CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the Study

Airports are very strategic to global/national economy and security. They are

critical infrastructures which play very vital roles in facilitating trade and movement

of persons. It is therefore necessary to protect these infrastructures against all threats

that could undermine their security. Of equal importance is the need to ensure that

have an informed breakdown of these threats and how they constitute impediments in

the achievement of the overall economic, political, strategic, national pride,

diplomatic and security functions of the airport.

The complexity of threats has underscored the need for more concerted efforts

in nipping in them in the bud and in responding which accentuates the need for a

robust and informed inter-agency cooperation. However, despite this realization, the

absence and sometimes inadequacies of cooperation amongst security agencies of

national and international governments have called for concerns on the need to ensure

that inter-agency cooperation in responding to threats that could undermine national

and global security (Jensen, McElreath, & Graves, 2013).

As agents responsible for the provision of security, security personnel are at

the centre of protecting the airports all over the world although the administration of

such facilities might be out of their purview depending on the extant laws and

regulations in specific countries. Also, the changing nature of security threats has

compelled countries to continuously reassess and reposition their strategies for

securing their airports which the advent of global terrorism has accentuated.

In the United States of America (USA), Patterson (2003) notes that the Bill

Clinton administration in 1996, on learning that terrorists were plotting to use

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commercial airliners as weapons by putting bombs on US airliners, appointed the then

Vice President, Al Gore to chair the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and

Security. Instructively, the Commission’s report released in 1998 identified inter-

agency cooperation as one of the measures to improve airport security, it states,

The report emphasised the need for interagency cooperation –

specifically the sharing of information among the Central Intelligence
Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Immigration and
Naturalisation Service, and the Federal Aviation Administration – on
suspected terrorists (p.140).
Unfortunately, the foregoing recommendation was never implemented by the

agencies involved (Patterson, 2003). Years later, the attempt by Umar Farouk

Abdulmutallab to bomb Northwest Airlines flight 253 bound for Detroit on December

25, 2009 heightened concerns about the of inter-agency cooperation in airport

security management in the USA (Holbrook, 2010). Observing that Abdulmutallab

had already been previously linked to Al-Qaeda, then President, Barack Obama

posited that:,

had this critical information been shared, it could have been compiled
with other intelligence and a fuller [and] clearer picture of the suspect
would have emerged. The warning signs would have triggered red
flags, and the suspect would have never been allowed to board that
plane to America (CNN, December 30, 2009).
Although the above view does not imply lack of inter-agency cooperation in

the US given its existence, it however, draws attention to the need to constantly

ensure that it is nurtured; this is because it might be the most needed security measure

especially given the peculiarities of the airport.

Examples of best practices exist globally in enhancing the security of airports.

In the Caribbean, Bowling (2010) asserts that there is extensive cooperation among

the numerous agencies responsible for airport security. The numerous organisations

have established working relationships at the national level with mechanisms to

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coordinate airport security; they have also established regional networks with their

counterparts on other islands and collaborative arrangements with metropolitan

countries. Bowling (2010) observes that,

in terms of day-to-day working, the various agencies responsible for

airport security are coordinated by a ‘law enforcement committee’
chaired by the chief of airport security involving Customs, police,
Special Branch and Securicor to ‘trash out areas of concern’(p.195)
.
Since 2010, the United Nations office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in

collaboration with the European Union (EU) have been promoting inter-agency

cooperation for improving the capacity of airport security systems to combat drug

trafficking and terrorism(UNODC, 2014). This national and international interagency

cooperation initiative supports the establishment of inter-agency Joint Airport

Interdiction Task Forces (JAITFs) linked to each other via the World Customs

Organization’s Customs Enforcement Network Communication Platform

(CENcomm) and with direct access to Interpol databases via the I-24/7 global police

communication system (UNODC, 2014).

In January 2016, for example, members of Kenya security agencies (Police,

Customs, Immigration and Kenya Airport Authority) operating at Jomo Kenyatta

Nairobi Airport were trained to be part of the Nairobi Joint Airport Interdiction Task

Force (UNODC, 2016). The JAITF is also operational in several West African

countries including Benin, Cape Verde, Cote d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Mali, Niger,

Senegal, Togo and Nigeria (UNODC, 2016).

The JAITF initiative has improved national inter-service cooperation (Police,

Customs, Immigration, Airport Authorities, etc.) in beneficiary countries and

operational communication between JAITFs, partner organisations and law

enforcement agencies of partner countries in Europe (EU, 2016).

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 However, inter-agency rivalry has become a reoccurring phenomenon when

exploring the relationship between Nigerian security and strategic departments and

agencies. Inter-agency rivalry in some cases has led to physical exchanges between

personnel of rival security agencies, sometimes resulting in fatalities and injuries

(Abolurin, 2013; Musa, 2013; Samuel, 2014). Even it is not uncommon to see

personnel of sister security agencies exchanging blows on the road while wearing

their respective uniforms.

The relationship between security agencies in Nigeria has not been cordial

going by incessant records of clashes among them. This has crystallized into inter

agency rivalry and crisis. Inter-agency rivalry is a state of competition contestation

and struggle between the security agencies for something perceived value to the

contending interests (Omoigui, 2006). Such clashes involve all security agencies such

as the Army, Navy, Air force, Department of State Services (DSS), Police and

Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC) (Daily Champion, 3 June,

2011).

In a similar vein although in another context, open expression of dissent and

antagonism is also common amongst agencies of government which underscores the

fact that the lack of synergy and cooperation amongst agencies of government is not

peculiar to the security agencies.

These incessant clashes between security agencies in Nigeria informed the

position of President Obasanjo (2000) on the imperative of inter-agency co-operation

without which National Security is a farce. This was encapsulated in a policy

document entitled “Grand Strategy for National Security” published in the year 2000.

In order to fine-tune this idea, two Presidential Retreats were organized through the

office of the National Security Adviser (NSA) on Inter-Agency Conflicts in Port-

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Harcourt, Rivers State in 2005, and Lagos, Lagos State, in 2006 (Sonnaike et al,

2010). All these efforts were put in place to serve as a panacea for inter-agency

conflicts but the problem seems to persist.

The aviation industry has not been exempted from this inter-agency rivalry.

For example, Federal Airport Authority of Nigeria’s Chart on Inter-Agency Rivalry

shows that between March 22, 2017 and December 14, 2017, four (4) incidents of

inter-agency rivalry occurred at the Murtala Muhammed International Airport

(MMIA) involving the Nigerian Air force (NA), Nigeria Police Force, Nigeria

Agricultural Quarantine Service (NAQS), FAAN Aviation Security (FAANAVSEC),

Nigerian Immigration Service and other agencies (FAAN, 2018a). Obi(2017) also

reported a case where personnel of the Nigerian Air Force and National Drug Law

Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) engaged one another in a gun duel at the Murtala

Muhammed International Airport, Lagos resulting in one (1)NDLEA officer being

injured.

Across strata, the implications of ineffective or lack of inter-agency

cooperation, undermines the optimum performance of security agencies strategically

and operational even in ensuring the provision of security in the airport., For example,

in June, 2016, the Comptroller General of the Nigeria Immigration Service (NIS),

Muhammad Babandede, complained that lack of access to the INTERPOL I-24/7

portal under the authority of the Nigerian Police Force (NPF) was inhibiting efforts at

winning the war against terrorism, insurgency and other organised crimes (Okeke,

2016).

Also, some aircrafts that arrive and take off from the Murtala Mohammed

International Airport (MMIA) are not escorted as the Federal Airports Authority of

Nigeria (FAAN) has only one escort vehicle for arriving and departing aircraft for the
5
entire airport which handles over 200 flights every day (Leadership Newspaper,2018).

These situations which could easily have been prevented through joint inter-agency

escort operations have resulted in reported cases of attacks on aircraft and stealing of

baggage (Leadership Newspaper,2018).

The foregoing therefore makes a study on inter-agency cooperation and airport

security relevant.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

Airport security is very vital for Nigeria’s economic and national security. The

threat of terrorism, smuggling of arms and dangerous chemicals, money laundering

and migration of undesirable elements or persons with communicable malignant

diseases among others highlight the need for efficient provision of security at

Nigerian airports.

Airport security in Nigeria is not the sole responsibility of any security agency.

It is the collective responsibility of the different security agencies at the airports.

However, despite the multiplicity of security agencies at Nigerian airports, criminals

have, over time, used them in perpetrating illicit activities such as money laundering,

smuggling of arms and drugs and cargo theft.

Murtala Mohammed International Airport is the busiest airport in the country

and as such its security needs cannot be ignored with a sleight of hand. Unfortunately,

the benefits of inter-agency cooperation have not been fully explored by the security

agencies operating at the airport to improve its security. Champion newspaper

November 17, 2017 reported a serious clash between police officers in the convoy of

the then Osun State governor and Air force soldiers of the Mobile Air Defence. This

lapse has created a security gap in the security architecture of the airport which
6
criminal elements have explored to perpetrate crimes at the airport such as luggage

theft, drug trafficking, money laundering, etc. (Leadership Newspaper,2018).

