Cases Labor Relations Law
"3. The strike declared by the members of the petitioning union, workers of the respondent company, on March 1,
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-4758. May 30, 1953.]
CALTEX [PHIL. ] INC., Petitioner, v. PHILIPPINE LABOR ORGANIZATIONS, CALTEX CHAPTER,Respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. EMPLOYEE AND LABORERS; STRIKES; DECISION OF COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS DECLARING
STRIKE ILLEGAL; LABORERS NEW DEMANDS AND CONSEQUENT STRIKE NOT A VIOLATION OF DECISION.
— If after the decision of the Court of Industrial Relations declaring a strike illegal, new demands or matters arise not
connected with, or similar to, the demands in the former case, and the laborers struck anew, the new strike cannot
be held as a violation of the decision.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION MAKING NEW DAMAGES; LACK OF SERVICE. — Where the
new demands or matters were brought before the Court of Industrial Relations in a motion for reconsideration, the
court may entertain such motion as an application by an interested party for the reopening of the question involved in
the decision under section 17 of Commonwealth Act No. 103 as amended, even if the motion for reconsideration was
not served upon the company, or if served there was no proof of service.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; REJECTION OF DEMANDS DOES NOT MAKE STRIKE ILLEGAL. — If the demands of the laborers
cannot be granted for being unjust and unreasonable, the only consequence should be rejection of the demands, but
not the illegality of the strike or the punishment of the workers who presented them, for this would be in effect to
outlaw altogether an effective means for securing better working conditions.
In the course of the proceedings in Case No. 112-V of the Court of Industrial Relations, involving an industrial dispute
between the Philippine Labor Organizations, Caltex Chapter, hereinafter referred to as the Union, and Caltex
(Philippines), Inc., hereinafter referred to as the Company, that court issued an order on January 2, 1948 containing
the following directive:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The laborers involved in these cases, pending the final determination of same, are enjoined not to stage strike or
walk out from their employment without authority from and without first submitting their grievances to the court. The
respondent companies are likewise enjoined not to lay off, dismiss, discharge or admit any employees or laborers in
their employments during the pendency of these cases without beforehand notifying and obtaining the authority of
the court. The controversial points involved in the petitions will be heard separately by this court at the opportune
time."cralaw virtua1aw library
On February 13 and 15, 1950, the Union presented certain demands on the Company which became the subject of
negotiations between the parties. On March 1, 1950, a strike was declared by the Union, a matter which the
Company submitted to the Court of Industrial Relations in Case No. 112-V(10). After hearing, the Court of Industrial
Relations, thru Presiding Judge Arsenio C. Roldan, rendered a decision dated July 31, 1950, holding as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1. The prohibition from declaring a strike during the determination of the dispute, issued in a pending case before
the Court, refers to a strike over the same or similar demands or dispute or matters directly connected with them in
the pending case only, and a strike thus declared while there is such order, is a violation of this injunction and,
therefore, illegal;
"2. Prohibition not to declare strike during the determination of the dispute in a pending case before the Court does
not prohibit a strike for new demands;
1950, was not a violation of the order given by the Court of Industrial Relations on January 2, 1948;
"4. The strike declared by the members of the petitioning union, workers of the respondent company, on March 1,
1950, was illegal, not only because the purpose was trivial, unjust or unreasonable but because there was no good
purpose at all.
"5. The company did not dismiss the laborers Concha, Silva, Algozo and Punzal as they abandoned their work, and,
therefore, the officials of the management can not be held in contempt of Court; and
"6. As this strike was illegal, the Company is authorized to dismiss those responsible therefor, and may rehire such
of the striking employees and laborers and/or new labor force as in its discretion it may see fit."cralaw virtua1aw
library
The Union filed a motion for reconsideration. Under date of January 31, 1951, the Court of Industrial Relations in
banc issued a resolution reversing the decision of Judge Roldan insofar as it declared the strike illegal and insofar as
it authorized the Company to discharge the workers responsible for the strike. This resolution was by a three-to-two
vote.
On March 20, 1951, the Company filed an urgent petition, followed on the next day by an urgent amended petition,
praying that the motion for reconsideration filed against the decision dated July 31, 1950 of Judge Roldan, be
denied, because said decision had become final and unappealable on August 17, 1950, in view of the fact that,
although the motion for reconsideration was filed by the Union on the last day of the reglementary period, no copy
thereof was served upon the adverse party and no proof of service was shown. This amended urgent petition was
denied by the Court of Industrial Relations in banc in its unanimous order of April 20, 1951. The Company has filed
the present petition for review on certiorari, praying that judgment be rendered:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"(a) reversing and setting aside the resolution of the Court of Industrial Relations modifying the decision of July 31,
1950, the latter having become final and unappealable;
"(b) but should this court be of the opinion that the decision had not become final and unappealable, petitioner prays
that this Honorable Court render judgment reversing and setting aside the resolution of the Court of Industrial
Relations which modified the decision of July 31, 1950, and affirming the said decision.
The contention of the Company that the decision of the Trial Judge of July 31, 1950 had become final and
unappealable, is without merit. Assuming that copy of the motion for reconsideration filed by the Union was not
served upon the Company, or if it was served no proof of service was presented, the Court of Industrial Relations
could entertain said motion for reconsideration as an application by an interested party for the reopening of a
question involved in the decision under section 17 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, as amended. (Goseco v. Court of
Industrial Relations, 68 Phil. 444.)
There is neither merit in the company’s contention that the strike staged by the Union on March 1, 1950 was in
violation of the directive of the Court of Industrial Relations of January 2, 1948, hereinabove quoted. From the very
decision of July 31, 1950, it is clear that the strike was motivated by new demands or matters not connected with or
similar to the demands or disputes involved in the case in which the order of January 2, 1948 were issued, and
therefore could not have been, as correctly held by Judge Roldan, violative of the directive against strikes.
The important question that arises is whether the strike held on March 1, 1950, was illegal. On this we agree with the
resolution of the Court of Industrial Relations in banc. It is noteworthy that on February 13, 1950, the Union sent a
letter to the Company, containing fourteen demands referring to wage differentials, retirement and insurance
benefits, free medical treatment and hospitalization with pay, Christmas bonus, bonus to drivers, vacation and sick
leave, overtime pay, reinstatement of certain employees, gratuity to pre-war employees and backpay during the
Japanese occupation. It appears also that in the second letter of February 15, 1950, the Union gave the manager of
the Company forty-eight hours to decide on the demands, with the admonition that the Union would declare a strike.
The resolution of the Court of Industrial Relations in banc of January 31, 1951 found that "among the factors that
motivated the declaration of the strike was the failure of the respondent to meet the petitioner’s demands." These
1
demands, if granted, would certainly tend to improve the conditions of the laborers and employees affected, and
cannot be said to be trivial, much less illegal. But whether the same are unreasonable or unjust is a matter to be
decided after proper consideration. If said demands cannot be granted for being unjust or unreasonable, the only
consequence, in the appropriate words of the Court of Industrial Relations in banc, should "be their rejection and not
the punishment of the workers who presented them." To make the legality or illegality of strikes dependent solely on
whether the demands of laborers may or may not be granted, is in effect to outlaw altogether an effective means for
Securing better working conditions.
Wherefore, the decision of the Court of Industrial Relations now under review is hereby affirmed, with costs against
the petitioner. So ordered.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-4061. May 28, 1952.]
CENTRAL VEGETABLE OIL MANUFACTURING CO., INC., Petitioner-Appellant, v. PHILIPPINE OIL INDUSTRY
WORKERS UNION (CLO, C. V. C. LOCAL), ET AL., Respondents-Appellees.
Quisumbing, Sycip, Quisumbing & Salazar for Petitioner.
SYLLABUS
1. LABOR AND CAPITAL; STRIKE, WHEN NOT ILLEGAL. — The strike prompted by the refusal of the company to
discuss the 14-point petition of the union and to concede at least two working days a week, was legitimate. The plea
of the laborers for better conditions and for more working days cannot be said to be trivial, unreasonable or unjust,
much less illegal, because it is not only the inherent right but the duty of all free men to improve their living standard
through honest work that pays a decent wage. The demands that gave rise to the strike may not properly be granted
but that fact should not make the demands and the consequent strike illegal. The ability of the company to grant the
demands is one thing, and the right of the laborers to make said demands is another thing. The latter should be kept
inviolate.
In case No. 146-V of the Court of Industrial Relations between the Central Vegetable Oil Manufacturing Company,
Inc. and the Philippine Oil Industry Workers Union, the parties entered on July 17, 1948, into an agreement worded
as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1. That pending the re-opening of the factory in all the departments:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"(a) Alfonso de los Reyes will work in place of Primitivo Tan at P6 per day and he and Jose Deogracias (the latter at
P6.30 per day) will be working regularly in the filling department;
"(b) Primitivo Soriano will be working as a helper electrician at P3.30 per day;
"(c) Apolinario Roque will work as filterman at P6.12 per day;
"2. That, if the new machinery has not been installed upon the re-opening of the factory in all its departments, the
Company shall admit all the former laborers of April 3, 1948; that, if the new machinery has then been installed upon
the re-opening of the factory in all its departments, the Company and a duly authorized representative of the Union
shall determine who among the former laborers shall be hired for each kind of work it deemed capable to do the
same and any disagreement thereon will be submitted to the Court of Industrial Relations for arbitration and decision;
Provided, however, that during the negotiation and the pendency of the matter before the Court of Industrial
Relations, the laborers called by the Company and the Union members shall work and continue working to the end
that the re-opening of the factory shall not be delayed;
"3. That, upon the re-opening of the factory in all its departments, the Company and a duly authorized representative
of the Union shall fix wages of the laborers at such scales similar to those of the Philippine Refining Company, in as
much as the same machines now being used by the said Company are to be installed in the factory; and, in case of
any disagreement, the provisions in paragraph 2 of this agreement will apply;
"4. That all laborers of April 3, 1948, shall be given a loan of twenty (20) days wages, except those who already
received gratuity from the Company as per attached list and those who will be working during the present period
pending the re-opening of the factory in all its departments, said loan being without interest and payable at the rate of
twenty (20%) per centum of each laborer’s weekly wage; except, however, that those laborers who are forcibly laid
off shall have the right to keep their loan without obligation to repay the same.
"The above-mentioned Union agrees to allow its affiliated laborers who were working on June 10, 1948, to resume
work immediately upon signing of this agreement."cralaw virtua1aw library
This agreement, which was approved by the Court of Industrial Relations on July 23, 1948, was supplemented in the
sense that, in determining the former laborers who shall be hired for each kind of work, the Company and the duly
constituted representatives of the Union shall not consider the re-employment of those who have already received
gratuity before July 17, 1948, and severed their relations with the Company.
The arrangement embodied in the agreement was conceived by the parties in contemplation of the installation of
new machineries of the Company which might necessitate the reorganization of its personnel. Accordingly, there was
a time when, while machineries were being installed in the new oil mill, 24 laborers of the Union were laid off.
However, upon demand of said 24 laborers, the Company allowed them to work one day each week; so that from
June 27 to July 5, 1949, they continued to work on shifts of four men a day, during which they were also granted a
loan equivalent to one day’s salary per week. From July 5 to August 6, 1949, when the super duos were being
tested, however, these 24 laborers were allowed to work on full time basis. On or about August 6, 1949, a notice was
posted on the bulletin board of the Company by the plant superintendent to the effect that the oil mill would stop
operation at 7:00 a.m., Sunday, August 7, 1949, due to the readjustment of the machineries until further notice, and
that all shifts, mechanics and assistants should report for work at 8:00 a.m., Monday, August 8, 1949. On this latter
date, while the three mechanics and three assistants reported for work, the 24 laborers did not.
This gave rise to a petition dated August 13, 1949, which the Central Vegetable Oil Manufacturing Company, Inc.
filed with the Court of Industrial Relations against the Philippine Oil Industry Workers Union, praying that the laborers
affiliated with the respondent Union be discharged on the ground that they declared an illegal strike on August 8,
1949. After hearing, the Court of Industrial Relations, thru Judge Arsenio C. Roldan, rendered a decision on
December 12, 1949, authorizing the Central Vegetable Manufacturing Company, Inc. to dismiss the 24 laborers who
failed to report for work on August 8, 1949, and to replace them with new laborers, without prejudice to other laborers
of the Company who are members of the Union and who had not gone on strike. Upon motion for reconsideration
filed by the Union, the Court of Industrial Relations ordered the reinstatement of the laborers and the payment of their
wages from the day work is resumed in the Company. Judges V. Jimenez Yanson and Jose S. Bautista held that no
strike was stage by the 24 laborers, on the ground that, if they in fact stopped working on August 8, 1949, it was
because there was no work, as announced in the following notice posted in the bulletin board of the Company: "Oil
mill will stop operation, August 6, 1949, until further notice. All the three mechanics and three assistant mechanics
must report to their respective duty." Judge Juan L. Lanting concurred in the reinstatement of the laborers, but held
that, even admitting that there was a strike, the same was not illegal. Judges Arsenio C. Roldan and Modesto
Castillo dissented, holding that there was an illegal strike because it was in violation of the agreement of July 17,
1948, and that, at any rate, said laborers had abandoned their work in violation of said agreement. The company has
filed the present petition for review on certiorari.
In our view of the case, we will assume that there was a strike on August 8, 1949. In this connection, it may be stated
that on July 14, 1949, the respondent Union presented to the Company the following 14-point
petition:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1. That, in case of reparation periods all laborers who are members of the Union be given other jobs in the
company;
"2. That, all night shift workers covered from 6:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. be given an additional compensation of fifty per
2
cent (50%);
"3. That, sick leave up to complete recovery with full pay be provided the laborers;
"4. That, free medicine, medical care, dental treatment and hospitalization be provided all laborers;
"5. That, after one (1) month of service, any laborer be considered permanent;
"6. That, the closed-shop system in hiring new employees be established;
"7. That, in case of disability, death, incurable disease, dismissal and/or closing of the business, any laborer be given
a compensation of two (2) months pay for every year of service rendered;
"8. That, the amount of six pesos (P6.00) as the minimum wage for the present be given the laborers;
"9. That, the following laborers be given their former daily wages such as indicated hereinbelow:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library
‘a. Pricilo Sarmiento P12.00 a day;
b. Raymundo Dizon 9.60 a day; and
c. All foreman 9.00 a day.’
"10. That, the check-off system in the collection of dues and other monetary obligation of the union members be
established;
"11. That, one (1) man be given the sole responsibility in the supervision of all the works and operation of the whole
factory;
"12. That, due to the present conditions of speedy and heavy pressure of work in which the present laborers can’t
cope with due to their small number, an expeller, two (2) copra bodega tendermen and one (1) copra meal
tenderman be employed in each shift;
"13. That, the regular mechanics be reinforced or employed additional mechanics, and
"14. That, maternity leave of one (1) month before and one (1) month after delivery with full pay be provided all the
female laborers."cralaw virtua1aw library
In addition, on August 8, 1949, the Union asked the Company to allow the 24 laborers in question to work for more
than one day, or a minimum of two days every week. This was turned down by the Company which also refused to
consider the 14-point petition and insisted that the Union should appoint a representative who, with the Company,
could fix the wages of the laborers at scales similar to those of the Philippine Refining Company, as required by the
agreement of July 17, 1948.
In our opinion, the strike declared on August 8, 1949, undoubtedly prompted by the refusal of the company to
discuss the 14- point petition of the Union and to concede at least two working days a week, was legitimate. The plea
of the laborers for better conditions and for more working days cannot be said to be trivial, unreasonable or unjust,
much less illegal, because it is not only the inherent right but the duty of all free men to improve their living standards
through honest work that pays a decent wage. We cannot hope to have a strong and progressive nation, as long as
the laboring class (which constitutes the great majority) remains under constant economic insecurity and leads a life
of misery. The demand for two working days a week, even regardless of those for sick leave, maternity leave,
medical treatment and hospitalization, is the most legitimate that can be presented by any laborer, for it affects his
very right to live. We need not stretch our imagination or power of reasoning to realize that the laborer who has to
feed and clothe himself and his family for seven days a week, cannot survive on one day’s wage.
The demands that gave rise to the strike may not properly be granted under the circumstances of this case, but that
fact should not make said demands and the consequent strike illegal. The ability of the Company to grant said
demands is one thing, and the right of the laborers to make said demands is another thing. The latter should be kept
inviolate. There are adequate instrumentalities which may be resorted to in case of excesses. In this connection, it
may be mentioned that there is nothing in the agreement of July 17, 1948, that may be interpreted as prohibiting the
Union absolutely from seeking more working days or better conditions for the laborers. And such prohibition will be
patently immoral if not illegal.
The Union is charged with having violated its agreement of July 17, 1948, by refusing to name a representative for
the purpose of fixing the scales of salaries and wages in accordance with those of the Philippine Refining Company,
but, as Judge Lanting properly observes, said violation may be negatived by the belief of the Union that the
Company first violated the agreement by employing extra laborers. The explanation of the Company to the effect that
extra laborers were hired, not to replace the regular laborers but merely to do odd jobs, is not entirely plausible,
because the 24 laborers in question could have been as well employed to perform said odd jobs, especially because
as admitted by the appellant, "the twenty-four laborers worked on rotation of four men a day so that each man
worked one day a week. They worked — not in their regular work which had to do with the operation of the duo
expellers and which duo expellers were not then operating — but by doing odd jobs and helping at the installation of
the new machineries." At any rate, we think that the fixing of wages should be subordinated to the more urgent and
important matter of threshing out the question of granting two working days to the laborers.
Wherefore, the appealed decision of the Court of Industrial Relations is affirmed, and it is so ordered with costs
against the petitioner.
Separate Opinions
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J., dissenting:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
I dissent from the opinion of the majority that the failure of the twenty-four laborers to report for work on August 8,
1949, in line with the notice posted by the oil company that the mill will be stopped due to some adjustments until
further notice, does not constitute an illegal strike or a sufficient justification for their separation notwithstanding the
previous commitments they had with their employer.
It is an admitted fact that the company and the labor union entered into an agreement on July 7, 1948, whereby the
union agreed that, upon the reopening of the factory after the installation of the new machineries, the company and a
duly authorized representative of the union shall determine who shall be hired for each kind of work among the
former laborers and shall fix the wages they should receive similar to those of the laborers of the Philippine Refining
Company, and whereby the company agreed to pay to its laborers a gratuity of twenty days wages repayable as a
loan by those laborers who shall be returned to work. This agreement was entered into in contemplation of the
installation by the company of six new super duo expellers necessary to increase production and effect economy in
the management. This agreement was approved by the Court of Industrial Relations. The Company faithfully
complied with this agreement by paying to the laborers their gratuity. While the six super duo expellers were being
installed, three duo expellers were operated and in this operation thirty men were employed including the 24 laborers
involved in this case. It developed later that the installation of the new machineries interfered with the operation of
the three duo expellers. Consequently, the operation of these three duo expellers were stopped with the result that
the 24 laborers were laid off. One week later, the union requested that these 24 laborers be given work at least one
day a week in line with the procedure adopted by the Philippine Refining Company. The Company agreed and the 24
laborers worked on rotation of four men a day so that each man worked one day a week. They worked not in line
with the work which was assigned to them in the operation of the duo expellers but by doing odd jobs and helping in
the installation of the new machineries. When the installation terminated, the testing of the new machineries started.
This lasted one month or until August 6, 1949. The testing was successful, but as the company needed to make
some adjustments before resuming the operation of the mill, on said date, August 6, 1949, the company posted a
notice saying that "the oil mill will stop operation at 7:00 a. m. Sunday, on August 7, 1949, due to some adjustments,
until further notice." The notice also provided that "all shifts, mechanics and assistants will report for work 8:00 a.m.,
Monday, August 8, 1949." But when the latter date arrived, the 24 laborers failed to report for work. They went on
strike.
Why did said laborers stage a strike? It appears that during the test operation of the new machineries, when it
became apparent to the union that the installation was quite successful, the union realized that the company would
3
soon call a conference of the representatives of both parties for the purpose of complying with their agreement
concluded on July 7, 1948. The union knew that the company would enforce that portion of the agreement which
provided for a scale of wages similar to the wages paid by the Philippine Refining Company. Finding that these
wages were lower than their prevailing wages, the union decided to break that agreement. They, therefore,
presented a petition containing 14 demands, among which is a demand for increase of wages. A conference for a
discussion of these demands was arranged at which the union pressed for their approval. The representative of the
company showed reluctance to discuss those demands unless they first discuss the question of wages which was
very vital from the point of view of the company. It was then that the union made known to the company that it was
not agreeable to the wages being paid by the Philippine Refining Company because they were low in view of the
absence of a labor union in the said company, and demanded that these wages be increased. The company insisted
that the wages of the Philippine Refining Company be followed, not only because there is an agreement to that
effect, but also because the Philippine Refining Company was in a better financial condition because it has more
super duos, bigger production and bigger capital than it had. The union remained adamant in its demands and
nothing was accomplished in this conference. On August 7, 1949, another conference was held at which the union
persisted in its refusal to abide by the agreement of July 7, 1948. This conference also broke up without the parties
reaching an understanding but not after the president of the union had warned that, if the company should insist on
following the wages paid by the Philippine Refining Company, the laborers would be forced to declare a strike. In
effect, on August 8, 1949, said laborers went on strike on the alleged claim that they cannot agree to working only
one day a week during the stoppage of operation of the oil mill contrary to the agreement they had with the company
that they were to work on rotation of four men a day during the installation of the new machineries.
It is apparent that the impelling motive of the 24 laborers in declaring a strike is the refusal of the company to agree
to their demand not to follow the wages paid by the Philippine Refining Company because they were low in view of
the absence of a labor union in the said company, let alone the other thirteen demands that they included in the
petition which the company refused to discuss unless the question of wages has been settled, and not precisely their
avowed claim for more working days during the stoppage of the operation of the oil mill. It is for this reason that I
dissent from the opinion of the majority because in my opinion the labor union must know how to respect the sanctity
of valid commitments. It is evident that the purpose of the strike is merely to avoid and circumvent the agreement
entered into by the company and the union on July 7, 1948, the latter knowing full well that said agreement was
celebrated precisely in contemplation of the installation of the new machineries. That agreement received the
sanction of the Court of Industrial Relations. It was still binding and in full force. If the move of the union be tolerated,
we would be allowing a subversion of a contract freely entered into without any valid and justifiable reason. Such act
cannot be sanctioned in law or in equity as it is in derogation of the principle underlying the freedom of contract and
the good faith that should exist in contractual relations (Manila Oriental Sawmill Co. v. National Laborer Union, Et Al.,
supra, p. 28.) .
I agree with the majority that "it is not only the inherent right but the duty of all free men to improve their living
standard through honest work that pays a decent wage." And I sympathize with the plight of the 24 laborers when
they were only allowed to work one day a week during the period of the installation of the new machineries. But it
should be observed that if they were so allowed to work, it was only upon their express request because they
preferred to earn something than to have nothing when the three super duos stopped operating. Moreover, the work
they were undertaking was only temporary in nature with the particularity that when they staged a strike the company
was already taking steps to resume the operation of the oil mill as a result of the installation of the new machineries.
The remedy they have adopted for the redress of their grievance is not in keeping with the law and the
circumstances, because they not only violated a commitment validly entered into but have shown little or no regard
for the interest of their employer. Undoubtedly, the strike has caused unnecessary damage to their employer which
could have been averted had the laborers presented their claim through proper negotiations and not by resorting to
force. For these reasons, I dissent from the opinion of the majority.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-38258. November 19, 1982.]
LAKAS NG MANGGAGAWANG MAKABAYAN (LAKAS), Petitioner, v. MARCELO ENTERPRISES and
MARCELO TIRE & RUBBER CORP., MARCELO RUBBER AND LATEX PRODUCTS, MARCELO STEEL
CORPORATION, MARCELO CHEMICAL & PIGMENT CORP., POLARIS MARKETING CORPORATION and THE
COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, Respondents.
[G.R. No. L-38260. November 19, 1982.]
MARCELO TIRE & RUBBER CORPORATION, MARCELO RUBBER & LATEX PRODUCTS, INC., MARCELO
STEEL CORPORATION, POLARIS MARKETING CORPORATION, MARCELO CHEMICAL AND PIGMENT
CORP., MARCELO ENTERPRISES, under which name or style they are also known, Petitioners, v. LAKAS NG
MANGGAGAWANG MAKABAYAN (LAKAS) AND THE HONORABLE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS, Respondents.
SYNOPSIS
The Marcelo Companies, composed of six independent enterprises and each represented by local unions which
were all affiliated with Philippine Social Security Labor Union (PSSLU), received letters front their local unions and
also from herein petitioner LAKAS (which claimed that a local union was affiliated therewith) requesting for
negotiation of new collective bargaining agreements. Confronted with the problem of whom to recognize as the
bargaining unit, Marcelo suggested to all to settle the question by filing a petition for certification election before the
Court of Industrial Relations. PSSLU and LAKAS, interpreting the same as refusal to negotiate, filed notices of strike
which were later withdrawn. Eventually, bargaining negotiations were made but after LAKAS received a copy of
management’s draft of the bargaining agreement, LAKAS, without filing the required notice, declared a strike
completely paralizing Marcelo. A month later, after being informed that striking workers and employees will return to
work, Marcelo posted notices for them to return back to work and requested them to fill up a form (Exh. 49) indicating
therein the date of their availability for work for the purpose of scheduling since some machine needed a team of
workers to operate and the absence of ones worker will be useless to start its operation, Several strikers filled up the
required form but the remaining others, led and supported by LAKAS, refused to do so on the ground that such
constituted "screening" and insisted that they be admitted back to work without complying with the same. For
Marcelo’s refusal to forego the requirement, LAKAS filed a complaint for unfair labor practice with the Industrial
Court. After the trial had commenced, three local unions, MUEVA, UNWU and MFWU, prayed for the dismissal of the
complaint filed in their behalf on the grounds that the same was filed without their authority. and that the latter two
had disaffiliated from LAKAS. Judgment was rendered denying the motions for dismissal or withdrawal of the
complaint on the ground that LAKAS filed the same for and in behalf of the individual employees concerned as a
class suit; declared the strike illegal for lack of the requisite notice; and held that Marcelo was guilty of an unfair labor
practice in finding that the scheduling adopted was in effect a screening of those who were readmitted which
constituted discrimination. Both parties filed motions for reconsiderations. The same were denied, hence, the present
recourse.
The Supreme Court held that a labor organization cannot bring any action for and in behalf of a local union which is
not an affiliate thereof; and that the requirement of respondent companies in filing up of Exh. 49 was an act of self
preservation designed to effect cost-savings as well as ensure peace and order within their premises and could not
constitute an unfair labor practice.
The petition in L-38258 is dismissed and the petition in L-38260 is granted. The decision of the Court of Industrial
Relations is reversed and set aside and a new judgment is rendered holding that respondent Marcelo companies are
not guilty of unfair labor practice.
SYLLABUS
1. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATIONS; LABOR CODE; LABOR RELATIONS; CERTIFICATION ELECTION;
INDISPENSABLE WHERE THE ISSUE OF LEGITIMATE REPRESENTATION IS VIED BY TWO OR MORE LABOR
ORGANIZATIONS; CASE AT BAR. — Indeed, what We said in Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions
(PAFLU) v. The Bureau of Labor Relations, 69 SCRA 132, applies as well to this case. in a situation like this where
the issue of legitimate representation in dispute is vied for not only by one legitimate labor organization but two or
4
more, there is every equitable ground warranting the holding of a certification election. In this way, the issue as to
who is really the true bargaining representative of all the employees maybe firmly settled by the simple expedient of
an election." The cited ease gives the reason for the need of determining once and for all the true choice of
membership as to who should be their bargaining representative, which is that," (E)xperience teaches us one of the
root causes of labor or industrial disputes is the problem arising from a questionable bargaining representative
entering into CBA concerning terms and conditions of employment."cralaw virtua1aw library
2. ID; ID; LABOR UNIONS; COLLECTIVE BARGAINING EMPLOYER’S RIGHT TO DEMAND OF THE ASSERTED
BARGAINING AGENT PROOF OF ITS REPRESENTATIONS OF ITS EMPLOYEES. — Respecting the issue of
representation and the right of the employer to demand reasonable proof of majority representation on the part of the
supposed or putative bargaining agent, the commentaries in Rothenberg on Labor Relations, pp. 429- 431 are
forceful and persuasive, thus : "It is essential to the right of a putative bargaining agent to represent the employees
that it be the delegate of a majority of the employees and, conversely, an employer is under duty to bargain
collectively only when the bargaining agent is representative of the majority of the employees. A natural
consequences of these principles is that the employer has the right to demand of the asserted bargaining agent proof
of its representation of its employees. Having the right to demonstration of this fact, it is not an ‘unfair labor practice’
for an employer to refuse to negotiate until the asserted bargaining agent has presented reasonable proof of majority
representation. It is necessary however that such demand be made in good faith and not merely as a pretext or
device for delay or evasion. The employer’s right is however to reasonable proof. . . . Although an employer has the
undoubted right to bargain with a bargaining agent whose authority has been established, without the requirement
that the bargaining agent be officially certified by the National Labor Relations Board as such, if the informally
presented evidence leaves a real doubt as to the issue, the employer has a right to demand a certification and to
refuse to negotiate until such official certification is presented.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CONCERTED ACTIVITIES EXECUTED AND CARRIED INTO EFFECT AT THE INSTIGATION
AND MOTIVATION OF A LABOR ORGANIZATION NOT A BARGAINING AGENT CONSTITUTE A VIOLATION OF
EMPLOYER’S BASIC RIGHT TO BARGAIN COLLECTIVELY; CASE AT BAR. — The clear facts of the case as
hereinbefore restated indisputably show that a legitimate representation issue confronted the respondent Marcelo
Companies. In the face of these facts and in conformity with the existing jurisprudence, We hold that there existed on
duty to bargain collectively with the complainant LAKAS on the part of said companies. And proceeding from this
basis, it follows that all acts instigated by complainant LAKAS such as the filing of the Notice of Strike on June 13,
1967 (although later withdrawn) and the two strikes of September 4, 1967 and November 7, 1967 were calculated,
designed and intended to compel the respondent Marcelo Companies to recognize or bargain with it notwithstanding
that it was an uncertified union, or in the case of respondent Marcelo Tire and Rubber Corporation, to bargain with it
despite the fact that the MUEWA of Paulino Lazaro was already certified as the sole bargaining agent in said
respondent company. These concerted activities executed and carried into effect at the instigation and motivation of
LAKAS are all illegal and violative of the employer’s basic right to bargain collectively only with the representative
supported by the majority of its employees in each of the bargaining units. This Court is not unaware of the present
predicament of the employees involved but much as We sympathize with those who have been misled and so lost
their jobs through hasty, ill-advised and precipitate moves, We rule that the facts neither substantiate nor support the
finding that the respondent Marcelo Companies are guilty of unfair labor practice.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE; REQUIREMENT TO FILL UP A FORM FOR SCHEDULING, NOT A
REFUSAL TO REINSTATE OR RE-EMPLOY STRIKERS; CASE AT BAR. — It is the settled jurisprudence that it is
an unfair labor practice for an employer not to reinstate, or re-employment to, members of union who abandon their
strike and make unconditional offer to return to work. Exhibit "B" presents an unconditional offer of the striking
employees to return to work under the same terms and conditions of employment before the strike. We find as a fact
that the respondent Marcelo Companies did not refuse to reinstate or re-employ the strikers, as a consequence of
which We overrule the finding of unfair labor practice against said companies based on the erroneous conclusion of
the respondent court. It is clear from the records that even before the unconditional offer to return to work contained
in Exhibit "B" was made, the respondent Marcelo Companies had already posted notices for the strikers to return
back to work. It is true that upon their return, the striker were required to fill up a form (Exhibit "49") wherein they
were to indicate the date of their availability for work. But We are more impressed and are persuaded to accept as
true the contention of the respondent Marcelo Companies that the aforestated requirement was only for purposes of
proper scheduling of the start of work for each returning striker. It must be noted that as a consequences of the two
strikes which were both attended by widespread acts of violence and vandalism, the businesses of the respondent
companies were completely paralyzed. It would hardly be justiciable to demand of the respondent companies to
readmit all the returning workers in one big force or as each demanded readmission. There were machines that were
not in operating condition because of long disuse during the strikes. Some of the machines needed more than one
worker to operate them so that in the absence of the needed team of workers, the start of work by one without his
teammates would necessarily be useless, and the company would be paying for his time spent doing no work.
Finally, We take judicial cognizance of the fact that companies whose businesses were completely paralyzed by
major strikes cannot resume operations at once and in the same state or force as before the strikes. But what strikes
Us most in lending credence to respondents’ allegation that Exhibit "49" was not meant to screen the strikers, is the
fact that all of the returning strikers who filled up the form were scheduled for work and consequently started with
their jobs. It is only those strikers who refused or failed to fill-up the required form, like the herein complaining
employees, who were not scheduled for work and consequently have not been re-employed by the respondent
Marcelo Companies. Even if there was a sincere belief on their part that the requirement of Exhibit "49" was a ruse at
"screening" them is, this fear would have been dispelled upon notice of the fact that each and all of their co-strikers
who filled up the required form were in fact scheduled for work and started to work. The stoppage of their work was
not, therefore, the direct consequence of the respondent companies’ complained act. Hence, their economic loss
should not be shifted to the employer. In the light of the above ruling and taking the facts and circumstances of the
case before Us in relation to the requirement by the respondent companies in the filling up of Exhibit "49", We hold
and rule that the requirement was an act of self- preservation, designed to effect cost-savings as well as to insure
peace and order within their premises. Accordingly, the petition in G.R. No. L-38258 should be dismissed, it having
failed to prove, substantiate and justify the unfair labor practice charges against the respondent Marcelo Companies.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; WORKER’S RIGHT TO SELF-ORGANIZATION; SUBJECT TO EMPLOYER’S FREEDOM TO
ENFORCE RULES AND ORDERS NECESSARY TO THE PROPER CONDUCT OF HIS BUSINESS. — It was
never the state policy nor Our judicial pronouncement that the employees’ rights to self-organization and to engage
in concerted activities for mutual aid and protection, are absolute or be upheld under all circumstances. Thus, in the
case of Royal Interocean Lines, Et. Al. v. CIR, We cited these authorities giving adequate panoply to the rights of
employer, to wit: "The protection of workers’ right to self-organization in no way interfere with employer’s freedom to
enforce such rules and orders as are necessary to proper conduct of his businesses, so long as employer’s
supervision is not for the purpose of intimidating or coercing his employees with respect to their self-organization and
representation. (National Relations Board v. Hudson Motor Car Co., C.C.A., 1942, 123 F 2d. 528). It is the functions
of the court to see that the rights of self-organization and collective bargaining guaranteed by the Act are amply
secured to the employee, but in its effort to prevent the prescribed unfair labor practice, the court must be mindful of
the welfare of the honest employer (Martel Mills Corp. v. M.L.R.L., C.C.A., 1940, 11471 F2d. 264)."cralaw virtua1aw
library
6. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL ACTIONS; PROPER PARTY; A SUIT BROUGHT BY ANOTHER IN REPRESENTATION
OF A REAL PARTY IN INTEREST IS DEFECTIVE; CASE AT BAR. — Firstly, LAKAS cannot bring any action for
and in behalf of the employees who were members of MUEWA because, as intimated earlier in this Decision, the
said local union was never an affiliate of LAKAS. What appears clearly from the records is that it was Augusto
Carreon and his follow who joined LAKAS, but then Augusto Carreon was not the recognized presidents of MUEWA
and neither he nor his followers can claims any legitimate representation of MUEWA. Apparently, it is this split faction
of MUEWA. headed by, Augusto Carreon who, is being sought to be represented by LAKAS. However, it cannot do
so because the members constituting this split faction of MUEWA were still members of MUEWA which was on its
own right a duly registered labor unions. Hence any suit to be brought for and in behalf of them can be made only by
MUEWA, and not LAKAS. It appearing then that Augusto Carreon and his cohorts did not disaffiliate from MUEWA
nor signed any individual affiliation with LAKAS, LAKAS bears no legal interest in representing MUEWA or any of its
members. In NARIC Workers’ Union vs CIR, We ruled that," (a) labor union would go beyond the limits of its
legitimate purposes if it is given the unrestrained liberty to prosecute any case even for employees who are not
members of any union at all. A suit brought by another in representation of a real party in interest is defective." Under
the uncontroverted facts obtaining herein, the aforestated ruling is applicable, the only difference being that, here, a
labor federation seeks to represent members of a registered local union never affiliated with it and members of
registered local unions which, in the course of the proceedings before the industrial court, disaffiliated from it.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REMEDY OF REAL PARTY IN INTEREST. — This is not to say that the complaining employees
were without any venue for redress. Under the aforestated considerations, the respondent court should have directed
the amendment of the complaint by dropping LAKAS as the complainant and allow the suit to be further prosecuted
in the individual names of those who had grievances. A class suit under Rule 3, Section 12 of the Rule of Court is
authorized and should suffice for the purpose.
5

Separate appeals by certiorari from the Decision of the Court of Industrial Relations (Manila) dated July 20, 1973, as
well as the Resolution of the court en banc dated January 24, 1974 denying the reconsideration thereof rendered in
ULP Case No. 4951 entitled, "Lakas ng Manggagawang Makabayan, Petitioner, versus Marcelo Enterprises and
Marcelo Tire and Rubber Corporation, Marcelo Rubber and Latex Products, Marcelo Steel Corporation, Polaris
Marketing Corporation, and Marcelo Chemical and Pigment Corporation, Respondents."cralaw virtua1aw library
The antecedent facts as found by the respondent Court of Industrial Relations embodied in the appealed Decision
are correct, supported as they are by the evidence on record. Nevertheless, We find it necessary to make a re-
statement of the facts that are integrated and inter-related, drawn from the voluminuous records of these cases
which are herein jointly decided, since it would only be from a statement of all the relevant facts of the cases made in
all fullness, collectively and comprehensively, can the intricate issues posed in these appeals be completely and
judiciously resolved.
It appears that prior to May 23, 1967, the date which may be stated as the start of the labor dispute between Lakas
ng Manggagawang Makabayan (hereinafter referred to as complainant LAKAS) and the management of the Marcelo
Tire and Rubber Corporation, Marcelo Rubber and Latex Products, Inc., Polaris Marketing Corporation, Marcelo
Chemical and Pigment Corporation, and the Marcelo Steel Corporation (Nail Plan) (hereinafter referred to as
respondent Marcelo Companies) the Marcelo Companies had existing collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) with
the local unions then existing within the appropriate bargaining units, viz: (1) the respondent Marcelo Tire and
Rubber Corporation, with the Marcelo Camelback Tire and Foam Union (MACATIFU); (2) the respondent Marcelo
Rubber and Latex Products, Inc., with the Marcelo Free Workers Union (MFWU); and (3) the respondent Marcelo
Steel Corporation with the United Nail Workers Union (UNWU). These existing CBAs were entered into by and
between the parties while the aforestated local unions were then affiliated with a national federation, the Philippine
Social Security Labor Union (PSSLU).
It is well to note from the records that when the aforestated CBAs of the said local unions were nearing their
respective expiration dates (March 15, 1967) for MACATIFU and UNWU, and June 5, 1967 for MFWU), the general
situation within the ranks of labor was far from united. The MACATIFU in respondent Marcelo Tire and Rubber
Corporation, then headed by Augusto Carreon, did not enjoy the undivided support of all the workers of the
respondent corporation, as there existed a rival union, the Marcelo United Employees and Workers Association
(MUEWA) whose president was then Paulino Lazaro. As events would later develop, the members of the MACATIFU
of Augusto Carreon joined the MUEWA of Paulino Lazaro, after the latter filed a petition for direct certification which
was granted by the industrial court’s Order of July 5, 1967 recognizing and certifying MUEWA as the sole and
exclusive bargaining representative of all the regular workers of the respondent corporation. The union rivalry
between MACATIFU and MUEWA did not, however, end with the Order of July 5, 1967, but more than ever
developed into a more pressing problem of union leadership because Augusto Carreon also claimed to be the
president of the MUEWA by virtue of the affiliation of his MACATIFU members with MUEWA. The records also reveal
that even the ranks of MFWU in respondent Marcelo Rubber and Latex Products, Inc. was divided between those
supporting Ceferino Ramos and Cornelio Dizon who both claimed the presidency in said union. Only the UNWU in
respondent Marcelo Steel Corporation was then enjoying relative peace as Jose Roque was solely recognized as the
union’s president. The events that followed are hereinafter stated in chronological order for a clearer understanding
of the present situation.
On March 14, 1967, the management of respondent Marcelo Steel Corporation received a letter requesting the
negotiation of a new CBA together with a draft thereof, from the PSSLU president, Antonio Diaz, for and in behalf of
UNWU whose CBA was to expire the following day. Similar letters and proposals were, likewise, sent to the
management of respondent Marcelo Tire and Rubber Corporation for and in behalf of MACATIFU, and to respondent
Marcelo Rubber and Latex Products for and in behalf of MFWU, whose respective CBAs were both to expire on June
5, 1967.
However, on that very same day of March 14, 1967, the management of respondent Marcelo Tire and Rubber
Corporation received a letter from the UNWU president, Jose Roque, disauthorizing the PSSLU from representing
his union.
Then, on April 14, 1967, Paulino Lazaro of MUEWA requested negotiation of a new CBA with respondent Marcelo
Tire and Rubber Corporation, submitting therewith his union’s own proposals.
Again, on May 3, 1967, the management of respondents Marcelo Tire and Rubber Corporation and Marcelo Rubber
and Latex Products, Inc., received another letter requesting negotiation of new CBAs also for and in behalf of the
MACATIFU and the MFWU from J.C. Espinas & Associates.
Finally, on May 23, 1967, the management of all the respondent Marcelo Companies received a letter from
Prudencio Jalandoni, the alleged president of the complainant LAKAS. In this letter of May 23, 1967, the complainant
LAKAS informed management of the affiliation of the Marcelo United Labor Union (MULU) with it. Included therein
was a 17-points demand for purposes of the requested collective bargaining with management.
Confronted with a problem of whom to recognize as the bargaining representative of all its workers, the management
of all the respondent Marcelo Companies understandably dealt with the problem in this wise, viz: (1) it asked proof of
authority to represent the MFWU and the MACATIFU from J.C. Espinas & Associates: and (2) in a letter dated May
25, 1967, it apprised PSSLU, Paulino Lazaro of MUEWA and complainant LAKAS of the fact of the existing
conflicting demands for recognition as the bargaining representative in the appropriate units involved, consequently
suggesting to all to settle the question by filing a petition for certification election before the Court of Industrial
Relations, with an assurance that the management will abide by whatever orders the industrial court may issue
thereon.
PSSLU demurred to management’s stand and informed them of its intention to file an unfair labor practice case
because of management’s refusal to bargain with it, pointedly stating that it was with the PSSLU that the existing
CBAs were entered into. Again, as events later developed, on or about the middle of August 1981, PSSLU filed a
Notice of Strike which became the subject of conciliation with the respondent companies. In the case of MUEWA,
Paulino Lazaro threatened that his union will declare a strike against respondent Marcelo Tire and Rubber
Corporation. On the other hand, complainant LAKAS for MULU filed on June 13, 1967 before the Bureau of Labor
Relations a Notice of Strike against all the respondent Marcelo Companies, alleging as reasons therefor harrassment
of union officers and members due to union affiliation and refusal to bargain. This aforestated Notice of Strike was,
however, withdrawn on July 14, 1967.
In the meantime, as stated earlier in this Decision, the MUEWA filed a petition for direct certification before the
industrial court. There being no other union or interested person appearing before the court except the MUEWA, and
finding that MUEWA represented more than the majority of the workers in respondent Marcelo Tire and Rubber
Corporation, the court granted the petition and by Order of July 5, 1967, certified MUEWA of Paulino Lazaro as the
sole and exclusive bargaining representative of all the regular workers in said Respondent.
On July 11, 1967, Augusto Carreon of MACATIFU wrote the management of respondent Marcelo Tire and Rubber
Corporation expressly stating that no one was yet authorized to submit proposals for and in behalf of the union for
the renewal of its CBA, adding that" (a)ny group representing our Union is not authorized and should not be
entertained."cralaw virtua1aw library
On July 14, 1967, as earlier stated, the Notice of Strike filed by complainant LAKAS was withdrawn pursuant to a
Memorandum Agreement signed on the same day by management and LAKAS.
Thereafter, or on July 20, 1967, letters of proposal for collective bargaining were sent by Prudencio Jalandoni of
LAKAS to all the respondent Marcelo companies. In answer thereto, management wrote two (2) letters, both dated
July 24, 1967, addressed to Jalandoni, expressing their conformity to sit down in conference on the points to be
negotiated as soon as LAKAS can present evidence of authority to represent the employees of respondent
corporations in said conference. The records disclose that it was in the atmosphere of constant reservation on the
part of management as to the question of representation recognition that complainant LAKAS and management sat
down for CBA negotiations.
The first conference was held on August 14, 1967, followed by one on August 16, 1967 whereby management, in
formal reply to union’s economic demands, stated its willingness to give pay adjustments and suggested renewal of
other provisions of the old CBAs. A third conference was set although no one from LAKAS or the local unions
appeared. On August 29, 1967, the fourth conference was held where, from a letter dated August 30, 1967 from
Jose Delfin of Management to Jose B. Roque of UNWU, can be inferred that in the conference of August 29, 1967,
6
the management with respect to respondent Marcelo Steel Corporation, agreed to give pay adjustments from P0.15
to P0.25 to meritorious cases only, and to increase its contribution to the retirement fund from 1-1/2% to 3% provided
the employees’ contribution will be increased from 1% to 2%. Management likewise suggested the renewal of the
other provisions of the existing CBA. Management’s offers were not accepted by complainant LAKAS who insisted
on the grant of all its economic demands and in all of the Marcelo Companies.
As it would later appear during the trial of the ULP case below, and as found as a fact by the respondent court, only
the economic proposals of complainant LAKAS were the matters taken up in all these CBA conferences.
Less than a week after the fourth CBA conference, or on September 4, 1967, the complainant LAKAS declared a
strike against all the respondent Marcelo Companies. Acts of violence and vandalism attended the picketing. Ingress
and egress at the respondents’ premises were successfully blocked. One worker, Plaridel Tiangco, was manhandled
by the strikers and was hospitalized. Windows of the Chemical Plant were badly damaged. As a consequence, ten
(10) strikers were later charged before the Municipal Court of Malabon, Rizal, four of whom were convicted while the
others were at large.
On September 13, 1967, the respondent Marcelo Companies obtained a writ of preliminary injunction from the Court
of First Instance of Rizal enjoining the strikers from preventing the ingress and egress at the respondents’ premises.
The following day, a "Return to Work Agreement" (Exhibit "A") was executed by and among the management,
represented by Jose P. Marcelo and Jose A. Delfin, and the local unions, together with complainant LAKAS,
represented by Prudencio Jalandoni for LAKAS, Jose B. Roque for UNWU, Cornelio Dizon for MFWU and Augusto
Carreon for MUEWA, the representations of the latter two, however, being expressly subjected by management to
non-recognition. Aside from providing for the immediate lifting of the picket lines, the agreement, more pertinently
provides, to wit,
"4. The management agrees to accept all employees who struck without discrimination or harassment consistent
with an orderly operation of its various plants, provided it is understood that management has not waived and shall
continue to exercise freely its rights and prerogatives to punish, discipline and dismiss its employees in accordance
with law and existing rules and regulations that cases filed in court will be allowed to take their normal course."cralaw
virtua1aw library
By virtue of this agreement, the respondent Marcelo Companies resumed operations and the strikers went back to
work. As found by the respondent court, all strikers were admitted back to work, except four (4) namely, Wilfredo
Jarquio, Leonardo Sakdalan, Jesus Lim and Arlington Glodeviza, who chose not to report for work because of the
criminal charges filed against them before the municipal court of Malabon and because of the administrative
investigation conducted by management in connection with the acts of violence and vandalism committed during the
September 4 strike. Together with Jesus Lim, three other strikers who reported for work and were admitted, namely,
Jose Roque, Alfredo Cabel and Ramon Bataycan, were convicted in said criminal case.
After the resumption of normal business, the management of the respondent Marcelo Companies, the complainant
LAKAS together with the local unions resumed their bargaining negotiations subject to the conditions earlier
mentioned. On October 4, 1967, the parties met and discussed the bargaining unit to be covered by the CBA in case
one is entered into, union shop arrangement, check-off, waiver of the employer of the notice requirement in case of
employees’ separation, separation pay in cash equivalent to 12-days pay for every year of service, retirement plan,
and one or two years duration of the CBA. It was also agreed in that meeting not to negotiate with respect to
respondent Marcelo Tire and Rubber Corporation inasmuch as a CBA had already been entered into by
management with the MUEWA of Paulino Lazaro, the recently certified union in said Respondent.
Finally, on October 13, 1967, the negotiations reached its final stage when the management of respondents Marcelo
Rubber and Latex Products, Inc. and Marcelo Steel Corporation gave the complainant LAKAS a copy of
management’s drafts of the collective bargaining proposals for MFWU and UNWU, respectively.
Unexpectedly and without filing a notice of strike, complainant LAKAS declared another strike against the respondent
Marcelo Companies on November 7, 1967, resulting in the complete paralyzation of the business of said
respondents. Because of this second strike, conciliation conferences were again set by the Conciliation Service
Division of the Department of Labor on November 8, November 23, and December 4, 1967. On the last
aforementioned date, however, neither complainant LAKAS nor the local unions appeared.
Instead, on December 13, 1967, Prudencio Jalandoni of complainant LAKAS, in behalf of the striking unions,
coursed a letter (Exhibit "B") to Jose P. Marcelo of management advising that, "on Monday, December 18, 1967, at
7:00 o’clock in the morning, all your striking workers and employees will return to work under the same terms and
conditions of employment before the strike." The letter was attested to by Cornelio Dizon for MFWU, Jose Roque for
UNWU and Augusto Carreon for MUEWA. On December 15, 1967, the Bureau of Labor Relations was informed by
the complainant LAKAS who requested for the Bureau’s representative to witness the return of the strikers to their
jobs.
The records reveal that in the meantime, prior to December 13, 1967, some of the strikers started going back to work
and were admitted; and that as early as December 4, 1967, the management started posting notices at the gates of
the respective premises of the respondents for strikers to return back to work. Similar notices were also posted on
December 18 and December 27, 1967.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
Upon their return, the reporting strikers were requested to fill up a certain form (Exhibit "49") wherein they were to
indicate the date of their availability for work in order that they may be scheduled. According to the respondent
Marcelo Companies, this requirement was asked of the strikers for legitimate business reasons within management
prerogative. Several of the strikers filled up the required form and were accordingly scheduled for work. The
remaining others, led and supported by complainant LAKAS, refused and insisted that they be all admitted back to
work without complying with the aforestated requirement, alleging that the same constituted a "screening" of the
striking workers. As matters stood, Management refused to forego the requirement; on the other hand, the remaining
strikers demanded to be re-admitted without filing up the form for scheduling.
These then constitute the factual background when the complainant LAKAS, represented by its counsel, Atty.
Benjamin C. Pineda, on December 26, 1967, filed before the respondent court a charge for unfair labor practice
against the respondent Marcelo Companies, alleging non-readmission of the striking members of the three (3)
affiliated local unions despite the unconditional offer to return to work after the strike of November 7, 1967. Based on
the allegations of the foregoing charge and after a preliminary investigation conducted by the acting Prosecutor of
said respondent court, the acting Chief Prosecutor, Atty. Antonio Tria Tirona, filed on February 12, 1968 the instant
complaint under authority of Section 5(b) of Republic Act 875, otherwise known as the Industrial Peace Act.
The Complaint below alleges, among others, to wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1. That complainant is a legitimate labor organization, with its affiliates, namely: Marcelo Free Workers Union,
United Nail Workers Union, and Marcelo United Employees Unions, whose members listed in Annexes "A", "B", and
"C" of this complaint are considered employees of respondent within the meaning of the Act;
"2. . . .
x x x
"3. That individual complainants listed in Annexes "A", "B", and "C" of this complaint are members of the Marcelo
United Employees and Workers Association, Marcelo Free Workers Union, and United Nail Workers Union,
respectively; that the members of the Marcelo United Employees and Workers Union are workers of respondent
Marcelo Tire and Rubber Corporation; that the members of the Marcelo Free Workers Union compose the workers of
the Marcelo Rubber and Latex Products, Polaris Marketing Corporation, and the members of the United Nail Workers
Union compose the workers of the Marcelo Steel Corporation (Nail Plant);
"4. That each of the aforesaid local unions, before their affiliation with the complainant union LAKAS, had a collective
bargaining agreement with respondents; that after the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement above-
mentioned and after the above-mentioned local unions affiliated with the complainant LAKAS, the said federation
sent to respondents’ president, Jose P. Marcelo, on May 23, 1967, a letter, requesting for a negotiation for collective
bargaining, together with union proposals thereof, but respondents refused;
"5. That after respondents knew of the affiliation of the aforementioned local unions with the LAKAS, the said
respondents, thru their officers and agents began harassing the union members, discriminated against them by
transferring some of its officers and members from one section to another in such a way that their work was reduced
to manual labor, and by suspending them without justifiable cause, in spite of long years of service with said
7
respondents;
"6. That as a result of the abovementioned unfair labor practice of respondents, and after complainant sent
communication thereto, protesting against the acts of the above-mentioned, complainant decided to stage a strike on
September 4, 1967, after filing a notice of strike with the Department of Labor;
"7. That on September 14, 1967, however, Jose P. Marcelo, and Jose A. Delfin, president and vice-president of the
respondents, respectively, on one hand and the presidents of the three local unions above-mentioned and the
national president of complainant union on the other, entered into a Return-to-Work Agreement, providing among
others, as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"4. The management agrees to accept all employees who struck without discrimination or harassment consistent
with an orderly operation of its various plants provided it is understood that management has not waived and shall
continue to exercise freely its rights and prerogatives to punish, discipline and dismiss its employees in accordance
with law and existing rules and regulations and that cases filed in Court will be allowed to take their normal course.’
"8. That, contrary to the above Return-to-Work agreement, and in violation thereof, respondents refused to admit the
members of the three striking local unions; that in admitting union members back to work, they were screened in
spite of their long employment with respondent, but respondents gave preference to the casual employees;
"9. That, because of the refusal of the respondents to accept some union members, in violation of the above-
mentioned Return-to-Work agreement and refusal of respondents to bargain in good faith with complainant, the
latter, together with the members of the three local unions above-mentioned, again staged a strike on November 7,
1967;
"10. That on December 13, 1967, complainant sent a letter to respondents that the members of the striking unions
above-mentioned offered to return to work on December 18, 1967 without any condition, but respondents likewise
refused, and still continue to refuse to reinstate them up to the present;
"11. That hereto attached are the list of names of the members of the three local unions above-mentioned who were
not admitted back to work by respondents, marked as Annexes "A", "B", and "C" and made as an integral part of this
complaint;
"12. That the union members listed in Annexes "A", "B", and "C" hereof were not able to secure substantial
employment in spite of diligent efforts exerted by them;
"13. That the above unfair labor practice acts of respondents are in violation of Section 4, subsections 1, 4 and 6 in
relation to Sections 13, 14 and 15 of Republic Act No. 875."cralaw virtua1aw library
The complaint prayed "that after due hearing, judgment be rendered, declaring respondents guilty of unfair labor
practice, and
"(a) Ordering respondents to cease and desist from further committing the acts complained of;
"(b) Ordering respondents to comply with the Return-to-Work agreement dated September 14, 1967, and to admit
back to work the workers listed in annexes "A", "B" and "C" hereof, with back wages, without loss of seniority rights
and privileges thereof;
"(c) Ordering respondents to bargain in good faith with complainant union; and
"(d) Granting complainant and its complaining members thereof such other affirmative reliefs and remedies equitable
and proper, in order to effectuate the policies of the Industrial Peace Act."cralaw virtua1aw library
On March 16, 1968, after an Urgent Motion for Extension of Time to File Answer, the respondents filed their Answer
denying the material allegations of the Complaint and alleging as affirmative defenses,
"I. That the Collective Bargaining Agreement between respondent Marcelo Steel Corporation and the United Nail
Workers Union expired on March 15, 1967; The Collective Bargaining Agreement between the United Rubber
Workers Union (which eventually became the Marcelo Free Workers Union) and the respondent Marcelo Rubber and
Latex Products, Inc., expired on June 5, 1967; the Collective Bargaining Agreement between Marcelo Camelback
Tire and Foam Union and the Marcelo Tire and Rubber Corporation expired on June 5, 1967;
"II. That on May 23, 1967, one Mr. Prudencio Jalandoni of complainant addressed a communication to Mr. Jose P.
Marcelo of respondents informing him of the alleged affiliation of the Marcelo United Labor Union with complainant
and submitting a set of collective bargaining proposal to which counsel for respondents replied suggesting that a
petition for certification election be filed with the Court of Industrial Relations in view of the several demands for
representation recognition;
"III. That the transfers of workers from one job to another were made in accordance with needs of the service.
Respondents afforded union officers and members affected by the transfers the privilege to watch out for vacancies
and select positions they prefer to be in. No suspensions without justifiable cause were made as alleged in the
Complaint;
"IV. That between May 23, 1967, the date of their first demand for negotiations, and September 4, 1967, the start of
the first strike, proposals and counter-proposals were had. Respondents are not aware of whether or not a notice of
strike was filed with the Court of Industrial Relations;
"V. That Mr. Jose P. Marcelo is the President of Marcelo Rubber and Latex Products, Inc., Marcelo Tire and Rubber
Corporation, and Marcelo Steel Corporation, while Mr. Jose A. Delfin is the acting Personnel Manager of respondent
Marcelo Rubber and Latex Products, Inc., Marcelo Tire and Rubber Corporation, Marcelo Steel Corporation and
Marcelo Chemical and Pigment Corporation;
"VI. That respondents did not refuse to admit members of the striking union. Only four (4) workers who had criminal
cases filed against them voluntarily failed to report to the Personnel Department for administrative investigation;
"VII. That after September 14, 1967, all workers of the different respondent corporations returned to work except the
four mentioned in the preceding paragraph hereof who have pending criminal cases; between September 14, 1967,
and November 7, 1967 another strike was declared without justifiable cause;
"VIII. That on November 28, 1967, respondent obtained an injunction from the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Caloocan City Branch, against the illegal picketing of the local unions; in the first week of December, 1967, the
striking workers began returning to work; on December 13, 1967, a letter was received from complainant advising
respondents that its striking workers were calling off, lifting the picket line and returning to work, that from the first
week of December, 1967, respondents invited the striking workers desiring to return to work to fill out an information
sheet stating therein their readiness to work and the exact dates they were available so that proper scheduling could
be done; a number of workers showed no interest in reporting to work; management posted in the Checkpoint,
Bulletin Boards, and the gates notices calling all workers to return to work but a number of workers obviously were
not interested in returning anymore;
"IX. That respondents posted several times lists of names of workers who had not returned to work with the invitation
to return to work, but they did not return to work;
"X. That a number of workers in the list Annexes "A" "B" and "C" have resigned after they found more profitable
employment elsewhere;
"XI. That the local unions referred to in the Complaint if they ever had affiliated with complainant union had
subsequently disaffiliated therefrom;
"XII. That the strikes called and declared by the striking unions were illegal;
"XIII. That the local unions were bargaining in bad faith with respondents,"
and praying for the dismissal of the Complaint as well as for the declaration of illegality of the two (2) strikes called by
the striking unions.
8

