THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 198780. October 16, 2013.]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES , petitioner, vs . LIBERTY D. ALBIOS ,

respondent.

DECISION

MENDOZA , J : p

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing
the September 29, 2011 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CV No. 95414,
which a rmed the April 25, 2008 Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court, Imus, Cavite (RTC),
declaring the marriage of Daniel Lee Fringer (Fringer) and respondent Liberty Albios
(Albios) as void from the beginning.
The Facts
On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American citizen, and Albios were married before
Judge Ofelia I. Calo of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 59, Mandaluyong City (MeTC),
as evidenced by a Certificate of Marriage with Register No. 2004-1588. 3
On December 6, 2006, Albios led with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity 4
of her marriage with Fringer. She alleged that immediately after their marriage, they
separated and never lived as husband and wife because they never really had any intention
of entering into a married state or complying with any of their essential marital obligations.
She described their marriage as one made in jest and, therefore, null and void ab initio.
Summons was served on Fringer but he did not le his answer. On September 13,
2007, Albios led a motion to set case for pre-trial and to admit her pre-trial brief. The RTC
ordered the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor to conduct an investigation and determine the
existence of a collusion. On October 2, 2007, the Assistant Prosecutor complied and
reported that she could not make a determination for failure of both parties to appear at
the scheduled investigation.
At the pre-trial, only Albios, her counsel and the prosecutor appeared. Fringer did not
attend the hearing despite being duly notified of the schedule. After the pre-trial, hearing on
the merits ensued.
Ruling of the RTC
In its April 25, 2008 Decision, 5 the RTC declared the marriage void ab initio, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring
the marriage of Liberty Albios and Daniel Lee Fringer as void from the very
beginning. As a necessary consequence of this pronouncement, petitioner shall
cease using the surname of respondent as she never acquired any right over it
and so as to avoid a misimpression that she remains the wife of respondent.
ESDcIA

xxx xxx xxx

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 SO ORDERED. 6
The RTC was of the view that the parties married each other for convenience only.
Giving credence to the testimony of Albios, it stated that she contracted Fringer to enter
into a marriage to enable her to acquire American citizenship; that in consideration thereof,
she agreed to pay him the sum of $2,000.00; that after the ceremony, the parties went
their separate ways; that Fringer returned to the United States and never again
communicated with her; and that, in turn, she did not pay him the $2,000.00 because he
never processed her petition for citizenship. The RTC, thus, ruled that when marriage was
entered into for a purpose other than the establishment of a conjugal and family life, such
was a farce and should not be recognized from its inception.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the O ce of the Solicitor
General (OSG), led a motion for reconsideration. The RTC issued the Order, 7 dated
February 5, 2009, denying the motion for want of merit. It explained that the marriage was
declared void because the parties failed to freely give their consent to the marriage as they
had no intention to be legally bound by it and used it only as a means to acquire American
citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00.
Not in conformity, the OSG filed an appeal before the CA.
Ruling of the CA
In its assailed decision, dated September 29, 2011, the CA a rmed the RTC ruling
which found that the essential requisite of consent was lacking. The CA stated that the
parties clearly did not understand the nature and consequence of getting married and that
their case was similar to a marriage in jest. It further explained that the parties never
intended to enter into the marriage contract and never intended to live as husband and
wife or build a family. It concluded that their purpose was primarily for personal gain, that
is, for Albios to obtain foreign citizenship, and for Fringer, the consideration of $2,000.00.
Hence, this petition.
Assignment of Error
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW WHEN IT
HELD THAT A MARRIAGE CONTRACTED FOR THE PURPOSE OF
OBTAINING FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP WAS DONE IN JEST, HENCE,
LACKING IN THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF CONSENT . 8

The OSG argues that albeit the intention was for Albios to acquire American
citizenship and for Fringer to be paid $2,000.00, both parties freely gave their consent to
the marriage, as they knowingly and willingly entered into that marriage and knew the
bene ts and consequences of being bound by it. According to the OSG, consent should be
distinguished from motive, the latter being inconsequential to the validity of marriage.
The OSG also argues that the present case does not fall within the concept of a
marriage in jest. The parties here intentionally consented to enter into a real and valid
marriage, for if it were otherwise, the purpose of Albios to acquire American citizenship
would be rendered futile.
On October 29, 2012, Albios led her Comment 9 to the petition, reiterating her
stand that her marriage was similar to a marriage by way of jest and, therefore, void from
the beginning.

