ownership of the parties John Nabor C. Arriola, Vilma G. Arriola and Anthony Ronald G. Arriola but EXEMPTED from partition by
public auction within the period provided for in Article 159 of the Family Code.

No costs.

ARA VS. PIZARRO

FACTS:

Romeo F. Ara and William A. Garcia (petitioners), and Dra. Fely S. Pizarro and Henry A. Rossi (respondents) all claimed to be children
of the late Josefa A. Ara, who died on November 18, 2002. Petitioners assert that Fely S. Pizarro was born to Josefa and her then
husband, Vicente Salgado, who died during World War II. At some point toward the end of the war, Josefa met and lived with an
American soldier by the name of Darwin Gray. Romeo F. Ara was born from this relationship. Josefa later met a certain Alfredo Garcia,
and, from this relationship, gave birth to sons Ramon Garcia and William A. Garcia. Josefa and Alfredo married on January 24, 1952.8
After Alfredo passed away, Josefa met an Italian missionary named Frank Rossi, who allegedly fathered Henry Rossi.

Respondent Pizarro claims that, to her knowledge, she is the only child of Josefa. Further, petitioner Garcia is recorded as a son of a
certain Carmen Bucarin and Pedro Garcia, as evidenced by a Certificate of Live Birth dated July 19, 1950; and petitioner Ara is
recorded as a son of spouses Jose Ara and Maria Flores, evidenced by his Certificate of Live Birth.

Petitioners, together with Ramon and herein respondent Rossi, verbally sought partition of the properties left by the deceased Josefa,
which were in the possession of respondent Pizarr. Plaintiffs a quo filed a Complaint for judicial partition of properties left by the
deceased Josefa, before the Regional Trial Court. In her Answer, respondent Pizarro averred that, to her knowledge, she was the only
legitimate and only child of Josefa. She denied that any of the plaintiffs a quo were her siblings, for lack of knowledge or information to
form a belief on that matter. Further, the late Josefa left other properties mostly in the possession of plaintiffs a quo, which were omitted
in the properties to be partitioned by the trial court in Special Civil Action No. 337-03, enumerated in her counterclaim.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioners may prove their filiation to Josefa through their open and continuous possession of the status of
illegitimate children, found in the second paragraph of Article 172 of the Family Code.

RULING:

NO! On establishing the filiation of illegitimate children, the Family Code provides:
Article 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate
children.

The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the action is based on the second paragraph
of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.

Articles 172 and 173 of the Family Code provide:

Article 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:

(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or

(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:

(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or

(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. (265a, 266a, 267a)

Article 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs
should the child die during minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of five years within which to
institute the action.

The action already commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding the death of either or both of the parties. (268a)

Thus, a person who seeks to establish illegitimate filiation after the death of a putative parent must do so via a record of birth appearing
in the civil register or a final judgment, or an admission of legitimate filiation. In Uyguangco v. Court of Appeals:43

The following provision is therefore also available to the private respondent in proving his illegitimate filiation:

Article. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:

(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or

(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

While the private respondent has admitted that he has none of the documents mentioned in the first paragraph (which are practically
the same documents mentioned in Article 278 of the Civil Code except for the "private handwritten instrument signed by the parent
himself), he insists that he has nevertheless been "in open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child," which is
now also admissible as evidence of filiation.

Thus, he claims that he lived with his father from 1967 until 1973, receiving support from him during that time; that he has been using
the surname Uyguangco without objection from his father and the petitioners as shown in his high school diploma, a special power of
attorney executed in his favor by Dorotea Uyguangco, and another one by Sulpicio Uyguangco; that he has shared in the profits of the
copra business of the Uyguangcos, which is a strictly family business; that he was a director, together with the petitioners, of the Alu
and Sons Development Corporation, a family corporation; and that in the addendum to the original extrajudicial settlement concluded
by the petitioners he was given a share in his deceased father's estate.

It must be added that the illegitimate child is now also allowed to establish his claimed filiation by "any other means allowed by the
Rules of Court and special laws," like his baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family Bible in which his name has been entered,
common reputation respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, the testimonies of witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible
under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

The problem of the private respondent, however, is that, since he seeks to prove his filiation under the second paragraph of Article 172
of the Family Code, his action is now barred because of his alleged father's death in 1975. The second paragraph of this Article 175
reads as follows:

The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the action is based on the second paragraph
of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.

It is clear that the private respondent can no longer be allowed at this time to introduce evidence of his open and continuous
possession of the status of an illegitimate child or prove his alleged filiation through any of the means allowed by the Rules of Court or
special laws. The simple reason is that Apolinario Uyguangco is already dead and can no longer be heard on the claim of his alleged
son's illegitimate filiation.44
Petitioners did not present evidence that would prove their illegitimate filiation to their putative parent, Josefa, after her death as
provided under Articles 172 and 175 of the Family Code.

None of the foregoing constitutes evidence under the first paragraph of Article 172 of the Family Code.

Although not raised by petitioners, it may be argued that petitioner Garcia's Certificate of Live Birth obtained in 2003 through a late
registration of his birth is a record of birth appearing in the civil register under Article 172 of the Family Code.

True, birth certificates offer prima facie evidence of filiation. To overthrow the presumption of truth contained in a birth certificate, a high
degree of proof is needed.55 However, the circumstances surrounding the delayed registration prevent us from according it the same
weight as any other birth certificate.

There is a reason why birth certificates are accorded such high evidentiary value. Act No. 3753, or An Act to Establish a Civil Register,
provides:

Section 5. Registration and Certification of Births. — The declaration of the physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or, in default
thereof, the declaration of either parent of the newborn child, shall be sufficient for the registration of a birth in the civil register. Such
declaration shall be exempt from the documentary stamp tax and shall be sent to the local civil registrar not later than thirty days after
the birth, by the physician, or midwife in attendance at the birth or by either parent of the newly born child.

In such declaration, the persons above mentioned shall certify to the following facts: (a) date and hour of birth; (b) sex and nationality of
infant; (c) names, citizenship, and religion of parents or, in case the father is not known, of the mother alone; (d) civil status of parents;
(e) place where the infant was born; (f) and such other data may be required in the regulation to be issued.

In the case of an exposed child, the person who found the same shall report to the local civil registrar the place, date and hour of
finding and other attendant circumstances.

In case of an illegitimate child, the birth certificate shall be signed and sworn to jointly by the parents of the infant or only the mother if
the father refuses. In the latter case, it shall not be permissible to state or reveal in the document the name of the father who refuses to
acknowledge the child, or to give therein any information by which such father could be identified.

Any foetus having human features which dies after twenty four hours of existence completely disengaged from the maternal womb shall
be entered in the proper registers as having been born and having died.

Further, Rule 21 of National Statistics Office Administrative Order No. 1-93, or the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Act No. 3753,
provides that a person's birth be registered with the Office of the Civil Registrar-General by one of the following individuals:

Rule 21. Persons Responsible to Report the Event. — (1) When the birth occurred in a hospital or clinic or in a similar institution, the
administrator thereof shall be responsible in causing the registration of such birth. However, it shall be the attendant at birth who shall
certify the facts of birth.

(2) When the birth did not occur in a hospital or clinic or in a similar institution, the physician, nurse, midwife, "hilot", or anybody who
attended to the delivery of the child shall be responsible both in certifying the facts of birth and causing the registration of such birth.

(3) In default of the hospital/clinic administrator or attendant at birth, either or both parents of the child shall cause the registration of the
birth.

(4) When the birth occurs aboard a vehicle, vessel or airplane while in transit, registration of said birth shall be a joint responsibility of
the driver, captain or pilot and the parents, as the case may be.

Further, the birth must be registered within 30 days from the time of birth.56 Thus, generally, the rules require that facts of the report be
certified by an attendant at birth, within 30 days from birth. The attendant is not only an eyewitness to the event, but also presumably
would have no reason to lie on the matter. The immediacy of the reporting, combined with the participation of disinterested attendants
at birth, or of both parents, tend to ensure that the report is a factual reporting of birth. In other words, the circumstances in which
registration is made obviate the possibility that registration is caused by ulterior motives. The law provides in the case of illegitimate
children that the birth certificate shall be signed and sworn to jointly by the parents of the infant or only by the mother if the father
refuses. This ensures that individuals are not falsely named as parents.

It is analogous to cases where a putative father's name is written on a certificate of live birth of an illegitimate child, without any showing
that the putative father participated in preparing the certificate. In Fernandez v. Court of Appeals:58

Fourth, the certificates of live birth (Exh. "A"; Exh. "B") of the petitioners identifying private respondent as their father are not also
competent evidence on the issue of their paternity. Again, the records do not show that private respondent had a hand in the
preparation of said certificates. In rejecting these certificates, the ruling of the respondent court is in accord with our pronouncement in
Roces vs. Local Civil Registrar, 102 Phil. 1050 (1958),viz:

". . . Section 5 of Act No. 3793 and Article 280 of the Civil Code of the Philippines explicitly prohibited, not only the naming of the father
or the child born outside wedlock, when the birth certificates, or the recognition, is not filed or made by him, but, also, the statement of
any information or circumstances by which he could be identified. Accordingly, the Local Civil Registrar had no authority to make or
record the paternity of an illegitimate child upon the information of a third person and the certificate of birth of an illegitimate child, when
signed only by the mother of the latter, is incompetent evidence of fathership of said child.

We reiterated this rule in Berciles, op. cit., when we held that "a birth certificate not signed by the alleged father therein indicated is not
competent evidence of paternity."59 (Emphasis in the original).

In Berciles v. Government Service Insurance System:60

The evidence considered by the Committee on Claims Settlement as basis of its finding that Pascual Voltaire Berciles is an
acknowledged natural child of the late Judge Pascual Berciles is the birth certificate of said Pascual Voltaire Berciles marked Exh. "6".
We have examined carefully this birth certificate and We find that the same is not signed by either the father or the mother; We find no
participation or intervention whatsoever therein by the alleged father, Judge Pascual Berciles. Under our jurisprudence, if the alleged
father did not intervene in the birth certificate, the putting of his name by the mother or doctor or registrar is null and void. Such
registration would not be evidence of paternity. (Joaquin P. Roces et al. vs. Local Civil Registrar of Manila, 102 Phil. 1050). The mere
certificate by the registrar without the signature of the father is not proof of voluntary acknowledgment on his part (Dayrit vs. Piccio, 92
Phil. 729). A birth certificate does not constitute recognition in a public instrument. (Pareja vs. Pareja, et al., 95 Phil. 167). A birth
certificate, to evidence acknowledgment, must, under Section 5 of Act 3753, bear the signature under oath of the acknowledging parent
or parents. (Vidaurrazaga vs. Court of Appeals and Francisco Ruiz, 91 Phil. 492).

....

In the case of Mendoza, et al. vs. Mella, 17 SCRA 788, the Supreme Court speaking through Justice Makalintal who later became chief
Justice, said:

It should be noted, however, that a Civil Registry Law was passed in 1930 (Act No. 3753) containing provisions for the registration of
births, including those of illegitimate parentage; and the record of birth under such law, if sufficient in contents for the purpose, would
meet the requisites for voluntary recognition even under Article 131. Since Rodolfo was born in 1935, after the registry law was
enacted, the question here really is whether or not his birth certificate (Exhibit 1), which is merely a certified copy of the registry record,
may be relied upon as sufficient proof of his having been voluntarily recognized. No such reliance, in our judgment, may be placed upon
it. While it contains the names of both parents, there is no showing that they signed the original, let alone swore to its contents as
required in Section 5 of Act No. 3753 (Vidaurrazaga vs. Court of Appeals, 91 Phil. 493; In re Adoption of Lydia Duran, 92 Phil. 729). For
all that might have happened, it was not even they or either of them who furnished the data to be entered in the civil register. Petitioners
say that in any event the birth certificate is in the nature of a public document wherein voluntary recognition of a natural child may also
be made, according to the same Article 131. True enough, but in such a case there must be a clear statement in the document that the
parent recognizes the child as his or her own (Madridejo vs. De Leon, 55 Phil. 1); and in Exhibit 1 no such statement appears. The
claim of voluntary recognition is without basis."61

Further, in People v. Villar,62 this Court sustained the Trial Court's rejection of a delayed registration of birth as conclusive evidence of
the facts stated therein:

In the resolution of the sole assignment of error we find as well-taken and accordingly adopt as our own the lower court's ratiocination,
thus:

After going over the evidence in support of the alleged minority of the accused Francisco Villar when he committed the crime on or
about August 24, 1977, the Court finds that Exhibit 1 and the testimonies of the defense witnesses can not have more probative value
than the written statement of Francisco Villar, Exhibit E. It is to be noted that Exhibit 1 is a delayed registration of a supposed birth
accomplished and submitted only on January 12, 1979 to the Local Civil Registrar of Caloocan City by the witness Leonor Villar, long
after the offense was committed and after the prosecution finally rested its case on November 21, 1978, thus exposing the basis of
Exhibit 1 to be resting on a slender and shaky foundation, and more so, in the absence of explanation from the defense of the reason
for said late registration. Hence, the Court rejects Exhibit 1....

The appellant invokes Art. 410 of the Civil Code which reads:

Art. 410. The books making up the civil register and all documents relating thereto shall be considered public documents and shall be
prima facie evidence of the facts herein contained.

Suffice it to say that the above-quoted provision makes the information given in Exhibit 1 only prima facie but not conclusive evidence.
This must be so because the Local Civil Registrar merely receives the information submitted to him; he does not inquire into its veracity.
Moreover, to regard as conclusive the content of a certificate of live birth can lead to absurd results. Supposing that Leonor had given
John F. Kennedy as the father of Francisco, are we to accept that as an incontestable fact? In the light of the circumstances already
narrated concerning the preparation and submission of Exhibit 1, the lower court committed no error in disregarding it.63

A delayed registration of birth, made after the death of the putative parent, is tenuous proof of filiation.

Thus, we are unable to accord petitioner Garcia's delayed registration of birth the same evidentiary weight as regular birth certificates.