The strategic importance of the airport and the associated threats to national

security makes it expedient to examine inter-agency cooperation at the airport to

determine whether and how it has undermined the security of the airport as well as

identify relevant challenges if there are any. This therefore, is the motivation for this

study. This section is where you need to show the lack of or inadequacy of inter-

agency cooperation with examples.

1.3 Aim

The aim of the study is to examine inter-agency cooperation at MMIA and its

implication for airport security management with a view to making recommendations

and proffering implementation strategies.

1.4 Research Objectives

The specific objectives of the study are to: -

i. Identify the nature of security threats at Murtala Muhammed International

Airport;
ii. Identify the causes of inter-agency rivalry at Murtala Muhammed International

Airport;
iii. Determine the challenges of inter-agency cooperation at Murtala Muhammed

International Airport;
iv. Examine the implications of the lack of inter-agency cooperation for airport

security at Murtala Muhammed International Airport; and

v. Proffer recommendations to enhance airport security at Murtala Muhammed

International Airport.

1.5 Research Questions

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 In line with the above research objectives, the research questions are as

follows: -

i. What is the nature of security threats at the Murtala Muhammed International

Airport?
ii. What are the causes of inter-agency rivalry at Murtala Muhammed

International Airport?
iii. What are the challenges of inter-agency cooperation at Murtala Muhammed

International Airport?
iv. What are the implications of the lack of inter-agency cooperation for airport

security at Murtala Muhammed International Airport or How is the lack of

inter-agency cooperation affecting security at the Murtala Muhammed

International Airport?
v. What recommendations strategies can be proffered to enhance airport security

at Murtala Muhammed International Airport?

1.6 Scope

The theme of this study is inter-agency cooperation and airport security. The

study’s locale is the MMIA, Ikeja, Lagos. The airport was chosen because it is the

busiest airport in the country(National Bureau of Statistics, 2014) and therefore, more

likely to encounter greater challenges of insecurity. It is also the most strategic to

Nigeria’s economic and national security.

The study will cover the period between 2008 and 2017. This period marked

the increased awareness of threats to airport security following the September 11

attacks in the United States of America as well as international and national response

measures to improve airport security.

1.7 Significance of the Study

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 The study will be beneficial to security agencies at Nigerian airports,

especially those in MMIA through advancing strategies for promoting synergy and

cooperation for better implementation of security regulations and guidelines in the

airports.

The outcome of this study would be useful to heads of security agencies,

policy makers, lawmakers, Nigeria Civil Aviation Authority (NCAA) and the Aviation

Ministry in the management of airport security in Nigeria. Finally, the study will add

to the existing body of knowledge on inter-agency cooperation and airport security.

The identification of the nature of security threats at MMIA will be of benefit

to the policy makers in that precise measures can be proffered to neutralize these

threats, by this secure the nation and airport better, also better service delivery to the

passengers.

The academia can interrogate these issues further, also proffer solutions from

other perspectives not yet considered.

The identification of the causes of inter-agency rivalry at MMIA would be of

great benefit to the policy makers as the issues can be tackled precisely and not guess

work. The security of the airport will be enhanced when these causes are obviated and

all users of the airport will be the greater beneficiaries.

When the implications of the lack of co-operation between security agencies

in the airport are succinctly presented, the policy makers would better appreciate the

enormity of the risk posed to national security in this flagship gateway to the country.

This will trigger reactions between all the agencies involved to neutralize the patent

threats and safeguard the nation and its critical assets.

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 The end result of these will be a more coordinated cooperative working

relationship between the agencies by the solutions proffered to address these issues.

1.8 Limitations of the Study

A limitation of the study was the classification of information by security

agencies and government departments as the researcher was denied access to certain

information like records of inter-agency disputes and criminal activities that occurred

at the airport by some agencies/departments. Another limitation was the bias of

respondents to provide objective answers to questions about their

agency’s/department’s efforts at inter-agency collaboration at MMIA.

However, the researcher made efforts to ensure that these challenges did not in

any way affect the validity of the findings. Consequently, the researcher made use of

available literature in newspapers, magazines and other publications as well as

available agencies’/departments’ records on inter-agency rivalry and criminal

activities perpetrated at MMIA. Also, the researcher spent weeks to carry out covert

observation (non-participant observation). In instances, that the researcher had to

interact with respondents, the fact the research was purely for academic reasons and

the confidentially of responses were part of measures to assure and reassure

respondents.

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1.9 Definition of Terms

1.9.1 Inter-agency Cooperation

The outcome of joint strategic, operational and tactical efforts by

actors in a particular sector in the military, law enforcement,
intelligence and oversight institutions. Cooperation is aimed at
facilitating the realisation of national security objectives and
enhancing cooperation (Ugonabo, 2013, p. 17).
1.9.2 Security

“A stable, relatively predictable environment in which an individual or a group

may pursue its ends without disruption or harm and without fear of disturbance or

injury” (Fischer, Halibozek, & Walters, 2012, p. 31).

1.9.3 Airport Security

“The techniques and methods used in protecting passengers, staff and aircraft

which use the airports from accidental/malicious harm, crime and other threats”

(Shafi, 2018, p. 11).

1.10 Organisation of the Work

This research will be organised into five (5) chapters. Chapter one will dwell

on Background to the Study, Statement of the Problem, Aim, Research Objectives,

Research Questions, Scope of the Study and Limitation(s) of the Study. Chapter two

will deal with the Conceptual Clarifications, Review of Related Literature and

Theoretical Framework. Chapter three is to deal with the description of the method of

data collection and Chapter four will dwell on presentation, analysis and interpretation

of data collected. Chapter five will consist of summary, conclusion and

recommendations.

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 CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter attempts a conceptual discourse of the variables of the study and

also reviews related literature. This is followed by the and theoretical framework of

the study in order to provide a proper understanding of the focus of the research.

2.1 Conceptual Clarification

The key concepts in this study are discoursed in this section with a view to

explaining their meanings as used in the study so as to facilitate better understanding

of the research work. The key concepts are Inter-Agency Cooperation and Airport

Security.

2.1.1 Inter-agency Cooperation

Inter-agency collaboration among federal agencies with overlapping

jurisdiction and shared responsibilities is not a new phenomenon (Kaiser 2011).

According to Giade (2009), inter-agency cooperation is defined as the cooperation

whereby relevant security and established agencies are bound by common goal and

patriotism to work jointly in National interest, avoiding parochial independence as

separate entities.
INCSR (2006-2008) as cited by Charles-Ibe (2010) opined that

“…cooperation among Nigeria Law Enforcement Agency

still leaves much to be desired… no single Law
Enforcement Agency in Nigeria has adequate resources to
combat the increasingly sophisticated international criminal
networks that operate in and through the country itself,
inter-agency cooperation is necessary for success”.

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 Integrated Border Management (IBM, n.d) also defines inter-agency

cooperation in relation to border security as,

the coordination and cooperation among all relevant authorities and

agencies involved in border security and trade facilitation to establish

effective, efficient and integrated border management systems, in

order to reach the common goal of open but controlled and secure

borders.

This definition is clearer and broader. However, it limits the concept of inter-

agency cooperation to border management.

The outcome of joint strategic, operational and tactical efforts by

actors in a particular sector in the military, law enforcement,

intelligence and oversight institutions. Cooperation is aimed at

facilitating the realisation of national security objectives and

enhancing cooperation (Ugonabo, 2013, p. 17).

The foregoing definition is very apt, it conceptualises internal security to

involve inter-sectoral cooperation as well as the purpose for inter-agency cooperation.

It is therefore adopted.

2.1.2 Airport Security

Aviation Knowledge (2012) defines airport security as procedures designed to

deter and respond to criminal acts that may affect the safety and security of aviation.

This definition is quite satisfactory; however, the term ‘aviation’ is too broad and does

not specifically identify the object of airport security.

On his part, Shafi (2018) defines airport security as, “the techniques and

methods used in protecting passengers, staff and aircraft which use the airports from

13
accidental/malicious harm, crime and other threats.” The foregoing definition is

clearer in identifying the objects of airport security. It is thus suitable for this study.

2.1.3 Nexus between Inter-Agency Cooperation and Airport Security

There is a direct relationship between Inter-Agency Cooperation and Airport

Security. Positive and effective synergy amongst stakeholder agencies in Airport

security management will lead to improved security at Nigerian airports (Jensen,

McElreath& Graves, 2013). Conversely, lack of inter-agency cooperation will

endanger airport security.

2.1.4 History of Murtala Muhammed International Airport (MMIA)

Murtala Muhammed International Airport is Nigeria’s most popular airport

(Cometonigeria, 2013). Located in Ikeja in Lagos State, the airport serves the city of

Lagos and south-western Nigeria and the MMA II Terminal is managed by Bi-

Courtney Aviation Services (Verdict Media Limited, 2018).

The airport was built during World War II. West African Airways Corporation

was formed in 1947 and had its main base at Ikeja. De Havilland Doves were initially

operated on WAACs Nigerian internal routes and then West African services

(Gradidge, 2006). Larger Douglas Dakotas were added to the Ikeja-based fleet from

1957 (Sykes, 1973). Originally known as Lagos International Airport, it was renamed

in 1976, during construction of the new international terminal, after a former Nigerian

military Head of State, Murtala Muhammed. The international terminal was modelled

after Amsterdam Airport Schiphol. The new terminal opened officially on 15 March

1979.

