WILLS CASE DOCTRINES

Art. 774
Estate of K. H. Hemady v. Luzon Surety (1956) [6]
· The responsibility of the heirs for the debts of their decedent cannot exceed the value of the
inheritance they receive from him. Heirs succeed not only to the rights of the deceased but also
to his obligations.
· General rule: a party’s contractual rights and obligations are transmissible to the successors.
· Exceptions under Art. 1311:
1) Nature of the obligation
2) Intransmissibility by stipulation of the parties
3) Obligation is not transmissible by operation of law

Art. 777
Unson v. Del Rosario (1953) [12]
The law in force at the time of the decedent’s death will determine who the heirs should be.
· Art. 2253 provides that rights which are declared for the first time by the new Civil Code shall
have retroactive effect even though the event which gave rise to them may have occurred under
the former legislation, but this is so only when the new rights do not prejudice any vested or
acquired right of the same origin. In instant case, M’s right of ownership over the lands became
vested in 1945 upon the death of her husband. The new right in favor of the illegitimate children
by the deceased cannot be asserted to the impairment of the vested right of M over the lands in
dispute.

De Borja v. Vda de Borja (1972) [14]

Ownership passes to the heir at the very moment of death, who therefore, from that moment
acquires the right to dispose of his share
· Hereditary share in a decedent’s estate is transmitted or vested immediately from the moment
of the death of such causante or predecessor in interest. Thus, there is no legal bar to a successor
(with requisite contracting capacity) disposing his hereditary share immediately after such death,
even if the actual extent of such share is not determined until the subsequent liquidation of the
estate.

Bonilla v. Barcena (1976) [16]

The heirs have the right to be substituted for the deceased as party on an action that survives.
· While it is true that a person who is dead cannot sue in court, yet he can be substituted by his
heirs in pursuing the case up to its completion.
· The moment of death is the determining factor when the heirs acquire a definite right to the
inheritance whether such right be pure or contingent. Thus, when F died, her claim or right to the
parcel s of land in litigation was not extinguished by her death but was transmitted to her heirs
upon her death. Her heirs have thus acquired interest in the properties in litigation and became
parties-in-interest in the case.
· The question as to whether an action survives or not depends on the nature of the action and
the damage sued for.
1) Survive: wrong complained of affects primarily and principally property and property rights, the
injuries to the person being merely incidental
2) Not survive: injury complained of is to the person, the property and rights of property affected
being incidental.
· In instant case, an action to quiet title over land in litigation affects primarily and principally
property and property rights, and therefore is one that survives even after F’s death.

Art. 804
Suroza v. Honrado (1981) [41]
Art. 804 provisions are mandatory. Consequently, failure to comply with the two requirements
nullifies the will.
· The will on its face is void because it is written in English, a language not known to the illiterate
testatrix, and which is probably a forged will because she and the attesting witnesses did not
appear before the notary as admitted by the notary himself.
· A judge who admits to probate such a will should face disciplinary action. In the absence of
opposition, the judge should have personally conducted the hearing on the probate of the will so
that he could have ascertained whether the will was validly executed.

Abangan v. Abangan (1919) [46]

It may sometimes be presumed that the testator knew the language in which the will was written.
· The circumstance appearing in the will itself that the same was executed in Cebu and in the
dialect of this locality where the testatrix was a neighbor [sic] is enough, in the absence of any
proof to the contrary, to presume that she knew this dialect in which the will was written.

RFB: same ruling in Gonzales v. Laurel (1923). On the authority of these cases it seems that, in
order for the presumption to apply, the following must appear:
1) The will must be in language or dialect generally spoken in the place of execution; and
2) The testator must be a native or resident of said locality

Art. 806
Payad v. Tolentino (1936) [49]
Thumb mark as signature.
· Testatrix, assisted by counsel, placed her thumb mark on each and every page of the questioned
will and that said counsel merely wrote her name to indicate the place where she placed said
thumb mark. In other words, counsel did not sign for the testatrix. She signed by placing her
thumb mark on each and every page thereof. “A statute requiring a will to be ‘signed’ is satisfied
if the signature is made by the testator’s mark.” It is clear, therefore, that it was not necessary
that the attestation clause in question should state that the testatrix requested her counsel to
sign her name inasmuch as the testatrix signed the will in question in accordance with law.

Matias v. Salud (1958) [50]

· The legal requisite that the will should be signed by testator is satisfied by a thumbprint or other
mark affixed by him; and that where such mark is affixed by the decedent, it is unnecessary to
state in the attestation clause that another person wrote the testator’s name at his request.
· In the instant case, it was shown that the herpes zoster that afflicted the right arm and shoulder
of the testatrix made writing a difficult and painful act, to the extent that, after writing one
signature on the second page, she dropped the pen because of an attack of pain that lasted many
minutes, and evidently discouraged attempts to sign.
· It is to be conceded that where a testator employs an unfamiliar way of signing, and both the
attestation clause and the will are silent on the matter, such silence is a factor to be considered
against the authenticity of the testament; but the failure to describe the unusual signature by
itself alone is not sufficient to refuse probate when the evidence for the proponent fully satisfies
the court that the will was executed and witnessed as required by law.

Garcia v. Lacuesta (1951) [54]

A cross as signature.
· It is not here presented that the cross appearing on the will is the usual signature of the testator
or even one of the ways by which he signed his name. The mere sing of a cross cannot be likened
to a thumbmark, because the cross cannot and does not have the trustworthiness of a
thumbmark.