Even without a record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment, filiation may still be established after the death of a
putative parent through an admission of filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument, signed by the parent
concerned.64 However, petitioners did not present in evidence any admissions of filiation.
An admission is an act, declaration, or omission of a party on a relevant fact, which may be used in evidence against him.65

The evidence presented by petitioners such as group pictures with Josefa and petitioners' relatives, and testimonies do not show that
Josefa is their mother. They do not contain any acts, declarations, or omissions attributable directly to Josefa, much less ones
pertaining to her filiation with petitioners. Although petitioner Garcia's Baptismal Certificate, Certificate of Marriage, and Certificate of
Live Birth obtained via late registration all state that Josefa is his mother, they do not show any act, declaration, or omission on the part
of Josefa. Josefa did not participate in making any of them. The same may be said of the testimonies presented. Although Josefa may
have been in the photographs, the photographs do not show any filiation. By definition, none of the evidence presented constitutes an
admission of filiation under Article 172 of the Family Code.

II

The Trial Court bypassed the issue of the birth certificates and did not consider the first paragraph of Article 172 of the Family Code.
Instead, it ruled only on the open and continuous possession of status of filiation:

Without anymore discussing the validity of their respective birth and baptismal certificates, there is sufficient evidence to hold that all the
plaintiffs are indeed the children of the said deceased Josefa Ara for having possessed and enjoyed the status of recognized illegitimate
children pursuant to the first paragraph of Article 175 of the Family Code[.]

....

All the plaintiffs and defendant were taken care of and supported by their mother Josefa Ara, including their education, since their
respective birth and were all united and lived as one family even up to the death and burial of their said mother, Josefa Ara. Their
mother had acknowledged all of them as her children throughout all her life directly, continuously, spontaneously and without
concealment.66

Thus, the Court of Appeals found that the Trial Court had erred in allowing petitioners to prove their illegitimate filiation through the open
and continuous possession of the status of illegitimate children after the death of the putative parent:

However, the trial court's finding cannot be sustained. Even granting for the sake of argument that appellants Romeo F. Ara and William
Garcia did enjoy open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child, still, they should have proven this during the
lifetime of the putative parent. Article 285 of the Civil Code provides the period for filing and (sic) action for recognition as follows:

ART. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be brought only during the lifetime of the presumed parents, except in
the following cases:

(1)
If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the latter may file the action before the expiration of four years
from the attainment of his majority;

(2)
If after the death of the father or of the mother a document should appear of which nothing had been heard and in which either or both
parents recognize the child.
In this case, the action must be commenced within four years from the finding of the document.

The two exceptions provided under the foregoing provision, have however been omitted by Articles 172, 173 and 175 of the Family
Code, which We quote:

The law is very clear. If filiation is sought to be proved under the second paragraph of Article 172 of the Family Code, the action must be
brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent. It is evident that appellants Romeo F. Ara and William Garcia can no longer be allowed
at this time to introduce evidence of their open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child or prove their alleged
filiation through any of the means allowed by the Rules of Court or special laws. The simple reason is that Josefa Ara is already dead
and can no longer be heard on the claim of her alleged sons' illegitimate filiation.67

The Court of Appeals did not adopt the Trial Court's appreciation of evidence. It ruled that, because petitioners' putative parent Josefa
had already passed away, petitioners were proscribed from proving their filiation under the second paragraph of Article 172 of the
Family Code.

The Court of Appeals properly did not give credence to the evidence submitted by petitioners regarding their status.

Josefa passed away in 2002.68 After her death, petitioners could no longer be allowed to introduce evidence of open and continuous
illegitimate filiation to Josefa. The only evidence allowed under the law would be a record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final
judgment, or an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private signed, handwritten instruction by Josefa.
An alleged parent is the best person to affirm or deny a putative descendant's filiation. Absent a record of birth appearing in a civil
register or a final judgment, an express admission of filiation in a public document, or a handwritten instrument signed by the parent
concerned, a deceased person will have no opportunity to contest a claim of filiation.

In truth, it is the mother and in some cases, the father, who witnesses the actual birth of their children. Descendants normally only come
to know of their parents through nurture and family lore. When they are born, they do not have the consciousness required to be able to
claim personal knowledge of their parents. It thus makes sense for the parents to be present when evidence under the second
paragraph of Article 172 is presented.

The limitation that an action to prove filiation as an illegitimate child be brought within the lifetime of an alleged parent acknowledges
that there may be other persons whose rights should be protected from spurious claims. This includes other children, legitimate and
illegitimate, whose statuses are supported by strong evidence of a categorical nature.

Respondent Pizarro has submitted petitioners' certificates of live birth to further disprove petitioners' filiation with Josefa. A Certificate of
Live Birth issued in Paniqui, Tarlac on July 19, 1950 shows that Garcia's parents are Pedro Garcia and Carmen Bugarin69 while
another Certificate of Live Birth issued in petitioner Ara's birthplace, Bauang, La Union, shows that he is the son of spouses Jose Ara
and Maria Flores.70

The Court of Appeals gave credence to these birth certificates submitted by respondent Pizarro:

The trustworthiness of public documents and the value given to the entries made therein could be grounded on 1) the sense of official
duty in the preparation of the statement made, 2) the penalty which is usually affixed to a breach of that duty, 3) the routine and
disinterested origin of most such statements, and 4) the publicity of record which makes more likely the prior exposure of such errors as
might have occurred.

Therefore, this Court upholds the birth certificates of William Garcia and Romeo F. Ara, as issued by the Civil Registry, in line with
Legaspi v. Court of Appeals, where the High Court ruled that the evidentiary nature of public documents must be sustained in the
absence of strong, complete and conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity. Consequently, appellants Romeo F. Ara and William Garcia are
deemed not to be the illegitimate sons of the late Josefa Ara.71

Thus, the Court of Appeals made a determination on the evidence and found that the birth certificates submitted by respondent Pizarro
belong to petitioners Garcia and Ara. These birth certificates name Carmen Bugarin72 and Maria Flores,73 as the respective mothers
of petitioners Garcia and Ara. Considering that these birth certificates do not name Josefa as a parent of either petitioner, petitioners are
properly determined not to be Josefa's children.

Petitioners point out that the Certificate of Birth does not contain petitioner Garcia's correct birth date. They claim that the birth date of
petitioner Garcia as recorded in his baptismal certificate is June 23, 1951. This birth date is also reflected on his Certificate of Live Birth
issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Paniqui, Tarlac, as well as in the Notice of Hearing of the delayed registration of birth
certificate of petitioner Garcia. Thus, petitioners speculate that the birth certificate submitted by respondent Pizarro is of a different
"William Garcia":

Perhaps, defendant-appellant Fely Pizarro obtained a Certificate of Live Birth and Cedula de Baotismo of a wrong person bearing the
same name William Garcia which always happened (sic) in our country considering that the family name Garcia is very much common
because in the said documents the birthdate of a certain William Garcia was June 23, 1950 not June 23, 1951, the actual birth of
William Garcia.74

On this point, respondent Pizarro argues:

It may be noted that William Garcia obtained said Certificate more than six (6) months after he, with his co-plaintiffs, had filed the case
of judicial partition on 9 April 2003. Obviously, he found the need to apply for the late registration of his birth when he learned from
respondent's Answer that from her knowledge she is the only child of Josefa Ara. Very likely, William Garcia already knew that he
already has a record of birth in the municipality of Paniqui, Tarlac, showing that her mother was not Josefa Ara.75

These are matters of appreciation of evidence, however, which cannot be subject of inquiry in a petition for review under Rule 45.
Nonetheless, considering that there were two reports of birth for William Garcia, and considering further that one of the reports was
made only after initiating a case which would directly use said report, we cannot find error in the Court of Appeals' decision to disregard
the delayed registration.

Finally, petitioners' claim that there was no basis for the Court of Appeals to find that respondents are the children of Josefa is
untenable. Respondents' filiation with Josefa was not put in question before the Trial Court. Even petitioners admitted in their Complaint
that respondents were Josefa's children.76 Further, on appeal, no party questioned the Trial Court's determination that respondents
Pizarro and Rossi were the children of Josefa. Consequently, the Court of Appeals did not err in sustaining these findings without
requiring further proof.

CALIMAG VS. HEIRS OF MACAPAZ

FACTS:
Virginia D. Calimag co-owned the property, the subject matter of this case, with Silvestra N. Macapaz. On the other hand, Anastacio P.
Macapaz, Jr. and Alicia Macapaz-Ritua are the children of Silvestra's brother, Anastacio Macapaz, Sr. and Fidela O. Poblete Vda. de
Macapaz. The property is located at Guadalupe Nuevo, Makati City, and was duly registered in the names of the Calimag and Silvestra.
Also, there is an annotation of an Adverse Claim of Fidela asserting rights and interests over a portion of the said property.

On November 11, 2002, Silvestra died without issue. On July 7, 2005, TCT was cancelled and a new certificate of title, TCT was issued
in the name of Calimag by virtue of a Deed of Sale dated January 18, 2005. It was stated therein that the affidavit of adverse claim filed
by Fidela was not signed by the Deputy Register of Deeds of Makati City, making the same legally ineffective. On September 16, 2005,
Fidela passed away.

On December 15, 2005, Anastacio, Jr. filed a criminal case for two counts of falsification of public documents which were dismissed. On
March 2, 2006, the respondents, asserting that they are the heirs of Silvestra, instituted the action for Annulment of Deed of Sale and
Cancellation of TCT with Damages against the Calimag and the Register of Deeds of Makati City.

Calimag averred that the respondents have no legal capacity to institute said civil action on the ground that they are illegitimate children
of Anastacio, Sr. As such, they have no right over Silvestra's estate pursuant to Article 992 of the Civil Code which prohibits illegitimate
children from inheriting intestate from the legitimate children and relatives of their father and mother. RTC ruled in favor of the
respondents and declared the Deed of Sale as null and void for being forged document. The CA affirmed RTC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Anastacio Sr. and Fidela were married, and therefore, respondents are legal heirs of Silvestra.

RULING:

YES! While it is true that a person's legitimacy can only be questioned in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, as held in
Spouses Fidel v. Hon. CA, et al., this Court however deems it necessary to pass upon the respondents' relationship to Silvestra so as to
determine their legal rights to the subject property.

Notwithstanding, it is well settled that other proofs can be offered to establish the fact of a solemnized marriage. Jurisprudence teaches
that the fact of marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other than the marriage certificate. Hence, even a person's birth certificate
may be recognized as competent evidence of the marriage between his parents.

Forsooth, the Court finds that the respondents' certificates of live birth were duly executed consistent with the provision of the law
respecting the registration of birth of legitimate children. Nonetheless, the respondents' certificates of live birth also intimate that
Anastacio, Sr. and Fidela had openly cohabited as husband and wife for a number of years, as a result of which they had two children—
the second child, Anastacio, Jr. being born more than three years after their first child, Alicia. Verily, such fact is admissible proof to
establish the validity of marriage.

Sarmiento v. CA is instructive anent the question of what other proofs can be offered to establish the fact of a solemnized marriage, viz:
In Trinidad vs. Court of Appeals, et al., this Court ruled that as proof of marriage may be presented: a) testimony of a witness to the
matrimony; b) the couple's public and open cohabitation as husband and wife after the alleged wedlock; c) the birth and baptismal
certificate of children born during such union; and d) the mention of such nuptial in subsequent documents.

Moreover, in a catena of cases, it has been held that, "persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence
of any counter presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of
society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of
decency and of law. A presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is 'that a man and a woman deporting themselves as
husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.' Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio — Always presume marriage."

Furthermore, as the established period of cohabitation of Anastacio, Sr. and Fidela transpired way before the effectivity of the Family
Code, the strong presumption accorded by then Article 220 of the Civil Code in favor of the validity of marriage cannot be disregarded.
Thus: Art. 220. In case of doubt, all presumptions favor the solidarity of the family. Thus, every intendment of law or facts leans toward
the validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds, the legitimacy of children, the community of property during marriage,
the authority of parents over their children, and the validity of defense for any member of the family in case of unlawful aggression.

ARADO VS. ALCORAN

FACTS:

Raymundo Alcoran (Raymundo) was married to Joaquina Arado (Joaquina), and their marriage produced a son named Nicolas Alcoran
(Nicolas).[3] In turn, Nicolas married Florencia Limpahan (Florencia)[4] but their union had no offspring. During their marriage, however,
Nicolas had an extramarital affair with Francisca Sarita (Francisca), who gave birth to respondent Anacleto Alcoran (Anacleto) on July
13, 1951[5] during the subsistence of Nicolas' marriage to Florencia.[6] In 1972, Anacleto married Elenette Sonjaco.[7]

Raymundo died in 1939, while Nicolas died m 1954. Likewise, Florencia died in 1960, and Joaquina in 1981.[8]

Florencia had three siblings, namely: Sulpicio, Braulia and Veronica Limpahan.[9] Joaquina had four siblings, i.e., Alejandra, Nemesio,
Celedonia and Melania, all surnamed Arado.[10] Nemesio had six children, namely: (1) Jesusa, who was married to Victoriano Alcoriza;
(2) Pedro, who was married to Tomasa Arado; (3) Teodorico; (4) Josefina; (5) Gliceria;[11] and (6) Felicisima.[12] During the pendency
of the case, Pedro died, and was substituted by his following heirs, to wit: (1) Juditho and his spouse, Jennifer Ebrole; (2) Bobbie Zito
and his spouse, Shirly Abad; (3) Juvenil and his spouse, Nicetas Ventula; (4) Antonieta and her spouse, Nelson Somoza; and (5) Nila.

On January 14, 1992, Alejandra, Jesusa, Victoriano Alcoriza, Pedro and Tomasa filed in the RTC a complaint for recovery of property
and damages (with application for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction) against Anacleto and Elenette.[13] Named as unwilling co-
plaintiffs were Sulpicio, Braulia and Veronica Limpahan, along with Teodorico, Josefina, Gliceria and Felicisima.