During the late 1980s and 1990s, the international terminal had a reputation of

being a dangerous airport. From 1992 through 2000, the US Federal Aviation

Administration (FAA) posted warning signs in all US international airports advising

14
travellers that security conditions at Lagos Airport did not meet ICAO minimum

standards (FAAN, 2016). In 1993, the FAA suspended air service between Lagos and

the United States. During this period, security at the airport continued to be a serious

problem (Gambrell, 2010).Travellers arriving in Lagos were harassed both inside and

outside of the airport terminal by criminals.

Immigration officers required bribes before stamping passports, while customs

agents demanded payment for non-existent fees. In addition, several jet airplanes were

attacked by criminals taxiing to and from the terminal and robbed their cargo holds as

widely reported by local and international media (Verdict Media Limited, 2008).

Following Olusegun Obasanjo's democratic election in 1999, the security

situation at Lagos began to improve. Airport police instituted a “shoot at sight” policy

for anyone found in secure areas around runways and taxiways, this measure further

airplane robberies. Police secured the inside of the terminal and the arrival areas

outside. The FAA ended its suspension of direct flights to Nigeria in 2001 in

recognition of these security improvements. By 2010, the FAA had granted the airport

its highest safety rating (Gambrell, 2010). This shows the direct impact of governance

and leadership on the provision of security services especially in the airports.

The airport consists of an international and a domestic terminal, located about

1km from each other. The domestic terminal was relocated to the old Lagos domestic

terminal in 2000 after a devastating fire (Verdict Media Limited, 2018). Murtala

Muhammed Airport Terminal 2 (MMA2) was constructed to replace the fire damaged

building and was commissioned on 7 April 2007(Verdict Media Limited, 2018).The

airport terminal has been renovated several times since the 1970s but its most radical

make over began in 2013, following the launch of the Federal government’s multi-

billion naira Remodelling/Rehabilitation Programme for its airports nationwide

15
(FAAN, 2018b). Under the re-modelling work there, by late 2014, the MMIA lounge

area had been expanded to four times its previous size and new passenger handling

conveyor systems installed which can handle over 1,000 passengers per hour (FAAN,

2018b).

In 2014, Murtala Muhammed International Airport has witnessed substantial

improvements. Malfunctioning and non-operational infrastructures such as air

conditioning and luggage belts have been repaired. The entire airport has been

cleaned, and many new restaurants and duty-free stores have opened. Bilateral Air

Services Agreements signed between Nigeria and other countries are being revived

and new ones signed. These agreements have seen the likes of Emirates, Ocean Air,

Delta and China Southern Airlines express interest and receive landing rights to

Nigeria's largest international airport.

2.2 Review of Related Literature

Although inter-agency cooperation remains a major challenge for airport

security across the globe, it has not generated much scholarly interest, as such there

appears to be a dearth of literature in this regard. While there abounds a plethora of

literature on inter-agency collaboration, this phenomenon has not been sufficiently

explored with regards to airport security.

Belger (2011) noted that the goal of aviation security is to prevent harm to

aircraft, passengers, and crew, as well as support national security and counter-

terrorism policy. Airport security attempts to prevent any threat or potentially

dangerous situations from arising or entering the country. If airport security does

succeed then the chances of any dangerous situation, illegal items or threats entering

into an aircraft, country or airport are greatly reduced. As such, airport security serves
16
several purposes: To protect the airport and country from any threatening events, to

reassure the travelling public that they are safe and to protect the country and their

people.

2.2.1 Nature of Security at Airports

Airport security management often involves the roles of more than one agency

or department. For example, at the John F. Kennedy Airport in the United States of

America, airport security is the responsibility of the Police Department of the Port

Authority, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Transportation Security

Administration (TSA), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), U.S. Army, Department

of Agriculture and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (Reuters,

2016). This multiplicity of agencies/departments creates a problem of overlapping

jurisdiction. As Reuters (2016) notes:

The variety of uniforms is a sign of the overlapping jurisdictions that

determine which federal, state or local agency — or even airline —
is responsible for security on any particular patch of turf.

Similarly, in Nigeria, airport security is the responsibility of the Federal

Airports Authority of Nigeria (FAAN), Nigeria Police Force (NPF), Department of

State Services (DSS), Nigeria Airforce (NAF), Nigerian Army (NA), Nigeria Customs

Service (NCS), Nigeria Immigration Service (NIS), Federal Road Safety Corps

(FRSC), Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC), Port Health Services,

Aircraft Operators and Airport Tenants (FAAN, 2015). This multiplicity of

agencies/departments creates a problem of overlapping jurisdiction. For example,

while the NIS and NCS are statutorily responsible for monitoring movement of

persons and goods respectively, the DSS also has the responsibility of monitoring the

movement of persons of security interest as well as monitoring travellers’

17
documents/passports with a view to identifying stolen ones along with their

possessors who may be the subject of a watch list entry. The DSS also has the

responsibility of monitoring and preventing illegal importation of arms and

ammunition, Publications designed to subvert government policies, goods and

materials (FAAN, 2015). Similarly, perimeter patrol of the airport and general

surveillance duty is primarily the responsibility of FAANAVSEC, it requires

assistance from the NPF, DSS, Nigeria Military Forces and (NAF and NA) (FAAN,

2015). These overlapping jurisdictions are preconditions for inter-agency rivalry.

2.2.2 Roles/Responsibilities of Security Agencies at the Airport

Federal Airports Authority of Nigeria (FAAN, 2015) outlined the following as

the roles/responsibilities of the different security agencies at the Nigerian airport:

2.2.2.1 Roles/Responsibilities of the MMAAVSEC Department

In order to comply with its terms of reference, the Security Department shall

carry out the following, but are not limited to:

a) Charged with coordinating the implementation of the provisions of the Airport

Security Programme.
b) Resolution of all security concerns, i.e. development of corrective action plans

to identify deficiencies with timeline for rectification.

c) Ensure the establishment of an Airport Security Committee at the airport, in

conformity with the requirements as stipulated in the NCASP.

d) Assist in the provision of Airport Security motivation and awareness through

Training (Lectures, Seminars and Workshops) on quarterly basis.

e) Establish measures and procedures for the control of access to Security

Restricted Areas (SRA) and Enhanced Security Restricted Areas (ESRA).

f) Establish procedures for the screening of originating departure, transfer and

transit passenger, cabin baggage and hold baggage.

g) Liaise with FAAN/Airport Management to ensure that AVSEC-MMA and the

other Security Agencies are provided with the necessary supporting facilities,
18
 including office space, communications equipment, vehicles, other appropriate

security equipment, and training facilities.

h) Ensure that lapses and observed weaknesses in security measures by security

Agencies and other authorities as well as operations, handlers, and other

organisations operating in the airport as well as their recommended

procedures, are brought to the attention of the Airport Manager for correction.
i) Develop and implement a system of Aviation Security self-audits to ensure

security quality control.

j) Report all security breaches to the appropriate agencies for necessary action.

The above represent the roles and responsibilities of the Security Department of

FAAN Aviation Security (AVSEC).

2.2.2.2 Policing Authority

The Nigeria Police Force (NPF) – Airport Command is headed by a

Commissioner of Police (CP) whose office is situated at the International Terminal

(ITZ) of MMA. He/she is assisted by a Deputy Commissioner of Police (DCP)

Operations, an Assistant Commissioner of Police (ACP) Operations, Assistant

Commissioner of Police (ACP) Investigations and three Police Stations Headed by

Divisional Police Officers (DPOs) serving the four Terminals of MMDA; DT I, DT II,

ITZ and HCT. Unlike the other Security Agencies at MMA, the CP is the head of all

Police Personnel in all Airports in Nigeria. Their main responsibility is to provide

armed support for AVSEC personnel deployed at MMA others include:

a) Assist AVSECMMA in the escort of arriving and departing aircraft.

b) Assist AVSECMMA in perimeter patrol of the airport including general

surveillance duties.
c) Receive cases referred to it by AVSECMMA (CIB) and prosecute same in

court when necessary.

d) Provide monthly feedback to AVSECMMA and the ASC on outcome of

cases/incidents handled.
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 e) Bomb detection and disposal duties.
f) Partake in Airport Emergency/Contingency Plans of MMA in conjunction with

AVSECMMA and other Security Agencies.

g) Assist AVSECMMA to prevent Criminal activities on the Landside of the

Airport as well as patrol the car parks.

h) Assist AVSECMMA in the conduct of Criminal Background Checks for the

purposes of issuance of Airport Access Permits.

i) Other duties referred to them by MMA Management particularly in the area of

Unlawful Interference against Civil Aviation.

In addition to these specific roles, the NPF possess esspecialist capability in

the field of Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD). The Nigerian Police E.O.D unit,

called the ANTI-BOMB SQUAD, are based at the Police E.O.D. Central Store, Ikeja.