Barut v. Cabacungan (1912) [56]

When agent must write.
· As regards the validity of the will, it is unimportant whether the person who writes the name of
the testatrix signs his own or not. The important thing is that it clearly appears that the name of
the testatrix was signed at her express direction in the presence of the three witnesses and that
they attested and subscribed it in her presence and in the presence of each other.
· It may be wise, as a practical matter that the one who signs the testator’s name signs also hi
own; but that is not essential to the validity of the will.

Nera v. Raymundo (1911) [61]

Signing in the presence of witnesses
· Jaboneta v. Gustilo: “The true test of presence of the testator and the witnesses in the execution
of a will is not whether they actually saw each other sign, but whether they might have seen each
other sign, had they chosen to do so, considering their mental and physical position with relation
to each other at the moment of inscription of each signature.”
· The position of the parties with relation to each other at the moment of the subscription of each
signature must be such that they may see each other sign if they choose to do so. Jaboneta
doctrine: the question whether the testator and the subscribing witnesses to an alleged will sign
the instrument in the presence of each other does not depend upon proof of the fact that their
eyes were actually cast upon the paper at the moment of its subscription by each of them, but
that at that moment existing conditions and their position with relation to each other were such
that by merely casting their eyes in the proper direction they could have seen each other sign.

Icasiano v. Icasiano (1964) [64]

· The inadvertent failure of one witness to affix his signature to one page of a testament, due to
the simultaneous lifting of two pages in the course of signing, is not per se sufficient to justify
denial of probate. That the failure of the witness to sign page three was entirely through pure
oversight is shown by his own testimony as well as by the duplicate copy of the will, which bears a
complete set of signatures in every page.
RFB: The Icasiano holding cannot, and should not, be taken as a departure from the rule that the
will should be signed by the witnesses on every page. The carbon duplicate was regular in all
aspects. A cavalier disregard of the formal requirements of wills in reliance on Icasiano is not
recommended.
Cagro v. Cagro (1953) [68]
The signatures of the witnesses must be at the bottom of the attestation clause.
· Fact: signature of the three witnesses do not appear on the bottom of the attestation clause, but
the page containing the clause is signed by the witnesses on the left-hand margin.
· The attestation clause is “a memorandum of the facts attending the execution of the will”
required by law to be made by the attesting witnesses, and it must necessarily bear their
signature. An unsigned attestation clause cannot be considered as an act of the witnesses, since
the omission of their signature at the bottom thereof negatives their participation.
· The signatures on the left-hand margin cannot be deemed as their signature to the clause
because said signatures are in compliance with the legal mandate that the will be signed on the
left-hand margin of all its pages. If an attestation clause not signed by the witnesses at the bottom
thereof, be admitted as sufficient, it would be easy to add such clause to a will on a subsequent
occasion and in the absence of the testator and any or all of the witnesses.
· Dissenting opinion of Bautista Angelo: (a) substantial compliance; (b) the uncontradicted
testimony of the witnesses that the clause was already written in the will when the same was
signed obviates fear of the majority that the clause may have been only added on a subsequent
occasion and not at the signing of the will.

Javellana v. Ledesma (1955) [70]

Acknowledgement before a notary public.
· Fact: Codicil signed by testatrix and witnesses at the hospital; the notary public brought the
codicil to his office, and signed and sealed it there.
· Whether or not the notary signed the certification of acknowledgement in the presence of the
testatrix and the witnesses does not affect the validity of the codicil. The Civil Code does not
require that the signing of the testator, witnesses and notary should be accomplished in one
single act.
· The subsequent signing and sealing by the notary of his certification that the testament was duly
acknowledged by the participants therein is not part of the acknowledgement itself nor of the
testamentary act.
RFB: (a) ratio: The certification of acknowledgement need not be signed in the presence of the
testator and the witnesses; (b) obiter: Art. 806 does not require that the testator and the
witnesses must acknowledge on the same day that it was executed.

Cruz v. Villasor (1973) [72]

The notary public cannot be counted as one of the attesting witnesses.
· The notary public before whom the will was acknowledged cannot be considered as the third
instrumental witness since he cannot acknowledge before himself his having signed the will. If the
third witness were the notary public himself, he would have to avow, assent, or admit his having
signed the will in front of himself. This cannot be done because he cannot split his personality into
two so that one will appear before the other to acknowledge his participation in the making of
the will.
· Furthermore, the function of the notary public is, among others, to guard against any illegal or
immoral arrangement. That function would be defeated if the notary public were one of the
attesting or instrumental witnesses. For then he would be interested in sustaining the validity of
his own act.
· To allow the notary public to act as third witness, or one of the attesting and acknowledging
witnesses, would have the effect of having only two attesting witnesses to the will which would
be in contravention of the Article 805 requiring at least three credible witnesses to act as such
and of Article 806 which requires that the testator and the required number of witnesses must
appear before the notary public to acknowledge the will.

Art. 808
Garcia v. Vasquez (1970) [75]
Provision of Article 808 mandatory.
· Fact: testatrix’s vision was mainly for viewing distant objects and not for reading print.
· For all intents and purposes of the rules on probate, the testatrix was not unlike a blind testator,
and the due execution of her will would have required observance of Article 808. The rationale
behind the requirement of reading the will to the testator if he is blind or incapable of reading the
will himself (as when he is illiterate) , is to make the provisions thereof known to him, so that he
may be able to object if they are not in accordance with his wishes.