The properties subject of the action were the following: (1) Lot No. 4100, covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. OV-1379; (2)
Lot No. 4054, covered by OCT No. OV-1380; (3) a parcel of land covered by Tax Declaration No. 6065; (4) a parcel of land covered by
Tax Declaration No. 20470; (5) a parcel of land covered by Tax Declaration No. 11-028-A; (6) Lot No. 709 covered by OCT No. OV-
7784; (7) a parcel of land covered by Tax Declaration No. 87-011-215-A; (8) a parcel of land covered by Tax Declaration No. 87-011-
217; (9) Lot No. 5234 covered by OCT No. 3489-A; and (10) Lot No. 5224 covered by Tax Declaration No. 8-201.[14] The parties later
stipulated that the first eight of the subject properties had previously belonged to Raymundo, while the last two had been the
paraphernal properties of Joaquina.[15]

The plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that when Raymundo died in 1939, his properties were inherited by his son Nicolas alone "as it
was during the period of the old Civil Code, where the spouse could not inherit but only a share of the usufruct, which was extinguished
upon the death of the usufructuary;"[16] that when Nicolas died in 1954 without issue, half of his properties were inherited by his wife,
Florencia, and the other half by his mother, Joaquina; that Florencia was, in turn, succeeded by her siblings Sulpicio, Braulia and
Veronica; that during the marriage of Nicolas and Florencia, the former had an affair with Francisca, from which affair Anacleto was
born, but it was unknown whether he was the spurious son of Nicolas; that Nicolas did not recognize Anacleto as his spurious child
during Nicolas' lifetime; hence, Anacleto was not entitled to inherit from Nicolas; that nonetheless, Anacleto claimed entitlement to the
properties as the heir of Nicolas and by virtue of the will executed by Joaquina; that the will was void for not having been executed
according to the formalities of the law, and the same did not reflect the true intention of Joaquina; that the supposed testator did not
acknowledge the will, which was not submitted for probate; that they were the rightful heirs to the properties; that notwithstanding their
repeated demands for the return of the properties, the defendants persistently refused; that a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
should issue to prevent the defendants from further violating their rights in the properties; and that the defendants should be ordered to
reconvey the properties, and to pay; P20,000.00 as actual damages; P20,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages, and P20,000.00
as attorney's fees.[17]

In their answer,[18] the defendants (respondents herein) countered that Anacleto was expressly recognized by Nicolas as the latter's
son, a fact evidenced by the certificate of birth of Anacleto; that Anacleto thus had the right to inherit the properties from Nicolas; that
because Anacleto was still too young when Nicolas died, the administration of the properties passed to Anacleto's grandmother,
Joaquina; that Joaquina executed a last will and testament in Anacleto's favor; that Joaquina's possession of the properties was for and
in behalf of Anacleto, who had been living with her since his birth; that such possession began in 1954 when Nicolas died and
continued until Joaquina's death in 1981; that Anacleto then took over the possession of the properties to the exclusion of all others;
that granting for the sake of argument that the plaintiffs had rights in the properties, the same were already lost through laches,
estoppel and prescription; and that Anacleto was the rightful owner of the properties, and his ownership and possession should not be
disturbed.

By way of counterclaim, the defendants prayed that the plaintiffs be ordered to pay 50,000.00 as moral damages, 1,000.00 "as initial
expenses as costs of this litigation which will increase as the case progresses"[19] and 10,000.00 as attorney's fees.

Veronica Limpahan and Sulpicio Limpahan likewise filed their answer[20] to the complaint, stating that they were not interested in
pursuing any claim of ownership in the properties; that assuming that they were entitled, they were abandoning their rights, interests,
title and participation in the properties; and that they be excluded from further court processes.

Judgrnent of the RTC

On January 15, 1997, the RTC rendered judgment, decreeing thusly:

Wherefore, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the complaint and the counterclaim for lack of merit.

Costs against the plaintiffs.

SO ORDERED.[21]
The RTC opined that Anacleto established that he was really the acknowledged illegitimate son of Nicolas. It cited the certificate of birth
of Anacleto (Exhibit 4) and Page 53, Book 4, Register No. 214 of the Register of Births of the Municipality of Bacong (Exhibit 3), which
proved that Nicolas had himself caused the registration of Anacleto's birth by providing the details thereof and indicating that he was the
father of Anacleto. It observed that the name of Nicolas appeared under the column "Remarks" in the register of births, which was the
space provided for the name of the informant; that because the plaintiffs did not present evidence to refute the entry in the register of
births, the entry became conclusive with respect to the facts contained therein; that Anacleto's claim of recognition was bolstered by his
baptismal certificate (Exhibit F), in which was indicated that his parents were Nicolas Alcoran and Francisca Sarita; that also presented
was a picture taken during the wake of Nicolas (Exhibit 5) showing the young Anacleto being carried by Joaquina, and also Nicolas'
wife, Florencia; that in addition, the school records of Anacleto (Exhibit 6) showed that Joaquina stood as his guardian during his grade
school years; that when Anacleto got married, it was Joaquina who gave consent to his marriage because he was then still a minor
(Exhibit 8); and that Joaquina executed her will in 1978 (Exhibit 9), bequeathing the subject properties to Anacleto, but the will was yet
to be probated.
As the case was filed during the effectivity of the Family Code, the RTC ruled that Articles 172,[22] 173[23] and 175[24] of the Family
Code allowed Anacleto to establish his filiation during his lifetime through the record of his birth appearing in the civil register. It further
ruled that because there were no legitimate children of Nicolas who contested Anacleto's right to inherit, the rule on the separation of
the legitimate from the illegitimate family was rendered irrelevant; and that, accordingly, Anacleto was entitled to possess the subject
properties upon having established that he was the acknowledged illegitimate son of Nicolas. Consequently, it also dismissed the
defendants' counterclaim for lack of sufficient basis.

The plaintiffs appealed to the CA.[25]

Decision of the CA

On February 28, 2003, the CA promulgated its decision,[26] affirming the judgment of the RTC in this wise:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED. Accordingly, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Dumaguete City, Branch 43 stands.
The CA sustained the ruling of the RTC to the effect that Anacleto was an acknowledged illegitimate son of Nicolas. It agreed that the
Register of Births of the Municipality of Bacong, Negros Oriental showed that Nicolas was the father of Anacleto, and that the former
had supplied the information on the latter's birth. It declared that the plaintiffs did not rebut the filiation of Anacleto by contrary evidence;
that the baptismal certificate of Anacleto and the picture taken during the wake of Nicolas further showed that Anacleto had been
acknowledged by Nicolas; that based on the Articles 172, 173 and 175 of the Family Code, the law applicable at the time of the filing of
the case, Anacleto's filiation was established by the record of his birth appearing in the civil register; and that Anacleto possessed rights
in the subject properties.

Anent the successional rights of the parties, the CA pronounced that after Raymundo died in 1939, his wife, Joaquina, and his son,
Nicolas, inherited his properties; that when Nicolas died in 1954, he was survived by Joaquina (his mother), Florencia (his legitimate
wife), and Anacleto (his illegitimate son); that Joaquina was entitled to one-half of Nicolas' estate, and the remaining half should be
divided between Florencia and Anacleto; that in 1960, when Florencia died without issue, the share she had inherited from Nicolas was
inherited by her siblings Sulpicio, Braulia and Veronica; and that when Joaquina died in 1981, she was survived by her sibling
Alejandra; her nieces Jesusa,[27] Josefina, Gliceria and Felicisima; her nephews Pedro and Teodorico; and her illegitimate grandson,
Anacleto.

The CA declared that the plaintiffs were already barred from asserting their rights in the properties by estoppel by laches; that Joaquina
had executed her last will and testament on April 19, 1978, whereby she bequeathed her properties to Anacleto; that the properties
were thus transmitted to Anacleto upon her death in 1981; that the plaintiffs filed their complairtt in the RTC only on January 14, 1992;
that it would be unjust to award the subject properties to the plaintiffs who had slept on their rights for a long time; and that the plaintiffs
could probably pursue their claim in the appropriate intestate or testate proceedings.

The plaintiffs filed a Motion for Reconsideration,[28] but the CA denied their motion on March 24, 2004.

Issues

In this appeal, the plaintiffs, herein petitioners,[29] implore the Court to nullify the assailed rulings of the CA, and to determine once and
for all the following issues:
(a) Whether Anacleto Alcoran is the illegitimate son of Nicolas Alcoran x x x; and

(b) Whether he is entitled to the properties in litigation.[30]

The petitioners insist that Anacleto was not duly recognized as Nicolas' illegitimate son; that inasmuch as Anacleto was born to
Francisca during the subsistence of Nicolas' marriage to Florencia, Anacleto could only be the spurious child of Nicolas; that there was
no law for the acknowledgment of a spurious child; that even if Anacleto would be given the benefit of the doubt and be considered a
natural child. Article 278 of the Civil Code states that "[r]ecognition shall be made in the record of birth, a will, a statement before a court
of record, or in any authentic writing;" that the appearance of the father's name in the certificate of birth alone, without his actual
intervention, was insufficient to prove paternity; that the mere certificate by the civil registrar that the father himself registered the child,
without the father's signature, was not proof of the father's voluntary acknowledgment; that the baptismal certificate was insufficient
proof of paternity; and that if there was ground for Anacleto's recognition, the period to claim recognition already prescribed.

The petitioners reject the claim of Anacleto that Joaquina bequeathed the subject properties to him by last will and testament. They
assail the validity and due execution of the will, which was not submitted for probate; that the joint affidavit allegedly executed in favor of
Anacleto by Sulpicio, Braulia and Veronica Limpahan, with Josefina, Gliceria and Felicisima Arado, whereby they ceded their rights in
the subject properties in favor of Anacleto, was unwarranted; and that the veracity of the affidavit was doubtful because it was
purportedly inconsistent with Anacleto's stance that he had inherited the properties in his own right.

In tum, the defendants, herein respondents, counter that Nicolas recognized Anacleto as his illegitimate child because Nicolas had
himself caused the registration of Anacleto's birth; that the petitioners' allegation of prescription lacked basis inasmuch as Anacleto was
not seeking compulsory recognition; and that Anacleto had already been voluntarily recognized by Nicolas as his illegitimate son.

Ruling of the Court

We affirm the dismissal of the petitioners' complaint by the RTC, albeit for different reasons.
The complaint filed by the petitioners in the RTC to recover the subject properties is properly characterized as an accion reivindicatoria.
According to Cañezo v. Bautista,[31] an "[a]ccion reivindicatoria seeks the recovery of ownership and includes the jus utendi and the jus
fruendi brought in the proper regional trial court. Accion reivindicatoria is an action whereby plaintiff alleges ownership over a parcel of
land and seeks recovery of its full possession." In essence, the petitioners seek to put an end to Anacleto's possession of the properties
on the basis of their being the rightful heirs considering that Anacleto, being the spurious child of Nicolas, held no successional rights in
the estate of Nicolas.

The burden of proof to establish the averments of the complaint by preponderance of evidence pertained to the petitioners as the
plaintiffs. In that regard, we have discoursed on preponderance of evidence in Amoroso v. Alegre, Jr.,[32] thusly:
"Preponderance of evidence" is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is usually considered to be
synonymous with the term "greater weight of the evidence" or "greater weight of the credible evidence." Preponderance of evidence is a
phrase which, in the last analysis, means probability of the truth. It is evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief
than that which is offered in opposition thereto. If plaintiff claims a right granted or created by law, he must prove his claim by competent
evidence. He must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not upon the weakness of that of his opponent. (Bold underscoring for
emphasis)
The petitioners did not discharge their burden of proof.

At the outset, the Court affirms the holding by the RTC and the CA that the provisions of the Family Code[33] should apply because the
petitioners' complaint was filed, litigated and decided by the RTC during the effectivity of the Family Code. Under the Family Code, the
classification of children is limited to either legitimate or illegitimate.[34] Illegitimate filiation is proved in accordance with Article 175 of
the Family Code, to wit:
ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.

The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the action is based on the second paragraph
of Article I72, in which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
On the other hand, legitimate filiation is established m accordance with Articles 172 and 173 of the Family Code, which state:
ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:

(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or

(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:

(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or laws.

(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special

ART. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs
should the child die during minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of five years within which to
institute the action.

The action already commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding the death of either or both of the parties.
Rightly enough, the RTC and the CA unanimously concluded that Nicolas had duly acknowledged Anacleto as his illegitimate son. The
birth certificate of Anacleto appearing in the Register of Births of the Municipality of Bacong, Negros Oriental (Exhibits 3, 3-A) showed
that Nicolas had himself caused the registration of the birth of Anacleto. The showing was by means of the name of Nicolas appearing
in the column "Remarks" in Page 53, Book 4, Register No. 214 of the Register of Births. Based on the certification (Exhibit 3-B) issued
by the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of Bacong, Negros Oriental, the column in the Register of Births entitled "Remarks"
(Observaciones) was the space provided for the name of the informant of the live birth to be registered. Considering that Nicolas, the
putative father, had a direct hand in the preparation of the birth certificate, reliance on the birth certificate of Anacleto as evidence of his
paternity was fully warranted.[35]

Anacleto's baptismal certificate (Exhibit 7) was of no consequence in determining his filiation. We have already held in Cabatania v.
Court of Appeals[36] that "while a baptismal certificate may be considered a public document, it can only serve as evidence of the
administration of the sacrament on the date specified but not the veracity of the entries with respect to the child's paternity;" and that
baptismal certificates were "per se inadmissible in evidence as proof of filiation," and thus "cannot be admitted indirectly as
circumstantial evidence to prove [filiation]." Hence, we attach no probative value to the baptismal certificate as proof of the filiation of
Anacleto.

The weight accorded by the RTC and the CA to the picture depicting the young Anacleto in the arms of Joaquina as she stood beside
the coffin of the departed Nicolas (Exhibit 5) was also undeserved. At best, the picture merely manifested that it was Joaquina who had
acknowledged her filiation with Anacleto. Cautioning against the admission in evidence of a picture of similar nature, we have pointed
out in Solinap v. Locsin, Jr.[37] that:
[R]espondent's photograph with his mother near the coffin of the late Juan C. Locsin cannot and will not constitute proof of filiation, lest
we recklessly set a very dangerous precedent that would encourage and sanction fraudulent claims. Anybody can have a picture taken
while standing before a coffin with others and thereafter utilize it in claiming the estate of the deceased.
The school records of Anacleto (Exhibit 6), which evinced that Joaquina was the guardian of Anacleto in his grade school years, and the
marriage contract between Anacleto and Elenette (Exhibits 8 to 8-C), which indicated that Joaquina had given consent to Anacleto's
marriage, did not have the evidentiary value accorded by the RTC and the CA. Joaquina's apparent recognition of Anacleto mattered
little, for, as we stressed in Cenido v. Apacionado,[38] the recognition "must be made personally by the parent himself or herself, not by
any brother, sister or relative; after all, the concept of recognition speaks of a voluntary declaration by the parent, of if the parent
refuses, by judicial authority, to establish the paternity or maternity of children born outside wedlock."

The lack of probative value of the respondents' aforecited corroborative evidence notwithstanding, Anacleto's recognition as Nicolas'
illegitimate child remained beyond question in view of the showing that Nicolas had personally and directly acknowledged Anacleto as
his illegitimate son.

