State Slaves: State-sponsored Forced Labor in Uzbekistan and North Korea

Dagmawi Gebre Yntiso

Globalization: Perspectives from Development, Culture and Civil Society (Dec. 2016)

‘Forced or compulsory labor shall mean all work or service which is exacted
from any person under the menace of any penalty and for which the said person
has not offered himself voluntarily.’ (International Labor Organization)

Introduction

There are at this moment nearly 46 million people worldwide trapped in forced labor (2016
Global Slavery Index, p. 4). Much of the attention this issue has garnered has revolved around human
trafficking (Nepalese construction workers in Qatar, Romanian asparagus farmers in the Czech Republic,
Bulgarian sex slaves in Italy, etc.). One area that has received less attention is the condition of state-
sponsored forced labor (which I define here as forced labor imposed directly through a government
body). Two illustrative examples (cotton pickers in Uzbekistan and North Korean construction workers in
Qatar) will help shed light on this practice. I hope to show that state-sponsored forced labor is a
condition radically different from that which is experienced by those who are trafficked through non-
state means. The practice shows itself paradoxically to be much easier to challenge but harder to
alleviate.

The problem, I argue, is in the very nature of the practice, i.e. that it is state-sponsored. This has
two contradictory impacts: 1) challenging forced labor is easier when the culprits are countries. Due to
the nature of global politics, it is becoming increasingly popular to challenge countries on one issue as a
way (as if by proxy) to challenge them over another, perhaps ‘bigger’, issue. For example, by putting
pressure on North Korea over its human rights abuses, it may be possible to affect its nuclear policy. In
the case of state sponsored forced labor, North Korea and Uzbekistan have been heavily criticized and
even taken action against. The first aspect of state-sponsored forced labor is therefore that it is easier to
challenge.

The second aspect, however, is that due to the fact that a state apparatus exists to support it,
the state-sponsored forced labor system is relatively difficult to change. Again, in the two cases
mentioned, little has been done in curbing the problem (except in stopping child labor in Uzbekistan)
despite the outpouring of rhetorical and actual challenges to the system. The two conditions (easy to
challenge, difficult to actually change) are what make the state-sponsored case different from the non-
state case (difficult to directly challenge, but somewhat easier to change).

When I mention that non-state forced labor is easier to change, I mean that the problem of non-
state forced labor has clear inputs and outputs that can be re-arranged to fix individual cases, not that
the problem of non-state sponsored forced labor is overall easy to change. For example, slavery in the

1
Qatar World Cup could have been avoided by merely changing the venue of the world cup. In the case of
state-sponsored forced labor, however, such quick fixes do not exist. This paper will provide an overview
of the cases in Uzbekistan and North Korea, as well as the indirectly related cases of Vietnam and the
U.S. and highlight some of the contradictory features of state-sponsored forced labor as distinct from
the non-state variety. I conclude with some of the ramifications of these features to policy.

Uzbekistan

Every year the government of Uzbekistan forces over one million students, teachers, doctors,
nurses, local administrators and others to harvest cotton (Connell). The country is the world’s fourth
larger exporter of the crop and gets about 1 billion USD annually from its export (Anti-Slavery
International). The earnings do not go back to the country, many of whose citizens are impoverished.
Instead it gets secreted away to the mysterious, non-transparent Selkozfond of the Finance Ministry, to
which only high-level government officials have access. The farmers who own the land are forced to
meet production quotas (if they miss these quotas, their land can be confiscated) and citizens are used
to harvest this cotton to meet the government’s demands. Threats of confiscation are combined with
threats of job loss, being kicked out of school, criminal penalties and fines for failure to abide by the
system.