Alvarado v. Gaviola (1993) [80]

The requirement has been liberally applied, the SC declaring substantial compliance to be
sufficient.
· Facts: The lawyer who drafted the will and subsequent codicil read them aloud in the presence
of the testator, the three instrumental witnesses and the notary public. The latter four followed
the reading with their own respective copies previously furnished them.
· Substantial compliance is acceptable where the purpose of the law has been satisfied, because
the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills are intended to protect the testator from all
kinds of fraud and trickery but are never intended to be so rigid and inflexible as to destroy
testamentary privilege.
· It was not only the lawyer who read the documents. The notary public and the three
instrumental witnesses likewise read the will and codicil, albeit silently. With four persons
following the reading word with their own copies, it can be safely concluded that the testator was
reasonably assured that what was read to him (those which he affirmed were in accordance with
his instructions), were the terms actually appearing in the typewritten documents.

Art. 809
Caneda v. CA (1993) [87]
· Fact: petitioners aver that the attestation clause is fatally defective since it fails to specifically
state that the instrumental witnesses to the will witnessed the testator signing the will in their
presence and that they also signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the
testator and of one another.
· SC agrees with petitioners. The absence of a statement that the witnesses signed the will and
every page thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another is a fatal defect which must
necessarily result in the disallowance of the will. Such defect in the attestation clause cannot be
characterized as merely involving form of the will or the language used therein which would
warrant the application of the substantial compliance rule contemplated in Art. 809. The defect is
not only in the form or the language of the attestation clause but the total absence of a specific
element required by Art. 805 to be specifically stated in the attestation clause.
· Proper interpretation of the substantial compliance rule in Art. 809: Omission which can be
supplied by an examination of the will itself, without the need of resorting to extrinsic evidence,
will not be fatal and, correspondingly, would not obstruct the allowance to probate of the will
being assailed. However, those omissions which cannot be supplied except by evidence aliunde
(“from another source, from elsewhere, from outside source”) would result in the invalidation of
the attestation clause and ultimately, of the will itself.

Art. 810
Roxas v. De Jesus (1985) [103]
· Issue: whether “FEB./61” appearing in the holographic will is a valid compliance with Art. 810.
· A complete date is required to provide against such contingencies as that of two competing wills
executed on the same day, or of a testator becoming insane on the day on which a will was
executed. There is no contingency in this case.
· As a general rule, the “date” in a holographic will should include the day, month, and year of its
execution. However, when, as in the case at bar, there is no appearance of fraud, bad faith, undue
influence and pressure and the authenticity of the will is established and the only issue is whether
or not the date “FEB./91” is a valid compliance with Art. 810, probate of the holographic will
should be allowed under the principle of substantial compliance.

Labrador v. CA (1990) [105]

· Fact: date appears in the body of the holographic will.
· The law does not specify a particular location where the date should be placed in the will. The
only requirements are that the date be in the will itself and executed in the hand of the testator.
Both requirements are present in the subject will.

Art. 811
Azaola v. Singson (1960) [110]
The three-witness provision in case of contested holographic wills is directory, not mandatory.
· Since the authenticity of the will was not contested, proponent was not required to produce
more than one witness; but even if the genuineness of the holographic will were contested, Art.
811 cannot be interpreted as to require the compulsory presentation of three witnesses to
identify the handwriting of the testator, under the penalty of having the probate denied.
· Since no witness may have been present at the execution of a holographic will, none being
required by law, it becomes obvious that the existence of witnesses possessing the requisite
qualifications is a matter beyond the control of the proponent.
· Art. 811 foresees the possibility that no qualified witness may be found (or what amounts to the
same thing, that no competent witness may be willing to testify to the authenticity of the will, and
provides for resort to expert evidence to supply the deficiency. Such resort to expert evidence is
conditioned by “if the Court deem it necessary,” which reveal that what the law deems essential
is that the Court should be convinced of the will’s authenticity. Since the law leaves it to the trial
court to decide if experts are still needed, no unfavorable inference can be drawn from a party’s
failure to offer expert evidence, until and unless the court expresses dissatisfaction with the
testimony of the lay witnesses.
· SC’s conclusion: the rule of Art. 811, par. 1, is merely directory and is not mandatory.

Codoy v.Calugay (1999)

· Fact: holographic will challenged for forgery. 6 witnesses of proponent did not categorically state
that they know the handwriting and signature of the testatrix; whereas, 2 did so.
· Issue: whether the provisions of Art. 811 is mandatory, i.e., for probate of contested holographic
will at least three witnesses explicitly declare the signature in the will is the genuine signature of
the testator.
· SC (Pardo): “We are convinced, based on the language used, that Article 811…is mandatory. We
have ruled that ‘shall’ in a statute commonly denotes an imperative obligation and is inconsistent
with the idea of discretion and that the presumption is that the word ‘shall’ when used in a
statute is mandatory.” Case remanded because the Court found that the testimony of the
aforesaid 2 witnesses was not convincing.
Query: has this ruling reversed Azaola, supra.?
1) Azaola is not on all fours with this case. Here, the will was contested (ground: forgery), in
Azaola the will was not contested.
2) RFB’s personal view: No, because the basis of the remand—that the Court did not find the
testimony of the 2 witnesses satisfactory—is perfectly consistent with Azaola that quality of the
testimony, not the quantity of the witnesses, is the criterion. Thus, SC’s statement that three-
witness rule is mandatory is an obiter. We can read Azaola and Godoy together.