Thereafter, the trial commenced. Then on October 24, 1968, a development occurred which gave a peculiar aspect
to the case at bar. A Manifestation and Motion signed by the respective officers and members of the MUEWA,
headed by Paulino Lazaro, was filed by the said union, alleging, to wit,
"1. That the above-entitled case purportedly shows that the Marcelo United Employees and Workers Association is
one of the Complainants being represented by the Petitioner Lakas ng Manggagawang Makabayan (LMM);
"2. That it likewise appears in the above-entitled case that the services of the herein Petitioner was sought by a
certain Augusto Carreon together with his cohorts who are not members of the Marcelo United Employees and
Workers Association much less connected with the Marcelo Tire and Rubber Corporation wherein the Marcelo
United Employees and Workers Association has an existing Collective Bargaining Agreement;
"3. That to set the records of this Honorable Court straight, the undersigned officers and members of the Marcelo
United Employees and Workers Association respectfully manifest that the aforesaid organization has no complaint
whatsoever against any of the Marcelo Enterprises;
"4. . . .
"5. . . ., the Complaint filed by the Petitioner in the above-entitled case in behalf of the Marcelo United Employees
and Workers Association is without authority from the latter and therefore the officers and/or representatives of the
petitioning labor organization should be cited for Contempt of Court;
"6. . . ., the Complaint filed by the Petitioner in the above-entitled case in behalf of the Marcelo United and
Employees and Workers Association should be considered as withdrawn;
x x x"
This was followed by another Manifestation and Motion filed on November 6, 1968 and signed by the officers and
members of the UNWU, headed by its President, Juan Balgos, alleging, to wit,
"1. That the above-entitled case purportedly shows that the United Nail Workers Union is being represented by the
Petitioner Lakas ng Manggagawang Makabayan for the alleged reason that the former is one of the affiliates of the
latter;
"2. That on January 15, 1968, all the Officers and members of the United Nail Workers Union disaffiliated from the
herein Petitioning labor organization for the reason that Petitioning labor organization could not serve the best
interest of the Officers and members of the United Nail Workers Union and as such is a stumbling block to a
harmonious labor-management relations within all the Marcelo enterprises; . . .
"3. That the filing of the above-entitled case by the herein Petitioning labor organization was made over and above
the objections of the officers and members of the United Nail Workers Union;
"4. That in view of all the foregoing, the Officers and members of the United Nail Workers Union do hereby
disauthorize the Petitioner of the above-entitled case (Re: Lakas ng Manggagawang Makabayan) from further
representing the United Nail Workers Union in the above-entitled case;
"5. That in view further of the fact that the filing of the above-entitled case was made over and above the objections
of the Officers and members of the United Nail Workers Union, the latter therefore manifest their intention to cease
and desist as they hereby ceased and desisted from further prosecuting the above-entitled case in the interest of a
harmonious labor-management relation within the Marcelo Enterprises;
x x x"
Likewise, a Manifestation and Motion signed by the Officers and members of the MFWU, headed by its president,
Benjamin Mañaol, dated October 28, 1968 and filed November 6, 1968, stated the same allegations as the
Manifestation and Motion filed by the UNWU quoted above, except that the disaffiliation of the MFWU from LAKAS
was made effective January 25, 1968. The Resolutions of Disaffiliation of both MFWU and UNWU were attached to
these Manifestations.
On November 19, 1968, complainant LAKAS filed an Opposition to these Manifestations and Motions, materially
alleging that, to wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1. That complainants respectfully stated that when Charge No. 2265 was filed on December 26, 1967 in this case,
giving rise to the instant complaint, the alleged officers of the union-movants were not yet officers on the filing of said
Charge No. 2265, . . .
"2. That the alleged officers and members who signed the three (3) Manifestations and Motions are the very
employees who were accepted back to work by the respondents during the strike by the complainants on September
4, 1967 and November 7, 1967, and the said alleged officers and members who signed the said manifestations and
motions are still working up to the present in the establishments of the respondents.
"3. That precisely because of the acceptance back to work of these alleged officers and members of the union-
movants, and the refusal of respondents to accept back to work all the individual complainants in this case
mentioned in Annexes "A", "B" and "C" of the instant complaint, inspite of the offer to return to work by the
complainants herein made to the respondents without any conditions at the time of the strike, as per complainants’
letter of December 13, 1967 (Exh. "B", for the complainants), which fact precisely gave rise to the filing of this case.
x x x
On January 31, 1969, after the submission of their respective Memoranda on the motions asking for the dismissal
and withdrawal of the complaint, the Court of Industrial Relations issued an Order deferring the resolution of the
Motions until after the trial on the merits. To this Order, two separate Motions for Reconsideration were filed by the
respondent companies and the movant-unions, which motions were, however, denied by the court en banc by its
Resolution dated March 5, 1969.
After the trial on the merits of the case, and after submission by the parties of their respective memoranda, the
respondent court rendered on July 20, 1973 the Decision subject of these petitions. On the motions for dismissal or
withdrawal of the complaint as prayed for by MUEWA, UNWU and MFWU, the respondent court denied the same on
the ground that the instant case was filed by the Lakas ng Manggagawang Makabayan for and in behalf of the
individual employees concerned and not for the movants who were not authorized by said individual complainants to
ask for the dismissal. On the merits of the case, while the Decision contained opinions to the effect that the
respondent Marcelo Companies were not remiss in their obligation to bargain, and that the September 4, 1967 strike
as well as the November 7, 1967 strike, were economic strikes, and were, therefore, illegal because of lack of the
required notices of strike before the strikes were declared in both instances, the Decision, nevertheless, on the
opinion that the "procedure of scheduling adopted by the respondents was in effect a screening of those who were to
be readmitted," declared respondent Marcelo Companies guilty of unfair labor practice in discriminating against the
employees named in Annexes "A", "B", and "C" by refusing to admit them back to work while other strikers were
admitted back to work after the strike of November 7, 1967. The dispositive portion of the appealed Decision states,
to wit,
"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, respondents should be, as they are hereby, declared guilty of unfair
labor practice only for the discrimination on terms or conditions of employment as hereinbefore discussed in
connection with the return of the strikers-complainants back to work after the second strike, and, therefore, ordered
to pay the individual complainants appearing in Annexes "A", "B" and "C" of the Complaint, except Arlington
Glodeviza, Jesus Lim, Wilfredo Jarquio, Leonardo Sakdalan, Jose Roque, Alfredo Cabel, and those still working,
were dismissed for cause. whose contracts expired or who had resigned as above indicated, their back wages from
December 18, 1967 but only up to June 29, 1970 when this case was submitted for decision, without reinstatement,
minus their earnings elsewhere for the same period.
"As to those who died without having been reemployed, the back wages shall be from December 18, 1967 up to the
date of their demise, as indicated in the body of this Decision, but not beyond June 20, 1970, likewise less their
9
earnings elsewhere.
"The Chief Auditing Examiner of this Court, or his duly authorized representative, is hereby directed to proceed to the
premises of respondent companies to examine their books, payrolls, vouchers and other pertinent papers or
documents as may be necessary to compute the back wages due the individual complainant in line with this
Decision, and to submit his Report thereon not later than twenty (20) days after completion of such examination for
further disposition of the Court.
SO ORDERED."cralaw virtua1aw library
On August 9, 1973, counsel for respondent Marcelo Companies filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the above
Decision assigning as errors, to wit,
"I. The trial court erred in not finding that complainant Lakas ng Manggagawang Makabayan (Lakas) has no authority
to file and/or to prosecute the Complaint against respondents in representation of the local unions and/or individual
complainants and/or members of local unions in their individual capacities and in not dismissing the complaint on that
ground upon motions of the local unions concerned and/or their members.
II. The trial court erred in finding that respondent discriminated against individual complainants who were not
readmitted to work after the November 7, 1967 strike while others were able to return to their former employment and
in holding that the procedure adopted by respondents was in effect a screening of those who were readmitted and in
finding respondents guilty of unfair labor practice by reason thereof."cralaw virtua1aw library
On August 14, 1973, the individual complainants who had earlier disauthorized the counsel of record, Atty. Benjamin
Pineda, from further representing them and from amicably settling their claims, on their own behalf filed their
arguments in support of their Motion for Reconsideration, through a newly retained counsel, Atty. Pablo B. Castillon.
Assigned as errors are, to wit,
"I. The findings of the trial court excluding some of the employees from the aforementioned Decision as well as from
the benefits resulting therefrom is not in accordance with law and the facts.
"II. The findings of the trial court declaring the strikes of September 4 and November 7, 1967 as illegal for being an
economic strike is not in accordance with law and the facts adduced in this case.
"III. The Honorable trial court in ordering the reduction of the back wages, without reinstatement, appears to have
departed from the substantial evidence rule and established jurisprudence."cralaw virtua1aw library
By Resolution of January 24, 1974, the Court en banc denied the two (2) Motions for Reconsideration filed by both
the respondent Marcelo Companies and the individual complainants. On February 19, 1974 and on February 20,
1974, both parties filed their respective Notices of Appeals. Hence, these petitions.
In L-38258, the petition filed by complainant Lakas ng Manggagawang Makabayan (LAKAS), the following were
assigned as reversible errors, to wit,
I. The respondent court erred in finding the strikes of September 4 and November 7, 1967 to be economic strikes
and declaring the said strikes illegal for non-compliance with the procedural requirement of Section 14(d) of Republic
Act 875, although its illegality was condoned or waived because of the Return-to-Work agreement on the first strike,
and the discriminatory rehiring of the striking employees after the second strike.
II. The respondent court erred in denying reinstatement to the striking complainants in Case No. 4951-ULP, and
limiting the computation of their backwages from December 18, 1967 to June 29, 1970 only, despite its findings of
unfair labor practice against private respondents herein as a consequence of the discriminatory rehiring of the
striking employees after the November 7, 1967 strike.
III. The respondent court erred in excluding the other individual complainants, except those who are still working,
those who resigned on or before December 18, 1967, and those whose employment contract expired, and denying to
these individual complainants the benefits resulting therefrom.
On the other hand, in L-38260 which is the petition filed by respondents Marcelo Enterprises, Marcelo Tire and
Rubber Corporation, Marcelo Rubber & Latex Products, Marcelo Steel Corporation, Marcelo Chemical & Pigment
Corporation, and Polaris Marketing Corporation, the following is the alleged assignment of errors, to wit,
I. Respondent court erred in not finding that respondent Lakas ng Manggagawang Makabayan (LAKAS) had no
authority to file and/or to prosecute the complaint against the petitioners herein in representation of the local unions
and or individual complainants and/or members of local unions in their individual capacities and in not dismissing the
complaint in Case No. 4951-ULP of respondent court on that ground upon motions of the local unions concerned
and/or their officers and members.
II. Respondent court erred in finding that petitioners herein discriminated against individual complainants in Case No.
4951-ULP of respondent court who were not readmitted to work after the November 7, 1967 strike, while others were
able to return to their former employment and in holding that the procedure adopted by petitioners herein was in
effect a screening of those who were readmitted and in finding petitioners herein guilty of unfair labor practice by
reasons thereof.
III. Respondent court erred in rendering judgment ordering petitioners herein to pay individual complainants in Case
No. 4951-ULP of respondent court backwages from December 18, 1967, to June 29, 1970, minus their earnings
elsewhere, except those who have resigned, those who have been dismissed for cause, those whose contracts have
expired and those who are already working.
IV. Respondent court erred in holding that petitioners herein have waived their right to declare the strikes of
September 4, 1967 and November 7, 1967, illegal.
From the aforecited assignments of errors respectively made in both petitions before Us, We find that there are only
two basic issues posed for Our resolution, viz: (1) whether or not the complaint filed by LAKAS against the Marcelo
Companies can be sustained, in view of the alleged fact that its authority to file and prosecute the same has been
squarely raised in issue at the first instance before the respondent court; and (2) whether or not the Marcelo
Companies are guilty of unfair labor practice, for which they should be made liable for backwages and be obliged to
reinstate the employees appearing in Annexes "A", "B", and "C" of the complaint, taking into consideration the prayer
of LAKAS anent the correct payment of said backwages and the non-exclusion of some employees from the benefits
arising from the appealed Decision.
The first issue poses a procedural question which We shall dwell on after a resolution of the second issue, this latter
issue being of greater significance to the correct determination of the rights of all parties concerned as it treats of the
merits of the present petitions.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
Hence, anent the second issue of whether or not the complaint for unfair labor practice can be sustained, this Court
rules in favor of the respondent Marcelo Companies and consequently, the appealed Decision is reversed. This
reversal is inevitable after this Court has pored through the voluminuous records of the case as well as after applying
the established jurisprudence and the law on the matters raised. We are not unmindful of the plight of the employees
in this case but We consider it oppressive to grant their petition in G.R. No. L-38258 for not only is there no evidence
which shows that the respondent Marcelo Companies were seeking for an opportunity to discharge these employees
for union activities, or to discriminate against them because of such activities, but there is affirmative evidence to
establish the contrary conclusion.
The present controversy is a three-sided conflict, although focus has been greatly placed upon an alleged labor
dispute between complainant LAKAS and the respondent Marcelo Companies. It would bear emphasizing, however,
that what had been patently disregarded by the respondent industrial court and the parties alike, is the fact that
LAKAS had never been the bargaining representative of any and all of the local unions then existing in the
respondent Marcelo Companies.
Contrary to the pretensions of complainant LAKAS, the respondent Marcelo Companies did not ignore the demand
for collective bargaining contained in its letter of June 20, 1967. Neither did the companies refuse to bargain at all.
What it did was to apprise LAKAS of the existing conflicting demands for recognition as the bargaining representative
in the appropriate units involved, and suggested the settlement of the issue by means of the filing of a petition for
10
certification election before the Court of Industrial Relations. This was not only the legally approved procedure but
was dictated by the fact that there was indeed a legitimate representation issue. PSSLU, with whom the existing
CBAs were entered into, was demanding of respondent companies to collectively bargain with it; so was Paulino
Lazaro of MUEWA, J.C. Espinas & Associates for MACATIFU and the MFWU, and the complainant LAKAS for
MULU which we understand is the aggrupation of MACATIFU, MFWU and UNWU. On top of all of these, Jose
Roque of UNWU disauthorized the PSSLU from representing his union; and similarly, Augusto Carreon of
MACATIFU itself informed management as late as July 11, 1967 or after the demand of LAKAS that no group
representing his Union "is not authorized and should not be entertained."cralaw virtua1aw library
Indeed, what We said in Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU) v. The Bureau of Labor Relations, 69
SCRA 132, applies as well to this case.
". . ., in a situation like this where the issue of legitimate representation in dispute is viewed for not only by one
legitimate labor organization but two or more, there is every equitable ground warranting the holding of a certification
election. In this way, the issue as to who is really the true bargaining representative of all the employees may be
firmly settled by the simple expedient of an election."cralaw virtua1aw library
The above-cited case gives the reason for the need of determining once and for all the true choice of membership as
to who should be their bargaining representative, which is that," (E)xperience teaches us, one of the root causes of
labor or industrial disputes is the problem arising from a questionable bargaining representative entering into CBA
concerning terms and conditions of employment."cralaw virtua1aw library
Respecting the issue of representation and the right of the employer to demand reasonable proof of majority
representation on the part of the supposed or putative bargaining agent, the commentaries in Rothenberg on Labor
Relations, pp. 429-431, are forceful and persuasive, thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"It is essential to the right of a putative bargaining agent to represent the employees that it be the delegate of a
majority of the employees and, conversely, an employer is under duty to bargain collectively only when the
bargaining agent is representative of the majority of the employees. A natural consequence of these principles is that
the employer has the right to demand of the asserted bargaining agent proof of its representation of its employees.
Having the right to demonstration of this fact, it is not an ‘unfair labor practice’ for an employer to refuse to negotiate
until the asserted bargaining agent has presented reasonable proof of majority representation. It is necessary
however, that such demand be made in good faith and not merely as a pretext or device for delay or evasion. The
employer’s right is however to reasonable proof . . .
". . . Although an employer has the undoubted right to bargain with a bargaining agent whose authority has been
established, without the requirement that the bargaining agent be officially certified by the National Labor Relations
Board as such, if the informally presented evidence leaves a real doubt as to the issue, the employer has a right to
demand a certification and to refuse to negotiate until such official certification is presented."cralaw virtua1aw library
The clear facts of the case as hereinbefore restated indisputably show that a legitimate representation issue
confronted the respondent Marcelo Companies. In the face of these facts and in conformity with the existing
jurisprudence, We hold that there existed no duty to bargain collectively with the complainant LAKAS on the part of
said companies. And proceeding from this basis, it follows that an acts instigated by complainant LAKAS such as the
filing of the Notice of Strike on June 13, 1967 (although later withdrawn) and the two strikes of September 4, 1967
and November 7, 1967 were calculated, designed and intended to compel the respondent Marcelo Companies to
recognize or bargain with it notwithstanding that it was an uncertified union, or in the case of respondent Marcelo Tire
and Rubber Corporation, to bargain with it despite the fact that the MUEWA of Paulino Lazaro was already certified
as the sole bargaining agent in said respondent company. These concerted activities executed and carried into effect
at the instigation and motivation of LAKAS are illegal and violative of the employer’s basic right to bargain collectively
only with the representative supported by the majority of its employees in each of the bargaining units. This Court is
not unaware of the present predicament of the employees involved but much as We sympathize with those who have
been misled and so lost their jobs through hasty, ill-advised and precipitate moves, We rule that the facts neither
substantiate nor support the finding that the respondent Marcelo Companies are guilty of unfair labor practice.
There are also other facts which this Court cannot ignore. The complaint of LAKAS charge that after their first strike
of September 4, 1967, management and the striking employees entered into a Return-to-Work Agreement but that it
was violated by the respondent companies who "refused to admit the members of the three striking local unions . . .
and gave preference to the casual employees." (No. 8, Complaint). It is also alleged that the strike of November 7,
1967 was staged "because of the refusal of the respondents to accept some union members . . . and refusal of
respondents to bargain in good faith with complainant" (No. 9, Complaint). We find however, that in making these
charges, complainant LAKAS lacked candor, truth and fidelity towards the courts.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
It is a fact found by the respondent court, and as revealed by the records of the case, that the respondent Marcelo
Companies did not violate the terms of the Return-to-Work Agreement negotiated after the first strike. All of the
strikers were admitted back to work except four (4) who opted not to report for work because of the administrative
investigation conducted in connection with the acts of violence perpetrated during the said strike.
It is also evident from the records that the charge of bargaining in bad faith imputed to the respondent companies, is
hardly credible. In fact, such charge is valid as only against the complainant LAKAS. The parties had a total of five
(5) conferences for purposes of collective bargaining. It is worth considering that the first strike of September 4, 1967
was staged less than a week after the fourth CBA conference and without any benefit of any previous strike notice. In
this connection, it must be stated that the notice of strike filed on June 13, 1967 could not have been the strike notice
for the first strike because it was already withdrawn on July 14, 1967. Thus, from these stated facts can be seen that
the first strike was held while the parties were in the process of negotiating. Nor can it be sustained that the
respondent Marcelo Companies bargained in bad faith since there were proposals offered by them, but the
complainant LAKAS stood pat on its position that all of their economic demands should be met and that all of these
demands should be granted in all of the respondent Marcelo Companies. The companies’ refusal to accede to the
demands of LAKAS appears to be justified since there is no showing that these companies were in the same state of
financial and economic affairs. There is reason to believe that the first strike was staged only for the purpose of
compelling the respondent Marcelo Companies to accede to the inflexible demands of the complainant LAKAS. The
records further establish that after the resumption of normal operations following the first strike and the consequent
Return-to-Work Agreement, the striking unions led by complainant LAKAS and the management of the respondent
Marcelo Companies resumed their bargaining negotiations. And that on October 13, 1967, complainant LAKAS sent
the final drafts of the collective bargaining proposals for MFWU and UNWU. The second strike-of November 7, 1967
was then staged immediately after which strike, as before, was again lacking of a strike notice. All of these facts
show that it was complainant LAKAS, and not the respondent Marcelo Companies, which refused to negotiate in the
pending collective bargaining process. All that the facts show is that the bargaining position of complainant LAKAS
was inflexible and that it was in line with this uncompromising attitude that the strikes were declared, significantly
after notice that management did not or could not meet all of their 17-points demand.
Respondent court, upholding the contention of petitioner LAKAS that after the second strike, the respondent Marcelo
Companies, despite the strikers’ unconditional offer to return to work, refused to readmit them without "screening"
which LAKAS insists to be "discriminatory hiring of the striking employees," declared that although the two strikes
were illegal, being economic strikes held in violation of the strike notice requirement, nevertheless held the Marcelo
Companies guilty of unfair labor practice in discriminating against the complaining employees by refusing to readmit
them while other strikers were admitted back to work. We do not agree.
It is the settled jurisprudence that it is an unfair labor practice for an employer not to reinstate, or refuse re-
employment to, members of union who abandon their strike and make unconditional offer to return to work. 1 As
indeed Exhibit "B" presents an unconditional offer of the striking employees to return to work under the same terms
and conditions of employment before the strike, the question then confronting Us is whether or not on the part of the
respondent companies, there was refusal to reinstate or re-employ the strikers.
We find as a fact that the respondent Marcelo Companies did not refuse to reinstate or re-employ the strikers, as a
consequence of which We overrule the finding of unfair labor practice against said companies based on the
erroneous conclusion of the respondent court. It is clear from the records that even before the unconditional offer to
return to work contained in Exhibit "B" was made, the respondent Marcelo Companies had already posted notices for
the strikers to return back to work. It is true that upon their return, the strikers were required to fill up a form (Exhibit
"49") wherein they were to indicate the date of their availability for work. But We are more impressed and are
persuaded to accept as true the contention of the respondent Marcelo Companies that the aforestated requirement
was only for purposes of proper scheduling of the start of work for each returning striker. It must be noted that as a
consequence of the two strikes which were both attended by widespread acts of violence and vandalism, the
businesses of the respondent companies were completely paralyzed. It would hardly be justiciable to demand of the
11
respondent companies to readmit all the returning workers in one big force or as each demanded readmission. There
were machines that were not in operating condition because of long disuse during the strikes. Some of the machines
needed more than one worker to operate them so that in the absence of the needed team of workers, the start of
work by one without his teammates would necessarily be useless, and the company would be paying for his time
spent doing no work. Finally, We take judicial cognizance of the fact that companies whose businesses were
completely paralyzed by major strikes cannot resume operations at once and in the same state or force as before the
strikes.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
But what strikes Us most in lending credence to respondents’ allegation that Exhibit "49" was not meant to screen
the strikers, is the fact that all of the returning strikers who filled up the form were scheduled for work and
consequently started with their jobs. It is only those strikers who refused or failed to fill-up the required form, like the
herein complaining employees, who were not scheduled for work and consequently have not been re-employed by
the respondent Marcelo Companies. Even if there was a sincere belief on their part that the requirement of Exhibit
"49" was a ruse at "screening" them, this fear would have been dispelled upon notice of the fact that each and all of
their co-strikers who filled up the required form were in fact scheduled for work and started to work. The stoppage of
their work was not, therefore, the direct consequence of the respondent companies’ complained act. Hence, their
economic loss should not be shifted to the employer. 2
It was never the state policy nor Our judicial pronouncement that the employees’ right to self-organization and to
engage in concerted activities for mutual aid and protection, are absolute or be upheld under all circumstances.
Thus, in the case of Royal Interocean Lines, Et. Al. v. CIR, 3 We cited these authorities giving adequate panoply to
the rights of employer, to wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The protection of workers’ right to self-organization in no way interfere with employer’s freedom to enforce such
rules and orders as are necessary to proper conduct of his businesses, so long as employer’s supervision is not for
the purpose of intimidating or coercing his employees with respect to their self-organization and representation.
(National Relations Board v. Hudson Motor Car Co., C.C.A., 1942, 123 F 2d. 528)."cralaw virtua1aw library
"It is the function of the court to see that the rights of self-organization and collective bargaining guaranteed by the
Act are amply secured to the employee, but in its effort to prevent the prescribed unfair labor practice, the court must
be mindful of the welfare of the honest employer (Martel Mills Corp. v. M.L.R.L., C.C.A., 1940, 11471 F2d.
264)."cralaw virtua1aw library
In Pagkakaisang Itinataguyod ng mga Manggagawa sa Ang Tibay (PIMA), Eliseo Samson, Et. Al. v. Ang Tibay, Inc.,
Et Al., L-22273, May 16, 1967, 20 SCRA 45, We held that the exaction, by the employer, from the strikers returning
to work, of a promise not to destroy company property and not to commit acts of reprisal against union members who
did not participate in the strike, cannot be considered an unfair labor practice because it was not intended to
discourage union membership. It was an act of a self-preservation designed to insure peace and order in the
employer’s premises. It was also held therein that what the Industrial Peace Act regards as an unfair labor practice is
the discrimination committed by the employer in regard to tenure of employment for the purpose of encouraging or
discouraging union membership.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
In the light of the above ruling and taking the facts and circumstances of the case before Us in relation to the
requirement by the respondent companies in the filling up of Exhibit "49", We hold and rule that the requirement was
an act of self-preservation, designed to effect cost-savings as well as to insure peace and order within their
premises. Accordingly, the petition in G. R. No. L-38258 should be dismissed, it having failed to prove, substantiate
and justify the unfair labor practice charges against the respondent Marcelo Companies.
Now to the procedural question posed in the first issue brought about by the respondent court’s denial of the motions
to withdraw the complaint respectively filed by MUEWA, UNWU and MFWU. In their petition (G.R. L-38260) the
respondent Marcelo Companies maintain that the respondent court erred in not dismissing the complaint even as it
knew fully well that the very authority of LAKAS to represent the labor unions who had precisely disaffiliated from the
LAKAS, was open to serious question and was being ventilated before it. On the other hand, the respondent court
rationalized the denial of the aforestated motions to withdraw by holding that the complaint was filed by LAKAS on
behalf of the individual employees whose names were attached to the complaint and hence, that the local unions
who were not so authorized by these individual employees, cannot withdraw the said complaint. The lower court’s
opinion is erroneous.
Firstly, LAKAS cannot bring any action for and in behalf of the employees who were members of MUEWA because,
as intimated earlier in this Decision, the said local union was never an affiliate of LAKAS. What appears clearly from
the records is that it was Augusto Carreon and his followers who joined LAKAS, but then Augusto Carreon was not
the recognized president of MUEWA and neither he nor his followers can claim any legitimate representation of
MUEWA. Apparently, it is this split faction of MUEWA, headed by Augusto Carreon, who is being sought to be
represented by LAKAS. However, it cannot do so because the members constituting this split faction of MUEWA
were still members of MUEWA which was on its own right a duly registered labor union. Hence, any suit to be
brought for and in behalf of them can be made only by MUEWA, and not LAKAS. It appearing then that Augusto
Carreon and his cohorts did not disaffiliate from MUEWA nor signed any individual affiliation with LAKAS, LAKAS
bears no legal interest in representing MUEWA or any of its members.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad
Nor will the lower court’s opinion be availing with respect to the complaining employees belonging to UNWU and
MFWU. Although it is true, as alleged by LAKAS, that when it filed the charge on December 26, 1967, the officers of
the movant unions were not yet then the officers thereof, nevertheless, the moment MFWU and UNWU separated
from and disaffiliated with LAKAS to again exercise its rights as independent local unions, registered before as such,
they are no longer affiliates of LAKAS, as what transpired here. Naturally, there would no longer be any reason or
occasion for LAKAS to continue representing them. Notable is the fact that the members purportedly represented by
LAKAS constitute the mere minority of the movant unions, as may be inferred from the allegations of the movant
unions as well as the counter-allegations of LAKAS filed below. As such, they cannot prevail or dictate upon the will
of the greater majority of the unions to which they still belong, it appearing that they never disaffiliated from their
unions; or stated in another way, they are bound by the action of the greater majority. 4
In NARIC Workers’ Union v. CIR, 5 We ruled that," (a) labor union would go beyond the limits of its legitimate
purposes if it is given the unrestrained liberty to prosecute any case even for employees who are not members of
any union at all. A suit brought by another in representation of a real party in interest is defective." Under the
uncontroverted facts obtaining herein, the aforestated ruling is applicable, the only difference being that, here, a labor
federation seeks to represent members of a registered local union never affiliated with it and members of registered
local unions which, in the course of the proceedings before the industrial court, disaffiliated from it.
This is not to say that the complaining employees were without any venue for redress. Under the aforestated
considerations, the respondent court should have directed the amendment of the complaint by dropping LAKAS as
the complainant and allowing the suit to be further prosecuted in the individual names of those who had grievances.
A class suit under Rule 3, Section 12 of the Rules of Court is authorized and should suffice for the purpose.
In fairness to the complaining employees, however, We treated their Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision
subject of appeal as curing the defect of the complaint as the said motion expressly manifested their collective desire
to pursue the complaint for and in their own behalves and disauthorizing LAKAS’ counsel from further representing
them. And We have also treated their petition before Us in the same manner, disregarding the fact that LAKAS
remained the petitioning party, as it appears from the verification that the petition in L-38258 was for and in behalf of
the complaining employees. The merits of their petition, however, fall short of substantiating the charge of unfair
labor practice against the respondent Marcelo Companies. On the other hand, the appeal of the Marcelo Companies
in L-38260 must be upheld and sustained.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
WHEREFORE, upon the foregoing considerations, the petition in L-38258 is dismissed and the petition in L-38260 is
granted. The decision of the Court of Industrial Relations is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new
judgment is rendered holding that the respondent Marcelo Companies are not guilty of unfair labor practice.
No Costs.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 91915. September 11, 1992.]
12
DIVINE WORD UNIVERSITY OF TACLOBAN, Petitioner, vs. SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT and
DIVINE WORD UNIVERSITY EMPLOYEES UNION-ALU,Respondents.
Assailed in this petition for certiorari for being violative of the "constitutional right of employees to self-organization
which includes the right to form, join or assist labor organizations of their own choosing for purposes of collective
bargaining," 1 are the Orders of May 23, 1989 and January 17, 1990 issued by then Secretary of Labor and
Employment Franklin H. Drilon and Acting Secretary of Labor and Employment Dionisio D. de la Serna, respectively.
Culled from the records are the following facts which led to the filing of the instant petition:
On September 6, 1984, Med-Arbiter Bienvenido C. Elorcha certified the Divine Word University Employees Union
(DWUEU) as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the Divine Word University (University for brevity). On March
7, 1985, DWUEU submitted its collective bargaining proposals. On March 26, 1985, the University replied and
requested a preliminary conference to be held on May 28, 1985. However, two days before the scheduled
conference or on May 26, 1985, DWUEU's resigned vice-president Mr. Brigido Urminita (or Urmeneta) wrote a letter
addressed to the University unilaterally withdrawing the CBA proposals. Consequently, the preliminary conference
was cancelled. 2
After almost three years, or on March 11, 1988, DWUEU, which had by then affiliated with the Associated Labor
Union, 3 requested a conference with the University for the purpose of continuing the collective bargaining
negotiations. 4 Not having heard from the University, DWUEU-ALU sent a follow-up letter on March 23, 1988
reiterating its request for a conference and warning the University against committing acts of interference through its
various meetings with both the academic and non-academic employees regarding their union affiliation and activities.
Despite the letter, the University persisted in maintaining silence.
On April 25, 1988, DWUEU-ALU filed with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board of the Department of Labor
and Employment a notice of strike on the grounds of bargaining deadlock and unfair labor practice acts, specifically,
refusal to bargain, discrimination and coercion on (sic) employees. 5 The conferences which were held after the filing
of the notice of strike led to the conclusion of an agreement between the University and DWUEU-ALU on May 10,
1888 with the following terms:
"1. Union will submit their (sic) CBA proposals on Friday, May 13, 1988 for whatever action management will take.
2. Union and management agrees (sic) to sit down and determine (sic) the number of employees that will represent
their bargaining unit.
3. Conciliation proceedings is (sic) temporarily suspended until the parties inform this office of further development.
4. The issues of discrimination: re Ms. Colinayo and Ms. Cinco Flores is settled.
5. Issue (sic) on coercion and refusal to bargain shall be subject of continuing dialogue.
6. Atty. Jacinto shall be given 10 days notice in the next conciliation meeting." 6
However, it turned out that an hour before the May 10, 1988 agreement was concluded, the University had filed a
petition for certification election with the Region VIII office of the Department of Labor and Employment. 7
On the other hand, on May 19, 1988, DWUEU-ALU, consonant with the agreement, submitted its collective
bargaining proposals. These were ignored by the University. Thereafter, through the National Conciliation and
Mediation Board (NCMB) of Region VIII, marathon conciliation conferences were conducted but to no avail. Hence,
on August 25, 1988, then Secretary of Labor Franklin M. Drilon, exercising his powers under Art. 263(g) of the Labor
Code, issued an Order assuming jurisdiction over the labor dispute and directing all striking workers to report back to
work within twenty-four (24) hours and the management to accept them back under the same terms and conditions
prevailing prior to the work stoppage. The Secretary also designated the NCMB to hear the case and to submit its
report thereon. 8
On the same day, Med-Arbiter Rodolfo S. Milado, acting on the University's petition for certification election, issued
an Order directing the conduct of a certification election to be participated in by DWUEU-ALU and "no union," after
he found the petition to be "well-supported in fact and in law." 9
Said Order prompted the DWUEU-ALU to file with the Secretary of Labor an urgent motion seeking to enjoin Milado
from further acting on the matter of the certification election. On September 20, 1988, the Labor Secretary granted
said motion and directed Milado to hold in abeyance any and all certification election proceedings at the University
pending the resolution of the labor dispute. 10 The Labor Secretary's Order, predicated on his extraordinary powers
under Art. 263 (g) of the Labor Code, conformed with this Court s Resolution of October 29, 1987 in the Bulletin
Today cases (G.R. Nos. 79276 and 79883) where the issue of strong disagreement among the parties on the
question of representation was deemed subsumed in the labor dispute certified for compulsory arbitration. The
Secretary added:
"Underscoring the necessity to conform with this settled doctrine is the fact that the dispute over which this Office
assumed jurisdiction arose from the alleged continued refusal by the University to negotiate a CBA with the Union
despite the latter's certification as exclusive bargaining agent in 1984. Necessarily related thereto is the
representativity issue raised by the University in its certification election petition. The resolution of these issues in
one proceeding is, in the words of the Supreme Court, 'meet and proper in view of the very special circumstances
obtaining in this case, and will prevent split jurisdiction and that multiplicity of proceedings which the law abhors' (24
December 1987 [should be December 17, 1987] resolution of the Supreme Court in the Bulletin Today cases,
supra).
Moreover, to allow a certification election to proceed at this point in time might further rupture the already strained
labor-management relations pervading at the University. The assumption order issued by this Office merely served
as a temporary bond to hold together such a fragile relationship. More importantly, the projected election hastily
decreed would preempt the proper resolution of the issues raised and pursued so zealously by the employees that
prompted them to stage their strike." 11
The NCMB of Region VIII conducted hearings on the case from October 17-18, 1988. On October 26, 1988, the
Divine Word University Independent Faculty and Employees Union (DWUIFEU), which was registered earlier that
day, filed a motion for intervention alleging that it had "at least 20% of the rank and file employees" of the University.
12
Exercising once again his extraordinary powers under Art. 263(g) of the Labor Code, the Secretary consolidated "the
entire labor dispute including all incidents arising therefrom, or necessarily related thereto" in his Order of May 23,
1989 13 and the following cases were "subsumed or consolidated to the labor dispute": the petition for certification
election docketed as MED-ARB-Case No. 5-04-88, the DWUEU's complaint docketed as NLRC Case No. 8-0321-88,
and the University's complaint docketed as NLRC Case No. 8-0323-88. Thus, in said Order of May 23, 1989, the
Secretary of Labor resolved these issues: "(1) whether there was refusal to bargain and an impasse in bargaining;
(2) whether the complaints for unfair labor practices against each other filed by both parties, including the legality of
the strike with the NLRC, which later on was subsumed by the assumption Order, are with merits; and, (3) whether or
not the certification election can be passed upon by this Office."
On the first issue, the Secretary of Labor said:
"It is a matter of record that when the Union filed its Notice of Strike (Exh. A) two of the issues it raised were
bargaining deadlock and refusal to bargain. It is also worth mentioning that the CBA proposals by the Union were
submitted on March 7, 1985 (Exh. 9) after Med-Arbiter Bienvenido Elorcha issued a certification election Order dated
September 6, 1984 (Exh. 4). An examination of the CBA proposals submitted by the Union of the University showed
there was (sic) some negotiations that has (sic) taken place as indicated on the handwritten notations made in the
CBA proposal (Exh. F). The said proposals include among others, union scope, union recognition, union security,
union rights, job security, practices and privileges, terms and conditions of work, leave of absence, hours of work,
compensation salary and wages, workers' rights and safety, workers' education, retirement longevity pay, strike and
lockouts and grievance machinery.
The said CBA proposals were indorsed by DWU President to Atty. Generosa R. Jacinto, Divine Word University legal
13
counsel together with a copy of the Union CBA proposals. The submission of the CBA proposals and the reply letter
of the DWU counsel, dated March 26, 1985 to the Union indicated that the CBA negotiations process was set into
motion. DWU's counsel even suggested that the preliminary conference between the union and the university be
scheduled on 28 May 1985 at 2:30 P.M. which unfortunately did not take place due to the alleged withdrawal of the
CBA proposals.
Undeniably, the Union and the DWU have not been able to conclude a CBA since its certification on 6 September
1984 by then Med-Arbiter Bienvenido Elorcha. But the non-conclusion of a CBA within one year, as in this case,
does not automatically authorize the holding of a certification election when it appears that a bargaining deadlock
issue has been submitted to conciliation by the certified bargaining agent. The records show that the Notice of Strike
was filed by the Union on 25 April 1988, citing bargaining deadlock as one of the grounds (Annex '1'), while the
Petition for Certification Election was filed by the DWU on 10 May 1988. The filing of the notice of strike was
precipitated by the University's act of not replying to the Union's letters of March 11 and March 23, 1988.
This being the case, Section 3, Rule V, Book V of the Rules Implementing the Labor Code applies and we quote:
'Sec. 3. When to file. In the absence of a collective bargaining agreement submitted in accordance with Article 231 of
the Code, a petition for certification election may be filed at any time. However, no certification election may be held
within one year from the date of issuance of declaration of a final certification election result. Neither may a
representation question be entertained it (sic) before the filing of a petition for certification election, a bargaining
deadlock to which an incumbent or certified bargaining agent is a party has been submitted to conciliation or
arbitration or had become the subject of a valid notice of strike or lockout.'
Clearly, a bargaining deadlock exists and as a matter of fact this is being conciliated by the National Conciliation and
Mediation Board at the time the University filed its Petition for Certification Election on 10 May 1988. In fact the
deadlock remained unresolved and was in fact mutually agreed upon to be conciliated further by the NCMB as per
items 1 and 5 of the 'Agreement' (Exhibit 'L').
The aforequoted rule clearly barred the Med-Arbiter from further entertaining the petition for certification election.
Furthermore, the various communications sent to the University by the Union prior to the filing of the notice of strike
was enough opportunity for the former to raise the issue of representation if it really casts doubt to the majority status
of the Union. More importantly, if DWU indeed doubted the status of the union, how come it entered into an
agreement with the latter on May 10, 1988. Apparently, the move to file the petition on the same day was an
afterthought on the part of the University which this Office considers as fatal." 14
The same Order dismissed not only the case filed by DWUEU-ALU for unfair labor practice on the ground of the
union's failure to prove the commission of the unfair labor practice acts specifically complained of (NLRC Case No.
8-0321-88) but also the complaint filed by the University for unfair labor practices and illegal strike for "obvious lack
of merit brought about by its utter failure to submit evidence" (NLRC Case No. 8-0323-88).
Citing the Bulletin Today cases, the said Order pronounced as untenable the University s claim that the assumption
Order earlier issued by the Office of the Secretary of Labor merely held in abeyance the holding of a certification
election and that the representation issue was not deemed consolidated by virtue of the said assumption Order.
Accordingly, the Order has this dispositive portion:
"WHEREFORE, ALL THE FOREGOING PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Divine Word University of Tacloban and the
Divine Word University Employees Union are hereby directed to enter into a collective bargaining agreement by
adopting the Union's CBA proposals sent to the DWU President on 19 May 1988 (Exhibit '6'). DWU is hereby warned
that any unwarranted delay in the execution of the collective bargaining agreement will be construed as an unfair
labor practice act. Moreover, the petition for certification election filed by the University is hereby dismissed for lack
of merit and the Order of Med-Arbiter Rodolfo Milado set aside. Likewise, NLRC CASES Nos. 8-0321-88 and 8-0323
filed by the Union and the DWU, respectively, are hereby dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED." 15
The University filed a motion for the reconsideration of said Order. It was opposed by the DWUEU-ALU. However,
since on May 5, 1989 the DWUEU-ALU had filed a second notice of strike charging the University with violation of
the return-to-work order of the Secretary of Labor and unfair labor practices such as dismissal of union officers,
coercion of employees and illegal suspension, 16 the Office of the Secretary called for a series of conciliation and
mediation conferences between the parties. At the July 5, 1989 conference, the University agreed to submit its
proposals on how to settle amicably the labor dispute on or before July 17, 1989.
On said date, however, the University failed to appear. Instead, its representative phoned in a request for the
resetting of the conference purportedly because its Board of Directors had failed to muster a quorum. Hence, after so
informing ALU's Eastern Visayas Vice-President, the conference was rescheduled for July 19, 1989. The University
once again failed to appear.
In view of the University's intransigence, the DWUEU-ALU pursued its second notice of strike on November 24,
1989. Four days later, the University filed with the Office of the Secretary of Labor a motion praying that said Office
assume jurisdiction over the dispute or certify the same to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration on the ground that
the strike affected not only the University but also its other academic and non-academic employees, the students and
their parents. On December 4, 1989, the Office of the Secretary of Labor received a Resolution passed by the
students of the University urging said Office's assumption of jurisdiction over the labor dispute and the earliest
resolution of the case.
Consequently, on December 29, 1989, Secretary Drilon issued an Order reiterating the August 28, 1988 Order which
assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute. He ordered all striking workers to return to work within 24 hours and the
University to accept them back under the same terms and conditions of employment; deemed the issues raised in
the May 5, 1989 notice of strike as "subsumed in this case"; ordered the Director of Regional Office No. VIII to hear
the issues raised in said notice of strike and to submit his findings and recommendations within ten days from
submission of the case by the parties, and enjoined the parties to cease and desist from any act that may "aggravate
the employer-employee relationship."
On January 17, 1990, Acting Secretary of Labor Dionisio L. de la Serna, "dismissed" for lack of merit the University's
motion for reconsideration and affirmed the Order of May 23, 1989. He noted the fact that the March 7, 1985
collective bargaining proposals of the DWUEU had not been validly withdrawn as the union's Vice-President had
resigned and the withdrawal was signed only by three of the eight members of the Executive Board of said union.
Granting that the withdrawal was valid, the Acting Secretary believed that it did not "exculpate the University from the
duty to bargain with the Union" because the collective bargaining processes had been "set in motion from the time
the CBA proposals was (sic) received by the University until the impasse took place on account of its failure to reply
to the Union's letters pursuing its CBA Proposals dated March 11 and 23, 1988."
On the University's assertion that no negotiations took place insofar as the March 7, 1985 collective bargaining
proposals are concerned, the Acting Secretary found that:
". . . The records indicate otherwise Conciliation meetings were conducted precisely to discuss the CBA proposals
the Union submitted to the University on March 7, 1985. As a matter of fact, the University admitted the existence of
the deadlock when a provision was incorporated in the agreement it signed on May 10, 1988 with the Union which
reads:
'a. That on the matter of Bargaining Deadlock —
1. Union will submit their (renewed) CBA proposals on Friday May 13, 1988 for whatever action management will
take.
2. Union and Management agree to sit down and determine the number of employees that will represent (constitute)
their bargaining unit;
xxx xxx xxx'
On account of the deadlock regarding the March 7, 1985 CBA proposals, it was agreed that the Union submit a
renewed CBA proposal which it did on May 19, 1988. The records indicate that no response was made by the
University. The uncooperative posture of the University to respond and continue with the negotiations could very well
be explained when one (1) hour prior to the start of the conciliation on May 10, 1988, the University filed a Petition for
14
Certification with (sic) Regional Office. The surreptitious filing of the petition and at the same time cunningly entering
into an agreement which required the Union to submit a renewed CBA proposal, is patently negotiating in bad faith.
The University should have candidly and timely raised the issue of representation, if it believed that such issue was
valid, not by entering into an agreement. The May 10, 1988 Agreement only served to falsely heighten the
expectations of the Union and this Office that a mutually acceptable settlement of the dispute was in the offing. This
Office cannot tolerate such actuations by the University." 17
The Acting Secretary then concluded that for reneging on the agreement of May 10, 1988 and for its "reluctance and
subscription to legal delay," the University should be "declared in default." He also maintained that since under the
circumstances the University cannot claim deprivation of due process, the Office of the Secretary of Labor may
rightfully impose the Union's May 19, 1988 collective bargaining agreement proposals motu proprio. On the
University's contention that the motion for intervention of the DWU-IFEU was not resolved, the Acting Secretary ruled
that said motion was in effect denied when the petition for certification election filed by the University was dismissed
in the Order of May 23, 1989.
Hence, the University had recourse to instant petition.
In its petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction filed on February 9, 1990, the University raises
as grounds therefor the following:
"A. Respondent Secretary committed grave and patent abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing
his order dated 17 January 1990 finally denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration in the face of the order dated
29 December 1989 and subsequent acts of DOLE official subsuming the second notice of strike with the first notice
of strike.
B. In the absence of a certified CBA and there having been no certification election held in petitioner unit for more
than five (5) years, a certification election is mandatory.
C. Respondent Secretary committed grave and patent abuse of discretion in issuing his orders dated 23 May 1989
and 17 January 1990 disregarding evidence on record, provisions of law and established jurisprudence.
D. Petitioner was denied due process." 18
Citing the dispositive portion of the December 29, 1989 Order of the Secretary of Labor which states that the issues
raised in the May 5, 1989 notice of strike "are ordered subsumed in this case" and elaborating on the meaning of the
word "subsume," i.e., "to include within a larger class, group, order, etc.," 19 the petitioner University argues that the
Secretary of Labor "cannot resolve petitioner's and (intervenor) DWU-IFEU's motions for reconsideration (in the NS.
1) of the Order dated 23 May 1989 until the proceedings in the subsumed NS. 2 are terminated." It opines that since
the Regional Director is an extension of the Secretary of Labor, the latter should have waited for the recommendation
of the former on the issues in notices of strike nos. 1 and 2 before the he issued the Order of January 17, 1990.
We agree with the Acting Secretary of Labor's observation that the action for intervention had in effect been denied
by the dismissal of the petition for certification election in the May 23, 1989 Order. The sub silencio treatment of the
motion for intervention in said Order does not mean that the motion was overlooked. It only means, as shown by the
findings of facts in the same Order, that there was no necessity for the holding of a certification election wherein the
DWU-IFEU could participate. In this regard, petitioner's undue interest in the resolution of the DWU-IFEU's motion for
intervention becomes significant since a certification election is the sole concern of employees except where the
employer itself has to file a petition for certification election. But once an employer has filed said petition, as the
petitioner did in this case, its active role ceases and it becomes a mere bystander. Any uncalled-for concern on the
part of the employer may give rise to the suspicion that it is batting for a company union. 20
Petitioner's contention that the Acting Secretary of Labor should have deferred the issuance of the Order of January
17, 1990 until after his receipt of the Regional Director's recommendation on the notices of strike is, under the
circumstances, untenable. Ideally, a single decision or order should settle all controversies resulting from a labor
dispute. This is in consonance with the principle of avoiding multiplicity of suits. However, the exigencies of a case
may also demand that some matters be threshed out and resolved ahead of the others. Any contrary interpretation of
the Secretary of Labor's powers under Art. 263(g) of the Labor Code on this matter would only result in confusion
and delay in the resolution of the manageable aspects of the labor dispute.
In this case, resolution of the motion for reconsideration at the earliest possible time was urgently needed to set at
rest the issues regarding the first notice of strike, the certification election and the unfair labor practice cases filed by
the University and the DWUEU-ALU. The nature of the business of the University demanded immediate and effective
action on the part of the respondent public officials. Otherwise, not only the contending parties in the dispute would
be adversely affected but more importantly, the studentry and their parents. It should be emphasized that on January
17, 1990, the second notice of strike could not have been resolved as yet considering that at that time, Regional
Director Teddy S. Cabeltes was still conducting the conference between the parties in pursuance of the directive in
the Order of December 19, 1989. The Secretary, or for that matter, the Acting Secretary, could not have intended the
efforts of the Regional Director to be inutile or fruitless. Thus, when he set aside the issues raised in the second
notice of strike, the Acting Secretary was acting in accordance with the exigencies of the circumstances of the case.
Hardly can it be said to be an abuse of his discretion.
On the issue of whether or not a certification election should have been ordered by the Secretary of Labor, pertinent
are the following respective provisions of the Labor Code and Rule V, Book V of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of the same Code:
"ART. 258. When an employer may file petition. — When requested to bargain collectively, an employer may petition
the Bureau for an election. If there is no existing certified collective bargaining agreement in the unit, the Bureau
shall, after hearing, order a certification election.
All certification cases shall be decided within twenty (20) working days.
The Bureau shall conduct a certification election within twenty (20) days in accordance with the rules and regulations
prescribed by the Secretary of Labor.
Sec. 3. When to file. — In the absence of a collective bargaining agreement duly registered in accordance with
Article 231 of the Code, a petition for certification election may be filed at any time. However, no certification election
may be held within one year from the date of issuance of a final certification election result. Neither may a
representation question be entertained if, before the filing of a petition for certification election, a bargaining deadlock
to which an incumbent or certified bargaining agent is a party had been submitted to conciliation or arbitration or had
become the subject of valid notice of strike or lockout. (Emphasis supplied)
If a collective bargaining agreement has been duly registered in accordance with Article 231 of the Code, a petition
for certification election or a motion for intervention can only be entertained within sixty (60) days prior to the expiry
date of such agreement."
These provisions make it plain that in the absence of a collective bargaining agreement, an employer who is
requested to bargain collectively may file a petition for certification election any time except upon a clear showing
that one of these two instances exists: (a) the petition is filed within one year from the date of issuance of a final
certification election result or (b) when a bargaining deadlock had been submitted to conciliation or arbitration or had
become the subject of a valid notice of strike or lockout.
While there is no question that the petition for certification election was filed by the herein petitioner after almost four
years from the time of the certification election and, therefore, there is no question as to the timeliness of the petition,
the problem appears to lie in the fact that the Secretary of Labor had found that a bargaining deadlock exists.
A "deadlock" is defined as the "counteraction of things producing entire stoppage: a state of inaction or of
neutralization caused by the opposition of persons or of factions (as in government or a voting body): standstill." 21
There is a deadlock when there is a "complete blocking or stoppage resulting from the action of equal and opposed
forces; as, the deadlock of a jury or legislature." 22 The word is synonymous with the word impasse 23 which, within
the meaning of the American federal labor laws, "presupposes reasonable effort at good faith bargaining which,
despite noble intentions, does not conclude in agreement between the parties." 24
A thorough study of the records reveals that there was no "reasonable effort at good faith bargaining" specially on
the part of the University. Its indifferent attitude towards collective bargaining inevitably resulted in the failure of the
15
parties to arrive at an agreement. As it was evident that unilateral moves were being undertaken only by the
DWUEU-ALU, there was no "counteraction" of forces or an impasse to speak of. While collective bargaining should
be initiated by the union, there is a corresponding responsibility on the part of the employer to respond in some
manner to such acts. This is clear from the provisions of the Labor Code Art. 250(a) of which states:
"ART. 250. Procedure in collective bargaining. — The following procedures shall be observed in collective
bargaining:
(a) When a party desires to negotiate an agreement, it shall serve a written notice upon the other party with a
statement of its proposals. The other party shall make a reply thereto not later than ten (10) calendar days from
receipt of such notice.
(b) Should differences arise on the basis of such notice and reply, either party may request for a conference which
shall begin not later than ten (10) calendar days from the date of request.
(c) If the dispute is not settled, the Board shall intervene upon request of either or both parties or at its own initiative
and immediately call the parties to conciliation meetings. The Board shall have the power to issue subpoenas
requiring the attendance of the parties to such meetings. It shall be the duty of the parties to participate fully and
promptly in the conciliation meetings the Board may call;
(d) During the conciliation proceedings in the Board, the parties are prohibited from doing any act which may disrupt
or impede the early settlement of the disputes; and
(e) The Board shall exert all efforts to settle disputes amicably and encourage the parties to submit their case to a
voluntary arbitrator."
Considering the procedure outlined above, the Court cannot help but notice that the DWUEU was not entirely
blameless in the matter of the delay in the bargaining process. While it is true that as early as March 7, 1985, said
union had submitted its collective bargaining proposals and that, its subsequent withdrawal by the DWUEU Vice-
President being unauthorized and therefore ineffective, the same proposals could be considered as subsisting, the
fact remains that said union remained passive for three years. The records do not show that during this three-year
period, it exerted any effort to pursue collective bargaining as a means of attaining better terms of employment.
It was only after its affiliation with the ALU that the same union, through the ALU Director for Operations, requested
an "initial conference" for the purpose of collective bargaining. 25 That the DWUEU abandoned its collective
bargaining proposals prior to its affiliation with ALU is further confirmed by the fact that in the aforequoted May 10,
1988 agreement with the University, said Union bound itself to submit a new set of proposals on May 13, 1988.
Under the circumstances, the agreement of May 10, 1988 may as well be considered the written notice to bargain
referred to in the aforequoted Art. 250(a) of the Labor Code, which thereby set into motion the machinery for
collective bargaining, as in fact, on May 19, 1988, DWUEU-ALU submitted its collective bargaining proposals.
Be that as it may, the Court is not inclined to rule that there has been a deadlock or an impasse in the collective
bargaining process. As the Court earlier observed, there has not been a "reasonable effort at good faith bargaining"
on the part of the University. While DWUEU-ALU was opening all possible avenues for the conclusion of an
agreement, the record is replete with evidence on the University's reluctance and thinly disguised refusal to bargain
with the duly certified bargaining agent, such that the inescapable conclusion is that the University evidently had no
intention of bargaining with it. Thus, while the Court recognizes that technically, the University has the right to file the
petition for certification election as there was no bargaining deadlock to speak of, to grant its prayer that the herein
assailed Orders be annulled would put an unjustified premium on bad faith bargaining.
Bad faith on the part of the University is further exemplified by the fact that an hour before the start of the May 10,
1988 conference, it surreptitiously filed the petition for certification election. And yet during said conference, it
committed itself to "sit down" with the Union. Obviously, the University tried to preempt the conference which would
have legally foreclosed its right to file the petition for certification election. In so doing, the University failed to act in
accordance with Art. 252 of the Labor Code which defines the meaning of the duty to bargain collectively as "the
performance of a mutual obligation to meet and convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith." Moreover, by
filing the petition for certification election while agreeing to confer with the DWUEU-ALU, the University violated the
mandate of Art. 19 of the Civil Code that "(e)very person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of
his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith."
Moreover, the University's unscrupulous attitude towards the DWUEU-ALU is also betrayed by its belated
questioning of the status of the said union. The communications between them afforded the University ample
opportunity to raise the issue of representation if indeed it was doubtful of the DWUEU-ALU's status as a majority
union, but it failed to do so. On the other hand, in the agreement of May 10, 1988, the University even agreed "to sit
down and determine the number of employees that will represent their bargaining unit." This clearly indicates that the
University recognized the DWUEU-ALU as the bargaining representative of the employees and is, therefore,
estopped from questioning the majority status of the said union.
Hence, petitioner's contention that the DWUEU-ALU's proposals may not be unilaterally imposed on it on the ground
that a collective bargaining agreement is a contract wherein the consent of both parties is indispensable is devoid of
merit. A similar argument had already been disregarded in the case of Kiok Loy v. NLRC, 26 where we upheld the
order of the NLRC declaring the union's draft CBA proposal as the collective agreement which should govern the
relationship between the parties. Kiok Loy v. NLRC is applicable in the instant case considering that the facts therein
have also been indubitably established in this case. These factors are: (a) the union is the duly certified bargaining
agent; (b) it made a definite request to bargain and submitted its collective bargaining proposals, and (c) the
University made no counter proposal whatsoever. As we said in Kiok Loy, "[a] company's refusal to make counter
proposal if considered in relation to the entire bargaining process, may indicate bad faith and this is especially true
where the Union's request for a counter proposal is left unanswered." 27 Moreover, the Court added in the same
case that "it is not obligatory upon either side of a labor controversy to precipitately accept or agree to the proposals
of the other. But an erring party should not be tolerated and allowed with impunity to resort to schemes feigning
negotiations by going through empty gestures." 28
That being the case, the petitioner may not validly assert that its consent should be a primordial consideration in the
bargaining process. By its acts, no less than its inaction which bespeak its insincerity, it has forfeited whatever rights
it could have asserted as an employer. We, therefore, find it superfluous to discuss the two other contentions in its
petition.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. This decision is immediately executory.
Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[G.R. Nos. L-7594 & L-7596. September 8, 1954.]
INSUREFCO PAPER PULP & PROJECT WORKER’S UNION, PETITIONER, v. SUGAR REFINING
CORPORATION, Respondent.
INSULAR SUGAR REFINING CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. HONORABLE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS and INSUREFCO & PAPER PULP PROJECT WORKER’S UNION, Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. STRIKES; WHEN STRIKE IS ILLEGAL. — A strike declared without giving to the general manager, or the board of
directors of the company, reasonable time within which to consider and act on the demands submitted by the union
is illegal. Likewise, a strike is illegal when it is declared in violation of a collective bargaining agreement especially
when it provides for conclusive arbitration clauses. These agreements must be strictly adhered to and respected if
their ends have to be achieved." (Liberal Labor Union v. Philippine Can Company 91 Phil., 72)
16
2. ID.; ID.; ORDER READMITTING STRIKERS DOES NOT MAKE THE QUESTION OF LEGALITY OF STRIKE
MOOT. — An order issued by the Court of Industrial Relations authorizing the partial resumption of the operation of
the sugar company readmitting to the service all those who took part in the strike, to enable merely the refinery to
carry out its commitment to refine a huge quantity of centrifugal sugar, cannot have the effect of declaring moot the
question of the legality of the strike where such order was issued subject to the express condition that the question
whether the strikers should be allowed to return permanently to work or not should be made subject to the outcome
of the case filed by the company to declare the strike unjustified and illegal.
3. PETITION FOR REVIEW; WHAT QUESTIONS ONLY CAN BE ENTERTAINED. — A question of fact cannot be
taken up in a petition for review. It is a well-settled rule in this jurisdiction that as long as there some evidence to
support a decision of the Court of Industrial Relations, the Supreme Court should not entertain, nor modify or reverse
it, Just because it is not based on overwhelming or preponderant evidence. Its only province is to resolve or pass
upon questions of law.
These two cases concern two petitions for review of the decision rendered by the Court of Industrial Relations on
December 8, 1953 declaring the strike staged by the members of the Insurefco Papers Pulp & Project Workers’
Union hereinafter referred to as Union, on June 14, 1952 unreasonable and illegal and leaving to the discretion of the
management of the Insular Sugar Refining Corporation, hereinafter referred to as Company, the dismissal of those
responsible therefor as listed in Exhibit "T" appearing on page 554-558 of the record of Case No. 283-V of said
court.
The Union interposed the present petition upon the plea that the court committed serious errors in declaring the
strike illegal and in authorizing the management of the Company to dismiss the alleged leaders of the Union at its
discretion, whereas the Company has likewise appealed because the authority did not include other persons who
allegedly had had a direct part in the strike or are deemed also leaders of the movement.
On June 12, 1952, petitioning Union through its leaders submitted to the Company two sets of economic demands,
one for increase in wages, elimination of the rotation system, and enforcement of check- off, and the other containing
proposals with respect to profit - sharing, union representation in the management of the Company, and an option to
purchase the refinery. In the morning of June 14, 1952, a third demand was submitted by the Union in which it
requested for the immediate cessation of the threats, intimidation, and violence being committed by certain thugs,
goons, and gangsters inside the refinery and asking at the same time that gratuities be granted to the laborers
incident to the purchase of the refinery. .
When said demands were submitted to the Chief of the Finance and Legal Division of the Company, the union
delegation was advised that the Acting General Manager of the Company was then absent from Manila and for that
reason no action could be taken on these demands until after his return.
On June 14, 1952, at about 11:30 p.m., the members of the Union, without notice or warning, struck causing the
stoppage and paralization of the operations of the refinery, said members going even to the extent of picketing the
approaches of its compound. Because of this walkout, the Company filed on June 18, 1952 an urgent petition in the
Court of Industrial Relations praying that the strike thus staged be declared unjustified and illegal and that the
Company be authorized to dismiss those responsible for the strike, which petition was docketed as Case No. 707-V.
The Union having failed to file its answer as required by the regulation, the trial of the case proceeded and the
Company was allowed to present its evidence in support of the petition. When the time of the Union came to present
its rebuttal evidence, its counsel asked that it be allowed to set up and prove certain special defenses, which request
was granted. These defenses are: (1) the maulings and acts of violence committed on members of the Union inside
the refinery; (2) the threats, intimidation and violence committed on members of the Union by persons supported,
encouraged, and abetted by company officials; and (3) the existence of a company union in the refinery.
After due trial, and the parties had submitted their memoranda, the Court of Industrial Relations rendered decision
declaring the strike unjustified and illegal and giving discretion to the management of the Company to dismiss from
the service the leaders responsible therefor whose names are listed in Exhibit "T" appearing on pages 554- 558 of
the record of Case No. 283-V. Both parties, being dissatisfied with the decision, interposed the present petition for
review.
Inasmuch as the cases before us concern two petitions for review of a decision of the Court of Industrial Relations
which, by their very nature, merely involve questions of law, the facts of this case as found in the decision are
deemed undisputed and, for the purposes of the issues herein raised, resort to said facts is sufficient. We would,
therefore, quote hereunder the pertinent portion of the decision wherein said facts are
outlined:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"It is clear that Mr. Andres B. Callanta and several others presented exhibits ’B’ and ’C’, the alleged set of demands,
to Mr. Manuel B. Villano, the secretary and treasurer and chief of the Finance and Legal Department of the
PHILSUGIN between 3:00 and 4:00 in the afternoon of June 12, 1952 at the office of the PHILSUGIN at 306
Samanillo Building. Mr. Callanta after asking him when the Acting General Manager of the PHILSUGIN could be
contacted was told that said Acting General Manager together with the chairman of the Board, (the Board being
composed of five members) and two others, were at the time in Bacolod, Negros Occidental, attending a convention
of sugar men Mr. Callanta was advised that the Acting General Manager was expected to arrive before June 17
because the usual meetings of the board was every Wednesday and the following Wednesday would be June 18.
Mr. Callanta was advised that Exhibits ’B’ and ’C’, would be submitted to Mr. Oliveros, the Acting General Manager,
the moment he arrived from Bacolod. Mr. Villano noticed upon receipt of exhibits ’B’ and ’C’ that the same were
dated March 31, 1952. On Monday morning June 15, 1952, Mr. Villano received from Mr. Santiago, the cashier of the
PHILSUGIN, another paper signed by one Mr. Lampiño and marked as exhibits ’S’ or exhibit ’5’ and was submitted
to Mr. Santiago about 11:00 or 12:00 o’clock, Saturday morning, June 14, 1952. This exhibit prayed for the stopping
of the alleged mauling, requested the payment of gratuities to the workers and the information about petty thefts
committed by "extras." It can readily be seen that there was no possibility for the General Manager nor the board of
directors to consider the so-called demands between the time they were presented and the declaration of the strike
— the strike having been declared about 11:30 p.m. on June 14, 1952. The first official knowledge of the would be
strike on that day was when Messrs. Lampiño, Robles, Carrera and De Jesus, officers of the union went to the house
of one of the key officials of the company, Mr. Dominador Salvador, about 10:30 p.m. urging the latter not to report
during his shift that night because there was going to be a strike.
"Exhibit ’S’ of petitioner or ’5’ for respondent which was received as mentioned by the cashier of the company
between 11:00 or 12:00 o’clock Saturday on the morning of June 14, 1952, the day that the strike was declared and
which respondent considered the same as an ultimatum, mentioned no time or warning of the declaration of strike.
The strike was particularly the act of the heads of the barangays whose names appear in exhibit ’T’ in Case No. 283-
V.
"There was no time to consider the alleged demands because the General Manager, the chairman of the Board, and
two others were in Bacolod, and even when the manager was advised by the Superintendent of the corporation at
5:03 a.m. thru a telegram on June 15 of the declaration of the strike, efforts to locate the General Manager in
Bacolod proved futile, perhaps it was because it was Sunday, (Exhibit ’U’). Mr. Callanta, the virtual head of the union,
being the president of the U.I.O. mother union of the respondent union, and the person who advised the emissary of
the union to serve an ultimatum, knew very well that when he for the very first time on June 12, 1952, presented
demands contained in exhibits ’B’ and ’C’ the company officials were not in Manila but elsewhere and would be in
Manila on June 17, and that the board would meet on June 18. There was, therefore, no time for the company thru
its duly constituted authority to consider the alleged demands whether to grant or not the contents of the three sets of
demands presented. Mr. Callanta the man who presented exhibits ’B’ and ’C’, a very intelligent young man, know
that petitioner is a corporation and its activities are supervised and/or controlled by its board. And while it is true that
during the progress of the hearing in court propositions and counter propositions were presented to settle the case
amicably in and out of court, and while it is equally true that the corporation eventually turned down every effort of
amicable settlement, the same could not be taken as the yard stick to conclude, as respondent claimed, that even if
the demands presented were studied and scrutinized by the management within a reasonable time still the same
would be rejected, as in fact they were. Certainly, it is different when a strike is declared before the demands are
studied and presented to the authority that has the final say on the matter, from a strike called after the demands
have been denied upon their consideration. As in this case, the strike has already been declared, and the case
presented in court. The corporation has every right to stand by on its prayer that the strike be declared illegal. For
these reasons, the court considers the strike unreasonable."cralaw virtua1aw library
The question now to be determined is: Has the Court of Industrial Relations gravely abused its discretion, as
17
claimed, in declaring the strike staged by the members of the Union unreasonable, unjustified, and illegal?
It appears that the Union, through its leaders and officials submitted to the management of the Company a set of
demands urging immediate action. These demands were handed over to the Secretary-Treasurer and Chief of the
Finance and Legal Division of the Company on June 12, 1952. At that time the Acting General Manager, together
with the Chairman and two members of the Board of Directors, were absent, having gone to Bacolod City, Negros
Occidental, to attend a conference of sugar men. The leaders of the Union were advised of this fact and were
informed that they would probably be back on June 17, because the usual meeting of the Board was held every
Wednesday and the following Wednesday would be June 18. And in the morning of June 14, 1952, the Union, also
through its leaders, submitted another demand regarding certain maulings and acts of violence being committed
inside the refinery and requesting that they be stopped. And as no immediate action was taken thereon, — but
despite the advice given to them that their demands would be submitted to the Acting General Manager immediately
upon his arrival from Bacolod City, — the leaders of the Union caused its members to declare a strike at about
midnight of June 14, 1952 thereby causing the stoppage and paralization of the operations of the refinery.
It can readily be seen that the walkout was premature as it was declared without giving to the General Manager, or
the Board of Directors of the Company, reasonable time within which to consider and act on the demands submitted
by the Union. The nature of the demands was such that no possible action could be taken thereon by the officials to
whom they were submitted. They could have only been acted upon by the General Manager, or by the Board of
Directors. The former was then in Bacolod, and the latter could not be convened because the chairman and two of its
members were also absent. And this fact was well known to the leaders of the Union. In the circumstances, the only
conclusion that can be drawn is that, as found by the lower court, the strike staged by the Union was unfortunate, as
it is ill-considered, considering the great damage caused to the business of the refinery resulting from the complete
paralization of its operations. The Court of Industrial Relations, therefore, acted rightly in declaring said strike
unjustified and illegal.
One circumstance that should be noted is the fact that a portion of the demands herein involved is but a reaffirmation
of the demands that had been submitted by the Union and which were the subject of a previous case between the
same parties (Case No. 283-V). This case also gave rise to a similar strike which was resolved by a partial
agreement concluded by the parties and wherein, among other things, they included a form of settlement of their
labor disputes of the following tenor:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"VI. That all labor-management disputes shall be taken up in a Grievance Committee consisting of 6 members, 3
from the Insurefco and Paper Pulp Project Workers’ Union and 3 from the management. This committee shall take
charge of investigating any dispute arising between labor and management, after which it shall make its
recommendation to the management which shall have the final say on the matter under consideration. Any matter
submitted to the Grievance Committee shall be decided within four days and the management to take action within
three days from the receipt of the recommendation of the Grievance Committee except when the matter necessitates
the action of the Board, in which case the management should decide the matter within one week from the receipt of
the recommendation of the Grievance Committee." (Exhibits ’D ’D-1’, and ’E’).
Note that the above form of settlement covers all disputes that might arise between labor and management and was
adopted precisely to pave the way for their amicable solution and avert a possible strike on the part of the Union.
This agreement received the sanction of the court. But, far from abiding by this form of arbitration, the Union declared
the instant strike as already pointed out. This infringement constitutes a further justification for the decision reached
by the court a quo. As this court has aptly said: "Strikes held in violation of the terms contained in a collective
bargaining agreement are illegal especially when they provide for conclusive arbitration clauses. These agreements
must be strictly adhered to and respected if their ends have to be achieved." (Liberal Labor Union v. Philippine Can
Company, 92 Phil., 72.)
It is true that the Union submitted a third demand complaining about certain mauling, threats, or intimidation being
committed by certain malefactors inside the refinery, and apparently action on this matter could be taken with out
awaiting the return of the General Manager or the convening to a session of the Board of Directors, but it should be
noted that said demand was submitted at noon of June 14, 1952 and at about midnight of the same day the Union
struck. Even granting that such mauling or intimidation really existed, still we believe that the action taken by the
Union was unjustified it appearing that it has been so sudden that it did not give time to the management to make an
investigation of the complaint. But the truth is, as found by the Court of Industrial Relations, "there is no proof that the
company had any hand in any of the treats, intimidations or mauling incidents as pictured before this court. . . . They
ensued out of petty jealousies existing between the two unions in the company — jealousies which were aimed
solely at one objective, control by one union." These incidents even reached the local courts and at the time the
claim was being considered, they were still pending determination. The court found that this claim is without merit.
The same thing may be said with regard to the claim that the declaration of the strike has become moot in view of the
order of the Court of Industrial Relations issued on March 27, 1953 authorizing the partial resumption of the
operation of the refinery readmitting to the service all those who took part in the strike, for the simple reason that said
order was issued to enable merely the refinery to carry out its commitment to refine a huge quantity of centrifugal
sugar. It appears that the order was issued subject to one express condition, that is, that the question of whether the
strikers should be allowed to return permanently to work or not should be made subject to the outcome of that case.
It is obvious that that order of March 27, 1953 cannot have the effect of declaring moot the question of the legality of
the strike which took place on June 14, 1952.
As regards the contention of the Company that the Court of Industrial Relations has failed to include among the
leaders whose dismissal was left to the discretion of the management other persons who, as contended, likewise
had a direct part in the declaration of the strike, we don’t believe necessary to pass upon it it appearing that it
involves a question of fact which cannot be taken up in a petition for review. It is a well-settled rule in this jurisdiction
that "as long as there is some evidence to support a decision of the Court of Industrial Relations, this court should
not interfere, nor modify or reverse it, just because it is not based on overwhelming or preponderant evidence. Its
only province is to resolve or pass upon questions of law.’ [Philippine Newspaper Guild v. Evening News, Inc. G.R.
No. L-2604, April 29, 1950, 47 Off. Gaz., 86 Phil. 303 Bardwill Bros. v. Philippine Labor Union and Court of Industrial
Relations (1940), 70 Phil., 672; Antamok Goldfields Mining v. Court of Industrial Relations and National Labor Union,
Inc. (1940) 70 Phil., 340.]
The petitions are dismissed, without pronouncement as to costs.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-7425. July 21, 1955.]
DAVID M. ALMEDA, ET AL., (Pepsi-Cola Labor Organization), Petitioners, v. THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS and PEPSI-COLA BOTTLING COMPANY, INC., Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEE; STRIKE; EFFECT OF UNJUSTIFIED STRIKE ON THE RELATION OF
EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEE. — That by reason and as a consequence of the unjustified strike, the relation of
employer and employee between the Company and the strikers is severed and the former may not be compelled to
reinstate the strikes as employees. (The doctrine in National Labor Union v. Philippine Match Factory Co. 70 Phil.
300 and Luzon Marine Department Union v. Roldan, Luzon Stevedoring Co., Et Al., 47 O.G. Supp. No. 12, p. 136
reiterated and reaffirmed.
The facts pertinent in the present petition for review by certiorari necessary for its determination are those found and
related in the order of May 16, 1952, issued by the Judge Jose S. Bautista of the Court of Industrial Relations who
heard the main case No. 697-V, which we accept as conclusive upon its Tribunal and reproduce below for purposes
of reference:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company, Inc. prays that the strike staged at 8:55 p.m. on May 8, 1952, be declared illegal. At
the hearing of this petition, the respondents failed to appear although notices of said motion have been served by the
18
bailiff to them and to their counsel.
"The facts are these:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. On March 12, 1952, the respondents presented to the president of the company, Mr. John P. Clarkin, certain
demands (Exh. A). The latter, replying that he would be glad to meet the respondents, invited them for a conference
(Exh. D), but they did not care to see the president, until Mr. Clarkin left the Philippines on April 21. On April 23, the
respondents submitted to Mr. Jose Pascual, Treasurer of the company, new demands Exh. C, giving the
management two days to answer. Knowing that Mr. Pascual had no power to act on their demands, they agreed to
wait until April 28 for the reply of Mr. Clarkin.
"A conference was held on April 28 between Mr. Pascual and respondent Antonio Ramos, as president of the Pepsi-
Cola Labor Organization, who was assisted by Attys. Cid and Rafael.
"In the said conference, Mr. Pascual told the respondents that he cannot grant their demands, especially the demand
for collective bargaining for the reason that neither the Pepsi-Cola Labor Organization has personality to enter into
such contract because it has not yet been registered in the Department of Labor, nor Mr. Pascual has authority to act
on the petition, being a mere treasurer of the company. Hence, he promised to relay the petition to Mr. Clarkin. In
spite of this assurance, respondents threatened to declare a strike.
"2. On April 30, the company filed its petition praying that the respondents be enjoined from declaring a strike. The
Court summoned the respondents for a preliminary conference. The summons was received by the persons whose
signatures appear in the list (pp. 16, 17 and 18 of the record) but the rest refused to accept it, saying it was their
president Ramos who was in charge to appear before the Court. (Officer’s return of service and bailiff’s testimony,
t.s.n. p. 6, hearing of May 13, 1952).
A preliminary conference took place on April 30, and May 2, 1952, between the company represented by its counsel,
and the respondents by Antonio Ramos, the president of the Pepsi-Cola Labor Organization. On April 30, Ramos
asked that the preliminary hearing be postponed because he was not able to study the petition and that he had no
attorney and that his lawyers Vicente A. Rafael and Cipriano Cid should be notified to appear in Court. The
conference was reset for May 2, at 9:00 a.m.
"On this day, May 2, Antonio Ramos, appeared in company with his co-respondents Juan Grizalba and Pedro
Amante and he informed the Court that Attys. Vicente A. Rafael and Cipriano Cid were the counsel for the
respondents but could not appear then as they were busy with the hearing of other cases. In other words, Attys.
Rafael and Cid failed to appear in said conference, although there is evidence in the record that they were in this
building on the morning of May 2, when this case was called for hearing. (Testimony of Jose Pascual, p. 22, hearing
of May 13, 1952).
"On that occasion, the undersigned, knowing from the minutes of the meeting of the Board of Directors of the
company (Exh. D) that Treasurer Pascual had no authority to act on the respondent’s demands, expressed the
opinion that Mr. Clarkin should be given an opportunity to act on said demands; and consequently, the Court, upon
agreement of both parties, postponed the hearing of the case for May 15, at which time Mr. Pascual would have
received the answer of Mr. Clarkin. In said hearing, the Court asked Antonio Ramos if he and his co-respondents
would go on strike at least not before May 15, and Ramos repeatedly assured the Court that they will not declare a
strike nor even had the intention of doing so. In view of such assurances, the undersigned said the Court could issue
the injunction restraining the respondents from declaring a strike but because the Court had been assured by
president Ramos and believing that the president of the union would fulfill the promise, the Court viewed that the
issuance of an injunction would not be necessary.
"3. On May 3, 1952, Antonio Ramos presented another petition to Mr. Jose Pascual (Exh. E). This petition contained
five (5) demands which were the same demands 4, 7, 15, 16 and 18 of the petition of April 23, 1952, Exh. C. In
conformity with Exhibit E, Mr. Pascual transmitted to Mr. Clarkin said second petition by telegram, copy of which was
given to the officers of the union.
"On May 8, at 8:55 p.m. the respondents went on strike. The syrup, which was usually prepared and placed in the
tanks, from 5:00 to 11:00 p.m., was spoiled when the workers left, because unless it is completely mixed, it sours.
The syrup was worth about P2,000.00.
"On the morning of May 9, the respondents formed the picket line and prevented, by means of threat, the other
employees of the company and the brokers, distributors and drivers to enter the premises of the company.
(Testimonies of Alberto Araullo, Jose Matias and William Yonan, t.s.n. pp. 37-50, hearing of May 13, 1952). Great
amount of empty bottles belonging to the company were unloaded in the streets end in a private lot, because the
trucks were not permitted to go into the company’s compound. (Exhs. F, F-1 and F-2). Due to said strike and
picketing the company has suffered damages in the amount of P4,000 daily, up to the present.
"Taking these facts into account, the Court finds that the strike was unjustified and it is being carried out through
unlawful means. Unjustified, because all the strikers knew beforehand that Treasurer Pascual had no authority to act
on their demands, and consequently, they should have waited for Clarkin’s answer, before staging the strike.
Unjustified, because it was declared after the respondents, through their legitimate representatives, have promised
and assured the Court that they would not go on strike before May 15. The picketing, which is the means employed
in carrying it on is illegal, because the strikers resorted to threat and intimidation.
"WHEREFORE, the Court hereby declares said strike unjustified and illegal and orders the respondents to dissolve
the picket line."cralaw virtua1aw library
SO ORDERED.
Manila, May 16, 1952.
(Sgd.) JOSE S. BAUTISTA
Associate Judge"
We understand that said-order was eventually appealed to this Tribunal but that we refused to give it due course,
thereby indirectly giving it our sanction as to its correctness and validity and rendering it final (Rule 44, Section 4, of
the Rules of Court).
On May 16, 1952, after Jose Pascual, Treasurer of the Pepsi-Cola Company who at the time was in charge of the
same in the absence of Mr. Clarkin who was then in the United States, learned of the order of May 16th declaring the
strike illegal, he invited the strikers to resume work on condition that their employment was on a temporary basis,
because it was only the President of the company who had the authority to appoint permanent employees, and he
gave said strikers 48 hours within which to return to work. On May 19th he posted notices on the main entrance of
the company’s premises stating that those who wanted to be reinstated temporarily should see the official in charge
not later than 4:00 p.m. on May 26, 1952. Up to May 28th 50 of the strikers out of the 82 members of the Pepsi-Cola
Labor Organization returned to work, but 32 of the strikers refused to work under a temporary basis and on May 19th
advised the court and the company that they were willing to resume work only under the conditions existing before
the strike on May 8, 1952, in order to maintain the status quo. These 32 strikers later filed a petition for reinstatement
in incidental case No. 697-V (1).
According to the findings of Judge Bautista contained in his order of June 12, 1953, of the 50 union members
readmitted, 19 were later dismissed on September 6, 1952 but together with this 19 dismissed union members the
company also dismissed 42 non-union members. After dismissing these 19 union members and the 42 non-union
members, no replacements were hired by the company. The said 19 dismissed union members later filed a petition
for reinstatement in incidental case No. 697-V(2). Judge Jose S. Bautista heard and decided these two incidental
cases 697-V(1) and 697-V(2). With respect to Case No. 697-V(2), in his order of June 12, 1953, he found that the
said 19 union members readmitted on a temporary basis were given the same salary, privileges and benefits given
them before the strike, the only difference being that their re-admission was on a temporary basis; that it had to be
on such basis because only the President of the company Mr. Clarkin who had the authority to hire permanent
employees, was in the United States; that the terms and conditions of the contract of re-admission signed by the 19
strikers were the same as those signed by the non-strikers and non-unionists; that in August 1952, all the laborers
hired in May executed a second contract wherein they agreed to extend their temporary status, which second
contract confirmed and ratified the due execution of the first contract; that upon their dismissal, they received one
month separation pay in lieu of one month advance notice, and they accepted it without protest and even requested
19
letters of recommendation from Mr. Clarkin; that there was nothing in the contracts of re-employment executed in
May and August, 1952 which was contrary to law, morals or public policy, and that the said 19 laborers having been
employed on temporary basis, the company was justified in dismissing them. We agree to this finding and holding of
Judge Bautista.
Now, as regards Case No. 697-V(1), it was found that after the 32 strikers refused to go back to work under a
temporary basis, the company employed 68 newcomers non-unionists, the need for this larger number of laborers
being the extra work during the summer months. In his order of June 12, 1953, Judge Bautista held that although the
strike was declared unjustified and illegal, still the company had no power to dismiss the strikers or to hire workers to
take their place without court authority; and that even when a strike is declared illegal, only those strikers who
committed illegal acts lose their right to continue working in the company. He therefore, in said order directed the
company to reinstate the said 32 laborers, but without backpay, and to submit to the court the names of the strikers
who committed the illegal acts in furtherance of the strike, for proper action.
Both parties, the company and strikers moved for reconsideration of said order of June 12, 1953. In a resolution
dated January 4, 1954, penned by Associate Judge Modesto Castillo and concurred in by Presiding Judge Arsenio
C. Roldan and Associate Judge Juan E. Lanting, the majority reconsidered the said order of June, 1953. Associate
Judges Jose S. Bautista and V. Jimenez Yanzon dissented in separate opinions voting to affirm the order of June 12,
1953. The strikers David M. Almeda, et al, have filed the present petition for review by certiorari of the
aforementioned resolution of the Court of Industrial Relations of January 4, 1954 and "to issue an order to reinstate
all the strikers except those who in the judgment of the Court committed specific unwarranted acts."cralaw virtua1aw
library
In relation to Case No. 697-V(2), it is clear that there is no merit in the claim for reinstatement of the 19 strikers who
after the strike had been declared illegal, had accepted re-employment under temporary basis and who were later
dismissed, accepted their dismissal including separation pay in lieu of notice, and even asked for recommendations
from the President of the company. As Judge Bautista said they voluntarily entered into two contracts of employment
under a temporary basis, under which contract the company had the right to dismiss them when their services were
no longer needed and were given their separation pay.
Case No. 697-V (1) requires a more serious consideration. The question involved is the effect of an illegal and
unjustified strike on the relation between the company and the strikers. The majority in the industrial court held that
by staging an unjustified and an illegal strike the strikers automatically forfeited their right to continue as employees
and laborers of the employer, while the dissenters equally claim that only those strikers who had committed illegal
acts such as employing force, coercion, intimidation, etc., lose their jobs and that the rest of the strikers continue
their relations with the company and should be reinstated but without backpay. This Tribunal has already ruled more
than once upon this matter.
In the case of National Labor Union Incorporated, Et Al., v. Philippine Match Factory Co., and the Court of Industrial
Relations, 70 Phil. 300, the Labor Union demanded the immediate dismissal of one Pablo Pabalan, a factory
foreman for supposedly assaulting one named Dineros. Acting upon said demand, the company indorsed the case to
the City Fiscal’s Office where it was dropped for failure of the complainant to furnish the address of the accused. In
spite of the dropping of the case, the company itself thru its attorney caused the case to be reopened in order to give
the company and the labor union the benefit of an impartial investigation. While the Fiscal was investigating the case,
and although he had announced that he would release the result of his investigation on September 18, 1939, the
members of the union employed by the Match Company went on strike on September 16th or two days before. The
strike was certified by the Secretary of Labor to the Court of Industrial Relations on September 21, 1939. On October
11th while the case was pending hearing 15 strikers representing themselves to be duly authorized representatives
of all the strikers addressed a letter to the acting Manager seeking their admission for re-employment. The Manager
declined to take action while the dispute was pending adjudication by the industrial court. Thereupon, the 15 strikers
through counsel filed a motion for an order to compel the company to re-admit the strikers. The industrial court
rendered judgment denying the petition to dismiss the company’s foreman as well as the petition for the re-admission
of the strikers to their employment. Against said judgment the Labor Union appealed to this Tribunal. We held that
the strike was clearly unjustified because despite the attention given by the company to the laborers’ demand for the
dismissal of its foreman for an alleged assault, the company even asking the Fiscal to reopen the case after he had
dropped it, the laborers went on strike without awaiting the result of the Fiscal’s investigation of the case; and we
said that as a consequence of such unjustified strike, the strikers automatically ceased in their employment and that
the company may not be compelled to re-admit them. It will be noticed that in said case, no acts of violence,
coercion, intimidation or sabotage were involved. The strike was found merely to be unjustified, and yet the strikers
were declared to have forfeited their status as workers of the company. Judge Bautista in his dissenting opinion in
the present case, to support his stand that even in the case of an illegal strike, only those strikers who committed
illegal acts lose their jobs, states that "The Supreme Court pointed out in the case of National Labor Union v.
Philippine Match Co. (70 Phil., 303) that not all the strikers could be punished but only those who commit specific
unwarranted acts." We have carefully examined said case of National Labor Union v. Philippine Match Co., supra,
but we failed to find any support or basis for said statement.
The doctrine laid down in the case of National Labor Union v. Philippine Match Factory Co., supra, was affirmed and
reiterated by this Court in the case of Luzon Marine Department Union v. Arsenio C. Roldan, Luzon Stevedoring Co.,
Et Al., * G. R. No. L-2660, May 30, 1950 (47 Off. Gaz. Supp. No. 12, p. 136). In that case the labor union presented
to the Luzon Stevedoring Co., a petition containing 12 demands and later filed the corresponding case with the Court
of Industrial Relations praying that the Stevedoring Company be directed to comply immediately with the demands.
After hearing the petition for dismissal and after receiving evidence Judge Bautista of the CIR issued an order
denying the motion to dismiss and declaring that the court had jurisdiction over the case; but before receipt of the
notice of said order 65 alleged members of the petitioning union went on strike without previously notifying the
respondent company. Thereafter, the union asked the CIR to issue a restraining order to prevent the respondent
company from employing strike breakers. Judge Bautista issued an order enjoining the strikers to return to work and
the respondent company to reinstate them in the positions they were occupying before the strike. On motion for
reconsideration of this last order of Judge Bautista the CIR en banc set aside said order on the ground that the strike
was unjustified and illegal. On appeal from that resolution of the CIR en banc we affirmed said resolution and held
that the right of an employee, tenant or laborer to be continued in the service of the company for whom he is working
under the last terms and conditions existing before the dispute arose, carries with it the corresponding obligation on
his part not to strike or to return to work if he has already done so, because if he goes on strike and the courts later
find said strike to be unjustified or illegal he has to suffer the consequences, one of which, is the loss of his post or
job in the company. Reiterating the ruling laid down in the case of Philippine Match Factory Co., supra, this Tribunal
said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . Conformably to these principles the Supreme Court, in the case of National Labor Union, Inc. v. Philippine
Match Company (70 Phil., 300) declared illegal and unjustified a strike motivated by an unreasonable demand of the
labor union for the dismissal of a factory foreman. In that case the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Moran, held
that although Commonwealth Act No. 103 recognizes, in a negative way, the laborers’ right to strike, it also creates
all the means by which a resort thereto may be avoided, ’because a strike is a remedy essentially coercive in
character and general in its disturbing effects upon the social order and the public interests’; that ’as the strike is an
economic weapon at war with the policy of the Constitution and the law, a resort thereto by laborers shall be deemed
to be a choice of a remedy peculiarly their own, and outside of the statute, and, as such, the strikers must accept all
the risks attendant upon their choice’; and that when the petitioners declared a strike even before the outcome of the
investigation by the company of their complaint against the factory foreman was announced, ’and without previously
having resorted to any of the pacific means provided by law, they acted unreasonably, and the law cannot interpose
its hand to protect them from the consequences of their behavior. Their cessation from their employment as a result
of such an unjustified strike is one of such consequences which they must take by the choice of a remedy of their
own, outside of the statute.’"
This Court then concluded:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"To summarize, the rulings of this Court in the cases hereinabove cited are:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(1) The law does not look with favor upon strikes and lockouts because of their disturbing and pernicious effects
upon the social order and the public interests; to prevent or avert them and to implement section 6, Article XIV of the
Constitution, the law has created several agencies, namely: the Bureau of Labor, the Department of Labor, the
Labor-Management Advisory Board, and the Court of Industrial Relations. See Sec. 4, Commonwealth Act No. 103;
and Executive Order No. 158, dated July 28, 1948.)
(2) The law does not expressly ban strikes except when enjoined against by the court; but if a strike is declared for a
trivial, unjust or unreasonable purpose, or if it is carried out through unlawful means, the law will not sanction it and
the court will declare it illegal, with the adverse consequences to the strikers.
20