They maintain a Permanent Presence at MMA, under a Deputy Superintendent of

Police. They are equipped with “Terror-ops” Vehicle that has “Buckeye” capability,

with remote C.C.TV and water disruption shotgun, Blast Screens, and are a 5-minute

call-out away with this vehicle from Ikeja Base. The E.O.D. Police unit receives

Aviation Security Training from Private Consultants, in Aircraft Searching, I.E.D

Technology and General Security Awareness.

2.2.2.3 Department of State Services (DSS)

The Department of State Service MMA Command is headed by a Director

whose office is situated at the International Terminal (ITZ) of MMA who is assisted

by four Assistant Directors at each of the four terminals. DSS personnel are equally

deployed to the front desk at each screening point with immigration personnel among

other locations. Their responsibilities include;

a) Provide internal security using convert means.

b) Co-operate with AVSECMMA in prevention, detection of criminals/criminal

activities including all forms of perceived acts of terrorism.

c) Provide feedback on all cases/matters/issues referred to it by AVSECMMA.
20
 d) Assist AVSECMMA to patrol the airside of the Terminal and surroundings,

carrying out covert assignments as deemed fit.

e) Monitor and report any security threat that may jeopardize normal operations.
f) Assist AVSECMMA in conducting Background and Criminal History Record

Checks (CHRC) for the purposes of issuance of Airport Access Permits.

Other functional roles of the Service that has direct bearing to the airport are

primarily those of prevention, detection and investigation of:

a) Threat of subversion.
b) Threat of sabotage.
c) Economic crimes of national security dimensions;
d) Terrorism/Terrorist activities;
e) Threat to law and order.

For the purpose of achieving the above mentioned functions, the Service

carries out the following duties;

a. Maintaining a watch list database in conjunction with the Nigerian

Immigration Service (NIS) at the airport for the purpose of monitoring the

movement of persons of security interest;

b. Monitoring and prevention of illegal importation of Arms and ammunition,

Publications designed to subvert government policies, Goods and materials

such as nuclear and radioactive elements which could be used singly or in

combination to carry out sabotage or acts of terrorism with premeditated intent

to inflict injury on the country.

c. Monitoring travellers’ documents/passports with a view to identifying stolen

ones along with their possessors who may be the subject of a watch list entry.
d. Engage in the conduct of appropriate intelligence exercises to ensure the

safety of the airports and their facilities.

e. Assist AVSECMMA in perimeter patrol of the airport including general

surveillance duties.
f. Partake in Airport Emergency/Contingency Plans of MMA in conjunction with

AVSECMMA and other Security Agencies.

21
 g. Ensure general liaison with sister agencies, AVSECMMA and other

stakeholders in the area of information sharing to facilitate their operations, as

well as other duties referred to it by MMA Management particularly in the

area of Unlawful Interference against Civil Aviation.

2.2.2.4 Nigerian Military Forces

The Nigeria Military Forces at MMA comprises of both the Nigerian Army

(NA) and the Nigerian Air Forces (NAF). The Army Artillery Air Defence

Detachment is headed by a Captain or Lieutenant while the Air Force is headed by a

Group Captain dubbed Military Airport Commandant (MAC). Their offices are

situated at the International Terminal (ITZ) of MMZ.

Their responsibilities include:

a. Consult with AVSECMMA and other relevant stakeholders to regularly review

the facilitation and enforcement aspects of their procedures to ensure that the

needs of the Airport community are fully met.

b. Provide armed support for AVSEC personnel deployed at MMA during high

threat situations including robust Landside/Airside patrols.

c. Maintain facilities for the protection of the Airspace and Airport against all

forms of attacks including external invasion.

d. Provide manpower assistance in manning Key Points (KPs), Vulnerable Points

(VPs) during periods of increased security threat.

e. Assist AVSECMMA in perimeter patrol of the airport including general

surveillance duties.
f. Partake in Airport Emergency/Contingency Plans of MMA in conjunction with

AVSECMMA and other Security Agencies.

g. Other duties referred to them by MMA Management particularly in the area of

Unlawful Interference against Civil Aviation.

2.2.2.5 Nigeria Customs Service (NCS)

22
 The Nigeria Customs Service (NCS) – MMA Command is headed by a

Customs Area Comptroller (CAC) whose office is situated at the Cargo Terminal of

MMA. He has Deputy Comptrollers of Customs (DCC) Administration, Enforcement,

Tarmac and International Terminal (ITZ). Their responsibilities include:

a. Consult with AVSECMMA and other relevant stakeholders to regularly review

the facilitation and enforcement aspects of their procedures to ensure that the

needs of both parties as well as the Airport Community are fully met.
b. Shall not request or require the airport operator to initiate any action or

inaction which would conflict with aviation laws, regulations, standards or

control requirements of Nigeria, nor should any action or inaction be

encouraged which could result in a conflict within national law.

c. Ensure that all their personnel having assigned duties at MMA, wear valid

Airport Restricted Area Permits to verify that they are assigned specific duties

at that facility, and are in accordance with appropriate legislative requirements

regarding control of access to restricted areas.

d. Assist AVSECMMA in exercising effective control over access to restricted

areas.
e. Assist AVSECMMA in securing cabin and hold baggage from aircraft that are

involved in incidents of an emergency nature, especially for arriving aircraft.

f. Assist AVSECMMA in patrolling the Cargo Terminal, both Landside and

Airside especially the Ejigbo end to ensure that touts and other

undesirable/illegal persons do not gain access.

g. Assist FAANMMA Management in other matters as may be called upon from

time to time.

2.2.2.6 Nigeria Immigration Service (NIS)

The Nigeria Immigration Service (NIS) – MMA Command is headed by a

Comptroller whose office is situated at the International Terminal (ITZ) of MMA,

whose responsibilities include:

23
a. Processing of arriving and departing passengers and giving general

information as to immigrant status.

b. Ensuring that arriving and departing passenger meet entry and departure

requirements (Visa).
c. Ensuring that Immigration cards are properly completed.
d. Ensuring that persons against whom “Stop Orders” have been placed are not

allowed to leave the country in conjunction with the DSS.

e. Ensuring that persons against whom deportation orders and prohibition orders

are made are not allowed to enter the country in conjunction with the DSS.
f. Ensuring that Nigerians, deported from other States, in conjunction with the

appropriate air carrier, are not allowed to enter Nigeria without being met at

the aircraft by an Immigration Office(s) or air operator security officer(s) and

escorted to Immigration for processing.

g. Processing and/or reprocessing surviving passenger(s) from aircraft accidents

in conjunction with AVSECMMA.

h. Consult with AVSECMMA and other relevant stakeholders to regularly review

the facilitation and enforcement aspects of their procedures to ensure that the

needs of the both parties as well as the Airport Community are fully met.
i. Carry out the inspection, treatment and certification of imported Agricultural

products and Pets coming into the country to ensure that they are free from

diseases and pests that are capable of devastating the nation’s agricultural

economy and human existence.

j. Carry out inspection, treatment and certification of Nigeria’s agricultural

products for export to ensure that they are pest free and meet the phytosanitary

requirements of the importing countries to make them acceptable in

international markets.
k. Partake in Airport Emergency/Contingency Plans of MMA in conjunction with

AVSECMMA and other Security Agencies.

l. Other duties referred to them by MMA Management particularly in the area of

Unlawful Interference against Civil Aviation.

24
2.2.3 Level of Cooperation amongst Security Agencies at Airports

Kaiser (2011) posits that the rationale for inter-agency collaboration include:

ending or reducing policy fragmentation, improving effectiveness in policy

formulation and implementation, making agencies aware of different perspectives and

orientations, mitigating conflict among agencies, increasing agency productivity,

enhancing efficiency, reducing redundancy, and cutting costs, heightening the

attention to and priorities for cross-cutting programmes, changing organisational

cultures, changing bureaucratic and administrative cultures and methods of operation

and streamlining and improving congressional and executive oversight.

However, despite the emphasis on the need for inter-agency cooperation,

nothing appears to have changed in the levels of distrust and non-cooperation among

the agencies. Omoigui cited in Samuel (2011) posits that Lack of inter-agency

cooperation is a common feature in inter-agency relationship in Nigeria. He states,

that

Security operatives, rather than exploring avenues of collaboration in

security provision, capacity building and sharing intelligence as is the

case with developed nations of the world, have over the years been

engulfed in unhealthy rivalries.

25
2.2.4 Nature of Threats to Airport Security

Tyson &Grabianowski (2018), terrorism has been a problem for airlines and

air travellers since the 1970s, when hijackings and bombings became the method of

choice for subversive, militant organisations around the world.

According to Rimmer (2011), the large numbers of people passing through

airports every day presents potential targets for terrorism and other forms of crime

because of the number of people located in one place. Similarly, the high

concentration of people on large airliners, the potential high death rate with attacks on

aircraft, and the ability to use a hijacked airplane as a lethal weapon may provide an

alluring target for terrorism. Some incidents have been the result of travellers carrying

either weapons or items that could be used as weapons on board aircraft so that they

can hijack the plane.

Apart from terrorism, there are other threats to security at Nigerian airports.

New Telegraph (2018) identify some of these threats at Nigerian airports to include

presence of intruders, who slip through perimeter gates or jump over fences, activities

of bandits, who have continued to rob airlines taxiing to their final stops, incidents of

stowaway at airports, which is a serious security breach and undermines the security

of aircraft and users of airports, and livestock, especially cows, taking over runways

and preventing aircrafts landing.