Gan v. Yap (1958) [114]

In the probate of a holographic will, the document itself must be produced. Therefore, a lost
holographic will cannot be probated.
· When the will itself is not submitted, the means of opposition and of assessing the evidence, are
not available. And then, the only guaranty of authenticity—the testator’s handwriting—has
disappeared.
· The execution and the contents of a lost or destroyed holographic will may not be proved by the
bare testimony of witnesses who have seen and/or read such will.
· Ordinary vs. holographic wills. The difference lies in the nature of wills. In holographic wills, the
only guarantee of authenticity is the handwriting itself; in ordinary wills, the testimony of the
subscribing or instrumental witnesses and of the notary. The loss of the holographic will entails
the loss of the only medium of proof; if the ordinary will is lost, the subscribing witnesses are
available to authenticate.

Rodelas v. Aranza (1982) [122]

Exception to the Gan ruling.
· Issue: whether a lost holographic will can be proved by means of a photostatic copy.
· Evidently, the photostatic or xerox copy of the lost or destroyed holographic will may be
admitted because the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased can be determined by the
probate court (i.e., comparison can be made with the standard writings of the testator.

Art. 814
Kalaw v. Relova (1984) [125]
Effect of non-compliance.
· Issue: whether the original unaltered text after subsequent alterations and insertions were
voided by the Trial Court for lack of authentication by full signature of the testatrix, should be
probated or not.
· Velasco v. Lopez: when a number of erasures, corrections, and interlineations made by the
testator in a holographic will have not been noted under his signature, the will is not thereby
invalidated as a whole, but at most only as respects the particular words, erased, or interlined.
· However, when as in this case, the holographic will in dispute had only one substantial provision,
which was altered by substituting the original heir with another, but which alteration did not carry
the requisite of full authentication by the full signature of the testator, the effect must be that the
entire will is voided or revoked for the simple reason that nothing remains in the will after that
which could remain valid. To state that the will as first written should be given efficacy is to
disregard the seeming change of mind of the testatrix. But that change of mind can neither be
given effect because she failed to authenticate it in the manner required by lay by affixing her full
signature.
· Velasco ruling must be held confined to such insertions, cancellations, erasures or alterations in
a holographic will, which affect only the efficacy of the altered words themselves but not the
essence and validity of the will itself.

SUBSECTION 4-WITNESSES TO WILLS

Article 821
Gonzales vs. CA

Under the law, there is no mandatory requirement that the witness testify initially or at any time
during the trial as to his good standing in the community, his reputation for trustworthiness and
reliableness, his honesty and uprightness in order that his testimony may be believed and
accepted by the trial court. It is enough that the qualifications enumerated in Article 820 of the
Civil Code are complied with, such that the soundness of his mind can be shown by or deduced
from his answers to the questions propounded to him, that his age (18 years or more) is shown
from his appearance, testimony, or competently proved otherwise, as well as the fact that he is
not blind, deaf or dumb and that he is able to read and write to the satisfaction of the Court, and
that he has none of the disqualifications under Article 821 of the Civil Code. The attributes of the
good standing of the witness in the community, his reputation for trustworthiness and
reliableness, his honesty and uprightness are presumed of the witness unless the contrary is
proved otherwise by the opposing party.
In probate proceedings, the instrumental witnesses are not character witnesses for they merely
attest the execution of a will or testament and affirm the formalities attendant to said execution.
‘Credible witnesses' mean competent witnesses and not those who testify to facts from or upon
hearsay.

Article 830
Maloto vs. CA

It is clear that the physical act of destruction of a will, like burning in this case, does not per se
constitute an effective revocation, unless the destruction is coupled with animus revocandi on the
part of the testator. It is not imperative that the physical destruction be done by the testator
himself. It may be performed by another person but under the express direction and in the
presence of the testator. Of course, it goes without saying that the document destroyed must be
the will itself."Animus revocandi is only one of the necessary elements for the effective
revocation of a last will and testament. The intention to revoke must be accompanied by the
overt physical act of burning, tearing, obliterating, or cancelling the will carried out by the testator
or by another person in his presence and under his express direction.
Gago vs. Mamuyac

The law does not require any evidence of the revocation or cancellation of the will to be
preserved. It therefore becomes difficult at times to prove the cancellation or revocation of wills.
The fact that such cancellation or revocation has taken place must either remain unproved or be
inferred from evidence showing that after due search the original will cannot be found. Where a
will which cannot be found is shown to have been in the possession of the testator, when last
seen, the presumption is in the absence of other competent evidence, that the same was
cancelled or destroyed. The same presumption arises where it is shown that the testator had
ready access to the will and it cannot be found after his death. It will not be presumed that such
will has been destroyed by any other person without the knowledge or authority of the testator.