(3) If the laborers resort to a strike to enforce their demands, instead of resorting first to the legal processes provided
by law, they do so at their own risk, because the dispute will necessarily reach the court and, if they later should find
that the strike was unjustified, the strikers would suffer the adverse consequences.
"The Court of Industrial Relations has merely applied to this case the settled doctrines of this Court as above
summarized. We reaffirm those doctrines and must, consequently, sustain the resolution complained of."cralaw
virtua1aw library
It is not necessary for the purposes of this decision to rule upon acts of illegality committed in the course of the strike
and their effect on the status of the strikers as employees of the company. We agree with the majority of the CIR in
its appealed resolution, that the strike in the present case was clearly unjustified because the petitioners-appellants
went on strike knowing that their demands could not be acted upon by the Treasurer of the company in the absence
of its President who was then in the United States, and they did not wait until their demands could be transmitted to
said President and acted upon by him. Not only this, but the strikers through their representatives had misled, not to
say deceived the trial court. Despite the assurances given by them that they would not go on strike and did not even
have the intention of striking, they went on strike just the same. Said strike may, in a way, even be regarded as
equivalent to a violation or disobedience of an order of the Industrial Court. When the Union commenced these
proceedings before the CIR the Union members threatened to immediately go on strike. Sensing this attitude of the
workers, the Company petitioned the CIR to issue an order to prohibit the threatened strike. Judge Bautista said that
he was ready and was about to issue a writ of injunction against the laborers and employees not to strike, and that
the only reason he did not issue the writ was because of the assurances given to him by the Union, assurances
which were not fulfilled. It should also be stated that the strikers unanimously voted in favor of the strike. As a result
of the unjustified strike, the syrup daily prepared and placed in the tanks valued at P2,000 soured and became a
loss; and because the strikers by means of threats, prevented the other employees, and the brokers, distributors and
drivers of the Company to enter its premises, the Company suffered damages in the sum of P4,000 daily, up to May
16, 1952.
Under the doctrine laid down in the cases of the Philippine Match Factory Co., and the Luzon Marine Department
Union, supra, where no acts of violence were involved and where the strikes were declared merely unjustified, and
yet the workers were held to have forfeited their status as laborers of their employer, which doctrines we again
reiterate and reaffirm, we hold that by reason and as a consequence of the unjustified strike herein staged, the
relation of employer and employee between the Company and the strikers was severed and the former may not be
compelled to reinstate the strikers as employees. The resolution appealed from is affirmed, with costs.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-29217. May 11, 1978.]
MARIA CRISTINA FERTILIZER PLANT EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, VICENTE DUMAGUENG, OLEGARIO
SARMIENTO, ANDRES BELTRAN, DIONISIO TANDOC, TOMAS MAPANAO, EUDOSIO ALCOVER, ALFONSO
ALVAREZ, MAGDALENO BAGUIO, ANASTACIO CAPANGPANGAN, JUSTINIANO IGNACIO and ANGEL
SANTIAGO, SR., Petitioners, v. HON. TEODULO C. TANDAYAG, MARIA CRISTINA FERTILIZER
CORPORATION, Respondents.
[G.R. No. L-33935. May 11, 1978.]
MARIA CRISTINA FERTILIZER PLANT EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-ALU, VICENTE DUMAGUENG,
OLEGARIO SARMIENTO, ANDRES BELTRAN, DIONISIO TANDOC, TOMAS MAPANAO, EUDOSIO ALCOVER,
ALFONSO ALVAREZ, MAGDALENO BAGUIO, ANASTACIO CAPANGPANGAN, JUSTIANO IGNACIO and
ANGEL SANTIAGO, Petitioners, v. MARIA CRISTINA FERTILIZER CORPORATION, JOSE MARCELO and
COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, Respondents.
SYNOPSIS
L-29217 — Two weeks after the strike was declared, the company sued the union and its officers in the Court of First
Instance for damages with a petition for preliminary injunction. Despite the union’s opposition alleging that the case is
intertwined with labor dispute pending with the Court of Industrial Relations, the lower court issued the injunction.
On petition for certiorari, the Supreme Court held that the Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction over the action
for damages, or to issue injunction since plaintiff’s cause of action arose out of, or was necessarily intertwined with,
an alleged unfair labor practice committed by the union.
L-33935 — The company and the union filed unfair labor practice cases against each other. The Industrial Court on
the basis of evidence found that the union struck in order to attain their economic demands not because of alleged
refusal of the company to enter into a new collective bargaining agreement. It also found that the strike; was not
preceded by the requisite notice of intention to strike; that the union resorted to unlawful acts in the conduct of strike;
that the picketing was highly coercive; and that the strikers threatened with harm or violence a contractor dealing with
the company. On the basis of these findings the Industrial Court held that the union officers and members who took
part in the strike, committed them, ratified them, or authorized the unlawful acts, had lost their status as employees.
The Supreme Court affirmed the resolution of the Industrial Court lawful acts, had lost their status as employees.
SYLLABUS
1. LABOR STRIKES; UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE. — An illegal strike, accompanied by violent or intimidatory
picketing, may constitute an unfair labor practice insofar as it amounts to a refusal on the part of the union to bargain
collectively with the employer (Sec. 4[b][3], Industrial Peace Act; Art 249[c], Labor Code).
2. ID.; ID.; JURISDICTION. — Where the plaintiff’s cause of action for damages arose out of, or was necessarily
intertwined with, the alleged unfair labor practice committed by the union, the jurisdiction properly belonged to the
Court of Industrial Relations. For the same reason, the lower court has no jurisdiction to issue the injunction against
the union. Where the issue in an action filed in the Court of First Instance was tied up with an unfair labor practice
case pending in the Court of Industrial Relations, the action was outside the jurisdiction of the regular Courts even if
acts of violence, intimidation and coercion were imputed to the union. The injunction should have been obtained from
the Industrial Court which was empowered to restrain such acts under the Industrial Peace Act. That rule obviates
multiplicity of suits.
3. APPEAL; FINDINGS OF FACTS OF COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS CONCLUSIVE ON SUPREME
COURT. — The Supreme Court may review the decision of the Court of Industrial Relations in unfair labor practice
cases only on questions of law. The Industrial Court’s findings, if supported by substantial evidence are conclusive.
The review is proper if the Court of Industrial Relations has decided a question of substance not heretofore
determined by the Supreme Court or has decided it in way not in accord with law or with the Cupreme Court’s
applicable decisions.
4. ID.; ID.; INDUSTRIAL COURT’S FACTUAL FINDINGS MAY BE SET ASIDE ONLY IF DEVOID OF BASIS. — The
factual findings of the Court of Industrial Relations should be set aside if they are devoid of basis and if it acted with
grave abuse of discretion. its factual findings are final and binding when (1) the parties were given the opportunity to
present evidence; (2) the tribunal considered the evidence presented; (3) there is something in the record to support
the findings, and (4) the evidence supporting the findinggs is substantial.
5. EVIDENCE; SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, DEFINED. — Substantial evidence means evidence which is more than
a mere scintilla. it is relevant and credible evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.
6. LABOR STRIKE; ONLY PEACEFUL PICKETING ALLOWED. — A strike is a legitimate weapon in the universal
struggle for existence. But to be lawful, a strike must be preceded by the requisite intention to strike. It should have
lawful purpose and should be executed through lawful means.
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7. ID.; ID.; DISMISSAL OF OFFICERS AND MEMBERS WHO TAKE PART IN ILLEGAL STRIKE. — it is not a grave
abuse of discretion for the Court of Industrial Relations to declare that union officers and members, who took part in
an illegal strike, authorized the unlawful acts, committed them or ratified them, had lost their status as employees
8. ID.; ID.; NOTICE OF INTENTION TO STRIKE, INSUFFICIENCY OF. — A notice of intention to strike sent by the
union to company, and not to the Conciliation Service or Director of Labor, with whom the company had a pending
suggestion for mediation is not the notice of intention to strike contemplated in Section 14(d) of the Industrial Peace
Act.
9. ID.; ID.; ILLEGAL STRIKE. — A strike is illegal where the strikers resort to unlawful acts in the conduct of the
strike, such as conducting a highly coercive picketing, preventing the plant supervisor from checking defects in the
company plant, threatening with harm or violence a contractor dealing with the company, using human barricades to
block the ingress of nonstrikers, and displaying inflamatory placards.
FERNANDO, J., concurring and dissenting:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; PROTECTION TO LABOR; INDUSTRIAL PEACE ACT; JURISDICTION OVER
UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE CASES VESTED IN THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS. — The fundamental
doctrine of the exclusive competence vested in the Court of Industrial Relations had nowhere been more
emphatically set forth than in Associated Labor Union v. Gomez, 3 Justice Sanchez being the ponente, in these
words: "A rule buttressed upon statute and reason that [is] frequently reiterated in jurisprudence is that labor cases
involving unfair labor practice are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the CIR. By now, this rule has ripened into
dogma. It thus commands adherence, not breach." Since then cases have been decided enunciating the principle of
exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations over unfair labor practice controversies demonstrating how
firmly the Supreme Court is committed to such a ruling, in accordance with the leter and spirit iof the Industrial Peace
Act.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; AVERMENT OF DAMAGES WILL NOT DEFEAT COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATION’S
EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION. — The averment that damages were suffered by reason of the strike will not work to
defeat the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations to hear the unfair labor practice charge. Reason for this is
that the right to damages "would still have to depend on the evidence in the unfair labor practice case’ — in the court
of Industrial Relations. To hold otherwise is to sanction split jurisdiction — which is obnoxious to the orderly
administration of justice." (Associated Labor Union v. Gomez, 195 SCRA 304, 308-309)
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; STRIKES; PROHIBITION PENDING THE DETERMINATION OF THE DISPUTE BEFORE THE
COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS. — Under Commonwealth Act No. 103 the employee, tenant or laborer is
inhibited from striking or walking out of his employment only when so enjoined by the Court of Industrial Relations
and after a dispute has been submitted thereto and pending award or decision by the court of such dispute. It follows
that, as in the present case, the employees or laborers may strike before being ordered not to do so and before an
industrial dispute is submitted to the Court of Industrial Relations, subject to the power of the latter, after hearing
when public interest so requires or when the dispute cannot, in its opinion, be promptly decided or settled, to order
them to return, with the consequence that if the strikers fail to return to work, when so ordered, the court may
authorize the employer to accept other employees or laborers.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; A CONCERNED ACTIVITY ENTITLED TO LEGAL PROTECTION. — The Industrial Peace Act
made explicit that a strike in a concerted activity entitled to legal protection. It expressly recognizes the right to of the
employees "to self-organization and to form, join or assist labor organizations of their own choosing for the purpose
of collective bargaining through representatives of their own choosing and to engage in concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining and other mutual aid or protection." (Section 3, Industrial Peace Act)
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; AN INSTITUTIONALIZED FACTOR OF DEMOCRATIC GROWTH; NOTICE OF INTENTION TO
STRIKE NOT TO BE RIGIDLY INTERPRETED. — A strike is "an institutionalized factor of democratic growth." It is a
logical corollary to the philosophy of the Industrial Peace Act, embodying the policy of self-organization and collective
bargaining, that to the workers themselves should be left the determination of whether or not to engage in such
concerted activity as a strike. They are free to select the means for attaining success in their disputes with
management. The retirement in the Act that before the employees may strike, they must file with the Conciliation
Service of the Department of Labor a notice of such intention, should not be given an interpretation so rigid in
character as to render nugatory such a right.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; BELIEF IN GOOD FAITH OF THE COMMISSION OF UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE, SUFFICIENT
INDUCEMENT THEREFOR. — A strike does not automatically carry the stigma of illegality even if no unfair labor
practice were committed by the employer. It suffices if such a believe in good faith is entertained by labor as the
inducing factor for staging a strike.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; MAY BE IILLEGAL IF MARKED BY VIOLENCE. — A strike may be tainted by illegality if marked
by violence. What was within the protection of the Industrial Peace Act was the concerted activity of cessation of
work in order that a union’s economic demands may be granted or that an employer cease and desist from an unfair
labor practice. That was a right recognized by law, which certainly could not approve of the utilization of force to
attain either objective. It is a truism to state that implicit in the concept of a legal order is the maintenance of peaceful
ways. It would follow then that if marred by violence, a strike could be characterized as illegal.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RESPONSIBILITY FOR ACTS OF VIOLENCE SHOULD BE INDIVIDUAL. — Care is to be taken,
however, especially where an unfair labor practice is involved, to avoid stamping it with illegality just because it is
tainted by such acts. To avoid rendering illusory the recognition of the right to strike, responsibility in such a case
should be individual and not collective. A different conclusion would be called for, of course, if the existence of force
while the strike lasts is pervasive and widespread, consistently and deliberately resorted to as a matter of policy. It
could be reasonably concluded then that even if justified as to ends, it becomes illegal because of the means
employed.
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT EVERY FORM OF VIOLENCE MAKES A STRIKE ILLEGAL. — A strike is usually
attended by "the excitement, the heat and the passion of the direct participants in the labor dispute, at the peak
thereof," the picketing as such being "inherently explosive." But notvery form of violence suffices to affix the seal of
illegality on a strike or to cause the loss of employment by the guilty party. Only such strikers who were proven to
have committed "specific serious act of violence" could be penalized with loss of employment.
10. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; FINDING OF ILLEGALITY SHOULD NOT BE AUTOMATICALLY FOLLOWED BY
WHOLESALE DISMISSAL; REASON. — Why a mere finding of the illegality of a strike should not be automatically
followed by wholesale dismissal was once again stressed in the recent case of Almira v. B. F. Goodrich Philippines,
Inc. in these words: "It would imply at the very least that where a penalty less punitive would suffice, whatever
missteps may be committed by labor ought not to be visited with a consequence so severe. It is not only because of
the law’s concern for the workingman. There is, in addition, his family to consider. Unemployment brings untold
hardships and sorrows on those dependent on the wage-earner. The misery and pain attendant on the loss of jobs
then could be avoided if there be acceptance of the view that under all the circumstances of this case, petitioners
should not be deprived of their means of livelihood. Nor is this to condone what had been done by them. For all this
while, since private respondent considered them separated from the service, they had not been paid. From the
strictly juridical standpoint, it cannot be too strongly stressed, to follow Davis in his masterly work, Discretionary
Justice, that where a decision may be made to rest on informed judgment rather than rigid rules, all the equities of
the case must be accorded their due weight. Finally, labor law determinations, to quote from Bultmann, should be not
only secundum rationem but also secundum caritatem."
These two cases have a common factual background. L-29217 is about the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance
of Lanao del Norte to entertain an action for damages arising from unfair labor practices and to issue an injunction
restraining the picketing concomitant with the strike. And L-33935 is a consolidation of two unfair labor practice cases
originating from the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR).
The first case was filed by the employer against the union in connection with an alleged illegal strike and picketing.
The second case was filed by the union against the employer for the latter’s alleged refusal to enter into a collective
bargaining agreement. The salient facts are as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. Maria Cristina Fertilizer Corporation, a company engaged in the manufacture of fertilizer and chemicals at its plant
in Iligan City, had a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with the Maria Cristina Fertilizer Plant Employees
22
Association expiring on December 31, 1967. In September, 1967 the union submitted to the company a draft of a
new CBA. The company countered with the suggestion that the existing CBA be renewed for a five-year period.
2. Believing that the company did not want to negotiate a new CBA, the union on November 2, 1967 sent to the
company a notice of strike. The company clarified that it was not refusing to negotiate. It sent to the union its own
draft of a new CBA. In December, 1967 fruitless negotiations regarding a new CBA were held on several occasions
between the company and the union.
3. On January 5, 1968 the company proposed that all regular employees would be given an increase of twenty pesos
and that those whose monthly salary was below P130 would be paid P150 a month. The union rejected the proposal.
On January 15, 1968 the company president sent a radiogram to the union president, requesting the latter to specify
the provisions in the draft of the CBA, which were unacceptable, and appealing to the union members to take into
account the problems facing the company.
4. The union in its letter of January 16, 1968 reminded the management of its four major demands previous
submitted to the company president. The letter ended with this ominous warning "Until midnight tonight, we beg your
understanding and acceptance." (Exh. M or 17). On that same day, the company president sent a wire to the union
president, suggesting mediation and conciliation by the Department of Labor. The union president promised to reply
in the afternoon of the next day, January 17, after consultation with the officers of the union.
5. Without having made any reply, the union declared a strike in the evening of January 17, 1968. The declaration of
a strike, which was served upon the plant manager at eleven-thirty in the evening, read as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Please be informed that the Maria Cristina Fertilizer Plant Employees Association is declaring a strike against the
management of the Maria Cristina Fertilizer Corporation at 10:47 p.m. on January 17, 1968 for the following
reasons:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1. For the refusal of the Management to grant the reasonable Union demands.
"2. For violation of the Minimum Wage Law by the management.
"3. For the anti-unionism attitude of the management.
"4. For various unfair labor practices.
"Any negotiation the management wants will be coursed on the picket lines.
"The Union will maintain a peaceful and lawful picket lines around the premises of the Maria Cristina Fertilizer Plant
Compound to effect its strike until their grievances are given redress.
"Yours truly,
"MC-Fertilizer Plant Employees
Assn. (MCFPEA).
"By: Sgd. Vicente Dumagueng
President"
In view of the strike and the picketing, the company’s operations were paralyzed.
6. Two weeks after the strike was declared, or on January 30, 1968, the company filed with the Court of First
Instance of Lanao del Norte against the union and its officers a complaint for damages with a petition for preliminary
injunction. The company alleged that the strike and picketing were illegal and that it was suffering a loss of P39,000
daily as a result of the strike. The union alleged in its answer that the lower court has no jurisdiction because the
case involves labor dispute which falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the CIR. The union opposed the issuance of
an injunction on the ground that the strike was lawful, peaceful and orderly. (Civil Case No. 1262).
7. On February 8, 1968 the lower court issued an injunction restraining the union and its agents and representatives
from preventing the employees, who are not members of the union, from entering the fertilizer plant and performing
their usual duties and from going out of the same and from preventing the customers from loading the fertilizer and
other products purchased from the company.
8. Not content with filing an action for injunction and damages, the company on January 31, 1968 filed against the
union and its officers a charge of unfair labor practice with the CIR’s regional office at Cagayan de Oro City. After
due investigation, the CIR’s prosecution division on March 12, 1968 filed in behalf of the company a complaint for
unfair labor practice against the union and its officers for having declared an illegal strike and resorted to unlawful
picketing which were the same acts complained of in Civil Case No. 1262. (CIR Case No. 109-ULP-ORO).
9. On the other hand, the union on March 8, 1968 charged the company and its president with unfair labor practice.
After due investigation, the prosecution division filed on October 30, 1968 in behalf of the union a complaint for unfair
labor practice against the company, its president and personnel officer for having allegedly refused to enter into a
collective bargaining agreement, for restraining the members of the union in exercising their right to self-organization,
and for discriminating against them by not giving them the privileges enjoyed by non-union members (CIR Case No.
111-ULP-ORO).
10. The strike was terminated on October 18, 1968 when the parties entered into a collective bargaining agreement
which took effect on the following day. The picketing was lifted. But before that settlement was made, or on July 9,
1968, the union filed in this Court the special civil actions of certiorari and prohibition against the Court of First
Instance of Lanao del Norte and the company in order to nullify the injunction and to secure a declaration that the
lower court has no jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 1262. On July 17, 1968, or after the petitioners had posted a bond
in the sum of P500, this Court issued a writ of preliminary injunction restraining the lower court from further
proceeding in Civil Case No. 1262 and from enforcing the writ of preliminary injunction dated February 8, 1968. (L-
29217). Hence, Civil Case No. 12652 was frozen.
11. The two unfair labor practice cases were heard jointly. The CIR trial judge in a decision dated May 4, 1970 held
that the strike was illegal because there was no notice of intention to strike, as contemplated in section 14 of
Republic Act No. 875, and because the picketing was highly coercive in character. The officers and members of the
union named as respondents were declared to have lost their status as employees of the company. A motion for the
reconsideration of that decision was denied in the CIR’s resolution en banc dated May 14, 1971.
12. On August 19, 1971 the union filed in this Court a petition for the review of that decision. The petition was given
due course. (L-33935).
L-29217 — Jurisdictional issue: Can the CFI enjoin on strike and award damages arising from alleged unfair labor
practices? — We hold that the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte has no jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 1262
which is interwoven with the unfair labor practice case, CIR Case No. 109-ULP-ORO. The two cases involve the
legality of the strike and picketing conducted by the union against the company.
An illegal strike, accompanied by violent or intimidatory picketing, may constitute an unfair labor practice insofar as it
amounts to a refusal on the part of the union to bargain collectively with the employer (Sec. 4[b][3], Industrial Peace
Act; Art 249[c], Labor Code).
The Court of Industrial Relations used to have exclusive jurisdiction over the prevention of unfair labor practices, a
power which was not affected "by any other means of adjustment or prevention that has been or may be established
by an agreement, code, law or otherwise" (Sec. 5, Industrial Peace Act).chanrobles law library
It is settled that where the plaintiff’s cause of action for damages arose out of, or was necessarily intertwined with,
the alleged unfair labor practice committed by the union, the jurisdiction properly belonged to the Court of Industrial
Relations (Associated Labor Union v. Central Azucarera de la Carlota, L-25649, June 30, 1975, 64 SCRA 564;
Progressive Labor Association v. Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corp., L-27585, May 29, 1970, 33
SCRA 349; Goodrich Employees Association v. Flores, L-30211, October 5, 1976, 73 SCRA 297; Holganza v.
23
Apostol, L-32953, March 31, 1977, 76 SCRA 190).
For the same reason, the lower court has no jurisdiction to issue the injunction against the union. Where the issue in
an action filed in the Court of First Instance was tied up with an unfair labor practice case pending in the Court of
Industrial Relations, the action was outside the jurisdiction of the regular Courts even if acts of violence, intimidation
and coercion were imputed to the union. The injunction should have been obtained from the Industrial Court which
was empowered to restrain such acts under the Industrial Peace Act. That rule obviates multiplicity of suits. (BCI
Employees and Workers Union v. Marcos, L-21016, July 30, 1965, 14 SCRA 793).
Applying the above-cited rulings, we come to the unavoidable conclusion that all the proceedings in Civil Case No.
1262 are void for lack of jurisdiction. That case should be dismissed.
L-33935 — Legality of the strike. — The union and its officers, as appellants in the unfair labor practice cases,
contend that the Industrial Court erred in not holding that the strike was staged against an unfair labor practice; in
finding that the strike was illegal because the requisite thirty-day notice was not given; in holding that illegal acts
were resorted to in the prosecution of the strike, there being no substantial evidence to prove the alleged illegal acts;
in declaring that the individual petitioners had lost their status as employees, notwithstanding their good faith in
declaring a strike; in not finding that the petitioners did not take part nor authorize the alleged illegal acts; in not
finding that the company and its president were estopped to claim that the strike was illegal; in not declaring the
company guilty of unfair labor practices, and in not ordering the reinstatement of the individual petitioners with back
wages.
The union has not raised clear-cut pure legal issues. This Court may review the CIR’s decision in unfair labor
Practice cases only on questions of law. The CIR’s findings, if supported by substantial evidence, are conclusive
(Sec. 6, Industrial Peace Act. See sec. 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 103 as amended). The review is proper if the
CIR has decided a question of substance not heretofore determined by this Court or has decided it in a way in
accord with law or with this Court’s applicable decision (Sec. 3, Rule 43, Rules of Court).
The CIR’s factual findings should be set aside if they are completely devoid of basis and if it acted with grave abuse
of discretion. Its factual findings are final and binding when (1) the parties were given the opportunity to present
evidence; (2) the tribunal considered the evidence presented; (3) there is something in the record to support the
findings, and (4) the evidence supporting the findings is substantial (Kaisahan ng Mga Manggagawa sa La Campana
v. Tantongco and CIR, 116 Phil. 883, 890).
Substantial evidence means evidence which is more than a mere scintilla. It is relevant and credible evidence which
a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion (Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations, 69
Phil. 635).
In this case, the CIR on the basis of the evidence found (a) that in no instance did the company refuse to negotiate
with the union on the terms of a new collective bargaining agreement; (b) that the company did not coerce the
employees to resign from the union on the promise of increased compensation and, therefore, it did not interfere in
the right of the employees to self-organization; (c) that the company did not perpetrate acts of discrimination against
the members of the union, and (d) that the strike was staged because of the company’s refusal to grant the union’s
four demands regarding the inclusion of foremen and casuals in the union, the increase of the basic monthly pay to
P180 and the increase to P240 a month of the salaries of employees already receiving P180 a month, free medical
and dental treatment for the employees and their families, and gratuity pay.
The CIR found that the union struck in order to attain those demands and not because of the alleged refusal to the
company to enter into a new collective bargaining agreement. The company had a pending suggestion for mediation
by the Department of Labor when the strike was declared.
Hence, the union should have filed with the Conciliation Service or with the Director of Labor Relations thirty days
prior to the strike a notice of its intention to strike, as required by section 14(d) of the Industrial Peace Act.
The CIR also found that the union resorted to unlawful acts in the conduct of the strike. The picketing was highly
coercive. The union prevented the plant supervisor from checking the leak in the ammonia pipeline, threatened with
harm or violence a contractor dealing with the company, barred the entrance into the company compound trucks
loaded with pyrite, used a human barricade to block the ingress of nonstrikers and supervisors, and displayed a
placard with the words "Blast off Cahanap."
The lower court arrived at those factual conclusions after analyzing the evidence presented by the parties at a full-
dress hearing. Those findings are supported by substantial evidence.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
Specifically, we are bound by the finding that the alleged letter of November 2, 1967 was not the notice of intention to
strike contemplated in section 14(d) of the Industrial Peace Act. That letter was sent to the company and not to the
Conciliation Service or Director of Labor Relations. The chief conciliator of the Department of Labor testified that his
office did not receive any notice of the impending strike. That testimony was given credence by the CIR. We cannot
reverse that finding.
Nor can we ignore the CIR’s explicit finding that the strike was not peacefully conducted and that the picketing was
characterized by coercion and intimidation. Only peaceful picketing is allowed (Republic Act No. 1167; De Leon v.
National Labor Union, 100 Phil. 789).
As has been said, a strike is a legitimate weapon in the universal struggle for existence. But to be lawful, a strike
must be preceded by the requisite notice of intention to strike. It should have a lawful purpose and it should be
executed through lawful means. (See sec. 264[b] of Labor Code).
Since the strike was found by the CIR to be illegal, we cannot say that it gravely abused its discretion in declaring
that the union officers and members, who took part in the strike, authorized the unlawful acts, committed them, or
ratified them, had lost their status as employees. (See Almeda v. CIR and Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 97 Phil. 306,
317.)
WHEREFORE, in L-29217 the order and writ of injunction issued by the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte
are set aside for lack of jurisdiction and the writ of preliminary injunction issued by this Court is made permanent. In
L-33935 the CIR decision and resolution under appeal are affirmed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Barredo, Antonio, Concepcion, Jr. and Santos, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, J., concurring and dissenting:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
It must conceded that from the perspective taken by the Court in these two cases, Justice Aquino’s opinion,
distinguished, as is usually the case, by thorough research and marked clarity, supplies a neat and logical solution to
the basic problem posed. Inasmuch as the decision in L-29217 reaffirms the well-settled doctrine that an unfair labor
practice controversy was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the now-defunct Court of Industrial Relations, there can
be no thought of dissent. It is a different matter as far as L-33935 is concerned. I am no prepared to yield
concurrence inasmuch as, to my mind, there appears to be a retreat from the later trend discernible in recent
opinions of this Court, to be more specifically referred to, informed by a spirit of leniency towards participants in an
illegal strike. That approach, in my opinion, reflects greater fidelity to the expanded constitutional principles of social
justice 1 and protection to labor, 2 dismissal being visited only on those strikers found guilty of committing serious
acts of violence.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
1. The fundamental doctrine of the exclusive competence vested in the Court of Industrial Relations had nowhere
been more emphatically set forth than in Associated Labor Union v. Gomez, 3 Justice Sanchez being the ponente, in
these words: "A rule buttressed upon statute and reason that [is] frequently reiterated in jurisprudence is that labor
cases involving unfair labor practice are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the CIR. By now, this rule has ripened into
dogma. It thus commands adherence, not breach." 4 As noted in Security Bank Employees Union-NATU v. Security
Bank and Trust Co., 5 there were from PAFLU v. Tan 6 to Bay View Hotel, Inc. v. Manila Hotel Workers Union 7
fourteen decisions of this Tribunal enunciating the principle of exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial
Relations over unfair labor practice controversies. Three other cases, Associated Labor Union v. Borromeo, 8
Veteran Security Free Workers Union v. Cloribel, 9 and Meralco Workers Union v. Gaerlan, 10 were decided prior to
24
Progressive Labor Association v. Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corporation, 11 cited in the opinion of
Justice Aquino. There were three other decisions referred to therein, Associated Labor Union v. Central Azucarera
de la Carlota, 12 Goodrich Employees Association v. Flores, 13 and Holganza v. Apostol. 14 To demonstrate how
firmly committed this Court is to such a ruling, in accordance with the letter and spirit of the Industrial Peace Act, 15
reference may be made to fourteen other cases from Lakas ng Manggagawang Makabayan v. Abiera 16 to
Holganza. 17
2. To be more precise, insofar as the issue of damages is concerned, the same leading case of Associated Labor
Union stated the following: "Jurisdiction then is exclusively vested in the Court of Industrial Relations. For, explicit in
Section 5(a) of the Industrial Peace Act is the precept that — ‘The Court shall have jurisdiction over the prevention of
unfair labor practices and is empowered to prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice. This
power shall be exclusive and shall not be affected by any other means of adjustment or prevention that has been or
may be established by an agreement, code, law or otherwise.’ . . . Nor will Sugeco’s averment below that it suffers
damages by reason of the strike, work to defeat the CIR’s jurisdiction to hear the unfair labor practice charge.
Reason for this is that the right to damages ‘would still have to depend on the evidence in the unfair labor practice
case’ — in the CIR. To hold otherwise is to sanction split jurisdiction — which is obnoxious to the orderly
administration of justice." 18
3. Now as to the dissenting portion of this opinion. As set forth at the outset, it is a different approach to the principle
of governing strikes that precludes me from according acceptance to the opinion of the Court in L-33935. My starting
point is the highly-persuasive ponencia of Justice Laurel in the leading case of Rex Taxicab Co. v. Court of Industrial
Relations: 19 "Independently of the right to organization and collective bargaining which, according to some
authorities, connotes the right to strike in the event that such a course is deemed advisable by the employees for
their mutual aid or protection (see cases on Labor Law by Landis, pp. 632, 633), Commonwealth Act No. 103, for
instance, provides that when any dispute has been submitted to the Court of Industrial Relations for settlement or
arbitration, and pending award or decision by the court of such dispute, the employee, tenant, or laborer shall not
strike or walk out of his employment when so enjoined by the court after hearing and when public interest so
requires, and if he has already done so, he shall forthwith return to it, upon order of the court, which shall be issued
only after hearing when public interest so requires or when the dispute cannot, in its opinion, be promptly decided or
settled. (Commonwealth Act No. 103, section 19, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 559.) In other words, the
employee, tenant or laborer is inhibited from striking or walking out of his employment only when so enjoined by the
Court of Industrial Relations and after a dispute has been submitted thereto and pending award or decision by the
court of such dispute. It follows that, as in the present case, the employees or laborers may strike before being
ordered not to do so and before an industrial dispute is submitted to the Court of Industrial Relations, subject to the
power of the latter, after hearing when public interest so requires or when the dispute cannot, in its opinion, be
promptly decided or settled, to order them to return, with the consequence that if the strikers fail to return to work,
when so ordered, the court may authorize the employer to accept other employees or laborers. Furthermore, the
jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations does not extend to cases where the number of employees, laborers or
tenant or farm-laborers involved does not exceed thirty, and it is apparent that in any of these cases the prohibition
against a strike pending the determination of the dispute before the Court of Industrial Relations cannot be invoked.
We are here concerned with a definite and well-marked policy of the legislature and not with the extent to which the
policy would go. If the legislature should decide to prohibit or abolish strikes absolutely, as it has attempted to do in
the past, this is its prerogative, not ours. In this case, we cannot supply what we right conceive to be the defects of
the law and interpolate into it what, in our opinion, ought to have been put there by the lawmakers. We can neither
mar nor change a clear legislative policy." 20
4. That was so under Commonwealth Act No. 103. At the most, it was implicit. The Industrial Peace Act made explicit
that a strike in a concerted activity entitled to legal protection. It expressly recognizes the right to of the employees
"to self-organization and to form, join or assist labor organizations of their own choosing for the purpose of collective
bargaining through representatives of their own choosing and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining and other mutual aid or protection." 21 The above provision of law is taken from the Wagner
Act. 22 Commenting on that section of the Wagner Act, Cox says: "Although the National Labor Relations Act is
primarily concerned with safeguarding employees in their right to organize labor unions and bargain collectively, it
also confers important rights to engage in strikes, picketing and other forms of economic pressure. Section 7 created
‘the right to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.’
Section 8(a) (1) forbids an employer to interfere with restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of a right
guaranteed by Section 7. When a peaceful negotiations over wages or hours break down and the employees resort
to a peaceful strike, they are engaging in ‘concerted activities.’" 23
5. That the law should be thus ought not to occasion any surprise. For, in the apt phrase of Justice J.B.L. Reyes, a
strike is "an institutionalized factor of democratic growth." 24 It is a logical corollary to the philosophy of the Industrial
Peace Act, embodying the policy of self-organization and collective bargaining, that to the workers themselves
should be left the determination of whether or not to engage in such concerted activity as a strike. They are free to
select the means for attaining success in their disputes with management. The retirement in the Act that before the
employees may strike, they must file with the Conciliation Service of the Department of Labor a notice of such
intention, should not be given an interpretation so rigid in character as to render nugatory such a right. It would be, to
my mind, to the backward step.
6. On a more specific level, it may be stated that a strike does not automatically carry the stigma of illegality even if
no unfair labor practice were committed by the employer. It suffices if such a believe in good faith is entertained by
labor as the inducing factor for staging a strike. So it was clearly stated by Chief Justice Concepcion, while still an
Associate Justice of this Court: "As a consequence, we hold that the strike in question had been called to offset what
petitioners were warranted in believing in good faith to be unfair labor practices on the part of Management, that
petitioners were not bound, therefore, to wait for the expiration of thirty (30) days from notice of strike before staging
the same, that said strike was not, accordingly, illegal and that the strikers had not thereby lost their status as
employees of respondents herein."25cralaw:red
7. It is to be admitted that a strike may be tainted by illegality if marked by violence. What was within the protection of
the Industrial Peace Act was the concerted activity of cessation of work in order that a union’s economic demands
may be granted or that an employer cease and desist from an unfair labor practice. That was a right recognized by
law, which certainly could not approve of the utilization of force to attain either objective. It is a truism to state that
implicit in the concept of a legal order is the maintenance of peaceful ways. It would follow then that if marred by
violence, a strike could be characterized as illegal. Nonetheless, as was observed in Shell Oil Workers’ Union v.
Shell Company of the Philippines: 26 "Care is to be taken, however, especially where an unfair labor practice is
involved, to avoid stamping it with illegality just because it is tainted by such acts. To avoid rendering illusory the
recognition of the right to strike, responsibility in such a case should be individual and not collective. A different
conclusion would be called for, of course, if the existence of force while the strike lasts is pervasive and widespread,
consistently and deliberately resorted to as a matter of policy. It could be reasonably concluded then that even if
justified as to ends, it becomes illegal because of the means employed." 27 While the Court held in this case that
there was no unfair labor practice, still, from my appraisal of the situation, there was good faith in the belief of the
strikers of its existence.
8. According to the Court: "The CIR also found that the union resorted to unlawful acts in the conduct of the strike.
The picketing was highly coercive. The union prevented the plant supervisor from checking the lead in the ammonia
pipeline, threatened with harm or violence a contractor dealing with the company, barred the entrance into the
company compound trucks loaded with pyrite, used a human barricade to block the ingress of nonstrikers and
supervisors, and displayed a placard with the words ‘Blast off Canahap.’" 28 There is relevance therefore to this
excerpt from the Shell opinion: "Except on those few days specified then, the Shell Company could not allege that
the strike was conducted in a manner other than peaceful. Under the circumstances, it would be going too far to
consider that it thereby became illegal. This is not by any means to condone the utilization of force by labor to attain
its objectives. It is only to show awareness that in labor conflicts, the tension that fills the air was well as the feeling of
frustration and bitterness could break out in sporadic acts of violence. . . . It is enough that individual liability be
incurred by those guilty of such acts of violence that calls for loss of employee status." 29
9. It was realistically observed by retired Chief Justice Concepcion that a strike is usually attended "the excitement,
the heat and the passion of the direct participants in the labor dispute, at the peak thereof . . . ." 30 In insular Life
Assurance Co., Ltd. Employees’ Association v. Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd., 31 there was the recognition by this
Court, speaking through the then Associate, now Chief Justice, Castro, of picketing as such being "inherently
explosive." 32 It is thus clear that not every form of violence suffices to affix the seal of illegality on a strike or to
cause the loss of employment by the guilty party. As was held in the Shell Oil Worker’s Union decision, only such
strikers who were proven to have committed "specific serious acts of violence" could be penalized with loss of
employment. 33
10. Why a mere finding of the illegality of a strike should not be automatically followed by wholesale dismissal was
25
once again stressed in the recent case of Almira v. B. F. Goodrich Philippines, Inc. 34 in these words: "It would imply
at the very least that where a penalty less punitive would suffice, whatever missteps may be committed by labor
ought not to be visited with a consequence so severe. It is not only because of the law’s concern for the workingman.
There is, in addition, his family to consider. Unemployment brings untold hardships and sorrows on those dependent
on the wage-earner. The misery and pain attendant on the loss of jobs then could be avoided if there be acceptance
of the view that under all the circumstances of this case, petitioners should not be deprived of their means of
livelihood. Nor is this to condone what had been done by them. For all this while, since private respondent
considered them separated from the service, they had not been paid. From the strictly juridical standpoint, it cannot
be too strongly stressed, to follow Davis in his masterly work, Discretionary Justice, that where a decision may be
made to rest on informed judgment rather than rigid rules, all the equities of the case must be accorded their due
weight. Finally, labor law determinations, to quote from Bultmann, should be not only secundum rationem but also
secundum caritatem." 35 This decision, it must be noted, was rendered after the effectivity of the present
Constitution.
Hence this dissent in L-33935, there being, to my mind, a failure to meet the more exacting standard to justify
dismissal of strikers, even on the assumption that the strike could be declared illegal.cralawnad
1. According to Article II, Section 6 of the present Constitution: "The State shall promote social justice to ensure the
dignity, welfare, and security of all the people. Towards this end. the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership,
use, enjoyment, and disposition of private property, and equitably diffuse property ownership and profits."cralaw
virtua1aw library
2. According to Article II, Section 9 of the present Constitution: "The State shall afford protection to labor, promote full
employment and equality in employment, ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race, or creed, and
regulate the relations between workers and employers. The State shall assure the rights of workers to self-
organization, collective bargaining, security of tenure, and just and humane conditions of work. The State may
provide for compulsory arbitration."cralaw virtua1aw library
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-59743. May 31, 1982.]
NATIONAL FEDERATION OF SUGAR WORKERS (NFSW), Petitioner, v. ETHELWOLDO R. OVEJERA,
CENTRAL AZUCARERA DE LA CARLOTA (CAC), COL. ROGELIO DEINLA, as Provincial Commander, 3311st
P.C. Command, Negros Occidental, Respondents.
SYNOPSIS
Petitioner, the bargaining respondent Central Azucarera de la Carlota (CAC) employees entered into collective
bargaining agreement with it wherein the parties agreed to maintain the present practice on the grant of Christmas
bonus, milling bonus and amelioration bonus equivalent to 1 1/2 month’s salary. On November 30, 1981, petitioner
and respondent CAC entered into a compromise agreement two days after the petition struck to compel payment of
the 13th month pay agreeing to abide by the final decision of the Supreme Court in any case involving the 13th
month pay if it clearly held that the employer is liable to pay the same separate and distinct from the bonuses already
given. Meanwhile, G.R. No. 51254, Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Marcopper Mining Corporation
which sought to annul the decision of the Labor Deputy Minister granting the 13th month pay to its employees in
addition to mid-year ands Christmas bonuses under a CBA was dismissed on June 11, 1981 on the vote of seven (7)
Justices and the motion for its reconsideration was denied by a vote of five Justices. Thereafter, petitioner struck
after six days notice with the Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE). One day after the commencement of the
strike, petitioner filed a strike vote report with MOLE . The strike was declared illegal by respondent Ovejera for
violation of the 15 day cooling-off period and the 7 day strike ban required by B.P. 130. Without appealing to the
NLRC, the present petition was filed questioning the declaration of illegality of the strike and the denial of the 13th
month pay.
On review, The Supreme Court, in affirming the decision of the deputy of labor minister, ruled that a) the failure of the
NFSW to abide with the mandatory cooling-off period and the 7 day strike ban made the strike illegal and b) the
NFSW cannot insist on its claim that its members are entitled to a 13th month pay in addition to the bonuses already
paid by CAC.
SYLLABUS
1. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; LABOR CODE; STRIKE: COOLING OFF PERIOD AND SEVEN DAY
STRIKE BAN, MANDATORY — The provisions of Article 264 (c, e, f) and Article 265 of the Labor Code hardly leave
any room for doubt that the cooling-off period in Article 264(c) were meant to be and should be deemed, mandatory.
When the law says "the labor union may strike" should the dispute "remain unsettled until the lapse of the requisite
number of days (cooling-off) period from the mandatory filing of the notice," the unmistakable implication is that the
union may not strike before the lapse of the cooling-off period. Similarly, the mandatory character of the 7 day strike
ban after the report on the strike vote is manifest in the provisions that "in every case," the union shall furnish the
MOLE with the results of the voting "at least seven (7) days before the intended strike, subject to the (prescribed)
cooling-off period and the 7 day strike ban must both complied with, although a labor union may take a strike vote
and report within the statutory cooling-off period.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; PURPOSE OF STRIKE NOTICE AND COOLING- OFF PERIOD. — In requiring a strike notice and a
cooling-off period, the avowed intent of the law is to provide an opportunity for mediation and conciliation. It thus
directs the MOLE" to exert all efforts at mediation and reconciliation to effect a voluntary settlement" during the
cooling-off period.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; STRIKE VOTE REPORT, PURPOSE. — The submission of the report gives assurance that a strike
vote has been taken and that, if the report concerning it is false, the majority of the members can take appropriate
remedy before it is too late.
4. ID.; ID.; MANDATORY WAITING PERIOD AFTER STRIKE NOTICE AND STRIKE VOTE REPORT; SAME
CONSTITUTE REASONABLE RESTRICTIONS AND VALID EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER. — The cooling-off
period and the 7 day strike ban after the filing of a strike vote report, as prescribed in Article 264 of the Labor Code,
are reasonable restrictions and their impositions is essential to attain the legitimate policy objectives embodied in the
law. They constitute a valid exercise of the police power of the state.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ILLEGAL WHEN DECLARED BEFORE THE LAPSE OF MANDATORY COOLING-OFF PERIOD
AND THE 7 DAY STRIKE BAN; CASE AT BAR. — The NFSW declared the strike (6) days after filing of strike notice.
i.e., before the lapse of mandatory cooling-off period. It is also file with the MOLE before launching the strike a report
on the strike vote, when it should have filed such report "at least 7 days before the intended strike." Under the
circumstances , the strike stated by petitioner is not in conformity with the law.
6. ID.; P.D. 851; 13th MONTH PAY; PURPOSE. — The intention of the law are revealed by the law itself, was to
grant an additional income in the form of a 13th month pay to employees not receiving the same. Otherwise put, the
intention was to grant some relief — not to all workers — but only to the unfortunate ones not actually paid a 13th
month salary or what amounts to it, by whatever named called; but it was not envisioned that a double burden would
be imposed on the employer already paying his employees a 13th month pay or it is equivalent-whether out of pure
generosity or the basis of a binding agreement and, in the latter case, regardless of the conditional character of the
grant (such as making the payment dependent on the profit), so long as there is actual payment. Otherwise, what
was conceived to be 13th month salary would in effect become a 14th or possibly 15th month pay.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; GRANTY OF EXEMPTION. — Under PD 851, employers already paying their employees a 13th
month pay or its equivalent are not covered by this Decree.
26
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; TERM" ITS EQUIVALENT" DEFINED. — The term "its equivalent" shall include Christmas bonus,
mid-year bonus, profit sharing payments and other cash bonuses amounting to not less than 1/12th of the basic
salary but should not include cash and stock dividents, cost of living allowances and all other allowances regularly
enjoyed by the employee, as well as non- monetary benefits. Where an employer pays less than 1/12th of the
employee’s basic salary, the employer shall pay the difference (Sec. 3(e), Rules implementing PD 851).
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ISSUANCE OF RULES IMPLEMENTING PD 851 SHOULD BE ACCORDED GREAT WEIGHT.
— Having been issued by the agency charged with the implementation of the law, the quoted rule should be
accorded great weight.
10. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; MARCOPPER DECISION NOT DOCTRINAL. — When the compromise agreement between
NFSW and CAC was forged on November 30, 1981 wherein they agreed to abide by the final decision of the
Supreme Court in any cases involving the 13th Month Pay Law if it clearly held that the employer is liable to pay a
13th month pay separate and distinct from the bonuses already given, the original decision dismissing the petition in
the Marcopper case had already been promulgated by this Court. On the votes of only seven Justices, including the
distinguished Chief Justice, the petition of Marcopper employees (in addition to mid-year and Christmas bonuses
under a CBA) had been dismissed. But a motion for reconsideration filed by Marcopper was pending as of November
30, 1981. In December 1981, the original decision was affirmed when this Court finally denied the motion for
reconsideration. But the resolution of the denial was supported by the votes of only five Justices. The Marcopper
decision is therefore a Court decision but without the necessary eight voted to be doctrinal. This being so, it cannot
be said that the Marcopper decision "clearly held" that the" employer is liable to pay the 13th month pay separate
and distinct from the bonuses already given," within the meaning of the NFSW-CAC compromise agreement.
Fernando, C.J., Concurring with qualifications on the questions of the legality of the strike and dissenting on the
interpretation to be accorded Presidential Decree No. 851 on the thirteenth-month additional pay:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; PROTECTION TO LABOR; GRANT OF THE 13-MONTH ADDITIONAL PAY;
PROVISIONS OF LAW THEREON MUST BE CONSTRUED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CONSTITUTION. —
The decisive considerations in the opinion of the Court is the language used both of the applicable provisions of the
Labor Code, Article 264 (C), (e) and (f) and Article 265, as well as the Presidential Decree No. 851. Such an
approach, is limited. The standard that should govern is the one supplied by the Constitution . That is the clear
implication of constitutionalism. Anything less would deprive it of its quality as a fundamental law. Statutes , codes,
decrees, administrative rules, municipal ordinances and nay other jural norms must be construed in the light and in
accordance with the Constitution.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; DECISION IN MARCOPPER MINING CORPORATION v. HON. BLAS OPLE BASED ON THE
SOCIAL JUSTICE CONCEPT. — It is accurate to state that Marcopper as stated in the main opinion, is not doctrinal
character, the necessary eight votes not having been obtained. It is plurality, as distinguished from a majority
opinion. It is quite apparent, however, that there was not a single dissenting vote. There was subsequently a motion
for reconsideration. in the brief resolution denying the motion, with five Justices adhering to their original stand, it was
set forth that such denial was based" primarily on the reason that the arguments advanced had been duly considered
and found insufficient to call for a decision other than that promulgated on June 11, 1981, which stands unreversed
and unmodified. This is a case involving the social justice concept, which, as pointed out in Carillo v. Allied Workers
Association of the Philippines involves ‘the effectiveness of the community’s effort to assist the economically
underprivileged. For under existing conditions, without such succor and support, they might not, unaided, be able to
secure justice for themselves.’ In an earlier decision, Del Rosario v. De los Santos, it was categorically stated that
the social justice principle ‘is the translation into reality of its significance as popularized by the late President
Magsaysay: He who has less in life should have more in law.’" (Resolution dated Dec. 15, 1981).
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 851 TO BE LIBERALLY CONSTRUED IN FAVOR OF THE RIGHTS
OF LABOR. — The social and economic rights found in the 1935 Constitution antedated by thirteen years the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. When it is considered that, as pointed out in the opinion of Justice Antonio in
Alfanta, rendered in the first year of the present Constitution, the social justice principle now lends itself to the
equitable diffusion of property ownership and profits, it becomes difficult for me to justify why any lurking ambiguity in
Presidential Decree No. 851 could be construed against the rights of labor. This Court is not acting unjustly if it
promotes social justice. This Court is not acting unjustly if it protects labor. This Court is just being true to its mission
of fealty to the Constitution. Under the concept of separation of powers, while the political branches enact the laws
and thereafter enforce them, any question as to their Interpretation, justiciable in character, is for the courts,
ultimately this Tribunal, to decide. That is its sworn duty. It cannot be recreant to such a trust. Its role, therefore, is far
from passive. It may be said further that if the object of statutory construction is in the well-known language of
Learned Hand "proliferation of purpose, ‘there is warrant for the view that I espouse. That is to attain its basic
objective, namely, to cope with the ravages of inflation. Moreover, the Decree only benefits the low-salaried
employees. There is thus ample warrant for a more liberal approach.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; EMPLOYERS LIABLE TO PAY THE 13-MONTH PAY SEPARATE AND DISTINCT FROM BONUSES
ALREADY GIVEN. — With the unanimous opinion rendered and a subsequent denial of a motion for reconsideration,
it would appear that while it lacked doctrinal force, this Court "clearly held" that there is liability on the part of the
employer to pay a 13-month pay separate and distinct from the bonuses already given.
5. ID.; ID.; STRIKES; CONSEQUENCES OF ILLEGAL STRIKE MUST BE DEFINED. — The finding of the illegality
of strike based on the codal provisions does not fully resolve the questions raised by such a declaration. From a
reading of the opinion of the Court, it does not go as far as defining the consequences of such illegal strike. The
approach I propose to follow is premised on the two basic mandates of social justice and protection to labor, for while
they are obligations imposed on the government by the fundamental law, compulsory arbitration as a result of which
there could be a finding of illegality, is worded in permissive, not in mandatory language. It would be a departure from
principles to which this Court has long remained committed, if thereby loss of employment, even loss of seniority
rights or other privileges, is ultimately incurred. That is still an open question. The decision has not touched on that
basic aspect of this litigation. The issue is not foreclosed.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; POWER OF COMPULSORY ARBITRATION MUST BE EXERCISED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE OF PROTECTION TO LABOR. — An excerpt from Free Telephone Workers Union
v. The Minister of Labor, G.R. No. 58184, October 30, 1981 states: "It must be stressed that the power of compulsory
arbitration, while allowable under the Constitution and quite understandable in labor disputes affected with a national
interest, to be free from the taint of unconstitutionality, must be exercised in accordance with the constitutional
mandate of protection to labor. The arbiter then is called upon to take due care that in the decision to be reached,
there is no violation of ‘the rights of workers to self-organization, collective bargaining, security of tenure, and just
and humane conditions of work.’ It is of course manifest that there is such unconstitutional application if a law ‘fair on
its face and impartial in appearance is applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye and an unequal
hand. It does not even have to go that far. An instance of unconstitutional application would be discernible if what is
ordained by the fundamental law, the protection of labor, is ignored or disregarded."cralaw virtua1aw library
BARREDO, J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION P.D. 851; 13TH MONTH PAY; MARCOPPER OPINION NOT THE "DEFINITE"
DECISION THE PARTIES HAVE AGREED UPON TO ABIDE. — Justice Barredo concurs fully in the main opinion of
Justice Plana as regards both issues of the strike in question and the non-applicability hereto of whatever has been
said in Marcopper. Looking deeper at the precise wording of the November 30, 1981 agreement between NFSW and
CAC, the proposition in the main opinion that what must be deemed contemplated in said agreement is that the final
decision of the Supreme Court therein referred to must be one wherein it would be "clearly held that the employer is
liable to pay 13th month pay separate and distinct from the bonuses already given," compels concurrence on his
part. Said agreement is definitely worded. There is no room at all for doubts as to the meaning thereof. And tested in
the light of such unambiguous terminology of the said agreement, the Marcopper opinion signed by only seven
members of the Court, cannot, under the Constitution and prevailing binding legal norms, have doctrinal worth and
cannot be considered as stare decisis. Hence, it cannot be said to be the "definite" decision of the Supreme Court
the parties (CAC and NFSW) had in mind. Accordingly, NFSW’s plea in this case is premature and rather off tangent.
ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; P.D. 851; 13th MONTH PAY; EMPLOYERS ALREADY PAYING THEIR
EMPLOYEES A 13th MONTH PAY OR ITS EQUIVALENT EXEMPTED FROM THE OBLIGATION; MARCOPPER
CASE AND CASE AT BAR DISTINGUISHED. — Justice Abad Santos Concurs even as he voted to dismiss the
petition in Marcopper for lack of merit as a result of which Marcopper had to give the 13th month pay provided in P.D.
No. 851 even as its employees under the CBA had mid-year and ended-of-year bonuses. The Marcopper and La
27
Carlota cases different factual situations. In Marcopper, the payment of bonuses under the CBA was contingent upon
the realization of profits. Accordingly, it was fair and proper to conclude that Marcopper had not shown that it was
already paying its employees the 13th month pay or its equivalent as provided in Sec. 2 of P.D. No. 851. In the
instant case of La Carlota, the obligation of the employer to pay bonuses is not contingent on the realization of
profits, thus it can be said that La Carlota is already paying the equivalent of the 13th-month pay. Likewise, in
Marcopper, the company’s liability for the 13th-month pay was determined by no less than the Deputy Minister of
Labor, Amado G. Inciong. In the present case of La Carlota, there has been no determination that the employees are
entitled to the 13th-month pay. In fact, a negative conclusion can be implied from the declaration of Labor Arbiter
Overeja that the labor union’s strike against La Carlota was illegal.
HERRERA, J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; P.D. 851; 13th-MONTH PAY; EMPLOYERS ALREADY PAYING THEIR
EMPLOYEES A 13th-MONTH PAY OR ITS EQUIVALENT EXEMPTED FROM THE OBLIGATION;
ADMINISTRATIVE VIEW ON THE MEANING OF THE TERM "ITS EQUIVALENT" ENTITLED TO GREAT WEIGHT.
— PD 851 does not contain a provision for rules and regulations to be promulgated by the Department of Labor for
implementation of the Decree. Notwithstanding, on December 22, 1975, the Department of Labor issued "Rules and
Regulations implementing Presidential Decree 851" with the relevant provision that the term ‘its equivalent’ as used
in paragraph (c) shall include Christmas bonus, mid-year bonus, profit-sharing payment and other cash bonuses
amounting to not less than 1/12th of the basic salary but shall not include cash and stock dividends, cost of living
allowances and all other allowances regularly enjoyed by the employee, as well as non-monetary benefits. Where an
employer pays less than 1/12th of the employees basic salary, the employer shall pay the difference." Although the
rule defining the term "equivalent" as used in PD 851 does not have the force and effect of law, as the same was not
properly :delegated," it can should be considered as an administrative view entitled to great weight as it is an
interpretation of "equivalent" made by the administrative agency which has the duty to enforce the Decree.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PETITION IN CASE AT BAR DISMISSED FOR LACK OF MERIT. — Justice Herrera concurs
with the dismissal of the Petition for Prohibition with the express statements that La Carlota’s Christmas bonus and
other bonuses exempt it from giving 13th month pay to its employees, and that the strike of January 28, 1982 was
not a ULP strike of January 28, 1982 was not a ULP strike and should be considered illegal even if NFSW had
complied with all statutory requirements for the strike.
This is a petition for prohibition seeking to annul the decision dated February 20, 1982 of Labor Arbiter Ethelwoldo R.
Ovejera of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) with station at the Regional Arbitration Branch No. VI-
A, Bacolod City, which, among others, declared illegal the ongoing strike of the National Federation of Sugar
Workers (NFSW) at the Central Azucarera de la Carlota (CAC), and to restrain the implementation thereof.
I. FACTS —
1. NFSW has been the bargaining agent of CAC rank and file employees (about 1200 of more than 2000 personnel)
and has concluded with CAC a collective bargaining agreement effective February 16, 1981 — February 15, 1984.
Under Art. VII, Sec. 5 of the said CBA —
"Bonuses — The parties also agree to maintain the present practice on the grant of Christmas bonus, milling bonus,
and amelioration bonus to the extent as the latter is required by law."cralaw virtua1aw library
The Christmas and milling bonuses amount to 1-1/2 months’ salary.
2. On November 28, 1981, NFSW struck allegedly to compel the payment of the 13th month pay under PD 851, in
addition to the Christmas, milling and amelioration bonuses being enjoyed by CAC workers.
3. To settle the strike, a compromise agreement was concluded between CAC and NFSW on November 30, 1981.
Under paragraph 4 thereof —
"The parties agree to abide by the final decision of the Supreme Court in any case involving the 13th Month Pay Law
if it is clearly held that the employer is liable to pay a 13th month pay separate and distinct from the bonuses already
given."cralaw virtua1aw library
4. As of November 30, 1981, G.R. No. 51254 (Marcopper Mining Corp. v. Blas Ople and Amado Inciong, Minister
and Deputy Minister of Labor, respectively, and Marcopper Employees Labor Union, Petition forCertiorari and
Prohibition) was still pending in the Supreme Court. The Petition had been dismissed on June 11, 1981 on the vote
of seven Justices. 1 A motion for reconsideration thereafter filed was denied in a resolution dated December 15,
1981, with only five Justices voting for denial. (3 dissented; 2 reserved their votes: 4 did not take part.)
On December 18, 1981 — the decision of June 11, 1981 having become final and executory — entry of judgment
was made.
5. After the Marcopper decision had become final, NFSW renewed its demand that CAC give the 13th month pay.
CAC refused.
6. On January 22, 1982, NFSW filed with the Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE) Regional Office in Bacolod
City a notice to strike based on non-payment of the 13th month pay. Six days after, NFSW struck.
7. One day after the commencement of the strike, or on January 29, 1982, a report of the strike-vote was filed by
NFSW with MOLE.
8. On February 8, 1982, CAC filed a petition (R.A.B. Case No. 0110-82) with the Regional Arbitration Branch VI-A,
MOLE, at Bacolod City to declare the strike illegal, principally for being violative of Batas Pambansa Blg. 130, that is,
the strike was declared before the expiration of the 15-day cooling-off period for unfair labor practice (ULP) strikes,
and the strike was staged before the lapse of seven days from the submission to MOLE of the result of the strike-
vote.
9. After the submission of position papers and hearing, Labor Arbiter Ovejera declared the NFSW strike illegal. The
dispositive part of his decision dated February 20, 1982 reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Wherefore, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1. Declaring the strike commenced by NFSW on January 28, 1982, illegal;
"2. Directing the Central to resume operations immediately upon receipt hereof;
"3. Directing the Central to accept back to work all employees appearing in its payroll as of January 28, 1982 except
those covered by the February 1, 1982 memorandum on preventive suspension but without prejudice to the said
employees’ instituting appropriate actions before this Ministry relative to whatever causes of action they may have
obtained proceeding from said memorandum;
"4. Directing the Central to pay effective from the date of resumption of operations the salaries of those to be placed
on preventive suspension as per February 1, 1982 memorandum during their period of preventive suspension; and
"5. Directing, in view of the finding that the subject strike is illegal, NFSW, its officers, members, as well as
sympathizers to immediately desist from committing acts that may impair or impede the milling operations of the
Central.
"The law enforcement authorities are hereby requested to assist in the peaceful enforcement and implementation of
this Decision.
"SO ORDERED."cralaw virtua1aw library
10. On February 26, 1982, the NFSW — by passing the NLRC — filed the instant Petition for prohibition alleging that
Labor Arbiter Ovejera, CAC and the PC Provincial Commander of Negros Occidental were threatening to
immediately enforce the February 20, 1982 decision which would violate fundamental rights of the petitioner, and
praying that —
28