How should the acknowledgment of Anacleto by Nicolas affect the respective rights of the parties in relation to the specific properties
subject of the complaint?

To recall, the parties stipulated that the first eight of the subject properties had previously belonged to Raymundo, while the remaining
two had been the paraphernal properties of Joaquina.

With Raymundo having died in 1939, the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 was the governing law on succession. Under Article 807 thereof,
[39] Joaquina and Nicolas, i.e., the surviving spouse and the legitimate son of Raymundo, were the forced heirs who acquired legal title
to Raymundo's estate upon his death. In accordance with Article 834 thereof,[40] Nicolas was entitled to inherit the entire estate of
Raymundo, while Joaquina was entitled to a portion in usufruct equal to the one third portion available for betterment.

When Nicolas died in 1954, the Civil Code of the Philippines was already in effect.[41] Under Article 1000 thereof,[42] the heirs entitled
to inherit from Nicolas's estate were Joaquina (his mother), Florencia (his surviving spouse), and Anacleto (his acknowledged
illegitimate son). Said heirs became co-owners of the properties comprising the entire estate of Nicolas prior to the estate's partition in
accordance with Article 1078[43] of the Civil Code.

Anacleto had an established right to inherit from Nicolas, whose estate included the first eight of the subject properties that had
previously belonged to Raymundo. Anacleto became a co-owner of said properties, pro indiviso, when Nicolas died in 1954.[44]
Likewise, Joaquina succeeded to, and became a pro indiviso co-owner of, the properties that formed part of the estate of Nicolas.
When Joaquina died in 1981, her hereditary estate included the two remaining properties, as well as her share in the estate of Nicolas.
In as much as Joaquina died without any surviving legitimate descendant, ascendant, illegitimate child or spouse, Article 1003[45] of the
Civil Code mandated that her collateral relatives should inherit her entire estate.

Contrary to the rulings of the lower courts, Anacleto was barred by law from inheriting from the estate of Joaquina. To start with,
Anacleto could not inherit from Joaquina by right of representation of Nicolas, the legitimate son of Joaquina.[46] Under Article 992 of
the Civil Code, an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; in
the same manner, such children or relatives shall not inherit from the illegitimate child. As certified in Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate
Court,[47] the right of representation is not available to illegitimate descendants of legitimate children in the inheritance of a legitimate
grandparent. And, secondly, Anacleto could not inherit from the estate of Joaquina by virtue of the latter's last will and testament, i.e.,
the Katapusan Tugon (Testamento) (Exhibit K). Article 838 of the Civil Code dictates that no will shall pass either real or personal
property unless the same is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court. We have clarified in Gallanosa v. Arcangel[48]
that in order that a will may take effect, "it has to be probated, legalized or allowed in the proper testamentary proceeding. The probate
of the will is mandatory." It appears that such will remained ineffective considering that the records are silent as to whether it had ever
been presented for probate, and had been allowed by a court of competent jurisdiction. The petitioners alleged this fact in their
complaint, and the respondents did not controvert the allegation. In the absence of proof showing that the supposed will of Joaquina
had been duly approved by the competent court, we hold that it had not been so approved. Hence, we cannot sustain the CA's ruling to
the effect that Joaquina had bequeathed her properties to Anacleto by will, and that the properties had been transmitted to him upon
her death.

As the petitioners were among the collateral relatives of Joaquina, they are the ones entitled to inherit from her estate.

Nonetheless, the petitioners' appeal still fails because the parties did not establish that the estates of Raymundo, Nicolas and Joaquina
had been respectively settled with finality through the appropriate testate or intestate proceedings, and partitioned in due course.
Unless there was a proper and valid partition of the assets of the respective estates of Raymundo, Nicolas and Joaquina, whether
extrajudicially or judicially, their heirs could not adjudicate unto themselves and claim specific portions of their estates, because, as we
have declared in Carvajal v. Court of Appeals:[49]
x x x Unless a project of partition is effected, each heir cannot claim ownership over a definite portion of the inheritance. Without
partition, either by agreement between the parties or by judicial proceeding, a co-heir cannot dispose of a specific portion of the estate.
For where there are two or more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is, before its partition, owned in common by such heirs. Upon
the death of a person, each of his heirs becomes the undivided owner of the whole estate left with respect to the part or portion which
might be adjudicated to him, a community of ownership being thus formed among the co-owners of the estate or co-heirs while it
remains undivided.
Without the showing that the respective estates of Raymundo, Nicolas and Joaquina had been previously partitioned, the Court
concludes and holds that none of the parties herein can lay claim over any of the disputed specific properties. The petitioners cannot
contend, therefore, that they were the rightful owners of the properties of the late Joaquina to the exclusion of Anacleto. Thus, we
uphold the dismissal of the petitioners' complaint for recovery of such properties.

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on February 28, 2003 by the Court of Appeals; and ORDERS the
petitioners to pay the costs of suit.

REYES VS. MAURICIO

FACTS:

Eugenio Reyes (Eugenio) was the registered owner of a parcel of land located at Turo, Bocaue, Bulacan, with an area of four thousand
five hundred twenty-seven (4,527) square meters, more or less, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 109456(M). Said
title came from and cancelled TCT No. T-62290 registered in the name of Eufracia and Susana Reyes, siblings of Eugenio. The subject
property was adjudicated to Eugenio by virtue of an extrajudicial settlement among the heirs following the death of his parents.

The controversy stemmed from a complaint filed before the DARAB of Malolos, Bulacan by respondents Librada F. Mauricio (Librada),
now deceased, and her alleged daughter Leonida F. Mauricio (Leonida) for annulment of contract denominated as Kasunduan and
between Librada and Eugenio as parties. Respondents also prayed for maintenance of their peaceful possession with damages.

Respondents alleged that they are the legal heirs of the late Godofredo Mauricio (Godofredo), who was the lawful and registered tenant
of Eugenio through his predecessors-in-interest to the subject land; that from 1936 until his death in May 1994, Godofredo had been
working on the subject land and introduced improvements consisting of fruit-bearing trees, seasonal crops, a residential house and
other permanent improvements; that through fraud, deceit, strategy and other unlawful means, Eugenio caused the preparation of a
document denominated as Kasunduan dated 28 September 1994 to eject respondents from the subject property, and had the same
notarized by Notary Public Ma. Sarah G. Nicolas in Pasig, Metro Manila; that Librada never appeared before the Notary Public; that
Librada was illiterate and the contents of the Kasunduan were not read nor explained to her; that Eugenio took undue advantage of the
weakness, age, illiteracy, ignorance, indigence and other handicaps of Librada in the execution of the Kasunduan rendering it void for
lack of consent; and that Eugenio had been employing all illegal means to eject respondents from the subject property. Respondents
prayed for the declaration of nullity of the Kasunduan and for an order for Eugenio to maintain and place them in peaceful possession
and cultivation of the subject property. Respondents likewise demanded payment of damages.2 During trial, respondents presented a
leasehold contract executed between Susana and Godofredo to reaffirm the existing tenancy agreement.3

Eugenio averred that no tenancy relationship existed between him and respondents. He clarified that Godofredo’s occupation of the
subject premises was based on the former’s mere tolerance and accommodation. Eugenio denied signing a tenancy agreement, nor
authorizing any person to sign such an agreement. He maintained that Librada, accompanied by a relative, voluntarily affixed her
signature to the Kasunduan and that she was fully aware of the contents of the document. Moreover, Librada received P50,000.00 from
Eugenio on the same day of the execution of the Kasunduan. Eugenio also questioned the jurisdiction of the DARAB since the principal
relief sought by respondents is the annulment of the contract, over which jurisdiction is vested on the regular courts. Eugenio also
asserted that Leonida had no legal personality to file the present suit. 4

Based on the evidence submitted by both parties, the Provincial Adjudicator5 concluded that Godofredo was the tenant of Eugenio, and
Librada, being the surviving spouse, should be maintained in peaceful possession of the subject land. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff Librada Mauricio and against defendant
Eugenio R. Reyes and order is hereby issued:

1. Declaring the kasunduan null and void;

2. Ordering defendant to respect the peaceful possession of herein plaintiff Librada Mauricio over the subject landholding;

3. Ordering plaintiff to return the amount of P50,000.00 to herein defendant;

4. No pronouncement as to costs.6

On appeal, two issues were presented to and taken up by the DARAB, namely: (1) Whether or not there is tenancy relation between the
parties; and (2) whether or not the Kasunduan dated 28 September 1994 is valid and enforceable. The DARAB held that the Mauricio’s
are former tenants of Spouses Reyes. It found that when Spouses Reyes died, siblings Eufracia, Susana and Eugenio, among others
inherited the subject property. Under the law, they were subrogated to the rights and substituted to the "obligations" of their late parents
as the agricultural lessors over the farmholding tenanted by respondents. Moreover, the DARAB banked on the Kasunduang Buwisan
sa Sakahan or the leasehold contract executed by Susana in favor of Godofredo to support the tenancy relationship. Furthermore, the
DARAB declared the other Kasunduan as void by relying on the evaluation of the Provincial Adjudicator as to the legal incapacity of
Librada to enter into such a contract.7

Eugenio filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the DARAB on 28 September 2004.8

Aggrieved by the DARAB ruling, Eugenio filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals. On 10 July 2006, the Court of Appeals
issued a resolution regarding the status of Leonida as a legal heir and allowed her to substitute Librada, who died during the pendency
of the case.9 On 10 August 2006, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision and resolution of the DARAB. It sustained the factual
findings of the DARAB with respect to the tenancy relation between Godofredo and Spouses Reyes and the nullity of the Kasunduan.10

Undaunted, Eugenio filed the instant petition. Eugenio submits that no tenancy relationship exists between him and respondents. He
insists that the Kasunduang Buwisan sa Sakahan allegedly executed between Godofredo and Susana in 1993 giving the former the
right to occupy and cultivate the subject property is unenforceable against Eugenio, having been entered into without his knowledge
and consent. Eugenio further asserts that per records of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), no leasehold contract was entered
into by Godofredo and Eugenio with respect to the disputed property. Eugenio attributes error on the part of the Court of Appeals in
concluding that a tenancy relationship existed between the parties despite the absence of some of the essential requisites of a tenancy
relationship such as personal cultivation and the subject land being agricultural. Finally, Eugenio defends the validity of the Kasunduan
entered into between him and Librada wherein the latter agreed to vacate the subject property, in that it was voluntarily entered into and
the contents thereof were mutually understood by the parties.11

In a Resolution dated 7 February 2007, this Court denied the petition for failure to show that the Court of Appeals committed reversible
error in its challenged decision and resolution. The Court also dismissed the issues raised as factual. However, upon filing of a motion
for reconsideration by Eugenio, this Court reinstated the petition and required respondent Leonida to comment on the petition.12

In her comment, respondent prayed for the denial of the petition because the jurisdiction of this Court is limited to review of errors of law
and not of facts.13

In the main, Eugenio insists that no tenancy relationship existed between him and Godofredo. This is a question of fact beyond the
province of this Court in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court in which only questions of law may be raised.14
Absent any of the obtaining exceptions15 to this rule, the findings of facts of the Provincial Adjudicator, as affirmed by DARAB and
especially by the Court of Appeals, are binding on this Court.

The DARAB ruling outlined how the tenancy relationship between Godofredo and the Mauricio’s came about, thus:

This Board, after a thorough evaluation of the evidences, is convinced that the Mauricios are former tenants of the parents of the herein
Defendant-Appeallant. A perusal of Exhibit "H" which is the Tax Declaration of the property in controversy proves that upon the death of
the parents of Defendant-Appellant, the property was the subject matter of their extra-judicial partition/settlement and this property was
initially under the ownership of the appellant’s sisters, Eufracia and Susana Reyes until the same property was finally
acquired/transferred in the name of Respondent-Appellant. Obviously, in order to re-affirm the fact that the Mauricios are really the
tenants, Susana Reyes had voluntarily executed the Leasehold Contract with Godofredo Librada being the tenant on the property and
to prove that she (Susana Reyes) was the predecessor-in-interest of Respondent-Appeallant Eugenio Reyes. x x x. The "Kasunduang
Buwisan sa Sakahan" alleging that their tenancy relationship began in the year 1973 and their agreement as to the rental shall remain
until further revised.16

This is a contest of "Kasunduans." Respondents rely on a Kasunduan of tenancy. Petitioners swear by a Kasunduan of termination of
tenancy.

Librada claims that her late husband had been working on the land since 1936 until his death in 1994. She presented the Kasunduang
Buwisan sa Sakahan dated 26 May 1993 and executed by Godofredo and Susana which reaffirmed the leasehold tenancy over the
subject land. On the other hand, Eugenio disputes the claims of Librada and presented another Kasunduan executed between him and
Librada on 28 September 1994 which effectively terminates the leasehold tenancy when the latter allegedly agreed to vacate the
subject premises in exchange of monetary considerations.

This second Kasunduan is the subject of the instant complaint. In its disquisition, the DARAB nullified the second Kasunduan, to wit:

x x x Insofar as this "Kasunduan" is concerned, and after reading the transcript of the testimony of the old woman Librada Mauricio, this
Board is convinced that indeed the purpose of the document was to eject her from the farmholding but that Librada Mauricio wanted to
return the money she received because the contents of the document was never explained to her being illiterate who cannot even read
or write. This Board is even further convinced after reading the transcript of the testimonies that while the document was allegedly
signed by the parties in Turo, Bocaue, Bulacan, the same document was notarized in Pasig, Metro Manila, thus, the Notary Public was
not in a position to explain much less ascertain the veracity of the contents of the alleged "Kasunduan" as to whether or not Plaintiff-
Appellee Librada Mauricio had really understood the contents thereof. This Board further adheres to the principle that it cannot
substitute its own evaluation of the testimony of the witnesses with that of the personal evaluation of the Adjudicator a quo who, in the
case at bar, had the best opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witness Librada Mauricio while testifying on the circumstances
relevant to the execution of the alleged "Kasunduan." Furthermore, this Board adheres to the principle that in all contractual, property or
other relations, when one of the parties is at a disadvantage on account of his moral dependence, ignorance, mental weakness or other
handicap, the courts (and in the case at bar, this Board) must be vigilant for his protection (Art. 24, New Civil Code). In the case at bar,
Plaintiff-Appellee is already eighty-one (81) years old who can neither read nor write, thus, she just simply signs her name with her
thumbmark.17

Applying the principle that only questions of law may be entertained by this Court, we defer to the factual ruling of the Provincial
Adjudicator, as affirmed by DARAB and the Court of Appeals, which clearly had the opportunity to closely examine the witnesses and
their demeanor on the witness stand.