SUBSECTION 8- ALLOWANCE AND DISALLOWANCE OF WILLS

Article 838
Guevara vs. Guevara

The proceeding for the probate of a will is one in rem, with notice by publication to the whole
world and with personal notice to each of the known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator.
Although not contested, the due execution of the will and the fact that the testator at the time of
its execution was of sound and disposing mind and not acting under duress, menace, and undue
influence or fraud, must be proved to the satisfaction of the court, and only then may the will be
legalized and given effect by means of a certificate of its allowance, signed by the judge and
attested by the seal of the court; and when the will devises real property, attested copies thereof
and of the certificate of allowance must be recorded in the register of deeds of the province in
which the land lies. It will readily be seen from the above provisions of the law that the
presentation of a will to the court for probate is mandatory and its allowance by the court is
essential and indispensable to its efficacy.
The heirs may not disregard the provisions of the will unless those provisions are contrary to law.
Neither may they do away with the presentation of the will to the court for probate, because such
suppression of the will is contrary to law and public policy. The law enjoins the probate of the will
and public policy requires it, because unless the will is probated and notice thereof given to the
whole world, the right of a person to dispose of his property by will may be rendered nugatory,

De la Cerna vs. Potot

In a case where a joint will between husband and wife was executed and the will was probated
when the husband died before the effectivity of the Civil Code, the final decree of probate has
conclusive effect as to the last will and testament, despite the fact that even then the Civil Code
already decreed the invalidity of joint wills. A final judgment rendered on a petition for the
probate of a will is binding upon the whole world and public policy and sound practice demand
that at the risk of occasional errors, judgment of courts should become final at some definite date
fixed by law. The probate decree of the will of the husband could only affect the share of the
deceased husband. It could not include the disposition of the share of the wife who was then still
alive, and over whose interest in the conjugal properties the probate court acquired no
jurisdiction, precisely because her estate could not then be in issue. It follows that the validity of
the joint will, in so far as the estate of the wife was concerned, must be, on her death,
reexamined and adjudicated de novo, since a joint will is considered a separate will of each
testator. Thus, probate of the wife’s will is denied as joint wills are now prohibited by the Civil
Code.

Gallanosa vs. Arcangel

A decree of probate is conclusive as to the due execution or formal validity of a will. That means
that the testator was of sound and disposing mind at the time when he executed the will and was
not acting under duress, menace, fraud, or undue influence; that the will was signed by him in the
presence of the required number of witnesses, and that the will is genuine and is not a forgery.
Accordingly, these facts cannot again be questioned in a subsequent proceeding, not even in a
criminal action for the forgery of the will. After the finality of the allowance of a will, the issue as
to the voluntariness of its execution cannot be raised anymore.
The following are included in the term formal validity and therefore are conclusively settled by a
final decree of probate:
i. that the testator was of sound and disposing mind
ii. that his consent was not vitiated
iii. that the will was signed by the requisite number of witnesses
iv. that the will is genuine

Nepomuceno vs. CA

The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the court's area of inquiry is limited to an
examination and resolution of the extrinsic validity of the Will. The rule, however, is not inflexible
and absolute. Given exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not powerless to do what the
situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the Will. The probate of a will
might become an idle ceremony if on its face it appears intrinsically void. Where practical
considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is
probated, the court should meet the issue.

SECTION 2- INSTITUTION OF HEIR

Article 850
Austria vs. Reyes

Before the institution of heirs may be annulled under article 850 of the Civil Code, the following
requisites must concur: First, the cause for the institution of heirs must be stated in the will;
second, the cause must be shown to be false; and third, it must appear from the face of the will
that the testator would not have made such institution if he had known the falsity of the cause.
Article 854
Reyes vs. Barretto-Datu

If there is a compulsory heir in the direct line, such heir is instituted in the will, and the
testamentary disposition given to such heir is less than her legitime, there is no preterition. There
is no total omission, inasmuch as the heir received something from the inheritance. The remedy is
for completion of legitime under Articles 906 and 907.

Aznar vs. Duncan

Manresa defines preterition as the omission of the heir in the will, either by not naming him at all
or, while mentioning him as father, son, etc., by not instituting him as heir without disinheriting
him expressly, nor assigning to him some part of the properties. In a case where the testator left
to one who was a forced heir a legacy worth less than the legitime, but without referring to the
legatee as an heir or even as a relative, and willed the rest of the estate to other persons, it was
held that Article 815 applied, and the heir could not ask that the institution of heirs be annulled
entirely, but only that the legitimate be completed.

Acain vs. IAC

An adopted child, if totally omitted in the inheritance, is preterited and can invoke its protection
and consequences. Since an adopted child is given by law the same rights as a legitimate child, the
adopted child can, in proper cases, invoke Article 854 in the same manner a legitimate child can.

Nuguid vs. Nuguid

To 'annul' means to abrogate, to make void. The word annul employed in the statute (Article 854)
means that the universal institution of petitioner to the entire inheritance results in totally
abrogating the will. Because, the nullification of such institution of universal heir — without any
other testamentary disposition in the will — amounts to a declaration that nothing at all was
written. Carefully worded and in clear terms, Article 854 offers no leeway for inferential
interpretation. Giving it an expansive meaning will tear up by the roots the fabric of the statute.
(Note that what was involved here was a universal institution of a sole heir, nothing more. Article
854 annuls his institution, thus no more heirs are left. Hence, the entire will is void.)

SECTION 3-SUBSTITUTION OF HEIRS

Article 863
Palacios vs. Ramirez

What is meant by "one degree" from the first heir is explained by Tolentino as follows:
"Scaevola, Maura, and Traviesas construe 'degree' as designation, substitution, or transmission.
The Supreme Court of Spain has decidedly adopted this construction. From this point of view,
there can be only one transmission or substitution, and the substitute need not be related to the
first heir. Manresa, Morell, and Sanchez Roman, however, construe the word 'degree' as
generation, and the present Code has obviously followed this interpretation, by providing that the
substitution shall not go beyond one degree 'from the heir originally instituted.' The Code thus
clearly indicates that the second heir must be related to and be one generation from the first heir.
"From this, it follows that the fideicommissary can only be either a child or a parent of the first
heir. These are the only relatives who are one generation or degree from the fiduciary."