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 On March 22, 2013, the OSG led its Reply 1 0 reiterating its arguments in its petition
for review on certiorari.
Ruling of the Court
The resolution of this case hinges on this sole question of law: Is a marriage,
contracted for the sole purpose of acquiring American citizenship in consideration of
$2,000.00, void ab initio on the ground of lack of consent?
The Court resolves in the negative.
Before the Court delves into its ruling, It shall rst examine the phenomenon of
marriage fraud for the purposes of immigration. SACTIH

Marriage Fraud in Immigration

The institution of marriage carries with it concomitant bene ts. This has led to the
development of marriage fraud for the sole purpose of availing of particular bene ts. In
the United States, marriages where a couple marries only to achieve a particular purpose
or acquire speci c bene ts, have been referred to as "limited purpose" marriages. 1 1 A
common limited purpose marriage is one entered into solely for the legitimization of a
child. 1 2 Another, which is the subject of the present case, is for immigration purposes.
Immigration law is usually concerned with the intention of the couple at the time of their
marriage, 1 3 and it attempts to lter out those who use marriage solely to achieve
immigration status. 1 4
In 1975, the seminal case of Bark v. Immigration and Naturalization Service , 1 5
established the principal test for determining the presence of marriage fraud in
immigration cases. It ruled that a "marriage is a sham if the bride and groom did not intend
to establish a life together at the time they were married." This standard was modi ed with
the passage of the Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendment of 1986 (IMFA), which now
requires the couple to instead demonstrate that the marriage was not "entered into for the
purpose of evading the immigration laws of the United States." The focus, thus, shifted
from determining the intention to establish a life together, to determining the intention of
evading immigration laws. 1 6 It must be noted, however, that this standard is used purely
for immigration purposes and, therefore, does not purport to rule on the legal validity or
existence of a marriage.
The question that then arises is whether a marriage declared as a sham or
fraudulent for the limited purpose of immigration is also legally void and inexistent. The
early cases on limited purpose marriages in the United States made no de nitive ruling. In
1946, the notable case of United States v. Rubenstein 1 7 was promulgated, wherein in
order to allow an alien to stay in the country, the parties had agreed to marry but not to live
together and to obtain a divorce within six months. The Court, through Judge Learned
Hand, ruled that a marriage to convert temporary into permanent permission to stay in the
country was not a marriage, there being no consent, to wit:
. . . But, that aside, Spitz and Sandler were never married at all. Mutual consent
is necessary to every contract; and no matter what forms or ceremonies the
parties may go through indicating the contrary, they do not contract if they do
not in fact assent, which may always be proved. . . . Marriage is no exception to
this rule: a marriage in jest is not a marriage at all. . . . It is quite true that a
marriage without subsequent consummation will be valid; but if the spouses
agree to a marriage only for the sake of representing it as such to the outside
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 world and with the understanding that they will put an end to it as soon as it has
served its purpose to deceive, they have never really agreed to be married at all.
They must assent to enter into the relation as it is ordinarily understood, and it is
not ordinarily understood as merely a pretence, or cover, to deceive others. 1 8
(Italics supplied)

On the other end of the spectrum is the 1969 case of Mpiliris v. Hellenic Lines , 1 9
which declared as valid a marriage entered into solely for the husband to gain entry to the
United States, stating that a valid marriage could not be avoided "merely because the
marriage was entered into for a limited purpose." 2 0 The 1980 immigration case of Matter
of McKee, 2 1 further recognized that a fraudulent or sham marriage was intrinsically
different from a nonsubsisting one.
Nullifying these limited purpose marriages for lack of consent has, therefore, been
recognized as problematic. The problem being that in order to obtain an immigration
bene t, a legal marriage is rst necessary. 2 2 At present, United States courts have
generally denied annulments involving "limited purpose" marriages where a couple married
only to achieve a particular purpose, and have upheld such marriages as valid. 2 3 ACIDTE

The Court now turns to the case at hand.