"WHEREFORE, on the foregoing considerations, it is prayed of the Honorable Court that on the Petition for
Preliminary Injunction, an order, after hearing, issue:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1. Restraining implementation or enforcement of the Decision of February 20, 1982;
"2. Enjoining respondents to refrain from the threatened acts violative of the rights of strikers and peaceful picketers;
"3. Requiring maintenance of the status quo as of February 20, 1982, until further orders of the Court;
and on the Main Petition, judgment be rendered after hearing:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1. Declaring the Decision of February 20, 1982 null and void;
"2. Making the preliminary injunction permanent;
"3. Awarding such other relief as may be just in the premises."cralaw virtua1aw library
11. Hearing was held, after which the parties submitted their memoranda. No restraining order was issued.
II. ISSUES —
The parties have raised a number of issues, including some procedural points. However, considering their relative
importance and the impact of their resolution on ongoing labor disputes in a number of industry sectors, we have
decided — in the interest of expediency and dispatch — to brush aside non-substantial items and reduce the
remaining issues to but two fundamental ones:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. Whether the strike declared by NFSW is illegal, the resolution of which mainly depends on the mandatory or
directory character of the cooling-off period and the 7-day strike ban after report to MOLE of the result of a strike
vote, as prescribed in the Labor Code.
2. Whether under Presidential Decree 851 (13th Month Pay Law), CAC is obliged to give its workers a 13th month
salary in addition to Christmas, milling and amelioration bonuses, the aggregate of which admittedly exceeds by far
the disputed 13th month pay. (See petitioner’s memorandum of April 12, 1982, p. 2; CAC memorandum of April 2,
1982, pp. 3-4.) Resolution of this issue requires an examination of the thrusts and application of PD 851.
III. DISCUSSION —
1. Articles 264 and 265 of the Labor Code, insofar as pertinent, read:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
ART. 264. Strikes, picketing and lockouts. — . . .
"(c) In cases of bargaining deadlocks, the certified or duly recognized bargaining representative may file a notice of
strike with the Ministry (of Labor and Employment) at least thirty (30) days before the intended date thereof. In cases
of unfair labor practices, the period of notice shall be shortened to fifteen (15) days; . . .
x x x "Many disastrous strikes have been staged in the past based merely on the insistence of minority groups within the
"(e) During the cooling-off period, it shall be the duty of the Ministry to exert all efforts at mediation and conciliation to
effect a voluntary settlement. Should the dispute remain unsettled until the lapse of the requisite number of days from
the mandatory filing of the notice, the labor union may strike or the employer may declare a lockout.
"(f) A decision to declare a strike must be approved by at least two-thirds (2/3) of the total union membership in the
bargaining unit concerned by secret ballots in meetings or referenda. A decision to declare a lockout must be
approved by at least two-thirds (2/3) of the board of directors of the employer corporation or association or of the
partners in a partnership obtained by secret ballot in a meeting called for the purpose. The decision shall be valid for
the duration of the dispute based on substantially the same grounds considered when the strike or lockout vote was
taken. The Ministry, may at its own initiative or upon the request of any affected party, supervise the conduct of the
secret balloting. In every case, the union of the employer shall furnish the Ministry the results of the voting at least
seven (7) days before the intended strike or lockout, subject to the cooling-off period herein provided." (Emphasis
supplied)
"ART. 265. Prohibited activities. — It shall be unlawful for any labor organization or employer to declare a strike or
lockout without first having bargained collectively in accordance with Title VII of this Book or without first having filed
the notice required in the preceding Article or without the necessary strike or lockout vote first having been obtained
and reported to the Ministry.
"It shall likewise be unlawful to declare a strike or lockout after assumption of jurisdiction by the President or the
Minister or after certification or submission of the dispute to compulsory or voluntary arbitration or during the
pendency of cases involving the some grounds for the strike or lockout." (Emphasis supplied.)
(a) Language of the law. — The foregoing provisions hardly leave any room for doubt that the cooling-off period in
Art. 264(c) and the 7-day strike ban after the strike-vote report prescribed in Art. 264(f) were meant to be, and should
be deemed, mandatory.
When the law says "the labor union may strike" should the dispute "remain unsettled until the lapse of the requisite
number of days (cooling-off period) from the mandatory filing of the notice," the unmistakable implication is that the
union may not strike before the lapse of the cooling-off period. Similarly, the mandatory character of the 7-day strike
ban after the report on the strike-vote is manifest in the provision that "in every case," the union shall furnish the
MOLE with the results of the voting "at least seven (7) days before the intended strike, subject to the (prescribed)
cooling-off period." It must be stressed that the requirements of cooling-off period and 7-day strike ban must both be
complied with, although the labor union may take a strike vote and report the same within the statutory cooling-off
period.
If only the filing of the strike notice and the strike-vote report would be deemed mandatory, but not the waiting
periods so specifically and emphatically prescribed by law, the purposes (hereafter discussed) for which the filing of
the strike notice and strike-vote report is required would not be achieved, as when a strike is declared immediately
after a strike notice is served, or when — as in the instant case — the strike-vote report is filed with MOLE after the
strike had actually commenced. Such interpretation of the law ought not and cannot be countenanced. It would
indeed be self-defeating for the law to imperatively require the filing on a strike notice and strike-vote report without
at the same time making the prescribed waiting periods mandatory.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
(b) Purposes of strike notice and strike-vote report. — In requiring a strike notice and a cooling-off period, the
avowed intent of the law is to provide an opportunity for mediation and conciliation. It thus directs the MOLE "to exert
all efforts at mediation and conciliation to effect a voluntary settlement" during the cooling-off period. As applied to
the CAC-NFSW dispute regarding the 13th month pay, MOLE intervention could have possibly induced CAC to
provisionally give the 13th month pay in order to avert great business loss arising from the project strike, without
prejudice to the subsequent resolution of the legal dispute by competent authorities; or mediation conciliation could
have convinced NFSW to at least postpone the intended strike so as to avoid great waste and loss to the sugar
central, the sugar planters and the sugar workers themselves, if the strike would coincide with the milling season.
So, too, the 7-day strike-vote report is not without a purpose. As pointed out by the Solicitor General —
union. The submission of the report gives assurance that a strike vote has been taken and that, if the report
concerning it is false, the majority of the members can take appropriate remedy before it is too late." (Answer of
public respondents, pp. 17-18.)
If the purpose of the required strike notice and strike-vote report are to be achieved, the periods prescribed for their
attainment must, as aforesaid, be deemed mandatory.
". . . when a fair interpretation of the statute, which directs acts or proceedings to be done in a certain way, shows the
legislature intended a compliance with such provision to be essential to the validity of the act or proceeding, or when
some antecedent and prerequisite conditions must exist prior to the exercise of power or must be performed before
29
certain other powers can be exercised, the statute must be regarded as mandatory. So it has been held that, when a
statute is founded on public policy [such as the policy to encourage voluntary settlement of disputes without resorting
to strikes], those to whom it applies should not be permitted to waive its provisions. (82 C.J.S. 873-874. Bracketed
words supplied.)
(c) Waiting period after strike notice and strike-vote report, valid regulation of right to strike. — To quote Justice
Jackson in International Union v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 336 U.S. 245, at 259 —
"The right to strike, because of its more serious impact upon the public interest, is more vulnerable to regulation than
the right to organize and select representatives for lawful purposes of collective bargaining . . ."cralaw virtua1aw
library
The cooling-off period and the 7-day strike ban after the filing of a strike-vote report, as prescribed in Art. 264 of the
Labor Code, are reasonable restrictions and their imposition is essential to attain the legitimate policy objectives
embodied in the law. We hold that they constitute a valid exercise of the police power of the state.
(d) State policy on amicable settlement of criminal liability. — Petitioner contends that since the non-compliance (with
PD 851) imputed to CAC is an unfair labor practice which is an offense against the state, the cooling-off period
provided in the Labor Code would not apply, as it does not apply to ULP strikes. It is argued that mediation or
conciliation in order to settle a criminal offense is not allowed.
In the first place, it is at best unclear whether the refusal of CAC to give a 13th month pay to NFSW constitutes a
criminal act. Under Sec. 9 of the Rules and regulations Implementing Presidential Decree No. 851 —
"Non-payment of the thirteenth-month pay provided by the Decree and these rules shall be treated as money claims
cases and shall be processed in accordance with the Rules Implementing the Labor Code of the Philippines and the
Rules of the National Labor Relations Commission."cralaw virtua1aw library
Secondly, the possible dispute settlement, either permanent or temporary, could very well be along legally
permissible lines, as indicated in (b) above or assume the form of measures designed to abort the intended strike,
rather than compromise criminal liability, if any. Finally, amicable settlement of criminal liability is not inexorably
forbidden by law. Such settlement is valid when the law itself clearly authorizes it. In the case of a dispute on the
payment of the 13th month pay, we are not prepared to say that its voluntary settlement is not authorized by the
terms of Art. 264(e) of the Labor Code, which makes it the duty of the MOLE to exert all efforts at mediation and
conciliation to effect a voluntary settlement of labor disputes.
(e) NFSW strike is illegal. — The NFSW declared the strike six (6) days after filing a strike notice, i.e., before the
lapse of the mandatory cooling-off period. It also failed to file with the MOLE before launching the strike a report on
the strike-vote, when it should have filed such report "at least seven (7) days before the intended strike." Under the
circumstances, we are perforce constrained to conclude that the strike staged by petitioner is not in conformity with
law. This conclusion makes it unnecessary for us to determine whether the pendency of an arbitration case against
CAC on the same issue of payment of 13th month pay [R.A.B. No. 512-81, Regional Arbitration Branch No. VI-A,
NLRC, Bacolod City, in which the National Congress of Unions in the Sugar Industry of the Philippines (NACUSIP)
and a number of CAC workers are the complainants, with NFSW as Intervenor seeking the dismissal of the
arbitration case as regards unnamed CAC rank and file employees] has rendered illegal the above strike under Art.
265 of the Labor Code which provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"It shall likewise be unlawful to declare a strike or lockout after assumption of jurisdiction by the President or the
Minister, or after certification or submission of the dispute to compulsory or voluntary arbitration or during the
pendency of cases involving the same grounds for the strike or lockout." (Emphasis supplied.)
(2) The Second Issue. — At bottom, the NFSW strike arose from a dispute on the meaning and application of PD
851, with NFSW claiming entitlement to a 13th month pay on top of bonuses given by CAC to its workers, as against
the diametrically opposite stance of CAC. Since the strike was just an offshoot of the said dispute, a simple decision
on the legality or illegality of the strike would not spell the end of the NFSW-CAC labor dispute. And considering
further that there are other disputes and strikes — actual and impending — involving the interpretation and
application of PD 851, it is important for this Court to definitively resolve the problem: whether under PD 851, CAC is
obliged to give its workers a 13th month salary in addition to Christmas, milling and amelioration bonuses stipulated
in a collective bargaining agreement amounting to more than a month’s pay.
Keenly sensitive to the needs of the workingmen, yet mindful of the mounting production cost that are the woe of
capital which provides employment to labor, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 851 on
16 December 1975. Thereunder, "all employers are hereby required to pay all their employees receiving a basic
salary of not more than P1,000 a month, regardless of the nature of their employment, a 13th month pay not later
than December 24 of every year." Exempted from the obligation however are:chanrobles.com : virtual law library
"Employers already paying their employees a 13th month pay or its equivalent . . ." (Section 2.)
The evident intention of the law, as revealed by the law itself, was to grant an additional income in the form of a 13th
month pay to employees not already receiving the same. Otherwise put, the intention was to grant some relief — not
to all workers — but only to the unfortunate ones not actually paid a 13th month salary or what amounts to it, by
whatever name called; but it was not envisioned that a double burden would be imposed on the employer already
paying his employees a 13th month pay or its equivalent — whether out of pure generosity or on the basis of a
binding agreement and, in the latter case, regardless of the conditional character of the grant (such as making the
payment dependent on profit), so long as there is actual payment. Otherwise, what was conceived to be a 13th
month salary would in effect become a 14th or possibly 15th month pay.
This view is justified by the law itself which makes no distinction in the grant of exemption: "Employers already
paying their employees a 13th month pay or its equivalent are not covered by this Decree." (P.D. 851.)
The Rules Implementing P.D. 851 issued by MOLE immediately after the adoption of said law reinforce this stand.
(Under Section 3(e) thereof —
"The term ‘its equivalent’ . . . shall include Christmas bonus, mid-year bonus, profit-sharing payments and other cash
bonuses amounting to not less than 1/12th of the basic salary but shall not include cash and stock dividends, cost of
living allowances and all other allowances regularly enjoyed by the employee, as well as non-monetary benefits.
Where an employer pays less than 1/12th of the employee’s basic salary, the employer shall pay the difference."
(Italics supplied.)
Having been issued by the agency charged with the implementation of PD 851 as its contemporaneous interpretation
of the law, the quoted rule should be accorded great weight.
Pragmatic considerations also weigh heavily in favor of crediting both voluntary and contractual bonuses for the
purpose of determining liability for the 13th month pay. To require employers (already giving their employees a 13th
month salary or its equivalent) to give a second 13th month pay would be unfair and productive of undesirable
results. To the employer who had acceded and is already bound to give bonuses to his employees, the additional
burden of a 13th month pay would amount to a penalty for his munificence or liberality. The probable reaction of one
so circumstanced would be to withdraw the bonuses or resist further voluntary grants for fear that if and when a law
is passed giving the same benefits, his prior concessions might not be given due credit; and this negative attitude
would have an adverse impact on the employees.
In the case at bar, the NFSW-CAC collective bargaining agreement provides for the grant to CAC workers of
Christmas bonus, milling bonus and amelioration bonus, the aggregate of which is very much more than a worker’s
monthly pay. When a dispute arose last year as to whether CAC workers receiving the stipulated bonuses would
additionally be entitled to a 13th month pay, NFSW and CAC concluded a compromise agreement by which they —
"agree(d) to abide by the final decision of the Supreme Court in any case involving the 13th Month Pay Law if it is
clearly held that the employer is liable to pay a 13th month pay separate and distinct from the bonuses already
given."cralaw virtua1aw library
When this agreement was forged on November 30, 1981, the original decision dismissing the petition in the
aforecited Marcopper case had already been promulgated by this Court. On the votes of only 7 Justices, including
the distinguished Chief Justice, the petition of Marcopper Mining Corp. seeking to annul the decision of Labor Deputy
Minister Amado Inciong granting a 13th month pay to Marcopper employees (in addition to mid-year and Christmas
30
bonuses under a CBA) had been dismissed. But a motion for reconsideration filed by Marcopper was pending as of
November 30, 1981. In December 1981, the original decision was affirmed when this Court finally denied the motion
for reconsideration. But the resolution of denial was supported by the votes of only 5 Justices. The Marcopper
decision is therefore a Court decision but without the necessary eight votes to be doctrinal. This being so, it cannot
be said that the Marcopper decision "clearly held" that "the employer is liable to pay a 13th month pay separate and
distinct from the bonuses already given," within the meaning of the NFSW-CAC compromise agreement. At any rate,
in view of the rulings made herein, NFSW cannot insist on its claim that its members are entitled to a 13th month pay
in addition to the bonuses already paid by CAC. WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit. No
costs.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
SO ORDERED.
Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, C.J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Concurring with qualifications on the questions of the legality of the strike and dissenting on the interpretation to be
accorded Presidential Decree No. 851 on the thirteenth-month additional pay:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
There is at the outset due acknowledgment on my part of the high quality of craftsmanship in the opinion of the Court
penned by Justice Efren Plana. It is distinguished by its lucidity. There is the imprint of inevitability in the conclusion
reached based on the basic premise that underlies it. So it should be if the decisive consideration is the language
used both of the applicable provisions of the Labor Code, Article 264 (c), (e), and (f) and Article 265, as well as of
Presidential Decree No. 851. In that sense, the decision of the Court can stand the test of scrutiny based on sheer
logic.
That for me would not suffice. Such an approach, to my mind, is quite limited. The standard that should govern is the
one supplied by the Constitution. That is the clear implication of constitutionalism. Anything less would deprive it of
its quality as the fundamental law. It is my submission, therefore, that statutes, codes, decrees, administrative rules,
municipal ordinances and any other jural norms must be construed in the light of and in accordance with the
Constitution. There is this explicit affirmation in the recently decided case of De la Llana v. Alba sustaining the
validity of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 reorganizing the judiciary: "The principle that the Constitution enters into and
forms part of every act to avoid any unconstitutional taint must be applied. Nuñez v. Sandiganbayan, promulgated
last January, has this relevant excerpt: ‘It is true that the other Sections of the Decree could have been so worded as
to avoid any constitutional objection. As of now, however, no ruling is called for. The view is given expression in the
concurring and dissenting opinion of Justice Makasiar that in such a case to save the Decree from the dire fate of
invalidity, they must be construed in such a way as to preclude any possible erosion on the powers vested in this
Court by the Constitution. That is a proposition too plain to be contested. It commends itself for approval.’" 1
1. It may not be amiss to start with the dissenting portion of this separate opinion. It is worthwhile to recall the
decision in Marcopper Mining Corporation v. Hon. Blas Ople. 2 It came from a unanimous Court. It is true that only
seven Justices signed the opinion, two of the members of this Tribunal, who participated in the deliberation, Justices
Teehankee and Melencio-Herrera having reserved their votes. Justice Concepcion Jr. was on leave. It is accurate,
therefore, to state that Marcopper as stated in Justice Plana’s opinion, is not doctrinal in character, the necessary
eight votes not having been obtained. It is a plurality as distinguished from a majority opinion. It is quite apparent,
however, that there was not a single dissenting vote. There was subsequently a motion for reconsideration. This
Court duly weighed the arguments for and against the merit of the unanimous opinion rendered. The resolution
denying the motion for reconsideration was not issued until December 15, 1981 on which occasion three Justices
dissented. 3 In the brief resolution denying the option for reconsideration, with five Justices adhering to their original
stand 4 it was set forth that such denial was based: "primarily [on] the reason that the arguments advanced had been
duly considered and found insufficient to call for a decision other than that promulgated on June 11, 1981, which
stands unreversed and unmodified. This is a case involving the social justice concept, which, as pointed out in Carillo
v. Allied Workers Association of the Philippines involves ‘the effectiveness of the community’s effort to assist the
economically under-privileged. For under existing conditions, without such succor and support, they might not,
unaided, be able to secure justice for themselves.’ In an earlier decision, Del Rosario v. De los Santos, it was
categorically stated that the social justice principle ‘is the translation into reality of its significance as popularized by
the late President Magsaysay: He who has less in life should have more in law.’" 5 In his dissent, Justice Fernandez
took issue on the interpretation of social justice by relying on the well-known opinion of Justice Laurel in Calalang v.
Williams 6 and concluded: "It is as much to the benefit of labor that the petitioner be accorded social justice. For if
the mining companies, like the petitioner, can no longer operate, all the laborers employed by aid company shall be
laid-off." 7 To reinforce such a conclusion, it was further stated: "The decision in this case is far reaching. It affects all
employers similarly situated as the petitioner. The natural reaction of employers similarly situated as the petitioner
will be to withdraw gratuities that they have been giving employees voluntarily. In the long run, the laborers will
suffer. In the higher interest of all concerned the contention of the petitioner that the mid-year bonus and Christmas
bonus that it is giving to the laborers shall be applied to the 13th month pay should be sustained." 8 Such pragmatic
consideration is likewise evident in the opinion of the Court in this case. It is quite obvious from the above resolution
of denial that the approach based on the Constitution, compelling in its character set forth in the opinion of the Court
of June 11, 1981, is the one followed by the members of this Court either adhering to or departing from the previous
unanimous conclusion reached. The main reliance to repeat, is on the social justice provision 9 as reinforced by the
protection to labor provision. 10 As noted, such concepts were enshrined in the 1930 Constitution. 11 The opinion
pursued the matter further: "Even then, there was a realization of their importance in vitalizing a regime of liberty not
just as immunity from government restraint but as the assumption by the State of an obligation to assure a life of
dignity for all, especially the poor and the needy. The expanded social justice and protection to labor provisions of
the present Constitution lend added emphasis to the concern for social and economic rights. . . . That was so under
the 1935 Constitution. Such an approach is even more valid now. As a matter of fact, in the first case after the
applicability of the 1973 constitution where social and economic rights were involved, this Court in Alfanta v. Noe,
through Justice Antonio, stated: ‘In the environment of a new social order We can do no less. Thus, under the new
Constitution, property ownership has been impressed with a social function. This implies that the owner has the
obligation to use his property not only to benefit himself but society as well. Hence, it provides under Section 6 of
Article II thereof, that in the promotion of social justice, the State "shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use,
enjoyment, and disposition of private property, and equitably diffuse property ownership and profits." The
Constitution also ensures that the worker shall have a just and living wage which should assure for himself and his
family an existence worthy of human dignity and give him opportunity for a better life.’ Such a sentiment finds
expression in subsequent opinions." 12
2. It thus becomes apparent, therefore, why predicated on what for me is the significance of the social justice and the
protection to labor mandates of the Constitution, I cannot, with due respect, concur with my brethren. The stand
taken by this Court, I submit, cannot be justified by the hitherto hospitable scope accorded such provisions. It is to
the credit of this Administration that even during the period of crisis government, the social and economic rights were
fully implemented. As a matter of fact, some critics, not fully informed of the actual state of affairs, would predicate
their assessment of its accomplishments in this sphere on their inaccurate and unsympathetic appraisal of how much
success had been achieved. It is a matter of pride for the Philippines that as far back as her 1935 Constitution,
provisions assuring liberty in its positive sense, enabling her citizens to live a life of humanity and dignity, were
already incorporated. The social and economic rights found therein antedated by thirteen years the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. When it is considered that, as pointed out in the opinion of Justice Antonio in Alfanta,
rendered in the first year of the present Constitution, the social justice principle now lends itself to the equitable
diffusion of property ownership and profits, it becomes difficult for me to justify why any lurking ambiguity in
Presidential Decree No. 851 could be construed against the rights of labor. This Court is not acting unjustly if it
promotes social justice. This Court is not acting unjustly if it protects labor. This Court is just being true to its mission
of fealty to the Constitution. Under the concept of separation of powers, while the political branches enact the laws
and thereafter enforce them, any question as to their interpretation, justiciable in character, is for the courts,
ultimately this Tribunal, to decide. That is its sworn duty. It cannot be recreant to such a trust. Its role, therefore, is far
from passive. It may be said further that if the object of statutory construction is in the well-known language of
Learned Hand "proliferation of purpose," there is warrant for the view that I espouse. That is to attain its basic
objective, namely, to cope with the ravages of inflation. Moreover, the Decree only benefits the low-salaried
employees. There is thus ample warrant for a more liberal approach. It only remains to be added that there was in
Marcopper not only a recognition of the administrative determination by the Minister of Labor as well as the then
Deputy Minister of Labor but also an acceptance of the ably-written memorandum of Solicitor General Mendoza.
Hence, to repeat, my inability to concur on this point with my brethren whose views, as I stated earlier, are deserving
of the fullest respect.
3. There is, however — and it must be so recognized — an obstacle to the approach above followed. There is an
agreement both on the part of management and labor in this case quoted in the main opinion to this effect, "to abide
31
by the final decision of the Supreme Court in any case involving the 13th Month Pay Law if it is clearly held that the
employer is liable to pay a 13th month pay separate and distinct from the bonuses already given." Such an obstacle,
on further reflection, is not, for me, insurmountable. The only case then within the contemplation of the parties is
Marcopper. With the unanimous opinion rendered and a subsequent denial of a motion for reconsideration, it would
appear that while it lacked doctrinal force, this Court "clearly held" that there is liability on the part of the employer to
pay a 13-month pay separate and distinct from the bonuses already given. Perhaps the parties, especially labor,
could have been more accurate and more precise. It take comfort from the view expressed by Justice Cardozo in
Wood v. Duff-Gordon: 13 "The law has outgrown its primitive stage of formalism when the precise word was the
sovereign talisman, and every slip was fatal. It takes a broader view today. A promise may be lacking, and yet the
whole writing may be ‘instinct with an obligation,’ imperfectly expressed." 14
4. Now as to the qualified concurrence. Based on the codal provisions the finding of the illegality of strike is
warranted. That for me does not fully resolve the questions raised by such a declaration. From my reading of the
opinion of the Court, it does not go as far as defining the consequences of such illegal strike. Again the approach I
propose to follow is premised on the two basic mandates of social justice and protection to labor, for while they are
obligations imposed on the government by the fundamental law, compulsory arbitration as a result of which there
could be a finding of illegality is worded in permissive not in mandatory language. It would be, for me, a departure
from principles to which this Court has long remained committed, if thereby loss of employment, even loss of
seniority rights or other privileges is ultimately incurred. That is still an open question. The decision has not touched
on that basic aspect of this litigation. The issue is not foreclosed. It seems fitting that this brief concurrence and
dissent should end with a relevant excerpt from Free Telephone Workers Union v. The Minister of Labor: 15 "It must
be stressed anew, however, that the power of compulsory arbitration, while allowable under the Constitution and
quite understandable in labor disputes affected with a national interest, to be free from the taint of unconstitutionality,
must be exercised in accordance with the constitutional mandate of protection to labor. The arbiter then is called
upon to take due care that in the decision to be reached, there is no violation of ‘the rights of workers to self-
organization, collective bargaining, security of tenure, and just and humane conditions of work.’ It is of course
manifest that there is such unconstitutional application if a law ‘fair on its face and impartial in appearance [is] applied
and administered by public authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand.’ It does not even have to go that far. An
instance of unconstitutional application would be discernible if what is ordained by the fundamental law, the
protection of labor, is ignored or disregarded." 16
I am authorized to state that Justice Makasiar joins me in this separate opinion.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
BARREDO, J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
At this stage of my tenure in the Supreme Court which is to end in about four months from now, I feel it is but fitting
and proper that I make my position clear and unmistakable in regard to certain principles that have to be applied to
this labor case now before Us. Few perhaps may have noticed it, but the fact is that in most cases of this nature I
have endeavored my very best to fully abide by the part that pertains to the judiciary in the social justice and
protection to labor clauses of the Constitution, not alone because I consider it as an obligation imposed by the
fundamental law of the land but by natural inclination, perhaps because I began to work as a common worker at the
age of thirteen, and I cannot in any sense be considered as a capitalist or management-inclined just because I
happen to have joined, within the legal bounds of the position I occupy, some business ventures with the more
affluent members of my family and with some good and faithful old time friends. I need not say that I am pro-labor; I
only wish to deny most vehemently that I am anti-labor.
Having been one of the seven members of the Court who cosigned with our learned Chief Justice the Marcopper
"decision" and later on reserved my vote when a motion for reconsideration thereof was filed for me to concur now by
merely cosigning the brilliant opinion of our distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice Plana, is to my mind short of what all
concerned might expect from me. For me to merely vote in support of the judgment herein without any explanation of
my peculiar situation does not satisfy my conscience, not to mention that I owe such explanation to those who would
all probably be raising their eyebrows since they must come to feel they could depend on me to always vote in favor
of labor.
The Supreme Court is a court of law and of equity at the same time but, understandably, equity comes in only when
law is inadequate to afford the parties concerned the essence of justice, fairness and square dealing. It is to this
basic tenet that I am bound by my oath of office before God and our people. Having this ideal in mind, the paramount
thought that should dominate my actuations is complete and absolute impartiality in the best light God has given me.
Hence, when the aid of the Court is sought on legal grounds, We can resort to equity only when there is no law that
can be properly applied. My view of the instant case is that it is one of law, not of equity. It is on this fundamental
basis that I have ventured to write this concurrence.chanrobles law library : red
Looking back at my concurrence in Marcopper, and guided by the observations in the main opinion herein, as to the
doctrinal value of Our decision therein, I have come to the realization, after mature deliberation, that the conclusion
reached in the opinion of the Chief Justice may not always be consistent with the evident intent and purpose of
Section 2 of P.D. No. 851 which, indeed, unequivocally provides that" (E)mployers already paying their employees a
13th month pay or its equivalent are not covered by this decree", albeit it does not clarify what it means by the
"equivalent" of the 13th month pay. Such being the case, nothing can be more proper than for everyone to abide by
or at least give due respect to the meaning thereof as has been officially expressed by the usual executive authority
called upon to implement the same, none other than the Ministry of Labor (MOLE, for short), unless, of course, the
understanding of MOLE appears to be manifestly and palpably erroneous and completely alien to the evident intent
of the decree. And Section 3(e) of the Rules Implementing P.D. 851 issued by MOLE reads
thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The term ‘its equivalent’ as used in paragraph (c) hereof shall include Christmas bonus, midyear bonus, profit-
sharing payments and other cash bonuses amounting to not less than 1/12th of the basic salary but shall not include
cash and stock dividends, cost of living allowances and all other allowances regularly enjoyed by the employee, as
well as non-monetary benefits. Where an employer pays less than 1/12th of the employee’s basic salary, the
employer shall pay the difference."cralaw virtua1aw library
Petitioner National Federation of Sugar, Workers (NFSW, for short) is now before Us with the plea that because in its
agreement with respondent Central Azucarera de la Carlota (CAC, for short) of November 30, 1981 to the effect
that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The parties agree to abide by the final decision of the Supreme Court in any case involving the 13th Month Pay Law
if it is clearly held that the employer is liable to pay a 13th month pay separate and distinct from the bonuses already
given." (Par. 4)
and because this Court dismissed, in legal effect, for lack of necessary votes, the petition in the Marcopper case
seeking the setting aside of Deputy Minister Inciong’s decision which considered the midyear and Christmas
bonuses being given to the Marcopper workers as not the equivalent of the 13th month pay enjoined by P.D. 851,
We should now order CAC to pay NFSW members in the same way as stated in the opinion of the Chief Justice in
the Marcopper case.
At first glance, such a pause does appear tenable and plausible. But looking deeper at the precise wording of the
November 30, 1981 agreement between NFSW and CAC abovequoted, the proposition in the main opinion herein
that what must be deemed contemplated in said agreement is that the final decision of the Supreme Court therein
referred to must be one wherein it would be "clearly held that the employer is liable to pay 13th month pay separate
and distinct from the bonuses already given", compels concurrence on my part. I find said agreement to be definitely
worded. There is no room at all for doubt as to the meaning thereof. And tested in the light of such unambiguous
terminology of the said agreement, the Marcopper opinion signed by only seven members of this Court, cannot,
under the Constitution and prevailing binding legal norms, unfortunately, have doctrinal worth and cannot be
considered as stare decisis. Hence, it cannot be said to be the "definite" decision of the Supreme Court the parties
(CAC and NFSW) had in mind. Accordingly, it is my considered opinion that NFSW’s plea in this case is premature
and rather off tangent.cralawnad
I am not unmindful of the possibility or even probability that labor may argue that in signing the November 30. 1981
agreement, NFSW little cared, for it was not fully informed about what doctrinal and what is not doctrinal signify in
law. Labor may argue that it is enough that Marcopper workers got their 13th month pay in addition to their bonuses
by virtue of the denial by this Supreme Court of Marcopper Company’s appeal to US, and NFSW members should
not be left getting less. And it would only be rational to expect labor to invoke in support of their plea no less than the
social justice and protection to labor provisions of the Constitution.
As I have said at the outset, I am about to leave this Court. Nothing could warm my heart and lift my spirit more than
32
to part with the noble thought that during my tenure of fourteen years in this Supreme Court, I have given labor the
most that it has been within my power to give. But again I must emphasize that what is constitutionally ordained, and
by that I mean also by God and by our country and people, is for me to jealously guard that the scales of justice are
in perfect balance. No fondness for any sector of society, no love for any man or woman, no adherence to any
political party, no feeling for any relative or friend nor religious consideration or belief should ever induce me to allow
it to tilt in the slightest degree in favor of anyone.
The concept of social justice has been variously explained in previous decisions of this Court. In Talisay Silay, 1
penned by this writer, We went as far as to hold that when it comes to labor-management relationship, the social
justice principle is more pervasive and imperious than police power. It is indeed consecrated as one of the most
valued principles of national policy in the Constitution. (Sec. 6, Art. II) So also is protection to labor. (Sec. 9, Id.) I am
of the firm conviction, however, that these constitutional injunctions are primarily directed to and are responsibilities
of the policy-determining departments of the government. In the enforcement of said principles, the role of the
judiciary is to a certain degree less active. The courts are supposed to be called upon only to strike down any act or
actuation, of anyone violative thereof, and, of course, in case of doubt in any given situation, to resolve the same in
favor of labor. Verily, neither the Supreme Court nor any other court is enjoined to favor labor merely for labor’s sake,
even as the judiciary is duty bound never to place labor at a disadvantage, for that would not be only unconstitutional
but inhuman, contrary to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and unpardonably degrading to the dignity of
man who has been precisely created in the image of God. At bottom, the ideal in social justice is precisely to
maintain the forces of all the economic segments of society in undisturbed and undisturbable equilibrium, as
otherwise there would be no justice for anyone of them at all.
In the case at bar, I do not feel at liberty to disregard what the parties have freely agreed upon, assuming, as I must,
that in entering into such agreement both parties were fully aware of their legal rights and responsibilities. In this
connection, I take particular note of the fact that if CAC is a big financially well conditioned concern, NFSW is not just
one ignorant laborer or group of laborers, but a federation with leaders and lawyers of adequate if not expert
knowledge-ability in regard to their rights and other relevant matters affecting labor. I am satisfied that there is here
no occasion to apply the Civil Code rule regarding vigilance whenever there is inequality in the situations of the
parties to an agreement or transaction.chanrobles law library : red
In conclusion, I concur fully in the main opinion of Justice Plana as regards both issues of illegality of the strike here
in question and the non-applicability hereto of whatever has been said in Marcopper. I have added the above
remarks only to make myself clear on labor-management issues before I leave this Court, lest there be no other
appropriate occasion for me to do so.
ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
I concur but lest I be accused of inconsistency because in Marcopper Mining Corporation v. Ople, Et Al., No. 51254,
June 11, 1981, 105 SCRA 75, I voted to dismiss the petition for lack of merit and as a result Marcopper had to give
the 13th month pay provided in P.D. No. 851 even as its employees under the CBA had mid-year and end-of-year
bonuses, I have to state that Marcopper and La Carlota have different factual situations as follows:chanrobles virtual
lawlibrary
1. In Marcopper, the CBA clearly stated that the company was obligated to "grant mid-year and end-of-year bonuses
to employees following years in which it had profitable operations." Thus the payment of the bonuses was contingent
upon the realization of profits. If there were no profits, there were to be no bonuses. Accordingly, it was fair and
proper to conclude that Marcopper had not shown that it was already paying its employees the 13th-month pay or its
equivalent as provided in Sec. 2 of P.D. No. 851. However, in the instant case of La Carlota the obligation of the
employer to pay bonuses is not contingent on the realization of profits. The CBA stipulates that the "parties also
agree to maintain the present practice on the grant of Christmas bonus, milling bonus, and amelioration bonus to the
extent as the latter is required by law." It can thus be said that La Carlota is already paying the equivalent of the
13th-month pay.
2. In Marcopper, the company’s liability for the 13th-month pay was determined by no less than the Deputy Minister
of Labor, Amado G. Inciong. I have always given much weight to the determination of officers who are tasked with
implementing legislation because their expertise qualifies them in making authoritative decisions. In the present case
of La Carlota, there has been no determination that the employees are entitled to the 13th-month pay. In fact, a
negative conclusion can be implied from the declaration of Labor Arbiter Ovejera that the labor union’s strike against
La Carlota was illegal.
De Castro, J., concurs.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
A. The question of law involved in this Petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction is based on the following
relevant facts which are indicated in the record:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. Prior to December 16, 1975, Central Azucarera de la Carlota (LA CARLOTA, for short), which operates a sugar
mill in La Carlota, Negros Occidental, may be deemed as paying to its employees milling bonus, amelioration bonus,
and Christmas bonus equal at least to a months’ salary.
2. PD 851, effective on the aforementioned date of December 16, 1975, required employers to pay their employees a
13th month pay, provided the employer was not already paying the said 13th month pay or its equivalent.
3. On December 22, 1975, the then Department of Labor promulgated a regulation stating that "Christmas bonus" is
an equivalent of the 13th month pay.
4. From 1975 to 1981, LA CARLOTA was not paying 13th month pay on the assumption that the "Christmas bonus"
it was paying was an "equivalent" of the 13th month pay. The employees of LA CARLOTA and their labor unions had
not protested the non-payment of the 13th month pay in addition to the Christmas bonus.
5. On June 11, 1981, this Court promulgated its Decision in the "Marcopper" case, which involved a relationship
between the" 13th month pay" and the "Christmas bonus" being paid by an employer. A Motion for reconsideration of
the Decision was subsequently filed in said case, which was denied only on December 15, 1981.
6. In the meantime, on November 29, 1981, the National Federation of Sugar Workers (NFSW), as the labor union
representing the majority of employees at LA CARLOTA, staged a strike because LA CARLOTA had refused to pay
the 13th month pay in addition to Christmas bonus. The strike lasted one day as, on November 30, 1981, LA
CARLOTA and NFSW entered into a settlement agreement, paragraph 4 whereof provided as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"4. The parties agree to abide by the final decision of the Supreme Court in any case involving the 13th Month Pay
Law if it is clearly held that the employer is liable to pay a 13th Month Pay separate and distinct from the bonuses
already given;"
7. On January 28, 1982, NFSW declared a strike on the ground that, despite the finality of the Marcopper Decision,
LA CARLOTA had refused to grant 13th month pay to its employees, in addition to Christmas bonus, as agreed upon
in the settlement agreement of November 30, 1981.
B. The legal controversy in the matter may be explained as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. NFSW filed a notice of strike on January 22, 1982, claiming that the contemplated strike was based on an unfair
labor practice, and that it could declare the strike even before the expiration of fifteen (15) days thereafter. The unfair
labor practice relied upon was management’s alleged renegation of the November 30, 1981 agreement, considering
that the finality of the Marcopper Decision had "clearly held that the employer is liable to pay a 13th month pay
separate and distinct from "the Christmas bonus."
2. On the other hand, LA CARLOTA took the position that the strike was not a ULP strike but an economic strike
subject to a cooling period of thirty (30) days with its attendant requirements.
3. It is clear that the controversy between NFSW and LA CARLOTA substantially hinges on the question of whether
or not the Marcopper Decision has clearly held that a Christmas bonus, in whatsoever form, should not deter the
employer’s obligation to the payment of the 13th month pay.
33
C. The proceedings in the case below were as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. On February 4, 1982, LA CARLOTA filed a petition to declare the strike of January 28, 1982 as illegal in R. A. B.
Case No. 110-82 of the Regional Arbitration Branch No. VI-A of the National Labor Commission in Bacolod City (the
CASE BELOW).
2. After relatively protracted hearings, respondent Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision declaring illegal the strike of
January 28, 1982. That is the Decision assailed by NFSW in this instance claiming it to be null and void.
D. Reference to a collateral proceeding may be made at this juncture:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. It appears that, in LA CARLOTA, there is another labor union under the name of National Congress of Unions in
the Sugar Industry in the Philippines (NACUSIP).
2. On July 30, 1981, NACUSIP filed a complaint in FSD Case No. 1192-81 before R. A. B. No. VI-A in Bacolod City
praying that an Order be issued directing LA CARLOTA to pay 13th month pay to its employees from the effective
date of PD 851 (the COLLATERAL PROCEEDING).
3. On December 4, 1981, NFSW filed a notice to intervene in the COLLATERAL PROCEEDING.
4. On January 26, 1982, a Decision was rendered in the COLLATERAL PROCEEDING which, in part,
said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"On the contrary, what this Labor Arbiter is aware of, with which he can take notice, is the policy declaration of the
Honorable Minister of Labor and Employment contained in a telegram addressed to Asst. Director Dante G. Ardivilla,
Bacolod District Office, this Ministry, and disseminated for the information of this Branch which states, among other
things, that where bonuses in CBAs are not contingent on realization of profit as in the Marcopper case, the decision
(of the Supreme Court, re: Marcopper case), does not apply, and cases thereon should be resolved under the
provisions of PD 851 and its implementing rules."cralaw virtua1aw library
5. On February 15, 1982, NFSW filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision.
Upon the foregoing exposition, there is justification for an outright dismissal of the Petition for Prohibition for the
simple reason that the strike of January 28, 1982 may not be considered a ULP strike. When the strike was declared,
it could not be validly claimed that there was already a final decision made by this Court which "clearly held that the
employer is liable to pay a 13th month pay separate and distinct from" the Christmas bonus being paid by LA
CARLOTA. However, since the Marcopper Decision has engendered controversies in labor-management relations in
several industrial/commercial firms, the Court has resolved to rule on the merits of the substantial question between
LA CARLOTA and NFSW for the public benefit with a clarification of the Marcopper
judgment.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
I agree with the proposition taken by the Ministry of Labor and Employment that Christmas bonus, not contingent on
realization of profit as in the Marcoper case, is the equivalent of the 13th month pay. In regards to the juxtaposition of
the terms "13th month pay" and "Christmas bonus" in an amount not less than a month’s salary, the following may be
explained:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Within recent time, it has been usual for an industrial or commercial firm, which has had a successful year, to grant a
bonus to its employees generally denominated before as year-end bonus. A firm usually knows whether or not it has
had a successful year by the middle of December. In case of profitability, payment of the year-end bonus does not
have to await the end of the year, but it is often times given some days before New Year, generally about Christmas
day. Before long, the year-end bonus became also known as Christmas bonus, following the change of the
Christmas gift-giving day from January 6th to December 25th. Thus, it has been stated: "a less formal use of the
bonus concept, which is designed to reward workers for a successful business year, is the annual or Christmas
bonus" (3 Ency. Brit., 918).
Although the original concept of a year-end bonus or Christmas bonus, was that it depended on a successful year,
the bonus, in many instances, has been developed into an obligatory payment as part of wages and not related to
profitability of operations. As part of wages, they are subject to CBA negotiation. That has been the general trend in
the United States and in our country.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library
". . . But where so-called gifts are so tied to the remuneration which employees receive for their work that they are in
fact a part of it, they are in reality wages within the meaning of the Act.
x x x
In a number of cases an employer has been held required to bargain concerning bonuses, including regularly given
Christmas bonuses." (48 Am Jur 2d., p. 455).
Moreover, once a Christmas bonus becomes institutionalized, it has to be non-discriminatory. "An employer violates
29 USC (Sec.) 158(a) (3) where, to discourage union membership, he ceases giving a Christmas bonus to all
employees and gives the bonus only to office and supervisory employees after unionization of his production and
maintenance employees." (48 Am Jur 2d., p. 420).
The Christmas bonus, as it clearly denotes, has a literal religious connection, "Christmas" being a term within the
Christian religion. Considering that the Christmas bonus has become obligatory and non-discriminatory in many
jurisdictions, a tendency arose to disassociate that bonus from its religious connotation. Some countries, with non-
christian or "liberal" christian segments, have opted to make the year-end or Christmas bonus obligatory, and they
called it the 13th month pay. It is, perhaps, having our Moslem brothers in mind that the Government had decided to
set up in our country the obligatory payment of the 13th month pay. Thereby, the orthodox non-christian employee is
not subjected to "discrimination" due to his inability to accept the Christmas bonus because of strict allegiance to this
own faith. It should, therefore, be apparent that "christmas bonus" and "13th month pay" should be equated one with
the other.
PD 851 does not contain a provision for rules and regulations to be promulgated by the Department of Labor for
implementation of the Decree. Notwithstanding, on December 22, 1975, the Department of Labor issued "Rules and
Regulations Implementing Presidential Decree 851", with the following relevant provision:chanrobles lawlibrary :
rednad
"The term ‘its equivalent’ as used in paragraph (c) hereof shall include Christmas bonus, mid-year bonus, profit-
sharing payments and other cash bonuses amounting to not less than 1/12th of the basic salary but shall not include
cash and stock dividends cost of living allowances and all other allowances regularly enjoyed by the employee, as
well as non-monetary benefits. Where an employer pays less than 1/12th of the employees basic salary, the
employer shall pay the difference."cralaw virtua1aw library
When administrative rules and regulations are not properly "delegated", they cannot have the force and effect of law.
It has been stated that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Administrative rules and regulations. As discussed in Public Administrative Bodies and Procedure (Sec.) 108, rules
and regulations duly promulgated and adopted in pursuance of properly delegated authority have the force and effect
of law where they are legislative in character, but rules and regulations which are merely executive or administrative
views as to the meaning and construction of the statute are not controlling on the courts, and cannot alter or extend
the plain meaning of a statute, although they are entitled to great weight where the statute is ambiguous." (82 C.J.S.,
pp. 770, 771).
Although the rule defining the term "equivalent" as used in PD 851 does not have the force and effect of law, it can
and should be considered as an administrative view entitled to great weight as it is an interpretation of "equivalent"
made by the administrative agency which has the duty to enforce the Decree.
In the light of the foregoing views, I concur with the dismissal of the Petition for Prohibition with the express
statements that LA CARLOTA’s Christmas bonus and other bonuses exempts it from giving 13th month pay to its
employees, and that the strike of January 28, 1982 was not a ULP strike and should be considered illegal even if
NFSW had complied with all statutory requirements for the strike.
34

ART. 264. Strikes, picketing and lockouts. — . . .
"(c) In cases of bargaining deadlocks, the certified or duly recognized bargaining representative may file a notice of
strike with the Ministry (of Labor and Employment) at least thirty (30) days before the intended date thereof. In cases
of unfair labor practices, the period of notice shall be shortened to fifteen
(15) days; . . .
x x x
"(e) During the cooling-off period, it shall be duty of the Ministry to exert all efforts at mediation and conciliation to
effect a voluntary settlement. Should the dispute remain unsettled until the lapse of the requisite number of days from
the mandatory filing of the notice, the labor union may strike or the employer may declare a lockout.
"(f) A decision to declare a strike must be approved by at least two-thirds (2/3) of the total union membership in the
bargaining unit concerned by secret ballots in meetings in meetings or referenda. A decision to declare a lockout
must be approved by at least two-thirds (2/3) of the board of directors of the employer corporation or association or
of the partners in a partnership obtained by secret ballot in a meeting called for the purpose. The decision shall be
valid for the duration of the dispute based on substantially the same grounds considered when the strike or lockout
vote was taken. The Ministry, may at its own initiative or upon the request of any affected party, supervise the
conduct of the secret balloting. In every case, the union of the employer shall furnish the Ministry the results of the
voting at least seven (7) days before the intended strike or lockout, subject to the cooling-off period herein provided."
(Emphasis supplied.)
9. According to Article II, Sec. 6 of the present Constitution: "The State shall promote social justice to ensure the
dignity, welfare, and security of all the people. Towards this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership,
use, enjoyment, and disposition of private property, and equitably diffuse property ownership and profits."cralaw
virtua1aw library
10. According to Article II, Sec. 9 of the present Constitution: "The State shall afford protection to labor, promote full
employment and equality in employment, ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race, or creed, and
regulate the relations between workers and employers. The state shall assure the rights of workers to self-
organization, collective bargaining, security of tenure, and just and humane conditions of work. The State may
provide for compulsory arbitration."cralaw virtua1aw library
11. According to Article II, Sec. 5 of the 1935 Constitution: "The promotion of social justice to insure the well-being
and economic security of all the people should be the concern of the State." According to Article XIV, Sec. 6 of the
1935 Constitution: "The State shall afford protection to labor, especially to working women and minors, and shall
regulate the relation between landowner and tenant, and between labor and capital in industry and in agriculture.
The State may provide for compulsory arbitration."cralaw virtua1aw library
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. Nos. 95494-97 September 7, 1995
LAPANDAY WORKERS UNION, ARQUILAO BACOLOD, JOSE ERAD, FERNANDO HERNANDO, EDDIE
ESTRELLA, CIRILO DAYAG, EDUARDO POQUITA, CARLITO PEPITO, RENE ARAO, JUANITO GAHUM,
EMILIANO MAGNO, PERLITO LISONDRA, GREGORIO ALBARAN, ABRAHAM BAYLON, DIONESIO TRUCIO,
TOMAS BASCO AND ROSARIO SINDAY, pertitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION &
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondents.
G.R. Nos. 95494-97 September 7, 1995
LAPANDAY WORKERS UNION, ARQUILAO BACOLOD, ET AL., Petitioners, v.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION AND CADECO ARGO DEVELOPMENT PHILS., INC. Respondents.
G.R. Nos. 95494-97 September 7, 1995
LAPANDAY WORKERS UNION, ARQUILAO BACOLOD, ET AL., Petitioners, v.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION AND LAPANDAY AGRICULTURAL & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondents.
G.R. Nos. 95494-97 September 7, 1995
LAPANDAY WORKERS UNION, TOMAS N. BASCO, ET AL., petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION AND LAPANDAY AGRICULTURAL & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondents.
Petitioner Lapanday Agricultural Workers' Union (Union for brevity) and petitioners-workers of Lapanday Agricultural
and Development Corporation and CADECO Agro Development Philippines, Inc., seek to reverse the
consolidated Decision dated August 29, 1990, 1rendered by public respondent National Labor Relations Commision,
declaring their strike illegal and ordering the dismissal of their leaders.chanrobles virtual law library
The background of the case:chanrobles virtual law library
Private respondents are sister companies engaged in the production of bananas. Their agricultural establishments
are located in Davao City.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
On the other hand, petitioner Lapanday Workers' Union (Union) is the duly certified bargaining agent of the rank and
file employees of private respondents. The Union is affiliated with the KMU-ANGLO. The other petitioners are all
members of the Union.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The records show that petitioner Union has a collective bargaining agreement with private respondents, covering the
period from December 5, 1985 to November 30, 1988. A few months before the expiration of their CBA, private
respondents initiated certain management policies which disrupted the relationship of the
parties.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
First, on August 1, 1988, private respondents contracted Philippine Eagle Protectors and Security Agency, Inc., to
provide security services for their business premises located in Lapanday, Bandug, Callawa, Davao City, and
Guising, Davao Del Sur. Their contract also called for the protection of the lives and limbs of private respondents'
officers, employees and guests within company premises. The Union branded the security guards posted within the
company premises as private respondents' "goons" and "special forces." It also accused the guards of intimidating
and harassing their members.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Second, private respondents conducted seminars on Human Development and Industrial Relations (HDIR) for their
managerial and supervisory employees and, later, the rank-and-filers, to promote their social education and
economic growth. Among the topics discussed in the seminar were the mission statement of the company, corporate
values, and the Philippine political spectrum. The Union claimed that the module on the Philippine political spectrum
lumped the ANGLO (Alliance of Nationalist and Genuine Labor Organization), with other outlawed labor
organizations such as the National Democratic Front or other leftist groups.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
These issues were discussed during a labor-management meeting held on August 2, 1988. The labor group was
represented by the Union, through its President, petitioner Arquilao Bacolod, and its legal counsel. After private
respondents explained the issues, the Union agreed to allow its members to attend the HDIR seminar for the rank-
and-filers. Nevertheless, on August 19 and 20, the Union directed its members not to attend the seminars scheduled
on said dates. Earlier on, or on August 6, 1988, the Union, led by petitioners Arquilao Bacolod and Rene Arao,
picketed the premises of the Philippine Eagle Protectors to show their displeasure on the hiring of the
guards.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
35
Worse still, the Union filed on August 25, 1988, a Notice of Strike with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board
(NCMB). It accused the company of unfair labor practices consisting of coercion of employees, intimidation of union
members and union-busting. 2 These were the same issues raised by the Union during the August 2, 1988 labor-
management meeting.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
On August 29, 1988, the NCMB called a conciliation conference. The conference yielded the following
agreement:chanrobles virtual law library
(1) Union officers, including the officials of KMU-ANGLO, and the Executive Director of the NCMB would attend the
HDIR seminar on September 5, 1988; andchanrobles virtual law library
(2) A committee shall convene on September 10, 1989, to establish guidelines governing the
guards.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The Union officials did attend the September 5, 1988 seminar. While they no longer objected to the continuation of
the seminar, they reiterated their demand for the deletion of the discussion pertaining to the KMU-
ANGLO.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
With the apparent settlement of their differences, private respondents notified the NCMB that there were no more
bases for the notice of strike.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
An unfortunate event brake the peace of the parties. On September 8, 1988, Danilo Martinez, a member of the Board
of Directors of the Union, was gunned down in his house in the presence of his wife and children. The gunman was
later identified as Eledio Samson, an alleged member of the new security forces of private
respondents.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
On September 9, 1988, the day after the killing, most of the members of the Union refused to report for work. They
returned to work the following day but they did not comply with the "quota system" adopted by the management to
bolster production output. Allegedly, the Union instructed the workers to reduce their production to thirty per cent
(30%). Private respondents charged the Union with economic sabotage through
slowdown.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
On September 14, 1988, Private respondents filed separate charges against the Union and its members for illegal
strike, unfair labor practice and damages, with prayer for injunction. These cases were docketed as Case Nos. RAB-
11-09-00612-888 and RAB No. 11-09-00613-88 before Labor Arbiter Antonio
Villanueva.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
On September 17, 1988, petitioners skipped work to pay their last respect to the slain Danilo Martinez who was laid
to rest. Again, on September 23, 1988, petitioners did not report for work. Instead, they proceeded to private
respondents' office at Lanang, carrying placards and posters which called for the removal of the security guards, the
ouster of certain management officials, and the approval of their mass leave application. Their mass action did not
succeed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
In a last ditch effort to settle the deteriorating dispute between the parties, City Mayor Rodrigo Duterte intervened.
Dialogues were held on September 27 and 29, 1988 at the City Mayor's Office. Again, the dialogues proved fruitless
as private respondents refused to withdraw the cases they earlier filed with public
respondent.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
On October 3, 1988, a strike vote was canducted among the members of the Union and those in favor of the strike
won overwhelming support from the workers. The result of the strike vote was then submitted to the NCMB on
October 10, 1988. Two days later, or on Ootober 12, 1988, the Union struck.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
On the bases of the foregoing facts, Labor Arbiter Antonio Villanueva ruled that the Onion staged an illegal strike.
The dispositlve portion of the Decision, dated December 12, 1988, states:
COMFORMABLY WITH ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered:chanrobles virtual law library
a) Declaring the strike staged by respondents (petitioners) to be illegal;chanrobles virtual law library
b) Declaring the employees listed as respondents in the complaint and those mentioned in page 21 to have lost their
employment status with complainants Lapanday Agricultural and Development Corporation and Cadeco Agro
Development Philippines, Inc.; andchanrobles virtual law library
c) Ordering respondents (petitioners in this case) to desist from further committing an illegal strike.
Petitioners appealed the Villanueva decision to public respondent NLRC.
It also appears that on December 6, 1988, or before the promulgation of the decision of Arbiter Villanueva, the Union,
together with Tomas Basco and 25 other workers, filed a complaint for unfair labor practice and illegal suspension
against LADECO. The case was docketed as Case No. RAB-11-12-00780-88. On even date, another complaint for
unfair labor practice and illegal dismissal was filed by the Union, together with Arquilao Bacolod and 58 other
complainants. This was docketed as Case No. RAB-11-12-00779-88. These two (2) cases were heard by Labor
Arbiter Newton Sancho.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Before the NLRC could resolve the appeal taken on the Villanueva decision in Case Nos. RAB-11-09-00612-88 and
RAB-11-09-00613-88, Labor Arbiter Sancho rendered a decision in the two (2) cases filed by the Union against
private respondents LADECO andCADECO (Case Nos. RAB-11-12-00779-88 and RAB-11-12-00780-88). The
Sancho decision, dated October 18, 1989, declared LADECO and CADECO guilty of unfair labor practices and illegal
dismissal and ordered the reinstatement of the dismissed employees of private reapondents, with backwages and
other benefits. Significantly, the Sancho decision considered the refusal of the workers to report for work on
September 9, 1988, justified by the circumstance then prevailing, the killing of Danilo Martinez on September
8,1988.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Private respondents appealed the Sancho decision, claiming, among others, that labor arbiter Sancho erred in
passing upon the legality of the strike staged by petitioners since said issue had already been passed upon by the
Regional Arbitration Branch and was still on appeal before the NLRC.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library
Considering that the four (4) cases before it arose from the same set of facts and involved substantially the same
issues, the NLRC rendered a consolidated decision, promulgated August 29, 1990, upholding the Villanueva
decision in Case Nos. RAB-11-09-00612-88 and RAB-11-09-00613-88. The dispositive portion of the assailed NLRC
decision states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, a new judgment is entered in the four consolidated and above-captioned cases
as follows:chanrobles virtual law library
1. The strike staged by the Lapanday Agricultural Workers Union is hereby declared to be (sic) illegal;chanrobles
virtual law library
2. As a consequence thereof, the following employees-union officers are declared to have lost their employment
status with Lapanday Agricultural Development Corporation and CADECO Agro Development Philippines, to wit:
Arguilao Bacolod, Jose Erad, Fernando Hernando, Eldie Estrella, Cerelo Dayag, Lucino Magadan, Rene Arao,
Eduardo Poquita, Juanito Gahum, Emilio Magno, Perlito Lisondra, Gregorio Albaron, Abraham Baylon, Dionosio
Trocio, Tomas Basco and Rosario Sinday;chanrobles virtual law library
3. However, the individual respondents (union members), being merely rank-and-file employees and who merely
joined the strike declared as illegal, are ordered reinstated but without backwages, the period they were out of work
is deemed the penalty for the illegal strike they staged;chanrobles virtual law library
4. Ordering Lapanday Workers' Union, its leaders and members, to desist from further committing an illegal strike;
andchanrobles virtual law library
36
5. Dismissing the complaint for unfair labor practice, illegal suspension and illegal dismissal filed by the Lapanday
Workers Union (LWU)-ANGLO and its members, for lack of merit.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
SO ORDERED.
Petitioners fileds motion for reconsideration. It did not prosper. Hence, the petition.
Petitioners now claim that public respondent NLRC gravely abused its discretion in: a) declaring that their activities,
from September 9, 1988 to October 12, 1988, were strike activities; and b) declaring that the strike staged on
October 12, 1988 was illegal.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The critical issue is the legality of the strike held on October 12, 1988. The applicable laws are Articles 263 and 264
of the Labor Code, as amended by E.O. No. 111, dated December 24, 1986. 3
Paragraphs (c) and (f) of Article 263 of the Labor Code, as amended by E.O. 111, provides:
(c) In cases of bargaining deadlocks, the duly certified or recognized bargaining agent may file a notice of strike or
the employer may file, notice of lockout with the Ministry at least 30 days before the intended date thereof. In cases
of unfair labor practice, the notice shall be 15 days and in the absence of a duly certified or recognized bargaining
agent, the notice of strike may be filed by any legitimate labor organization in behalf of its members. However, in
case of dismissal from employment of union officers duly elected in accordance with the union constitution and by-
laws, which may constitute union busting where the existence of the union is threatened, the 15-daycooling-off period
shall not apply and the union may take action immediately.
xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library
(f) A decision to declare a strike must be approved by a majority of the total union membership in the bargaining unit
concerned, obtained by secret ballot in meetings or referenda called for that purpose. A decision to declare a lockout
must be approved by a majority of the board of directors of the corporation or association or of the partners in a
partnership, obtained by secret ballot in a meeting called for that purpose. The decision shall be valid for the duration
of the dispute based on substantially the same grounds considered when the strike or lockout vote was taken. The
Ministry may, at its own initiative or upon the request of any affected party, supervise the conduct of secret
balloting. In every case, the union or the employer shall furnish the Ministry the results of the voting at least seven (7)
days before the intended strike or lockout subject to the cooling-off period herein provided.
Article 264 of the same Code reads:
Art. 264. Prohibited activities. - (a) No labor organization or employer shall declare a strike or lockout without first
having bargained collectively in accordance with Title VII of this Book or without first having filed the notice required
in the preceding Article or without the necessary strike or lockout vote first having been obtained and reported to the
Ministry.
xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library
. . . . Any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or union officer who knowingly
participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment
status:Provided that mere participation of a worker in a lawful strike shall not constitute sufficient ground for
termination of his employment, even if a replacement had been hired by the employer during such lawful strike.
(emphasis ours).
A strike is "any temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action of employees as a result of an industrial or labor
dispute." 4It is the most preeminent of the economic weapons of workers which they unsheathe to force management
to agree to an equitable sharing of the joint product of labor and capital. Undeniably, strikes exert some disquieting
effects not only on the relationship between labor and management but also on the general peace and progress of
society. Our laws thus regulate their exercise within reasons by balancing the interests of labor and management
together with the overarching public interest.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Some of the limitations on the exercise of the right of strike are provided for in paragraphs (c) and (f) of Article 263 of
the Labor Code, as amended, supra. They Provide for the procedural steps to be followed before staging a strike -
filing of notice of strike, taking of strike vote, and reporting of the strike vote result to the Department of Labor and
Employment. In National Federation of Sugar Workers (NFSW) vs. Overseas, et al., 5we ruled that these steps are
mandatory in character, thus:
If only the filing of the strike notice and the strike-vote report would be deemed mandatory, but not the waiting
periods so specifically and emphatically prescribed by law, the purposes (hereafter discussed) far which the filing of
the strike notice and strike-vote report is required cannot be achieved. . . .
xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library
So too, the 7-day strike-vote report is not without a purpose. As pointed out by the Solicitor General -chanrobles
virtual law library
. . . The submission of the report gives assurance that a strike vote has been taken and that, if the report concerning
it is false, the majority of the members can take appropriate remedy before it is too late.
The seven (7) day waiting period is intended to give the Department of Labor and Employment an opportunity to
verify whether the projected strike really carries the imprimatur of the majority of the union members. The need for
assurance that majority of the union members support the strike cannot be gainsaid. Strike is usually the last weapon
of labor to compel capital to concede to its bargaining demands or to defend itself against unfair labor practices of
management. It is a weapon that can either breathe life to or destroy the union and its members in their struggle with
management for a more equitable due of their labors. The decision to wield the weapon of strike must, therefore, rest
on a rational basis, free from emotionalism, unswayed by the tempers and tantrums of a few hotheads, and firmly
focused on the legitimate interest of the union which should not, however, be antithetical to the public welfare. Thus,
our laws require the decision to strike to be the consensus of the majority for while the majority is not infallible, still, it
is the best hedge against haste and error. In addition, a majority vote assures the union it will go to war against
management with the strength derived from unity and hence, with better chance to succeed. In Batangas Laguna
Tayabas Bus Company vs. NLRC, 6we held:
xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library
The right to strike is one of the rights recognized and guaranteed by the Constitution as an instrument of labor for its
protection against exploitation by management. By virtue of this right, the workers are able to press their demands
for better terms of employment with more energy and persuasiveness, poising the threat to strike as their reaction to
employer's intransigence. The strike is indeed a powerful weapon of the working class. But precisely because of this,
it must be handled carefully, like a sensitive explosive, lest it blow up in the workers' own hands. Thus, it must be
declared only after the most thoughtful consultation among them, conducted in the only way allowed, that is,
peacefully, and in every case conformably to reasonable regulation. Any violation of the legal requirements and
strictures, . . . will render the strike illegal, to the detriment of the very workers it is supposed to
protect.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Every war must be lawfully waged. A labor dispute demands no less observance of the rules, for the benefit of all
concerned.
Applying the law to the case at bar, we rule that strike conducted by the union on October 12, 1988 is plainly illegal
as it was held within th seven (7) day waiting period provided for by paragraph (f), Article 263 of the Labor Code, as
amended. The haste in holding the strike prevented the Department of Labor and Employment from verifying
whether it carried the approval of the majority of the union members. It set to naught an important policy
consideration of our law on strike. Considering this finding, we need not exhaustively rule on the legality of the work
stoppage conducted by the union and some of their members on September 9 and 23, 1988. Suffice to state, that the
37
ruling of the public respondent on the matter is supported by substantial
evidence.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
We affirm the decision of the public respondent limiting the penalty of dismissal only to the leaders of the illegal
strike. especially the officers of the union who served as its major players. They cannot claim good faith to exculpate
themselves. They admitted knowledge of the law on strike, including its procedure. They cannot violate the law which
ironically was cast to promote their interest.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
We, likewise, agree with the public respondent that the union members who were merely instigated to participate in
the illegal strike should be treated differently from their leaders. Part of our benign consideration for labor is the policy
of reinstating rank-and-file workers who were merely misled in supporting illegal strikes. Nonetheless, these
reinstated workers shall not be entitled to backwages as they should not be compensated for services skipped during
the illegal strike.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is dismissed for failure to show grave abuse of discretion on the part of the public
respondent. Costs against the petitioners.chanrobles virtual law library
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. Nos. 107302 & 107306. June 10, 1997.]
INDUSTRIAL TIMBER CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (5th
Division), ITC BUTUAN LOGS LABOR UNION-WATU, OSCAR MONTEROSO and DODONG
MORDENO, Respondents.
[G.R. Nos. 108559-60. June 10, 1997.]
INDUSTRIAL TIMBER CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (5th
Division), ITC BUTUAN LOGS LABOR UNION-WATU, OSCAR MONTEROSO and DODONG
MORDENO, Respondents.
Industrial Timber Corporation (ITC) is a corporation registered under Philippine laws and is engaged in the business
of manufacturing and processing veneer and plywood products. It used to operate a veneer processing plant known
as the Butuan Logs Plant and a veneer and plywood processing plant known as the Stanply Plant. Both plants
occupied a single compound with a common point for ingress and egress and were both leased from Industrial
Plywood Group Corporation. Both plants had also two (2) distinct bargaining units represented by separate labor
unions and had separate collective bargaining agreements with their respective principals. ITC Butuan Logs Workers
Union-WATU (Union) represented the rank and file employees of the Butuan Logs Plant.
Sometime in 1989, ITC decided to permanently stop and close its veneer production at its Butuan Logs Plant "due to
impending heavy financial losses resulting from high production costs, erratic supply of raw materials and depressed
prices and market conditions for its wood products." Accordingly, on November 9, 1989, ITC served a written notice
to all its employees in the said plant and to the Butuan District Office of the Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE) stating that effective December 10, 1989 or thirty (30) days thereafter, it would cease operations at said
plant.
After receiving the notice, the employees therein, through their union representative, filed a formal objection to the
intended shutdown. Consequently, conciliation proceedings were conducted at the DOLE District Office pursuant to
the provisions of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) on grievances. The parties, however, failed to settle
their differences.
On November 25, 1989, ITC formally notified the Union in a letter addressed to Oscar Monteroso, Union president, of
the availability for release of separation pay and other CBA benefits consisting of the monetary value of unused
vacation and sick leave credits, house repair benefits and the mandatory 13th month pay. Only sixty-three (63)
employees availed of the foregoing and subsequently received said separation pay and other CBA benefits.
On November 29, 1989, the Union filed a notice of strike with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board which
conducted a conciliation meeting. Again, conciliation failed. On December 17, 1989, the Union conducted a strike
vote. Sixty-two (62) of the one hundred seventy-three (173) members voted in favor of staging a strike.
As scheduled, plant operations ceased on December 10, 1989 and it has not resumed operations since then.
On January 14, 1990 or a few days thereafter, the Union staged a strike at the common gate of the closed Butuan
Logs Plant and the Stanply Plant which, incidentally, has resumed operations after annual maintenance servicing.
When the futility of their protest action dawned on them, the members of the Union, sought judicial redress. On
January 18, 1990, a complaint for illegal shutdown against ITC was filed by the Union in representation of its
members with the Sub-Regional Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) at Butuan
City, Branch X, where said case was docketed as NLRC Case No. SRAB-10-01-00024-90. The Union sought its
members’ reinstatement and recovery of backwages. It, likewise, charged ITC with violation of Republic Act No. 6727
for non-payment of wage increases. The complaint was subsequently amended to include claims for payment of
CBA benefits and recovery of damages and attorney’s fees.
On February 6, 1990, ITC for its part filed a complaint for illegal strike with a prayer for an award of damages against
the union and its officers, likewise with the Sub-Regional Arbitration Branch mentioned above. Said case was
docketed as NLRC Case No. SRAB-10-02-00067-90.
On March 29, 1990, the labor arbiter rendered a consolidated decision of the two (2) cases, the dispositive portion of
which reads:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby entered in NLRC Case No. SRAB-10-01-00024-90
(Illegal shutdown, etc.) dismissing the complaint for illegal shutdown and violation of R.A. 6727 but ordering
respondent Industrial Timber Corporation and the Manager Tomas Tangsoc, Jr. to jointly and severally pay its
employees who did not opt to receive separation benefits, separation pay consisting of one-half (1/2) month salary
for every year of service, a period of at least six (6) months being considered one year and all the CBA benefits
namely:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. monetary value of unused vacation and sick leave;
2. house repairs benefits and
3. 13th month pay
4. fiesta subsidy
All the rest of the claims in this case are dismissed for lack of merit.
In NLRC Case No. SRAB-10-02-00067-90, the strike staged by the Workers Alliance Trade Union (WATU), ITC
Butuan Logs Labor Union is hereby and so declared illegal and the Union and its members are hereby ordered to
desist from conducting any strike or picket in the premises of both Stanply and Butuan Logs Plants.
The rest of the claims in this case are dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED. 1
Obviously aggrieved by the ruling, the Union appealed the decision of the labor arbiter to the NLRC.
38
In a resolution dated August 30, 1991, the NLRC issued the assailed resolution, the decretal portion of which
reads:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is Reversed and Set Aside and a new one entered declaring respondent
ITC Butuan Logs, Inc. guilty of illegal shutdown while the strike staged by complainant union (ITC Butuan Logs
Workers Union-WATU) and members is hereby declared valid and lawful exercise of their right to peaceful assembly
and petition for redress of grievances. Accordingly, respondent corporation (ITC Butuan Logs, Inc.) is hereby
ordered, through its corporate officers, to pay complainant workers the following:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. Backwages equivalent to six (6) months based on their last salary as adjusted by R.A. 6727 and under the CBA
effective December 11, 1989 without qualification or deduction;
2. Salary differential of P1.50 each effective July 1, 1989 up to December 10, 1989;
3. Separation pay equivalent to one (1) month salary each in lieu of reinstatement for every year of service based on
their adjusted salary as set forth above plus all CBA fringe benefits; and
In fine, this Court is presented with the following issues for consideration and resolution, to wit: (a) whether or not
petitioner ITC is guilty of illegal shutdown of its Butuan Logs Plant; (b) whether or not respondent Union and its
members are guilty of staging an illegal strike; and (c) whether or not money claims should be awarded to the Union
members.
Petitioner corporation asseverates that the closure of the Butuan Logs Plant was purely based on sound
management decision arrived at after thorough and considerable assessment and evaluation of the company’s
impending economic predicament. The closure was the only remaining remedy available to the petitioner in order to
prevent imminent heavy losses on account of high production costs, erratic supply of raw materials, depressed prices
and poor market conditions for its wood products. To justify and substantiate its threatening economic difficulty,
petitioner submitted a certification executed by an independent certified public accountant showing in detail the
heavy losses petitioner would have to suffer should it continue operating its business, thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

4. Assessed to pay attorney’s fees fixed at the rate of ten (10%) percent equivalent to the aggregate monetary This is to certify that the manufacturing cost incurred by INDUSTRIAL TIMBER CORPORATION in producing
award. plywood can be broken down as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

The rest of the claims are dismissed. With costs against respondent corporation. PER PANEL 5.00 MM

SO ORDERED. 2 Logs used P43.45

Glue cost 24.92
A motion for reconsideration of the said resolution was filed by ITC but the same was denied for lack of merit in a Log preparation 1.52
Resolution dated August 25, 1992 which dispositively reads as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library Peeling 4.58
Drying 2.83
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration of respondent corporation is Denied for lack of merit. The application Dry veneer preparation 9.68
of complainant union to pierce the veil of corporate fiction of both respondent ITC and Industrial Plywood Group Gluing & pressing 1.83
Corporation is likewise Denied as well as the rest of the claims of the union for lack of basis. The Acting Fiscal Sizing/Finishing 2.14
Examiner of this Commission is directed to compute the monetary benefits in favor of the terminated workers who Crating 1.30
are members of complainant union and to submit his report for approval. This order is final and no further motion will Electrical power/allocation 4.98
be entertained, except with respect to the manner of execution of the judgment of the Commission. Steam power/allocation 4.18
Shipping 6.54
SO ORDERED. 3 ———
Total variable cost P107.95
Hence, the instant petition for certiorari anchored on the following assignment of errors attributed to the NLRC, Programmed 0.79
thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library Committed 2.33
———
5.1. The NLRC relied on mere conjectures and speculations absolutely without support from the evidence on record Total period cost 3.12
in holding that the closure of petitioner’s Butuan Logs Plant was illegal. Administrative expenses 11.75
Other expenses (income) 0.00 11.75
5.2. The NLRC grossly violated and disregarded the law and settled jurisprudence upholding the inherent right of the ——— ————
employer to manage his business in holding that the closure of the Butuan Logs Plant was illegal. TOTAL MANUFACTURING COST P122.82
————
5.3. Assuming arguendo that the NLRC correctly found that the closure of the Butuan Logs Plant was illegal and that
petitioner violated R.A. 6727, the NLRC seriously erred nonetheless in awarding money claims to all complainants in The current selling price of 5.00 mm is P110.00 per panel. The difference between the manufacturing cost and
general despite unrebutted evidence on record establishing that 179 out of 189 complainants have voluntarily selling price (P12.82), at 8,000 panels per day production, or a net lost of P102,560.00 per day.
entered into an amicable settlement with petitioner and accordingly withdrew from the case.
Based on the above premises and considering the fact of stoppage of operation from time to time due to low supply
5.4. In refusing to declare the strike illegal, the NLRC ignored the fact that, as incontrovertibly established by the of Raw Materials (Logs) the Corporation will have to sustain additional expenses without any production. Hence
evidence on record, the Union did not comply with the legal requirements for a valid strike and the strikers, in concert continuance of operation will mean more losses to the Corporation. Thus closure of one plant is a wise move to save
with one another, committed illegal acts during the strike in furtherance of the objectives of the strike. the Corporation.