Okeke (2017) posit that luggage poaching is one of the security threats at

Nigerian airports, with international and local airlines operating in country spending

as much as $46million annually as compensation paid for baggage losses.

The above situation has changed positively as no airline in the period between

2015 and 2018 reported loss of passenger baggage to FAAN (FAAN, 2018).

26
2.2.5 Implication of Lack of Inter-Agency Cooperation for Airport Security

Given the myriad of possible security threats in airports, inter-agency rivalry

portends negative consequence for airport security as it could create loopholes in the

security architecture of the airport, which could be exploited by criminals. For

example, the failure of the U.S, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to share

information with the U.S. Customs and Border Protection Observing about

Abdulmutallab connection to Al-Qaeda, allowed the suspect to be able to board a

plane to the United States (CNN, 2009).

Similarly, in Nigeria, the lack of cooperation amongst security agencies has

created loopholes in airport security architecture, which have been exploited by

criminals (FAAN, 2015). For example, at the Murtala Mohammed International

Airport, Also, although it is the responsibility of the Nigeria Police Force to assist the

Federal Airports Authority of Nigeria Aviation Security in the escort of arriving and

departing aircraft (FAAN, 2015), however it has been reported that some aircrafts that

arrive and take off from the airport are not escorted as the FAAN has only one (1)

escort vehicle for arriving and departing aircraft for the entire airport which handles

over 200 flights every day (Leadership Newspaper, 2018). Consequently, this has

resulted in reported cases of attacks on aircraft and stealing of baggage (Leadership

Newspaper, 2018).

2.2.5 Challenges of Inter-Agency Cooperation at Airports

Several factors have been adduced as causes of inter-agency conflict. Ulin

(2010) sees lack of inter-agency cooperation as a lack of a unifying authority. For

example, in the USA, except for the President of the United States who sits at the top

of the entire US government, each federal department or federal agency has its own
27
leader, budget, career progression and mission. The situation in Nigeria is different

after the President, Commander-in-Chief, there is the National Security Adviser

(NSA) who co-ordinate the activities of security agencies and armed forces through

the Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA).

Ulin (2010) also identifies lack of incentives for cooperation as a reason for

the lack of cooperation. Citing examples from the USA, Ulin stated that, “While one

might think that broad governmental experience by any federal employee is a plus,

service outside of one’s own agency or department is hardly seen as career

enhancing.” The United States Government Accountability Office (USGAO) also

states that “agencies’ personnel systems often do not recognise or reward interagency

collaboration, which could diminish agency employees’ interest in serving in

interagency efforts” (Mora, 2010). This is also applicable to Nigerian airports, where

there appears to be no clear incentives or rewards for personnel/staffs of

agencies/departments that engender inter-agency cooperation at the airports.

A Nigerian Army Director blames the problem on pride on the part of all the

agencies. According to him, “Most of our roles are overlapping, and the fear of the

possibility of diminishing importance in the security architecture has made

cooperation between the agencies elusive” (Olawale, 2013, p. 37). Bello (2013) as

cited in (Olawale, 2013, p. 52) also puts the blame on pride. He says that it is “a

common human weakness for any security or intelligence agency to seek to claim

credit for the successes in fighting crimes and terrorism in the society.” The desire to

seek agency’ glory, may be a factor inhibiting inter-agency cooperation at Nigerian

airports.

USGAO also attributes the problem to lack of clear policy guidelines. It stated

that “US government agencies do not always share relevant information with their
28
national security partners due to a lack of clear guidelines for sharing information and

security clearance issues” (Mora, 2010). USGAO also identified other problems to be,

mutual suspicion, lack of a comprehensive strategy and milestones, lack of clear

agency roles and responsibilities for undertaking operations, problems in creating a

database that is accessible to all relevant agencies, differences among agency cultures

and planning processes, and difficulties in developing consensus around competing

priorities (Mora, 2010).

The foregoing also poses challenges to inter-agency cooperation at Nigerian

airports. For example, the Comptroller General of the NIS, Muhammad Babandede,

lamented lack of access to the INTERPOL I-24/7 portal under the authority of the

NPF (Okeke, 2016). The availability of a clear policy guideline would have dictated

the sharing of such information in the interest of airport and national security.

The Military, Police and Paramilitary Public Relations Officers' Forum

(MILPOPPROF) as cited in Samuel (2014, p. 17) submits that the problem is largely

due to the ignorance on the part of personnel of these agencies about sister agencies in

such matters as the complementary roles of other agencies to the actualisation of their

own roles, areas of mutual cooperation and exclusivity as well as their perception of

the ranks and organisational structure of other agencies. There is also the lack of

regular interaction between the agencies especially among personnel of the lower

ranks. This is the case at Nigerian airports and inter-agency rivalry appears to occur

amongst personnel of lower ranks (Obi, 2017).

2.2.5 Gap in Literature

The foregoing review of literature shows the absence of any scholarly work

specifically focused on inter-agency cooperation with regards to airport security in

Nigeria. This study hopes to fill the gap in this regard.

29
2.3 Theoretical Framework

2.3.1 Network Theory

The idea of social networks and the notions of sociometry and sociograms

appeared over 50 years ago (University of Twente, 2017). Barnes is credited with

coining the notion of social networks, an outflow of his study of a Norwegian island

parish in the early 1950s (Barnes, 1954). Network analysis (social network theory) is

the study of how the social structure of relationships around a person, group, or

organisation affects beliefs or behaviours.

The most fundamental characteristic of network theory is the focus on

relationships among actors as an explanation of actor and group outcomes (University

of Twente, 2017).Network theory, in sociology, has been used mainly for studying

communication networks; however, it is still unclear whether Network Theory can

illuminate inter-agency cooperation (Bardach, 1994).

2.3.2 Collaboration Theory

Collaboration theory consists of analytical frameworks for understanding the

collaborative process and its outcomes derived through various forms of research and

reflection (Faleti, Darlington & Ojelabi, 2018). Collaboration theory, in sociology,

concerns itself with the social rules and processes that bind and separate people not

only as individuals, but as members of associations, groups, and institutions (Faleti et

al, 2018).

Bradshaw (1997) defines organisational collaboration as “a unique process

depending on the needs and resources of the individual stakeholders in a particular

problem domain.” However, studies of other collaborative efforts have found that

such organisations progress through predictable stages of development. Some theories

30
of collaboration distinguish between collaboration and cooperation, but Wood and

Gray prefer a more inclusive definition as:

collaboration occurs when a group of autonomous stakeholders of a

problem domain engage in an interactive process, using shared rules,
norms, and structures, to act or decide on issues related to that
domain (Wood &Gray, 1991).
The collaborative process is developmental although ‘steps’ may differ in

name and number. Gray uses the terms ‘problem-setting,’ ‘direction-setting,’ and

‘structuring’ to describe three stages of collaborative activity (Wood &Gray, 1991).

The early stages of a collaborative effort are particularly important. Reed &

Cedjaas cited in Gray (1985) describe organisational preconditions which support

successful collaboration as:

i. Linked organisational objectives that foster mutual goal attainment

ii. Comprehensive pre-assessment of valued commodities
iii. Organisational values that promote interdependence
iv. Environmental scanning and strategic planning
v. Administrative commitment, knowledge, and support.

Energy invested in meeting these preconditions in the early stages of a

collaborative project is linked to activities undertaken during problem setting,

direction setting, and structuring. In ‘problem setting’, it is important that stakeholders

recognize the complexity of the problem and the interdependence of the organisations

that are undertaking the joint effort. During ‘direction setting’, stakeholders work

together to gather information and develop a strategic plan. As the plan takes shape,

the distribution of power should allow all stakeholders to influence decisions about

the collaborative effort. With implementation, structures and processes are established

to accomplish shared goals. An ‘enablement framework’ must assure funding and

communication linkages, and as the collaboration evolves, environmental scanning

and adaptation must continue (Reed &Cedja as cited in Gray, 1985).

31
 Throughout the life of a collaborative effort, ‘boundary-spanners’ please

explain this succinctly before going on communicate frequently within and across

organisational boundaries and engage in a variety of activities that may support the

new organisation, protect their own organisations, or link organisations together.

Although the stages of collaboration are incremental, progress often looks

more like a spiral rather than a straight line, and partners must balance a focus on

long-term goals with flexibility as they find the most effective way to “knit their local

needs, resources, and preferences into a purposeful plan.”Ultimately, the successful

implementation of collaborative agreements depends upon stakeholders’ collective

adaptability (i.e. ability to manage continuous change).

A criticism of Collaboration theory is that there currently exists no

consolidated General Theory of Collaboration (GTC). Such a theory (GTC) could

provide a common language and framework for those seeking to better understand

and expand the collaborative aspects of any given field of human endeavour.

Additionally, a GTC would provide a body of knowledge for those developing

collaborative software and other design based enterprises to draw on (Faleti et al,

2018).Also, a GTC must address: the meaning of collaboration itself, the auspices

under which a collaboration is convened and the role of intervention in directing

social change, the implications of collaboration for environmental complexity and

organizational control over the environment, and the relationship between

organisations’ self-interests and the collective interests present in a collaborative

alliance.