The practice has received international attention, with many suppliers and leading clothing
companies having agreed to stop purchasing Uzbek cotton. Two of the largest processors of the cotton
(South Korea-based Daweoo and Singapore-based Indorama) are currently under federal investigation in
the U.S. for using cotton produced through forced labor (Cotton Campaign). Over 130 companies
(including Nike and H&M) have agreed to the so-called Daweoo Protocol, vowing to stop the use of
Daewoo’s cotton. Another 260 or so have signed the Cotton Pledge, which states that they will not be
using cotton produced through forced labor (largely Uzbek, although Turkmenistan has a similar
practice). (Cotton Pledge)

Part of the reason for this mass support is the conditions under which the workers toil. Many of
them are little compensated (if at all), and their living accommodations are deplorable. They work under
the heat of the summer sun, sometimes with no water, and always under the threat of getting fired or
kicked out of school should they refuse. The workers suffer ill health and malnutrition as well. With
some international pressure, Uzbekistan stopped using children under the age of 16 in the fields, but the
practice continues with adults. Some estimate that over 200 million dollars is lost in work revenue every
year from employees being pulled out of their offices. (Cotton Campaign) This is to say nothing of the
hours lost by university and high school students.

The government has responded to local pressure through a crackdown on activists and
journalists. At the same time, it claims that the citizens do voluntary work (or hashar) for love of country
and that new domestic legislation is not needed. Uzbekistan’s own laws prohibit forced labor and the
country is a signatory of the International Labor Organization’s Conventions 182 and 105, both
pertaining to forced labor. Ironically, the Federation of Trade Unions of Uzbekistan, which is supposed to

2
stand up for worker’s rights, is run by a cabinet member and it has been alleged that the FTUU itself
sometimes mobilizes workers to harvest. (Cotton Campaign)

Possible suggested reforms include setting the price of raw cotton above production price
(including labor) so that farmers can afford to hire workers and setting a minimum wage for cotton
work. At the same time, the government can make itself more transparent to the ILO, as well as local
and international organizations and media. Gradual reform of the cotton sector (e.g. reporting earnings
directly and replacing quotas with incentives, as well as getting rid of the system whereby land is
confiscated for failure to meet quotas) is another measure that can be used to curb the problem.

North Korea

The North Korean situation is strikingly similar in that the government is using the labor of its
citizens for the personal enrichment of the elite but differs in that North Korean workers are sent
outside the country to perform labor1. At least one hundred thousand North Korean migrants work in
places such as Russia, China, the Middle East and Mongolia. (Kwon) Together, they earn their country
hard foreign currency of up to 2.3 billion USD annually. (Boonen, et al., p. 16) The workers suffer from
excessive overtime, withholding of wages and vulnerability to abuse (the precise conditions of forced
labor, according to one expert). Whatever money they make, however, is not given to them, but
deposited in government coffers.

Many estimates indicate that up to 90 percent of the workers’ salary is taken by the
government. (Padden) Seventy percent of all migrant earnings is directly taken and another 20 percent
is used to pay ‘fees’, such as for food and accommodation (though the workers seldom get either). In
the end, after a few years of work abroad, the workers return to North Korea to receive just 10 percent
of what they earned. The foreign currency the workers earn is used to keep the country afloat in the
face of numerous international sanctions related to human rights abuses and unwillingness to curb the
nuclear program. North Korea also regularly faces famine and drought.

To offer one example of a target country: Pyongyang is sending many workers to Qatar in the
run up the 2022 World Cup. In preparation for event, the Qatari government is spending billions to
revamp the city and provide new infrastructure and amenities. Among these is Lusail City, a 45 billion
USD project meant to serve as the host city for the Cup, as well as Qatar’s future city. The three
thousand North Korean migrant workers in Qatar work on four construction sites in Lusail. (Pattisson)
Like the migrants from Nepal and India, they suffer from poor work and living conditions. But, in
addition, North Korean migrants work longer hours than any of the other nationalities.

Furthermore, they are constantly surveilled by the North Korean government and face strict
reprisals for complaining or attempting to escape. That they receive no pay almost goes without saying.
The North Korean government-run recruitment agencies themselves openly admit that their workers do

1
There is, of course, a huge forced labor system within the DPRK, but I focus here only on those sent abroad to
highlight the fact that state-sponsored forced labor does not only occur in-country. For more on the local situation,
visit the Borowiec article in the references.

3
not directly receive their pay. (Pattisson) Many are forced to ask for money from their employers for
simple things like cigarettes. The Qatari government, on its part, says it has received no complaints
about payments or mistreatment (which is expected, given the nature of the migrants’ relationship to
their home government).