Respondent's marriage not void
In declaring the respondent's marriage void, the RTC ruled that when a marriage was
entered into for a purpose other than the establishment of a conjugal and family life, such
was a farce and should not be recognized from its inception. In its resolution denying the
OSG's motion for reconsideration, the RTC went on to explain that the marriage was
declared void because the parties failed to freely give their consent to the marriage as they
had no intention to be legally bound by it and used it only as a means for the respondent to
acquire American citizenship.
Agreeing with the RTC, the CA ruled that the essential requisite of consent was
lacking. It held that the parties clearly did not understand the nature and consequence of
getting married. As in the Rubenstein case, the CA found the marriage to be similar to a
marriage in jest considering that the parties only entered into the marriage for the
acquisition of American citizenship in exchange of $2,000.00. They never intended to enter
into a marriage contract and never intended to live as husband and wife or build a family.
The CA's assailed decision was, therefore, grounded on the parties' supposed lack
of consent. Under Article 2 of the Family Code, consent is an essential requisite of
marriage. Article 4 of the same Code provides that the absence of any essential requisite
shall render a marriage void ab initio.
Under said Article 2, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2) made
in the presence of a solemnizing o cer. A "freely given" consent requires that the
contracting parties willingly and deliberately enter into the marriage. Consent must be real
in the sense that it is not vitiated nor rendered defective by any of the vices of consent
under Articles 45 and 46 of the Family Code, such as fraud, force, intimidation, and undue
in uence. 2 4 Consent must also be conscious or intelligent, in that the parties must be
capable of intelligently understanding the nature of, and both the bene cial or unfavorable
consequences of their act. 2 5 Their understanding should not be affected by insanity,
intoxication, drugs, or hypnotism. 2 6

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 Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer. In fact,
there was real consent because it was not vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice of
consent. Their consent was also conscious and intelligent as they understood the nature
and the bene cial and inconvenient consequences of their marriage, as nothing impaired
their ability to do so. That their consent was freely given is best evidenced by their
conscious purpose of acquiring American citizenship through marriage. Such plainly
demonstrates that they willingly and deliberately contracted the marriage. There was a
clear intention to enter into a real and valid marriage so as to fully comply with the
requirements of an application for citizenship. There was a full and complete
understanding of the legal tie that would be created between them, since it was that
precise legal tie which was necessary to accomplish their goal.
In ruling that Albios' marriage was void for lack of consent, the CA characterized
such as akin to a marriage by way of jest. A marriage in jest is a pretended marriage, legal
in form but entered into as a joke, with no real intention of entering into the actual marriage
status, and with a clear understanding that the parties would not be bound. The ceremony
is not followed by any conduct indicating a purpose to enter into such a relation. 2 7 It is a
pretended marriage not intended to be real and with no intention to create any legal ties
whatsoever, hence, the absence of any genuine consent. Marriages in jest are void ab initio,
not for vitiated, defective, or unintelligent consent, but for a complete absence of consent.
There is no genuine consent because the parties have absolutely no intention of being
bound in any way or for any purpose.
The respondent's marriage is not at all analogous to a marriage in jest. Albios and
Fringer had an undeniable intention to be bound in order to create the very bond necessary
to allow the respondent to acquire American citizenship. Only a genuine consent to be
married would allow them to further their objective, considering that only a valid marriage
can properly support an application for citizenship. There was, thus, an apparent intention
to enter into the actual marriage status and to create a legal tie, albeit for a limited
purpose. Genuine consent was, therefore, clearly present. cEaSHC