However, although there is currently no widely accepted general theory of

collaboration, there are many theoretical approaches to collaborative practice that

32
have been developed within a wide variety of disciplines, such as Sociology,

Demographics, Ethnography, Biology and Economics.

The Collaboration Theory is apt for this study because it would help to explain

processes that would integrate the separate agencies in the airport (MMIA) security

management in the most effective way and shed light on the processes of cooperation

that could help these agencies knit their local needs, resources, and preferences into a

purposeful plan, and the ultimate successful implementation of such collaborative

agreements. Collaboration Theory also provides a useful lens for examining the

history of partnerships, recognising preconditions for collaboration, and evaluating

progress.

33
 CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This chapter presents the methods of data collection, analysis and presentation

in this research. Specifically, it discusses the research design, sample population and

sampling technique, sources of data, techniques of data collection and methods of data

analysis and presentation.

3.1 Research Design

This study made use of both cross-sectional and case study designs. It is a

cross-sectional design because data were collected from the respondents at a single

point in time. This design is appropriate because it captures a specific point in time

and can be used to prove and/or disprove assumptions (Rivers, n.d). It is also a case

study design because all the representative subset is drawn from MurtalaMuhammed

International Airport (MMIA). This case study design is appropriate because of the

inability to effectively study the subject of the study in all airports in the country.

3.2 Sources of Data

Primary and secondary sources of data were obtained in the course of this

study.

a. Primary Data

Primary data for this study were drawn from the sampling population.

Questionnaire containing structured (close-ended) questions were administered to

personnel of Nigeria Customs Service (NCS), Nigeria Immigration Service (NIS),

National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA), Nigeria Police Force (NPF),

Department of State Services (DSS), Federal Airport Authority of Nigeria Aviation

Security (FAANAVSEC), National Civil Aviation Authority (NCAA) and airport

34
users. Interviews were also conduct with some stakeholders in the foregoing

categories.

b. Secondary Sources

Secondary data was sourced from books, journals, articles, constitutions,

unpublished projects, internet sources, government documents, agencies records and

reports, newspapers, magazines, etc.

3.3 Population and Sampling Technique

The research could not study the whole population of security operatives at the

MMIA. Therefore, a representative subset of the population was chosen. The target

population of the study comprised of all staff of NCS, NIS, NDLEA, NPF, DSS,

FAANAVSEC and NCAA working at MMIAand airport users.

The choice of these subsets was guided by their involvement either as

providers or receivers of airport security at MMIA. The NPF, FAANAVSEC and DSS

are statutorily responsible for providing law enforcement and intelligence services at

the airport, NIS and NCS and responsible for migration controls, anti-smuggling and

tax collection duties, NCAA is responsible for regulation of safety of aircraft

operations, while airport users are the beneficiaries/victims of efficient/inefficient

airport security as well as witnesses of inter-agency cooperation or the lack of thereof

at the airport.

The sample size of the study was two hundred (200) respondents. Ten (10)

respondents each were drawn from NDLEA and DSS, twenty (20) respondents each

from NCS, NIS, NCAA and NPF, thirty (30) respondents from FAANAVSEC and

seventy (70) respondents from airport users (See Table 3.1 below). Interviews were

35
also conducted with the Heads of NCS, DSS and Nigerian Agricultural and

Quarantine Services (NAQS).

Stratified Sampling Technique was used for the study. This sampling

technique was chosen because it allows the researcher the discretion to obtain a

sample that appears to be representative of the population. The selection of the

sample size of the population was guided by size of each representative subset in the

case study which enables the researcher to draw up a representative sample from the

entire population under study.

The research instruments used were the questionnaire and interview guide.

The questionnaire was drafted by the researcher and tested for adequacy and ease of

administration and effectiveness in achieving the elicitation of desired information by

the project supervisor. The questionnaire were administered by the researcher.

Table 3.1: Distribution of Questionnaires

Agency/Department Distributed Returned

NDLEA 10 10
DSS 10 10
NCS 20 20
NIS 20 20
NPF 20 20
NCAA 20 20
FAANAVSEC 30 30
Airport users 70 70
Total 200 200
Source:

3.4 Techniques of Data Collection

The research employed field methods and document analysis for the study.

The study utilised the administration of questionnaire conduct of interview as the

instruments of data collection. The purpose was to obtain direct responses from

different stakeholders on the subject of the study. The choice of questionnaire as the

36
instrument was hinged upon the fact that it was the most suitable and convenient for

the population under study. The busy work schedules of majority of the respondents

did not allow many of them to grant audience for interviews.They rather opted to fill

the questionnaire at their convenience. The interview also allowed some major

stakeholders to provide additional information not catered for in the questionnaire.

3.5 Method of Data Presentation and Analysis

The technique used in data analysis included document analysis for secondary

data and interviews, while the data generated from questionnaire administered were

analysed quantitatively. The data were analysed using Statistical Package for Social

Sciences (SPSS) and presented in frequency tables, percentages and charts.

CHAPTER FOUR

DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSES

This Chapter deals on the presentation and analysis of data collected in the

course of this study as well as summary of findings from the study. It concludes with

the discussion of the research objectives using the findings.

37
4.1 Presentation and Analysis of Research Data

In order to meet the objectives of this study, two hundred (200) copies of the

research instrument i.e. copies of questionnaire were distributed and all the two

hundred (200) were retrieved representing 100% response rate. This is a rare event,

but the fact that the location of the study is the immediate past station of the

researcher, seeing him back in the familiar terrain encouraged the respondents to give

prompt responses to the research instrument.

38
Table 4.1: Socio-Demographic Characteristics of Respondents

Characteristics Frequency Percentages %

Gender
Male 147 73.5
Female 53 26.5
Total 200 100.0
Age
Below 20 Years 3 1.5
21 - 30 Years 35 17.5
31 - 40 Years 65 32.5
41 – 50 Years 65 32.5
51 Years and above 32 16.0
Total 200 100.0
Educational qualification
Primary school 1 0.5
Secondary school 34 17.0
Tertiary level 165 82.5
Total 200 100.0
Work Experience
Below 1 Year 47 23.5
1 – 5 Years 55 27.5
6 – 10 Years 33 16.5
Above 10 Years 65 32.5
Total 200 100.0

Source: Researcher’s Field Work, August 2018

The demographic characteristic of the respondents is as shown in Table 4.1

above. According to the table, the research instruments (questionnaires) are

distributed to the respondents in the selected locations. The gender distribution of the

questionnaire showed that majority of the respondents, 73.5%, are male while 53

respondents, representing 26.5% of the respondents are female.

The age distribution of the respondents showed that most of the respondents

were in age groups 31 – 40 years and 41 – 50 yearswith each group accounted for

32.5% of the respondents. The other age groups, 21 – 30 years and 51 years and

39
above accounted for 17.9% and 16.0% of the respondents respectively while only 3

respondents representing 1.5% of the respondents are below 20 years.

For educational qualification, most of the respondents (82.5%) have tertiary

education and just 34 representing 17.0% of the respondents have secondary

education while only 1 respondent (0.5%) has primary education. This shows that the

respondents are well read and should be able to give reasonable responses to the

questions in the research instrument. I think it is less about literacy but positions

occupied, experience on the job and specifically about the airport

On the length of stay of the respondents at Murtala Mohammed International

Airport (MMIA), more than one-third of the respondents, 32.5%, have been in MMIA

for more than 10 years while 23.5% of the respondents have served in MMIA for less

than a year. On the other hand, 27.5% of the respondents have between 2 – 5 years’

work experience at MMIA while 16.5% have 6 – 10 years’ experience. The

implication here is that, a staff with at least a year experience in a working

environment should have a sound knowledge of his/her environment, therefore with

76.5% of the respondents who have stayed in MMIA for more than a year, it is

obvious that sound responses would be obtained to the research questions.

40
4.1.1 Security Threats to Murtala Muhammad International Airport

Questions numbers 1 to 14 of Section B of the Research Questionnaire

(Appendix 1) provide answers to RQ1 thereby satisfying RO1. Table 4.2 gives the

respondents’ opinions about their knowledge of the possible security threats at

MMIA.

Table 4.2: Respondents’ Opinion on Some Security Threats at MMIA

Source of Threats Very Likely Likely Not Likely

Money laundering 109 82 9
(54.5) (41.0) (4.5)
Drug trafficking 108 84 8
(54.0) (42.0) (4.0)
Human trafficking 99 89 12
(49.5) (44.5) (6.0)
Luggage theft 99 83 18
(49.5) (41.5) (9.0)
Contraband smuggling 94 91 15
(47.0) (45.5) (7.5)
Migrant smuggling 74 98 28
(37.0) (49.0) (14.0)
Vandalism/Sabotage 73 93 34
(36.5) (46.5) (17.0)
Act of terrorism 60 97 43
(30.0) (48.5) (21.5)
Arms smuggling 60 89 51
(30.0) (44.5) (25.5)
Animal/Human intrusion 54 99 47
(27.0) (49.5) (23.5)
Stowaway 45 115 40
(22.5) (57.5) (20.0)
Armed robbery 40 115 45
(20.0) (57.5) (22.5)
Kidnapping/Hostage taking 42 87 71
(21.0) (43.5) (35.5)
Plane hijack 22 61 117
(11.0) (30.5) (58.5)

41
Source: Researcher’s Field Work, August 2018

In Table 4.2, it is evident that from the respondents’ opinion that all the

identified threats are likely to pose security threats at MMIA though at various degree.