The North Korean practice of sending workers abroad began in the 1980s and got intensified in
the 1990s due to the ailing economy. The workers, as mentioned earlier, get sent to many parts of the
world (including the European Union) and there are estimates that 1 in 20 North Koreans spends at least
part of their lives in some form of slavery. (Batha) The currency they bring in is thought to be going to
the current construction boom in North Korea as well as the coffers of President Kim Jong-un and his
trusted friends and colleagues. The use of migrants to earn currency can be seen as an extension of
previous North Korean attempts to maintain a working economy (including drug trafficking and
producing counterfeit money).

Due to North Korea’s isolated nature on the global stage, solutions to this problem are even
more difficult to identify than for the Uzbek case. Countries can simply refuse to accept North Korean
workers, but few seem inclined to do so, including Russia, which takes the largest number of North
Korean migrant workers (between 20,000 and 25,000). Another possible solution would be to have the
migrants get paid directly, but this would go against the contracts (mentioned below) that the host
countries sign with Pyongyang for the workers.

Differences from other forms of forced labor

The first and obvious difference from other forms of modern-day slavery is the direct link the
practice has to government. Indeed, the use of migrants from North Korea in various countries can
almost be seen as a form of international exchange, as bilateral contracts are often used to agree on
conditions of the labor (CIA World Factbook). In addition, the kinds of workers are different. In the case
of Nepalese workers in Qatar, for example, these men often come from peasant backgrounds. In the
case of state-sponsored forced labor, however, even professionals are not exempt from exploitation.

A third major difference is the level of global outrage that has resulted. In the case of North
Korea, for instance, there are strong calls from the U.S. and Europe for the practice to end. This comes
despite the fact that many of the North Korean migrants are actually employed in Europe (in Polish
shipyards, for example). In the case of Uzbekistan, the outcry was even more extreme, with literally
hundreds of corporations boycotting easily available Uzbek cotton on seemingly moral grounds.

This is in stark contrast to the reaction that the corporate and government worlds often have of
similar conditions which are not state-sponsored. For example, Foxcomm, the Chinese company
responsible for assembling the vast majority of the world’s smartphones, often faces little direct
opposition despite the fact that conditions in its factories are arguably much worse than what the North
Koreans or Uzbek face. Suicides occur regularly (Dou) and the plight of the electronics workers in well
documented in the media, though few companies have called for a boycott of Foxcomm’s products.

4
 One possible explanation for this phenomenon (of very strong opposition) is that state-
sponsored forced labor involves states, and in many cases, opposition to the practice is used as part of a
more general opposition to the government. This is clear in the case of North Korea: the outcry against
the treatment of its migrant workers appears as just an additional attack against the government, which
already faces opposition on a number of other grounds. Similarly, opposition to Uzbek products occurs
alongside general Western distaste for Uzbekistan over its cozy relationship with neighboring Russia.

What this creates, I argue, is a condition in which opposition to a practice (forced labor) can be
very intensive (involving possible sanctions, corporate boycotting on an unprecedented scale, etc.) while
at the same time, the practice itself continues to go on relatively unencumbered. The Uzbek system
continues to operate with little sign of slowing down (as does the situation in Turkmenistan) and there is
little sign that the number of North Korean migrants sent abroad will slow down after all these years of
increasing. If anything, increased sanctions against North Korea may cause even greater economic
instability, resulting in even more migrants being sent abroad, and the boycotting of Uzbek cotton will
either force some of the market underground or cause a need for accelerated production to maintain
revenue, both of which may result in even more Uzbek citizens being herded to the harvest.

The condition of the state-sponsored forced labor system is unique among the many forms of
coerced physical labor in that the determinants of the case are not just monetary. In the case of
Nepalese migrant workers, for example, if it was found to be more profitable to use Tibetans, the
problem could be avoided. No more Nepalese would go to Qatar because economically they would not
be needed. In the case of sex slaves, as well, there is an element of economic necessity that maintains a
steady supply of human bodies. In the case of Uzbekistan and North Korea, however, the system
continues to prosper even outside any economic logic; it will continue to operate because an entire
government exists to maintain the process. This is why it is difficult to combat.