Assuming that the leasehold contract between Susana and Godofredo is void, our conclusion remains. We agree with the Court of
Appeals that a tenancy relationship cannot be extinguished by mere expiration of term or period in a leasehold contract; or by the sale,
alienation or the transfer of legal possession of the landholding. Section 9 of Republic Act No. 1199 or the Agricultural Tenancy Act
provides:

SECTION 9. Severance of Relationship. — The tenancy relationship is extinguished by the voluntary surrender of the land by, or the
death or incapacity of, the tenant, but his heirs or the members of his immediate farm household may continue to work the land until the
close of the agricultural year. The expiration of the period of the contract as fixed by the parties, and the sale or alienation of the land
does not of themselves extinguish the relationship. In the latter case, the purchaser or transferee shall assume the rights and
obligations of the former landholder in relation to the tenant. In case of death of the landholder, his heir or heirs shall likewise assume
his rights and obligations. (Emphasis supplied)

Moreover, Section 10 of Republic Act No. 3844 (Code of Agrarian Reforms of the Philippines) likewise provides:

SEC. 10. Agricultural Leasehold Relation Not Extinguished by Expiration of Period, etc. — The agricultural leasehold relation under this
Code shall not be extinguished by mere expiration of the term or period in a leasehold contract nor by the sale, alienation or transfer of
the legal possession of the landholding. In case the agricultural lessor sells, alienates or transfers the legal possession of the
landholding, the purchaser or transferee thereof shall be subrogated to the rights and substituted to the obligations of the agricultural
lessor. (Emphasis supplied)

As an incidental issue, Leonida’s legal standing as a party was also assailed by Eugenio.1avvphi1 Eugenio submitted that the
complaint was rendered moot with the death of Librada, Godofredo’s sole compulsory heir. Eugenio contended that Leonida is a mere
ward of Godofredo and Librada, thus, not a legal heir.18

We are in full accord with the Court of Appeals when it ruled that Eugenio cannot collaterally attack the status of Leonida in the instant
petition.19

It is settled law that filiation cannot be collaterally attacked.20 Well-known civilista Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino, in his book "Civil Code of the
Philippines, Commentaries and Jurisprudence," noted that the aforecited doctrine is rooted from the provisions of the Civil Code of the
Philippines. He explained thus:

The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of defense or as a collateral issue in another action for a different purpose. The
necessity of an independent action directly impugning the legitimacy is more clearly expressed in the Mexican code (article 335) which
provides: "The contest of the legitimacy of a child by the husband or his heirs must be made by proper complaint before the competent
court; any contest made in any other way is void." This principle applies under our Family Code. Articles 170 and 171 of the code
confirm this view, because they refer to "the action to impugn the legitimacy." This action can be brought only by the husband or his
heirs and within the periods fixed in the present articles.21

In Braza v. City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental,22 the Court stated that legitimacy and filiation can be
questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through collateral attack.23

The same rule is applied to adoption such that it cannot also be made subject to a collateral attack. In Reyes v. Sotero,24 this Court
reiterated that adoption cannot be assailed collaterally in a proceeding for the settlement of a decedent’s estate.25 Furthermore, in
Austria v. Reyes,26 the Court declared that the legality of the adoption by the testatrix can be assailed only in a separate action brought
for that purpose and cannot be subject to collateral attack.27

Against these jurisprudential backdrop, we have to leave out the status of Leonida from the case for annulment of the "Kasunduan" that
supposedly favors petitioners’ cause.

WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing premises, the instant petition for review on certiorari is DENIED and the Decision dated 10
August 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87148 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

LEE VS. CA

FACTS:

Spouses Lee Tek Sheng (Lee) and Keh Shiok Cheng (Keh) entered the Philippines in the 1930s as immigrants from China. They had
11 children, namely, Rita K. Lee, Leoncio K. Lee, Lucia K. Lee-Ong, Julian K. Lee, Martin K. Lee, Rosa Lee-Vanderlek, Melody Lee-
Chin, Henry K. Lee, Natividad Lee-Miguel, Victoriano K. Lee, and Thomas K. Lee (collectively, the Lee-Keh children).

In 1948, Lee brought from China a young woman named Tiu Chuan (Tiu), supposedly to serve as housemaid. The respondent Lee-Keh
children believe that Tiu left the Lee-Keh household, moved into another property of Lee nearby, and had a relation with him.

Shortly after Keh died in 1989, the Lee-Keh children learned that Tiu’s children with Lee (collectively, the Lee’s other children) claimed
that they, too, were children of Lee and Keh. This prompted the Lee-Keh children to request the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
to investigate the matter. After conducting such an investigation, the NBI concluded in its report:

[I]t is very obvious that the mother of these 8 children is certainly not KEH SHIOK CHENG, but a much younger woman, most probably
TIU CHUAN. Upon further evaluation and analysis by these Agents, LEE TEK SHENG is in a quandary in fixing the age of KEH SHIOK
CHENG possibly to conform with his grand design of making his 8 children as their own legitimate children, consequently elevating the
status of his second family and secure their future. The doctor lamented that this complaint would not have been necessary had not the
father and his second family kept on insisting that the 8 children are the legitimate children of KEH SHIOK CHENG.1

The NBI found, for example, that in the hospital records, the eldest of the Lee’s other children, Marcelo Lee (who was recorded as the
12th child of Lee and Keh), was born of a 17-year-old mother, when Keh was already 38 years old at the time. Another of the Lee’s
other children, Mariano Lee, was born of a 23-year-old mother, when Keh was then already 40 years old, and so forth. In other words,
by the hospital records of the Lee’s other children, Keh’s declared age did not coincide with her actual age when she supposedly gave
birth to such other children, numbering eight.

On the basis of this report, the respondent Lee-Keh children filed two separate petitions, one of them before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Caloocan City2 in Special Proceeding C-1674 for the deletion from the certificate of live birth of the petitioner Emma Lee, one
of Lee’s other children, the name Keh and replace the same with the name Tiu to indicate her true mother’s name.

In April 2005 the Lee-Keh children filed with the RTC an ex parte request for the issuance of a subpoena ad testificandum to compel
Tiu, Emma Lee’s presumed mother, to testify in the case. The RTC granted the motion but Tiu moved to quash the subpoena, claiming
that it was oppressive and violated Section 25, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the rule on parental privilege, she being Emma Lee’s
stepmother.3 On August 5, 2005 the RTC quashed the subpoena it issued for being unreasonable and oppressive considering that Tiu
was already very old and that the obvious object of the subpoena was to badger her into admitting that she was Emma Lee’s mother.

Because the RTC denied the Lee-Keh children’s motion for reconsideration, they filed a special civil action of certiorari before the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP 92555. On December 29, 2006 the CA rendered a decision,4 setting aside the RTC’s August 5, 2005
Order. The CA ruled that only a subpoena duces tecum, not a subpoena ad testificandum, may be quashed for being oppressive or
unreasonable under Section 4, Rule 21 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. The CA also held that Tiu’s advanced age alone does not
render her incapable of testifying. The party seeking to quash the subpoena for that reason must prove that she would be unable to
withstand the rigors of trial, something that petitioner Emma Lee failed to do.

Since the CA denied Emma Lee’s motion for reconsideration by resolution of May 8, 2007,5 she filed the present petition with this
Court.

The Question Presented

The only question presented in this case is whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the trial court may compel Tiu to testify in the
correction of entry case that respondent Lee-Keh children filed for the correction of the certificate of birth of petitioner Emma Lee to
show that she is not Keh’s daughter.

The Ruling of the Court

Petitioner Emma Lee claims that the RTC correctly quashed the subpoena ad testificandum it issued against Tiu on the ground that it
was unreasonable and oppressive, given the likelihood that the latter would be badgered on oral examination concerning the Lee-Keh
children’s theory that she had illicit relation with Lee and gave birth to the other Lee children.

But, as the CA correctly ruled, the grounds cited—unreasonable and oppressive—are proper for subpoena ad duces tecum or for the
production of documents and things in the possession of the witness, a command that has a tendency to infringe on the right against
invasion of privacy. Section 4, Rule 21 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, thus provides:

SECTION 4. Quashing a subpoena. — The court may quash a subpoena duces tecum upon motion promptly made and, in any event,
at or before the time specified therein if it is unreasonable and oppressive, or the relevancy of the books, documents or things does not
appear, or if the person in whose behalf the subpoena is issued fails to advance the reasonable cost of the production thereof.

Notably, the Court previously decided in the related case of Lee v. Court of Appeals6 that the Lee-Keh children have the right to file the
action for correction of entries in the certificates of birth of Lee’s other children, Emma Lee included. The Court recognized that the
ultimate object of the suit was to establish the fact that Lee’s other children were not children of Keh. Thus:

It is precisely the province of a special proceeding such as the one outlined under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court to establish
the status or right of a party, or a particular fact. The petitions filed by private respondents for the correction of entries in the petitioners'
records of birth were intended to establish that for physical and/or biological reasons it was impossible for Keh Shiok Cheng to have
conceived and given birth to the petitioners as shown in their birth records. Contrary to petitioners' contention that the petitions before
the lower courts were actually actions to impugn legitimacy, the prayer therein is not to declare that petitioners are illegitimate children
of Keh Shiok Cheng, but to establish that the former are not the latter's children. There is nothing to impugn as there is no blood relation
at all between Keh Shiok Cheng and petitioners.7 (Underscoring supplied)

Taking in mind the ultimate purpose of the Lee-Keh children’s action, obviously, they would want Tiu to testify or admit that she is the
mother of Lee’s other children, including petitioner Emma Lee. Keh had died and so could not give testimony that Lee’s other children
were not hers. The Lee-Keh children have, therefore, a legitimate reason for seeking Tiu’s testimony and, normally, the RTC cannot
deprive them of their right to compel the attendance of such a material witness.

But petitioner Emma Lee raises two other objections to requiring Tiu to come to court and testify: a) considering her advance age,
testifying in court would subject her to harsh physical and emotional stresses; and b) it would violate her parental right not to be
compelled to testify against her stepdaughter.

1. Regarding the physical and emotional punishment that would be inflicted on Tiu if she were compelled at her age and condition to
come to court to testify, petitioner Emma Lee must establish this claim to the satisfaction of the trial court. About five years have passed
from the time the Lee-Keh children sought the issuance of a subpoena for Tiu to appear before the trial court. The RTC would have to
update itself and determine if Tiu’s current physical condition makes her fit to undergo the ordeal of coming to court and being
questioned. If she is fit, she must obey the subpoena issued to her.
Tiu has no need to worry that the oral examination might subject her to badgering by adverse counsel. The trial court’s duty is to protect
every witness against oppressive behavior of an examiner and this is especially true where the witness is of advanced age.8

2. Tiu claimed before the trial court the right not to testify against her stepdaughter, petitioner Emma Lee, invoking Section 25, Rule 130
of the Rules of Evidence, which reads:

SECTION 25. Parental and filial privilege.- No person may be compelled to testify against his parents, other direct ascendants, children
or other direct descendants.

The above is an adaptation from a similar provision in Article 315 of the Civil Code that applies only in criminal cases. But those who
revised the Rules of Civil Procedure chose to extend the prohibition to all kinds of actions, whether civil, criminal, or administrative, filed
against parents and other direct ascendants or descendants.

But here Tiu, who invokes the filial privilege, claims that she is the stepmother of petitioner Emma Lee. The privilege cannot apply to
them because the rule applies only to "direct" ascendants and descendants, a family tie connected by a common ancestry.1avvphi1 A
stepdaughter has no common ancestry by her stepmother. Article 965 thus provides:

Art. 965. The direct line is either descending or ascending. The former unites the head of the family with those who descend from him.
The latter binds a person with those from whom he descends.

Consequently, Tiu can be compelled to testify against petitioner Emma Lee.

LUCAS VS. LUCAS

FACTS:

FACTS:

Petitioner, Jesse Lucas filed a Petition to Establish Filiation with a Motion for the Submission of Parties to DNA Testing before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC). Jesse alleged that he is the son of his mother Elsie who got acquainted with respondent, Jesus S. Lucas in
Manila. He also submitted documents which include (a) petitioner’s certificate of live birth; (b) petitioner’s baptismal certificate; (c)
petitioner’s college diploma, showing that he graduated from Saint Louis University in Baguio City with a degree in Psychology; (d) his
Certificate of Graduation from the same school; (e) Certificate of Recognition from the University of the Philippines, College of Music;
and (f) clippings of several articles from different newspapers about petitioner, as a musical prodigy.

Jesus learned of this and he filed a Special Appearance and Comment manifesting that the petition was adversarial in nature and
therefore summons should be served on him. Meanwhile, Jesse filed a Very Urgent Motion to Try and Hear the Case which the RTC
found to be sufficient in form and hence set the case for hearing. Jesus filed a Motion for Reconsideration arguing that DNA testing
cannot be had on the basis of a mere allegation pointing to him as Jesse’s father.

Acting on Jesus’ Motion for Reconsideration, the RTC dismissed the case and held that Jesse failed to establish compliance with the
four procedural aspects for a paternity action enumerated in the case of Herrera v. Alba namely, a prima facie case, affirmative
defences, presumption of legitimacy, and physical resemblance between the putative father and the child.

This prompted Jesse to file a Motion for Reconsideration which the RTC granted. A new hearing was scheduled where the RTC held
that ruling on the grounds relied upon by Jesse for filing the instant petition is premature considering that a full-blown trial has not yet
taken place. Jesus filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the RTC. He then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court
of Appeals (CA). The CA ruled in favour of Jesus, it noted that Jesse failed to show that the four significant aspects of a traditional
paternity action had been met and held that DNA testing should not be allowed when the petitioner has failed to establish a prima facie
case.

ISSUE:

Whether aprima facie showing is necessary before a court can issue a DNA testing order

HELD:

Yes, but it is not yet time to discuss the lack ofa prima facie case vis-à-vis the motion for DNA testing since no evidence has, as yet,
been presented by petitioner.