5.5. The NLRC erroneously applied Section 8, Chapter I of the Implementing Rules of R.A. 6727 in finding that (Sgd.)
petitioner is liable to pay the P1.50 difference between the wage increase granted in the CBA and the wage increase
legislated under R.A. 6727. 4 VIRGINIA P. CANLAS
39

PTR No. 1123448
January 30, 1990
Mandaluyong, M.M. 5
In addition, petitioner contends that the Butuan Logs Plant was merely a veneering plant which produced veneer, an
essential component of plywood manufactured by the Stanply Plant which, incidentally, has also the capacity and
capability to produce veneer.
Respondent Union, on the other hand, claims that the closure of the plant was just a smoke screen to mask the true
intention of the petitioner which was to bust the Union. It alleges that petitioner’s pretended avowals of economic
distress were negated by the latter’s good and robust economic status at the time of the closure though it submitted
no evidence to prove its allegation. Concomitantly, respondent Union avers that the certification executed by an
independent public accountant showing the company’s impending financial debacle did not constitute as substantial
proof sufficient to discharge it of the burden of proving its plight as required by law. On its part, respondent Union
neither rebutted the contents of the certification nor presented any evidence to the contrary.
The petition is impressed with merit.
At the outset, we reiterate the rule that in certiorari proceedings under Rule 65, this Court does not assess and weigh
the sufficiency of evidence upon which the labor arbiter and public respondent NLRC based their resolutions. Our
query is limited to the determination of whether or not public respondent acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction
or with grave abuse of discretion in rendering the assailed resolutions. 6 However, where the findings of the NLRC
contradict those of the labor arbiter, this Court, in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, may look into the records of
the case and reexamine the questioned findings, 7 as in the case at bar.
Article 283 of the New Labor Code provides thusly:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
ART. 283. Closure of establishment and reduction of personnel. — The employer may also terminate the
employment of any employee due to the installation of labor saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent
losses or the closing or cessation of operation of the establishment or undertaking unless the closing is for the
purpose of circumventing the provisions of this Title, by serving a written notice on the workers and the Ministry of
Labor and Employment at least one (1) month before the intended date thereof. In case of termination due to the
installation of labor saving devices or redundancy, the worker affected thereby shall be entitled to a separation pay
equivalent to at least his one (1) month pay or to at least one (1) month pay for every year of service, whichever is
higher. In case of retrenchment to prevent losses and in cases of closures or cessation of operations of
establishment or undertaking not due to serious business losses or financial reverses, the separation pay shall be
equivalent to one (1) month pay or at least one-half (1/2) month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. A
fraction of at least six (6) months shall be considered as one (1) whole year.
The foregoing article clearly provides inter alia that the employer may terminate the employment of his employees to
prevent losses. Closure or cessation of operations for economic reasons is, therefore, recognized as a valid exercise
of management prerogative. The determination to cease operations is a prerogative of management which the State
does not usually interfere with, as no business or undertaking must be required to continue operating at a loss simply
because it has to maintain its workers in employment. Such an act would be tantamount to a taking of property
without due process of law. 8
However, the burden of proving that such closure is bona fide falls upon the employer. In this case, petitioner
corporation presented the analysis of an independent certified public accountant, 9 showing in detail the imminent
losses it would suffer should it continue its operations. It is understandable that no audited financial statements or
other similar documents were presented as the company is claiming impending future losses, not past or actual
ones. Moreover, the fact that petitioner company has ceased operations and has not resumed to do so only
reinforces its claim to a valid closure, not to mention the other established fact that its Stanply Plant has also the
capacity and capability to produce veneer, the product it solely manufactured in its now closed plant.
At any rate, we held in a recent case that an employer may close or cease his business operations even if he were
not suffering from business losses or financial reverses, thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
In any case, Article 283 of the Labor Code is clear that an employer may close or cease his business operations or
undertaking even if he is not suffering from serious business losses or financial reverses, as long as he pays his
employees their termination pay in the amount corresponding to their length of service. It would, indeed, be
stretching the intent and spirit of the law if we were to unjustly interfere in management’s prerogative to close or
cease its business operations just because said business operation or undertaking is not suffering from any loss.
This Court, in the case of Maya Farms Employees Organization, Et. Al. v. NLRC, Et. Al. held that:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library
‘The rule is well-settled that labor law discourage interference with an employer’s judgment in the conduct of his
business. Even as the law is solicitous of the welfare of employees, it must also protect the right of an employer to
exercise what are clearly management prerogatives. As long as the company’s exercise of the same is in good faith
to advance its interest and not for the purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of employees under the laws
or valid agreements, such exercise will be upheld.’
In Dangan v. NLRC, this Court had occasion to reiterate management’s prerogative to close or abolish a department
or section of the employer’s establishment for economic reasons. We reasoned out that since the greater right to
close the entire establishment and cease operations due to adverse economic conditions is granted an employer, the
closure of a part thereof to minimize expenses and reduce capitalization should similarly be recognized.
Likewise, this Court held in the case of Special Events & Central Shipping Office Workers Union v. San Miguel Corp.
that the determination of the usefulness of a section, being a company prerogative, the closure may not be
questioned, specially in this case where it is impelled by economic reasons due to the continuous losses sustained in
its operation, coupled with the lack of demand for the services of such section. 10
The foregoing notwithstanding, petitioner corporation complied with the requirements mandated by law to effectuate
valid termination of employment on account of closure. Under the law, for an employer to validly terminate the
service of his employees under the aforesaid ground, he has to comply with two (2) requirements, namely: (a)
serving a written notice on the workers and the DOLE at least one (1) month before the effective date of the closure
and (b) payment of separation pay equivalent to one (1) month pay or at least one-half (1/2) month pay for every
year of service, whichever is higher, with a fraction of at least six (6) months to be considered one (1) whole year.
The records bear out that petitioner had sufficiently complied with the aforecited requirements. It informed its
employees and the DOLE District Office at Butuan of the termination of service of the employees effective December
10, 1989 in a Letter dated November 9, 1989. The employees were, likewise, informed of the availability for release
of the funds for their separation pay and other CBA benefits. Unfortunately, only 63 employees availed of the
benefits. The rest chose to file the instant action.
Anent the issue of whether or not the strike staged within the premises of the petitioner on January 14, 1990 was
legal or not, we adopt the findings and conclusions made by the labor arbiter, substantiated as they are by the
evidence on record, thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
At first impression, this forum is readily tempted to opine that the issues of illegal strike has become moot and
academic. The records reveal that it has become undisputed that the Union staged a strike only on January 15, 1990
and for a few days thereafter, as of now, the Union has disbanded and appearances would indicate that whatever
concerted action it took has passed into the diplomatic and legal province, such that it is precisely why this Branch is
now called upon to compulsorily adjudicate on the issues.chanroblesvirtual|awlibrary
The company in trying to obtain a judicial declaration that the strike conducted by the Union on January 15, 1990 and
for a few days thereafter was illegal relies on two grounds namely:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. That the Union failed to garner the majority vote requirements to sustain a valid strike vote. At the time the notice
of strike was filed, the rank and file employees at Butuan Logs plant numbered 176. This notwithstanding only 62 of
the said employees voted on December 27, 1989, a number less than the majority required by law.
40
2. That the Union by the use of intimidation, force of numbers, harassment had successfully prevented the
company’s supervisory and administrative personnel from reporting to work at its Stanply Plant Operation. Which had
resulted in the temporary stoppage of work at said plant. That the Union had in fact barricaded the common gate of
Stanply and Butuan Logs plants. To substantiate this allegations, the company submitted in evidence as annexes ‘6’,
‘7’, ‘8’, ‘9’ and ‘10’ of its position paper, the affidavits of Romeo Burdeous, and Hermilondo Paque, Stanply Plant
Supervisors, Alejandra Perlita P. Yayon, Quality Control Supervisor and Engr. Jaime C. Gacula, Plant Engineer.
The company then states that it suffered losses amounting to 2 million pesos daily owing to the fact that its Stanply
plant remained non-operational. These losses were incurred because the supervisory and administrative personnel
could not enter the Stanply working premises thereby penalyzing the plant and in the process causing administrative
expenses.
The company then asks for the following reliefs and remedies, to wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable Labor Arbiter to issue an Order:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library
1. Declaring the strike staged by all the herein respondents as ILLEGAL;
2. Condemning all of them to pay IN SOLIDUM damages in the amount of P2 Million daily covering the periods that
the Stanply operation had been non-operational, as well as the administrative expenses which petitioner is bound to
pay to its workers at its Stanply operations who reported for work but did not actually work; and
3. Declaring to have lost the employment status of all the strikers with petitioners’ Butuan Logs plant.
The Union, brushing aside the allegations of the company in its manifestations dated February 25, 1990 maintains
that the strike vote constituted a majority of the union members. It alleges that at the time the strike vote was taken,
the remaining work force numbered only 98 because the others had opted to receive separation benefits. That 98
should therefore be the basis for the determination of the majority and because 62 had voted ‘yes’ the requirement of
the law was therefore complied with.
The Union in assailing the allegations of the company of intimidation, harassment and the putting up of barricade to
prevent egress and ingress in the stanply plant, likewise states that it did not really stage a strike in the legal
meaning of the word. What is really conducted was only a peaceful exercise of the constitutional right of assembly
and expression. To air their grievance and announce their tragic plight. That actually a strike was an exercise in
futility because it could serve no purpose at all. The Butuan Logs plant had already stopped operations and therefore
a strike which has for its purpose a temporary stoppage of work could not attain such as objective considering that
the establishment struck against was already closed. In a Nutshell the Union says that whatever a strike could hope
to accomplish was already preempted by the company.
The Union, however, is steadfast in maintaining that the ‘strike’ was conducted in accordance with law and
emphatically states that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
35. Let it be emphasized however that the concerted action staged by the Union on January 15, 1990 was all within
the bounds of law, propriety, decency and public order as may be shown by the following:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
a) Ingress and egress were observed and provided for as shown by Annexes ‘J’ to ‘S’;
b) The concerted action was peaceful and not marred by violence or intimidation;
c) No injury to persons nor damage to property has been inflicted;
d) No violation of personal and property rights was committed;
e) No disturbance to public peace was made.
and to evidence such orderly, demonstration of public display of grievances presented as evidence, Annex ‘M’, ‘N’,
‘O’, ‘P’, ‘Q’, ‘R’ and ‘S’ which are photographs depicting the untrammeled and unblocked working place of the
company, particularly the gates thereof.
To summarize therefore, the Union contends that its concerted action which was not really a ‘strike’ in the real and
legal meaning of the word was nonetheless carried out with due observance of the law, both in the formalities and its
actual conduct.
Under the circumstances, what then is this Branch to do? The Union says that it conducted a perfectly legal strike
and in the same breath says that it did not. That what it did while being a concerted action was only a public display
of grievances.
Be that as it may, this Branch finds and so holds that the strike was illegal. It cannot agree to the contention of the
Union that the majority of its members voted ‘yes’ to the strike. It must be borne in mind that there was 178 union
members at the time the plant was still operating. The fact that more than 60 of them opted to receive separation
benefits did not automatically sever their employee-employer relationship. While this is a legal nicety, it is undisputed
that the Union itself recognize this legal propositions, as it in fact seeks the reinstatement of all its members. In other
words, the Union contending that the shutdown was illegal and that its members were illegally dismissed cannot now
say that the more than 60 members were legally dismissed. It cannot have its cake and eat it too. It cannot say that
in the illegal shutdown case, its members were illegally dismissed but in the illegal strike case maintain that they
were legally dismissed so as to cause the non-appreciation of their votes or non-voting. This intransigence and
illogical culpability which is self-serving cannot be tolerated by this Branch. In fine, consistency must be upheld in all
the legal ramifications of these cases and consequently, this Branch finds that no majority vote as demanded by the
law was obtained. 178 members divided by 2 plus 1 equals 89 and this is the number which is the necessary majority
to give legality to the strike. This Branch also take note of the fact that this inconsistent stand is also displayed by the
Union in its notion of a ‘strike’. After undergoing the rigorous formalities of a strike and defending its legality, it
suddenly contradicts itself by saying it did not strike. This Branch cannot fathom nor countenance this legal
‘somersaults.’
There is no need therefore to belabor the issue as to whether the strike was conducted in the manner delineated by
law. The strike, whatever it was, was illegal from its inception and the events thereafter cannot cure it from its legal
abnormality. 11
In view of the foregoing, we find that respondent NLRC gravely abused its discretion in issuing the challenged
resolutions.
WHEREFORE, herein petitions are hereby GRANTED. The assailed resolutions of respondent National Labor
Relations Commission dated August 30, 1991 and August 25, 1992 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the
decision of the labor arbiter dated March 29, 1990 is hereby REINSTATED.
The case is remanded to the NLRC to determine with reasonable dispatch whether or not 179 out of 189 of herein
complainants have voluntarily executed quitclaims or waivers in favor of petitioner corporation and, corollarily, who
among the remaining employees are still entitled to separation pay and other benefits granted in the decision of the
labor arbiter and, thereafter, make appropriate dispositions thereon.chanroblesvirtual|awlibrary
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-4330. March 24, 1952.]
MANILA ORIENTAL SAWMILL CO., Petitioner, v. NATIONAL LABOR UNION and COURT OF INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS, Respondents.
41
This is a petition for review of an order of the respondent court dated September 8, 1950, declaring the strike staged
by the members of the respondent Union legal and setting the case for hearing for the determination of the demands
presented by said Union to petitioner.
On May 4, 1950, the United Employees Welfare Association, a union duly registered in the Department of Labor and
with members among the employees of the petitioner, entered into an agreement of working conditions with the
petitioner pursuant to a settlement concluded in case No. 173-V of the Court of Industrial Relations. The said
agreement was to last for one year.
On August 14, 1950, thirty-six of the thirty-seven members of the said United Employees Welfare Association
tendered their resignations from the same union and joined the local chapter of the respondent National Labor Union.
There is no evidence that these resignations were made with the approval of petitioner.
On August 15, 1950, the president of the respondent union sent a letter to petitioner containing seven demands
allegedly on behalf of the members of its local chapter who are employed by the petitioner, to which the latter,
through its counsel, answered with another letter stating among other things that the laborers on whose behalf the
letter of August 15, 1950, has been written were already affiliated with the United Employees Welfare Association.
On August 22, 1950, the respondent union reiterated its demands. In reply, counsel for petitioner sent a letter stating
that petitioner could not recognize the alleged local chapter of the respondent union until and after the agreement of
May 4, 1950, entered into by the same employees concerned and petitioner is declared null and void by the Court of
Industrial Relations.
On August 28, 1950, the members of the respondent union struck. On August 31, 1950, petitioner filed a petition in
the Court of Industrial Relations to declare the strike illegal.
On September 8, 1950, the Court of Industrial Relations, through its Presiding Judge, Honorable Arsenio Roldan,
issued an order denying petitioner’s prayer that said strike be declared illegal and setting the case for hearing on the
demands prayed for by respondent union.
On September 20, 1950, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of said order, and on November 14, 1950, the
Court of Industrial Relations en banc denied the motion for reconsideration. Hence this petition for review.
Petitioner claims that the order of respondent court of September 8, 1950, is null and void because, in refusing to
declare the strike staged by the members of the respondent union illegal notwithstanding the agreement entered into
between the labor union to which the employees who struck formerly belonged and petitioner which is still valid and
subsisting, it violated the constitutional precept underlying the freedom of contract.
We find merit in this claim. The record shows that the local chapter of the respondent union is composed entirely,
except one, of members who made up the total membership of the United Employees Welfare Association, a
registered union in the petitioner’s company. To be exact, thirty-six of the thirty-seven members of said association
tendered their resignations and joined the local chapter of the respondent union without first securing the approval of
their resignations. The new Union then sought to present a seven-point demand of the very same employees to
petitioner, which in many respects differs from their previous demand. It is evident that the purpose of their transfer is
merely to disregard and circumvent the contract entered into between the same employees and the petitioner on
May 4, 1950, knowing full well that that contract was effective for one year, and was entered into with the sanction of
the Court of Industrial Relations. If this move were allowed the result would be a subversion of a contract freely
entered into without any valid and justifiable reason. Such act cannot be sanctioned in law or in equity as it is in
derogation of the principle underlying the freedom of contract and the good faith that should exist in contractual
relations.
A labor organization is wholesome if it serves its legitimate purpose of settling labor disputes. That is why it is given
personality and recognition in concluding collective bargaining agreements. But if it is made use of as a subterfuge,
or as a means to subvert valid commitments, it outlives its purpose for far from being an aid, it tends to undermine
the harmonious relations between management and labor. Such is the move undertaken by the respondent union.
Such a move cannot be considered lawful and cannot receive the sanction of the Court. Hence, the strike it has
staged is illegal.
"The manifest object of the act is to prevent industrial strike, confusion and unrest. Industrial peace is promoted by
collective agreements obtained for employees through the medium of their bona fide labor organizations or other
proper representatives, free from employer interference. . . . And this is particularly so in the instant case, where the
employer is a bus company, operating a business affected with a public interest, under a public franchise. I cannot
conceive it to have been the intent of the Legislature to permit employees, where a valid existing contract is involved
and under the circumstances presented here, to substitute one bargaining agency for another whenever it suits their
purpose, or the purpose of a rival labor organization, during the life of that contract. If employees are to enjoy actual
liberty of contract through their labor organizations or other bona fide representatives, and their contracts are to be
effective, their obligations may not be repudiated simply by the process of changing their representatives, and in their
own interest they should not seek to do so. The contention that the mere holding of an election, and certification of
new representatives, would not in and of itself affect the contract or impair its obligations is best answered by the
board’s own language in its emended decision following the first representation proceeding herein: ’In practice the
result might well be otherwise under the particular circumstances of this case.’" (Triboro Coach Corp., 3 Labor
Cases, 60,076). (Emphasis supplied.) .
Wherefore, the order appealed from is reversed, without pronouncement as to costs.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-4834. March 28, 1952.]
LIBERAL LABOR UNION, Petitioner, v. PHILIPPINE CAN COMPANY, Respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEES; LABOR DISPUTES; COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS. —
The mainpurpose of the parties in entering into a collective bargaining agreement is to adopt a procedure in the
settlement of their disputes so that strikes may be prevented. This procedure must be followed in its entirety if it is to
achieve its objective.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; WHERE MANAGEMENT FAILS TO DO ITS PART UNDER THE AGREEMENT. — Even if the
management has failed to do its duty in connection with the formation of the grievance committee stipulated in the
agreement, such failure does not give to labor the right to declare a strike outright, for its duty under the agreement is
to exhaust all available means within its reach before resorting to force. If labor chooses not to deal with the
management either because of distrust or prejudice, the other way left to achieve a peaceful settlement of its
grievance is to resort to the Court of Industrial Relations. Strikes held in violation of the terms contained in
a collective bargaining agreement are illegal, specially when they provide for conclusive arbitration clauses. These
agreements must be strictly adhered to and respected if their ends have to be achieved.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; STRIKES; EMPLOYMENT OF FORCE, INTIMIDATION OR VIOLENCE. — If in carrying out the
strike, coercion, force, intimidation, violence with physical injuries, sabotage, and the use of unnecessary and
obscene language or epithets are committed by members of the labor union in an attempt to prevent the other willing
laborers to go to work, such strike can not be justified in a regime of law, for that would encourage abuses and
terrorism and would subvert the very purpose of the law which provides for arbitration and peaceful settlement of
labor disputes.
This is a petition for review of a resolution of the Court of Industrial Relations dated March 14, 1951, declaring illegal
the strike staged by the members of petitioning labor union on March 14, 1949, and giving authority to respondent
not to hire those responsible for the strike on the ground that petitioner violated the terms of the collective bargaining
agreement it concluded with respondent when it failed to submit its grievance, first, to a committee of top officials of
both the union and the company and, later, to the Court of Industrial Relations before declaring the strike.
42
It appears that because of a labor dispute that had arisen between petitioner and respondent a case was filed in the
Court of Industrial Relations, which was docketed as case No. 229-V, and, by way of compromise, a collective
bargaining agreement was entered into between them on February 26, 1949. One of the provisions agreed upon
therein concerns the procedure that should be followed in the settlement of a labor dispute which in substance
consists as follows: If a worker has a complaint the same shall first be submitted to a grievance committee, which
shall be composed of six members, three representing the union, and three the company. If the complaint is not
satisfactorily settled, it shall next be taken up by the top officials of both the union and the company. And if still no
settlement is reached, the matter shall be submitted to the Court of Industrial Relations, which shall determine it in
accordance with law.
It likewise appears that on the very day the collective bargaining agreement was concluded, respondent reduced the
wages of seven of the laborers of petitioner by P.50. Two days thereafter, petitioner protested this reduction to
the assistant manager of respondent, and when the latter intimated that he had nothing to do with it, petitioner
reiterated its protest to the general manager who on March 5, 1949, told the protestee to come back because the
management would meet to discuss the matter. When the representatives of the union returned days later they were
told that the reductions could not be returned because they do not appear in the pay-roll, and that in case the matter
would reach the court, the management would deny it. Because of this refusal, and the fact that the matter could not
be brought to the grievance committee by reason of the failure of respondent to name its representatives to said
committee, after the union had designated the names of those who should compose it in its behalf, the union struck
on March 14, 1949. As a consequence, the union filed the petition that initiated these proceedings praying that the
strike be declared legal and that respondent be ordered to restore the former rate of wages that the laborers affected
were receiving and to refund to them all the reductions that were made in their salaries.
After several days of trial, the case was decided by Hon. Jose S. Bautista, concurred in by Judge Modesto Castillo,
who held that the strike was legal and justified because of the failure of respondent to designate its representatives in
the grievance committee as provided for in the bargaining agreement; but on motion for reconsideration, said holding
was reversed in a resolution issued on March 15, 1951, penned by Presiding Judge Arsenio S. Roldan, and
concurred in by Judges Juan L. Lanting and Vicente Jimenez Yanzon, wherein it was held that the strike was illegal
and that the respondent was justified in not continuing in its service those responsible for the strike. Hence this
petition for review.
The only issue involved in this appeal refers to the legality of the strike staged by the members of the petitioning
union on March 14, 1949.
Petitioner contends that the majority opinion of the Court of Industrial Relations erred in declaring that petitioner had
violated the collective bargaining agreement of February 26, 1949, when it declared a strike on March 14, 1949,
without first submitting its dispute with respondent to the Court of Industrial Relations, because while it is true that in
said agreement a grievance committee was provided for to which any dispute should first be submitted, petitioner
could not make use of the procedure agreed upon in view of the failure of respondent to designate its representatives
in said committees, as it was done by the labor union, and that because of this failure of the respondent which
amounted to an outright violation of the agreement, the union became relieved of its duty to follow the grievance
procedure and, therefore, its failure to go to the Court of Industrial Relations before declaring the strike did not
amount to a violation of the agreement.
The pertinent provisions of the collective bargaining agreement of February 26, 1949, read as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"There is hereby created a grievance committee composed of six (6) members, three as representatives of
management and three as representatives of the union, all of whom are workers in the company. The matter of
discipline, promotion, and other managerial affairs lies in the hands of management, subject to the grievance
procedure. Any worker who feels aggrieved on the action taken by the management shall submit his grievance, orally
or in writing, to the grievance committee within three days from such action, which committee shall pass upon the
grievance within three days upon the submission thereof. Should the grievance be not satisfactorily settled at this
stage, it shall be taken up in conference between top management officials and top union officials. Should no
agreement be reached at this stage, either party shall submit the matter to the Court of Industrial Relations for
disposition in accordance with law. It is understood that the members of the grievance committee shall work in
company’s time, which shall not exceed one hour a day, which altogether shall not exceed seven hours a week. The
determination of the time to meet shall be undertaken by the management."cralaw virtua1aw library
As may be noted, the parties have expressly agreed on a procedure to be followed in the settlement of labor
disputes. Under this procedure, the first step to be taken is the creation of a grievance committee composed of six
representatives, three from the union and three from the company, to which the grievance must first be submitted.
The second step is the submission of the grievance to a conference of top officials of both management and labor,
and if the grievance still is not settled, the third step is for either party to submit the grievance to the Court of
Industrial Relations for its determination in accordance with law. The parties undoubtedly have adopted this
graduated procedure in the settlement of their labor disputes because of their desire to maintain harmonious
relations and prevent as much as possible the declaration of a strike which in its last analysis works adversely both
to capital and labor.
Having in mind this fundamental point of view, the next question to be determined is, is the strike staged by the
members of the petitioning labor union on March 14, 1949, legal and justified? In this respect, we find that the
majority opinion of the Court of Industrial Relations has interpreted correctly the import and effect of the procedure
for settlement of labor disputes agreed upon by the parties. On this point, the majority opinion said: "Admitting
therefore that the respondent company has not yet nominated its three representatives to said grievance body . . . it
cannot be denied, too, that the petitioner union, by its strike on March 14, 1949, has acted beyond its bound in the
collective bargaining agreement when it failed to submit the workers’ grievance to a conference of top management
officials and top union officials and on top of all, to the Court of Industrial Relations which has jurisdiction on the
subject matter of the dispute." We find this appraisal of the situation correct. As we have already stated, the main
purpose of the parties in adopting a procedure in the settlement of their disputes is to prevent a strike. This
procedure must be followed in its entirety if it is to achieve its objective. This procedure provides for three steps
which should be resorted to before any other step may be taken for the redress of a particular grievance. It is true
that the management has failed to do its duty in connection with the formation of a grievance committee, but this
failure does not give to labor the right to declare a strike outright, for its duty is to exhaust all available means within
its reach before resorting to force. There is no use providing for these steps if they can be ignored. This is a
compulsory arbitration which received the sanction of the court. And if labor chooses not to deal with the
management, either because of distrust or prejudice, the other way left to achieve a peaceful settlement of its
grievance is to resort to the Court of Industrial Relations. This the union failed to do. The authorities are numerous
which hold that strikes held in violation of the terms contained in a collective bargaining agreement are illegal,
specially when they provide for conclusivearbitration clauses. These agreements must be strictly adhered to and
respected if their ends have to be achieved (Shop N. Save v. Retail Food Clerks Union (1940) Cal. Super. Ct. CCT.
Tab. Case 91-18675; 2 A. L. R. Ann., 2nd Series, pp. 1278-1282).
But in the present case there is more than a mere violation of a collective bargaining agreement. Here we find that
the majority opinion predicated the illegality of the strike not merely on the infringement of said agreement by the
union but on the proven fact that, in carrying out the strike, coercion, force, intimidation, violation with physical
injuries, sabotage and the use of unnecessary and obscene language or epithets were committed by the top officials
and members of the union in an attempt to prevent the other willing laborers to go to work. We hold that a strike held
under these circumstances cannot be justified in a regime of law for that would encourage abuses and terrorism and
would subvert the very purpose of the law which provides for arbitration and peaceful settlement of labor disputes. As
aptly said in one case: "A labor philosophy based upon the theory that might is right, in disregard of law and order, is
an unfortunate philosophy of regression whose sole consequences can be disorder, class hatred and intolerance"
(Greater City Masters Plumbers Association v. Kahme, [1937] 6 N.Y.S. [2nd] 589).
In view of the foregoing, we are of the opinion, and so hold, that the resolution appealed from is in accordance with
law, and should, therefore, be affirmed.
Wherefore, the petition is denied with costs against petitioner.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-34948-49 May 15, 1979
43
PHILIPPINE METAL FOUNDRIES INC., Petitioner, vs. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, REGAL
MANUFACTURING EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION REGEMAS and CELESTINO BAYLON, Respondents.
The Philippine Metal Foundries, Inc. (now dissolved and merged with Shriro [Philippines] Inc.) is in this case a review
of the decision of the Court of Industrial Relations in Cases Nos. 3932-ULP and 3941-ULP
.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Petitioner, in its complaint dated November 21, 1963 (Case No. 3941-ULP), charged the Regal Manufacturing
Employees Associations FTUP and its members (herein private respondents), with unfair labor practice for declaring
a strike on October 5, 1963 and picketing the company's premises without filing a notice of strike in spite of the
existence of a no strike, no lockout clause and grievance procedure in the collective bargaining agreement entered
into between the petitioner and the Union. In their answer to this complaint, the Union and its members denied the
charge and, as affirmative defense, alleged that on October 3, 1963, the Union requested the management for a
grievance conference, stating in its invitation the time and place of meeting, but the company, through its General
Manager, refused and instead handed the Union's President a memorandum dismissing him from work and told the
Union members not to report for work, which is in violation of the no lockout and no strike clause of the
contract.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Upon the other hand, petitioner Philippine Metal Foundries, Inc. and its General Manager, in Case No. 3932-ULP,
were charged by private respondents on July 21, 1964 with unfair labor practice for the dismissal of Celestino
Baylon, President of the Union, on October 3, 1963, allegedly due to his union activities in representing and
protecting the Union members in their relations with the petitioner. To this complaint, petitioner and its manager filed
an answer denying the material allegations and alleged as affirmative defenses, among others, that on October 3,
1963, the company was constrained to terminate the services of Baylon by reason of the fact that he had, in spite of
repeated notices and warnings from the company, frequently and repeatedly absented himself from his work as
foundry worker and by reason of said dismissal he, as President of the Union as well as an officer of the FTUP
encouraged and abetted the staging of a strike on October 5, 1963, without prior notice to the company or any of the
latter's officials, in gross violation of a stipulation provided in their Collective Bargain Agreement, establishing pickets
and blocking ingress and egress to and from the company's premises, causing interruption of the work and/or
business of the company to its serious damage and prejudice.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
After holding joint trial on these two cases, the Court of Industrial Relations rendered its decision, finding that Baylon,
as Union President, was discharged for his union activities and that the employees declared a strike because they
believed in good faith that the dismissal of their President was an unfair labor practice. The Court declared
respondents Philippine Metal Foundries, Inc. and Leopoldo Relunia in Case No. 3932-ULP, guilty of unfair labor
practice in dismissing complainant Celestino Baylon; ordered respondents to reinstate Celestino Baylon to his former
position with all the rights and privileges formerly appertaining thereto, with one (1) year back wages computed from
October 3, 1963; and dismissed the petitioner's charge in Case No. 3941-ULP.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
Its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the Court of Industrial Relations en banc, petitioner filed the
present petition which was considered by this Court as submitted for decision without respondents'
brief.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The issues raised are: (1) whether Celestino Baylon was dismissed due to his absences or to his union activities as
Union President; and (2) whether the strike declared by the Union on October 5, 1963, is legal or
not.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
With respect to the first issue, it is argued by petitioner that according to the Collective Bargaining Agreement
between the Union and the company "one absent for a period of one week who fails to give notice thereof shall be
dropped automatically" and under its Disciplinary Policies and Procedures, dated and enforced since March 1, 1963,
absence of an employee without permission for a period of seven (7) consecutive calendar days is a ground for
immediate dismissal upon establishment of guilt; that since the Court of Industrial Relations found that Baylon
incurred numerous absences from January to September 1963, broken dowm as follows: for the month of January,
one (1) unexcused absence; March one (1) unexcused absence and twelve (12) consecutive absences without
permission; April, four (4) consecutive absences without permission; May, two (2) absences without permission; and
September, five (5) unexcused absences, the said court erred in holding that in Case No. 3932-ULP, Baylon was
dismissed not because of his absences but rather due to his being Union President and union
activities.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
In determining whether a discharge is discriminatory, the true reason for the discharge must be established. It has
been said that while union activity is no bar to a discharge, the existence of a lawful cause for discharge is no
defense if the employee was actually discharged for union activity. There is no question that Celestino Baylon
incurred numerous absences from January to September 1963. Had the company wanted to terminate his services
on the ground of absences, it could have done so, pursuant to Article V of the Collective Bargaining Agreement as
early as March 1963 when he incurred twelve (12) consecutive absences without permission. Its failure to do so
shows that the infractions commited by Baylon were disregarded. The Court of Industrial Relations found that Baylon
went to the company on September 28, 1963, but did not work as he was very sleepy. When he reported for work on
October 1, 1963, he submitted a written explanation for his absences which was received by the company. Two (2)
days later, as President of the Union, he invited the General Manager of the company for a grievance conference to
thresh out union problems at the D & E Restaurant at 6:00 p.m. of October 5, 1963. The letter of invitation was
received by the company at almost 12:45 noon of October 3, 1963. At 2:45 p. m. of the same day, Baylon was in turn
handed his termination letter. Under the attendant circumstances, We believe the Court of Industrial Relations was
justified in concluding that:
In 1963, Baylon had been a habitual absentee. His excused absences for causes other than sickness, sick leave and
vacation leave, total two (2) in January; nine (9) in February; eleven (11) in April; ten (10) in May; nine (9) in June;
eleven (11) in July; and five (5) in August (Exhs. '5' and '5-A').chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
This record, plus his numerous tardiness and half-day work, and the aforesaid unexcused absences, show how little
work for the employer Baylon had been doing as an employee (Exhs. 'EE' and '6-A'). His last unexcused absence in
September must have been just enough on the part of the company to withdraw its special treatment of Baylon as
union president (Exh 'EE').chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
This Court believes, however, that it was the aforementioned letter of invitation to a grievance conference sent by
Baylon to the general manager (Exhs. 'DD' and '7'), coming at the heels of his last unexcused absences, that broke
the proverbial camel's back. His dismissal under the foregoing circumstances, being ultimately triggered by his union
activity, is therefore not without some taint of unfair labor practice.
The question of whether an employee was discharged because of his union activities is essentially a question of fact
as to which the findings of the Court of Industrial Relations are conclusive and binding if supported by substantial
evidence considering the record as a whole. 1This is so because the Industrial Court is governed by the rule of
substantial evidence, rather than by the rule of preponderance of evidence as in any ordinary civil
cases. 2Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion. 3It means such evidence which affords a substantial basis from which the fact in
issue can be reasonably inferred. 4Examining the evidence on hand on this matter, We find the same to be
substantially supported.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Although a man's motive, like his intent, is, in the words of Lord Justice Bowen "as much a fact as the state of his
digestion", evidence of such fact may consist both direct testimony by one whose motive is in question and of
inferences of probability drawn from the totality of other facts. 5chanrobles virtual law library
It is admitted by petitioner that it accepted the invitation of Baylon for a grievance conference on October 5, 1963.
Yet, two hours after it accepted the letter of invitation, it dismissed Baylon without prior notice and/or investigation.
Such dismissal is undoubtedly an unfair labor practice committed by the company. Under these facts and
circumstances, Baylon and the members of the Union had valid reasons to ignore the schedule grievance
conference and declared a strike. When the Union declared a strike in the belief that the dismissal of Baylon was due
to union activities, said strike was not illegal . 6It is not even required that there be in fact an unfair labor practice
committed by the employer. It suffices, if such a belief in good faith is entertained by labor, as the inducing factor for
staging a strike. 7 The strike declared by the Union in this case cannot be considered a violation of the "no strike"
44
clause of the Collective Bargaining Agreement because it was due to the unfair labor practice of the employer.
Moreover, a no strike clause prohibition in a Collective Bargaining Agreement is applicable only to economic
strikes. 8 chanrobles virtual law library
The strike cannot be declared as illegal for lack of notice. In strikes arising out of and against a company's unfair
labor practice, a strike notice is not necessary in view of the strike being founded on urgent necessity and directed
against practices condemned by public policy, such notice being legally re. required only in cases of economic
strikes. 9 chanrobles virtual law library
On the contention of petitioner that the grievance conference which Baylon requested to be held on October 5, 1963
was not for the purpose of discussing union problems but of his dismissal, it is clearly shown in the records that
Baylon received his termination letter after he requested for a grievance conference. It is, therefore, clear that when
Baylon requested for a grievance conference, he was not yet aware of his dismissal. Baylon could not have
requested for a grievance conference on October 5, 1963 if he did not have demands to present on that date. The
records disclose that, as Union President, he used to make representations and protestations in behalf of the
members of the Union against unfair acts committed by the company. As early as March 2, 1962, he reminded the
company of an agreement arrived at in a previous labor-management conference that was violated when the
management hired several casual workers without giving preference to previously laid off employees and without
notifying the Union President (Exhibit "P"). On May 25, 1962, he complained of the poor condition of the toilet
facilities in one of the buildings of the company and requested the management for its improvement (Exhibit "Q"). On
August 18, 1962, he caged the attention of the management regarding the plight of seventy-two (72) workers who
were supposed to be temporarily laid off for a period of two (2) months only as agreed upon between the Union and
the management, but were not re-hired after the lapse of the period so he requested for the payment of their
separation pay (Exhibit "R"). On December 14, 1962, he requested for the payment of a claim for compensation of a
worker prior to the scheduled hearing of the same (Exhibit " U "). On December 20, 1962, he worked for the payment
of the accrued vacation and sick leave of a terminated worker (Exh. exhibit "V"). On January 12, 1963, he interceded
for the payment of the two months separation pay of another terminated worker (Exhibit "W"). On April 25, 1963, he
worked for the payment of separation pays of terminated workers found to be physically unfit (Exhibit "AA"). And on
September 2, 1963, he invited the General Manager of the company for a grievance conference to settle the
complaints of several Union members regarding their vacation leaves and other union problems (Exhibit "BB").
These exhibits show how Baylon, as President of the Union, fought for the rights and protection of his members. We
are satisfied that the Court's finding, in the above regard, are supported by substantial evidence on the record
considered as a whole.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED.
G.R. No. L-17038 July 31, 1964
CONSOLIDATED LABOR ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILS., Petitioner, vs. MARSMAN and CO., INC., and the
COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, Respondents.
-----------------------------
G.R. No. L-17057 July 31, 1964
MARSMAN and Co., INC., Petitioner, vs. CONSOLIDATED LABOR ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES HON.
JOSE S. BAUTISTA HON. ARSENIO I. MARTINEZ, HON. BALTAZAR M. VILLANUEVA, and HON. EMILIANO C.
TABIGNE, Respondents.
In the Court of Industrial Relations, Marsman & Co., Inc., hereinafter referred to as the Company, was charged with
unfair labor practice committed against sixty-nine officers and members of the Marsman & Company Employees and
Laborers Association (hereinafter referred to as MARCELA or simply as the Union). The Court (Judge Jose S.
Bautista), after hearing, found the Company guilty of the charge and ordered it to reinstate 60 of the aforementioned
69 complainants to their former positions or to similar ones with the same rate of pay, without back wages. On
motions for reconsideration filed by the Union and by the Company, respectively, the Court en banc affirmed the
decision - with Judge Arsenio I. Martinez concurring in the result Judge Baltazar M. Villanueva also concurring in the
result in a special opinion; Judge Emiliano C. Tabigne filing a separate concurring and dissenting opinion; and Judge
Amando C. Bugayong taking no part.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Both the Union and the Company appealed. The former claims that the 60 reinstated employees should be granted
backpay (G.R. No. L-17038) while the latter questions the Industrial Court's finding of unfair labor practice (G.R. No.
L-17057).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The facts, as found by the Industrial Court, are: The Company had in its employ approximately 320 persons, about
140 of whom where members of MARCELA and about 20 of the National Labor Union. On December 23, 1953 the
Industrial Court named MARCELA as the employees' bargaining agent in regard to rates of pay, terms and
conditions of employment. At that time MARCELA was affiliated with the Federation of Free Workers, or FFW, a
national labor organization. On March 17, 1954 MARCELA-FFW submitted to the Company a set of proposals for
collective bargaining, which the Company answered on March 24, 1954. In spite of negotiations held between the
Company and the Union, they failed to reach In agreement; so on April 8, 1954 the Union, failed a notice of strike
with the Department of Labor. Mediation by the Conciliation Service of that Department proved fruitless.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and approved by this
Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this
stipulation of facts.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
On June 4, 1954 the Union declared a strike and at the same time placed a "round-the-clock" picket line around the
Company's premises in Intramuros, Manila. The tense situation in the strike zone prompted the Manila Police
Department to send policemen thereto to preserve peace. Meanwhile the Labor Department's Conciliation Service
continued to mediate between the representatives of the Union and of the
Company.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
On July 21, 1954 some 50 employees, of whom nine were members of the National Labor Union and one a member
of MARCELA, entered the Company premises under police escort in order to return to
work.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
On July 30, 1954, in a conference called by Eleuterio Adevoso, then Secretary of Labor, the Union officials and
members then present were prevailed upon by Adevoso to accept the proposals of Antonio de las Alas, Company
vice-president, that they stop the strike and go back to work, and that when they were already working the Company
would discuss with them their demands. Upon being informed to the Union's acceptance of the proposal the strikers
returned to work. The Company admitted back sixteen picketing strikers on August 9, 1954 and later on, it also
reemployed non-union employees and a majority of the strikers. However, complainants herein were refused
admittance and were informed by Company officials that they would not be reinstated unless they ceased to be
active Union members and that in any case the Company already had enough men for its business
operations.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
As a result the strike and the picketing were resumed, because of which employees who had been admitted to work
since July 21, 1954 had to stay inside the Company premises, where the Company furnished them food and quarters
up to October 1954. Nevertheless some of those employed could go in and out after office hours to visit their
families.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
During the strike, some of the picketers and some non-strikers were arrested within the strike zone for having
committed unlawful acts, and were duly charged therewith.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
A petition for writ of injunction filed by the Company against MARCELA and its president, Buenaventura Bacay, on
the ground that the strike and picket were being maintained illegally, was denied by the Court of First Instance of
Manila, which pointed out that proper criminal complaints should have been filed against the individual strikers in the
corresponding courts.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
45
Because of the Company's consistent refusal to reinstate the 69 complainants even after repeated requests, the
Confederation of Labor Associations of the Philippines (CLAP), to which the Union had affiliated after seceding from
the FFW initiated the present charge for unfair labor practice.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Initially the strike staged by the Union was meant to compel the Company to grant it certain economic benefits set
forth in its proposal for collective bargaining. The strike was an economic one,1 and the striking employees would
have a tight to be reinstated if, in the interim, the employer had not hired other permanent workers to replace them.
For it is recognized that during the pendency of an economic strike an employer may take steps to continue and
protect his business by supplying places left vacant by the strikers, and is not bound to discharge those hired for that
purpose upon election of the strikers to resume their employment. 2 But the strike changed its character from the time
the Company refused to reinstate complainants because of their union activities after it had offered to admit all the
strikers and in fact did readmit the others. It was then converted into an unfair labor practice
strike.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The Company disputes the Industrial Court's findings that (1) it offered to reinstate all the strikers; (2) the
complainants made a timely acceptance of the offer; and (3) the Company's refusal to reinstate complainants was for
the purpose of discouraging union activities.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Substantial evidence supports the findings of fact of the Court of Industrial Relations. Complainants Teodoro
Bacalzo, Raymundo Mostoles-Cruz, Mariano Bautista, and Godofredo Garcia testified thus: They were all present at
the July 30, 1954 conference called by then Labor Secretary Eleuterio Adevoso in order to settle the differences
between the Company and the Union. It was during this conference that Antonio de las Alas, then the Company's
vice-president, offered to take back all the strikers if they would only stop the strike and as further inducement
promised that the Union's demands would be discussed when the strikers were already working. Adevoso convinced
the Union officers and members who were present to accept De las Alas'
proposal.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The lower court's reasons, we think, amply answer the Company's contention that De las Alas could not, by his offer,
have bound the Company because it was Velilla, and not he, who had the authority to deal with the strikers:
The denial of respondent that Antonio de las Alas was not authorized by the Company but Amando L. Velilla to deal
with the union with respect to the strike is not worthy of belief. First, because then De las Alas was an executive
Vice-President while Velilla was only the Secretary of the Company; second, while respondent wants to impress this
Court that Velilla's authority to deal with the strikers was virtue of the Board resolution, such document was not
presented in Court and third not even De las Alas was presented to make the denial.
The Company claims that the complainants applied for readmission only on June 7, 1955, more than a year after the
offer, when the CLAP, in their behalf, wrote the Company asking for their reinstatement. Prior to said letter, however,
complainants had, by various means, sought readmission. After De las Alas' invitation to return to work was
accepted by the Union officers and members, they informed all the other strikers accordingly. Thereupon the strikers
terminated the strike and presented themselves for work at the Company's premises. Eighty one of the strikers were
allowed to come back. But the Company's security guards, upon instructions of the Company officials, barred the
entrance when complainants attempted to enter, and informed them that they had to write individual letters of
application. So complainants complied with this requirement. It appears that the applications were scrutinized by a
committee of employees composed of Salvador Bantique assistant accountant of the mines division; Mariano Lee,
purchasing agent; Juan de Vera, paymaster; and Regina Cruz, accountant. Then the applications were further
screened by a personnel committee composed of Jan H. Marsman, Antonio de las Alas, Charles G. Herdman and
Amando Velilla. None of the sixty-nine applications met with favorable action by either
committee.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
In addition to writing formal letters of application a number of complainants phoned while others personally
approached their respective chiefs of department in the Company. Some also went to see Salvador Bantique,
chairman of the screening committee, and expressed their desire to work. Bantique, however, upon learning that the
strikers, among them Eulogio Labrador, were still active union members, informed them that they should first
disaffiliate from the union in order to be reinstated. Furthermore, Amando Velilla, when approached by a group of
complainants, told the latter that they had been away for a long time; that the Company had enough employees and
did not need additional help; that some of those whom he had invited to return refused; and that by that time (August,
1954) it was already too late for them to wish to return.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The Company alleges that it was economic reasons, i.e., its policy of retrenchment, not labor discrimination, which
prevented it from rehiring complainants. This is disproved, however, by the fact that it not only readmitted the other
strikers, but also hired new employees and even increased the salaries of its personnel by almost 50%. We are
convinced that it was not business exigency but a desire to discourage union activities which prompted the Company
to deny readmittance to complainants. This is an indubitable case of unfair labor
practice.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The strike was illegal of purpose, the Company insists, first, because it was staged for a trifling reason; and second,
the union demands, which had precipitated the strikes, were already covered by an Industrial Court judgment, for the
alteration, modification or setting aside of which a certain procedure has to be
followed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The Union began the strike because it believed in good faith that settlement of their demands was at an impasse and
that further negotiations would only come to naught. It stopped the strike upon the belief they could go back to work.
Then it renewed the strike (or it started a new strike) as a protest against the discrimination practiced by the
Company. Both are valid grounds for going on a strike.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
It is true that on August 14, 1952 the Industrial Court promulgated a decision in CIR Case No. 571-V, Marsman and
Company Employees and Labors Association (MARCELA-FFW) v. Marsman and Company, Inc. However, except
for the demand for general salary increases, the demands in said labor case were different from the demands which
the Union made before it went on strike. For this reason, it did not have to ask modification of the aforementioned
judgment. It had only to give the proper strike notice, as in fact it did.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
The Company further argues that since the methods used by the strikers were illegal, it had the right to refuse them
readmission. Of the 69 complainants, nine, namely Alejandro Mojar, Manuel Mazo, Esteban Borja, Cecilio Walo,
Eugenio Valenzuela, Elias Matic, Marcos Buccat, Malisimo Vargas and Ricardo Antonio, were charged with and
convicted of various crimes like coercion, malicious mischief, physical injuries, breach of the peace, light threats, and
damage to property, all committed during the period from September 4, 1954 to October 12, 1954. Admittedly, the
Company could not have condoned these acts which were committed after it had offered to reinstate the strikers.
Nevertheless, as the lower court reasoned out, it does not appear that the aforementioned individual acts were
authorized or even impliedly sanctioned by the Union. Hence, the other strikers who were innocent of and did not
participate in the illegal acts should not be punished by being deprived of their right of reinstatement. It is only those
who had been found guilty who should be penalized by the loss of the right. 3chanrobles virtual law library
We now come to the question of backpay. In an economic strike, the strikers are not entitled to backpay, since the
employer should get the equivalent day's work for what he pays his employees. During the time that the strike was
an economic one, complainants had no right to back pay. The Industrial Court could not have made a finding of
unfair labor practice with respect to such time, as none had so far been committed. This being an unfair labor
practice case, it cannot, therefore, order reinstatement much less back pay for that period. 4chanrobles virtual law
library
On the other hand, even after the court has made a finding of unfair labor practice, it still has the discretion to
determine whether or not to grant back pay. Such discretion was not abused when it denied back wages to
complainants, considering the climate of violence which attended the strike and picket that the complainants
conducted. While the complainants ordered reinstated did not actively take part in the acts of violence, their minatory
attitude towards the Company may be gathered from the fact that from the very first day of the strike policemen had
to patrol the strike zone in order to preserve peace.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, without costs.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes and Regala, JJ., concur.
46

1
An economic strike is defined as one which is to force wage or other concessions from the employer which he is not
required by law to grant.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-10114. November 26, 1957.]
BISAYA LAND TRANSPORTATION CO., INC., Petitioner, v. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and
PHILIPPINE MARINE RADIO OFFICERS ASSOCIATION, Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEE; STRIKE AND LOCKOUTS; RETURN OF STRIKERS TO WORK NOT WAIVER
OF DEMANDS. — The PHILMAROA presented its demands for the standardization and increase of salaries, sick
and vacation leaves, hospitalization, and closed shop agreement. Thereafter notice of intention to strike was filed in
the Conciliation Service Division of the Department of Labor against the employer. Pending the resolution of the
dispute by the CIR of the Presidential Certification to it, of the said dispute, two radio operators abandoned their
ships by some weeks thereafter, they returned to work and readmitted by the employer. The question is whether the
return of the radio officers was a waiver of the demands of the labor Union, Held: that the strike in the case at bar
was adopted by the union to compel the employer to accede to its demands. The strike was but one of the means
employed to achieve its ends. When the radio officers returned to work after the strike, such return did not imply the
waiver of the original demands. The fact that the radio operators returned to work and ended their strike only meant
that they desisted from the strike; such desistance is a personal act of the strikers and cannot be used against the
union and interpreted as a waiver by it of its regional demands for which the strike was adopted as a weapon.
2. ID.; UNION CRAFT HAS POWER TO BARGAIN COLLECTIVELY. — A Union craft, such as the one to which the
radio operators belonged, is expressly recognized in the Industrial Peace (section 9 (f), paragraphs 1 and 2, Republic
Act No. 875) and its right and power to bargain collectively is recognized.
3. ID.; EMPLOYEE’S AFFILIATION WITH ANOTHER LABOR UNION; RIGHT TO BARGAIN COLLECTIVELY. —
The contention that the PHILMAROA has no right to bargain collectively for radio operators employed by the
employer in the case at bar, because these radio operators are affiliated with another local labor union to which the
union most of the employees of said employer are affiliated is without merit. The PHILMAROA acted as
representative of the radio operators N and O as radio operators not as mere employees of the employer. There is
no prohibition in the law against employees affiliating with a craft union as well as with an ordinary labor union. . As
PHILMAROA represented the interest of N and O as radio operators said union was fully competent to represent
them in the proceedings in said capacity.
4. ID.; PRESIDENTIAL CERTIFICATION OF LABOR DISPUTE; NOT LIMITED TO PREVENT STRIKES AND
LOCKOUTS. — There is no reason or ground for the contention that Presidential certification of labor dispute to the
CIR is limited to the prevention of strikes and lockouts. Even after a strike has been declared where the President
believes that public interest demands arbitration and conciliation, the President may certify the case for that purpose.
The practice has been for the Court of Industrial Relations to order the strikers to return to work , pending final
determination of the union demands that impelled the strike. There is nothing in the law to indicate that this practice
is abolished.
Appeal by certiorari instituted by petitioner against the decision of the Court of Industrial Relations in its case No. 4 L-
IPA entitled the Philippine Marine Radio Officers’ Association v. Compañia Maritima, Et. Al.
This case is intimately related to G. R. No. L-10095 and G. R No. L-10115, already resolved by Us in a decision
promulgated last October 31, 1957. Insofar as this appeal is concerned, it appears that the PHILMAROA presented
its demands for standardization and increase of salaries, sick and vacation leaves, hospitalization, and closed shop
agreement on September 26, 1953. On October 24, 1953, notice of intention to strike was filed in the Conciliation
Service Division of the Department of Labor against the petitioners herein. Pending the resolution of the dispute by
the Court of Industrial Relations, by reason of the presidential certification to it of the said dispute, Benjamin Nadanza
and Arcadio Ouano abandoned their ships, which belong to the petitioner, on November 30 and December 7, 1953,
respectively. But some weeks thereafter said radio operators came back and, upon their request, were readmitted by
the company. In the court below the petitioner herein alleged that the strike was unlawful because no notice of the
strike was served directly to it. It was also contended that with the reinstatement of the radio operators there was no
longer any cause of action against the Bisaya Land Transportation Co., petitioner herein. The court a quo held that
the illegality of the strike was waived by the Bisaya Land Transportation Company when it accepted the striking radio
operators. As to the Absence of the cause of action against the petitioner herein, the court a quo held that this
defense is good as against the reinstatement and backpay of the striking radio operators, but not as to the
prosecution of the demands contained in the original petition of the union.
On this appeal the petitioner assigns the following errors:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"I. THE PETITIONER-UNION, NOW RESPONDENT, HAS NO CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE BISAYA LAND
TRANSPORTATION CO., INC.
"II. THE PETITIONER-UNION BEING ONLY A CRAFT UNION HAS NO RIGHT OR POWER TO BARGAIN
COLLECTIVELY.
"III. THE PETITIONER-UNION HAS NO RIGHT OR POWER TO BARGAIN COLLECTIVELY FOR RADIO
OPERATORS NADANZA AND OUANO AS BOTH OF THEM ARE AFFILIATED WITH ANOTHER LOCAL LABOR
UNION IN CEBU, THE PHILIPPINE MARINE & SHIPPING EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (PHILMASEA), WITH
WHICH THE GREAT MAJORITY OF THE EMPLOYEES OF THE BISAYA LAND TRANSPORTATION CO., INC.
ARE AFFILIATED.
"IV. THE STRIKE OR ABANDONING OF THEIR POSTS BY THE RADIO OPERATORS WAS NOT LEGAL.
"V. THE CERTIFICATION OF THE CASE TO THE C.I.R. BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES WAS NULL
AND VOID. "VI. THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS HAD NO JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE."cralaw
virtua1aw library
In support of the first assignment of error, it is claimed that when the radio operators employed by the petitioner went
back to work and the latter reinstated them, the parties thereby waived any of the grounds that they may have had
for striking. There is absolutely no merit in this contention. The strike in this case was adopted by the union to compel
the respondent shipping company to accede to its demands. The strike was but one of the means employed to
achieve its ends. When the radio officers returned back to work after the strike, such return did not imply the waiver
of the original demands. The fact that the radio operators returned back to work and ended their strike only meant
that they desisted from the strike; such desistance is a personal act of the strikers, and cannot be used against the
union and interpreted as a waiver by it of its original demands for which the strike was adopted as weapon.
The second assignment of error is also without merit as held by the court below. A union craft, such as the one to
which the radio operators belonged, is expressly recognized in the Industrial Peace Act (Sec. 9 [f], pars. 1 & 2 Rep.
Act No. 875) and its right and power to bargain collectively is recognized.
In third assignment of error it is claimed that the PHILMAROA has no right to bargain collectively for the radio
operators employed by the petitioner Bisaya Land Transportation Company, because these radio operators are
affiliated with another local union to which union most of employees of the petitioner union are affiliated. This
contention is also without merit. The PHILMAROA acted as representatives of the radio operators Nadanza and
Ouano, as radio operators, not as mere employees of the Bisaya Land Transportation Company. There is no
prohibition in the law against employees affiliating with a craft union as well as with an ordinary labor union. As the
PHILMAROA represented the interest of Nadan and Ouano as radio operators, said union was fully competent to
represent them in the proceedings in said capacity.
In the fourth assignment of error it is claimed that the strike was illegal. Admitting for the sake of argument that the
47
strike was illegal for being premature, this defense was waived by the Bisaya Land Transportation Company when it
voluntarily agreed to reinstate the radio operators.
The fifth assignment of error refers to the supposed invalidity of the presidential certification of the case to the Court
of Industrial Relations. It is argued that the real purpose of certification is to avoid or prevent strikes and lockouts, but
that since the strike in this case occurred before the certification, the latter was null and void. There is no reason or
ground for the contention that presidential certification is limited to the prevention of strikes and lockouts. Even after
a strike has been declared, where the President believes that public interest demands arbitration and conciliation, the
President may certify the case for that purpose. The practice has been for the Court of Industrial Relations to order
the strikers to return to work, pending final determination of the union demands that impelled the strike. There is
nothing in the law to indicate that the practice is abolished.
The last assignment of error is so clearly unfounded as to deserve no consideration on Our part other than a
statement that it is without merit.
The petition is hereby denied and the resolution appealed from, affirmed. With costs against petitioner.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-25291. January 30, 1971.]
THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., LTD., EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-NATU, FGU INSURANCE GROUP
WORKERS & EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-NATU, and INSULAR LIFE BUILDING EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-
NATU, Petitioners, v. THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., LTD., FGU INSURANCE GROUP, JOSE M.
OLBES and COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, Respondents.
Appeal, by certiorari to review a decision and a resolution en banc of the Court of Industrial Relations dated August
17, 1965 and October 20, 1965, respectively, in Case 1698-ULP.
The Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd., Employees Association-NATU, FGU Insurance Group Workers & Employees
Association-NATU, and Insular Life Building Employees Association-NATU (hereinafter referred to as the Unions),
while still members of the Federation of Free Workers (FFW), entered into separate collective bargaining agreements
with the Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. and the FGU Insurance Group (hereinafter referred to as the Companies).
Two of the lawyers of the Unions then were Felipe Enaje and Ramon Garcia; the latter was formerly the secretary-
treasurer of the FFW and acting president of the Insular Life/FGU unions and the Insular Life Building Employees
Association. Garcia, as such acting president, in a circular issued in his name and signed by him, tried to dissuade
the members of the Unions from disaffiliating with the FFW and joining the National Association of Trade Unions
(NATU), to no avail.
Enaje and Garcia soon left the FFW and secured employment with the Anti-Dummy Board of the Department of
Justice. Thereafter, the Companies hired Garcia in the latter part of 1956 as assistant corporate secretary and legal
assistant in their Legal Department, and he was soon receiving P900 a month, or P600 more than he was receiving
from the FFW. Enaje was hired on or about February 19, 1957 as personnel manager of the Companies, and was
likewise made chairman of the negotiating panel for the Companies in the collective bargaining with the Unions.
In a letter dated September 16, 1957, the Unions jointly submitted proposals to the Companies for a modified
renewal of their respective collective bargaining contracts which were then due to expire on September 30, 1957.
The parties mutually agreed and to make whatever benefits could be agreed upon retroactively effective October 1,
1957.
Thereafter, in the months of September and October 1957 negotiations were conducted on the Union’s proposals,
but these were snagged by a deadlock on the issue of union shop, as a result of which the Unions filed on January
27, 1958 a notice of strike for "deadlock on collective bargaining." Several conciliation conferences were held under
the auspices of the Department of Labor wherein the conciliators urged the Companies to make reply to the Unions’
proposals en toto so that the said Unions might consider the feasibility of dropping their demand for union security in
exchange for other benefits. However, the Companies did not make any counter-proposals but, instead, insisted that
the Unions first drop their demand for union security, promising money benefits if this was done. Thereupon, and
prior to April 15, 1958, the petitioner Insular Life Building Employees Association-NATU dropped this particular
demand, and requested the Companies to answer its demands, point by point, en toto. But the respondent Insular
Life Assurance Co. still refused to make any counter-proposals. In a letter addressed to the two other Unions by the
joint management of the Companies, the former were also asked to drop their union security demand, otherwise the
Companies "would no longer consider themselves bound by the commitment to make money benefits retroactive to
October 1, 1957." By a letter dated April 17, 1958, the remaining two petitioner unions likewise dropped their demand
for union shop. April 25, 1958 then was set by the parties to meet and discuss the remaining demands.
From April 25 to May 6, 1958, the parties negotiated on the labor demands but with no satisfactory result due to a
stalemate on the matter of salary increases. On May 13, 1958 the Unions demanded from the Companies final
counter-proposals on their economic demands, particularly on salary increases. Instead of giving counter-proposals,
the Companies on May 15, 1958 presented facts and figures and requested the Unions to submit a workable formula
which would justify their own proposals, taking into account the financial position of the former. Forthwith the Unions
voted to declare a strike in protest against what they considered the Companies’ unfair labor practices.
Meanwhile, eighty-seven (87) unionists were reclassified as supervisors without increase in salary nor in
responsibility while negotiations were going on in the Department of Labor after the notice to strike was served on
the Companies. These employees resigned from the Unions.
On May 20, 1958 the Unions went on strike and picketed the offices of the Insular Life Building at Plaza Moraga.
On May 21, 1958 the Companies through their acting manager and president, the respondent Jose M. Olbes
(hereinafter referred to as the respondent Olbes), sent to each of the strikers a letter (exhibit A) quoted verbatim as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"We recognize it is your privilege both to strike and to conduct picketing.
"However, if any of you would like to come back to work voluntarily, you may:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1. Advise the nearest police officer or security guard of your intention to do so.
"2. Take your meals within the office.
"3. Make a choice whether to go home at the end of the day or to sleep nights at the office where comfortable cots
have been prepared.
"4. Enjoy free coffee and occasional movies.
"5. Be paid overtime for work performed in excess of eight hours.
"6. Be sure arrangements will be made for your families.
"The decision to make is yours — whether you still believe in the motives of the strike or in the fairness of the
Management."cralaw virtua1aw library
The Unions, however, continued on strike, with the exception of a few unionists who were convinced to desist by the
aforesaid letter of May 21, 1958.
From the date the strike was called on May 21, 1958, until it was called off on May 31, 1958, some management
men tried to break thru the Unions’ picket lines. Thus, on May 21, 1958 Garcia, assistant corporate secretary, and
Vicente Abella, chief of the personnel records section, respectively of the Companies, tried to penetrate the picket
lines in front of the Insular Life Building. Garcia, upon approaching the picket line, tossed aside the placard of a
48
picketer, one Paulino Bugay; a fight ensued between them, in which both suffered injuries. The Companies
organized three bus-loads of employees, including a photographer, who with the said respondent Olbes, succeeded
in penetrating the picket lines in front of the Insular Life Building, thus causing injuries to the picketers and also to the
strike-breakers due to the resistance offered by some picketers.
Alleging that some non-strikers were injured and with the use of photographs as evidence, the Companies then filed
criminal charges against the strikers with the City Fiscal’s Office of Manila. During the pendency of the said cases in
the fiscal’s office, the Companies likewise filed a petition for injunction with damages with the Court of First Instance
of Manila which, on the basis of the pendency of the various criminal cases against striking members of the Unions,
issued on May 31, 1958 an order restraining the strikers, until further orders of the said court, from stopping,
impeding, obstructing, etc. the free and peaceful use of the Companies’ gates, entrance and driveway and the free
movement of persons and vehicles to and from, out and in, of the Companies’ building.
On the same date, the Companies, again through the respondent Olbes, sent individually to the strikers a letter
(exhibit B), quoted hereunder in its entirety:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The first day of the strike was last 21 May 1958.
"Our position remains unchanged and the strike has made us even more convinced of our decision.
"We do not know how long you intend to stay out, but we cannot hold your positions open for long. We have
continued to operate and will continue to do so with or without you.
"If you are still interested in continuing in the employ of the Group Companies, and if there are no criminal charges
pending against you, we are giving you until 2 June 1958 to report for work at the home office. If by this date you
have not yet reported, we may be forced to obtain your replacement.
"Before, the decisions was yours to make.
"So it is now."cralaw virtua1aw library
Incidentally, all of the more than 120 criminal charges filed against the members of the Unions, except three (3),
were dismissed by the fiscal’s office and by the courts. These three cases involved "slight physical injuries" against
one striker and "light coercion" against two others.
At any rate, because of the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction against them as well as the ultimatum of the
Companies giving them until June 2, 1958 to return to their jobs or else be replaced, the striking employees decided
to call off their strike and to report back to work on June 2, 1958.
However, before readmitting the strikers, the Companies required them not only to secure clearances from the City
Fiscal’s Office of Manila but also to be screened by a management committee among the members of which were
Enage and Garcia. The screening committee initially rejected 83 strikers with pending criminal charges. However, all
non-strikers with pending criminal charges which arose from the breakthrough incident were readmitted immediately
by the Companies without being required to secure clearances from the fiscal’s office. Subsequently, when
practically all the strikers had secured clearances from the fiscal’s office, the Companies readmitted only some but
adamantly refused readmission to 34 officials and members of the Unions who were most active in the strike, on the
ground that they committed "acts inimical to the interest of the respondents," without however stating the specific
acts allegedly committed. Among those who were refused readmission are Emiliano Tabasondra, vice president of
the Insular Life Building Employees’ Association-NATU; Florencio Ibarra, president of the FGU Insurance Group
Workers & Employees Association-NATU, and Isagani Du Timbol, acting president of the Insular Life Assurance Co.,
Ltd. Employees Association-NATU. Some 24 of the above number were ultimately notified months later that they
were being dismissed retroactively as of June 2, 1958 and given separation pay checks computed under Rep. Act
1787, while others (ten in number) up to now have not been readmitted although there have been no formal
dismissal notices given to them.
On July 29, 1958 the CIR prosecutor filed a complaint for unfair labor practice against the Companies under Republic
Act 875. The complaint specifically charged the Companies with (1) interfering with the members of the Unions in the
exercise of their right to concerted action, by sending out individual letters to them urging them to abandon their
strike and return to work, with a promise of comfortable cots, free coffee and movies, and paid overtime, and,
subsequently, by warning them that if they did not return to work on or before June 2, 1958, they might be replaced;
and (2) discriminating against the members of the Unions as regards readmission to work after the strike on the
basis of their union membership and degree of participation in the strike.
On August 4, 1958 the Companies filed their answer denying all the material allegations of me complaint, stating
special defenses therein, and asking for the dismissal of the complaint.
After trial on the merits, the Court of Industrial Relations, through Presiding Judge Arsenio Martinez, rendered on
August 17, 1965 a decision dismissing the Unions’ complaint for lack of merit. On August 31, 1965 the Unions
seasonably filed their motion for reconsideration of the said decision, and their supporting memorandum on
September 10, 1965. This was denied by the Court of Industrial Relations en banc in a resolution promulgated on
October 20, 1965.
Hence, this petition for review, the Unions contending that the lower court erred:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. In not finding the Companies guilty of unfair labor practice in sending out individually to the strikers the letters
marked Exhibits A and B;
2. In not finding the Companies guilty of unfair labor practice for discriminating against the striking members of the
Unions in the matter of readmission of employees after the strike;
3. In not finding the Companies guilty of unfair labor practice for dismissing officials and members of the Unions
without giving them the benefit of investigation and the opportunity to present their side in regard to activities
undertaken by them in the legitimate exercise of their right to strike; and
4. In not ordering the reinstatement of officials and members of the Unions, with full back wages, from June 2, 1958
to the date of their actual reinstatement to their usual employment.
I. The respondents contend that the sending of the letters, exhibits A and B, constituted a legitimate exercise of their
freedom of speech. We do not agree. The said letters were directed to the striking employees individually — by
registered special delivery mail at that — without being coursed through the Unions which were representing the
employees in the collective bargaining.
"The act of an employer in notifying absent employees individually during a strike following unproductive efforts at
collective bargaining that the plant would be operated the next day and that their jobs were open for them should
they want to come in has been held to be an unfair labor practice, as an active interference with the right of collective
bargaining through dealing with the employees individually instead of through their collective bargaining
representatives." (31 Am. Jur. 563, citing NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co. [CA 9th] 133 F2d 676, 146 ALR 1045)
Indeed, it is an unfair labor practice for an employer operating under a collective bargaining agreement to negotiate
or to attempt to negotiate with his employees individually in connection with changes in the agreement. And the basis
of the prohibition regarding individual bargaining with the strikers is that although the union is on strike, the employer
is still under obligation to bargain with the union as the employees’ bargaining representative (Melo Photo Supply
Corporation v. National Labor Relations Board, 321 U.S. 332).
Indeed, some such similar actions are illegal as constituting unwarranted acts of interference. Thus, the act of a
company president in writing letters to the strikers, urging their return to work on terms inconsistent with their union
membership, was adjudged as constituting interference with the exercise of his employees’ right to collective
bargaining (Lighter Publishing, CCA 7th, 133 F2d 621). It is likewise an act of interference for the employer to send a
letter to all employees notifying them to return to work at a time specified therein, otherwise new employees would be
engaged to perform their jobs. Individual solicitation of the employees or visiting their homes, with the employer or
his representative urging the employees to cease union activity or cease striking, constitutes unfair labor practice. All
the above-detailed activities are unfair labor practices because they tend to undermine the concerted activity of the
employees, an activity to which they are entitled free from the employer’s molestation. 1
49
Moreover, since exhibit A is a letter containing promises of benefits to the employees in order to entice them to return
to work, it is not protected by the free speech provisions of the Constitution (NLRB v. Clearfield Cheese Co., Inc.,
213 F2d 70). The same is true with exhibit B since it contained threats to obtain replacements for the striking
employees in the event they did not report for work on June 2 1958. The free speech protection under the
Constitution is inapplicable where the expression of opinion by the employer or his agent contains a promise of
benefit, or threats, or reprisal (31 Am. Jur. 544; NLRB v. Clearfield Cheese Co., Inc., 213 F2d 70; NLRB v. Goigy
Co., 211 F2d 533, 35 ALR 2d 422).
Indeed, when the respondents offered reinstatement and attempted to "bribe" the strikers with "comfortable cots,"
"free coffee and occasional movies," "overtime" pay for "work performed in excess of eight hours," and
"arrangements" for their families, so they would abandon the strike and return to work, they were guilty of strike-
breaking and/or union-busting and, consequently, of unfair labor practice. It is equivalent to an attempt to break a
strike for an employer to offer reinstatement to striking employees individually, when they are represented by a
union, since the employees thus offered reinstatement are unable to determine what the consequences of returning
to work would be.
Likewise violative of the right to organize, form and join labor organizations are the following acts: the offer of a
Christmas bonus to all "loyal" employees of a company shortly after the making of a request by the union to bargain;
wage increases given for the purpose of mollifying employees after the employer has refused to bargain with the
union, or for the purpose of inducing striking employees to return to work; the employer’s promises of benefits in
return for the strikers’ abandonment of their strike in support of their union; and the employer’s statement, made
about 6 weeks after the strike started, to a group of strikers in a restaurant to the effect that if the strikers returned to
work, they would receive new benefits in the form of hospitalization, accident insurance, profit-sharing, and a new
building to work in. 2
Citing paragraph 5 of the complaint filed by the acting prosecutor of the lower court which states that "the officers
and members of the complainant unions decided to call off the strike and return to work on June 2, 1958 by reason of
the injunction issued by the Manila Court of First Instance," the respondents contend that this was the main cause
why the strikers returned to work and not the letters, exhibits A and B. This assertion is without merit. The
circumstance that the strikers later decided to return to work ostensibly on account of the injunctive writ issued by the
Court of First Instance of Manila cannot alter the intrinsic quality of the letters, which were calculated, or which
tended, to interfere with the employees’ right to engage in lawful concerted activity in the form of a strike.
Interference constituting unfair labor practice will not cease to be such simply because it was susceptible of being
thwarted or resisted, or that it did not proximately cause the result intended. For success of purpose is not, and
should not, be the criterion in determining whether or not a prohibited act constitutes unfair labor practice.
"The test of whether an employer has interfered with and coerced employees within the meaning of subsection (a)
(1) is whether the employer has engaged in conduct which it may reasonably be said tends to interfere with the free
exercise of employees’ rights under section 3 of the Act, and it is not necessary that there be direct evidence that any
employee was in fact intimidated or coerced by statements of threats of the employer if there is a reasonable
inference that anti-union conduct of the employer does have an adverse effect on self-organization and collective
bargaining." (Francisco, Labor Laws 1956, Vol. II, p. 323, citing NLRB v. Ford, C.A., 1948, 170 F2d 735).
Besides, the letters, exhibits A and B, should not be considered by themselves alone but should be read in the light
of the preceding and subsequent circumstances surrounding them. The letters should be interpreted according to the
"totality of conduct doctrine,"
". . . whereby the culpability of an employer’s remarks were to be evaluated not only on the basis of their implicit
implications, but were to be appraised against the background of and in conjunction with collateral circumstances.
Under this ‘doctrine’ expressions of opinion by an employer which, though innocent in themselves, frequently were
held to be culpable because of the circumstances under which they were uttered, the history of the particular
employer’s labor relations or anti-union bias or because of their connection with an established collateral plan of
coercion or interference." (Rothenberg on Relations, p. 374, and cases cited therein.)
It must be recalled that previous to the petitioners’ submission of proposals for an amended renewal of their
respective collective bargaining agreements to the respondents, the latter hired Felipe Enage and Ramon Garcia,
former legal counsels of the petitioners, as personnel manager and assistant corporate secretary, respectively, with
attractive compensations. After the notice to strike was served on the Companies and negotiations were in progress
in the Department of Labor, the respondents reclassified 87 employees as supervisors without increase in salary or
in responsibility, in effect compelling these employees to resign from their Unions. And during the negotiations in the
Department of Labor, despite the fact that the petitioners granted the respondents’ demand that the former drop their
demand for union shop and in spite of urgings by the conciliators of the Department of Labor, the respondents
adamantly refused to answer the Unions’ demands en toto. Incidentally, Enage was the chairman of the negotiating
panel for the Companies in the collective bargaining between the former and the Unions. After the petitioners went to
strike, the strikers were individually sent copies of exhibit A, enticing them to abandon their strike by inducing them to
return to work upon promise of special privileges. Two days later, the respondents, thru their president and manager,
respondent Jose M. Olbes, brought three truckloads of non-strikers and others, escorted by armed men, who,
despite the presence of eight entrances to the three buildings occupied by the Companies, entered thru only one
gate less than two meters wide and in the process, crashed thru the picket line posted in front of the premises of the
Insular Life Building. This resulted in injuries on the part of the picketers and the strike-breakers. Then the
respondents brought against the picketers criminal charges, only three of which were not dismissed, and these three
only for slight misdemeanors. As a result of these criminal actions, the respondents were able to obtain an injunction
from the court of first instance restraining the strikers from stopping, impeding, obstructing, etc. the free and peaceful
use of the Companies’ gates, entrance and driveway and the free movement of persons and vehicles to and from,
out and in, of the Companies’ buildings. On the same day that the injunction was issued, the letter, Exhibit B, was
sent — again individually and by registered special delivery mail — to the strikers, threatening them with dismissal if
they did not report for work on or be fore June 2, 1958. But when most of the petitioners reported for work, the
respondents thru a screening committee — of which Ramon Garcia was a member — refused to admit 63 members
of the Unions on the ground of "pending criminal charges." However, when almost all were cleared of criminal
charges by the fiscal’s office, the respondents adamantly refused admission to 34 officials and union members. It is
not, however, disputed that all-non-strikers with pending criminal charges which arose from the breakthrough incident
of May 23, 1958 were readmitted immediately by the respondents. Among the non-strikers with pending criminal
charges who were readmitted were Generoso Abella, Enrique Guidote, Emilio Carreon, Antonio Castillo, Federico
Barretto, Manuel Chuidian and Nestor Cipriano. And despite the fact that the fiscal’s office found no probable cause
against the petitioning strikers, the Companies adamantly refused admission to them on the pretext that they
committed "acts inimical to the interest of the respondents," without stating specifically the inimical acts allegedly
committed. They were soon to admit, however, that these alleged inimical acts were the same criminal charges
which were dismissed by the fiscal and by the courts.
Verily, the above actuations of the respondents before and after the issuance of the letters, exhibits A and B, yield
the clear inference that the said letters formed of the respondents scheme to preclude if not destroy unionism within
them.
To justify the respondents’ threat to dismiss the strikers and secure replacements for them in order to protect and
continue their business, the CIR held the petitioners’ strike to be an economic strike on the basis of exhibit 4 (Notice
of Strike) which states that there was a "deadlock in collective bargaining" and on the strength of the supposed
testimonies of some union men who did not actually know the very reason for the strike. It should be noted that
exhibit 4, which was filed on January 27, 1958, states, inter alia:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"TO: BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
MANILA
"Thirty (30) days from receipt of this notice by the Office, this [sic] unions intends to go on strike against.
"THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., LTD.
Plaza Moraga, Manila
"THE FGU INSURANCE GROUP
Plaza Moraga, Manila
50