A similar situation occurs with Turkish government-owned brothels. Even if patrons choose to
visit private brothels, the government-owned brothels would continue to operate (as they are funded by
more than just their own revenue). One essential lesson from the Uzbek and North Korean cases is
therefore that changing the system to be more friendly to workers will require much more than
economic sanctions or corporate boycotts. While these may work when the human trafficking is largely
a private-business matter, it does not have the same effect on a government enterprise. This is why
many of the suggestions mentioned earlier for the Uzbek case involve government reform.

A detour through Vietnam and the U.S.

An interesting related phenomenon to note is the practice of using prison laborers in the U.S.
and drug center patients in Vietnam to engage in menial, low-paying work. While this not considered a
form of state-sponsored forced labor, it is my opinion that it should. In the U.S., for example, prisoners
get paid as low as 0.23 cents per hour (minimum wage is 7.25 USD). (Starr) There is a clear racial bias in
the prison population (a residual effect of the drug wars of the 20th century and ongoing structural
racism in the criminal justice system) that is reflected in the forced labor workforce. These prisoners
have virtually no labor protection. The argument for the continued existence of the practice is that the

5
13th Amendment (which effectively ended slavery) allows for forced labor in the case of punishment of
criminals. At the same time, the Fair Labor Standards Act (which protects workers of all kinds) has no
clause for prisoners.

Similarly in Vietnam, there are drug centers to which addicts are taken by family or authorities.
Over 309,000 people were taken to these centers between 2000 and 2010. The number of centers grew
in the same period from 67 to 123. (Human Rights Watch) The patients stay in the centers from 2 to 5
years and work for little or no pay, just like the American prisoners. Many are beaten or kept in isolation
and detainees never get a trial (as the centers are outside the mandates of the justice system). The work
includes shelling cashew nuts (Vietnam’s second largest export to the U.S.), making garments and
breeding livestock. Around 90 percent of the detainees relapse upon release. (Human Rights Watch)
Despite having signed ILO Convention 29 against forced labor, the government has done little to
alleviate the situation.

I mention these two examples for three reasons. One is to highlight the extent to which
deplorable working conditions can be justified due to mere technicalities in law. And two, to show that
even when laws do exist (e.g. ILO conventions), they are ignored. This is a common thread that runs
throughout much of forced labor practices (state-sponsored or otherwise): international conventions,
even those ratified by the country in question, have zero bearing on the activities of the government or
what it allows to take place within its borders. This is seen in Qatar’s treatment of its World Cup 2022
construction workers, the treatment of Uzbek citizens at the hands of their own government and the
treatment of drug center detainees in Vietnam.

Finally, the examples of the U.S. and Vietnam reveal the contradictory nature of state-sponsored
forced labor mentioned in the introduction, namely that it is easier to challenge than non-state forced
labor, but harder to actually stop. Again, this is due to the state apparatus that exists to support it.

Conclusion

I believe that human trafficking for forced labor will be among the defining problems of the 21 st
century. While many organizations (from Anti-Slavery International to the Guardian) have attempted to
shed light on the plight of modern day slaves, the numbers show little sign of decreasing. What I argue
here is that in one particular case of forced labor, that which is state-sponsored, a solution needs to look
beyond the simply monetary as this form of forced labor is fundamentally unlike the others. This is
because the problem, while easily identifiable and even actionable (in the sense that concrete steps are
available, such as boycotting), proves to be much more intractable than non-state forced labor.

The solutions to the problem exist outside the black-and-white logic of economics and instead
must be tackled from the angle of policy reform. While the enthusiasm with which clothing companies
are willing to forego Uzbek cotton is commendable, and despite all the noise regarding about North
Korea’s treatment of its own workers, I believe a more comprehensive approach, combining the
financial and political, is the only way to solve this particular problem.

6
 On a wider scale, economic exploitation of all kinds can benefit from such an approach. One
simple example is the case of the Indian and Nepalese migrant workers in Qatar mentioned earlier.
Much of the discussion that the governments have had in relation to forced labor revolve around the
recruiters (largely private entities) and how best to stop them. Solutions have ranged from requiring
better registration for migrants to establishing a cap on the recruitment fees. These single-point
solutions may not be enough, however. An analysis of root causes (related to employment opportunities
in the country of origin, for example) would be more fruitful in truly curbing that problem.