RATIO:

Misapplication of Herrera v. Alba by the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals. The statement in Herrera v. Alba that there are
four significant procedural aspects in a traditional paternity case which parties have to face has been widely misunderstood and
misapplied in this case. A party is confronted by these so-called procedural aspects during trial, when the parties have presented their
respective evidence. They are matters of evidence that cannot be determined at this initial stage of the proceedings, when only the
petition to establish filiation has been filed. The CA’s observation that petitioner failed to establish a prima facie case is herefore
misplaced. A prima facie case is built by a party’s evidence and not by mere allegations in the initiatory pleading.
Section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence merely provides for conditions that are aimed to safeguard the accuracy and integrity of the
DNA testing. It states that the appropriate court may, at any time, either motu proprio or on application of any person, who has a legal
interest in the matter in litigation, order a DNA testing. Such order shall issue after due hearing and notice to the parties upon a showing
of the following: (a) A biological sample exists that is relevant to the case;(b) The biological sample: (i) was not previously subjected to
the type of DNA testing now requested; or (ii) was previously subjected to DNA testing, but the results may require confirmation for
good reasons; (c) The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid technique; (d) The DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce new
information that is relevant to the proper resolution of the case; and (e) The existence of other factors, if any, which the court may
consider as potentially affecting the accuracy or integrity of the DNA testing. This Rule shall not preclude a DNA testing, without need of
a prior court order, at the behest of any party, including law enforcement agencies, before a suit or proceeding is commenced. This
does not mean, however, that a DNA testing order will be issued as a matter of right if, during the hearing, the said conditions are
established.

In some states, to warrant the issuance of the DNA testing order, there must be a show cause hearing wherein the applicant must first
present sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case or a reasonable possibility of paternity or “good cause” for the holding of the
test. In these states, a court order for blood testing is considered a “search,” which, under their Constitutions (as in ours), must be
preceded by a finding of probable cause in order to be valid. Hence, the requirement of a prima facie case, or reasonable possibility,
was imposed in civil actions as a counterpart of a finding of probable cause. Courts in various jurisdictions have differed regarding the
kind of procedures which are required, but those jurisdictions have almost universally found that a preliminary showing must be made
before a court can constitutionally order compulsory blood testing in paternity cases. We agree, and find that, as a preliminary matter,
before the court may issue an order for compulsory blood testing, the moving party must show that there is a reasonable possibility of
paternity. As explained hereafter, in cases in which paternity is contested and a party to the action refuses to voluntarily undergo a
blood test, a show cause hearing must be held in which the court can determine whether there is sufficient evidence to establish a
prima facie case which warrants issuance of a court order for blood testing The same condition precedent should be applied in our
jurisdiction to protect the putative father from mere harassment suits. Thus, during the hearing on the motion for DNA testing, the
petitioner must present prima facie evidence or establish a reasonable possibility of paternity.”

LIYAO VS. BANHOTI-LIYAO

FACTS:

William Liyao Jr., the illegitimate son of the deceased, as represented by her mother (Corazon), filed a petition ordering Juanita Tanhoti-
Liyao, Pearl L. Tan, Tita L. Tan and Linda Liyao to recognize and acknowledge the former as a compulsory heir of the deceased and to
be entitled to all successional rights. Liyao Jr. was in continuous possession and enjoyment of the status as the child of the deceased
having been recognized and acknowledged as such child by the decedent during his lifetime. There were two sides of the story.
Corazon G. Garcia is legally married to but living separately from Ramon M. Yulo for more than ten (10) years at the time of the
institution of the said civil case. Corazon cohabited with the late William Liyao from 1965 up to the time of William’s untimely demise on
December 2, 1975. They lived together in the company of Corazon’s two (2) children from her subsisting marriage. On the other hand,
one of the children of the deceased stated that her mom and the deceased were legally married and that her parents were not
separated legally or in fact.

ISSUE:

WON the petitioner can impugn his own legitimacy to be able to claim from the estate of the deceased.

RULING:

Under the New Civil Code, a child born and conceived during a valid marriage is presumed to be legitimate. The presumption of
legitimacy of children does not only flow out from a declaration contained in the statute but is based on the broad principles of natural
justice and the supposed virtue of the mother. The presumption is grounded in a policy to protect innocent offspring from the odium of
illegitimacy.The presumption of legitimacy of the child, however, is not conclusive and consequently, may be overthrown by evidence to
the contrary. Hence, Article 255 of the New Civil Code provides:

Article 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty days following the celebration of the marriage, and before three hundred days
following its dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate.

Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other than that of the physical impossibility of the husband having access to his
wife within the first one hundred and twenty days of the three hundred which preceded the birth of the child.

This physical impossibility may be caused:

1)By the impotence of the husband;

2) By the fact that husband and wife were living separately in such a way that access was not possible;

3) By the serious illness of the husband.

The fact that Corazon Garcia had been living separately from her husband, Ramon Yulo, at the time petitioner was conceived and born
is of no moment. While physical impossibility for the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife is one of the grounds for
impugning the legitimacy of the child, it bears emphasis that the grounds for impugning the legitimacy of the child mentioned in Article
255 of the Civil Code may only be invoked by the husband, or in proper cases, his heirs under the conditions set forth under Article 262
of the Civil Code. Impugning the legitimacy of the child is a strictly personal right of the husband, or in exceptional cases, his heirs for
the simple reason that he is the one directly confronted with the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produces and he
should be the one to decide whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it in view of the moral and economic interest involved. It is only
in exceptional cases that his heirs are allowed to contest such legitimacy. Outside of these cases, none – even his heirs – can impugn
legitimacy; that would amount of an insult to his memory.

Furthermore, the court held that there was no clear, competent and positive evidence presented by the petitioner that his alleged father
had admitted or recognized his paternity.

BABIERA VS. CATOTAL

FACTS:

Presentacion B. Catotal filed a petition for the cancellation of the entry of birth of Teofista Babiera. From the petition filed, Presentacion
asserted the following:

that she was the only surviving child of the late spouses Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena Cariñosa, who died on May 26, 1996 and
July 6, 1990 respectively;
that on September 20, 1996 a baby girl was delivered by “hilot” in the house of spouses Eugenio and Hermogena Babiera and without
the knowledge of said spouses, Flora Guinto, the mother of the child and a housemaid of spouses Eugenio and Hermogena Babiera,
caused the registration/recording of the facts of birth of her child, by simulating that she was the child of the spouses Eugenio, then 65
years old and Hermogena, then 54 years old, and made Hermogena Babiera appear as the mother by forging her signature that
petitioner, then 15 years old, saw with her own eyes and personally
witnessed Flora Guinto give birth to Teofista Guinto, in their house, assisted by “hilot”;
that the birth certificate of Teofista Guinto is void ab initio, as it was totally a simulated birth, signature of informant forged, and it
contained false
Teofista filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that “the petition states no cause of action, it being an attack on the legitimacy of the
respondent as the child of the spouses Eugenio Babiera and HermogenaCariñosaBabiera; that plaintiff has no legal capacity to file the
instant petition pursuant to Article 171 of the Family Code; and finally that the instant petition is barred by prescription in accordance
with Article 170 of the Family Code.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a certificate of live birth is sufficient to establish the legitimacy of a child regardless of the fact that the same is obtained
by fraud or that it contained some irregularities

RULING:

No. The present case alleged and showed that Hermogena did not give birth to petitioner. The prayer was not to declare that petitioner
was an illegitimate child of Hermogena, but to establish that the former was not the latter’s child at all. The action did not impugn
petitioner’s filiation to Spouses Eugenio and Hermogena Babiera, because there was no blood relation to impugn in the first place.

While it is true that an official document such as petitioner’s Birth Certificate enjoys the presumption of regularity, the specific facts
attendant in the case, as well as the totality of the evidence presented during trial, sufficiently negate such presumption. First, there
were already irregularities regarding the Birth Certificate itself. It was not signed by the local civil registrar. More important, the Court of
Appeals observed that the mother’s signature therein was different from her signatures in other documents presented during the trial.

The circumstances surrounding the birth of petitioner show that Hermogena was not the former’s real mother. There was no evidence of
Hermogena’s pregnancy, such as medical records and doctor’s prescriptions, other than the Birth Certificate itself. Moreover, at the time
of her supposed birth, Hermogena was already 54 years old. Even if it were possible for her to have given birth at such a late age, it
was highly suspicious that she did so in her own home, when her advanced age necessitated proper medical care normally available
only in a hospital. The most significant piece of evidence, however, was the deposition of Hermogena Babiera which stated that she did
not give birth to petitioner, and that the latter was neither hers nor her husband Eugenio’s.

BENITEZ-BADUA VS. CA

FACTS:

Spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian had various properties. They both died intestate. The special proceedings for
administration of the properties were filed with the trial court. Vicente's sister Victoria B. Lirio filed for issuance of letters of
administration in favor of the nephew. Marissa opposed the petition, saying that she is the sole heir of deceased Vicente and that she is
capable of administering his estate. She submitted the pieces of documentary evidence and testified that the spouses treated her as
their own daughter. The relatives of Vicente tried to prove through testimonial evidence, that the spouses failed to beget a child during
their marriage. Victoria categorically declared that Marissa was not the biological child of the spouses who were unable to physically
procreate.

Trial court relied on Arts. 166 and 170 of the Family Code and ruled in favor of Marissa. On appeal, the CA reversed the lower court
decision and declared Marissa Benitez-Badua is not the biological child of the late spouses.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Marissa Benitez-Badua is the legitimate child and the sole heir of the late spouses.

RULING:
No. The SC find no merit to the petition.

Articles 164, 166, 170 and 171 of the Family Code cannot be applied in the case at bar. The above provisions do not contemplate a
situation where a child is alleged not to be the biological child of a certain couple.

In Article 166, it is the husband who can impugn the legitimacy of the child by:
(1) it was physically impossible for him to have sexual intercourse, with his wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which
immediately preceded the birth of the child;
(2) that for biological or other scientific reasons, the child could not have been his child;

(3) that in case of children conceived through artificial insemination, the written authorization or ratification by either parent was
obtained through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation or undue influence.

Articles 170 and 171 speak of the prescription period within which the husband or any of his heirs should file an action impugning the
legitimacy of the child. In this case, it is not where the heirs of the late Vicente are contending that Marissa is not his child or a child by
Isabel, but they are contending that Marissa was not born to Vicente and Isabel.

Marissa was not the biological child of the dead spouses. Marissa's Certificate of Live Birth was repudiated by the Deed of Extra-
Judicial Settlement of the Estate of the late Isabel by Vicente, saying that he and his brother-in-law are the sole heirs of the estate.

HEIRS OR ROLDAN VS. ROLDAN

FACTS:

Natalia Magtulis6 owned Lot No. 4696, an agricultural land in Kalibo, Aklan, which had an area of 21,739 square meters, and was
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-7711.7 Her heirs included Gilberto Roldan and Silvela Roldan, her two children by her first
marriage; and, allegedly, Leopolda Magtulis her child with another man named Juan Aguirre.8 After her death in 1961, Natalia left the
lot to her children. However, Gilberta and his heirs took possession of the property to the exclusion of respondents.

On 19 May 2003, respondents filed before the RTC a Complaint for Partition and Damages against petitioners.9 The latter refused to
yield the property on these grounds: (1) respondent heirs of Silvela had already sold her share to Gilberto; and (2) respondent heirs of
Leopolda had no cause of action, given that he was not a child of Natalia.

During trial, petitioners failed to show any document evidencing the sale of Silvela's share to Gilberto. Thus, in its Decision dated 14
December 2007, the RTC ruled that the heirs of Silvela remained co-owners of the property they had inherited from Natalia. As regards
Leopoldo Magtulis, the trial court concluded that he was a son of Natalia based on his Certificate of Baptism10 and Marriage
Contract.11

Considering that Gilberta, Silvela, and Leopolda were all descendants of Natalia, the RTC declared each set of their respective heirs
entitled to one-third share of the property. Consequently, it ordered petitioners to account and deliver to respondents their equal share
to the produce of the land.

Petitioners appealed to the CA. They reiterated that Silvela had sold her share of the property to her brother Gilberta. They asserted
that the RTC could not have considered Leopolda the son of Natalia on the mere basis of his Certificate of Baptism. Emphasizing that
filiation required a high standard of proof, petitioners argued that the baptismal certificate of Leopoldo served only as evidence of the
administration of the sacrament.

In its Decision dated 20 December 2011, the CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC that Gilberto, Silvela, and Leopoldo remained co-owners
of Lot No. 4696. The appellate court refused to conclude that Silvela had sold her shares to Gilberto without any document evidencing a
sales transaction. It also held that Leopoldo was the son of Natalia, since his Certificate of Baptism and Marriage Contract indicated her
as his mother.

Petitioner heirs of Gilberto moved for reconsideration,12 but to no avail. Before this Court, they reiterate that Silvela sold her shares to
Gilberto, and that Leopoldo was not the son of Natalia. They emphasize that the certificates of baptism and marriage do not prove
Natalia to be the mother of Leopoldo since these documents were executed without her participation.

Petitioners additionally contend that respondents lost their rights over the property, since the action for partition was lodged before the
RTC only in 2003, or 42 years since Gilberto occupied the property in 1961. For the heirs of Gilberto, prescription and laches already
preclude the heirs of Silvela and the heirs of Leopoldo from claiming co-ownership over Lot No. 4696.

In their Comment,13 respondents assert that the arguments raised by petitioners involve questions of fact not cognizable by this Court.
As regards the issue of prescription and laches, they insist that petitioners cannot invoke a new theory for the first time on appeal.

ISSUES OF THE CASE

The following issues are presented to this Court for resolution:

1. Whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC's finding that Silvela did not sell her share of the property to Gilberto

2. Whether the courts a quo correctly appreciated Leopoldo to be the son of Natalia based on his baptismal and marriage certificates

3. Whether prescription and laches bar respondents from claiming coownership over Lot No. 4696

RULING OF THE COURT

Sale of the Shares of Silvela to Gilberto

Petitioners argue before us that Silvela had a perfected contract of sale with Gilberto over her shares of Lot No. 4696. That argument is
obviously a question of fact,14 as it delves into the truth of whether she conveyed her rights in favor of her brother.

The assessment of the existence of the sale requires the calibration of the evidence on record and the probative weight thereof. The
RTC, as affirmed by the CA, already performed its function and found that the heirs of Gilberto had not presented any document or
witness to prove the fact of sale.

The factual determination of courts, when adopted and confirmed by the CA, is final and conclusive on this Court except if unsupported
by the evidence on record.15 In this case, the exception does not apply, as petitioners merely alleged that Silvela "sold, transferred and
conveyed her share in the land in question to Gilberto Roldan for a valuable consideration" without particularizing the details or referring
to any proof of the transaction.16 Therefore, we sustain the conclusion that she remains coowner of Lot No. 4696.