PCI Bank vs. Escolin

If there is no absolute obligation imposed upon the first heir to preserve the property and
transmit it to a second heir, there is no fideicomisaria. The institution is not necessarily void; it
may be valid as some other disposition, but it is not a fideicomisaria.

SECTION 5- LEGITIME

Article 887
Rosales vs. Rosales

The surviving spouse referred to in Article 887 who is entitled to the legitime, is the spouse of the
decedent and not the spouse of a child who has predeceased the decedent.

Lapuz vs. Eufemio

An action for legal separation which involves nothing more than the bed-and-board separation of
the spouses (there being no absolute divorce in this jurisdiction) is purely personal. Being
personal in character, it follows that the death of one party to the action causes the death of the
action itself — actio personalis moritur cum persona. Thus, death of either party during the
pendency of a petition for legal separation results in the dismissal of the case.

Niñal vs. Badayog

May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage
after his death? Petitions for the declaration of the voidability of a marriage can only be brought
during the lifetime of the parties and not after the death of either. A void marriage, on the other
hand, can be brought even after the death of either party. The Code is silent as to who can file a
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. Any proper interested party (heirs of the deceased
husband) may attack a void marriage.

Baritua vs. CA

Legitimate ascendants (parents of the deceased) succeed only when the descendant dies without
a legitimate ascendant. The surviving spouse concurs with all classes of heirs. Thus, where an
obligation has been paid to the spouse and descendants, the obligation is extinguished and the
legitimate ascendants have no right to claim upon the obligation.
Article 891
Solivio vs. CA

The reserva troncal only applies to properties inherited by an ascendant or a brother or sister. It
does not apply to property inherited by a descendant from his ascendant, the reverse of the
situation covered by Article 891.

Padura vs. Baldovino

The reserva troncal is a special rule designed primarily to assure the return of the reservable
property to the third degree relatives belonging to the line from which the property originally
came, and avoid its being dissipated into and by the relatives of the inheriting ascendant.
The reserva merely determines the group of relatives to whom the property should be returned;
but within that group the individual right to the property should be decided by the applicable
rules of ordinary intestate succession, since Article 891 does not specify otherwise. (RFB: Those
reservatarios nearer in degree to the prepositus will exclude the more remotely related.)

Florentino vs. Florentino

I Any ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property, while there are living, within the
third degree, relatives of the latter, is nothing but a life usufructuary or a fiduciary of the
reservable property received. He is, however, the legitimate owner of his own property which is
not reservable property and which constitutes his legitime, according to article 809 of the Civil
Code. But if, afterwards, all of the relatives, within the third degree, of the descendant (from
whom came the reservable property) die or disappear, the said property becomes free property,
by operation of law, and is thereby converted into the legitime of the ascendant heir who can
transmit it at his death to his legitimate successors or testamentary heirs. This property has now
lost its nature of reservable property, pertaining thereto at the death of the relatives, called
reservatarios, who belonged within the third degree to the line from which such property came.
The right of representation cannot be alleged when the one claming same as a reservatario of the
reservable property is not among the relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from
which such property came, inasmuch as the right granted by the Civil Code in article 811 is in the
highest degree personal and for the exclusive benefit of designated persons who are the relatives,
within the third degree, of the person from whom the reservable property came. Therefore,
relatives of the fourth and the succeeding degrees can never be considered as reservatarios, since
the law does not recognize them as such.
(RFB: Actually there will be only one instance of representation among the reservatarios, i.e., a
case of the Prepositus being survived by brothers/sisters and children of a predeceased or
incapacitated brother or sister.)

Edroso vs. Sablan

1. The reservista’s right over the reserved property is one of ownership.

2. The ownership is subject to a resolutory condition, i.e. the existence of reservatarios at the
time of the reservista’s death.
3. The right of ownership is alienable, but subject to the same resolutory condition.
4. The reservista’s right of ownership is registrable.
The conclusion is that the person required by article 811 to reserve the right has, beyond any
doubt at all, the rights of use and usufruct. He has, moreover, for the reasons set forth, the legal
title and dominion, although under a condition subsequent. Clearly he has, under an express
provision of the law, the right to dispose of the property reserved, and to dispose of is to alienate,
although under a condition. He has the right to recover it, because he is the one who possesses or
should possess it and have title to it, although a limited and revocable one. In a word, the legal
title and dominion, even though under a condition, reside in him while he lives. After the right
required by law to be reserved has been assured, he can do anything that a genuine owner can
do.
On the other hand, the relatives within the third degree in whose favor the right is reserved
cannot dispose of the property, first because it is no way, either actually, constructively or
formally, in their possession; and, moreover, because they have no title of ownership or of fee
simple which they can transmit to another, on the hypothesis that only when the person who
must reserve the right should die before them will they acquire it, thus creating a fee simple, and
only then will they take their place in the succession of the descendant of whom they are relatives
within the third degree, that is to say, a second contingent place in said legitimate succession in
the fashion of aspirants to a possible future legacy.

Sienes vs. Esparcia

1. The reservatarios have a right of expectancy over the property.

2. The right is subject to a suspensive condition, i.e. the expectancy ripens into ownership if the
reservatarios survive the reservista.
3. The right is alienable, but subject to the same suspensive condition.
4. The right is registrable.