Just as in the case of the state-sponsored migrants, an analysis from all sides (economic, social,
and political) would be needed. As the examples of Vietnam and the U.S. further show, however, merely
agreeing to policies is not enough, as they can just be ignored. A framework that combines
comprehensive, implementable policy reform with new economic incentives (or penalties) is, I believe,
an ideal way to approach the problem of forced labor today.

7
References

2016 Global Slavery Index

(http://assets.globalslaveryindex.org/downloads/Global+Slavery+Index+2016.pdf)

Connell, Tula. ‘Student Death Launches Uzbekistan’s Forced Labor Season’. In ‘Solidary Center’ report.
September 28, 2016. (http://www.solidaritycenter.org/one-person-died-in-uzbekistan-cotton-fields-
among-others-in-forced-labor/)

Anti-Slavery International. Forced Labor in the Uzbek Cotton Industry.

(http://www.antislavery.org/english/campaigns/cottoncrimes/forced_labour_in_uzbekistan_backgroun
d.aspx)

Cotton Campaign. Uzbekistan: State-sponsored Slavery Continues.

(http://www.cottoncampaign.org/harvest-2016/uzbekistan-state-sponsored-slavery-continues)

Daewoo Protocol (http://www.cottoncampaign.org/uploads/3/9/4/7/39474145/daewooprotocol.pdf)

Responsible Sourcing Network.Cotton Pledge.

(http://www.cottoncampaign.org/uploads/3/9/4/7/39474145/daewooprotocol.pdf)

Kwon, K.J. ‘Long days, no money and no escape: Life of a North Korean migrant worker’. from CNN
Freedom Project. May 27, 2015. (http://edition.cnn.com/2015/05/15/asia/north-korean-foreign-
workers/)

Boonen, Marte, et al. ‘North Korean Forced Labor in the EU, The Polish Case: How the Supply of a
Captive DPRK Workforce Fits Our Demand for Cheap Labor’. In First Findings from the Slaves to the
System Project. July 6, 2016. (http://slavestothesystem.eu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/North-Korean-
Forced-Labour-in-the-EU-the-Polish-Case.pdf)

Padden, B. ‘Activists Seek Better Conditions for North Korean Migrant Laborers’. VOA. December 23,
2015. (http://www.voanews.com/a/new-push-to-improve-conditions-for-north-korean-migrant-
laborers/3115148.html)

Pattisson, P. ‘North Koreans working as ‘state-sponsored slaves’ in Qatar’. The Guardian. November 7,
2014. (https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2014/nov/07/north-koreans-working-state-
sponsored-slaves-qatar)

Batha, E. ‘North Korea sends "state-sponsored slaves" to Europe - rights group’. Reuters. July 5, 2016.
(https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2014/nov/07/north-koreans-working-state-
sponsored-slaves-qatar)

CIA World Factbook. Field Listing: Trafficking in Persons (https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-

world-factbook/fields/2196.html)

8
Dou. E. ‘Deaths of Foxconn Employees Highlight Pressures Faced by China’s Factory Workers.’ Wall
Street Journal. August 21, 2016. (http://www.wsj.com/articles/deaths-of-foxconn-employees-highlight-
pressures-faced-by-chinas-factory-workers-1471796417)

Starr, Terrell Jermanie. ‘23 Cents an Hour? The Perfectly Legal Slavery Happening in Modern-Day
America’. Alternet. July 1, 2015 (http://www.alternet.org/civil-liberties/23-cents-hour-perfectly-legal-
slavery-happening-modern-day-america)

Human Rights Watch. ‘The Rehab Archipelago: Forced Labor and Other Abuses in Drug Detention
Centers in Southern Vietnam’. (https://www.hrw.org/report/2011/09/07/rehab-archipelago/forced-
labor-and-other-abuses-drug-detention-centers-southern#page)

ILO. Forced Labor Convention No. 29.

(http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::P12100_ILO_CODE:C029)

Borowiec, S. ‘North Koreans perform $975 million worth of forced labor each year’. Los Angeles Times.
October 6, 2016. (http://www.latimes.com/world/asia/la-fg-north-korea-forced-labor-20161006-snap-
story.html)