Filiation of Leopoldo to Natalia

In resolving the issue of filiation, the RTC and the CA referred to Articles 172 and 175 of the Family Code, viz.:
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:

(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:

(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.

The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the action is based on the second paragraph
of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
The parties concede that there is no record of Leopolda's birth in either the National Statistics Office17 or in the Office of the Municipal
Registrar of Kalibo, Aklan.18 The RTC and the CA then referred to other means to prove the status of Leopoldo: his Certificate of
Baptism and his Marriage Contract. Since both documents indicate Natalia as the mother of Leopoldo, the courts a quo concluded that
respondent heirs of Leopoldo had sufficiently proven the filiation of their ancestor to the original owner of Lot No. 4696. For this reason,
the RTC and the CA maintained that the heirs of Leopoldo are entitled to an equal share of the property, together with the heirs of
Gilberto and heirs of Silvela.

We disagree.

Jurisprudence has already assessed the probative value of baptismal certificates. In Fernandez v. Court of Appeals,19 which referred to
our earlier rulings in Berciles v. Government Service Insurance System20 and Macadangdang v. Court of Appeals,21 the Court
explained that because the putative parent has no hand in the preparation of a baptismal certificate, that document has scant
evidentiary value. The canonical certificate is simply a proof of the act to which the priest may certify, i.e., the administration of the
sacrament. In other words, a baptismal certificate is "no proof of the declarations in the record with respect to the parentage of the child
baptized, or of prior and distinct facts which require separate and concrete evidence."22

In cases that followed Fernandez, we reiterated that a baptismal certificate is insufficient to prove filiation.23 But in Makati Shangri-La
Hotel and Resort, Inc. v. Harper,24 this Court clarified that a baptismal certificate has evidentiary value to prove kinship "if considered
alongside other evidence of filiation."25 Therefore, to resolve one's lineage, courts must peruse other pieces of evidence instead of
relying only on a canonical record. By way of example, we have considered the combination of testimonial evidence,26 family
pictures,27 as well as family books or charts,28 alongside the baptismal certificates of the claimants, in proving kinship.

In this case, the courts below did not appreciate any other material proof related to the baptismal certificate of Leopoldo that would
establish his filiation with Natalia, whether as a legitimate or as an illegitimate son.

The only other document considered by the RTC and the CA was the Marriage Contract of Leopoldo. But, like his baptismal certificate,
his Marriage Contract also lacks probative value as the latter was prepared without the participation of Natalia. In Reyes v. Court of
Appeals,29 we held that even if the marriage contract therein stated that the alleged father of the bride was the bride's father, that
document could not be taken as evidence of filiation, because it was not signed by the alleged father of the bride.

The instant case is similar to an issue raised in Paa v. Chan.30 The claimant in that case relied upon baptismal and marriage
certificates to argue filiation. The Court said:
As regards the baptismal and marriage certificates of Leoncio Chan, the same are not competent evidence to prove that he was the
illegitimate child of Bartola Maglaya by a Chinese father. While these certificates may be considered public documents, they are
evidence only to prove the administration of the sacraments on the dates therein specified - which in this case were the baptism and
marriage, respectively, of Leoncio Chan - but not the veracity of the statements or declarations made therein with respect to his kinsfolk
and/or citizenship.
All told, the Baptismal Certificate and the Marriage Contract of Leopoldo, which merely stated that Natalia is his mother, are inadequate
to prove his filiation with the property owner. Moreover, by virtue of these documents alone, the RTC and the CA could not have justly
concluded that Leopoldo and his successors-in-interest were entitled to a one-third share of the property left by Natalia, equal to that of
each of her undisputed legitimate children Gilberto and Silvela. As held in Board of Commissioners v. Dela Rosa,31 a baptismal
certificate is certainly not proof of the status of legitimacy or illegitimacy of the claimant. Therefore, the CA erred in presuming the
hereditary rights of Leopoldo to be equal to those of the legitimate heirs of Natalia.

Prescription and Laches

According to petitioners, prescription and laches have clearly set in given their continued occupation of the property in the last 42 years.
Prescription cannot be appreciated against the co-owners of a property, absent any conclusive act of repudiation made clearly known to
the other coowners.32

Here, petitioners merely allege that the purported co-ownership "was already repudiated by one of the parties" without supporting
evidence. Aside from the mere passage of time, there was failure on the part of petitioners to substantiate their allegation of laches by
proving that respondents slept on their rights.33 Nevertheless, had they done so, two grounds deter them from successfully claiming
the existence of prescription and laches.

First, as demanded by the repudiation requisite for prescription to be appreciated, there is a need to determine the veracity of factual
matters such as the date when the period to bring the action commenced to run. In Macababbad, Jr. v. Masirag,34 we considered that
determination as factual in nature. The same is true in relation to finding the existence of laches. We held in Crisostomo v. Garcia, Jr.35
that matters like estoppel, laches, and fraud require the presentation of evidence and the determination of facts. Since petitions for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as in this case, entertain questions of law,36 petitioners claim of prescription
and laches fail.

Second, petitioners have alleged prescription and laches only before this Court. Raising a new ground for the first time on appeal
contravenes due process, as that act deprives the adverse party of the opportunity to contest the assertion of the claimant.37 Since
respondents were not able to refute the issue of prescription and laches, this Court denies the newly raised contention of petitioners.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner heirs of Gilberto Roldan is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Court of
Appeals Decision and Resolution in CA-G.R. CEB-CV No. 02327 are hereby MODIFIED to read as follows:

1. Only the heirs of Gilberta Roldan and Silvela Roldan are declared co-owners of the land covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-
7711, which should be partitioned among them in the following proportions:
a. One-half share to the heirs of Gilberta Roldan; and
b. One-half share to the heirs of Silvela Roldan.
2. Petitioners are ordered to account for and deliver to the heirs of Silvela Roldan their one-half share on the produce of the land.

THE ROMAN CATHOLIC VS, PRUDENCIO

FACTS:

Felipe Prudencio (Felipe) married twice during his lifetime. With his first wife, Elena Antonio (Elena), he begot five (5) children, namely:
Valentina, Eusebia, Paula, Florentina and Avelina. With his second wife, Teodora Abad (Teodora), he had two (2) children namely:
Felipe Prudencio, Jr. (Prudencio, Jr.) and Leonora.5

During the marriage of Felipe and Elena, they acquired a 13.0476 hectares (or 130,476 sq. m.) parcel of land located at Sitio Abbot,
Barrio Imurung, Baggao, Cagayan (Cagayan lot), covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 1343.6 When Elena died, Felipe and their
children became co-owners of the property.

Felipe then died intestate during his second marriage. Upon his death, Teodora, Prudencio, Jr. and Leonora executed a Deed of Extra-
Judicial Partition of the Estate of the late Felipe with Waiver of Rights in favor of Teodora (Extra-Judicial Partition). While the Extra-
Judicial Partition acknowledged that the Cagayan lot was acquired during the marriage of Felipe and Elena, it stated that Felipe and
Elena did not have any children who could inherit the property; hence, Teodora and her children with Felipe are the only living heirs by
operation of law.7 The Extra-Judicial Partition also provided that Prudencio, Jr. and Leonora waived their rights over the Cagayan lot in
favor of their mother Teodora.8 It was published in the Daily Mirror on October 22 and 29, 1969 and November 5, 1969.9 Accordingly,
title to the Cagayan lot was transferred to Teodora's name under TCT No. 14306.10
On May 16, 1972, Teodora sold the Cagayan lot to respondents Spouses Isidro Cepeda and Salvacion Divini (Spouses Cepeda). TCT
No. 14306 was therefore cancelled, and TCT No. 184375 was issued in favor of Spouses Cepeda.11

On August 25, 1972, Spouses Cepeda sold the Cagayan lot to petitioner for P16,500.00.12 Thereafter, petitioner was issued TCT No.
T-20084.13

On September 15, 1972, respondents-appellees filed a Complaint for Partition with Reconveyance14 against petitioner, Spouses
Cepeda and Teodora, Prudencio, Jr. and Leonora before the RTC. They alleged that they are the children and grandchildren15 of
Felipe by his first marriage. They asserted that upon the death of Elena, they became the owners of Elena's conjugal share on the
Cagayan lot, while the other undivided half remained with Felipe.16 Upon the death of Felipe, respondents-appellees then became
owners as well of Felipe's conjugal share in the property, together with Teodora, Prudencio, Jr. and Leonora. The Cagayan lot should,
therefore, be distributed as follows:

Florentina Prudencio - 2.5628 HECTARES;

Avelina Prudencio - 2.5628 HECTARES;
Ernesto [Penalber] - 2.5628 HECTARES; and
Rodrigo Talang - 2.5628 HECTARES;
[Total: 10.2512 hectares]

Teodora Abad Vda. De Prudencio - .9319 HECTARE;

Leonora Prudencio - .9219 HECTARE; and
Felipe Prudencio, Jr. - .9319 HECTARE;
[Total: 2.7857 hectares]17
Respondents-appellees posited that they were fraudulently deprived of their rightful shares in the estate of Felipe and Elena when the
Extra-Judicial Partition declared Teodora as the sole owner of the Cagayan lot.18 Thus, they prayed that they be declared the owners
pro indiviso of the undivided portion of 10.2512 hectares of the Cagayan lot, and that this portion be reconveyed to them. They also
sought payment of moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.19

Petitioner filed an Answer with Cross Claim.20 It countered that Spouses Cepeda were in possession of the Cagayan lot at the time
they offered it for sale. It denied knowledge of the existence of any defect over Spouses Cepeda's title.21 Petitioner stated that in fact,
Atty. Pedro R. Perez Jr. (petitioner's lawyer), verified the title and ownership of Spouses Cepeda before it purchased the Cagayan lot.22
Thus, it averred that it was an innocent purchaser for value. Nevertheless, petitioner insisted that Spouses Cepeda should be held
liable for the value of the 10.2562 hectares of the Cagayan lot plus interest and damages, or for the rescission of the sale with
reimbursement of the purchase price plus interest and damages,23 in case the claim for reconveyance of respondents-appellees is
successful. It contended that the Deed of Sale between petitioner and Spouses Cepeda expressly stated that the latter shall answer for
any claim of any other possible heir who might be deprived of their lawful participation in the estate of the original registered owner.24

Spouses Cepeda maintained that their title over the Cagayan lot was clean and that they had no knowledge that other persons had
interest on it because Teodora's title over the property was clean.25cralawred They asserted that like petitioner, they were purchasers
for value and in good faith. Therefore, petitioner has no cause of action against them.26

RTC Ruling

In its Decision27 dated August 15, 2002, the RTC ruled in favor of respondents-appellees, the decretal portion of which reads:

In view of the above consideration, DECISION is hereby rendered:

1. Declaring the Deed of Extra Judicial Partition of the Estate of Felipe Prudencio with Waiver of Rights as null and void;

2. Declaring plaintiffs as owners pro indiviso of the undivided portion of 99,924.6 sq. meters of the land in suit;

3. That the Sale with respect to the 99,924.6 sq. meters conveyed by Teodora Abad to defendants Isidro Cepeda and Salvacion Divini
and later to the Roman Catholic Bishop of Tuguegarao is declared null and void;

4. Ordering defendant Roman Catholic Bishop of Tuguegarao to reconvey to plaintiffs said portion; and

5. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.28

The RTC held that it was impossible for Teodora and her children to not know that Felipe had children/heirs by his first marriage. It
observed that the real property taxes on the Cagayan lot, from 1963 to 1968, were actually paid by respondent-appellee Ernesto
Penalber, the grandson of Felipe by her daughter Valentina.29 Therefore, the execution of the Extra-Judicial Partition was done in bad
faith. In excluding the children of Felipe with Elena, the partition is invalid and not binding upon them.30

The RTC therefore ruled that Teodora can only sell 33,550 sq. m. of the Cagayan lot to Spouses Cepeda. In turn, Spouses Cepeda can
only sell that much to petitioner, for a person cannot give what he does not own.31 Hence, the sale of the Cagayan lot to Spouses
Cepeda and subsequently to petitioner is valid only as to the 33,550 sq. m. share of Teodora. The sale of the remaining 99,924.6 sq.
m., which properly belongs to the respondents-appellees, was void. Petitioner was ordered to reconvey 99,924.6 sq. m. of the Cagayan
lot to respondents-appellees.32

Both petitioner and respondents-appellees appealed to the CA. However, respondents-appellees' appeal was dismissed outright for
failure to file an appellant's brief.33

CA Ruling

The CA found that the sole issue is whether petitioner is a buyer in good faith and for value. In its Decision dated October 21, 2008, the
CA resolved the issue in the negative.

The CA noted that petitioner has the burden of proving that it was a purchaser in good faith, which it failed to discharge. While
petitioner's lawyer investigated the title and ownership of Spouses Cepeda and the previous owners, he did not look beyond what was
declared in the documents and failed to determine if there are other heirs.34 Spouses Cepeda were also not in possession of the
Cagayan lot at the time of sale, which should have alerted petitioner to inquire further.35 The CA held that the fact of fraud on the part
of Teodora and her children was admitted by petitioner in its petition, particularly, in its third assignment of error.36

Thus, the CA affirmed with modification the ruling of the RTC. It declared that petitioner shall retain ownership of only 33,550 sq. m. of
the Cagayan lot, which is the area equivalent to Teodora's share. The remaining 96,926 sq. m. (as modified by the CA from the RTC's
previous ruling of 99,924.6 sq. m.) should be reconveyed to respondents-appellees.37

Petitioner moved for reconsideration, which was denied; hence, this petition38 which raises the sole issue of whether the action for
partition with reconveyance filed by respondents-appellees against petitioner should prosper.

Our Ruling

We deny the petition.

This is a case of exclusion of the rightful heirs in the partition of the estate of the deceased, followed by the sale of their shares to third
persons who claim good faith. Both petitioner and Spouses Cepeda consistently contend that they were not aware that any person,
other than the seller, has interest over the Cagayan lot. Thus, they are innocent purchasers for value.