While Drug trafficking and Money laundering are more likely with the average score

of 2.500, they are closely followed by Human trafficking, Luggage theft and

Contraband smuggling with mean scores of 2.435, 2.405 and 2.395 respectively.

Other security threats at MMIA according to the respondents with their mean scores

are; Migrant smuggling (2.230), Vandalism/Sabotage (2.195), Act of terrorism

(2.085), Arm smuggling (2.045), Animal/Human intrusion of restricted areas (2.035)

and Stowaway (2.025). The less likely security threats at MMIA according to

respondents are Plane hijack, Kidnapping/Hostage taking and Armed robbery with

mean scores of 1.525, 1.855 and 1.975 respectively.

In furtherance of the foregoing, NDLEA Annual Summary of Drug Seizures

2017 confirm high rate of drug trafficking at MMIA. In 2017 alone, seventy (70)

cases were recorded, resulting in the seizure of 1266.400kilograms (kms) of drugs

including cocaine, heroin, cannabis sativa, methamphetamine, ephedrine and

psychotropic substances such as tramadol,rohypnoland swinol, and the arrest eighty-

five (85) suspects (See Appendix 3).

Furthermore, FAAN’s Chart on Trafficked Victim Transferred to NAPTIP

shows that within September 26, 2016 and July 20, 2018, five (5) cases were

transferred to the National Agency for the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons

(NAPTIP) involving forty-six (46) victims (See Appendix 4).

42
4.1.2 Reasons for Inter-Agency Rivalry at MMIA?

Questions 15, 16 and 17i n Section B of Appendix 1 provide answers to this

research question and it is as analysed below (that is not analysis but a tabular

presentation of the responses. Table 4.4 gives summaries of the opinion of the

respondents on likely causes of inter-agency rivalry at MMIA.

Table 4.3: Causes of Inter-Agency Rivalry among Security Agents at MMIA

Causes of inter-agency Rivalry Strongly Agree Disagree Strongly

Agree Disagree
Agency pride/superiority complex 121 (60.5) 53 16 10
(26.5) (8.0) (5.0)
Mutual suspicion among agencies 72 96 24 8
(36.0) (48.0) (12.0) (4.0)
Inheritance of primordial rivalry 68 90 32 10
(34.0) (45.0) (16.0) (5.0)

Source: Researcher’s Field Work,August 2018

Table 4.3 indicates that “Agency pride/superiority complex” is the main cause

of inter-agency rivalry at MMIA with mean score of 3.425 according to the opinion of

the respondents. It was followed by “Mutual suspicion among agencies/departments”

with mean score of 3.16 and “Inheritance primordial rivalry” followed them behind as

the cause of inter-agency rivalry with mean score of 3.08.

4.1.3 Challenges of Inter-Agency Cooperation at MMIA?

Questions 25 to 31 in Section B of appendix1 provide the answers to this

research question. Table 4.5 gives the summary of the respondents’ opinions on some

factors inhibiting inter-agency cooperation at MMIA.s

43
Table 4.4: Respondents’ Opinion on Factors Inhibiting Inter-Agency

Cooperation at MMIA

Factors inhibiting inter-agency Strongly Agree Disagree Strongly

cooperation Agree Disagree
The lack of a lead Authority or Inter-agency 70 85 35 10
Coordinator (35.0) (42.5) (17.5) (5.0)
Lack of reward for personnel of agencies 72 91 31 6
who show initiative for inter-agency (36.0) (45.5) (15.5) (3.0)
cooperation
Lack of clear policy guidelines for inter- 76 90 19 15
agency cooperation (38.0) (45.0) (9.5) (7.5)
Differences in agency culture and 68 103 22 7
operational processes (34.0) (51.5) (11.0) (3.5)
Difficulties in developing consensus around 60 114 22 4
competing priorities (30.0) (57.0) (11.0) (2.0)
Lack of joint airport security strategy and 69 93 28 10
milestones/target (34.5) (46.5) (14.0) (5.0)
Ignorance of the complementary roles of 76 98 17 9
other agencies to the actualization of (38.0) (49.0) (8.5) (4.5)
individual agency’s roles
Source: Researcher’s Field Work, August 2018

In Table 4.4, respondents posit that “Ignorance of the complementary roles of

other agencies/departments to actualization of individual agency’s roles in airport

security” is the major challenge of inter-agency cooperation at MMIA with mean

score of 3.21. It was closely followed by “Differences in agency/department culture

and operational processes” and “Difficulties in developing consensus around

competing priorities” with mean scores of 3.16 and 3.15 respectively. Other

challenges inhibiting inter-agency cooperation according to the respondents, with

their mean scores, include; “Lack of reward for personnel of agencies/departments

who show initiative for inter-agency cooperation (3.15)”, “Lack of clear policy

guidelines for inter-agency cooperation (3.14)” and “Lack of joint airport security

44
strategy and milestones/targets (3.11)”. The least challenges facing inter-agency

cooperation according to the respondents is “The lack of a Lead Authority/Inter-

agency coordinator” with mean score of 3.08.

In furtherance of the foregoing, interviews with the Heads of NDLEA, NCS,

DSS and NAQS revealed that the recent Executive Order has engendered a culture of

division/disparity/incohesion and suspicion rather than the cohesiveness expected for

cooperation (See appendix 2). For example, the Head of DSS stated that,

The implementation of the Executive Order 1 in 2016 created a serious

conflict between FAANAVSEC and other security agencies. The
implementation of the Executive Order 1 should have been addressed
and agreed upon by the headquarters of the various agencies. This
would have created less conflict. However, FAAN, on June 6, 2016,
singlehandedly commenced its implementation without notice to others
and more significantly did not provide alternative measures, equipment
to plug the gaping holes the action created in the security architecture
at the airport.

He further added that the foregoing has impacted negatively on the DSS

statutory roles in the airport as manifested in decrease in the interception of illegally

imported arms and subversive literature.

The Head of NDLEA also averred that the implementation of the Executive

Order 1 without the promised corresponding alternatives led to a sharp drop in the

arrest and seizures of couriers and narcotic substances which necessitated the NDLEA

to revert to random manual searches of passengers which immediately yielded results

as shown in the month of September 2017 (See Appendix 3).

4.1.4 Implications of Lack of Inter-Agency Cooperation for Airport Security at

MMIA?

45
 Questions 18 and 24 in Section B of appendix1 provide answer to this research

question. Table 4.3 below gives the summary of respondents’ levels of agreement on

some implications of inter-agency rivalry for airport security at MMIA.

Table 4.5: Respondents’ Opinion on the Implications of Inter-Agency Rivalry

for Airport Security at MMIA

Implications of Inter-Agency Strongly Agree Disagree Undecided

Rivalry Agree
Create loopholes in the security 128 59 12 1
architecture of MMIA that can be (64.0) (29.5) (6.0) (0.5)
exploited by the criminals
Lead to duplication of airport security 92 80 22 6
roles (46.0) (40.0) (11.0) (3.0)
Lead to inefficient utilization of 87 84 27 2
security resources at MMIA (43.5) (42.0) (13.5) (1.0)
Lead to lack of/delay in information 101 85 11 3
sharing (50.5) (42.5) (5.5) (1.5)
Lead to agencies/department at 73 102 19 6
MMIA working at cross purpose (36.5) (51.0) (9.5) (3.0)
Influence security personnel to 88 86 22 1
deliberately undermine the security (44.0) (43.0) (11.0) (0.5)
roles of rival agencies
Lead to poor mobilization of support 79 91 21 9
in emergency situations (39.5) (45.5) (10.5) (4.5)
Source: Researcher’s Field Work, August 2018

In the Table 4.5, “Creation of loopholes in the security architecture of MMIA

that can be exploited by the criminals” is the foremost implication of inter-agency

rivalry with the mean score of 3.57 according to respondents’ opinion. It was closely

followed by “Influence security personnel/staff to deliberately undermine the security

roles of rival agencies/department” and “Lead to lack of/delay in information sharing

which could inhibit other agencies/departments effective performance” with mean

46
scores of 3.46 and 3.42 respectively. Other implications of inter-agency rivalry with

their mean scores, according to the respondents are; “Lead to duplication of airport

security roles (3.29)”, “Lead to inefficient utilization of security resources (3.28)”,

“Lead to agency/department at MMIA working at cross purposes (3.21) and “Lead to

poor mobilization of support in emergency situations (3.20)” in that order.

4.1.5 Recommendations for Enhancing Airport Security at MMIA?

Questions32 to 37 in Section B of Appendix 1 provide the answer to this

research question. Table 4.6 gives the summaries of respondents’ opinions on some of

the recommendations to enhance inter-agency cooperation and airport security at

MMIA.