"INSULAR LIFE BUILDING ADMINISTRATION
Plaza Moraga, Manila
for the following reason: DEADLOCK IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library
However, the employees did not stage the strike after the thirty-day period, reckoned from January 27, 1958. This
simply proves that the reason for the strike was not the deadlock on collective bargaining nor any lack of economic
concessions. By letter dated April 15, 1958, the respondents categorically stated what they thought was the cause of
the "Notice of Strike," which so far as material, reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"3. Because you did not see fit to agree with our position on the union shop, you filed a notice of strike with the
Bureau of Labor Relations on 27 January 1958, citing ‘deadlock in collective bargaining’ which could have been for
no other issue than the union shop." (exhibit 8, letter dated April 15, 1958.)
The strike took place nearly four months from the date the said notice of strike was filed. And the actual and main
reason for the strike was, "When it became crystal clear the management double crossed or will not negotiate in
good faith, it is tantamount to refusal collectively and considering the unfair labor practice in the meantime being
committed by the management such as the sudden resignation of some unionists and [who] became supervisors
without increase in salary or change in responsibility, such as the coercion of employees, decided to declare the
strike." (tsn., Oct. 14, 1958, p. 14.) The truth of this assertion is amply proved by the following circumstances: (1) it
took the respondents six (6) months to consider the petitioners’ proposals, their only excuse being that they could not
go on with the negotiations if the petitioners did not drop the demand for union shop (exh. 7, respondents’ letter
dated April 7, 1958); (2) when the petitioners dropped the demand for union shop, the respondents did not have a
counter-offer to the petitioners’ demands. Sec. 14 of Rep. Act 875 required the respondents to make a reply to the
petitioners’ demands within ten days from receipt thereof, but instead they asked the petitioners to give a "well
reasoned, workable formula which takes into account the financial position of the group companies." (tsn., Sept. 8,
1958, p. 62; tsn., Feb. 26, 1969, p. 49.)
II. Exhibit H imposed three conditions for readmission of the strikers, namely: (1) the employee must be interested in
continuing his work with the group companies; (2) there must be no criminal charges against him; and (3) he must
report for work on June 2, 1958, otherwise he would be replaced. Since the evidence shows that all the employees
reported back to work at the respondents’ head office on June 2, 1953, they must be considered as having complied
with the first and third conditions.
Our point of inquiry should therefore be directed at whether they also complied with the second condition. It is not
denied that when the strikers reported for work on June 2, 1958, 63 members of the Unions were refused
readmission because they had pending criminal charges. However, despite the fact that they were able to secure
their respective clearances 34 officials and union members were still refused readmission on the alleged ground that
they committed acts inimical to the Companies. It is beyond dispute, however, that non-strikers who also had criminal
charges pending against them in the fiscal’s office, arising from the same incidents whence the criminal charges
against the strikers evolved, were readily readmitted and were not required to secure clearances. This is a clear act
of discrimination practiced by the Companies in the process of rehiring and is therefore a violation of sec. 4 (a) (4) of
the Industrial Peace Act.
The respondents did not merely discriminate against all the strikers in general. They separated the active from the
less active Unionists on the basis of their militancy, or lack of it, on the picket lines. Unionists belonging to the first
category were refused readmission even after they were able to secure clearances from the competent authorities
with respect to ‘the criminal charges filed against them. It is significant to note in this connection that except for one
union official who deserted his union on the second day of the strike and who later participated in crashing through
the picket lines, not a single union officer was taken back to work. Discrimination undoubtedly exists where the
record shows that the union activity of the rehired strikers has been less prominent than that of the strikers who were
denied reinstatement.
"So is there an unfair labor practice where the employer, although authorized by the Court of Industrial Relations to
dismiss the employees who participated in an illegal strike, dismissed only the leaders of the strikers, such dismissal
being evidence of discrimination against those dismissed and constitution a waiver of the employer’s right to dismiss
the striking employees and a condonation of the fault committed by them." (Carlos and Fernando, Labor and Social
Legislation, p. 62 citing Phil. Air Lines, Inc. v. Phil. Air Lines Employees Association, L-8197, Oct. 31, 1958.).
It is noteworthy that — perhaps in an anticipatory effort to exculpate themselves from charges of discrimination in the
readmission of strikers returning to work — the respondents delegated the power to readmit to a committee. But the
respondent Olbes had chosen Vicente Abella, chief of the personnel records section, and Ramon Garcia, assistant
corporate secretary, to screen the unionists reporting back to work. It is not difficult to imagine that these two
employees — having been involved in unpleasant incidents with the picketers during the strike — were hostile to the
strikers. Needless to say, the mere act of placing in the hands of employees hostile to the strikers the power of
reinstatement, is a form of discrimination in rehiring.
"Delayed reinstatement is a form of discrimination in rehiring, as is having the machinery of reinstatement in the
hands of employees hostile to the strikers, and reinstating a union official who formerly worked in a unionized plant,
to a job in another mill, which was imperfectly organized." (Morabe, The Law on Strikes, p. 473, citing Sunshine
Mining Co. 7 NLRB 1252; Cleveland Worsted Mills, 43 NLRB 545; Italics supplied.)
Equally significant is the fact that while the management and the members of the screening committee admitted the
discrimination committed against the strikers, they tossed back and around to each other the responsibility for the
discrimination. Thus, Garcia admitted that in exercising for the management the authority to screen the returning
employees, the committee admitted the non-strikers but refused readmission to the strikers (tsn., Feb. 6, 1962, pp.
15-19, 23-29). Vicente Abella, chairman of the management’s screening committee, while admitting the
discrimination, placed the blame therefor squarely on the management (tsn., Sept. 20, 1960, pp. 7-8, 14-18). But the
management, speaking through the respondent Olbes, head of the Companies, disclaimed responsibility for the
discrimination. He testified that "The decision whether to accept or not an employee was left in the hands of that
committee that had been empowered to look into all cases of the strikers." (tsn., Sept. 6, 1962, p. 19.)
Of course, the respondents — through Ramon Garcia — tried to explain the basis for such discrimination by
testifying that strikers whose participation in any alleged misconduct during the picketing was not serious in nature
were readmissible, while those whose participation was serious were not (tsn, Aug. 4, 1961, pp. 48-49, 56). But even
this distinction between acts of slight misconduct and acts of serious misconduct which the respondents contend was
the basis for either reinstatement or discharge, is completely shattered upon a cursory examination of the evidence
on record. For with the exception of Pascual Esquillo whose dismissal sent to the other strikers cited the alleged
commission by them of simple "acts of misconduct."cralaw virtua1aw library
III. Anent the third assignment of error, the record shows that not a single dismissed striker was given the opportunity
to defend himself against the supposed charges against him. As earlier mentioned, when the striking employees
reported back for work on June 2, 1358, the respondents refused to readmit them unless they first secured the
necessary clearances; but when all, except three, were able to secure and subsequently present the required
clearances, the respondents still refused to take them back. Instead, several of them later received letters from the
respondents in the following stereotyped tenor:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"This will confirm the termination of your employment with the Insular Life-FGU Insurance Group as of 2 June 1958.
"The termination of your employment was due to the fact that you committed acts of misconduct while picketing
during the last strike. Because this may not constitute sufficient cause under the law to terminate your employment
without pay, we are giving you the amount of P1,930.32 corresponding to one-half month pay for every year of your
service in the Group Company.
"Kindly acknowledge receipt of the check we are sending herewith.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) JOSE M. OLBES
"President, Insurance Life
51
Acting President, FGU."cralaw virtua1aw library
The respondents, however, admitted that the alleged "acts of misconduct" attributed to the dismissed strikers were
the same acts with which the said strikers were charged before the fiscal’s office and the courts. But all these
charges except three were dropped or dismissed.
Indeed, the individual cases of dismissed officers and members of the striking unions do not indicate sufficient basis
for dismissal.
Emiliano Tabasondra, vice-president of the petitioner FGU Insurance Group Workers & Employees Association-
NATU, was refused reinstatement allegedly because he did not report for duty on June 2, 1958 and, hence, had
abandoned his office. But the overwhelming evidence adduced at the trial and which the respondents failed to rebut,
negates the respondents’ charge that he had abandoned his job. In his testimony, corroborated by many others,
Tabasondra particularly identified the management men to whom he and his group presented themselves on June 2,
1958. He mentioned the respondent Olbes’ secretary, De Asis, as the one who received them and later directed
them — when Olbes refused them an audience — to Felipe Enage, the Companies’ personnel manager. He likewise
categorically stated that he and his group went to see Enage as directed by Olbes’ secretary. If Tabasondra were not
telling the truth, it would have been an easy matter for the respondents to produce De Asis and Enage — who
testified anyway as witnesses for the respondents on several occasions — to rebut his testimony. The respondents
did nothing of the kind. Moreover, Tabasondra called on June 21, 1958 the respondents’ attention to his non-
admission and asked them to inform him of the reasons therefor, but instead of doing so, the respondents dismissed
him by their letter dated July 10, 1958. Elementary fairness required that before being dismissed for cause,
Tabasondra be given "his day in court."cralaw virtua1aw library
At any rate, it has been held that mere failure to report for work after notice to return, does not constitute
abandonment nor bar reinstatement. In one case, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the taking back of six of eleven
men constituted discrimination although the five strikers who were not reinstated, all of whom were prominent in the
union and in the strike, reported for work at various times during the next three days, but were told that there were no
openings. Said the Court:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . The Board found, and we cannot say that its finding is unsupported. that, in taking back six union men, the
respondent’s officials discriminated against the latter on account of their union activities and that the excuse given
that they did not apply until after the quota was full was an afterthought and not the true reason for the discrimination
against them." (NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333, 58 Sup. Ct. 904, 82 L. Ed. 1381) (Mathews,
Labor Relations and the Law, p. 725, 728)
The respondents’ allegation that Tabasondra should have returned after being refused readmission on June 2, 1958,
is not persuasive. When the employer puts off reinstatement when an employee reports for work at the time agreed,
we consider the employee relieved from the duty of returning further.
Sixto Tongos was dismissed allegedly because he revealed that despite the fact that the Companies spent more
than P80,000 for the vacation trips of officials, they refused to grant union demands; hence, he betrayed his trust as
an auditor of the Companies. We do not find this allegation convincing. First, this accusation was emphatically
denied by Tongos on the witness stand. Gonzales, president of one of the respondent Companies and one of the
officials referred to, took a trip abroad in 1958. Exchange controls were then in force, and an outgoing traveller on a
combined business and vacation trip was allowed by the Central Bank, per its Circular 52 (Notification to Authorized
Agent Banks) dated May 9, 1952, an allocation of $1,000 or only P2,000, at the official rate of two pesos to the dollar,
as pocket money; hence, this was the only amount that would appear on the books of the Companies. It was only on
January 21, 1962, per its Circular 133 (Notification to Authorized Agent Banks), that the Central Bank lifted the
exchange controls. Tongos could not therefore have revealed an amount bigger than the above sum. And his
competence in figures could not be doubted considering that he had passed the board examinations for certified
public accountants. But assuming arguendo that Tongos indeed revealed the true expenses of Gonzales’ trip —
which the respondents never denied or tried to disprove — his statements clearly fall within the sphere of a unionist’s
right to discuss and advertise the facts involved in a labor dispute, in accordance with section 9 (a) (5) of Republic
Act 875 which guarantees the untramelled exercise by striking employees of the right to give "publicity to the
existence of, or the fact involved in any labor dispute, whether by advertising, speaking, patrolling, or by any method
not involving fraud or violence." Indeed, it is not only the right, it is as well the duty, of every unionist to advertise the
facts of a dispute for the purpose of informing all those affected thereby. In labor disputes, the combatants are
expected to expose the truth before the public to justify their respective demands. Being a union man and one of the
strikers, Tongos was expected to reveal the whole truth on whether or not the respondent Companies were justified
in refusing to accede to union demands. After all, not being one of the supervisors, he was not part of management.
And his statement, if indeed made, is but an expression of free speech protected by the Constitution.
"Free speech on both sides and for every faction on any side of the labor relation is to me a constitutional and useful
right. Labor is free . . . to turn its publicity on any labor oppression, substandard wages, employer unfairness, or
objectionable working conditions. The employer, too, should be free to answer and to turn publicity on the records of
the leaders of the unions which seek the confidence of his men . . ." (Concurring opinion of Justice Jackson in
Thomas v. Collins, 223 U.S. 516, 547, 65 Sup. Ct. 315, 89 L. Ed. 430.) (Mathews, Labor Relations and the Law, p.
591.)
The respondents also allege that in revealing certain confidential information, Tongos committed not only a betrayal
of trust but also a violation of the moral principles and ethics of accountancy. But nowhere in the Code of Ethics for
Certified Public Accountants under the Revised Rules and Regulations of the Board of Accountancy formulated in
1954, is this stated. Moreover, the relationship of the Companies with Tongos was that of an employer and not a
client. And with regard to the testimonies of Juan Raymundo and Antolin Carillo, both vice-presidents of the Trust
Insurance Agencies, Inc. about the alleged utterances made by Tongos, the lower court should not have given them
much weight. The firm of these witnesses was newly established at that time and was still a "general agency" of the
Companies. It is not therefore amiss to conclude that they were more inclined to favor the respondents rather than
Tongos.
Pacifico Ner, Paulino Bugay, Jose Garcia, Narciso Daño, Vicente Alsol and Hermenigildo Ramirez, opined the lower
court, were constructively dismissed by non-readmission allegedly because they not only prevented Ramon Garcia,
assistant corporate secretary, and Vicente Abella, chief of the personnel records section of the Companies, from
entering the Companies’ premises on May 21, 1958, but they also caused bruises and abrasions on Garcia’s chest
and forehead — acts considered inimical to the interest of the respondents. The Unions, upon the other hand, insist
that there is complete lack of evidence that Ner took part in pushing Garcia; that it was Garcia who elbowed his way
through the picket lines and therefore Ner shouted "Close up," which the picketers did; and that Garcia tossed
Paulino Bugay’s placard and a fight ensued between them in which both suffered injuries. But despite these
conflicting versions of what actually happened on May 21, 1958, there are grounds to believe that the picketers are
not responsible for what happened. The picketing on May 21, 1958, as reported in the police blotter, was peaceful
(see Police blotter report, exh. 3 in CA-G.R. No. 25991-R of the Court of Appeals, where Ner was acquitted).
Moreover, although the Companies during the strike were holding offices at the Botica Boie building at Escolta,
Manila; Tuason Building at San Vicente Street, Manila; and Ayala, Inc. offices at Makati, Rizal, Garcia, the assistant
corporate secretary, and Abella, the chief of the personnel records section, reported for work at the Insular Life
Building. There is therefore a reasonable suggestion that they were sent to work at the latter building to create such
an incident and have a basis for filing criminal charges against the petitioners in the fiscal’s office and applying for
injunction from the court of first instance. Besides, under the circumstances the picketers were not legally bound to
yield their grounds and withdraw from the picket lines. Being where the law expects them to be in the legitimate
exercise of their rights, they had every reason to defend themselves and their rights from any assault or unlawful
transgression. Yet the police blotter, about adverted to, attests that they did not resort to violence.
The heated altercations and occasional blows exchanged on the picket line do not affect or diminish the right to
strike. Persuasive on this point is the following commentary:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"We think it must be conceded that some disorder is unfortunately quite usual in any extensive or long drawn out
strike. A strike is essentially a battle waged with economic weapons. Engaged in it are human beings whose feelings
are stirred to the depths. Rising passions call forth hot words. Hot words lead to blows on the picket line. The
transformation from economic to physical combat by those engaged in the contest is difficult to prevent even when
cool heads direct the fight. Violence of this nature, however much it is to be regretted, must have been in the
contemplation of the Congress when it provided in Sec. 13 of Act 29 USCA Sec. 163, that nothing therein should be
construed so as to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike. If this were not co, the rights
afforded to employees by the Act would indeed be illusory. We accordingly recently held that it was not intended by
the Act that minor disorders of this nature would deprive a striker of the possibility of reinstatement." (Republic Steel
Corp. v. N. L. R. B., 107 F2d 472, cited in Mathews, Labor Relations and the Law, p. 378)
52