The avowed purpose of marriage under Article 1 of the Family Code is for the couple
to establish a conjugal and family life. The possibility that the parties in a marriage might
have no real intention to establish a life together is, however, insu cient to nullify a
marriage freely entered into in accordance with law. The same Article 1 provides that the
nature, consequences, and incidents of marriage are governed by law and not subject to
stipulation. A marriage may, thus, only be declared void or voidable under the grounds
provided by law. There is no law that declares a marriage void if it is entered into for
purposes other than what the Constitution or law declares, such as the acquisition of
foreign citizenship. Therefore, so long as all the essential and formal requisites prescribed
by law are present, and it is not void or voidable under the grounds provided by law, it shall
be declared valid. 2 8
Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does not and
cannot dictate on the kind of life that a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to regulate
their lifestyle would go into the realm of their right to privacy and would raise serious
constitutional questions. 2 9 The right to marital privacy allows married couples to
structure their marriages in almost any way they see t, to live together or live apart, to
have children or no children, to love one another or not, and so on. 3 0 Thus, marriages
entered into for other purposes, limited or otherwise, such as convenience,
companionship, money, status, and title, provided that they comply with all the legal
requisites, 3 1 are equally valid. Love, though the ideal consideration in a marriage contract,
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 is not the only valid cause for marriage. Other considerations, not precluded by law, may
validly support a marriage.
Although the Court views with disdain the respondent's attempt to utilize marriage
for dishonest purposes, It cannot declare the marriage void. Hence, though the
respondent's marriage may be considered a sham or fraudulent for the purposes of
immigration, it is not void ab initio and continues to be valid and subsisting.
Neither can their marriage be considered voidable on the ground of fraud under
Article 45 (3) of the Family Code. Only the circumstances listed under Article 46 of the
same Code may constitute fraud, namely, (1) non-disclosure of a previous conviction
involving moral turpitude; (2) concealment by the wife of a pregnancy by another man; (3)
concealment of a sexually transmitted disease; and (4) concealment of drug addiction,
alcoholism, or homosexuality. No other misrepresentation or deceit shall constitute fraud
as a ground for an action to annul a marriage. Entering into a marriage for the sole purpose
of evading immigration laws does not qualify under any of the listed circumstances.
Furthermore, under Article 47 (3), the ground of fraud may only be brought by the injured or
innocent party. In the present case, there is no injured party because Albios and Fringer
both conspired to enter into the sham marriage.
Albios has indeed made a mockery of the sacred institution of marriage. Allowing
her marriage with Fringer to be declared void would only further trivialize this inviolable
institution. The Court cannot declare such a marriage void in the event the parties fail to
qualify for immigration bene ts, after they have availed of its bene ts, or simply have no
further use for it. These unscrupulous individuals cannot be allowed to use the courts as
instruments in their fraudulent schemes. Albios already misused a judicial institution to
enter into a marriage of convenience; she should not be allowed to again abuse it to get
herself out of an inconvenient situation.
No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as an inviolable social
institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State. 3 2 It must,
therefore, be safeguarded from the whims and caprices of the contracting parties. This
Court cannot leave the impression that marriage may easily be entered into when it suits
the needs of the parties, and just as easily nullified when no longer needed.
WHEREFORE , the petition is GRANTED . The September 29, 2011 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 95414 is ANNULLED , and Civil Case No. 1134-06 is
DISMISSED for utter lack of merit. SCIcTD

SO ORDERED .
Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-de Castro, * Brion ** and Peralta, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
*Designated Acting Member in lieu of Associate Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen, per
Special Order No. 1570 dated October 14, 2013.
**Designated Acting Member in lieu of Associate Justice Roberto A. Abad, per Special Order No.
1554 dated September 19, 2013.
1.Rollo, pp. 26-32; penned by Associate Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. and concurred in by
Associate Justice Ramon M. Bato, Jr. and Associate Justice Florito S. Macalino of the
Fifth Division, Manila.
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 2.Id. at 38-39.

3.Id. at 37.
4.Id. at 33-35.
5.Id. at 38-39.
6.Id. at 39.
7.Id. at 48-49.