47
Table 4.6: Recommendations for Enhancing Aviation Security at MMIA

What about delineation of roles?

Suggested Recommendations Strongly Agree Disagree Strongly
Agree Disagree
Development of clear policy 123 69 7 1
guidelines on inter-agency (61.5) (34.5) (3.5) (0.5)
cooperation by each agency
Joint setting of airport security goals 135 50 11 4
and objectives (67.5) (25.0) (5.5) (2.0)
A national legislation to compel 93 76 25 6
inter-agency cooperation at airport (46.5) (38.0) (12.5) (3.0)
A new security architecture that 83 79 26 12
constructs all military and (41.5) (39.5) (13.0) (6.0)
paramilitary agencies as equal
partners-in-security
A platform to catalyze collaboration 100 85 14 1
among the airport security agencies (50.0) (42.5) (7.0) (0.5)
through regular joint training

Need to address the issue of statutory 84 104 8 4

coordination of the security agencies (42.0) (52.0) (4.0) (2.0)
at airport
Source: Researcher’s Field Work, August 2018

From the Table 4.6, the respondents(these are not mere respondents but

experts and insiders and we might need to see how to make this obvious in the title

because it validates) recommended the following strategies to enhance airport security

at MMIA; the topmost among the recommendations is “Joint setting of airport

security goals and objectives” with mean score of 3.58 this was closely followed by

“Development of clear policy guidelines on inter-agency cooperation by each

agency/department” with mean score of 3.57. Other recommendations include; “A

platform to catalyze collaboration among the airport security agencies/departments

48
through regular joint training and operations (3.42)”, “Need to address the issue of

statutory coordination of the security agencies/departments at Nigeria airports (3.34)”,

“A national legislation to compel inter-agency cooperation in airport security (3.28)”

and “A new security architecture that constructs all military and paramilitary agencies

as equal partners-in-security (3.17)” in that order of importance.

4.1.6 Summary of Findings

From the data presentation and analysis in sub sections 4.1.1 to 4.1.5 above,

this study has been able to establish the following findings:

i. Major possible or common security threat at MMIA is drug trafficking and

money laundering;
ii. Other likely you need to be sure security threats at MMIA include Human

trafficking, Luggage theft and Contraband smuggling, Migrant smuggling,

Vandalism/Sabotage, Act of terrorism, Arms smuggling, Animal/Human

intrusion of restricted areas and stowaway.

iii. The study established that the principal implication of inter-agency rivalry in

airport security management is that it creates loopholes in the security

architecture of MMIA that can be exploited by the criminals. Furthermore, it

influences security personnel/staff to deliberately undermine the

security roles of rival agencies/department which lead to lack of/delay in

information sharing which could inhibit other agencies/departments effective

performance;
iv. Other implications of inter-agency rivalry are, it leads to duplication of airport

security roles, inefficient utilisation of security resources and

agencies/departments at working at cross purposes which manifests in poor

mobilisation of support in emergency situations;

v. On the causes of inter-agency rivalry at MMIA, the study situates its findings

in three main reasons in order of priority as agency pride/superiority

49
 complex, followed by mutual suspicion among agencies/departments

and inheritance of primordial rivalry;

vi. That the major challenge of inter-agency cooperation at MMIA is the

ignorance of the complementary roles of other agencies/departments to

actualisation of individual agency’s roles in airport security, closely followed

by differences in agency/department culture and operational processes and

difficulties in developing consensus around competing priorities;

vii. Other challenges inhibiting inter-agency cooperation emanating from the study

include; lack of reward for personnel of agencies/departments who show

initiative for inter-agency cooperation, lack of clear policy guidelines for inter-

agency cooperation and lack of joint airport security strategy and

milestones/targets;
viii. The study further makes recommendations to enhance airport security at

MMIA; the topmost among the recommendations is Joint setting of airport

security goals and objectives, closely followed by the Development of clear

policy guidelines on inter-agency cooperation by each agency/department;

ix. Other recommendations include, developing a platform to catalyse

collaboration among the airport security agencies/departments through regular

joint training and operations and the need to address the issue of statutory

coordination of the security agencies/departments at Nigeria airports;

x. The passage of a national legislation to compel inter-agency cooperation in

airport security and a new security architecture that constructs all military and

paramilitary agencies as equal partners-in-security is also advocated for in the

recommendation from this study.

4.2 Discussion of Research Objectives Using Findings

RO1: Identify the security threats at the MMIA

50
 In line with the foregoing Research Objective, the findings of the study

showed that the most likely security threats at MMIA are drug trafficking and money

laundering. Others are human trafficking, luggage theft, contraband smuggling,

migrant smuggling, vandalism/sabotage, act of terrorism, arms smuggling,

animal/human intrusion of restricted areas and stowaway. The foregoing aligns with

Belger (2011), Rimmer (2011), Okeke (2017), Tyson & Grabianowski (2018) and

New Telegraph (2018) identification of security threats at airports.

RO2: Identify the causes of inter-agency rivalry at MMIA

On the causes of inter-agency rivalry at MMIA, the findings of the study

identified agency pride/superiority complex, mutual suspicion among

agencies/departments and inheritance of primordial rivalry. The foregoing lends

credence to Bello (2013) (as cited in Olawale, 2013) assertion that it is a common

human weakness for any security or intelligence agency to seek to claim credit for the

successes in fighting crimes. It also confirms Mora (2010) perception of mutual

suspicion as a causal factor of inter-agency rivalry.

RO3: Determine the challenges of inter-agency cooperation at MMIA

In line with the foregoing Research Objective, the findings of the study

showed that the major challenges inhibiting inter-agency cooperation at MMIA are the

ignorance of the complementary roles of other agencies/departments to actualisation

of individual agency’s roles in airport security differences in agency/department

culture and operational processes and difficulties in developing consensus around

competing priorities. Other inhibiting challenges include; lack of reward for personnel
51
of agencies/departments who show initiative for inter-agency cooperation, lack of

clear policy guidelines for inter-agency cooperation and lack of joint setting of airport

security strategy and milestones/targets.

The foregoing confirms Mora (2010) position that government agencies do not

always share relevant information with their national security partners due to a lack of

clear guidelines for sharing information and security clearance issues. Mora similarly

identified other challenges to be lack of a comprehensive strategy and milestones,

lack of clear agency roles and responsibilities for undertaking operations, differences

among agency cultures and planning processes, and difficulties in developing

consensus around competing priorities.

Similarly, it corroborates the views of MILPOPPROF as cited in Samuel

(2014) that the problem of inter-agency rivalry is largely due to the ignorance on the

part of personnel of these agencies about sister agencies in such matters as the

complementary roles of other agencies to the actualisation of their own roles. Lastly,

it confirms Ulin (2010) and Mora (2010) also identification of the lack of incentives

for cooperation as a factor inhibiting cooperation.

The foregoing show a lack linked organisational objectives that foster mutual

goal attainment, organisational values that promote interdependence and joint

strategic planning amongst the agencies and departments at MMIA, which according

to the Collaboration Theory describes organisational preconditions which support

successful collaboration.

RO4: Examine the implications of the lack of inter-agency cooperation ` for

airport security at MMIA

In line with the foregoing Research Objective, the findings of the study

established that the principal implication of inter-agency rivalry in airport security

52
management is that it creates loopholes in the security architecture of MMIA that can

be exploited by the criminals. Furthermore, the findings show that it influences

security personnel/staff to deliberately undermine the security roles of rival

agencies/department which lead to lack of/delay in information sharing which could

inhibit other agencies/departments effective performance. Other implications are

duplication of airport security roles, inefficient utilisation of security resources and

agencies/departments at working at cross purposes which manifests in poor

mobilisation of support in emergency situations.

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Conclusion

Inter-agency rivalry is not a new phenomenon in Nigeria. It has been a

recurrent theme when exploring the relationship between Nigeria security agencies.

The foregoing scenario is replicated at Murtala Mohammed International Airport,

53
where, unfortunately, the benefits of inter-agency cooperation have not been fully

explored by the security agencies operating at the airport to enhance its security.

The study established that inter-agency rivalry at MMIA created loopholes in

the security architecture of MMIA which could be exploited by the criminals.

Ignorance of the complementary roles of other agencies/departments to actualisation

of individual agency’s roles in airport security was also identified as a major

challenge.

It is therefore necessary to provide a platform to catalyse collaboration among

the security agencies/departments at Nigerian airports as well as address the issue of

statutory coordination of their roles in airport security.

5.2 Recommendations

In view of the foregoing, the following recommendations are hereby proposed:

 Federal Government should review national security laws with a view to

compel inter-agency cooperation.

 The leadership of security agencies/departments and their subordinates at

MMIA should work assiduously towards strengthening structural factors for

inter-agency cooperation at the airport.

 The leadership of security agencies/departments at MMIA should sensitise

their staff on their agency's/department’s roles and responsibilities for

undertaking joint operations.

 Leadership of security agencies at MMIA should organise and sustain inter-

agency sensitisation programmes to promote knowledge on such matters as the

54
 complimentary roles of other agencies to the actualisation of their own

statutory roles.
 Federal Government to enhance the financial allocation and additional staff to

the airports.

55
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