Hence the incident that occurred between Ner, Et. Al. and Ramon Garcia was but a necessary incident of the strike
and should not be considered as a bar to reinstatement. Thus it has been held that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Fist-fighting between union and non-union employees in the midst of a strike is no bar to reinstatement." (Teller,
Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining, Vol. II, p. 855 citing Stackpole Carbon, Co. 6 NLRB 171, enforced 105
F2d 167.)
Furthermore, assuming that the acts committed by the strikers were transgressions of law, they amount only to mere
ordinary misdemeanors and are not a bar to reinstatement.
"In cases involving misdemeanors, the board has generally held that unlawful acts are not bar to reinstatement."
(Teller, Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining, Id., p. 854, citing Ford Motor Company, 23 NLRB No. 28.)
Finally, it is not disputed that despite the pendency of criminal charges against non-striking employees before the
fiscal’s office, they were readily admitted, but those strikers who had pending charges in the same office were
refused readmission. The reinstatement of the strikers is thus in order.
" [W]here the misconduct, whether in reinstating persons equally guilty with those whose reinstatement is opposed,
or in other ways, gives rise to the inference that union activities rather than misconduct is the basis of his [employer]
objection, the Board has usually required reinstatement." (Teller, supra, p. 853, citing the Third Annual Report of
NLRB [1938], p. 211.)
Lastly, the lower Court justified the constructive dismissal of Florencio Ibarra allegedly because he committed acts
inimical to the interest of the respondents when, as president of the FGU Workers and Employees Association-
NATU, he advised the strikers that they could use force and violence to have a successful picket and that picketing
was precisely intended to prevent the non-strikers and company clients and customers from entering the Companies’
buildings. Even if this were true, the record discloses that the picket line had been generally peaceful, and that
incidents happened only when management men made incursions into and tried to break the picket line. At any rate,
with or without the advice of Ibarra, picketing is inherently explosive. For, as pointed out by one author, "The picket
line is an explosive front, charged with the emotions and fierce loyalties of the union-management dispute. It may be
marked by colorful name-calling, intimidating threats or sporadic fights between the pickets and those who pass the
line." (Mathews, Labor Relations and the Law, p. 752). The picket line being the natural result of the respondents’
unfair labor practice, Ibarra’s misconduct is at most a misdemeanor which is not a bar to reinstatement. Besides, the
only evidence presented by the Companies regarding Ibarra’s participation in the strike was the testimony of one
Rodolfo Encarnacion, a former member of the board of directors of the petitioner FGU Insurance Group Workers and
Employees Union-NATU, who became a "turncoat" and who likewise testified as to the union activities of Atty.
Lacsina, Ricardo Villaruel and others (annex C, Decision, p. 27) — another matter which emphasizes the
respondents’ unfair labor practice. For under the circumstances, there is good ground to believe that Encarnacion
was made to spy on the activities of the union members. This act of the respondents is considered unjustifiable
interference in the union activities of the petitioners and is unfair labor practice.
"It has been held in a great number of decisions that espionage by an employer of union activities, or surveillance
thereof, are such instances of interference, restraint or coercion of employees in connection with their right to
organize, form and join unions as to constitute unfair labor practice . . .’Nothing is more calculated to interfere with,
restrain and coerce employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization than such activity even where no
discharges result. The information obtained by means of espionage is invaluable to the employer and can be used in
a variety of cases to break a union.’ The unfair labor practice is committed whether the espionage is carried on by a
professional labor spy or detective, by officials or supervisory employees of the employer, or by fellow employees
acting at the request or direction of the employer, or an ex-employee . . ." (Teller, Labor Disputes and Collective
Bargaining, Vol. II, pp. 765-766, and cases cited.)
IV. The lower court should have ordered the reinstatement of the officials and members of the Unions, with full back
wages from June 2, 1958 to the date of their actual reinstatement to their usual employment. Because all too clear
from the factual and environmental milieu of this case, coupled with settled decisional law, is that the Unions went on
strike because of the unfair labor practices committed by the respondents, and that when the strikers reported back
for work — upon the invitation of the respondents — they were discriminatorily dismissed. The members and officials
of the Unions therefore are entitled to reinstatement with back pay.
" [W]here the strike was induced and provoked by improper conduct on the part of an employer amounting to an
‘unfair labor practice,’ the strikers are entitled to reinstatement with back pay." (Rothenberg on Labor Relations, p.
418.)
" [A]n employee who has been dismissed in violation of the provisions of the Act is entitled to reinstatement with back
pay upon an adjudication that the discharge was illegal." (Id., citing Waterman S. S. Corp. v. N. L R. B., 119 F2d 760;
N. L. R. B. v. Richter’s Bakery, 140 F2d 870; N. L. R. B. v. Southern Wood Preserving Co., 135 F. 2d 606: C. G.
Conn, Ltd. v. N. L. R. B., 108 F2d 390; N. L. R. B. v. American Mfg. Co., 106 F2d 61; N. L. R. B. v. Kentucky Fire
Brick Co., 99 F2d 99.)
And it is not a defense to reinstatement for the respondents to allege that the positions of these union members have
already been filled by replacements.
" [W]here the employers’ ‘unfair labor practice’ caused or contributed to the strike or where the ‘lock-out’ by the
employer constitutes an ‘unfair labor practice,’ the employer cannot successfully urge as a defense that the striking
or lock-out employees position has been filled by replacement. Under such circumstances. if no job sufficiently and
satisfactorily comparable to that previously held by the aggrieved employee can be found, the employer must
discharge the replacement employee, if necessary, to restore the striking or locked-out worker to his old or
comparable position . . . If the employer’s improper conduct was an initial cause of the strike, all the strikers are
entitled to reinstatement and the dismissal of replacement employees wherever necessary; . . ." (Id., p. 422 and
cases cited.)
A corollary issue to which we now address ourselves is, from what date should the backpay payable to the unionists
be computed? It is now a settled doctrine that strikers who are entitled to reinstatement are not entitled to back pay
during the period of the strike, even though it is caused by an unfair labor practice. However, if may offer to return to
work under the same conditions just before the strike, the refusal to re-employ or the imposition of conditions
amounting to unfair labor practice is a violation of section 4(a) (4) of the Industrial Peace Act and the employer is
liable for backpay from the date of the offer (Cromwell Commercial Employees and Laborers Union v. Court of
Industrial Relations, L-19778, Decision, Sept. 30, 1964, 12 SCRA 124; Id., Resolution on motion for reconsideration,
13 SCRA 258; see also Mathews, Labor Relations and the Law, p. 730 and the cited cases). We have likewise ruled
that discriminatorily dismissed employees must receive backpay from the date of the act of discrimination, that is,
from the date of their discharge (Cromwell Commercial Employees and Laborers Union v. Court of Industrial
Relations, supra).
The respondents notified the petitioner strikers to report back for work on June 2, 1958, which the latter did. A great
number of them, however, were refused readmission because they had criminal charges against them pending
before the fiscal’s office, although non-strikers who were also facing criminal indictments were readily readmitted.
These strikers who were refused readmission on June 2, 1958 can thus be categorized as discriminatorily dismissed
employees and are entitled to backpay from said date. This is true even with respect to the petitioners Jose Pilapil,
Paulino Bugay, Jr. and Jose Garcia, Jr. who were found guilty only of misdemeanors which are not considered
sufficient to bar reinstatement (Teller, Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining, p. 854), especially so because their
unlawful acts arose during incidents which were provoked by the respondents’ men. However, since the employees
who were denied readmission have been out of the service of the Companies (for more than ten years) during which
they may have found other employment or other means of livelihood, it is only just and equitable that whatever they
may have earned during that period should be deducted from their back wages to mitigate somewhat the liability of
the company, pursuant to the equitable principle that no one is allowed to enrich himself at the expense of another
(Macleod & Co. of the Philippines v. Progressive Federation of Labor, 97 Phil. 205 [1955]).
The lower court gave inordinate significance to the payment to and acceptance by the dismissed employees of
separation pay. This Court has ruled that while employers may be authorized under Republic Act 1052 to terminate
employment of employees by serving the required notice, or, in the absence thereof, by paying the required
compensation, the said Act may not be invoked to justify a dismissal prohibited by law, e.g., dismissal for union
activities.
". . . While Republic Act No. 1052 authorizes a commercial establishment to terminate the employment of its
53
employee by serving notice on him one month in advance, or, in the absence thereof, by paying him one month
compensation from the date of the termination of his employment, such Act does not give to the employer a blanket
authority to terminate the employment regardless of the cause or purpose behind such termination. Certainly, it
cannot he made use of as a cloak to circumvent a final order of the court or a scheme to trample upon the right of an
employee who has been the victim of an unfair labor practice." (Yu Ki Lam, Et. Al. v. Nena Micaller, Et Al., 99 Phil.
904 [1956].)
Finally, we do not share the respondents’ view that the findings of fact of the Court of Industrial Relations are
supported by substantial and credible proof. This Court is not therefore precluded from digging deeper into the
factual milieu of the case (Union of Philippine Education Employees v. Philippine Education Company, 91 Phil. 93;
Lu Do & Lu Ym Corporation v. Philippine-Land-Air-Sea Labor Union, 11 SCRA 134 [1964]).
V. The petitioners (15 of them) ask this Court to cite for contempt the respondent Presiding Judge Arsenio Martinez
of the Court of Industrial Relations and the counsels for the private respondents, on the ground that the former wrote
the following in his decision subject of the instant petition for certiorari, while the latter quoted the same on pages 90-
91 of the respondents’ brief:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . Says the Supreme Court in the following decisions:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"‘In a proceeding for unfair labor practice, involving a determination as to whether or not the acts of the employees
concerned justified the adoption of the employer of disciplinary measures against them, the mere fact that the
employees may be able to put up a valid defense in a criminal prosecution for the same acts, does not erase or
neutralize the employer’s right to impose discipline on said employees. For it is settled that not even the acquittal of
an employee of the criminal charge against him is a bar to the employer’s right to impose discipline on its employees,
should the act upon which the criminal charge was based constitute nevertheless an activity inimical to the
employer’s interest . . . The act of the employees now under consideration may be considered as a misconduct
which is a just cause for dismissal.’ (Lopez, Sr., Et. Al. v. Chronicle Publication Employees Ass’n. Et. Al., G.R. No. L-
20179-81, December 28, 1964.)" (Italics supplied)
The two pertinent paragraphs in the above-cited decision * which contained the underscored portions of the above
citation read however as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Differently as regard the dismissal of Orlando Aquino and Carmelito Vicente, we are inclined to uphold the action
taken by the employer as proper disciplinary measure. A reading of the article which allegedly caused their dismissal
reveals that it really contains an insinuation albeit subtly of the supposed exertion of political pressure by the Manila
Chronicle management upon the City Fiscal’s Office, resulting in the non-filing of the case against the employer. In
rejecting the employer’s theory that the dismissal of Vicente and Aquino was justified, the lower court considered the
article as ‘a report of some acts and omissions of an Assistant Fiscal in the exercise of his official functions’ and,
therefore, does away with the presumption of malice. This being a proceeding for unfair labor practice, the matter
should not have been viewed or gauged in the light of the doctrine on a publisher’s culpability under the Penal Code.
We are not here to determine whether the employees’ act could stand criminal prosecution, but only to final out
whether the aforesaid act justifies the adoption by the employer of disciplinary measure against them. This is not
sustaining the ruling that the publication in question is qualified privileged, but even on the assumption that this is so,
the exempting character thereof under the Penal Code does not necessarily erase or neutralize its effect on the
employer’s interest which may warrant employment of disciplinary measure. For it must be remembered that not
even the acquittal of an employee, of the criminal charges against him, is a bar to the employer’s right to impose
discipline on its employees, should the act upon which the criminal charges was based constitute nevertheless an
activity inimical to the employer’s interest.
"In the herein case, it appears to us that for an employee to publish his ‘suspicion,’ which actually amounts to a
public accusation, that his employer is exerting political pressure on a public official to thwart some legitimate
activities on the employees, which charge, in the least, would sully the employer’s reputation, can be nothing but an
act inimical to the said employer’s interest. And the fact that the same was made in the union newspaper does not
alter its deleterious character nor shield or protect a reprehensible act on the ground that it is a union activity,
because such end can be achieved without resort to improper conduct or behavior. The act of the employees now
under consideration may be considered as a misconduct which is a just cause for dismissal." ** (Italics ours)
It is plain to the naked eye that the 60 un-underscored words of the paragraph quoted by the respondent Judge do
not appear in the pertinent paragraph of this Court’s decision in L-20179-81. Moreover, the first underscored
sentence in the quoted paragraph starts with "For it is settled . . ." whereas it reads, "For it must be remembered . .
.," in this Court’s decision. Finally, the second and last underlined sentence in the quoted paragraph of the
respondent Judge’s decision, appears not in the same paragraph of this Court’s decision where the other sentence
is, but in the immediately succeeding paragraph.
This apparent error, however, does not seem to warrant an indictment for contempt against the respondent Judge
and the respondents’ counsels. We are inclined to believe that the misquotation is more a result of clerical ineptitude
than a deliberate attempt on the part of the respondent Judge to mislead. We fully realize how saddled with many
pending cases are the courts of the land, and it is not difficult to imagine that because of the pressure of their varied
and multifarious work, clerical errors may escape their notice. Upon the other hand, the respondents’ counsels have
the prima facie right to rely on the quotation as it appears in the respondent Judge’s decision, to copy it verbatim,
and to incorporate it in their brief. Anyway, the import of the underscored sentences of the quotation in the
respondent Judge’s decision is substantially the same as, and faithfully reflects, the particular ruling in this Court’s
decision, i.e., that" [N]ot even the acquittal of an employee, of the criminal charges against him, is a bar to the
employer’s right to impose discipline on its employees, should the act upon which the criminal charges were based
constitute nevertheless an activity inimical to the employer’s interest."cralaw virtua1aw library
Be that as it may, we must articulate our firm view that in citing this Court’s decisions and rulings, it is the bounden
duty of courts, judges and lawyers to reproduce or copy the same word-for-word and punctuation mark-for-
punctuation mark. Indeed, there is a salient and salutary reason why they should do this. Only from this Tribunal’s
decisions and rulings do all other courts, as well as lawyers and litigants, take their bearings. This is because the
decisions referred to in article 8 of the Civil Code which reads. "Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or
the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines," are only those enunciated by this Court of
last resort. We said in no uncertain terms in Miranda, Et. Al. v. Imperial, Et. Al. (77 Phil. 1066) that" [O]nly the
decisions of this Honorable Court establish jurisprudence or doctrines in this jurisdiction." Thus, ever present is the
danger that if not faithfully and exactly quoted, the decisions and rulings of this Court may lose their proper and
correct meaning, to the detriment of other courts, lawyers and the public who may thereby be misled. But if inferior
courts and members of the bar meticulously discharge their duty to check and recheck their citations of authorities
culled not only from this Court’s decisions but from other sources and make certain that they are verbatim
reproductions down to the last word and punctuation mark, appellate courts will be precluded from acting on
misinformation, as well as be saved precious time in finding out whether the citations are correct.
Happily for the respondent Judge and the respondents counsels, there was no substantial change in the thrust of this
Court’s particular ruling which they cited. It is our view, nonetheless, that for their mistake, they should be, as they
are hereby, admonished to be more careful when citing jurisprudence in the future.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the Court of Industrial Relations dated August 17, 1965 is reversed and set aside,
and another is entered, ordering the respondents to reinstate the dismissed members of the petitioning Unions to
their former or comparatively similar positions, with backwages from June 2, 1958 up to the dates of their actual
reinstatements. Costs against the respondents.
EN BANC
[G.R. Nos. L-10095 & L-10115. October 31, 1957.]
THE PHILIPPINE MARINE RADIO OFFICERS’ ASSOCIATION, petitioner v. THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS, COMPAÑIA MARITIMA, PHILIPPINE STEAM NAVIGATION CO., MADRIGAL SHIPPING CO.,
NORTH CAMARINES LUMBER SHIPPING CO., PAN ORIENTAL SHIPPING CO., HIJOS DE F. ESCAÑO, INC.,
VISAYAN TRANSPORTATION CO., ROYAL LINES, INC., CARLOS A. GOTHONG SHIPPING CO. and BISAYA
LAND TRANSPORTATION CO.,Respondents. COMPAÑIA MARITIMA, PHILIPPINE STEAM NAVIGATION and
MADRIGAL SHIPPING CO., INC., Petitioners, v. PHILIPPINE MARINE RADIO OFFICERS ASSOCIATION and
COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, ET AL., Respondents.
54
SYLLABUS
1. EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEE; STRIKE NOT CAUSED BY ILLEGAL AND UNFAIR ACT; ABSENCE OF
DEMAND TO RETURN TO WORK; NP BACKPAY. — Where the strike is not caused by any illegal or unfair labor
practice on the part of the employers and neither the strikers have demanded the privilege to return to work, but their
return to work was left at the discretion of the court, Held: that the strikers are not entitled to pay or backpay during
the period they voluntarily absented themselves from work and such situation is governed by the general principle of
fair day’s wage for a fair day’s labor.
2. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS; CASE CERTIFIED TO IT BY PRESIDENT; POWER OF CIR. — Upon
certification by the President of a case to the C.I.R. under section 109 of Republic Act 875 it comes under the
operation of "Commonwealth Act 103 which enforces compulsory arbitration in cases of labor disputes in industries
indispensable to the national interest. The evident intention of the law is to empower the Court of Industrial Relations
to act in such cases not only in the manner prescribed under Commonwealth Act 103, but with the
same broad powers and jurisdiction granted by that act. If the Court of Industrial Relations is granted authority to find
a solution which consists in the ordering of employees to return back to work, it has likewise the power or jurisdiction
to carry that solution into effect, to fix the terms and conditions of employment, and to order the return of the workers
with or without backpay as a term or condition of the employment.
In the above-entitled cases petitioners seek the annulment and or revision of an order of the Court of Industrial
Relations concurred in by Judges Lanting, Jimenez Yanson and Martinez, the main provisions of which: (1) direct the
return of the strikers, members of the Philippine Marine Radio Operators Association and the different shipping
companies parties to the action, (2) but refuse the grant of backpay to them during the period of the strike.
The facts that led to the promulgation of the order in question may be briefly stated as follows: On August 28, 1953,
the Philippine Marine Radio Officers Association (PHILMAROA) presented a list of demand to the Association de
Navieros, the Philippine Shipowners’ Association and the Luzon Stevedoring Company, the most important of which
are: (1) the standardization and increase of salaries; (2) sick and vacation leave; (3) hospitalization and sick leave;
and (4) a closed shop agreement. On September 25, 1953, the Associacion de Navieros informed the Philmaroa that
the matter of their petition was referred to the members of the Association, the most important of which were the
Compañia Maritima and the Philippine Steam Navigation Company. On October 22, 1953, the Philippine
Shipowners’ Association, the most important members of which are the Madrigal Shipping Company, the Visayan
Transportation Company and the Bisaya Land Transportation, informed the Philmaroa that it could not deal with the
latter and requested that the demands be made on the member companies. On September 26, 1953, the Philmaroa
also presented the demands with the Bisaya Land Transportation Company and the Royal Steamship Lines. As none
of the companies were willing to consider its demands the Philmaroa gave notice of its intention to strike to the
different shipping companies and to the Chief, Conciliation Service Division,Department of Labor. This notice to
strike was sent on October 17 and October 24. On October 31, 1953 the Chief of the Conciliation Service called the
parties for conference. At this conference the Association de Navieros and the Philippine Shipowners’ Association
gave the information that they had no authority or power to bargain collectively and suggested that the members of
the said association be notified, so the union sent notices to the different companies. After being notified, the
respondent companies, on November 7 and November 13, answered, questioning the authority of the Philmaroa to
act as representative of the radio operators and demanding that the list of the members employed who belong to the
Philmaroa be furnished them. But the Philmaroa refused to do so for fear of reprisal against its members.
The respondent companies also averred that some of them had given salaries over and above that demanded in the
standardization, some have given sick and vacation leave and hospitalization, etc.
At a conference held on November 13, 1953 before the Conciliation Service Division of the Department of Labor, it
was agreed that the respondents be allowed six days of grace within which to act upon or answer the demands
made by the Philmaroa. But without the period of six days having expired the Philmaroa declared a strike on
November 16, against the Compañia Maritima, on November 19, against the Philippine Steam Navigation Company.
On February 22, 1954, the President of the Philippines certified the case to the Court of Industrial Relations in
accordance with section 10 of Republic Act No. 875. The case was then heard by the Court of Industrial Relations
with Hon. Jose S. Bautista, presiding. After trial he rendered a decision ordering the respondent companies to
reinstate the radio operators on strike, with backpay to their former positions on the vessels under the terms and
conditions on August 28, 1953. The judge also granted demand (c) or free hospitalization and sick leave of 15 days
every year with pay. All the other demands were denied. Standardization was denied because the cost of operation
of the vessels cannot be controlled and not all of the companies are of the same level and the work and cost of living
vary among the different vessels. Vacation leave with pay was denied because the court found that many of the
respondents did not have the ability to pay. The closed shop agreement was denied because there was no need for
it as the nature of the work of radio operators did not need to be the subject of bargaining. Against this decision all
the parties appealed the court in banc. Judge V. Jimenez Yanson voted to allow the strikers to go back to their
respective positions, but without backpay. He voted to affirm the other portions of the decision denying
standardization, vacation leave and closed shop agreement, but granting sick leave, free hospitalization with pay.
Judge Martinez concurred in this opinion of Judge Vicente Jimenez Yanson. Judge Lanting concurred also with this
decision of Judge Jimenez Yanson, giving the grounds for his concurrence. All the parties to the action have
appealed to Us by certiorari from the order of the court in banc. Their appeals shall be considered separately.
APPEAL OF THE PHILIPPINE MARINE RADIO OFFICERS’ ASSOCIATION (G.R. No. L-10095)
The first error claimed to have been committed by the court a quo in its resolution is in finding that there was no
allegation or issue of unfair labor practice before the court, and in concluding that the latter could not, therefore, grant
backpay to the employees who were ordered to return back to their work. It is argued by the petitioner that the
existence of unfair labor practice was an issue in the case because the Philippine Steam Navigation Company and
the other steam companies, in their pleadings and allegations, claim that the strike was illegal because of acts of the
union amounting to unfair labor practice, and that under such allegations and pleadings the court had the power and
jurisdiction to find that it was the respondents who committed unfair labor practice, as a result of which the strike
could not have been illegal. It is argued as a consequence that the finding of the trial judge that the respondents
were guilty of unfair labor practice because they delayed passing upon the demands of petitioners union should be
sustained by Us.
We agree with the finding of the majority of the court below that there was no unreasonable delay by the respondents
in the consideration of the union demands. The demands were quite many and varied, involving very fundamental
questions that could affect the life of the business of each of the respondents, like increased salaries, standardized
salaries, vacation leave with pay, closed shop agreement. It is unreasonable to require the respondents, therefore, to
answer the demands in the very short period of time that the case was before the Conciliation Service Division of the
Department of Labor. Furthermore, it was agreed at the conference that respondent companies were to be granted
six days after November 13, within which to present their answer to the list of demands; but the petitioner union
began calling the strikes before the expiration of said period. It is possible under certain circumstances that delay in
consideration of demands of a labor union may amount to a refusal to bargain collectively, within the meaning of
Section 4, par. 6 of the Industrial Peace Act, but we find that under the circumstances of the case there was no
unreasonable delay which would amount to a refusal to bargain within the meaning of said provision.
With this holding, it becomes unnecessary to consider the correctness of the resolution appealed from insofar as it
declares that no employer may be declared guilty of unfair labor practice without allegation to that effect in the
pleadings and opportunity on the part of the employer to deny the same, to contest the charge, and submit evidence
in support of the denial.
It is also argued before Us that the respondent companies were guilty of unfair labor practice because while the
strike was in progress, Case No. 161-ULP was instituted against the Compañia Maritima for having removed or
dismissed employee Manuel C. Romero, whom the Court of Industrial Relations ordered returned to his former
position. This contention is without merit. The case of Romero was never mentioned as a cause of the strike, and
neither is it mentioned as a cause of finding said respondent company or any one of respondents guilty of unfair
labor practice. As a matter of fact, the trial judge had not considered the incident of Romero as a cause of unfair
labor practice against the Compañia Maritima; it was the supposed delaying tactics that were found by the trial judge
to constitute the act of unfair labor practice. Furthermore, the decision of the Court of Industrial Relations in the case
of Romero did not result in anything except in the reinstatement of Romero. No other matter was decided in that
55
case, hence the petitioner union cannot claim it to be a cause or reason for declaring respondent companies guilty of
unfair labor practice in the case now at bar.
The second important error assigned in this appeal is the refusal of the majority of the court below to grant backpay.
The alleged labor practice imputed to their respondent companies is again used as a ground for granting backpay to
the members of the petitioner union, but as we have found above that there was no act on the part of respondent
companies amounting to unfair labor practice, this ground for the demand must be rejected.
This brings us to a consideration of that part of the decision that has a relation to the right to backpay. The basic
facts are stated in the opinion of the three judges who denied the backpay claim:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"On February 25, 1954, this court issued an order setting the hearing of the case on March 1, 1954. At the hearing,
Atty. Cipriano Cid, then counsel for the petitioner, was asked several times by the trial Court and by counsel of
Compañia Maritima whether he wanted the strikers to be ordered back to work, and his reply was: ‘We have not
asked that yet. (p. 15-19 hearing on March 1, 1954). And when counsel for PSNCO directly asked him if he wanted
the strikers to go back to work, his answer in effect was, if ordered by the Court. . . ." (p. 5, Annex F-1 to Petition.)
It is clear from the above that the petitioner union never demanded the privilege to have its members reinstated to
their positions immediately, but that they left this matter of their return to the discretion of the court. The court, on the
other hand, did not order the return of the strikers; it did so only in its decision after the hearing and termination of the
case.
Under the circumstances as above indicated it is apparent that the strikers never expressed a desire or willingness to
return back to work, leaving that to the court’s discretion. The denial of backpay to the strikers is clearly justified, in
accordance with previous decisions of this Court.
It must be taken into account that neither the pleadings, nor the evidence, nor the judgment disclose the existence of
any act amounting to discrimination or unfair labor practice. The strike was resorted to by members of the petitioner
union as an economic weapon to compel the respondent companies to grant improvement in the pay of the members
of the union and in the conditions of their employment.
As a matter of fact they expressly wanted closed shop, standardization and increase of salaries as well as vacation
leave with pay. At the hearing of the case before the court a quo, counsel for the petitioner union, when asked if the
strikers wanted to return back to work, did not say so, but instead expressly declared that the strike was adopted as
a weapon to enforce their demands. The strike was by all means, therefore, a voluntary act on the part of the
strikers, not one to which they were compelled by reason of any act of discrimination, or unfair labor practice, or
refusal of the respondent companies to admit them back to work. The strike may have been legal because it was
used as a weapon in the interest of labor; but it was not caused by any illegal or unfair act on the part of the
employers, and the strikers should not be entitled to pay during the period they voluntarily absented themselves from
work. What we stated in the case of J.P. Heilbrown Company v. National Labor Union, (92 Phil., 575, 49 Off. Gaz.,
[2] 547) are exactly applicable:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . . The age-old rule governing the relation between labor and capital or management and employee is that of a
‘fair day’s wage for a fair day’s labor.’ If there is no work performed by the employee there can be no wage or pay,
unless of course, the laborer was able, willing and ready to work but was illegally locked out, dismissed or
suspended. It is hardly fair or just for an employee or laborer to fight or litigate against his employer on the
employer’s time."cralaw virtua1aw library
No commission of any unfair labor practice is involved in the case. The grant of backpay is, therefore, to be governed
by the general principle of "fair day’s wage for a fair day’s labor." If even in cases of unfair labor practices the court
may be justified in denying backpay (See section 5 (c) of Industrial Peace Act), there is absolutely no reason for
granting backpay if there has not been any unfair labor practice on the part of the respondent companies at all.
For the foregoing considerations the appeal should be denied.
APPEAL OF COMPAÑIA MARITIMA, ET AL. (G. R. NO. L-10115)
This appeal involves the interpretation of Section 10 of the Industrial Peace Act, which is as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Labor Disputes in Industries indispensable to the National Interest. — When in the opinion of the President of the
Philippines there exists a labor dispute in an industry indispensable to the national interest and when such labor
dispute is certified by the President to the Court of Industrial Relations, said Court may cause to be issued a
restraining order forbidding the employees to strike or the employer to lockout the employees, pending an
investigation by the Court, and if no other solution to the dispute is found, the Court may issue an order fixing the
terms and conditions of employment."cralaw virtua1aw library
It is contended that under the above-quoted provision the Court of Industrial Relations, in a case certified to it by the
President of the Philippines under the provisions of the above-quoted section, has no power to order the
reinstatement of employees and to grant them backpay. It is argued that the Industrial Peace Act does not prohibit
the replacement of strikers, and if this is so the employer has the right to make replacements during the strike, which
replacements may not be nullified by a subsequent order of the Court of Industrial Relations for the return of the
strikers.
We cannot subscribe to the above contention. We agree with counsel for the Philippine Marine Radio Officers’
Association that upon certification by the President under Section 10 of Republic Act 875, the case comes under the
operation of Commonwealth Act 103, which enforces compulsory arbitration in cases of labor disputes in industries
indispensable to the national interest when the President certifies the case to the Court of Industrial Relations. The
evident intention of the law is to empower the Court of Industrial Relations to act in such cases, not only in the
manner prescribed under Commonwealth Act 103, but with the same broad powers and jurisdiction granted by that
Act. If the Court of Industrial Relations is granted authority to find a solution in an industrial dispute and such solution
consists in the ordering of employees to return back to work, it cannot be contended that the Court of Industrial
Relations does not have the power or jurisdiction to carry that solution into effect. And of what use is its power of
conciliation and arbitration if it does not have the power and jurisdiction to carry into effect the solution it has
adopted. Lastly, if the said court has the power to fix the terms and conditions of employment, it certainly can order
the return of the workers with or without backpay as a term or condition of the employment.
The appeal is, therefore, without merit.
For the foregoing considerations, the appeals in the aforesaid cases are hereby dismissed, with costs against the
petitioner in G. R. No. L-10095, and the petitioners in G. R. No. L-10115.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. Nos. L-14023 & L-14135. January 30, 1960.]
TALISAY-SILAY MILLING CO., INC., Petitioner, v. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and TALISAY
EMPLOYEES AND LABORERS ASSOCIATION (TELA), Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS; ENFORCEMENT OF DECISIONS; EFFECT OF APPEAL; WHEN
EXECUTION OF DECISION MAY BE STAYED PENDING APPEAL. — Under Section 14 of Commonwealth Act
103, as amended by Commonwealth Act 559, a decision, award, or order of the Court of Industrial Relations
becomes self-executory 10 days after its promulgation notwithstanding the institution of an appeal therefrom, unless
at the discretion of the court, the execution thereof is expressly ordered suspended (1) for special reasons, and (2)
upon the appellant’s depositing in court either the amount of salaries or wages due the laborers or employees under
the order, decision or award appealed from, or a bond of such amount that would insure its compliance.
2. ID.; SECTION 14, COMMONWEALTH ACT 103, AS AMENDED, IS CONSTITUTIONAL. — Section 14 of
Commonwealth Act 103, as amended, is similar to the provisions of the Rules of Court empowering the courts of first
instance to order the execution of their judgment pending the appeal if for some special reasons such execution is
56
warranted. This rule has been applied in cases without number, and it has never been seriously contended that it
imposes a limitation upon the constitutional appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
These are two petitions for certiorari filed by the Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc. seeking to review and set aside the
order of the Court of Industrial Relations dated February 10, 1958 and the resolution of the court en banc dated April
11, 1958 in CIR Case No. 788-V (G.R. No. L-14023), and the orders of May 30, 1958 and July 17, 1958 in Case No.
83-ULP Cebu (G. R. No. L-14135). The parties in both cases being the same, and the actions being interrelated and
arising out of the same incident, we will take them up jointly and resolve the questions raised therein in
a single decision.
On December 17, 1952, the employees and laborers of the Talisay- Silay Milling Co., Inc., members of the Talisay
Employees & Laborers Association, hereinafter referred to as the Union, went on strike. On December 24 of the
same year, the Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc., henceforth to be called the Company, filed with the Court of Industrial
Relations a petition to declare the strike illegal (Case No. 788-V). The Union filed its answer and the case was duly
heard. During the pendency of the case and by virtue of a stipulation entered into by the parties on February 19,
1953, 400 of the striking laborers and employees were reinstated.
On June 25, 1953, Judge Bautista, sustaining the Company’s charge that the strike was illegal, issued an order the
dispositive part of which reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"For the above considerations, the Court hereby orders that the rest of the strikers who were excluded to return to
work in accordance with the stipulation submitted by the parties on February 19, 1953, be immediately reinstated to
their former positions in the company.
"The strikers who by virtue of said stipulation returned to their work on February 19, 1953 and those who will return
to their former works in the company are not entitled to any compensation during said illegal strike." (Emphasis
supplied.)
The parties filed separate motions for reconsideration of said order, both of which were denied by resolution of the
court en banc on August 12, 1953. The Company received copy of this order of denial on October 30, 1953.
On November 3, 1953, the Company filed notice to appeal to the Supreme Court from that portion of the decision
ordering reinstatement of the strikers to their former positions, and the case was actually filed and docketed in this
Court as G. R. No. L-7228 * . The records show, however, that prior to this appeal, that is, on October 7, 1953, the
Company re-admitted to the service 74 more of the laborers and employees who joined the strike.
On March 17, 1954, pending resolution by this Court of the matter on appeal, the Union, invoking Section 14 of
Commonwealth Act 103, as amended, filed with the Court of Industrial Relations a motion for execution of the order
of June 25, 1953. The Company opposed this move and offered "to file a bond in the amount (to be fixed by the
court) sufficient to cover the wages of the striking laborers who have not been re-admitted to their work in the
petitioner company." These motions, however, were not acted upon by the Industrial Court. On November 29, 1955,
this Court, holding that the strike was not illegal, affirmed the order of reinstatement this wise:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"We are therefore of the opinion that the respondent court, notwithstanding our diverging point of view, did not err in
ordering the reinstatement of the strikers who were excluded by the management without back pay, and, hence, we
affirm the decision appealed from, without pronouncement as to costs." (G. R. No. L-7228).
On January 16, 1956, the court issued a writ of execution by virtue of which, of the 185 persons appearing in the list
submitted by the Union, 70 were re-instated on January 27 and another group of 46 on January 30, 1956; 10 were
refused admission allegedly for having been found unfit for work; 3 separated for cause; 15 were laid off but given
separation pay; 3 were already dead; 15 were found already working; 5 were non-strikers; 10 were laid off even
before the strike, and 8 were discovered not in the payroll.
On February 5, 1958, the Union represented by a new counsel, filed in the Court of Industrial Relations an urgent ex-
parte motion for immediate execution of back wages, claiming that therein subject laborers were entitled to back pay
from June 25, 1953, when they were ordered reinstated, up to January 30, 1956, when they were actually re-
admitted to the service. And over the Company’s opposition thereto, the court in its order of February 10, 1958,
directed the Chief Examiner of the court to make the necessary computation of the back wages due the laborers
concerned, preparatory to the issuance of the writ prayed for. The Company moved to reconsider said order on the
ground that it was not justified either by the order of June 25, 1953 or of the decision of the Supreme Court in G. R.
No. L-7228, which motion was denied by resolution of April 11, 1958, although following the ruling laid down by this
Court in the case of Rizal Cement Company v. Bautista, G. R. No. L-10312, promulgated July 26, 1957, the order of
February 10, 1958 was modified as to cover back wages due the laborers only from November 10, 1953 (10 days
after the Company received notice of the denial of its motion for reconsideration of the order of June 25, 1953) up to
the date of their actual reinstatement. The Company thus filed with this Court a petition to review the aforesaid orders
(G. R. No. L-14023). Upon petitioner’s filing a bond in the sum of P10,000.00, this Court issued a writ of preliminary
injunction enjoining the respondent Court of Industrial Relations from executing the orders of February 10 and April
11, 1958 in CIR Case No. 788-V.
Upon the other hand, the records in G. R. No. L-14135 (CIR Case No. 83-ULP-Cebu) disclose that while the
Company, in compliance with the writ of execution issued by the lower court, reinstated strikers on January 27 and
30, 1956, these laborers were assigned not to their former positions but were employed on "rotation basis." And a
few days after their reinstatement, 143 members of the Union that participated in the strike each received written
notice of separation, and in fact were actually dismissed in March, 1956. These acts of the Company became the
subject of a new complaint for unfair labor practice lodged by the Union against the Company in the Court of
Industrial Relations, which was later docketed as Case No. 83-ULP-Cebu.
In its answer to this complaint, the Company denied the charges of discrimination and unfair labor practice,
contending that the dismissal of the complainants was brought about by economic necessity in the sense that with
their (the laborers) reinstatement, the Company became overmanned. After due hearing, the court held on
December 28, 1957:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"After due consideration of the evidence adduced by the parties, this Court is convinced that the 143 individual
complainants in this case were discriminated against by reason of their membership in the complainant union and
the intended effect of their dismissal was to discourage their continuous membership in the said union. It is clear
from the said evidence that respondents did not adopt reasonable bases for determining the persons to be laid off
assuming that there was an imperative necessity to do so. Instead of apportioning proportionately among the
members of the three (3) unions, the employees to be laid off or taking into consideration seniority and efficiency the
respondent singled out all the members of the complainant union. The uncontradicted evidence for the complainants
also shows that the majority of those laid off had been working for over ten (10) or fifteen (15) years had been
working for thirty (30) or thirty-five (35) years (t.s.n., July 24, 1957, p. 61).
"WHEREFORE, to remedy effects of such unfair labor practice and to effectuate the policies of Republic Act No. 875,
the respondent is hereby ordered to reinstate immediately the following 143 individual complainants to their former
positions without lose of seniority and other rights and privileges with full back wages from the time of their actual
dismissal up to their actual reinstatement: . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library
The Company sought reconsideration of this order, but was denied. Then it filed a petition in this Court to review the
said order; the petition was dismissed by resolution of this Court of March 18, 1958 for being factual and for lack of
merit (G. R. No. L-13576).
On March 31, 1958, the lower court directed the Chief Examiner of the Court of Industrial Relations to proceed to the
Company premises and make the necessary computation of the back wages due the laborers, and on April 22, 1958,
the Examiner submitted his report placing the Company’s liability at P298,956.74. The Company interposed an
objection to this report, claiming that the computation of back wages should have been based not on the payrolls for
1951 and 1952, but those for 1956 and the years thereafter. It was also alleged that the computation was excessive,
because it included wages allegedly due certain laborers named in the motion whose conditions preclude the
payment of such back salaries and, by computing the back wages for the off-season period on the basis of 6 working
days a week instead of the actual practice of only 5 days a week. The Company, therefore, prayed the Court to reject
the report, or that it be modified to the extent indicated in its objection.
As a consequence of this opposition, an amended report was submitted on May 29, 1958, computing the amount
due the laborers whose claims were not objected to at P234,974.96, while those claims that were opposed amounted
57
to P41,291.84.
On May 30, 1958, upon motion of the Union, the court ordered the Company to deposit in said court the sum of
P234,974.96. The Company once again moved to reconsider this order and prayed that the computation of the back
wages be referred to the Wage Administration Service of the Bureau of Labor. This motion having been denied on
July 17, 1958, the Company filed in this Court a petition to review the aforementioned orders (of May 30 and July 17,
1958, docketed as G. R. No. L-14135). As prayed for by petitioner, this Court also issued a writ of preliminary
injunction enjoining the respondent court from carrying into effect the said orders.
It may well be remembered, before proceeding with the discussion of the issues raised herein that the petitioner in
these cases is seeking to review only the orders of February 10, 1958 (computation of back wages) and April 11,
1958 (denying the motion for reconsideration in CIR Case No. 788-V), and the orders of May 30, 1958 (requiring the
Company to deposit in court the sum of P234,974.96) and of July 17, 1958 (denying its motion for reconsideration).
Thus, the questions presented for our determination are: (1) whether the strikers who were ordered reinstated on
June 25, 1953 but were actually returned to the service only on January 27 and 30, 1956 are entitled to back wages
for the duration of the appeal instituted by the Company; (2) whether the Company has the right to dismiss these
strikers, reinstated by order of the court, because of a retrenchment policy adopted by the Company and after
complying with the 30-day notice of separation required by Republic Act 1052; and (3) whether the Court of Industrial
Relations may lawfully order the Company to deposit the amount allegedly due the striking laborers.
(1) Regarding the first question, that is, whether the laborers are entitled to their wages from the time their immediate
reinstatement to their former positions was ordered up to their actual re-instatement in January, 1956, after this Court
affirmed the said order, the Company contends that neither the order of June 25, 1953 nor the decision of this Court
affirming the latter order justified the payment of such back wages, because although the order of June 25, 1953, as
affirmed by this Court, specifically provides for the immediate reinstatement of the laborers, yet no obligation on its
part to pay the laborers any such wages was created until the order of reinstatement was affirmed by the Supreme
Court. We find no merit in this contention.
Section 14 of Commonwealth Act 103, as amended by Commonwealth Act 559, provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SEC. 14. Enforcement of awards, orders, and decisions. At the expiration of ten days from the date of the award,
order, or decision, in cases brought under the provisions of section four hereof, judgment shall be entered in
accordance therewith, unless during said ten days an aggrieved party shall appeal therefrom to the Supreme Court
of the Philippines by writ of certiorari as hereinafter provided. The institution of such an appeal shall not, however,
stay the execution of the award, order, or decision sought to be reviewed, unless for special reasons the Court shall
order that the execution be stayed, in which event the Court in its discretion, may require the appellant to deposit
with the clerk of the Court such amount of salaries or wages due the employees, laborers, tenants or farm laborers
concerned under the award, order, or decision appealed from or require him to give bond in such form and of such
amount as to insure compliance with the award, order, or decision in case of the same is affirmed. The Court may
also require the appellant to deposit with the clerk of the Court every week, on a day therein to be fixed by the Court,
an amount equivalent to the salaries or wages to be earned during the time of the appeal by the employees or
laborers, or tenants or farm laborers whose reinstatement in, or readmission to, their employment has been decreed
by the Court. The failure to make such deposit shall vacate the order for stay of execution. When writs of execution
are so issued the proceeds thereof shall be kept by the Clerk of the Court of Industrial Relations in his custody,
pending decision of the appeal, to be disposed of in conformity with the final judgment of the Supreme Court. (Italics
supplied.)
It is clear from the foregoing legal provision that a decision, award, or order of the Court of Industrial Relations
becomes self- executory 10 days after its promulgation notwithstanding the institution of an appeal therefrom, unless
at the discretion of the court, the execution thereof is expressly ordered suspended (1) for special reasons, and (2)
upon the appellant’s depositing in court either the amount of salaries or wages due the laborers or employees under
the order, decision or award appealed from, or a bond of such amount that would insure its compliance. It must be
for this purpose that the Company, in opposing the execution of the order of reinstatement during the pendency of
the appeal, prayed for by the Union, offered to file a bond in an amount sufficient to cover the wages of the striking
laborers, which bond, pursuant to Commonwealth Act 103, as amended, would guarantee full satisfaction of the
order appealed from in the event that the same is affirmed by the appellate court. The petitioner Company at this
stage cannot, therefore, deny the existence of the laborers’ right to reinstatement and compensation from the date
such order became executory because by offering to file a bond, it had in effect recognized the existence of such
right. And although it is true that the lower court failed to act on the Union’s motion, neither did it order the stay of the
execution of the order of reinstatement. Hence, 10 days after the Company was notified of the resolution denying its
(the Company’s) motion for reconsideration of the order of June 25, 1953, the laborers’ right to re-employment and
wages accrued. 1 Consequently, and by reason of its failure to abide by the aforesaid order, the Company is liable
for back wages due the laborers from the date their right to reinstatement accrued up to the time they were actually
reinstated.
Petitioner Company’s contention that the aforequoted Section 14 of Commonwealth Act 103, as amended, is
unconstitutional when it provides that appeal of an award, order, or decision of the Court of Industrial Relations to the
Supreme Court shall not stay the execution of the award, order, or decision unless the Court of Industrial Relations
shall order such execution stayed, because it infringes upon the Supreme Court’s plenary jurisdiction under the
Constitution to review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal,certiorari or writ of error, final judgments and
decrees of inferior courts, needs no serious consideration. The questioned section of Commonwealth Act 103, as
amended, is similar to the provisions of the Rules of Court empowering the courts of first instance to order the
execution of their judgment pending the appeal if for some special reasons, such execution is warranted. 2 This rule
has been applied in cases without number and to our knowledge it has never been seriously contended that it
imposes a limitation upon the constitutional appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
(2) With respect to the subsequent separation of 143 of the striking laborers after their reinstatement as ordered by
the Court, the Company claims that such action can not be considered as an unfair labor practice because aside
from the fact that the dismissal was brought about by economic necessity, Republic Act 1052 allows such termination
of employment upon serving notice on the employee at least one month in advance, which was complied with in
these cases. This theory cannot be sustained.
Passing upon the identical question of whether an employee who was previously dismissed by the employer but was
reinstated by court order may again be dismissed under Republic Act 1052, this Court said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . While Republic Act No. 1052 authorizes a commercial establishment to terminate the employment of its
employee by serving notice on him one month in advance, or, in the absence thereof, by paying him one month
compensation from the date of the termination of his employment, such Act does not give to the employer a blanket
authority to terminate the employment regardless of the cause or purpose behind such termination. Certainly, it
cannot be made use of as a cloak to circumvent a final order of the court or as a scheme to trample upon the right of
an employee who has been the victim of an unfair labor practice. In other words, the privilege given by that Act to an
employer cannot be resorted to if to do so would infringe the law that Congress had enacted to protect labor as
against the abuses of capital. One of such abuses which our law condemns and which has given rise to the many
social problems which mar the relationship of labor and capital is unfair labor practice, and this is the act of which
said petitioners were condemned. To allow them to take refuge under that Act and obtain by indirect action what they
had been expressly enjoined by an express order of the court would be a mockery of law and a travesty of justice. . .
." (Yu Ki Lam, Et. Al. v. Micaller, 99 Phil., 902; 52 Off. Gaz. (14), 6146.
Granting arguendo that the reinstatement of the strikers, as ordered by the court, made the dismissal of a certain
number of laborers imperative, the fact that those who were laid off were precisely the reinstated strikers can hardly
be considered merely coincidental especially if we take into account the finding of the lower court that petitioner
Company did not adopt reasonable bases to determine the persons to be so separated from the service. That the
notice of separation was furnished the laborers a few days after their much delayed, much resisted reinstatement
further supports the finding that the dismissal was resorted to to rid the Company of the service of these strikers.
Certainly, such course of action contravenes the spirit of the Industrial Peace Act, and the court a quo, therefore,
committed no error in declaring the same discriminatory and in ordering the reinstatement of the laborers affected to
their former positions without losing their seniority and other privileges.
(3) The third issue raised is the correctness and validity of the court’s order approving the examiner’s computations
of back salaries based on the 1951 and 1952 payrolls. The Company contends that as the laborers should have
been re-admitted in 1956, their back wages must be based on the payroll for said year and thereafter.
In the first place, the laborers should have been reinstated since November 10, 1953, when the order of immediate
reinstatement became executory. Secondly, an order of reinstatement issued by the court after investigating a
58
complaint for unfair labor practice, includes not only back salaries but also other rights and privileges prior to
dismissal (Sec. 5-c, Rep. Act 875). The working conditions in the Company in 1951 and 1952, i.e., before the
introduction of the so- called retrenchment policy, and wherein the laborers worked on full time basis cannot be but
looked at as a right and, therefore, contemplated by the order of the court declaring the complainants entitled not
only to reinstatement but to "other rights and privileges with full back wages from the time of their actual dismissal up
to their reinstatement."
Furthermore, it may be observed that in the stipulation entered into by the parties on February 19, 1953, the
Company even obligated itself to reinstate strikers to "their salaries and their status should be the same as that
which they enjoyed before the strike." This means not only reinstatement to their formal status but also to the
salaries that they enjoyed before the strike 3 was declared that is, before the so-called retrenchment policy was
implemented by the Company. As the respondent Industrial Court observed, the computation undertaken by the
Court Examiner was in consonance with the leading doctrine in American jurisprudence, thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"In determining the rate of pay to be used in computing the award, where there is no fixed wage, or where the work is
seasonal or part time, the Board customarily uses as the criterion the employee’s average pay in a given period prior
to his improper discharge." (Rothenberg on Labor Relations, p. 583, citing authorities).
Anent the validity of the retrenchment system, introduced by the Company after the Court of Industrial Relations took
cognizance of the dispute (CIR Case No. 788-V), the record reveals that it was never sanctioned nor authorized by
said court. Such action contravenes Section 19, Commonwealth Act No. 103, as amended by Commonwealth Acts
Nos. 335 and 559, which provides that during the pendency of a dispute between the employer and employee, the
employer or landlord shall refrain from accepting other employees, and shall permit the continuation in the service of
his employees under the last terms and conditions existing before the dispute arose, unless expressly authorized by
the court, otherwise the same shall constitute contempt of the Court of Industrial Relations.
In view of all the foregoing, and finding no error in the appealed orders of the Court of Industrial Relations, the same
are hereby affirmed, and the writs of preliminary injunction heretofore issued are dissolved, with costs against the
petitioner in both cases. So ordered.
2. SEC. 2. Execution discretionary. — Before the expiration of the time to appeal, execution may issue, in the
discretion of the court, on motion of the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party, upon good reasons to be
stated in a special order. If a record on appeal is filed thereafter, the special order shall be included therein.
Execution issued before the expiration of the time to appeal may be stayed upon the approval by the court of a
sufficient supersedeas bond filed by the appellant, conditioned for the performance of the judgment or order
appealed from in case it be affirmed wholly or in part. (Rule 39, Rules of Court).
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-31503 August 15, 1974
FEATI UNIVERSITY FACULTY CLUB (PAFLU), Petitioner, vs. FEATI UNIVERSITY and COURT OF INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS, Respondents.
The Court reverses the industrial court's decision under review which would negate and nullify its earlier return
to work order and award for backwages to the professors-instructors members of petitioner union. The factual
findings and conclusions and orders rendered in the previous industrial court proceedings wherein it issued these
earlier orders (in 1963 and 1969) as affirmed by two final judgments of this Court are now res judicata and may no
longer be reopened, much less set aside, by the industrial court. Furthermore, the Court finds that the industrial
court's decision repudiating its earlier orders as upheld by final judgments of this Court is bereft of factual and legal
basis. The case is remanded to respondent court which is directed to fix and resolve with deliberate dispatch the
terms and conditions of employment involved in the labor dispute, which the President had certified to it for
compulsory arbitration in the national interest.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
I
Background facts and antecedents
The origin of this case goes back to the strike declared on February 18, 1963 by petitioner faculty club composed of
professors and instructors of respondent university on the ground of unfair labor practice due to the university's
refusal to recognize their union and to bargain collectively.
The issues resolved in favor of petitioner union in Feati University vs. Feati University Faculty Club-
PAFLU(December 29, 1966.)
The antecedent facts are related in this Court's extended (62 pages) decision of December 27, 1966
in FeatiUniversity vs. Feati University Club - Paflu 1thus: chanrobles virtual law library
On January 14, 1963, the President of the respondent Feati University Faculty Club-PAFLU - hereinafter referred to
as Faculty Club-wrote a letter to Mrs. Victoria L. Araneta, President of petitioner Feati University - hereinafter referred
to as University - informing her of the organization of the Faculty Club into a registered labor union. The faculty club
is composed of members who are professors and/or instructor of the University. On January 22, 1963, the President
of the Faculty Club sent another letter containing,twenty-six demands that have connection with the employment of
the members of the Faculty Club by the University, and requesting an answer within ten days from receipt thereof.
The President of the University answered the two letters, requesting that she be given at least thirty days to study
thoroughly the different phases of the demands. Meanwhile, counsel for the University, to whom the demands were
referred, wrote a letter to the President of the Faculty Club demanding proof of its majority status and designation as
a bargaining representative. On February 1, 1963, the President of the Faculty Club again wrote the President of the
University rejecting the latter's request for extension of time, and on the same day he filed a notice of strike with
the Bureau of Labor alleging as reason therefor the refusal of the University to bargain collectively. The parties were
called to conferences at the Conciliation Division of the Bureau of Labor but efforts to conciliate them failed.
On February 18, 1963, the members of the Faculty Clubdeclared a strike and established picket lines in the premises
of the University, resulting in the disruption of classes in the University. Despite further efforts of the officials from
the Department of Labor to effect a settlement of the differences between the management of the University and the
striking faculty members no satisfactory agreement was arrived at. On March 21, 1963, the President of the
Philippines certifiedto the Court of Industrial Relations the dispute between the management of the University and
the Faculty Club pursuant to the provisions of Section 10 of Republic Act No.
875.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
As a consequence of the dispute between the faculty club and the university, several cases were filed with the Court
of Industrial Relations and the various orders and resolutions issued by said court in favor of the faculty club were
elevated by the university to this Court in three cases 2which were jointly decided by this Court's decision
of December 27, 1966 upholding all the challenged orders.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
In the said 1966 decision, this Court unanimomously upheld the faculty club on all disputed issues, as
follows: chanrobles virtual law library
1) The Court upheld the industrial court's jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter in the cases before it,
rejecting as untenable the university's claim that Republic Act 875 is not applicable to the university since it is
an educational institution and not an industrial establishment and hence not an "employer" in contemplation of the
Act and that the faculty club members are independent contractors and not "employees' within the purview of the
Act.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The court applied the settled doctrine "that the Industrial Peace Act is applicable to any organization or entity -
whatever may be its purpose when it was created - that is operated for profit or gain," 3and cited with approval the
industrial court's factual finding that "the university is not for strictly educational purposes and that 'It realizes profits
and part of such earning is distributed as dividends to private stockholders or individuals." 4chanrobles virtual law
library
59
2) The Court recognized the employee status of the faculty club members as "employees and declared Republic Act
No. 875 applicable to them in their employment relations with their school," 4a citing the earlier case of Far Eastern
University vs. CIR 4b
The Court also declared that since "members of the faculty club are employees, it follows that they have a right to
unionize in accordance with the provisions of section 3 of the Magna Carta of Labor (Republic Act No. 875)" rejecting
as "without merit" the university's contrary assertion and stressing that "the faculty club is a duly registered
labor organization." 5chanrobles virtual law library
The Court flatly rejected the university's challenge against the validity of the presidential certification, ruling that "(T)o
certify a labor dispute to the CIR is the prerogative of the President under the law, and this Court will not interfere in,
much less curtail, the exercise of that prerogative," and that "in the instant case, when the President took into
consideration that the University 'has some 18,000 students and employed approximately 500 faculty members,' that
'the continued disruption in the operation of the University will necessarily prejudice the thousands of students,' and
that 'the dispute affects the national interest,' and certified the dispute to the CIR, it is not for the CIR nor this Court to
pass upon the correctness of the reasons of the President in certifying the labor dispute to the CIR." 6chanrobles
virtual law library
3) The Court likewise repudiated all contentions of the university questioning the legalityof the industrial
court's return-to-work order of March 30, 1963 and its implementing order of April 6, 1963, and asserting that there
were no more positions to which the faculty club members could return, as their individual contracts for teaching
had expiredby the end of March, 1963, ruling inter alia as follows:
Likewise untenable is the contention of the University that the taking in by it ofreplacements was valid and the return-
to-work order would be an impairment of its contract with the replacements. As stated by the CIR in its order of
March 30, 1963, it was agreed before the hearing of Case 41 - IPA on March 23, 1963that the strikers would return
to work under the status quo arrangement and the University would readmit them, and the return-to-work order was
aconfirmation of that agreement. This is a declaration of fact by the CIR which we cannot disregard. The faculty
members, by striking, have not abandoned their employment but, rather, they have only ceased from their labor
(Keith Theatre vs. Vachon, et al., 187 A. 692). The striking faculty members have notlost their right to go back to their
positions, because the declaration of a strike is not a renunciation of their employment and their employee
relationship with the University (Rex Taxicab Co. vs. CIR, et al., 40 O.G., No. 13, 138). The employment of
replacements was not authorized by the CIR. At most, that was a temporary expedient resorted to by the University,
which was subject to the power of the CIR to allow to continue or not. The employment of replacements by the
University prior to the issuance of the order of March 30, 1963 did not vest in the replacements a permanent right to
the positions they held. Neither could such temporary employment bind the University to retain permanently the
replacements.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library
It is clear from what has been said that the return-to-work order cannot be considered as an impairment of the
contract entered into by petitioner with the replacements. Besides, labor contracts must yield to the common
good and such contracts are subject to the special laws on labor unions, collective bargaining, strikes and similar
subjects (Article 1700, Civil Code).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Likewise unsustainable is the contention of the University that the Court of Industrial Relations could not issue the
return-to-work order without having resolved previously the issue of the legality or illegality of the strike, citing as
authority therefor the case of Philippine Can Company vs. Court of Industrial Relations, G.R. No. L-3021, July 13,
1950. The ruling in said case is not applicable to the case at bar, the facts and circumstances being very different.
The Philippine Can Company case, unlike the instant case, did not involve thenational interest and it was not certified
by the President. In that case the company no longer needed the services of the strikers, nor did it need substitutes
for the strikers, because the company was losing, and it was imperative that it lay off such laborers as were not
necessary for its operation in order to save the company from bankruptcy. This was the reason of this Court in ruling,
in that case, that the legality or illegality of the strike should have been decided first before the issuance of the return-
to-work order. The University, in the case before Us, does not claim that it no longer needs the services of professors
and/or instructors; neither does it claim that it was imperative for it to lay off the striking professors and instructors
because of impending bankruptcy. On the contrary, it was imperative for the University to hire replacements for the
strikers. Therefore, the ruling in the Philippine Can case that the legality of the strike should be decided first before
the issuance of the return-to-work order does not apply to the case at bar. Besides, as We have adverted to, the
return-to-work order of March 30, 1963, now in question, was a confirmation of an agreement between the University
and the Faculty Club during a pre-hearing conference on March 23, 1963.
The University also maintains that there was no more basis for the claim of the members of the Faculty Club to return
to their work, as their individual contracts for teaching hadexpired on March 25, or 31, 1963, as the case may be, and
consequently, there was also no basis for the return-to-work order of the CIR because the contractual relationships
having ceased there were no positions to which the members of the Faculty Club couldreturn to. This contention is
not well taken. This argument loses sight of the fact that when the professors and instructors struck on February 18,
1963, they continued to beemployees of the University for the purposes of the labor controversy not-withstanding the
subsequent termination of their teaching contracts, for Section 2(d) of the Industrial Peace Act includes among
employees 'any individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with, any current labor
dispute or of any unfair labor practice and who has not obtained any other substantially equivalent and regular
employment.' " 7chanrobles virtual law library
In the course of the proceedings, the industrial court issued its resolution en banc dated May 7, 1963 denying the
university's motion for reconsideration of the March 30, 1963 return-to-work order. The university appealed from the
order and resolution on theirmerits. The Court in the same 1966 decision affirmed on the merits the order and
resolution appealed from (already questioned on certiorari in L-21278) ruling that "(I)n Case G.R. No. L-21500 the
University appealed from the order of the CIR of March 30, 1963, issued by Judge Bautista, and from the resolution
of the CIR en banc promulgated on June 28, 1963, denying the motion for the reconsideration of that order of March
30, 1963, in CIR Case No. 41-IPA. We have already ruled that the CIR has jurisdiction to issue that order of March
30, 1963, and that order is valid, and We, therefore, hold that the CIR did not err in issuing that order of March 30,
1963 and in issuing the resolution promulgated on June 28, 1963 (although dated May 7, 1963) denying the motion
to reconsider that order of March 30,1963." 8chanrobles virtual law library
The Court thus sustained and affirmed the specific orders in the CIR's March 30, 1963 return-to-work order
"(ordering) the strikers to return immediately to work and the university to take them back under the last terms and
conditions existing before the dispute arose, as per agreement had during the hearing on March 23, 1963; and
likewise (enjoining) the university pending adjudication of the case, from dismissing any employee or laborer without
previous authorization from the CIRP." 8a
4) The Court also upheld the industrial court's order of April 29, 1963 for the arrest of the university officers upon
complaint for indirect contempt filed by the prosecutor for violation of and disobedience to the said court's March 30,
1963 return-to-work order issued in pursuance of the parties' agreement.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library
5) The Court also upheld the industrial court's order granting the faculty club's motion to withdraw its petition for
certification election on the ground that the case had been absorbed by the issues in the presidential certification
case (Case 41-IPA), ruling that after all the university wanted the certification election case dismissed and that "the
principal case before the CIR is Case No. 41-IPA and all the questions relating to the labor disputes between the
University and the Faculty Club may be threshed out, and decided, in that case." 9chanrobles virtual law library
The Court accordingly in its said joint decision of December 27, 1966 unanimously dismissed the certiorari
proceeding and upheld the industrial court's jurisdiction and the orders and resolutions issued in pursuance thereof,
particularly the March 30, 1963 return-to-work order and arrest order for indirect contempt (Case L-21278). The
orders and resolutions appealed from in Cases L-21462 and L-21500 (namely, the withdrawal of the certification
election by virtue of its absorption in the certified labor dispute case and the validity on the merits of the March 30,
1963 return-to- work order as upheld by the en banc resolution dated May 7, 1963) were expressly affirmed by this
Court. Costs in all three cases were awarded against the university.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
The Court ordered in the same decision the dissolution of the writ of preliminary injunction it had issued upon a
P50,000-bond upon the filing of the certiorari proceeding on May 10, 1963 restraining the industrial court "from
further proceeding in the premises" of the pending cases.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
60
As stated, this Court's said 1966 decision was unanimous with only Justice J.B.L. Reyes out of the then nine-
member Court, "concurring but reserving his vote on the teacher's right to
strike".chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Parenthetically, entry of judgment of the 1966 decision and execution proceedings were delayed, as the faculty club
filed with this Court on January 11, 1967 a "petition for award of damages" on the P50,000, injunction bond filed by
the university. As resolution thereof was not forthcoming, the faculty club filed successive petitions on May 15, 1967
and August 22, 1968 for the Court to deal separately with the pending damages award petition and to order the entry
of judgment and return of the case for execution of the return-to-work order since the "faculty members who were
unduly deprived of employment by the university have remained during these past five years [1963-1968]
unemployed as such." The Court per its resolution of August 26, 1968 ordered the entry of judgment to be effected
and "(3) to return this case to the court below for the execution of the judgment and for such action as the lower court
may deem fit to take on the petition for award of damages that respondent FEATI University Faculty Club-PAFLU
may file before it,".chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The issues resolved in favor of petitioner union in the second case of Feati University vs. Feati University Faculty
Club (May 22, 1969), particularly, the award of accrued backwages.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
After this Court's said 1966 decision had become final and executory with the entry of judgment on August 26, 1968,
the faculty club on October 24, 1968 filed a number of motions and petitions to execute and to implement the
decision as well as to hear the dispute on its merits (which had been left pending until this Court resolved the
university's challenge against the CIR jurisdiction over the dispute and the validity of the presidential
certification).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Foremost among such motions was the motion to execute dated October 24, 1968 for the execution of the March 30,
1963 return-to-work order directing the university management to permit and effect the return-to-work of the strikers,
plus the back salaries that have accrued. This was opposed by the university.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
The industrial court through then Judge Joaquin A. Salvador issued over the university's opposition and after hearing
its, order of February 7, 1969 ordering the issuance of a writof execution for the enforcement and compliance of the
March 30, 1963 return-to-work order, directing further that the secretary of education and director of private schools
be duly advised and furnished with copies of the execution orders" considering the time compliance of this order (of
March 30, 1963) has been pending insofar as the professors and/or instructors herein involved are
concerned." 10chanrobles virtual law library
The industrial court further ordered that accrued back wages from July 12, 1963 to the date of actual readmission be
paid to the faculty club members thus: "Conformably with the conclusions herein reached on the claim of accrued
back salaries, it is hereby declared that the professors and/or instructors concerned are entitled to such claim and
the Feati University, respondent herein, is hereby adjudged to pay their respective accrued salaries starting from July
12, 1963 up to when they are actually taken back or readmitted to work by respondent University." 11chanrobles
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The industrial court finally ordered the chief, examining division "to compute the respective accrued back salaries of
these professors and/or instructors" based on the university's records and payrolls and within 60 days from receipt of
the order "to submit his report for further disposition."chanrobles virtual law library
The bases of the industrial court's said execution order of February 7, 1969 were clearly and specifically set forth in
its order. The industrial court held:chanrobles virtual law library
"As jurisdiction of this Court and the validity and legality of the Orders of March 30, 1963, among other, were
affirmed, [by the Supreme Court's December 27, 1966 decision] the said Order is now ripe for
execution.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
"But execution nonetheless is opposition by respondent University, claiming that the Order of March 30, 1963 '... has
already been executed ....' and it '... has complied with it ....' But in the same breath it however admits that '... those
members (referring to the striking professors and/or instructors who are not yet working) whose classes had been
taken over by replacement professors who refused to yield their posts could not resume their classes, ....' Otherwise
stated and as it admitted through counsel at the hearing on March 23, 1963, the said Order has not yet been
completely complied with although it justified such circumstance with the alleged refusal of the replacements to
vacate their posts. But the issues as regards the replacements including their alleged refusal to yield their posts were
already laid at rest by the Supreme court." [Here the industrial court quotes the same portion of the Supreme Court
1966 decision already quoted above rejecting the university's contention that its taking of replacements was a valid
justification for the non-readmission of the faculty club members in view of the agreement before the March 23, 1963
hearing "that the strikers would return to work under the status quo arrangement and the university would readmit
them and the return-to-work order was a confirmation of that agreement."] 12chanrobles virtual law library
The industrial court added that.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
"Respondent University, through counsel, explaining its opposition further, manifested in brief that it is without power
to effect compliance of the return-to-work order of March 30, 1963 with respect to the posts being held by
replacements who refused allegedly to give them up. This is belied by the Decision of the Supreme Court itself. The
Order of April 6, 1963, implementing the return-to-work provision of the Order of March 30, 1963, was affirmed. In
this Order the replacements were directed '... for the time being, not to disturb nor in any manner commit any acts
tending to disrupt the effectivity of the Order of March 30, 1963, ....' The Supreme Court also took judicial notice of
the powers which a university like respondent University has over its professors and/or instructors which are, to
name a few; that it controls the work of the members of the faculty; that it prescribes the course or subjects the
professors and/or instructors will teach and when and where to teach; and that professors and/or instructors cannot
substitute others to do their work without the consent of the University. Assuredly, it was in the exercise of these
powers that the replacements we're employed by respondent University. Equally, therefore, it may also legally
exercise such powers to terminate the employment of such replacements. It is a fact that the strikers concerned have
not '... to be employees when they struck, ....' (Page 37, Decision). 12a
The industrial court further found expressly that the university's persistent refusal to take back the faculty club
members notwithstanding its return-to-work agreement and the fact that this Court's 1966 decision had long become
final and executory was "bad faith" and that the faculty club members were therefore fully entitled to the law's
protection in the form of accrued salaries from the date of their light to readmission until the date of the actual
readmission, as follows:
Included in the motion under consideration is the claim for '... back salaries, that have accrued ....' Reference to this
claim, the issue to resolve is whether or not the striking professors and/or instructors who were not taken back to
work by respondent University are entitled to back salaries. Considering the return-to-work agreement of March 23,
1963 and the orders and resolutions en banc thus far issued, this claim is well
taken.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The purpose of the agreement of March 23, 1963 was to end or settle the strike of February 18, 1963. The validity of
this agreement and its purpose were never disputed by the parties. As a matter of fact, the striking professors and/or
instructors returned to work as agreed (See verified Manifestation and Motion of Petitioner, dated March 25, 1963),
terminating the strike. In connection with the implementation of the agreement, respondent University, in its Answer
to the Manifestation and Motion filed by petitioner on March 25, 1963, alleged, among other things, that '... the only
arrangement made and assented to by the respondent contemplated the return of only the striking faculty members
whose classes have not been taken over by the replacement professors and teachers ....' It is then clear that
respondent University did not question the implementation of the agreement because of the issue it raised against
the Court's jurisdiction but only as its scope or coverage.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The agreement was clarified in the Order of March 30, 1963. After citing, in brief,. what was agreed by the parties at
the hearing on March 23, 1963, the Court in this Order directed '... all the strikers to return to work immediately and
the management to take them back under the last terms and conditions existing before the dispute arose...' But even
as respondent University had partially complied with the agreement [See Answer to petition for contempt, Case No.
41-IPA (1)], it nonetheless filed a motion for reconsideration of the said Order. It did not in this motion, however,
dispute the basis of the clarification and/or the clarification itself (See Memorandum it filed in support of its motion for
61
reconsideration). This being the case, and the Agreement being the law between the parties, it was and still is,
incumbent upon respondent University to comply with it and take the professor and/or instructor back to work. But it
did not. It will not comply with its part of the agreement in spite of the fact that its motion for reconsideration was
denied by the Court en banc (Resolution en bane, dated May 7, 1963). What is more is that respondent University
persisted and still persists up to the present in refusing to take the professors and/or instructors concerned back to
work even as the decision of the Supreme Court had long become final and executory. This is bad faith. As these
professors and/or instructors were not taken back to work not because of their fault as they presented to work as
agreed but due to the refusal of respondent University to honor its commitment under the agreement, it is but just
and proper that they should not be made to suffer thereby.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Considering the orders and resolution en banc issued, the claim for accrued back salaries is all the more justified.
Noteworthy, is the fact that the professor and/or instructors concerned have not, by striking, lost their right to go back
to their positions (Rex Taxicab v. CIR, et al., 40 G.C. No. 13,138). Indeed, this right was even articulated by the
Order of March 30, 1963 when they were directed to return to their work immediately and respondent University
required to take them back. This was, in the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 10 of R.A. 875 and pursuant to the
Presidential certification, the solution found by the Court to end or settle the strike. As a matter of fact the strike was
terminated when the striking professors and/or instructors returned to as the Court directed, but considerable of
these were not taken back or readmitted to work by respondent University.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
xxx xxx xxx
Clearly discernible from these requirements is the concern of the law in it protecting the rights of the employee or
employees concerned arising from the order appealed from. And one of such rights which these requirements
recognize is the right of such employee or employees to, and be the paid for, the salaries or wages due him or them
from the date his or their right to reinstatement or readmission up to the time he or they are actually reinstated or
readmitted back to work. In the case at bar, the Order of March 30, 1963 directed the professors and/or instructors
concerned to return to work immediately and respondent University to take them back to work. The implementation
of that Order was stayed in certiorari case (G.R. No. L-21278). On a bond filed by respondent University, the
injunction was issued. As earlier shown, the validity and legality of the Order of March 30, 1963, was a affirmed by
the Supreme Court. On almost the same facts and interpreting the same legal provision (Section 14 of C. A. 103, as
amended) the Supreme Court upheld the affirmative of the issue as to '... whether the strikers who were ordered
reinstated on June 25, 1963 but were actually returned to the service on January 27 and 30, 1966 are entitled to
back wages for the duration of the appeal instituted by the Company; ....' on this issue, it finally ruled that '... 10 days
after the Company was notified of the resolution denying its (Company's) motion for reconsideration of the Order of
June 25, 1953, the laborers' right to re-employment and wages accrued. Consequently, and by reason of its failure to
abide by the aforesaid order, the Company is liable for back wages due the laborers from the date of their Tight to
reinstatement accrued up to the time they were actually reinstated...' (Talisay Silay Milling Co., Inc. vs. CIR and
Talisay Employees and Laborers Ass., G. R. L-14023, promulgated on January 30, 1960). Under the law, the facts
and jurisprudence herein discussed, it is the considered opinion of this Court and so it holds that the professors
and/or instructors concerned herein are entitled to, and respondent University is liable for, their back starting from
July 12, 1963 up to when they are actually taken back or readmitted to work by respondent University. 13chanrobles
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The industrial court denied reconsideration per its resolution en banc of May 2, 1969. The university sought in vain to
appeal therefrom via its petition of May 9, 1969 for review on certiorari which was also entitled "Feati University vs.
Feati University Faculty Club" and docketed as Case No. L- 30484 of this Court. It assailed the industrial court's
order for the execution of the March 30, 1963 return-to-work with backwages, asserting principally inter alia that.
1) the [industrial] Court instead of ordering the issuance of a writ of execution of the Return to Work Order, should
have ordered the further implementation or enforcement of said order by ordering the replacing professors to vacate
and surrender their posts to the strikers who could not be returned to work because of the refusal of the replacing
professors to vacate their posts, and by ordering the University to return said strikers to the posts they were formerly
holding after the replacing professors had vacated them. 14chanrobles virtual law library
2) the industrial court erred in not granting its opposition "that the strike was not only illegal because it was declared
before the lapse of the 30 day cooling off period, and it is not covered by Republic Act 875 but also because it was
conducted or carried on illegally;" that "the strike and picketing declared and carried on by petitioner against
respondent be ruled and held as illegal; and that the demands of the petitioner be found and declared unreasonable
and very onerous and unjust to respondent," and that "this question of the legality or illegality of the strike, and the
question of whether or not the strikers should be reinstated with or without back wages have still to be decided by the
lower court, and only after the trial on the merits of this certified case which has only been started. The question of
the right of the strikers to strike was not submitted to the Supreme Court in the aforementioned certiorari cases filed
before it, and hence, was not resolved in its decision; 15chanrobles virtual law library
3) the finding of same Judge in the Order appealed from that University did not comply with the Order of March 30,
1963 but that it persisted and it still persists up to the present in refusing to take 'the professors and/or instructors
concerned' back to work, and that this is bad faith, is also absolutely devoid of factual or legal basis; 16chanrobles
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4) after the dispute was certified by the President of the Philippines to the CIR, the University at the first hearing
thereof on March 23, 1963 agreed to the return to work of the strikers, which agreement was referred to by the Trial
Court in its order of March 30, 1963. On April 1, 1963 the University accepted the strikers who returned to work, and
all resumed their classes, except those whose positions had been taken over by the replacement who refused to
yield their classes; 17andchanrobles virtual law library
5) consequently, the finding that the University refused and still persists in its refusal to comply with the return-to-
work Order is absolutely gratuitous, and cannot lawfully be and should not have been made a basis for the award of
back
wages. 18chanrobles virtual law library
The Court per its resolution of May 22, 1969 denied the university's petition for lack of
merit.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The university filed its motion and supplemental motion for reconsideration dated June 7 and June 11, 1969,
respectively.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Required to comment thereon, the faculty club union filed in due course its opposition/manifestation wherein it
frontally met the eleven grounds submitted by petitioner in assailing the appealed CIR order of execution of the
March 30, 1963 order with an award for backwages.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The university filed its reply thereto and on November 19, 1969 after considering all the pleadings the Court issued
its resolution denying reconsideration.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Judgment of this Court denying petitioner's appeal and upholding the appealed CIR order and resolution for
execution of the return-to-work order with backwages was entered on December 7, 1969, and the affirmed CIR order
of February 7, 1969 therefore became final and executory as of said date.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
The CIR's turn-about decision of November 24, 1969 now under review.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library
The ordeal of the professors-instructors members of petitioner faculty club was to prove far from
over.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Under date of November 24, 1969 (just after this Court had denied reconsideration of its May 22, 1969 resolution
denying the university's petition to review in L-30484 the CIR's February 7, 1969 order for execution of its March 30,
1963 return-to-work order and for backwages) the industrial court through the same then judge Joaquin A. Salvador
executed a complete turn-about and issued its decision wherein it repudiated and turned its back on its task
entrusted to it under the President's 1963 certification to resolve and fix the terms and conditions of employment
involved in the labor dispute by the simple expedient of declaring at that late day that petitioner's February 18, 1963
strike was "illegal and consequently, the employee status of the officers and members who participated therein is
hereby declared terminated." The industrial court thereby sought to negate and nullify the faculty club members'
62
finally adjudicated right to reinstatement with backwages as upheld by this Court in the two cited previous judgments
and against its own final pronouncements therein.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The industrial court now held that the university was not chargeable with unfair labor practice and refusal to bargain
collectively with the faculty club but that the strike was "an economic one". It further now held that "(I)n view of the
ruling that the strike of February 18, 1963 is illegal, it would be illogical to recompense the strikers with back salaries.
To hold otherwise would be to give them pecuniary advantage which under the law and rules of equity they should
not be entitled to. Besides, no proof has been submitted that the striking faculty members did return or offer to return
to work. On the contrary, it is undisputed that the intensive picketing remained unabated even after March 30,
1963." 19This of course was the exact opposite of its own final pronouncements as upheld by this Court in the two
cited previous judgments wherein it held that its March 30, 1963 return-to-work order terminated the strike and found
the university guilty of "bad faith" in failing to take back the petitioner's faculty members so much so that even in its
very decision now under review it found the university officials guilty of contempt of court for failure to implement its
said March 30, 1963 order and imposed a P200.-find on each of them!chanrobles virtual law library
Reconsideration was nevertheless denied by the industrial court's en banc resolution dated December 16,
1969.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
II The Court reverses the CIR decision of Nov. 24, 1969 under review.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library
Hence, the present review of the industrial court's said order and resolution by way of appeal
on certiorari.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The Court reverses. The factual findings and conclusions and orders rendered in the previous industrial court
proceedings as affirmed by two final judgments of this Court and above reproduced are now res judicata and bar the
industrial court's belated (just 4 months short of 7 years after its March 30, 1963 return-to-work order!) and
unfounded declaration of illegality of the strike and wholesale dismissal of all faculty club officers and members who
took part therein. As the Court stressed in its recent decision in NASSCO vs. CIR 19a issues concerning the
reinstatement with backwages which have been resolved by final judgment of this Court "may no longer be
reopened, it being the law of the case." Prescinding therefrom, the industrial court's volte face is bereft of factual and
legal basis, as will presently be seen.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
1. In this Court's 1966 decision upholding the 1963 return-to-work order, it was emphasized in rejecting the
university's contention that the issues of legality of the strike should have been first resolved, that the university had
a clear and imperative need for the services of the striking professors and instructors (to the point of hiring
replacements for the strikers!). The question of legality or illegality of the strike was thus rendered moot by the return-
to-work agreement and the order issued in pursuance thereof. As stressed by this Court, "the return-to-work order of
March 30, 1963, now in question, was a confirmation of an agreement between the university and the faculty club
during a pre-hearing conference on March, 23, 1963," supra. 20The doctrine that such unconditional return-to-work
agreement between the parties for their mutual benefit pending hearing and resolution of their dispute by the courts
is a virtual compromise and renders moot any issue of legality or illegality of the strike was recently reaffirmed by the
Court in Cafimsa vs. CIR. 21chanrobles virtual law library
**********chanrobles virtual law library
2. Any doubt that the issue of legality of the strike was thus rendered moot and inconsequential by this Court's 1966
decision is definitely dispelled by the industrial court's categorical pronouncement in its February 7, 1969 order for
execution of the 1963 return-to-work order with backwages I that "(T)he purpose of the agreement of March 23, 1963
was to end or settle the strike of February 18, 1963. The validity of this agreement and its purpose were never
disputed by the parties. As a matter of fact, the striking professors and/or instructors returned to work as agreed ...
terminating the strike" but that the university questioned "the scope or coverage" of the agreement and order
because of the alleged refusal of its replacements to yield their posts to the returnees. On this point, as already
stated above, the same CIR order found the University guilty of "bad faith" in refusing to take back the returnees
holding that "the agreement being the law between the parties, it was and still is incumbent upon respondent
university to comply with it and take the professors and/or instructors back to work," supra. 22
.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
3. Even prescinding from the industrial court's own final above- quoted pronouncement that the parties' agreement of
March 23, 1963 as affirmed in the March 30, 1963 return-to-work order settled and terminated the strike and
therewith any question as to its legality, the CIR's volte face after almost seven (7) years with its generalized
conclusion in its November 24, 1969 decision under review that petitioner's strike of February 18, 1963 was not an
unfair labor strike but an economic one to compel the university to grant economic benefits" and was therefore illegal
because "petitioner union struck before the expiration of the 30-day cooling off period provided by law" (from its
notice of strike filed on February 1, 1973) 23 is bereft of factual and legal basis.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
The record that the two cited 1966 and 1969 judgments of this Court manifestly show that there was no economic
deadlock to call for a 30-day cooling-off period but that the university questioned the faculty club members' right to
self-organization and to form a labor union and refused to negotiate with them notwithstanding the purported
extension of thirty days asked by it to study the demands which delay would have accomplished its purpose of
buying time until the close of the school year-by which time, as the petitioner states in its brief "if the union had to
wait for the 30 days period to expire, the union would have found themselves without work, without union, without
anything." 24 .chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Petitioner has cited in its brief without contradiction from the respondent the evidence adduced at the hearings of
many instances of discrimination and unfair labor practices and union-busting by the university which precipitated the
strike, viz, the university's threat of mass dismissal by not renewing the employment of (and not giving class
assignments to) professors/teachers-members of petitioner union at the close of the second semester of the 1962-
1963 school year; the circulation by the university management of a petition to be signed by faculty members
resigning from petitioner union, with some having been actually coerced into signing, and the case of Dean Opera
who testified as to his having been cautioned, threatened and ultimately dismissed for being sympathetic with the
union.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
In the light of these countervailing facts of record supported by the industrial court's own factual findings and final
pronouncements in the two cited earlier cases involving exactly the same parties and the same issues and dispute,
the Court cannot give faith to the same industrial court's belated and generalized conclusion against the legality of
the purpose of the strike. 25 .chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
4. Petitioner therefore had valid cause to go on strike because of the unfair labor practices and discriminatory acts
aimed at aborting its union, even without a notice of strike (much less wait out a 30-day cooling-off period required
only in economic strikes).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
As was held in Cafimsa, supra, one of the important rights recognized by the Magna Carta of Labor is the right to
self-organization and because of dilatory tactics usually employed by the employer to stave off union recognition and
collective bargaining, a union may be justified in resorting to a strike.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
Furthermore, even if it were to be conceded arguendo that the unfair labor practices complained of were not plainly
evident in the record, the Court has always recognized the unfair labor practice strike as labor's most effective
weapon against the employer's unfair labor practices.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
As stressed by the Court in Shell Oil Workers Union vs. Shell Co. of the Philippines, Ltd., 26 "It is not even required
that there be in fact an unfair labor practice committed by the employer. It suffices, if such a belief in good faith is
entertained by labor, as the inducing factor for staging a strike." The Court, in Shell, went oh to cite the earlier ruling
of Ferrer vs. CIR27 fully applicable to the case at bar, that " 'As a consequence, we hold that the strike in question
had been called to offset what petitioners were warranted in believing in good faith to be unfair tabor practices on the
part of Management, that petitioners were not bound, therefore, to wait for the expiration of thirty (30) days from
notice of strike before staging the same, that said strike was not, accordingly, illegal and that the strikers had not
thereby lost their status as employees of respondents herein." .chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
63
5. The industrial court's pronouncement of illegality of the strike and wholesale dismissal from employment of the
strikers due to five sporadic instances of violence or coercion, e. g. "chain picketing," preventing Commissioner
Maslog from going out of the university premises, the mauling of two students trying to get into the university, a
simple conviction of mauling and a complaint of a Feati bank employee for mauling which did not-prosper is
manifestly untenable.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Factually, none of these isolated incidents has been shown to involve a single member of the petitioner union. The
testimony of the union president that the union instructed its pickets to conduct the picketing without force and
violence and that these instructions were carried out as befitted the stature and dignity of the striking
professors/teachers stands unchallenged.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Legally, the union officers and members could not be held liable for the isolated instances of so-called violence which
involved the union sympathizers and detractors, by virtue of the mandate of section 9 (c) of Republic Act 875 that "(c)
No officer or member of any association or organization, and no association or organization participating or
interested in a labor dispute shall be held responsible or liable for the unlawful acts of individual officers, members or
agents, except upon proof of actual participation in, or actual authorization of such acts or of ratifying of such acts
after actual knowledge thereof." .chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Thus, the Court has long expressly abandoned the discarded doctrine that good faith of the strikers in the staging of
strike is immaterial in the determination of the legality or illegality of the strike, since the wholesale dismissal of
workers who erroneously but in good faith struck against what they believed to be unfair labor practices against them
has been rightfully considered an unduly harsh and excessive penalty for workers who were merely misled by their
leaders to join the illegal strike. 28 .chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
And as to the use of violence which outlaws a strike otherwise valid in purpose, the Court has made it clear that
absent a pervasive and widespread use of force and violence deliberately promoted and countenanced by the union,
where responsibility for injury to persons and destruction of property may be collectively attributed to the entire union
leadership and membership, responsibility for such sporadic and isolated acts must be individual in
nature.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Thus, Justice Fernando stressed for the Court in Shell 29 supra, that "a strike otherwise valid, if violent in character,
may be placed beyond the pale. Care is to be taken, however, especially where an unfair labor practice is involved,
to avoid stamping it with illegality just because it is tainted by such acts. To avoid rendering illusory the recognition of
the right to strike, responsibility in such a case should be individual and not collective. A different conclusion would
be called for, of course, if the existence of force while the strike lasts is pervasive and widespread, consistently and
deliberately resorted to as a matter of policy and that where the acts of violence were sporadic and not pervasive by
design and policy, "(I)t is enough that individual liability be incurred by those guilty of such acts of violence that call
for loss of employee status." .chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
As summed up by Justice Castro for the Court in the earlier case of Insular Life Ass'ce. Co. Employees Ass'n. vs.
Insular Life Ass'ce. Co. Ltd.,30 "it is thus clear that not every form of violence suffices to affix the seal of illegality on
a strike or to cause the loss of employment of the guilty party." .chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
Needless to say, here in the case at bar, the industrial court failed to name a single officer or member of petitioner
union who had participated in any act of violence or intimidation that would call for his outright dismissal. III
Disposition of the case at bar .chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The dispositive portion or judgment of the CIR's reversed decision provided as follows:
.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
xxx xxx xxx .chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
"1. The strike declared against the Feati University on February 18, 1963 is declared illegal and consequently, the
employee status of the officers and members who participated therein are hereby declared terminated;
.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
"2. The issue of certification be threshed out in an election to be conducted upon such mode and manner as may be
acceptable to the parties and whoever may desire to participate in it; .chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library
"3. The damages sustained by the parties, in the light of the facts and the jurisdictional competence of the Court, are
denied; and .chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
"4. The persons named in the contempt proceeding are fined P200.00 each.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
"xxx xxx xxx .chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
With the reversal of the CIR judgment, the Court now orders the following disposition of the issues with a view of
expediting the termination of this long pending dispute: .chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
1. With the reversal of the CIR's belated and unwarranted declaration of illegality of the February 18, 1963 strike and
wholesale dismissal of the strikers, the implementation of the return-to-work order with accrued backwages from July
12, 1963 up to date of actual readmission of the faculty club members should proceed without further
delay.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
As to the amount of backwages, the Court applies the precedent recently set in Mercury Drug. Co. vs. CIR 31 of
fixing the amount of backwages to a just and reasonable level without qualification or deduction so as to avoid
protracted delay in the execution of the award for backwages due to extended hearings and unavoidable delays and
difficulties encountered in determining the earnings of the laid-off employees ordered to be reinstated with
backwages during the pendency of the case for purposes of deducting the same from the gross backwages
awarded.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
As has been noted, this formula of awarding reasonable net backwages without deduction or qualification relieves
the employees from proving or disproving their earnings during their lay-off and the employers from submitting
counterproofs, and obviates the twin evils of idleness on the part of the employee who would "with folded arms,
remain inactive in the expectation that a windfall would come to him" 32 and attention and protracted delay in
satisfying such award on the part of unscrupulous employers who have seized upon the further proceedings to
determine the actual earnings of the wrongfully dismissed or laid-off employees to hold unduly extended hearings for
each and every employee awarded backwages and thereby render practically nugatory such award and compel the
employees to agree to unconscionable settlements of their backwages award in order to satisfy their dire need. 33
.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Here, a total of eleven (11) years has elapsed from July 12, 1963, date of commencement of the backwages.
Considering all the circumstances at bar, viz, the preliminary injunction issued by this Court in the first Feati case
restraining the enforcement of the March 30, 1963 return-to-work order, the nature of the work, the complexity of the
issues raised by the university which were then novel and which were only resolved in this Court's 1966 decision
recognizing the right of professors and instructors theretofore given teaching assignments on a contractual per-
semester basis to organize a labor union and to demand collective bargaining and to strike, the fact that respondent
is an educational institution, although engaged in it also for profit, and the further delay caused by the CIR's
turnabout 1969 decision herein ordered reversed, the Court considers that the fixing and limitation of the backwages
award to the equivalent of three (3) school years (of ten months each school year) without qualification and
deduction to the professors/instructors who have not been readmitted by the university all this time since the March
30, 1963 order is just and reasonable, and no further amount shall be due them except the P50,000.-injunction bond
in the first Feati case (L-21278) supra, which is hereby declared forfeited in favor of petitioner for the benefit of all its
members who have not yet been readmitted to the university in view of this Court's 1966 decision finding the
university not to be entitled to the issuance of such preliminary injunction which was ordered dissolved in the
decision. The computation of such accrued backwages shall be based on the university records and payrolls as
directed in the industrial court's February 7, 1969 execution order (upheld by this Court in L-30484 on May 22, 1969)
save that the report of such computation shall be made to the industrial court within thirty (30) days from notice
hereof and payment of the three years backwages (based on ten months per year) without qualification or deduction
64
shall be effected immediately thereafter to the faculty club members entitled
thereto.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
2. As to the actual reinstatement of the professors/instructors who up to now have not yet been taken back, the Court
notes that immediate reinstatement is not feasible considering that we are now in the midst of the first semester of
the school-year, and that on the other hand, the said professors/instructors may have already found other similar
employment and may no longer wish to be reinstated at this late date. The Court therefore directs the industrial court
to determine and work out a schedule for the actual reinstatement of such professors/instructors who wish to be so
reinstated at the beginning of the second semester of the current school-year and to use the court's coercive
processes to effect the same without further delay.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
3. The industrial court is directed to resolve with deliberate dispatch the merits of the labor dispute which the
President had certified to it in 1963 under section 10 of Republic Act No. 875 in the national interest particularly, the
twenty-six demands of petitioner union for union recognition, collective bargaining, security of tenure, etc. It should
be noted as reaffirmed in of Petroleum Workers (PFPW) vs. CIR 34 that such certified cases per se indicate a
"degree of required in the settlement of the terms and conditions of employment involved in the labor dispute. The
industrial court, in such cases, is empowered to act therein with the broad powers and jurisdiction granted it by law,
including the power of conciliation and compulsory arbitration; it is empowered to order the return to work of the
workers with or without backpay, and 'shall not be restricted to the specific relief or demands made by the parties to
the industrial dispute, but may include in the award, order or decision any matter or determination which may be
deemed necessary or expedient for the purpose of settling the dispute or of preventing further industrial disputes." 35
.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
It is under these ample powers of the CIR and the declared national interest involved that the strike was terminated
by its March 30, 1963 return-to-work order and the striking professors/instructors ordered reinstated and be not
dismissed from the university although technically their teaching assignments were on a contractual per semester
basis (which lack of security of tenure was one of the teachers' main complaints) during the pendency of the dispute
and its determination by the industrial court. The right of the professors/instructors to such reinstatement since July
12, 1963 has been frustrated all this time because of the tenacious opposition of the university and the intervening
circumstances hereinabove narrated.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Hence, the award of backwages to petitioner's members hereinabove fixed at three years without deduction or
qualification in implementation of the final February 7, 1969 award upheld in the second Feati case (L-30484) which
held the university in "bad faith " for its failure and refusal to comply with the reinstatement order notwithstanding this
Court's 1966 decision repudiating the university's challenge against its validity and the industrial court's
jurisdiction.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
All effort should now be exerted by the industrial court to settle and adjudicate without further delay the terms and
conditions of employment involved in the labor dispute.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The question of certification election is not necessary for the discharge by the industrial court of its task of resolving
and compulsory arbitrating the labor dispute between the parties, as already held in this Court's 1966 decision,
except that for purposes of determining the proper collective bargaining representative in view of the long period that
has elapsed since the dispute was certified in 1963 by the President but after the dispute has otherwise been
resolved in all other aspects, any of the parties affected may apply for certification election as provided by
law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
4. The P200.-fine imposed by the industrial court on each of the university officials named in the contempt
proceedings for to implement the March 30, 1963 return-to-work order shall stand, since the same has not been
complained of nor assigned as error by the parties in this review.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
ACCORDINGLY, the appealed decision of November 24, 1969 of the industrial court is hereby reversed and set
aside (save for paragraph 4 of the dispositive portion thereof which imposes a P200.-fine on each of the university
officials named in the contempt proceedings which shall stand). In lieu thereof, judgment is hereby rendered ordering
the industrial court to implement without further delay the March 30, 1963 return-to-work order with accrued
backwages as ordered in the February 7, 1969 order (with the amount of the backwages to be paid by the university
to the professors and instructors entitled thereto fixed at three (3) years backwages [at ten (10) months per year]
without deduction or qualification besides damages of P50,000.00 on the university's injunction bond in the first Feati
case which are hereby awarded against the university in favor of petitioner for the benefit of all its members who
have not yet been taken back by the university), and to resolve with deliberate dispatch the merits of the labor
dispute certified to it by the President, in accordance with the directives set forth in Part III of the Court's opinion
(entitled Disposition of the case at Bar) which is hereby reproduced and made an integral part hereof by reference.
With costs against respondent university.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
In view of the length of time that petitioners' members' right to reinstatement during the pendency of the dispute and
to accrued backwages has been pending enforcement as well as the fact that the labor dispute itself notwithstanding
the presidential certification in 1963 has been unresolved to date, this decision shall be immediately executory upon
its this decision shall be immediately executory upon its promulgation.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library
FERNANDO, J., concurring: .chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
There is no hesitancy in my concurrence with the thorough, comprehensive, and learned opinion of Justice
Teehankee. I find more than justified the tone of displeasure so evident therein, necessitated by the seeming
callousness with which the respondent Court of Industrial Relations viewed the plight of petitioner Feati University
Faculty Club as well as the lack of an adequate grasp of controlling legal doctrines in the field of labor law. What is
even more deplorable is that an agency precisely created to attain the salutary objectives in the 1935 Constitution on
the promotion of social justice and the protection of labor, appears, at least in this instance, to be a major obstacle.
More specifically, there is much less than full respect for the landmark opinion of Justice Zaldivar for this Court in the
parent case, Feati University v. Bautista. 1 The strictures aimed therefore at the appealed decision of respondent
Court are well-deserved. If this brief concurrence is penned it is only out of a desire to add a few words on the
applicability of progressive labor legislation to the underpaid and overworked members of the teaching profession,
those who till the vineyards of the intellect.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The 1966 Feati University decision is, to my mind, of far-reaching consequence because for the first time there is a
marked -recognition that intellectual labor, no less than physical labor, is fully deserving of state protection. That is as
it ought to be. If it were not thus, one of the most vital governmental ends, that of disseminating the fruits of
knowledge and extending its terrain, would be frustrated. That was one of the cherished aims of the 1935
Constitution. 2 It is even more emphasized under the present Charter. Thus: "All educational institutions shall be
under the supervision of, and subject to regulation by, the State. The State shall establish and maintain a complete,
adequate, and integrated system of education relevant to the goals of national development. 3 Also: "(1) The State
shall promote scientific research and invention. The advancement of science and technology shall have priority in the
national development. (2) Filipino culture shall be preserved and developed for national identity. Arts and letters shall
be under the patronage of the State. (3) The exclusive right to inventions, writings, and artistic creations shall be
secured to inventors, authors, and artists for a limited period. Scholarships, grants-in-aid, or other forms of incentives
shall be provided for specially gifted citizens." 4 .chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
So it is in the United States. Education, as was stressed in Brown v. Board of Education, 5 the famous desegregation
decision, "is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments." 6 That theme, according to a 1973
Supreme Court decision, San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 7 "expressing an abiding respect for the vital role of education in
a free society, may be found in numerous opinions of Justices of [the American Supreme] Court writing both before
and after Brown was decided. Wisconsin v. Yoder 406 US 205, 213, 32 L Ed 2d 15, 92 S Ct 1526 (The Chief
Justice), 237, 238-239, 32 L Ed 2d 15 (Mr. Justice White) (1972); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 US 203,
230, 10 L Ed 2d 844, 83 S Ct 1560 (1963) (Mr. justice Brennan); McCollum v. Bd. of Education, 333 US 203, 212, 92
L Ed 649, 68 S Ct 461, 2 ALR 2d 1338 (1948) (Mr. Justice Frankfurter); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 US 510, 69
L Ed 1070, 45 S Ct 571, 39 ALR 468 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 US 390, 67 L Ed 1042, 43 S Ct 625, 29 ALR
1446 (1923); Interstate Consolidated Street Ry v. Massachusetts, 207 US 79, 52 L Ed 111, 28 S Ct 26 (1907)." 8
.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
It is trite to say then that competent and able educators are of the essence. They are needed in all ranks, from those
teaching the very young to those furnishing tutelage to college and university students. Unless they are assured of
decent living conditions, their efficiency is impaired and their enthusiasm wanes. That is quite understandable. They
65
are mostly family men with their own children whose needs as to food clothing and shelter as well as schooling and
medicine have to be provided for. It is no indictment of Feati University to say that its management, like those in
other business establishments, while no doubt conscious of the desirability of having its labor force relatively content,
cannot close its eyes to the annual profit and loss statement. This is so because in this country, and it is most
regrettable, quite a number of educational institutions are operated like ordinary commercial firms. It is a common
complaint, one well-justified at that, that stipends granted faculty members are far from generous. In the original Feati
University decision and in this decision, there is the recognition, one that is impressed with the elements of fitness
and of justice, that instructors, lecturers and professors are entitled to all the benefits of the constitutional mandates
and the legal norms so concerned with and so solicitous of the welfare of labor. If there is anything evident in our
pronouncements then and now, it is that labor conditions in the Feati University are far from ideal. Its Faculty Club
has therefore the legal right to take the needed steps to improve matters. It did so, and yet, if the appealed decision
were to be upheld, it would be penalized for doing so. That should not be the
case.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Nor is this all. If the educators falter or fail in their task, the hapless victims are the unfortunate students, their parents
who undergo sacrifices so that their children might do better in life, and in a true sense, the country as a whole. One
way to avoid such a dire consequence is for a college or university to have a permanent corps of faculty members.
An assurance of tenure, it has been ascertained in some of the better centers of learning both here and abroad, is a
guarantee of greater proficiency in teaching. The movement by the members in petitioner organization was precisely
inspired by the belief that, if so united, the could obtain better working conditions, including the highly-prized security
of tenure. For one reason or another, possibly because it will cut into its profits, there was an objection on the part or
respondent Feati University. As was so made clear by us as far back as 1966, the objection to such concerted
activity was without legal basis. Moreover, the faculty members had to return to work. Yet, after all these years, they
are still knocking at the gates. It is then a sad state of affairs not only for the professors, lecturers, instructors and
their families, but for the cause of intellectual freedom, if instead of receiving encouragement and support, those who
devote themselves to training the young will be hampered in their efforts to improve their living conditions. Plagued
by a sense of insecurity, education itself suffers. That, to repeat, is a condition that must be remedied - and
now.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The appealed decision was obvious to such considerations. It was not only vitiated by bad law but also by complete
inattention to the demands of sound educational policy. In manifesting such blindness to the clear dictates of
progressive labor legislation, no less than of the requirements of intellectual freedom, respondent Court was clearly
recreant to its trust. Since the decision of the Court has that significance for me, I am as one with my brethren on this
matter.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
BARREDO, J.: Concurring- .chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
I deem it necessary to state briefly my reasons for concurring in the judgment rendered by the Court because I feel
there is need for me to explain why in spite of my knowledge from actual experience, having been a professor in
many private universities for a long time that my repeated appointments on semestral basis did not give me, as a
matter of right, sufficient ground to demand that I be assigned a teaching load every semester, I am nevertheless
voting in favor of ordering the reinstatement and of granting the members of petitioning union herein back salaries for
three years without deduction or qualification.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Indeed, were it not for the peculiar circumstances under which the services of the professors and instructors herein
involved were terminated, as recounted in the main opinion, it would have been, to my mind, extremely doubtful if
those of them who were holding positions on semestral basis could be considered as entitled as a matter of right to
reinstatement and the consequent corresponding back salaries. True, they were precisely demanding for security of
tenure, but even granting they are entitled thereto, their right thereunder cannot be considered as existing until after
the corresponding provision therefor has been made in the decision of the Industrial Court to which their demands
had been submitted by the President of the Philippines for arbitration. As a matter of fact, even the terms of the
Industrial Court's return-to-work order of March 30, 1963 do not seem to exclude conclusively the semestral
individual contracts, express or implied, herein involved, for it refers to the return to work of petitioners "under the last
terms and conditions existing before the dispute arose", which could mean in law a recognition of the semestral
nature of the contracts already mentioned. To my mind, the injunction to the respondent university against dismissing
any employee or laborer, pending adjudication of the case, does not necessarily mean the respondent had to extend
new appointments to those whose tenures, under the term of their "last" respective semestral contracts existing
before the strike, expired in the meanwhile. In law, there is a difference between dismissal and termination of tenure
pursuant to prevailing contracts.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
I am convinced, however, that it is highly improper and unfair to condone, in justice and equity, and from the
viewpoint of the respect that parties are supposed to accord judicial orders, the attitude of respondent university with
reference to the return-to-work order in question. I see no justification whatsoever for what clearly appears to be
furtive evasions of the court's order, if not, truculent defiance thereof. The terms of the order did not come from the
court sua sponte, the basis thereof being a return-to-work agreement entered into by the parties before the hearing
of March 23, 1963. There is no doubt in my mind that petitioners understood from the agreement that the university
would retain or continuously reappoint them pending the final adjudication of the case, and if respondent had any
contrary idea about it, it should not have remained silent but should have spelled it out for all to know. That
agreement superseded any existing contract of any other import. To allow the order to stand as it is, and to later on
take advantage of loose expressions and possible loopholes therein, knowing that the petitioners were pinning their
hopes on being able to work while their demands were being arbitrated, appears to me to smack of deception and
bad faith. In any event, in respect to this point, every vestige of legal justification for the respondent's posture ended
when in the decision of this Court of December 27, 1966 (18 SCRA 1191), it was made clear that respondent had no
right to take in replacements of petitioners, pursuant to the terms, not necessarily of the order, but of the return-to-
work agreement between the parties, of which the order was only a confirmation. From then on, it became the
indubitable and ineludible obligation of respondent to continuously reinstate petitioners until otherwise authorized by
the court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Moreover, it does seem clear in the records of the case that contrary to the spirit of the President's certification that
the parties should submit their differences to arbitration by the Industrial Court, among the most important of which,
was the one about security of tenure, respondent, thru its officials and counsel, in and outside of the court,
consistently took an intransingent attitude and resorted to dilatory devices, thereby betraying complete indifference to
the efforts of the faculty members of the institution, without whom, after all, it could not have attained the standing it
had as a respectable seat of education in this country. Such an anti-social posture can hardly evoke sympathy. The
Court of Industrial Relations was conceived as a special instrument for the promotion of social justice; for which
reason, the procedures therein are stripped of technicalities, and it is to apply the law to the end that its social
objectives not its cold juridical concepts alone are achieved. Which is not to create an imbalance or inequality before
the law, but to put into actual operation the Constitution's mandate for the State to "afford protection to labor,
promote full employment and equality in employment, . and regulate the relations between workers and employers"
as it "shall assure the rights of workers..... security of tenure" in the exercise, if necessary, of its power to "provide for
compulsory arbitration". (Sec. 9, Article 11, Constitution of the Philippines of 1973). No less than these, substantially,
were the principles pertaining to labor enunciated in our 1935 Constitution. Respondent's position frustrated the
laudable efforts to give meaning and substance to these constitutional precepts, and it has only itself to blame for the
sanction that it has entailed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Mr. Justice Teehankee could not have made the legality of the strike of petitioners plainer. Verily, the attempt to
stigmatize the same because of the alleged violation of the 30-day conciliation period prescribed by law and the
scattered incidents of coercions and violence in which some of the strikers participated, is futile in the light of
prevailing jurisprudence on the matter ably discussed in the main opinion. Such being the case, the right of
petitioners to reinstatement and back salaries as ordered in the judgment is beyond dispute. In all other respects, I
concur fully in the well reasoned decision penned by Mr. Justice Teehankee.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
D I S S E N T I N G .chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
ESGUERRA, J: .chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
I regret that I cannot subscribe to the majority opinion which substitutes its findings of fact for those of respondent
Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) and makes astounding statements on the liability of respondent FEATI University.
Particularly, I cannot accept the dictum that a presidential certification of an industrial dispute to the Court of
Industrial Relations (CIR) and a return to work order issued in the meantime by the (CIR) to maintain the status quo
and prevent further injury to the public interest, preclude all debates about the legality of the strike and shut out all
claims tending to show that the return to work order is not res judicata as between the parties to the
dispute.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
66
The background and antecedent circumstances which gave rise to the instant petition are found in the joint decision
promulgated by this Court on December 27, 1966, in the eases entitled: "Feati University vs. Honorable Jose
Bautista" (L21278); "Feati University vs. Feati University Faculty Club-PAFLU" (L-21462); and "Feati University vs.
Feati University Faculty Club-PAFLU" (L-21500). Excerpts from the decision setting forth the facts of these cases are
as follows:1 .chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
"On January 14, 1963, the President of the respondent Feati University Faculty Club-PAFLU-hereinafter referred to
as Faculty Club-wrote a letter to Mrs. Victoria L. Araneta, President of petitioner Feati University-hereinafter referred
to as University informing her of the organization of the Faculty Club into a registered labor union. The Faculty Club
is composed of members who are professors and/or instructors of the University. On January 22, 1963, the President
of the Faculty Club sent another letter containing twenty-six demands that have connection with the employment of
the members of the Faculty Club by the University, and requesting an answer within ten days from receipt thereof.
The President of the University answered the two letters, requesting that she be given at least thirty days to study
thoroughly the different phases of the demands. Meanwhile counsel for the University to whom the demands were
referred, wrote a letter to the President of the Faculty Club demanding proof of its majority status and designation as
a bargaining representative. On February 1, 1963, the President of the Faculty Club again wrote the President of the
University rejecting the latter's request for extension of time, and on the same day he filed a notice of strike with the
Bureau of Labor alleging as reason therefor the refusal of the University to bargain collectively. The parties were
called to conferences at the Conciliation Division of the Bureau of Labor but efforts to conciliate them failed. On
February 18, 1963, the members of the Faculty Club declared a strike and established picket lines in the premises of
the University, resulting in the disruption of classes in the University. Despite further efforts of the officials from the
Department of Labor to effect a settlement of the differences between the management of the University and the
striking faculty members no satisfactory agreement was arrived at. On March 21, 1963, the President of the
Philippines certified to the Court of Industrial Relations the dispute between the management of the University and
the Faculty Club pursuant to the provisions of Section 10 of Republic Act No.
875.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
"In connection with the dispute between the University and the Faculty Club and certain incidents related to said
dispute, various cases were filed with the Court of Industrial Relations.".chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library
Three of them, entitled and docketed as set forth in the second paragraph of the first page of this decision, reached
this court and were jointly decided as follows: .chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
"IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction in Case G. R.
No. L-21278 is dismissed and the writs prayed for therein are denied. The writ of preliminary injunction issued in
case G. R. No. L-21278 is dissolved. The orders and resolutions appealed from in Cases Nos. L-21462 and 21500,
are affirmed, with costs in these three cases against the petitioner- appellant Feati University." On October 24, 1968,
the Faculty Club filed several pleadings, viz: .chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
1. Motion to execute order of March 30, 1963, for return to work in accordance with the December 27, 1966 decision
abovementioned.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
2. Motion to set case for hearing.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
3. Petition for Award of Damages.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
4. Petition for the reinstatement with back wages of non-faculty members.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
On February 7, 1969, Judge Joaquin Salvador issued an order granting the motion to execute filed by petitioner
Faculty Club. The University moved to reconsider the same but the motion was denied on March 25, 1969. Several
hearings on CIR Case No. 41-IPA followed, and on November 24,1969, a decision was rendered thereon (confirmed
by the CIR en banc), the dispositive portion of which reads as follows: .chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Court hereby orders the following:
.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
1. The strike declared against the Feati University on February 18, 1963, is declared illegal and, consequently, the
employee status of the officers and members who participated therein are hereby declared terminated;
.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
2. The issue of certification be threshed out in an election to be conducted upon such mode and manner as may be
acceptable to the parties and whoever may desire to participate in it; .chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library
3. The claim for (sic) damages sustained by the parties, in the light of the facts and the jurisdictional competence of
the Court, are denied; and .chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
4. The persons named in the contempt proceedings are fined P200.00 each." .chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
From this decision petitioner Faculty Club appealed, claiming that respondent court erred in -
.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
1. Declaring the strike of the petitioner illegal inspite of the uncontroverted fact that there was already a return-to-
work agreement.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
2. Declaring the strike of the petitioner illegal inspite of the fact that this Honorable Court has, in its decision in Cases
Nos. L-21278, 21462 and 21500, already ruled out the question of strike
illegality.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
3. Ruling that the strike of the petitioner was illegal because the so-called 30-day notice requirement was not
complied with.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
4. Ruling that the strike of the petitioner was illegal because it was carried out through illegal
means.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
5. Ruling the strike of the petitioner illegal inspite of the contrary position it took in its earlier Order dated February 7,
1969.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
6. Finding that the strike members did not offer to return to work.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
7. Finding that the picketing continued even after March 30, 1963.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
8. Ruling on the question of damages which was never submitted; and ignoring the issues on the union economic
demands and the petition for the reinstatement of non-faculty members.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library
9. Reviving the question of majority, and .chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
10. Directing vaguely compliance with the "new precept here manifested in the SSS dispute."
.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The first five assigned errors will be taken up together as they all revolve around the legality or illegality of the strike.
The last five will be taken up separately. Petitioner Faculty Club contends that the return-to-work arrangement
rendered moot and academic the issue of legality of the strike. This is untenable. While in the case of Caltex Filipino
Managers and Supervisors Association vs. Court of Industrial Relations, L-30632-33, April 11, 1972, 44, SCRA, 350,
this Court had occasion to specifically rule that the legality or illegality of the strike became moot and academic
67
because of the return-to-work arrangement, this particular ruling is not applicable to the instant case. In the
aforecited case, the company unqualifiedly bound itself in the return-to-work agreement that all employees would be
taken back "with the same employee status prior to April 22, 1965." This is not true in the instant case, for the fact is
that when the return-to-work arrangement was first brought up, the University questioned the jurisdiction of the CIR.
Besides, the prefatory sentence of the CIR Order of March 30, 1963, that the dispute could not be promptly decided
and settled by the Court, and hence the strikers were ordered to return to work and the University directed to readmit
them under a status quo arrangement, confirm the fact that the return-to-work order was merely an interim or
provisional arrangement. There is no question as to the power of the CIR to issue a valid return-to- work order and
thus "avoid the dire possibility, foreseen in the certification, of huge economic losses, untold inconveniences and
grave dangers to safety and human lives" (National Power Corporation vs. National Power Corporation Employees
and Workers Association, 33 SCRA 811). The return-to-work arrangement was, therefore, designed to minimize in
the meantime the disastrous effects of the strike, especially as it affected thousands of students of respondent
University, and did not render moot and academic the issue of the legality or illegality of the
strike.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Nor can we accede to the interpretation of the petitioner that the decision of this Court of December 27, 1966, in
Feati University vs. Bautista, supra ruled out the question of the illegality of the strike. The issue of validity of the
strike staged by petitioner Faculty Club on February 18, 1963, was never put in issue squarely before us, for what
was questioned there was the validity of the return-to-work order and We upheld the legality of the CIR order of
March 30, 1963, to that effect, without ruling on the legality of the strike which We then believed could be threshed
out in later proceedings.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Petitioner Faculty Club claims that the CIR erred in declaring the strike illegal because the 30-day notice requirement
was practically complied with by it. But respondent Court of Industrial Relations found that it was an economic strike
and, therefore, the 30-day "cooling-off" period was indispensable and should have been strictly observed. It is a
settled rule not to disturb findings of the trial court where they are supported by substantial evidence. The alleged
sole reason for the strike was the refusal of the University to bargain, but the records show that the University
answered the two letters of petitioner Faculty Club although it bided for time to study the demands numbering twenty-
six which really necessitated thorough deliberation and serious consideration, involving as they did matters which
raised legal, organizational and economic questions vitally affecting the FEATI University. While it is true that under
Section 14 of the Industrial Peace Act (Republic Act 875), when a party serves written notice upon the employer of
its proposals and a reply to the same has to be made not later than ten days from receipt thereof, this condition is
merely procedural and non-compliance therewith cannot be deemed to be an act of unfair labor practice. (National
Union of Restaurant Workers vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 10 SCRA, p. 843). Hence no unfair labor practice
could be imputed to the respondent University which did not refuse to bargain but merely sought extension of time to
study and deliberate on the demands.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
As to the means resorted to by the strikers in carrying out the strike, there are testimonies of police officers who were
assigned to the strike-bound area to maintain peace and order there, and of persons who witnessed the violent and
illegal acts of the strikers, and who were victims thereof, to show the illegality of the strike. These are what the
respondent court found: .chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
"Captain David Laquian, in charge of the police detail in the Feati University premises testified that the "people can
not go in or out of the University because of several picketers" even resorting to "chain picketing" (t.s.n., Oct. 8,
1969, pp. 30-31); that this chain picketing consisted of picketers embracing each other and working around in front of
the two gates of the University that "there was violence", specifically the case of Commissioner Maslog, who was
prevented from going out of the premises, and the mauling of two student trying to get into the University, and
assault on an employee of the Feati Bank (pp. 32-34). Amado Ravalo, then investigator of MPD Precinct No. 2,
investigated the case of Charles King who was mauled on March 6, 1963 by the strikers between Echague and
Hellos Streets (t.s.n., Oct. 8, 1969, pp. 5-8) and of Ramon Vega, an employee of Feati Bank and, therefore, not
involved in the labor dispute, who was likewise mauled on February 19,1963 along Echague Street (p.
11).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
"Hospicio Brinas, legal officer of the University, averred that the picketers were not only professors, but professional
picketers "harassing, coercing, intimidating the professors and instructors from entering the Feati University", and
that he was one of those prevented from entering the premises (t.s.n., July 14, 1969, p. 42); that they forcibly pushed
away the persons entering (p. 45); these were all substantially corroborated by Commissioner Rodolfo Maslog (t.s.n.,
July 30, 1969).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
"More revealing are the documentary evidences consisting of certified court records in relation to the incidents in
question. Thus, Criminal Cases Nos. 69119 entitled, People of the Philippines vs. Dionisio Poladre y Taldero, the
Decision of conviction on the mauling of Charles King in the Court of First Instance of Manila (Exhs. "24", "24-A" to
"24-E"); the writ of preliminary injunction granted by Branch 1, Court of First Instance of Manila enjoining defendants
Bunag, et al., "from continuing the acts complained of, i.e., coercing, harassing and intimidating the students and
other teachers, instructors and professors and preventing them from entering the classrooms and attending their
classes, and preventing the plaintiff's employees from discharging their duties" (Exhs. "22" and "22- A"); and
Miscellaneous Complaint of Crime Report re: the complaint of Ramon Vega (Exhs. "16" to "16-
B").chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
"It is, therefore, clear that from the evidence presented, petitioner and its officers and members had not limited their
acts to legal picketing but had resorted to threats, intimidations, coercions, bodily harm and other illegal means
thereby rendering such strike illegal (Liberal Labor Union vs. Philippine Can Co., 91 Phil., 73; Luzon Marine
Department Union vs. Judge Roldan, et al., G. R. No. L-2660, 47 O.G. Supp. to No.
12)..chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
We now turn to the CIR Order of February 7, 1969, which was completely reversed by the decision of November 24,
1969, subject of the present petition. Petitioner claims that the order of February 7, 1969, for the execution of the
return to work order of March 30, 1963, became final and res judicata and could no longer be set aside by the
decision on the merits of CIR Case No. 41-IPA rendered on November
24,1969.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The petitioner apparently stresses the "finality of the Order" of February 7, 1969, to preclude the Respondent Court
from setting it aside by its decision of November 24, 1969. Petitioner's contention is untenable. The order of March
30, 1963, as has been previously shown, was merely provisional and temporary in character, or issued to maintain
the status quo arrangement pending decision of the case on the merits. The order of February 7, 1969, providing for
its execution, consequently, was also provisional in character and never became final. The respondent court by its
decision of November 24, 1969, could declare the strike illegal as the decision of this Court upholding the order of
March 30, 1963, only affirmed the jurisdiction of the CIR to issue it and never terminated the dispute by declaring the
strike legal. That decision precluded the execution of the return to work order since the strikers' picketing continued
beyond that date as found by the CIR and in the meantime the employment of the members of petitioner union on
the semestral basis were terminated. There is, therefore, no more return to work order that could be validly executed
and the authority of the Court of Industrial Relations to alter or amend its decision or orders that have become final
and executory under the authority of Section 17 of Commonwealth Act 103 as amended, need not be invoked, as it
has been shown that said order of March 30, 1963, as ordered executed by the order of February 7, 1969, was
rendered functus officio.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
As to the question of damages, the strike being illegal, it would be moot and academic to resolve that question. This
is also true with respect to the claim of petitioner for reinstatement and back
wages.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
For the foregoing, the judgment appealed should be affirmed.chanroblesvirtua
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-58341. June 29, 1982.]
PEPSI-COLA LABOR UNION-BFLU-TUPAS LOCAL CHAPTER NO. 896, Petitioner, v. NATIONALLABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION AND PEPSI-COLA BOTTLING COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., NAGA
PLANT, Respondents.
68