8.Id. at 13.
9.Id. at 61-71.
10.Id. at 89-95.
11.Abrams, Kerry. Marriage Fraud. 100 Cal. L. Rev. 1 (2012);
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2000956. Lutwak v. United States,
344 U.S. 604, 612-613 (U.S. 1953).
12.Abrams, Kerry. Marriage Fraud. 100 Cal. L. Rev. 1 (2012);
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2000956; citing Schibi v. Schibi,
69 A.2d 831 (Conn. 1949) (denying annulment where parties married only to give a name
to a prospective child); Bishop v. Bishop, 308 N.Y.S.2d 998 (Sup. Ct. 1970); Erickson v.
Erickson, 48 N.Y.S.2d 588 (Sup. Ct. 1944) (holding similarly to Schibi); Delfino v. Delfino,
35 N.Y.S.2d 693 (Sup. Ct. 1942) (denying annulment where purpose of marriage was to
protect the girl's name and there was an understanding that the parties would not live
together as man and wife); Bove v. Pinciotti, 46 Pa. D. & C. 159 (1942); Campbell v.
Moore, 189 S.E.2d 497 (S.C.1939) (refusing an annulment where parties entered
marriage for the purpose of legitimizing a child); Chander v. Chander, No. 2937-98-4,
1999 WL 1129721 (Va. Ct. App. June 22, 1999) (denying annulment where wife married
husband to get his pension with no intention to consummate marriage because husband
knew that was the purpose of the marriage).
13.Abrams, Kerry. Immigration Law and the Regulation of Marriage; 91 Minn. L. Rev. 1625
(2007); http://www.minnesotalawreview.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/01/Abrams_Final.pdf; citing Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA), § 237 (a) (1) (G), 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (a) (1) (G) (2000).
14.Abrams, Kerry. Immigration Law and the Regulation of Marriage; 91 Minn. L. Rev. 1625
(2007); http://www.minnesotalawreview.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/01/Abrams_Final.pdf; citing 132 CONG. REC. 27,012, 27,015
(1986) (statement of Rep McCollum) (promoting the Immigration Marriage Fraud
Amendments of 1986).
15.511 F.2d 1200, 1201 (9th Cir. 1975).

16.Abrams, Kerry. Immigration Law and the Regulation of Marriage; 91 Minn. L. Rev. 1625
(2007); http://www.minnesotalawreview.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/01/Abrams_Final.pdf.
17.151 F.2d 915 (2d Cir. 1945).
18.United States v. Rubenstein, 151 F.2d 915 (2d Cir. 1945).

19.Mpiliris v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd., 323 F. Supp. 865 (S.D. Tex. 1969), aff'd,440 F.2d 1163 (5th
Cir. 1971).
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 20.Abrams, Kerry. Marriage Fraud. 100 Cal. L. Rev. 1 (2012);
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2000956; citing Mpiliris v. Hellenic
Lines, Ltd., 323 F. Supp. 865 (S.D. Tex. 1969), aff'd, 440 F.2d 1163 (5th Cir. 1971).
21.Matter of McKee, 17 I. & N. Dec. 332, 333 (B.I.A. 1980).
22.Lynn D. Wardle and Laurence C. Nolan, Family Law in the USA, (The Netherlands: Kluwer
Law International, 2011) p. 86.
23.Abrams, Kerry. Marriage Fraud. 100 Cal. L. Rev. 1 (2012);
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2000956.
24.Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines, (Quezon City,
Philippines: Joer Printing Services, 2005), p. 4.
25.Melencio S. Sta. Maria, Jr., Persons and Family Relations Law, (Quezon City, Philippines:
Rex Printing Company, Inc., 2010), Fifth Edition, p. 121.
26.Arturo M. Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines,
(Manila, Philippines: Central Book Supply, Inc., 2004), Volume I, p. 231.
27.Arturo M. Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines,
(Manila, Philippines: Central Book Supply, Inc., 2004), Volume I, p. 231; citing McClurg v.
Terry, 21 N.J. 225.
28.Article 4, Family Code.

29.Bark v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 511 F.2d 1200, 1201 (9th Cir. 1975).
30.Abrams, Kerry. Immigration Law and the Regulation of Marriage; 91 Minn. L. Rev. 1625
(2007); http://www.minnesotalawreview.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/01/Abrams_Final.pdf; citing McGuire v. McGuire, 59 N.W.2d 336,
337 (Neb. 1953). Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965).
31.Article 4, Family Code.
32.Const. (1987), Article XV, Section 2.

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