(Query: Edroso case says reservatarios right is not alienable, Sienes says it is. Resolve. Personally, I
think Sienes is right.)

Gonzales vs. CFI

Can a reservista convey by will, reservable property to relervatarios in the third degree and by-
pass those in the second? NO. Article 891 clearly indicates that the reservable properties should
be inherited by all the nearest relatives within the third degree from the prepositus. She could not
select the reservees to whom the reservable property should be given and deprive the other
reservees of their share therein.
The reservable property does not form part of the reservista’s estate and should be given to all
the seven reservatarios or nearest relatives of the prepositus within the third degree. While it is
true that by giving the reservable property to only one reservatario, it did not pass into the hands
of strangers, nevertheless, it is likewise true that the reservista was only one of the reservatarios
and there is no reason founded upon law and justice why the other reservatarios should be
deprived of their shares in the reservable property. The property passes by strict operation of law.
Cano vs. Director

Upon the death of the reservista, the reservatario nearest to the prepositus becomes,
automatically and by operation of law, the owner of the reservable property. That property is no
part of the estate of the reservista, and does not even answer for the debts of the latter. Hence,
its acquisition by the reservatario may be entered in the property records without necessity of
estate proceedings, since the basic requisites therefor appear of record. It is equally well settled
that the reservable property cannot be transmitted by a reservista to her or his own successors
mortis causa, so long as a reservatario within the third degree from the prepositus and belonging
to the line whence the property came, is in existence when the reservista dies.

CHAPTER 3 LEGAL OR INTESTATE SUCCESSION

Article 977
Section 1 General Provisions
Subsection 2 Right of Representation
Teotico vs. Del Val

The relationship established by adoption is limited solely to the adopter and the adopted does not
extend to the relatives of the adopting parents or of the adopted child except only as expressly
provided for by law. Hence, no relationship is created between the adopted and the collaterals of
the adopting parents. As a consequence, the adopted is an heir of the adopter but not of the
relatives of the adopter. Thus, an adopted can neither represent nor be represented.

Section 2 Order of Intestate Sucession

Subsection 1 Descending Direct Line
Article 979
Sayson vs. CA

The philosophy underlying this article is that a person's love descends first to his children and
grandchildren before it ascends to his parents and thereafter spreads among his collateral
relatives. It is also supposed that one of his purposes in acquiring properties is to leave them
eventually to his children as a token of his love for them and as a provision for their continued
care even after he is gone from this earth.
There is no question that a legitimate daughter of a person who predeceased his parents, and
thus their granddaughter, has a right to represent her deceased father in the distribution of the
intestate estate of her grandparents. Under Article 981, she is entitled to the share her father
would have directly inherited had he survived, which shall be equal to the shares of her
grandparents' other children.
But a different conclusion must be reached for persons to whom the grandparents were total
strangers. While it is true that the adopted child shall be deemed to be a legitimate child and have
the same right as the latter, these rights do not include the right of representation. The
relationship created by the adoption is between only the adopting parents and the adopted child
and does not extend to the blood relatives of either party.
Subsection 3 Illegitimate Children
Article 992
Corpus vs. Administrator

There is a successional barrier between the legitimate and illegitimate relatives of the deceased.
The rule in article 943 is now found in article 992 of the Civil Code which provides that "an
illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of
his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the
illegitimate child".
That rule is based on the theory that the illegitimate child is disgracefully looked upon by the
legitimate family while the legitimate family is, in turn, hated by the illegitimate child. The law
does not recognize the blood tie and seeks to avoid further grounds of resentment

Leonardo vs. CA

An illegitimate cannot, by right of representation, claim a share of the estate left by the legitimate
relatives left by his father considering that, as found again by the Court of Appeals, he was born
outside wedlock as shown by the fact that when he was born on September 13, 1938, his alleged
putative father and mother were not yet married, and what is more, his alleged father's first
marriage was still subsisting. At most, petitioner would be an illegitimate child who has no right to
inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father.

Diaz vs. CA

Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a
succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of
the father or mother of said legitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not
recognized by law for the purposes of Art. 992. Between the legitimate family and the illegitimate
family there is presumed to be an intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate
child is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family; the family is in turn, hated by the
illegitimate child; the latter considers the privileged condition of the former, and the resources of
which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the
product of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law does no more than recognize
this truth, by avoiding further grounds of resentment. So that while Art, 992 prevents the
illegitimate issue of a legitimate child from representing him in the intestate succession of the
grandparent, the illegitimates of an illegitimate child can now do so.

Diaz vs. CA

The right of representation is not available to illegitimate descendants of legitimate children in

the inheritance of a legitimate grandparent. It may be argued, as done by petitioners, that the
illegitimate descendant of a legitimate child is entitled to represent by virtue of the provisions of
Article 982, which provides that "the grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by right of
representation." Such a conclusion is erroneous. It would allow intestate succession by an
illegitimate child to the legitimate parent of his father or mother, a situation which would set at
naught the provisions of Article 992. Article 982 is inapplicable to instant case because Article 992
prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate
children and relatives of the father or mother. It may not be amiss to state that Article 982 is the
general rule and Article 992 the exception.
The word "relative" as used in Article 992 is broad enough to comprehend all the kindred of the
person spoken of. The word "relatives" should be construed in its general acceptation. Amicus
curiae Prof. Ruben Balane has this to say:
According to Prof. Balane, to interpret the term relatives in Article 992 in a more restrictive sense
than it is used and intended is not warranted by any rule of interpretation. Besides, he further
states that when the law intends to use the term in a more restrictive sense, it qualifies the term
with the word collateral, as in Articles 1003 and 1009 of the New Civil Code.