The preliminary question then is whether the excluded heirs could recover what is rightfully theirs from persons who are innocent
purchasers for value. Segura v. Segura39 teaches that the answer would not depend on the good faith or bad faith of the purchaser, but
rather on the fact of ownership, for no one can give what he does not have—nemo dat quod non habet.40 Thus, the good faith or bad
faith of petitioner is immaterial in resolving the present petition. A person can only sell what he owns or is authorized to sell; the buyer
can as a consequence acquire no more than what the seller can legally transfer.41

The Extra-Judicial Partition is

Not Binding on Respondents-
Appellees

Petitioner's title over the Cagayan lot was derived from the title of Spouses Cepeda, who in turn obtained their title from Teodora.
Teodora, meanwhile, gained title over the entire Cagayan lot on the basis of the Extra-Judicial Partition dated October 20, 1969.42 The
question therefore is, did that partition validly pass ownership of the Cagayan lot to Teodora so that she had the right to sell the entire
lot?

We answer in the negative. Articles 979, 980 and 981 of the Civil Code of the Philippines (Civil Code) state that all the children of the
deceased shall inherit from him and by implication should participate in the settlement of his/her estate, to wit:

Art. 979. Legitimate children and their descendants succeed the parents and other ascendants, without distinction as to sex or age, and
even if they should come from different marriages.

An adopted child succeeds to the property of the adopting parents in the same manner as a legitimate child.

Art. 980. The children of the deceased shall always inherit from him in their own right, dividing the inheritance in equal shares.

Art. 981. Should children of the deceased and descendants of other children who are dead, survive, the former shall inherit in their own
right, and the latter by right of representation.

Thus, the children of Felipe in his two (2) marriages should be included in the execution of the Extra-Judicial Partition. In this case, it is
undisputed that respondents-appellees were children of Felipe by his first marriage. Teodora, Prudencio, Jr. and Leonora did not deny
respondents-appellees' relation with Felipe. Despite this, however, Teodora, Prudencio, Jr. and Leonora declared in the Extra-Judicial
Partition that they are the only living heirs of Felipe by operation of law. They claimed that Felipe had no child with his first wife Elena, in
effect depriving respondents-appellees of their rightful shares in the estate of their parents. They arrogated upon themselves not only
the share of Felipe in the Cagayan lot but also the shares belonging to respondents-appellees.

In this regard, we cite Rule 74, Section 1 of the Rules of Court which reads:
Sec. 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs.–If the decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age, or
the minors are represented by their judicial or legal representatives duly authorized for the purpose, the parties may, without securing
letters of administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a public instrument filed in the office of the
register of deeds, and should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of partition. If there is only one heir, he may
adjudicate to himself the entire estate by means of an affidavit filed in the office of the register of deeds. The parties to an extrajudicial
settlement, whether by public instrument or by stipulation in a pending action for partition, or the sole heir who adjudicates the entire
estate to himself by means of an affidavit shall file, simultaneously with and as a condition precedent to the filing of the public
instrument, or stipulation in the action for partition, or of the affidavit in the office of the register of deeds, a bond with the said register of
deeds, in an amount equivalent to the value of the personal property involved as certified to under oath by the parties concerned and
conditioned upon the payment of any just claim that may be filed under section 4 of this rule. It shall be presumed that the decedent left
no debts if no creditor files a petition for letters of administration within two (2) years after the death of the decedent.

The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the manner provided
in the next succeeding section; but no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had
no notice thereof. (Emphasis supplied.)

Considering that respondents-appellees have neither knowledge nor participation in the Extra-Judicial Partition, the same is a total
nullity. It is not binding upon them. Thus, in Neri v. Heirs of Hadji Yusop Uy,43 which involves facts analogous to the present case, we
ruled that:

[I]n the execution of the Extra Judicial Settlement of the Estate with Absolute Deed of Sale in favor of spouses Uy, all the heirs of
Anunciacion should have participated. Considering that Eutropia and Victoria were admittedly excluded and that then minors Rosa and
Douglas were not properly represented therein, the settlement was not valid and binding upon them and consequently, a total nullity.

xxx

The effect of excluding the heirs in the settlement of estate was further elucidated in Segura v. Segura, thus:

It is clear that Section 1 of Rule 74 does not apply to the partition in question which was null and void as far as the plaintiffs were
concerned. The rule covers only valid partitions. The partition in the present case was invalid because it excluded six of the nine heirs
who were entitled to equal shares in the partitioned property. Under the rule "no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any
person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof." As the partition was a total nullity and did not affect the excluded
heirs, it was not correct for the trial court to hold that their right to challenge the partition had prescribed after two years from its
execution x x x.44 (Citations omitted, Emphasis supplied.)

Petitioner, however, submits that the Extra-Judicial Partition is not void because it does not fall within any of the inexistent and void
contracts under Article 140945 of the Civil Code.46

Petitioner is not correct. In Constantino v. Heirs of Pedro Constantino, Jr.,47 we declared two (2) deeds of extrajudicial settlements as
void and inexistent for having a purpose or object which is contrary to law. The intention of the signatories in both deeds is to exclude
their co-heirs of their rightful share in the estate of the deceased.48 Similarly, in the present case, Teodora, Prudencio, Jr. and Leonora
acted in bad faith when they declared that they are the only living heirs of Felipe, despite knowing that Felipe had children in his first
marriage. It is well-settled that a deed of extrajudicial partition executed without including some of the heirs, who had no knowledge of
and consent to the same, is fraudulent and vicious.49

Thus, the Extra-Judicial Partition is void under Article 1409 (1) or those whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order or public policy. As a consequence, it has no force and effect from the beginning, as if it had never been entered
into and it cannot be validated either by time or ratification.50

The Sale to Spouses Cepeda

and Petitioner is Limited to
Teodora's Share

The nullity of the Extra-Judicial Partition does not automatically result in the nullity of the sale between (1) Teodora and Spouses
Cepeda, and that of (2) Spouses Cepeda and petitioner.

Respondents-appellees and Teodora (as the surviving heirs of Felipe) are co-owners of the Cagayan lot. As such, they have full
ownership and rights over their pro indiviso shares. Article 493 of the Civil Code defines the rights of a co-owner, to wit:

Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore
alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the
effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the
division upon the termination of the co-ownership.

Teodora may therefore sell her undivided interest in the Cagayan lot, and such disposition shall affect only her pro indiviso share. When
she sold the entire property to Spouses Cepeda, the latter legally and validly purchased only the part belonging to Teodora. The sale
did not include the shares of respondents-appellees, who were not aware of, and did not give their consent to such sale. Likewise,
when Spouses Cepeda sold the entire Cagayan lot to petitioner, the spouses only transferred to petitioner Teodora's pro indiviso share.
Our ruling in Vda. De Figuracion v. Figuracion-Gerilla51 is on point:
Thus, when Carolina sold the entire Lot No. 707 on December 11, 1962 to Hilaria and Felipa without the consent of her co-owner
Agripina, the disposition affected only Carolina's pro indiviso share, and the vendees, Hilaria and Felipa, acquired only what
corresponds to Carolina's share. A co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share; hence, a sale of the entire property by one co-owner
without the consent of the other co-owners is not null and void and only the rights of the co-owner/seller are transferred, thereby making
the buyer a co-owner of the property.

Accordingly, the deed of sale executed by Carolina in favor of Hilaria and Felipa was a valid conveyance but only insofar as the share of
Carolina in the co-ownership is concerned. As Carolina's successors-in-interest to the property, Hilaria and Felipa could not acquire any
superior right in the property than what Carolina is entitled to or could transfer or alienate after partition.

In a contract of sale of co-owned property, what the vendee obtains by virtue of such a sale are the same rights as the vendor had as
co-owner, and the vendee merely steps into the shoes of the vendor as co-owner.52 (Emphasis supplied.)

Simply put, the sale of the Cagayan lot to Spouses Cepeda, then to petitioner is valid insofar as the share of Teodora is concerned. In
effect, petitioner merely holds the share of respondents-appellees under an implied constructive trust.53 This is true though the TCTs
covering the entire Cagayan lot were issued in the name of Teodora, Spouses Cepeda and then petitioner, by virtue of the subsequent
sales. The issuance of a certificate of title could not vest upon them ownership of the entire property; neither could it validate their
purchase of the same which is null and void to the extent of the shares of the respondents-appellees.54 Registration does not vest title,
for it is merely the evidence of such title. Our land registration laws do not give the holder any better title than what he actually has.55

As it stands, petitioner which merely steps into the shoes of Teodora, and respondents-appellees are now the pro indiviso co-owners of
the property.

Partition of the Cagayan Lot

Notably, each co-owner has the right to ask for the partition of the property owned in common as no co-owner may be compelled to stay
in a co-ownership indefinitely.56 Here, respondents-appellees prayed for the partition and reconveyance of the Cagayan lot and their
rightful shares, respectively.

Before the partition of the Cagayan lot among the surviving heirs, the conjugal share of the surviving spouse shall first be deducted
from the conjugal property of the spouses because the same does not form part of the estate of the deceased spouse. Under Article
17557 of the Civil Code, the conjugal partnership is dissolved upon the death of either spouse. It shall then be subject to inventory and
liquidation, the net remainder of which shall be divided equally between the husband and the wife.58

Here, the Cagayan lot is the conjugal property of Elena and Felipe. Upon the former's death, one-half (1/2) of the Cagayan lot
automatically goes to the latter as his conjugal share. The remaining one-half (1/2) forms part of the estate of Elena and shall be
divided equally between Felipe and his four (4) surviving children with Elena, in conformity with Article 99659 of the Civil Code. Thus,
Felipe shall receive one-half (1/2) or 65,238 sq. m. of the Cagayan lot as his conjugal share and one-fifth (1/5) or 13,047.6 sq. m. of the
same lot as heir of Elena. Simply put, Felipe is entitled to a total of 78,285.6 sq. m. of the Cagayan lot. Meanwhile, respondents-
appellees shall receive one-fifth (1/5) or 13,047.6 sq. m. each.

When Felipe obtained a second marriage, his 78,285.6 sq. m. share was brought into his marriage with Teodora, such that the same
formed part of their conjugal partnership. Upon Felipe's death, Teodora became entitled to one-half (1/2) of the 78,285.6 sq. m. or
39,142.8 sq. m. The remaining half will compose the estate of Felipe, which will be divided equally among Teodora, Prudencio Jr.,
Leonora and respondents-appellees—each of them receiving one-seventh (1/7) of 39,142.8 sq. m. Teodora then shall receive
44,734.63 sq. m. This is further increased by the waiver of Prudencio, Jr. and Leonora of their rights over the estate of Felipe, such that
the aggregate share of Teodora will now be equivalent to 55,918.29 sq. m.

For better understanding, the Cagayan lot shall be divided as follows:

From Elena's Estate

From Felipe's Estate
Total
Florentina Prudencio
13,047.6 sq. m.
5,591.83 sq. m.
18,639.43 sq. m.
Avelina Prudencio
13,047.6 sq. m.
5,591.83 sq. m.
18,639.43 sq. m.
Ernesto Penalber
13,047.6 sq. m.
5,591.83 sq. m.
18,639.43 sq. m.
Rodrigo Talang
13,047.6 sq. m.
5,591.83 sq. m.
18,639.43 sq. m.

Combined Total:
74,557.72 sq. m.

Teodora Abad
(surviving spouse)
0
44,734.63 sq. m.
44,734.63 sq. m.
Leonora Prudencio
0
5,591.83 sq. m.
5,591.83 sq. m.
Felipe Prudencio, Jr.
0
5,591.83 sq. m.
5,591.83 sq. m.

Combined Total:
55,918.29 sq. m.

Petitioner, whose title over the Cagayan lot is ultimately derived from Teodora, is therefore entitled only to 55,918.29 sq. m. Thus,
petitioner should return to respondents-appellees the 74,557.72 sq. m. of the Cagayan lot which corresponds to respondents-appellees'
rightful share as heirs of Felipe and Elena.

Meanwhile, this Court is not unmindful of the unfairness resulting from the above order as petitioner stands to lose 74,557.72 sq. m. of
the Cagayan lot, which it purchased in fee simple from Spouses Cepeda. In the interest of fairness, justice and equity, we grant
petitioner's cross-claim against Spouses Cepeda. Spouses Cepeda are directed to return to petitioner the corresponding value paid for
the area of 74,557.72 sq. m. with legal interest.60

In fine, the RTC and the CA did not err when they held that respondents-appellees are entitled to recover their rightful shares in the
Cagayan lot. However, the reconveyance should conform to the distribution of shares set forth above.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

AGUILAR VS. SIASAT

FACTS:

Facts:
Spouses Alfredo Aguilar and Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar died, intestate and without debts, Included in their estate are two parcels of
land. In June 1996, petitioner Rodolfo Aguilar filed with the RTC- Bacolod City a civil case for Mandatory injunction with damages
against respondent Edna Siasat alleged that petitioner is the only son and sole surviving heir of the Aguilar spouses; that he (petitioner)
discovered that the subject titles were missing, and thus he suspected that someone from the Siasat clan could have stolen the same.

In her Answer, respondent claimed that petitioner is not the son and sole surviving heir of the Aguilar spouses, but a mere stranger who
was raised by the Aguilar spouses out of generosity and kindness of heart; that petitioner is not a natural or adopted child of the Aguilar
spouses; that since Alfredo Aguilar predeceased his wife, Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar, the latter inherited the conjugal share of the
former; that upon the death of Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar, her brothers and sisters inherited her estate as she had no issue; and that the
subject titles were not stolen, but entrusted to her for safekeeping by Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar, who is her aunt. By way of
counterclaim, respondent prayed for an award of moral and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees.

ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner cannot prove filiation to the spouse Aguilar who is the owner of the land due to the lost of his
Certificate of Live Birth and Alfredo Aguilar’s SSS Form E-1 is a mere proof of open and continuous possession.

RULING:

NO! It must be concluded that petitioner- who was born on March 5, 1945, or during the marriage of Alfredo Aguilar and Candelaria
Siasat-Aguilar and before their respective deaths- has sufficiently proved that he is the legitimate issue of the Aguilar spouses. As
petitioner correctly argues, Alfredo Aguilar’s SSS Form E-1 satisfies the requirement for proof of filiation and relationship to the Aguilar
spouses under Article 172 of the Family Code; by itself, said document constitutes an “admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned”.

Petitioner has shown that he cannot produce his Certificate of Live Birth since all the records covering the period 1945-1946 of the
Local Civil Registry of Bacolod City were destroyed, which necessitated the introduction of other documentary evidence- particularly
Alfredo Aguilar’s SSS Form E-1- to prove filiation. It was erroneous for the CA to treat said document as mere proof of open and
continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child under the second paragraph of Article 172 of the Family Code; it is evidence of
filiation under the first paragraph thereof, the same being an express recognition in a public instrument.