Subsection 4 Surviving Spouse

Article 996
Santillon vs. Miranda

There is a conflict with what the Civil Code provides as legitime of a spouse and what he or she
may receive by way of intestacy. Art. 892 of the New Civil Code falls under the chapter on
Testamentary Succession; whereas Art. 996 comes under the chapter on Legal or Intestate
Succession. Art. 892 merely fixes the legitime of the surviving spouse and Art. 888 thereof, the
legitime of children in testate succession. While it may indicate the intent of the law with respect
to the ideal shares that a child and a spouse should get when they concur with each other, it does
not fix the amount of shares that such child and spouse are entitled to when intestacy occurs.
Thus, upon intestacy, the provisions of Art. 996 applies.

Chapter 4 Provisions Common to Testate and Intestate Succession

Section 2 Capacity to Succeed by Will or by Intestacy
Article 1025
Parish Priest of Roman Catholic Church vs. Rigor

Where a priest makes a provision in his will that certain legacies shall pass to his nearest male
relative who pursues priesthood, it is said to be limited to those living at the time of the execution
of the will. We hold that the said bequest refers to the testator's nearest male relative living at
the time of his death and not to any indefinite time thereafter. "In order to be capacitated to
inherit, the heir, devisee or legatee must be living at the moment the succession opens, except in
case of representation, when it is proper" (Art. 1025, Civil Code).

Section 5 Collation
Article 1061
Vizconde vs. CA

Collation is the act by virtue of which descendants or other forced heirs who intervene in the
division of the inheritance of an ascendant bring into the common mass, the property which they
received from him, so that the division may be made according to law and the will of the testator.
Collation is only required of compulsory heirs succeeding with other compulsory heirs and
involves property or rights received by donation or gratuitous title during the lifetime of the
decedent. The purpose is to attain equality among the compulsory heirs in so far as possible for it
is presumed that the intention of the testator or predecessor in interest in making a donation or
gratuitous transfer to a forced heir is to give him something in advance on account of his share in
the estate, and that the predecessors will is to treat all his heirs equally, in the absence of any
expression to the contrary. Collation does not impose any lien on the property or the subject
matter of collationable donation. What is brought to collation is not the property donated itself,
but rather the value of such property at the time it was donated, the rationale being that the
donation is a real alienation which conveys ownership upon its acceptance, hence any increase in
value or any deterioration or loss thereof is for the account of the heir or donee.
Thus, it is an error to require a son-in-law of the decedent to be included in the collation as he is
not a compulsory heir.

Section 6 Partition and Distribution of the Estate

Subsection 1 Partition
Fajardo vs. Fajardo

There are only two ways in which said partition could have been made: By an act inter vivos, or by
will. In either case there were formalities which must be followed. If the partition was made by an
act inter vivos, it should have been reduced in writing in a public instrument, because it was a
conveyance of real estate. If by last will and testament, the legal requisites should have been
observed.

Chavez vs. IAC

Art. 1080 of the Civil Code clearly gives a person two options in making a partition of his estate;
either by an act inter vivos or by will. When a person makes a partition by will, it is imperative
that such partition must be executed in accordance with the provisions of the law on wills;
however, when a person makes the partition of his estate by an act inter vivos, such partition may
even be oral or written, and need not be in the form of a will, provided that the partition does not
prejudice the legitime of compulsory heirs. (RFB: This ruling should not be used as it raises
eyebrows very high. It gives a partition an irrevocable character and allows a conveyance of the
compulsory heirs of their legitimes even during their lifetimes.)

Legasto vs. Verzosa

A testator may, by an act inter vivos, partition his property, but he must first make a will with all
the formalities provided for by law. And it could not be otherwise, for without a will there can be
no testator; when the law, therefore, speaks of the partition inter vivos made by a testator of his
property, it necessarily refers to that property which he has devised to his heirs. A person who
disposes of his property gratis inter vivos is not called a testator, but a donor. In employing the
word "testator," the law evidently desired to distinguish between one who freely donates his
property in life and one who disposes of it by will to take effect after his death.

Article 1082
Tuason vs. Tuason Jr.

Where heirs contracted with a third person to develop their co-owned lot, with the stipulation
that the co-ownership shall subsist until all the lots have been sold, is not a violation of Art. 400,
and is only a mere incident to the main object of the partnership, which is to dissolve the co-
ownership.
Article 1088
Garcia vs. Calaliman

Written notice is required for the period of onemonth for the other co-heirs to redeem begins to
run. Both the letter and spirit of the new Civil Code argue against any attempt to widen the scope
of the notice specified in Article 1088 by including therein any other kind of notice, such as verbal
or by registration. Written notice is indispensable, actual knowledge of the sale acquired in some
other manners by the redemptioner, notwithstanding. He or she is still entitled to written notice,
as exacted by the Code, to remove all uncertainty as to the sale, its terms and its validity, and to
quiet any doubt that the alienation is not definitive. The law not having provided for any
alternative, the method of notifications remains exclusive, though the Code does not prescribe
any particular form of written notice nor any distinctive method for written notification of
redemption