SYNOPSIS
In a certification election conducted at the Pepsi Cola Bottling Co.’s (PEPSI) plant in Naga City, the petitioner Union
received a majority of the votes cast therein. Thereafter, it filed a notice of strike with the Ministry of Labor
and Employment’s Regional Office in Legaspi City on the ground that PEPSI refused to bargain. PEPSI countered
that it was merely awaiting the final decision in the appeal of the labor group that contested the results of the
election. The Med-Arbiter ruled that the Notice of Strike filed was premature. This notwithstanding, the petitioner
Union staged a strike. After a return-to-work order was obtained, PEPSI filed a complaint for unfair labor practice and
illegal strike. Judgment was rendered declaring the strike illegal resulting in the loss of employment status of all of
the Union’s officers and its members, with a few exceptions. The Union filed a "Motion for Reconsideration or
Appeal" to the NLRC. PEPSI moved to dismiss on the ground that the Union failed to furnish it with a copy thereof —
a fatal omission amounting to non-perfection of the appeal. The NLRC granted the motion to dismiss, hence the
petition for review.
The Supreme Court held that the NLRC cannot be faulted in dismissing the Union’s appeal for its action was in
accordance with both the law and regulations: The evidence clearly showed that it failed to served/furnish a copy of
its appeal on PEPSI, the adverse party, a requirement embodied in Art. 223 of the Labor Code and Sec. 9, Rule XIII,
Book V of the Implementing Rules and Regulation cited in the resolution of the NLRC. It was held however, that
although the strike was declared illegal, there was absence of proof that the rank and file members of the Union who
participated therein deserve their loss of employment. Their sole membership in the union or their given authority to it
to strike, believing in good faith that it was their sole bargaining representative, did not make them liable if they did
not actually participate therein. The officers of the Union who staged the strike in defiance of the Med-Arbiter’s ruling
should be held solely responsible.
Petition granted. Private respondent ordered to reinstate persons whose names appear in Annex "A" of the decision
of the Executive Arbiter, except for the officers of the Union.
SYLLABUS
1. LABOR LAWS; LABOR DISPUTES; APPEAL FROM A DECISION OF THE LABOR ARBITER; FAILURE TO
FURNISH ADVERSE PARTY OF A COPY OF THE APPEAL, FATAL; CASE AT BAR. — We are bound by the
finding of the NLRC that, "A careful scrutiny of the appeal shows that the respondents-appellants failed to
serve/furnish a copy thereof on the adverse party which fact has further been ascertained thru the positive
asseveration of the complainant-appellee in its motion to dismiss the appeal." This being the case, NLRC cannot be
faulted in dismissing the UNION’s appeal for its action was in accordance with both the law and regulations.
2. ID.; STRIKES; MEMBERS OF STRIKING UNION LIABLE FOR ILLEGAL STRIKE ONLY IF THEY ACTUALLY
PARTICIPATED THEREIN; SETTLED RULE. — It is now settled "that a strike does not automatically carry the
stigma of illegality even if no unfair labor practice were committed by the employer. It suffices if such a belief in good
faith is entertained by labor as the inducing factor for staging a strike." (Maria Cristina Fertilizer Plant Employees,
Assn. v. Tandayag, G.R. No. L-292l7, May 31, 1966, 17 SCRA 332; Norton & Harrison Co. & Jackbuilt Concrete
Blocks Co. Labor Union v. Norton Harrison Co. & Jackbuilt Concrete Blocks Co., Inc., G.R. No. L-1846l, Feb. 10,
1967, 19 SCRA 310.) And it had also been held that the members of a union cannot be held responsible for an illegal
strike on the sole basis of such membership or even on account of their affirmative vote authorizing the same. They
become liable only if they actually participated therein. (ESSO Philippines. Inc. vs Malayang Manggagawa sa Esso
(MME), G.R. No. L-36545, January 26, 1977, 75 SCRA 73).
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ONLY OFFICERS OF THE UNION RESPONSIBLE IN CASE AT BAR. — In the case at bar, although
the strike was indeed illegal, We cannot discount the presence of good faith on the part of the rank and file members
of the UNION considering that in the certification election the UNION obtained 128 out of the 131 votes cast so that
they could justifiably consider it as their sole bargaining representative. Moreover, there is no proof that the members
of the UNION all participated in the illegal strike. The ones who deserve what Justice Barredo calls "capital
punishment" in the Esso Philippines case, are the officers of the UNION who staged the strike in defiance of the
ruling of the Med-Arbiter.
This is a petition to review the proceedings in Case No. 82-80 both before the Arbitration Branch, Regional Office No.
V, of the Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE) and the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), 3rd
Division.
In a resolution filed on August 17, 1981, by the NLRC, the appeal of Pepsi-Cola Labor Union, BFLU-Tupas, Local
Chapter No. 896 (UNION) in NLRC Case No. 82-80 was dismissed. The resolution reads as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"For Our consideration is an appeal filed by the respondents from the Decision, dated November 20, 1980 of the
Labor Arbiter below and a motion to dismiss the appeal filed by the complainant company.
"A careful scrutiny of the appeal shows that the respondents-appellants failed to serve/furnish a copy thereof on the
adverse party which fact has further been ascertained thru the positive asseveration of the complainant-appellee in
its motion to dismiss the appeal.
"The failure to serve/furnish a copy of the appeal is a fatal error, as it is in clear violation of Article 223 of the Labor
Code and Section 9, Rule XIII Book V of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code, as well as
Section 3, Rule IX of the Rules of this Commission.
"By analogous application, the failure to serve a copy of the appeal on the adverse party stands on the same footing
as an appeal filed outside the reglementary period (Broco, Et Al., v. CIR, Et Al., G.R. No. L-12367, October 29, 1959)
and that there is no decision of the Labor Arbiter that the respondents-appellants can bring to this Commission for
review. (NDC v. CIR No. L-15422, November 30, 1963). The dismissal of the appeal, therefore, is in order.
"WHEREFORE, let the appeal be, as it is hereby DISMISSED, for lack of merit."cralaw virtua1aw library
The petitioner UNION now claims that the above-quoted resolution (a) is contrary to the facts, (b) is contrary to the
law, (c) was issued under highly anomalous and suspicious circumstances, and (d) constitutes a grave abuse of
discretion.
The factual background is as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
On December 11, 1979, a certification election was held at the Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company’s (PEPSI) plant in Naga
City. Out of 131 votes which were cast, the UNION got 128 so it regarded itself as the sole and exclusive bargaining
unit. The losing labor group contested the election at various levels but it was unsuccessful. Its petition for review
was dismissed by this Court in a resolution dated June 11, 1980 (G.R. No. 51893, Pepsi-Cola Employees and
Workers Union [UOEF] Et. Al. v. Bureau of Labor Relations, etc.).
Meanwhile, on April 1, 1980, the UNION filed a notice of strike with MOLE’s Regional Office in Legaspi City on the
ground that PEPSI refused to bargain. PEPSI countered that it was willing to bargain but there was yet no final
decision on the appeal of the other labor union. On April 25, 1980, Med-Arbiter Antonio B. Caayao issued a
resolution with following dispositive portion:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, conformably with the foregoing, the Notice of Strike under consideration, being premature, is illegal
and should, therefore, be dismissed. Consequently, any strike staged by virtue of this Notice of Strike shall, likewise,
be deemed illegal."cralaw virtua1aw library
In disregard of the resolution, the UNION staged a strike on May 7, 1980. There are conflicting claims on the duration
of the strike. The UNION claims that it was only a one-day strike; PEPSI says the strike lasted for three days. At any
rate, a return to work order was issued on May 9, 1980.
On May 15, 1980, PEPSI filed a complaint for unfair labor practice and illegal strike. It was docketed as Case No. 82-
69
80. On November 20, 1980, Executive Labor Arbiter Lolito C. Fulleros rendered a decision which reads in part as
follows:chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
"On a question of law, the sole issue to be resolved is the legality of the respondents’ strike. Like in the Mead
Johnson Phil., Inc. case, the complainant submits that the larger question to be answered is how, in such a sensitive
and volatile area of national life as labor relations, the Government should react to naked defiance of its authority.
That the strike has been declared by the respondent union, its officers and members as listed in Annex "A" of the
complaint has been indubitably and substantially established as shown in those supporting documentary evidence
submitted marked as Annex "M" which is xerox copy of the letter of Mr. Amadeo S. Diaz, Acting President, Pepsi-
Cola Labor Union-BFLU-TUPAS dated May 7, 1980 to Col. Alejandro Aguirre, Provincial Commander, Province of
Camarines Sur; Annex "N", which is the xerox copy of the pleading filed by the respondents in Case No. 1204-80
pending before this Office more particularly paragraph 4 thereof which show respondents’ admission of the strike
they stage; Annex "O" which is the xerox copy of the return to work order of Med-Arbiter Antonio Caayao; Annex "P"
which is the xerox copy of the affidavit of Joseph Abiada, a member of the striking union; Annex "Q" which is the
xerox copy of the joint affidavits of Messrs. Ireneo Sta. Romana and Rodolfo Bagar; Annex "R" which is the affidavit
of Ismael Teves, Plant Manager of complainant firm in Naga City. The complainant contends that the strike staged
and declared by the respondents on May 7, 8 and 9, 1980 is patently illegal, citing the provisions pertinent to the
case at bar, Article 264 and 266 of the Labor Code. The petitioner apparently making references to the Mead
Johnson Phil., Inc. case argued ‘that on the day following the proclamation of Martial Law in this country, the
President of the Philippines, in order to restore the tranquility and stability of the nation in the quickest possible
manner, and to avoid occasions and actions that would cause hysteria or panic among the populace, or would
incense the people against their legitimate government, or would generate sympathy for the radical and lawless
elements, or would aggravate the already critical political and social turmoil ... prevailing throughout the land, issued
General Order No. 5 which strictly prohibited all rallies, demonstrations and other forms of group actions by persons
within the geographical limits of the Philippines, including strikes and picketing.’ That for a considerable time after the
issuance of General Order No. 5, the prevailing general impression was that strikes were banned in all industries
vital or not, so that, with the exception of sporadic and abortive groups actions in certain industrial establishments,
practically no strike was staged anywhere in the country. It was perhaps as an immediate reaction to sporadic and
abortive group actions in some industrial establishments and for other purposes intended to further stabilize industrial
peace in the country, that Presidential Decree No. 823 was promulgated which is now embodied as Article 264, 265,
266 and 267 of the Labor Code. That the ultimate aim of PD 823 is not different from that of General Order No. 5.
Thus, the decree’s preamble speaks among other things of the need for stabilizing labor-management relations and
industrial peace of factors essential to national security and to the purposeful pursuit of economic development and
social justice for all our people, as well as to protect the gains of the new society. PD 823 therefore is important for
the preservation no less of our institutions. It is an expression of the State’s desire to protect itself to sustain the
momentum of reform that it has launch for the general welfare, to preserve the gain it has so far won and to prevent
the recurrence of the chaotic situation that made imperative in the first place the declaration of Martial Law as an act
of self-defense on the part of the state. There could be no doubt that strikes are allowed in non-vital industries, but
only on the grounds of unresolved economic issues in collective bargaining and after having filed in the Bureau of
Labor Relations a notice of strike at least 30 days before its intended date, and there is no question that in this
instant case a notice of strike was filed on April 1, 1980, however, there could be no denying that the respondents
strike in the complainant’s firm is one that is prohibited by PD No. 823 as amended. That at the time the strike was
declared on May 7, 8 and 9, 1980, there was no collective bargaining negotiations between the parties. There could
have been therefore no unresolved economic issues in collective bargaining in the real sense and without bargaining
there could be no deadlock. And there was no bargaining precisely because there was a pending case relative to
representation. The Ministry of Labor has not yet certified who will represent the employees as the bargaining agent.
Respondents have miserably failed to show any iota of proof that they have been certified as the bargaining agent of
the complainant’s employees. The insistence that what respondents perpetuated on said dates was merely a walkout
and/or demonstration is such gratuitous and specious argument. In deed, there is no dispute as to the fact that the
respondent acting in concert, stopped their work in the morning of May 7, 1980 and picketed the company’s
premises and only tried to report upon receipt of the return to work order of Med-Arbiter Antonio Caayao.
Complainants argued that no amount of hair-splitting can change the fact that respondents’ walkout was in fact a
strike. Article 255 of the Labor Code defines the term strike as comprising not only concerted work stoppage, but
also showdowns, mass leaves, sitdowns, attempts to damage, destroy or sabotage plant equipment and facilities,
and similar activities. It even cited the law governing labor relations, Republic Act No. 875, which defines strike as
any temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action of employees as a result of industrial dispute. Indeed,
whatever name respondent may call are concerted activity against the complainant for on May 7, 8 and 9, 1980 was,
under the eyes of the law, a strike just the same. Complainant further submitted that the strike in question was not
the result of a spur of the moment, but was planned by the respondent union’s officers and members. The strikers
thus knew beforehand that they would be risking the consequences, including but not limited to lost of employee
status, by striking. That the strike therefore, was the result of mature deliberations among the officers and members
of the respondent union and was accordingly carried out by all the participating strikers, and that respondent union
and its members having precipitately immersed themselves into the course of action they have chosen to pursue, an
illegal strike, they have none but themselves to blame and they must and should therefore suffer the consequences
of their misadventure.
"It is essential to add that the complainant union (sic) was not really free to enter into a collective agreement
negotiations with the respondent union or to recognize it as the exclusive collective bargaining representative since
there is an intervenor in this case which is the UOEF affiliated to the Beverage Industry National Union which is one
of the contending unions for recognition in whose instance a petition for certiorari was filed and pending action with
the Supreme Court on November 16, 1979 docketed as G.R. 51893. This issue of non-recognition of the union and
the alleged refusal of the petitioner to negotiate a CBA with the respondents are so embodied in the resolution dated
April 25, 1980 of Med-Arbiter Antonio Caayao. In the same resolution, it is expressed that the petitioner was willing to
recognize and negotiate a bargaining agreement with whomsoever is certified by competent authority as the sole and
exclusive bargaining agent of the rank and file employees within the bargaining union of the respondent-company.
However, until such time that either of the competing unions is certified as such, respondent-company is not willing to
recognize and negotiate a bargaining agreement. Under the situation, the Commission in the case of PLUM versus
Union Carbide Phil., Inc., NLRC Case No. 4690-ULP, held that ‘strike declared by a contending union to compel
recognition when there is another union seeking also the right to be recognized is illegal and consequently subject
participating members to loss of employment status.’ There is no doubt, to our mind, that the strike was called
knowingly and in violation of an existing order. The striking union and its members have been fairly and justly
reminded by Med-Arbiter Antonio Caayao in its resolution after denying the notice of strike filed by the union and its
members it being premature and therefore illegal and that any strike staged by virtue of said notice shall likewise
deemed illegal. Whether or not this ruling has a binding effect compliance and respect of the order should have been
considered by the union and its striking members by not taking the law into their own hands. Strike and other
coersive acts are justified only when peaceful alternatives have proven unfruitful in settling the dispute. Striking for
recognition maybe recognized but certainly not while the union members were expressly warned by the proper
government entity not to pursue such course of action for reasons made known to them. Indeed, the Mead Johnson
Philippines, Inc., versus Mead Johnson Philippines, Inc. Employees Union, Et. Al. well illustrates the instant case
presenting certain facts and circumstances with striking similarity. From this, the petitioner did expound in propping
up and strengthening its claim that the strike staged by the respondents herein was beyond doubt illegal. We feel
convinced with the argument of the petitioner that the issue in the instant case does no merely rest on the legality of
the strike but ‘how the government should react to the naked defiance of its authority’.
"The Commission speaking through Commissioner Diego P. Atienza in the aforecited case, with seeming eloquence,
said:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
‘It is common knowledge that PD 823 has been violated many times. The government has so far been leaning over
backward in a spirit of accommodation. Perhaps the Decree has not been understood well enough by those to whom
its prescriptions are addressed; perhaps these strikes have been brought about by the heady, if mistaken, feeling
that the right to strike has been fully restored; perhaps these strikes, although many of them were manifestly illegal,
were well-meant and designed to achieve legitimate ends so that in another time, under a different situation, they
would have been perfectly legal. The Government, in any case, has been very liberal in dealing with them. An
unhealthy condition in industrial relations is developing as a result. It is now time to blow the whistle. It is time to
uphold the rule of law.’.
"Commissioner Cleto T. Villatuya of the NLRC in his concurring and dissenting opinion in the case cited above
eloquently stated, referring to the respondent, ‘that they did not, and this act amounts to an open defiance to the
government authority for which the respondents should not be permitted to defy with impunity. They have all chosen
to be collectively or solidarily liable for the group action and for which they should be held responsible for the
consequences of their illegal acts’.
"Commissioner Geronimo B. Quadra of the said Commission in his similar concurring opinion in the same case,
despite his being the representative for the labor sector in the said commission wisely stated: ‘Respondent union and
70
its members having precipitately immersed themselves into the course of action they have chosen to pursue, they
have none but themselves to blame, they must and should therefore suffer the consequences of their misadventure.’
"It should be noted that at the time the notice of strike was filed with the district office in Naga City, the union has not
been recognized yet as the certified bargaining representative. If ever there was, such was precisely being
questioned and pursued through legal means by the complainant company and that was precisely why the Med-
Arbiter denied or rather dismissed their notice of strike as premature because of the pending case between two
contending union. It was not after the Supreme Court, First Division, resolved to dismiss the petition for certiorari for
lack of merit, dated June 30, 1980 that BLR Director Carmelo C. Noriel finally certified PCLU-BFLU-TUPAS as the
exclusive bargaining representative of the employees of Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., Naga City per his order dated July
19, 1980. Mutual understanding and harmonious relationship as vital ingredients are not difficult to achieve by both
management and labor thru legal means. These the government encourages for otherwise it will risk becoming the
contributing factor for those who suffer the illusion of imagined invulnerability from a wrong and who ride on the
erroneous impression of indispensability as employees by sheltering themselves under the protective mantle of the
constitutional as well as the labor code provisions. Respondents herein ultimately employed with defiance ways and
means which did not justify the ends to be achieved to thrust themselves beyond the latter if not the spirit of the law.
If only to serve as a deterent and an example to other similarly situated it is indeed the opportune time for us to blow
the whistle.
"WHEREFORE, after serious and meticulous study of the evidence of both parties in this case and anchored on the
above-cited cases, we feel very strongly that the strike staged by the respondent union and its members on May 7, 8
and 9, 1980 in the premises of the petitioner Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of the Philippines, Inc. (Naga Plant) Naga City
was ILLEGAL and uncalled for and therefore all the officers and members of the Union whose names and positions
appear on Annex "A" of the complaint except Romulo Cal, Nilo Bariso and Mauro Nieto be considered to have lost
their employment status effective May 7, 1980. Those employees excepted should be allowed to return to work by
the petitioning company under the same terms and conditions of employment existing prior to May 7, 1980."cralaw
virtua1aw library
On December 8, 1980, the UNION filed a "MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OR APPEAL TO THE NLRC"
alleging that there was grave abuse of discretion, lack of jurisdiction, and contrary to the law and the facts. PEPSI
moved to dismiss on the ground that the UNION failed to furnish it a copy of the motion for reconsideration or appeal
- a fatal omission amounting to non-perfection of the appeal.
We are bound by the finding of the NLRC that, "A careful scrutiny of the appeal shows that the respondents-
appellants failed to serve/furnish a copy thereof on the adverse party which fact has further been ascertained thru the
positive asseveration of the complainant-appellee in its motion to dismiss the appeal." This being the case, NLRC
cannot be faulted in dismissing the UNION’s appeal for its action was in accordance with both the law and
regulations. (See Art. 223 of the Labor Code and Sec. 9, Rule XIII, Book V of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations cited in the resolution of the NLRC.)
However, We go deeper than sustaining the action of the NLRC in dismissing the appeal because We have been
asked to review not only the actuation of that agency but also that of the Labor Arbitrator who declared in his
decision that, "all the officers and members of the union whose names and positions appear on Annex "A" of the
complaint except Romulo Cal, Nilo Bariso and Mauro Nieto be considered to have lost their employment status
effective May 7, 1980."cralaw virtua1aw library
It is now settled "that a strike does not automatically carry the stigma of illegality even if no unfair labor practice were
committed by the employer. It suffices if such a belief in good faith is entertained by labor as the inducing factor for
staging a strike." (Maria Cristina Fertilizer Plant Employees, Assn. v. Tandayag, G.R. No. L-29217, May 11, 1978, 83
SCRA 56, 72. See also Ferrer v. CIR, G.R. No. L-24267, May 31, 1966, 17 SCRA 352; Norton & Harrison Co. &
Jackbuilt Concrete Blocks Co., Inc., G.R. No. L-18461, Feb. 10, 1967, 19 SCRA 310.) And it has also been held that
the members of a union cannot be held responsible for an illegal strike on the sole basis of such membership or even
on account of their affirmative vote authorizing the same. They become liable only if they actually participated
therein. (ESSO Philippines, Inc. v. Malayang Manggagawa sa ESSO (MME), G.R. No. L-36545, January 26, 1977,
75 SCRA 73.)
In the case at bar, although the strike was indeed illegal, We cannot discount the presence of good faith on the part
of the rank and file members of the UNION considering that in the certification election the UNION obtained 128 out
of the 131 votes cast so that they could justifiably consider it as their sole bargaining representative. Moreover, there
is no proof that the members of the UNION all participated in the illegal strike. The ones who deserve what Justice
Barredo calls "capital punishment" in the Esso Philippines case, supra, are the officers of the UNION who staged the
strike in defiance of the ruling of Med-Arbiter Caayao.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the private respondent is hereby ordered to reinstate all of those persons
whose names and positions appear in Annex "A" which is mentioned in the decision of the Executive Labor Arbiter
dated November 20, 1980, under the same terms and conditions of employment existing prior to May 7, 1980, except
for the officers of the UNION. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 106316 May 5, 1997
FIRST CITY INTERLINK TRANSPORTATION CO., INC., doing business under the name and style FIL
TRANSIT, Petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE SECRETARY MA. NIEVES ROLDAN-CONFESOR, in her capacity as
Secretary of Labor andEmployment, and NAGKAKAISANG MANGGAGAWA NG FIL TRANSIT-NATIONAL
FEDERATION OF LABOR (NMF-NFL), Respondents.
This is a petition for review on certiorari to set aside the order dated July 23, 1992 of the respondent Secretary of the
Department of Labor and Employment, ordering thepayment of backwages and separation pay to striking employees
of petitioner First City Interlink Transportation Co., Inc.
Petitioner First City Interlink Transportation Co., Inc., is a public utility corporation doing business under the name
and style Fil Transit. Respondent Nagkakaisang Manggagawa ng Fil Transit-National Federation of Labor (NM-NFL)
is a labor union composed of employees of Fil Transit.
On May 27, 1986, the Fil Transit Employees Union filed a notice of strike with the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR)
because of alleged unfair labor practice of petitioner. Despite several conciliation conferences, the parties failed to
reach an agreement, so that, on June 17, 1986, the Union went on strike. As a result several workers were
dismissed. The Union filed another notice of strike alleging unfair labor practice, massive dismissal of union officers
and members, coercion of employees and violation of workers' rights to self-organization. Conciliation conferences
were again held but, on July 27, 1986, the Union again went on strike, lifting their picket only on August 2, 1986.
On September 16, 1986, the then Minister of Labor and Employment, after assuming jurisdiction over the dispute
under Art. 264(g) and Art. 278(b) of the Labor Code, ordered -
(1) all striking employees including those who were dismissed prior to the June 17, 1986 strike to return to work
within forty-eight (48) hours from receipt of the order; and
(2) petitioner to accept all the returning employees under the same terms and conditions prevailing previous to the
dispute.
On September 22, 1986, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and later a supplemental motion for
reconsideration, contending that no strike vote had been obtained before the strike was called and the result of strike
vote was not reported to the Ministry of Labor and Employment. Its motion was, however, not acted upon for the
reason that petitioner had already brought the matter to this Court on certiorari, resulting in the issuance of a
temporary restraining order.
71
The petition for certiorari was denied and the temporary restraining order was lifted by this Court in its resolution
dated February 23, 1987. On November 24, 1987, the Department of Labor and Employment issued a writ of
execution, ordering the chief of the execution arm of the NLRC to cause the actual and physical return to work of all
striking employees, including those dismissed prior to the June 17, 1986 strike under the same terms and conditions
prevailing previous to the dispute, and to secure certification that the parties have complied with such return to work
order.
The Union then filed a motion for the award of backwages in the total amount of P1,364,800.00 for the period
December 9, 1987 up to February 9, 1988 and for the issuance of a writ of execution.
On March 23, 1988, the Sheriff reported in his return that only 66 employees reported back to work and were
accepted by petitioner on condition that they submit certain requirements.
On May 15, 1990 the Secretary of Labor issued the order awarding backwages and the corresponding writ of
execution as follows:
Considering the unreasonable stance adopted by Fil Transit, Inc., vis-a-vis the implementation of the return to work
order, and the consequent denial to the workers of their means of livelihood, this office is inclined to grant the union's
prayer for backwages computed from the time the Writ of Execution was first served upon the company. We demur,
however, to the amount of P1,364,800.00 backwages as computed by the union. This is a matter which is best
discussed and maybe the subject of later proceedings. In the meantime, our paramount concern is the readmission
of the workers to forestall further economic suffering arising from their loss income.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the management of Fil Transit, Inc. is ordered to comply strictly with the
return to work directive dated September 16, 1986, as sought to be implemented by the writ of execution of
November 24, 1987. The list of employees attached to the aforementioned writ is hereby adopted en toto as the sole
basis for management's compliance. . . . 1
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration but its motion was denied. In his order dated August 27, 1991, the Secretary
of Labor ruled:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED.
The Fil Transit, Inc. and Fil Transit Employees Union NFL are hereby directed to file their position papers and
evidence with this office, within fifteen (15) days from receipt hereof, on the following issues, to wit:
(a) Amount of backwages due to the workers covered by the Return to Work Order of September 16, 1986 using as
basis therefore the list attached to the writ of execution;
(b) the issues identified in the Assumption Order of September 16, 1986, to wit;
(1) Alleged unfair labor practices, harassment, coercion, violation of worker's right to self-organization, alleged non-
payment of ECOLA.
(2) Validity of fines and suspensions;
(3) Validity of charge of wage distortion.
The Order dated 15 May 1990, calling for the compliance with the return to work directive of September 16, 1986 is
hereby AFFIRMED.
No further motions of this same nature shall be entertained. 2
Petitioner questioned the order in a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus filed with this Court which,
however, dismissed the petition on September 23, 1991, for lack of showing that the Secretary of Labor committed a
grave abuse of discretion in rendering the questioned order. 3
Thereafter, respondent Union submitted its position paper on October 30, 1991 and asked the Secretary of Labor.
1. To declare respondent company guilty of unfair labor practice for its continuous defiance of the return to work
Order issued by the Department of Labor and Employment.
2. To pay complainant backwages from the time they were refused of their reinstatement last 1986.
3. To pay individual complainants their separation pay, in lieu of reinstatement considering that complainants are no
longer interested to go back to Fil Transit.
4. To pay complainant union attorney's fees . . .
On the other hand, petitioner First City Interlink Transportation Co., Inc. asked that:
1. The Order of 27th August 1991, be amended, to include, among the issues the question of the legality or illegality
of the strike;
2. Respondent be given an extension of thirty (30) days from today within which to file its position paper;
3. That after the parties shall have submitted their respective position papers the case be set for hearing to afford the
respondent the opportunity to cross examine the supposed complainants.
Petitioner asked for another extension of the time for submitting its position paper that as of the date of respondent's
questioned order of July 23, 1992, it had not yet submitted its paper. Without waiting for the paper, the Secretary of
Labor ruled the strike of the Union legal and awarded backwages and separation pay to the strikers. The dispositive
portion of her decision, dated July 23, 1992, states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Fil Transit Co., Inc., is hereby ordered to pay the dismissed striking employees
the following:
1. Backwages for three (3) years without qualification and deduction and;
2. Separation pay equivalent to one-half month pay for every year of service in lieu of reinstatement, the date of this
office's order as the cut-off date.
The Director, Bureau of Working Conditions (BWC), this Department, is hereby directed to immediately compute the
monetary award, as ordered, which computation shall form part of this order.
Hence, this second petition questioning the grove order.
The petitioner contends that:
1. The Honorable Respondent Secretary of Labor erred in declaring the strike legal;
2. The strikers, having engaged in violent, illegal and criminal acts, have lost their employment status;
3. The Honorable Secretary erred in declaring that management refused to comply with the Return to Work Order;
4. The Honorable Secretary erred in disregarding the report of the sheriff.
5. The striking employees are not entitled to backwages;
6. Assuming that backwages could properly be awarded, there was no basis for the amount fixed by the Secretary of
Labor.
72
7. The judgment against Fil Transit is null and void.
First. Petitioner's main contention is that the strike called by the Union was illegal. Pursuant to Art. 263(c)(f) of the
Labor Code, the requisites for a valid strike are as follows:
(1) a notice of strike filed with the Department of Labor at least 30 days before the intended date thereof or 15 days
in case of unfair labor practice;
(2) strike vote approved by a majority of the total union membership in the bargaining unit concerned, obtained by
secret ballot in a meeting called for that purpose;
(3) notice given to the Department of Labor and Employment of the results of the voting at least 7 days before the
intended strike.
These requirements are mandatory. 4
Petitioner contends that the strike staged by the Union was illegal because no strike vote had been taken before the
strike was called. This matter was raised by petitioner before the Secretary of Labor and now in this petition.
However, in none of the numerous pleadings filed by respondent Union before this Court, has it been shown that a
strike vote had been taken before declaring a strike. As between petitioner and respondent Union, the latter is in a
better position to present proof of such fact. The Union's failure to do so raises the strong probability that there was
no strike vote taken. The first and only instance it is mentioned that such a vote had been taken before the strike was
called was in the order dated July 23, 1992 of the Secretary of Labor in which she stated:
. . . the records show that a notice of strike was filed by the union with the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) on May
27, 1986, and after a failure of several conciliation conferences due to management's consistent refusal to appear,
the union went on strike on June 17, 1986, after a strike vote was obtained. 5(Emphasis added)
But the Secretary of Labor did not indicate the basis for her statement nor the date the strike vote was allegedly
taken. Neither did she mention whether her office had been notified of the strike vote as required by law.
For that matter the statement in the same order that a notice of strike had been filed because several conciliation
conferences failed "due to management's consistent refusal to appear" is contrary to evidence in the record.
Annexes E and F of the petition show that management was duly represented during the conciliation proceeding
prior to the strike on June 17, 1986. Annex G likewise shows that at the conciliation conference held on July 17,
1986, management actively participated, contrary to the statement in the order of the Secretary of Labor that the
failure of the second set of conciliation conferences was due to management's refusal to attend.
Moreover, even assuming that a strike vote had been taken, we agree with petitioner that the Union nevertheless
failed to observe the required seven-day strike ban from the date the strike vote should have been reported to the
DOLE up to the time the Union staged the strike on June 17, 1986. As petitioner contends:
It must be noted in this regard that as shown in the minutes of conciliation conferences (Annex "F"), the parties met
in a conciliation conference on June 13, 1986, four (4) days before the June 17, 1986 strike. So even if it is conceded
that a strike vote was taken, there would have been non-compliance with the requisite cooling off period and the 7-
day strike ban for the simple reason that between June 13, 1986, the day the parties met for conciliation conference
and June 17, 1986, the day of the strike, there were only four (4) days. 6
It is nonetheless contended by the Solicitor General that "[a] strike inspired by good faith is not illegal simply because
certain requirements were not followed," citing the case of Ferrer v. CIR. 7 The contention has no merit. In Ferrer, the
strikers failed to observe the 30-day cooling off period, but this Court found the strike legal because of the strikers'
belief in good faith that the employer committed unfair labor practice. But, in the case at bar, what is lacking is the
strike vote which should have been reported to the DOLE seven days before staging the strike. The importance of
the strike vote and reporting of the results to the DOLE cannot be gainsaid as it is the Union itself that the law seeks
to protect by ensuring that the majority of its members voted in favor of the strike. As held in National Federation of
Sugar Workers (NFSW) v. Ovejera: 8
When the law says "the labor union may strike" should the dispute "domain unsettled until the lapse of the requisite
number of days (cooling-off period) from the mandatory filing of the notice," the unmistakeable implication is that the
union may not strike before the lapse of the cooling-off period. Similarly, the mandatory character of the 7-day strike
ban after the report on the strike-vote is manifest in the provision that "in any case," the union shall furnish the MOLE
with the results of the voting "at least seven (7) days before the intended strike, subject to the (prescribed) cooling-off
period. "It must be stressed that the requirements of cooling-off period and 7-day strike ban must both be complied
with, although the labor union may take a strike vote and report the same within the statutory cooling-off period.
Moreover, petitioner is right that good faith can not be invoked by the Union in the case.
As the records will bear out, the private respondent had clearly acted in bad faith when it went on strike.
Annex "F" of the petition (June 13, 1986 Minutes of Conciliation Proceedings) attached to the records of the case,
shows that at the time the strike was staged, conciliation meetings were going on. In fact, said Annex "F" reveals that
the parties met in a conciliation meeting on June 13, 1986 and agreed to meet further on June 17, 1986 at 2:00 P.M.
(Please see Annex "F"). Instead of meeting with petitioner on the scheduled conciliation meeting on June 17, 1986
as agreed upon, private respondent went on strike. Certainly, this act of the private respondent cannot be
characterized as having been made in good faith.9
Indeed, there is no finding in this case that petitioner was guilty of the alleged unfair labor practices as charged by
the Union. The award of backwages and separation pay was based solely on the alleged refusal of petitioner to
comply with the Return to Work Order - an issue which will be discussed in the latter part of this decision. Hence, the
ruling in Ferrer v. CIR - that the strike staged before the expiration of the 30-day cooling off period is not illegal
because of what the strikers perceived in good faith to be unfair labor practices of the employer - does not apply.
Second. Petitioner contends that the strikers, having engaged in violent, illegal, and criminal acts, have lost their
employment status. The Labor Code considers the commission of these acts a "prohibited activity" 10 and any worker
or union officer, who knowingly participates in their commission during a strike, may be declared to have lost his
employment status.
Respondent Secretary held that responsibility for such acts should be individual and not collective. In her questioned
order of July 23, 1992, she stated:
It is contended, by the Company, that several acts of violence were allegedly committed by former employees of the
company during the strike. However, in the absence of clear proof that the strikers committed the same by design or
policy, only those strikers who committed illegal acts could be held personally responsible therefor. To our mind, a
wholesale dismissal of the strikers from their employment on the basis that the strike was attended by violence, is not
warranted in the case at bar. As held by the Supreme Court in the case ofFEATI Faculty Club v. FEAU University, et
al.; G.R. NO. L-31504, to wit:
Not every form of violence suffices to affix the seal of illegality on a strike as to cause the loss of employment of the
guilty party. Where acts of violence while the strike lasts are sporadic and not pervasive by design and policy,
responsibility therefore is individual and not collective. 11
Contrary to respondent Secretary's finding, the strike declared by the Union was attended by pervasive and
widespread violence. The acts of violence committed were not mere isolated incidents which could normally occur
during any strike. The hijacking of Fil-Transit Bus No. 148 at the intersection of EDSA and Quezon Avenue on
Sunday, July 27, 1986, three days before the scheduled conciliation conference, reveals that it was staged in
pursuance of a preconceived plan. This was followed by the barricading of the terminal in Alabang by means of five
buses which had also been hijacked. In the days that followed, the strikers persisted in their violent acts, (1) the
hijacking of 26 more buses which resulted in injuries to some employees and panic to the commuters; (2) the
puncturing of tires; (3) the cutting of electric wirings, water hoses and fan belts; and (4) the alleged theft of expensive
equipment such as fuel injections worth P30,000 each. The commission of these illegal acts was neither isolated nor
accidental but deliberately employed to intimidate and harass the employer and the public. The strikers even
resorted to the use of molotov bombs which were thrown into the petitioner's compound.
73
Nevertheless, we are constrained to uphold the respondent Secretary's ruling that responsibility for these illegal acts
must be on an individual and not collective basis. Therefore, although the strike was illegal because of the
commission of illegal acts, only the union officers and strikers who engaged in violent, illegal and criminal acts
against the employer are deemed to have lost their employment status. Union members who were merely instigated
to participate in the illegal strike should be treated differently. 12
Third. As already noted, respondent Secretary awarded backwages on the ground that petitioner had refused to
comply with the Return to Work Order of September 16, 1986.
Petitioner explains that its failure to immediately reinstate the employees was due to the Union's insistence on the
reinstatement of even those who had been dismissed for cause and had been dismissed even before the strike held
on June 17, 1986. Moreover, by the time the respondent Secretary issued the questioned order of July 23, 1992,
petitioner had already complied with the Return to Work Order. Out of the approximately 160 employees included in
the Return to Work Order of the Secretary of Labor, 66 employees had been admitted back to work. The rest were
not readmitted to work because they simply did not return on March 8, 1988, the date agreed upon by the parties.
On the other hand, the Union contends that petitioner imposed certain requirements as condition for reinstatement
which amounted to a refusal to comply with the Return to Work Order. These were:
1. Cash of P1,000.00
2. X-Ray, urinalysis and stool results
3. Birth Certificate/Baptismal
4. NBI Clearance
5. Police Clearance
6. Barangay Clearance
7. Residence Certificate
8. High School Diploma/Transcript of records
9. Certification of employment
10. Driver's/Conductors/Conductresses license
11. Marriage Contract (If married)
12. Pictures 4 1x1 - colored
13. Pictures 4 2x2 - black and white
Some requirements are indeed unreasonable considering that the strikers were not being hired for the first time but
merely being reinstated. Reinstatement connotes a continuity of the employer-employee relationship as contrasted to
an initial employment. Hence, a distinction must be made between requirements which are valid management
prerogatives and those which are unreasonable.
On the other hand, there are certain conditions which are valid. The requirement to submit NBI, Police and Barangay
clearances is reasonable to enable management to determine whether the returning employees have pending
charges of illegal acts especially those committed during the strike. So also is the requirement to have driver's and
conductor's/conductress' license, to enable them to perform their tasks. The pictures required are necessary for the
employer's personnel records and so can validly be required.
With respect to the required medical examination, the same can be justified as management prerogative since it is
the employer's right to ensure that the employees are physically fit to resume the performance of their duties. This is
especially true in this case, because two years had elapsed since the time of dismissal of the employees. As held
in Jackbilt Concrete Block Co., Inc. v. Norton & Harrison Co., 13 an employer should not be compelled to reinstate an
employee who is no longer physically fit for the job from which he was ousted.
It is true that in Davao Free Workers Front v. CIR, 14 it was held that the medical examination could not be required
as a condition for reinstatement, but that is in cases where the employer is guilty of unfair labor practice. As this
Court explained:
To require [employees] to undergo a physical or medical examination as a precondition of reinstatement or return to
work simply because of the long pendency of their case which is due to no fault of theirs would not only defeat the
purpose of the law and the constitutional and statutory mandates to protect labor but would work to their unfair
prejudice as aggrieved parties and give an undue advantage to employers as the offenders who have the means and
resources to wage attrition and withstand the bane of protracted litigation.
Hence, the aggrieved workers may be subject to periodic physical or medical examination as old reinstated workers,
but not as a precondition to their reinstatement or return to work with the important consequence that if they are
found to be ill or suffering from some disability, they would be entitled to all the benefits that the laws and company
practices provide by way of compensation, medical care, disability benefits and gratuities, etc. to employees and
workers. 15
In the present case, although the Union has charged petitioner with unfair labor practice, the matter is still to be
resolved. Hence, the ruling in Davao Free Workers Front v. CIR 16does not apply.
With respect to some of the requirements (i.e., P1,000, cash bond, birth/baptismal certificate, residence certificate,
high school diploma/transcript of records, certification of employment, and marriage contract), we agree with
respondent Union that these requirements cannot be imposed being more appropriate for employees who are being
hired for the first time. However, the imposition of such requirements by the employer did not amount to a refusal to
admit workers back to work or an illegal lock-out so as to entitle the workers to the payment of backwages under Art.
264(g) of the Local Code, the pertinent portion of which states:
. . . For this purpose, the contending parties are strictly enjoined to comply with such orders, prohibitions or
injunctions as are issued by the Secretary of Labor and Employment or the Commission, under pain of immediate
disciplinary action, including dismissal or loss of employment status or payment by the locking-out employer of
backwages, damages and other affirmative relief, even criminal prosecution against either or both of them. . .
For the fact is that petitioner after all accepted all returning employees. If there were workers who were not taken in,
they were those who did not return to work on March 8, 1988.
In the Sheriff's Return dated March 23, 1988, Antonio P. Soriano, Deputy Sheriff, reported:
1. That on 01 March 1988, as per appointment, undersigned together with a number of returning employees went to
the company (FIL TRANSIT, INC.,) to discuss the final details of the implementation of the Order. The parties sat
down with Mr. Virgilio M. Aquino, who represented Management. After a while and upon suggestion of said Mr.
Aquino, parties agreed that the employee will return on 08 March 1988, where the returning employee duly covered
by and qualified under the Order shall report for work with Management reiterating its willingness to comply strictly
with the said Order of this Honorable Office;
2. . . . However, it appearing [sic] that only sixty-six (66) employees reported back for work, as evidenced in the
yellow pad showing the names and their corresponding signatures. Acting on the same, Management accepted the
returning employees. . . 17
xxx xxx xxx
From the foregoing, undersigned is of the opinion that the Order has been complied with upon completion of the
above-requirements being requested by Management. . . .
In Jackbilt Concrete Block Co., Inc., v. Norton & Harrison Co., 18 the unjustified refusal of the striking employees to
return to work and comply with the employer's requirement to undergo a medical examination was considered a
waiver of their right to reinstatement.
Consequently, petitioner is not liable for backwages. Employees, who are not guilty of illegal acts and, therefore, are
entitled to reinstatement would only be entitled to backwages if they were refused readmission. As none of such
employees was refused readmission, no backwages are due from petitioner. On the other hand, employees who are
entitled to be reinstated because they did not take part in illegal acts would be entitled to separation pay in lieu of
74
reinstatement in view of the fact that, after all the time that this case has been pending, reinstatement is no longer
feasible. Separation pay should be computed only up to March 8, 1988, the date when employees were supposed to
return as agreed upon by the parties. Those who failed to return on March 8, 1988, will not be entitled to separation
pay after such date.
In view of the conclusion thus far reached, we find it unnecessary to discuss the other questions raised in this case.
To summarize, this Court holds that:
1) The respondent Secretary of Labor erred in declaring the strike legal. There is no evidence to show that a strike
vote had in fact been taken before a strike was called. Even assuming that a strike vote had been taken, the strike
called by the Union was illegal because of nonobservance by the Union of the mandatory seven-day strike ban
counted from the date the strike vote should have been reported to the Department of Labor and Employment up to
the time the Union staged the strike on June 17, 1986. In accordance with Art. 264 of the Labor Code, any union
officer who knowingly participated in the illegal strike is deemed to have lost his employment status.
2) The commission of the illegal acts during the strike rendered it illegal. However, only officers and leaders of the
Union and workers guilty of illegal acts are liable. Such employees are deemed to have lost their employment status
in accordance with Art. 264 of the Labor Code.
3) Petitioner substantially complied with the Return to Work Order. The medical examination, NBI, Police and
Barangay Clearances as well as the driver's and conductor's/conductress licenses and photographs required as
conditions for reinstatement were reasonable management prerogatives. However, the other requirements imposed
as condition for reinstatement were unreasonable considering that the employees were not being hired for the first
time, although the imposition of such requirements did not amount to refusal on the part of the employer to comply
with the Return to Work Order or constitute illegal lockout so as to warrant payment of backwages to the strikers. If at
all, it is the employees' refusal to return to work that may be deemed a refusal to comply with the Return to Work
Order resulting in loss of their employment status. As both the employer and the employees were, in a sense, at fault
or in pari delicto, the nonreturning employees, provided they did not participate in illegal acts; should be considered
entitled to reinstatement. But since reinstatement is no longer feasible, they should be given separation pay
computed up to March 8, 1988 (the date set for the return of the employees) in lieu of reinstatement.
4) Because the award of backwages was based on the alleged refusal of the employer to comply with the Return to
Work Older, the same should be set aside for being without basis.
WHEREFORE, the questioned order of respondent Secretary of Labor is SET ASIDE. The union officers who
participated in the illegal strike and those who participated in the commission of illegal acts are deemed to have lost
their employment status. Petitioner is ORDERED to pay the employees who did not participate in the commission of
illegal acts during the strike separation pay.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-2660. May 30, 1950.]
LUZON MARINE DEPARTMENT UNION, Petitioner, v. ARSENIO C. ROLDAN, JUAN L. LANTING and
MODESTO CASTILLO judges of Court of Industrial Relations, LUZON STEVEDORING CO., INC. UNION DE
OBREROS ESTIVADORES DE FILIPINAS, and UNIVERSAL MARINE UNION,Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. EMPLOYERS AND LABORERS; STRIKERS AND LOCKOUTS, LAW DOES NOT LOOK WITH FAVOR UPON. —
The law does not look with favor upon strikes and lockouts because of their disturbing and pernicious effects upon
the social order and the public interests; to prevent or avert them and to implement section 6, Article XIV of the
Constitution, the law has created several agencies, namely: the Bureau of Labor, theDepartment of Labor, the Labor-
Management Advisory Board, and the Court of Industrial Relations.
2. ID.; STRIKE; WHEN COURT WILL DECLARE IT ILLEGAL. — The law does not expressly ban strikes except
when enjoined against by the court; but if a strike ia declared for a trivial, unjust or unreasonable purpose, or if it is
carried out through unlawful means, the law will not sanction it and the court will declare it illegal, with the adverse
consequences to the strikers.
3. ID.; ID.; DECLARED AT STRIKERS’ OWN RISK. — If the laborers resort to a strike to enforce their demands,
instead of resorting first to the legal processes provided by law, they do so at their own risk, because the dispute will
necessarily reach the court and, if the latter should find that the strike was unjustified the strikers would suffer the
adverse consequences.
This petition for certiorari to review a resolution of the Court of Industrial Relations raises the question of the legality
of a strike declared by the petitioner during the pendency of its petition for the settlement of an industrial dispute
before the Court of Industrial Relations.
The facts out of which the question arose are briefly as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
On June 17, 1948, the petitioner, which is a duly registered labor union, presented to the respondent Luzon
Stevedoring Company, Inc. a petition containing twelve demands, among which was that it be granted full recognition
"with the right to collective bargaining, closed-shop and check-off." On June 21, 1948, said petitioner initiated the
present proceeding in the Court of Industrial Relations by filing a petition therein, praying that the respondent
company be directed "to comply immediately with all the demands embodied in the aforesaid petition."cralaw
virtua1aw library
The Union de Obreros Estivadores de Filipinas (U.O.E.F.) a labor organization claiming some 75,000 members,
divided into units or committees, one of which is the Universal Marine Union, intervened on behalf of the latter for the
reason that the demand of the petitioner for recognition with the right to collective bargaining, closed-shop, etc.,
would violate an agreement entered into between the respondent company and the said U.O.E.F. in the early part of
1947, whereby the said company recognized the U.O.E.F. "as the labor organization of the workers rendering
services to the Luzon Stevedoring Company, Inc., with full right for collective bargaining, and that no person or
persons must be hired by the company unless he or they are bona fide members of the Union."cralaw virtua1aw
library
The intervenor U.O.E.F. moved for the dismissal of the petition for lack of jurisdiction, on the ground that the
petitioner did not count with more than thirty members employed by the respondent company. The petition for
dismissal was duly heard and the parties adduced evidence on the question of jurisdiction on July 7, 10, and 12,
1948. On July 19, 1948, Judge Jose S. Bautista issued an order denying the motion to dismiss and declaring that the
court had jurisdiction over the case. Before receipt of notice of said order, 65 alleged members of the petitioner failed
to report for work on the morning of July 19, 1948, without previously notifying the respondent of the cause of their
absence. The foreman of the Towing Department of the respondent requested the U.O.E.F. to furnish men who
could take the places of the absent ones, and that request was promptly complied. It was only at 8:15 a. m. on July
21, 1948, that the general manager of the respondent company received by mail a notice from the petitioner that the
said 65 men struck on July 19, 1948, at 6 a. m.
On July 20, 1948, the petitioner filed with the Court of Industrial Relations a petition alleging that all members of
petitioner, numbering more than 300, went on strike at 6 a. m. on July 19 due to the refusal of the respondent
company to grant their demands or to negotiate with them and "the challenge flung to them that there are not more
than thirty members of the petitioning union employed by the respondent company," and praying for the issuance of
a restraining order to prevent the respondent from employing strike breakers. The respondent company and the
intervenor U.O.E.F. filed their respective oppositions to that petition.
On August 16, 1948, Associate Judge Jose S. Bautista issued an order directing the strikers to return to work
75
immediately and the respondent company to reinstate them in the positions they were occupying before the strike.
The intervenor and the respondent company immediately filed a motion for the reconsideration of the order, and the
court sitting in banc, with the dissent of Judge Bautista, set said order aside on the ground that the strike was
unjustified and illegal.
The opinion of the Court, penned by Associate Judge Lanting and concurred in by Presiding Judge Roldan and
Associate Judge Castillo, held: Although section 19 of Commonwealth Act No. 103 provides that, pending award or
decision by the Court of Industrial Relations, the employee, tenant or laborer shall not strike or walk out of his
employment when so enjoined by the Court, and although the Court had not enjoined the petitioner not to strike, it
does not necessarily follow that the strike was legal and justified. In the case of Rex Taxicab Company v. Court of
Industrial Relations (70 Phil., 621), wherein this Supreme Court held that "the employee, tenant or laborer is inhibited
from striking or walking out of his employment only when so enjoined by the Court of Industrial Relations," it was also
held that "in cases not falling within the prohibition, the legality or illegality of a strike depends, first, upon the purpose
for which it is maintained, and, second, upon the means employed in carrying it on." And in the case of Manila
Trading and Supply Company v. Philippine Labor Union (71 Phil., 124), the Supreme Court further held that "the right
of the employees, tenants or laborers to be continued in the service under the last terms and conditions existing
before the dispute arose carries with it the corresponding obligation on their part not to strike or walk out of their
employment, or to return to it if they have already done so." Conformably to these principles the Supreme Court, in
the case of National Labor Union, Inc. v. Philippine Match Company, (70 Phil., 300), declared illegal and unjustified a
strike motivated by an unreasonable demand of the labor union for the dismissal of a factory foreman. In that case
the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Moran, held that although Commonwealth Act No. 103 recognizes, in a
negative way, the laborers’ right to strike, it also creates all the means by which a resort thereto may be avoided,
"because a strike is a remedy essentially coercive in character and general in its disturbing effects upon the social
order and the public interests" ; that "as the strike is an economic weapon at war with the policy of the Constitution
and the law, a resort thereto by laborers shall be deemed to be a choice of a remedy peculiarly their own, and
outside of the statute, and, as such, the strikers must accept all the risks attendant upon their choice" ; and that when
the petitioners declared a strike even before the outcome of the investigation by the company of their complaint
against the factory foreman was announced, "and without previously having resorted to any of the pacific means
provided by law, they acted unreasonably, and the law cannot interpose its hand to protect them from the
consequences of their behavior. Their cessation from their employment as a result of such an unjustified strike is one
of such consequences which they must take by the choice of a remedy of their own, outside of the statute.."
The Court of Industrial Relations found from the testimony of Ciriaco C. Sarmiento, president of the petitioning union,
that his men went on strike because "the opposite party claims or asserts that we have no members inside the
company, and because the members of the union were becoming impatient to wait for the decision of the court, and
they are in suspense - they are doubting." From this, the Court concluded, that the purpose of the strike was to
influence the decision and to compel the Court to decide the question promptly. According to the Court, "it was an
unwarranted interference with the ordinary processes of law and cannot be tolerated because it tends to destroy the
confidence of the public in the machinery instituted by the Government for the orderly solution of industrial disputes."
Applying the rulings laid down by this Court in the cases above stated, the Court of Industrial Relations declared the
strike in question illegal.
Counsel for the petitioner insist before this Court that the strike in question was called for a lawful purpose. They
contend that the evidence clearly shows that the members of the petitioning union struck "in order to show the
company and the U. O. E. F. that they had more than thirty members, and due to the threats of Alejo Villanueva, who
threatened to dismiss the laborers from the company." Thus, according to the petitioner, the strike was motivated (1)
by the desire of the strikers to show the company and the U. O. E. F. that they were more than thirty in number, and
(2) by the threat of Alejo Villanueva to dismiss them from the company.
In our opinion, neither of these motives nor both of them justified such a drastic measure as a strike, which
necessarily entails pernicious consequences not only to the company but also to the laborers themselves and the
public. It was of no avail to the petitioner to strike to show to the company and the intervenor U. O. E. F. that the
petitioner had more than thirty members, because the question of whether or not the petitioner had more than thirty
members employed in the service of the company was at that time sub judice, both parties having submitted
evidence before the court to prove their respective contentions, and the company had the right to wait for the
decision of the court upon the evidence adduced before it. As the lower court correctly observed, "the only
permissible way to prove an allegation and to influence the decision of the court is to adduce evidence in the regular
course of the proceedings." The second motive, referring to the alleged threat of dismissal by Alejo Villanueva, is
likewise trivial and puerile. Villanueva was not an officer or employee of the respondent company, and the petitioner
knew that he had no power or authority to dismiss any of the company’s employees. He was merely an officer of the
intervenor U. O. E. F. Indeed, we venture to say, that even if the threat had been made by an officer of the
respondent company, the petitioner would not have been justified thereby to declare a strike because the petitioner
knew that under the law, during the pendency of an industrial dispute before the Court of Industrial Relations, the
employer cannot lay off, and much less dismiss, the petitioning employees without the permission of the Court.
Counsel contend "that there is no provision of law, decision, ruling or doctrine which provides that a strike called for
such a purpose is against the law." We have adverted to the ruling of this Court in Rex Taxicab Company v. Court of
Industrial Relations, supra, that in cases not falling within the prohibition against strikes, the legality or illegality of a
strike depends, first, upon the purpose for which it is maintained, and, second, upon the means employed in carrying
it on. Thus, if the purpose which the laborers intend to accomplish by means of a strike is trivial, unreasonable or
unjust (as in the case of the National Labor Union, Inc. v. Philippine Match Company, supra), or if in carrying on the
strike the strikers should commit violence or cause injuries to persons or damage to property (as in the case of
National Labor Union, Inc. v. Court of Industrial Relations and Manila Gas Corporation, 68 Phil., 732), the strike,
although not prohibited by injunction, may be declared by the court illegal, with the adverse consequences to the
strikers.
To summarize, the rulings of this Court in the cases hereinabove cited are:.
(1) The law does not look with favor upon strikes and lockouts because of their disturbing and pernicious effects
upon the social order and the public interests; to prevent or avert them and to implement section 6, Article XIV of the
Constitution, the law has created several agencies, namely: the Bureau of Labor, the Department of Labor, the
Labor-Management Advisory Board, and the Court of Industrial Relations. (See sec. 4, Commonwealth Act No. 103;
and Executive Order No. 158, dated July 28, 1948.) (2) The law does not expressly ban strikes except when enjoined
against by the court; but if a strike is declared for a trivial, unjust or unreasonable purpose, or if it is carried out
through unlawful means, the law will not sanction it and the court will declare it illegal, with the adverse
consequences to the strikers. (3) If the laborers resort to a strike to enforce their demands, instead of resorting first to
the legal processes provided by law, they do so at their own risk, because the dispute will necessarily reach the court
and, if the latter should find that the strike was unjustified, the strikers would suffer the adverse consequences.
The Court of Industrial Relations has merely applied to this case the settled doctrines of this Court as above
summarized. We reaffirm those doctrines and must, consequently, sustain the resolution complained of.
We do not deem it necessary to decide the two collateral issues raised by counsel for petitioner in their
memorandum, namely: (1) whether or not the business of the respondent company is coupled with public interest;
and (2) whether or not the closed-shop agreement between the respondent company and the U. O. E. F. is valid,
legal and binding. These questions do not affect the main issue of the illegality of the strike in question.
The resolution appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the petitioner.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 92009 February 17, 1993
MASTER IRON LABOR UNION (MILU), WILFREDO ABULENCIA, ROGELIO CABANA, LOPITO SARANILLA,
JESUS MOISES, BASILIO DELA CRUZ, EDGAR ARANES, ELY BORROMEO, DANIEL BACOLON, MATIAS
PAJIMULA, RESTITUTO PAYABYAB, MELCHOR BOSE, TEOFILO ANTOLIN, ROBERT ASPURIA, JUSTINO
BOTOR, ALFREDO FABROS, AGAPITO TABIOS, BENARDO ALFON, BENIGNO BARCENA, BERNARDO
NAVARRO, MOISES LABRADOR, ERNESTO DELA CRUZ, EDUARDO ESPIRITU, IGNACIO PAGTAMA,
BAYANI PEREZ, SIMPLICIO PUASO, EDWIN VELARDE, BEATO ABOGADO, DANILO SAN ANTONIO,
BERMESI BORROMEO, and JOSE BORROMEO, Petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
and MASTER IRON WORKS AND CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, Respondents.
76

MELO, J.:
The petition for certiorari before us seeks to annul and to set aside the decision of the National Labor Relations
Commission (Second Division) dated July 12, 1986 which affirmed that of Labor Arbiter Fernando V. Cinco declaring
illegal the strike staged by petitioners and terminating the employment of the individual
petitioners.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The Master Iron Works Construction Corporation (Corporation for brevity) is a duly organized corporate entity
engaged in steel fabrication and other related business activities. Sometime in February 1987, the Master Iron Labor
Union (MILU) entered into a collective barganing agreement (CBA) with the Corporation for the three-year period
between December 1, 1986 and November 30, 1989 (Rollo, p. 7). Pertinent provisions of the CBA state:
Sec. 1. That there shall be no strike and no lockout, stoppage or shutdown of work, or any other interference with
any of the operation of the COMPANY during the term of this AGREEMENT, unless allowed and permitted by
law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Sec. 2. Service Allowance - The COMPANY agrees to continue the granting of service allowance of workers
assigned to work outside the company plant, in addition to his daily salary, as follows:
(a) For those assigned to work outside the plant within Metro Manila, the service allowance shall be
P12.00;chanrobles virtual law library
(b) For those assigned to work outside Metro Manila, the service allowance shall be P25.00/day;chanrobles virtual
law library
(c) The present practice of conveying to and from jobsites of workers assigned to work outside of the company plant
shall be maintained.
Right after the signing of the CBA, the Corporation subcontracted outside workers to do the usual jobs done by its
regular workers including those done outside of the company plant. As a result, the regular workers were scheduled
by the management to work on a rotation basis allegedly to prevent financial losses thereby allowing the workers
only ten (10) working days a month (Rollo, p. 8). Thus, MILU requested implementation of the grievance procedure
which had also been agreed upon in the CBA, but the Corporation ignored the
request.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Consequently, on April 8, 1987, MILU filed a notice of strike (Rollo,
p. 54) with the Department of Labor and Employment. Upon the intervention of the DOLE, through one Atty. Bobot
Hernandez, the Corporation and MILU reached an agreement whereby the Corporation acceded to give back the
usual work to its regular employees who are members of MILU (Rollo, p. 55).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
Notwithstanding said agreement, the Corporation continued the practice of hiring outside workers. When the MILU
president, Wilfredo Abulencia, insisted in doing his regular work of cutting steel bars which was being done by casual
workers, a supervisor reprimanded him, charged him with insubordination and suspended him for three (3) days
(Rollo, pp. 9 & 51-52). Upon the request of MILU, Francisco Jose of the DOLE called for conciliation conferences.
The Corporation, however, insisted that the hiring of casual workers was a management prerogative. It later ignored
subsequent scheduled conciliation conferences (Rollo, pp. 51-52 & 57-58).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
Hence, on July 9, 1987, MILU filed a notice of strike on the following grounds: (a) violation of CBA; (b) discrimination;
(c) unreasonable suspension of union officials; and (d) unreasonable refusal to entertain grievance (Rollo,
p. 9). On July 24, 1987, MILU staged the strike, maintaining picket lines on the road leading to the Corporation's
plant entrance and premises.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
At about 11 o'clock in the morning of July 28, 1987, CAPCOM soldiers, who had been summoned by the
Corporation's counsel, came and arrested the picketers. They were brought to Camp Karingal and, the following day,
to the Caloocan City jail. Charges forillegal possession of firearms and deadly weapons were lodged against them.
Later, however, those charges were dismissed for failure of the arresting CAPCOM soldiers to appear at the
investigation (Rollo, p. 10). The dispersal of the picketlines by the CAPCOM also resulted in the temporary lifting of
the strike.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
On August 4, 1987, the Corporation filed with the NLRC National Capital Region arbitration branch a petition to
declare the strike illegal (Rollo,
p. 40). On September 7, 1987, MILU, with the assistance of the Alyansa ng Manggagawa sa Valenzuela (AMVA), re-
staged the strike. Consequently, the Corporation filed a petition for injunction before the NLRC which, on September
24, 1987, issued an order directing the workers to remove the barricades and other obstructions which prevented
ingress to and egress from the company premises. The workers obliged on October 1, 1987 (Rollo, p. 25). On
October 22, 1987, through its president, MILU offered to return to work in a letter which states:
22 Okt. 1987chanrobles virtual law library
Mr. Elieze Haochanrobles virtual law library
Master Iron Works & Construction Corp.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
790 Bagbagin, Caloocan Citychanrobles virtual law library
Dear Sir:chanrobles virtual law library
Ang unyon, sa pamamagitan ng nakalagda sa ibaba, ay nagmumungkahi, nagsusuhestiyon o nag-oofer sa inyong
pangasiwaan ng aming kahilingan na bumalik na sa trabaho dahilan din lang sa kalagayan na tuloy tuloy ang ating
pag-uusap para sa ikatitiwasay ng ating relasyon. Gusto naming manatili ang ating magandang pagtitinginan bilang
magkasangga para sa ika-uunlad ng ating kumpanya. Sana ay unawain niyo kami dahil kailangan namin ng trabaho.
Gumagalang,chanrobles virtual law library
(Sgd.)
WILFREDO ABULENCIA
Pangulo
(Rollo, p. 590)
On October 30, 1987, MILU filed a position paper with counter-complaint before the NLRC. In said counter-
complaint, the workers charged the Corporation with unfair labor practice for subcontracting work that was normally
done by its regular workers thereby causing the reduction of the latter's workdays; illegal suspension of Abulencia
without any investigation; discrimination for hiring casual workers in violation of the CBA, and illegal dispersal of the
picket lines by CAPCOM agents (Rollo, pp. 26-27).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
In due course, a decision dated March 16, 1988 was rendered by Labor Arbiter Fernando Cinco declaring illegal the
strike staged by MILU. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered, as follows:chanrobles virtual law
library
1. Declaring the strike by the respondents illegal and unlawful;chanrobles virtual law library
2. Ordering the cancellation of the registered permit of respondent union MILU for having committed an illegal
strike;chanrobles virtual law library
77
3. Ordering the termination of employment status of the individual respondents, including the forfeiture of whatever
benefits are due them under the law, for having actively participated in an illegal strike, namely: Wilfredo Abulencia,
President; Rogelio Cabana, Vice-President; Lopito Saranilla, Secretary; Jesus Moises, Treasurer; Basilio dela Cruz,
Auditor; as Members of the Board: Edgar Aranes, Melchor Bose, Restituto Payabyab, Matias Pajimula, Daniel
Bacolon, and Ely Borromeo, as Members of the Union: Teofilo Antolin, Robert Aspuria, Justino Botor, Alfredo
Fabros, Agapito Tabios, Bernardo Alfon, Benigno Barcena, Bernardo Navaro, Moises Labrador, Ernesto dela Cruz,
Eduardo Espiritu, Ignacio Pagtama, Bayani Perez, Simplicio Puaso, Edwin Velarde, Beato Abogado, Danila San
Antonio, Bermes Borromeo and Jose Borromeo.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The respondents as appearing in Annex "A" of the Petition, but not included as among those whose employment
status were not terminated as above-mentioned, are given priority of reinstatement, without backwages, in the event
petitioner starts its normal operations, or shall be paid their separation pay according to
law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
4. Ordering the respondents to cease and desist from further committing the illegal acts complained of;chanrobles
virtual law library
5. Ordering Respondent Union to pay the amount of P10,000.00 to Petitioner's Counsel as attorney's
fees;chanrobles virtual law library
6. Ordering the dismissal of the claim for damages for lack of merit; andchanrobles virtual law library
7. Ordering the dismissal of the counter-complaint in view of the filing of a separate complaint by the
respondents.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
SO ORDERED. (pp. 35-36, Rollo.)
On appeal to the NLRC, MILU and the individual officers and workers named in Labor Arbiter Cinco's decision
alleged that said labor arbiter gravely abused his discretion and exhibited bias in favor of the Corporation in
disallowing their request to cross-examine the Corporation's witnesses, namely, Corporate Secretary Eleazar Hao,
worker Daniel Ignacio and foreman Marcial Barcelon, who all testified on the manner in which the strike was staged
and on the coercion and intimidation allegedly perpetrated by the strikers (Rollo,
p. 151).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The Second Division of the NLRC affirmed with modifications the decision of the labor arbiter. The decision, which
was promulgated on July 12, 1989 with Commissioners Domingo H. Zapanta and Oscar N. Abella concurring and
Commissioner Daniel M. Lucas, Jr. dissenting, disagreed with the labor arbiter on the "summary execution of the life
of Master Iron Labor Union (MILU)" on the grounds that the Corporation did not specifically pray for the cancellation
of MILU's registration and that pursuant to Articles 239 and 240 of the Labor Code, only the Bureau of Labor
Relations may cancel MILU's license or certificate of registration. It also deleted the award of P10,000.00 as
attorney's fees for lack of sufficient basis but it affirmed the labor arbiter with regard to the declaration of illegality of
the strike and the termination of employment of certain employees and the rest of the dispositive portion of the labor
arbiter's decision (Rollo, pp. 48-49).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
In his dissent, Commissioner Lucas stated that he is "for the setting aside of the decision appealed from, and
remanding of the case to the labor arbiter of origin, considering the respondent's countercharge or complaint for
unfair labor practice was not resolved on the merits" (Rollo, p. 49).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
MILU filed a motion for the reconsideration but the same was denied by the NLRC for lack of merit in its Resolution
of August 9, 1989 (Rollo, p. 50). Hence, the instant petition. 1chanrobles virtual law library
Petitioners contend that notwithstanding the non-strike provision in the CBA, the strike they staged was legal
because the reasons therefor are non-economic in nature. They assert that the NLRC abused its discretion in
holding that there was "failure to exhaust the provision on grievance procedure" in view of the fact that they
themselves sought grievance meetings but the Corporation ignored such requests. They charge the NLRC with bias
in failing to give weight to the fact that the criminal charges against the individual petitioners were dismissed for
failure of the CAPCOM soldiers to testify while the same individual strikers boldly faced the charges against them.
Lastly, they aver that the NLRC abused its discretion in holding that the workers' offer to return to work was
conditional.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
In holding that the strike was illegal, the NLRC relied solely on the no-strike no-lockout provision of the CBA
aforequoted. As this Court has held in Philippine Metal Foundries, Inc. vs. CIR (90 SCRA 135 [1979]), a no-strike
clause in a CBA is applicable only to economic strikes. Corollarily, if the strike is founded on an unfair labor practice
of the employer, a strike declared by the union cannot be considered a violation of the no-strike
clause.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
An economic strike is defined as one which is to force wage or other concessions from the employer which he is not
required by law to grant (Consolidated Labor Association of the Philippines vs. Marsman & Co., Inc., 11 SCRA 589
[1964]). In this case, petitioners enumerated in their notice of strike the following grounds: violation of the CBA or the
Corporation's practice of subcontracting workers; discrimination; coercion of employees; unreasonable suspension of
union officials, and unreasonable refusal to entertain grievance.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
Private respondent contends that petitioner's clamor for the implementation of Section 2, Article VIII of the CBA on
service allowances granted to workers who are assigned outside the company premises is an economic issue (Rollo,
p. 70). On the contrary, petitioners decry the violation of the CBA, specifically the provision granting them service
allowances. Petitioners are not, therefore, already asking for an economic benefit not already agreed upon, but are
merely asking for the implementation of the same. They aver that the Corporation's practice of hiring subcontractors
to do jobs outside of the company premises was a way "to dodge paying service allowance to the workers" (Rollo,
pp. 61 & 70).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Much more than an economic issue, the said practice of the Corporation was a blatant violation of the CBA - and
unfair labor practice on the part of the employer under Article 248(i) of the Labor Code. Although the end result,
should the Corporation be required to observe the CBA, may be economic in nature because the workers would then
be given their regular working hours and therefore their just pay, not one of the said grounds is an economic demand
within the meaning of the law on labor strikes. Professor Perfecto Fernandez, in his
book Law on Strikes, Picketing and Lockouts (1981 edition, pp. 144-145), states that an economic strike involves
issues relating to demands for higher wages, higher pension or overtime rates, pensions, profit sharing, shorter
working hours, fewer work days for the same pay, elimination of night work, lower retirement age, more healthful
working conditions, better health services, better sanitation and more safety appliances. The demands of the
petitioners, being covered by the CBA, are definitely within the power of the Corporation to grant and therefore the
strike was not an economic strike.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The other grounds, i.e., discrimination, unreasonable suspension of union officials and unreasonable refusal to
entertain grievance, had been ventilated before the Labor Arbiter. They are clearly unfair labor practices as defined
in Article 248 of the Labor Code. 2 The subsequent withdrawal of petitioners' complaint for unfair labor practice
(NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-11-04132-87) which was granted by Labor Arbiter Ceferina Diosana who also considered
the case closed and terminated (Rollo, pp. 97 & 109) may not, therefore, be considered as having converted their
other grievance into economic demands.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Moreover, petitioners staged the strike only after the Corporation had failed to abide by the agreement forged
between the parties upon the intervention of no less than the DOLE after the union had complained of the
Corporation's unabated subcontracting of workers who performed the usual work of the regular workers. The
Corporation's insistence that the hiring of casual employees is a management prerogative betrays its attempt to coat
with legality the illicit curtailment of its employees' rights to work under the terms of the contract of employment and
to a fair implementation of the CBA.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
While it is true that an employer's exercise of management prerogatives, with or without reason, does not per
se constitute unjust discrimination, such exercise, if clearly shown to be in grave abuse of discretion, may be looked
into by the courts (National Federation of Labor Unions vs. NLRC, 202 SCRA 346 [1991]). Indeed, the hiring, firing,
transfer, demotion, and promotion of employees are traditionally identified as management prerogatives. However,
they are not absolute prerogatives. They are subject to limitations found in law, a collective bargaining agreement, or
78
general principles of fair play and justice (University of Sto. Tomas vs. NLRC, 190 SCRA 758 [1990] citing Abbott
Laboratories [Phil.], Inc. vs. NLRC, 154 SCRA 713 [1987]). The Corporation's assertion that it was exercising a
management prerogative in hiring outside workers being contrary to the contract of employment which, of necessity,
states the expected wages of the workers, as well as the CBA, is therefore
untenable.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Private respondent's failure to traverse petitioners' allegations that the NLRC abused its discretion in holding that the
provision on grievance procedure had not been exhausted clearly sustains such allegation and upholds the
petitioners' contention that the Corporation refused to undergo said procedure. It should be remembered that a
grievance procedure is part of the continuous process of collective bargaining (Republic Savings Bank. vs. CIR, et
al., 21 SCRA 226 [1967]). It is intended to promote a friendly dialogue between labor and management as a means
of maintaining industrial peace. The Corporation's refusal to heed petitioners' request to undergo the grievance
procedure clearly demonstrated its lack of intent to abide by the terms of the
CBA.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Anent the NLRC's finding that Abulencia's offer to return to work is conditional, even a cursory reading of the letter
aforequoted would reveal that no conditions had been set by petitioners. It is incongruous to consider as a
"condition" the statement therein that the parties would continue talks for a peaceful working relationship ("tuloy tuloy
ang ating pag-uusap sa ikatitiwasay ng ating relasyon"). Conferences form part of the grievance procedure and their
mere mention in Abulencia's letter did not make the same "conditional".chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library
In the same manner, the following findings of the Labor Arbiter showed the illegal breakup of the picket lines by the
CAPCOM:
d) On 28 July 1987, CAPCOM soldiers, on surveillance mission, arrived at the picket line of respondents and
searches were made on reported deadly weapons and firearms in the possession of the strikers. Several bladed
weapons and firearms in the possession of the strikers were confiscated by the CAPCOM soldiers, as a result of
which, the apprehended strikers were brought to Camp Tomas Karingal in Quezon City for proper investigation and
filing of the appropriate criminal charges against them. The strikers who were charged of illegal possession of deadly
weapon and firearms were: Edgar Aranes, Wilfredo Abulencia, Ernesto dela Cruz, Beato Abogado, Lopito Saranilla,
Restituto Payabyab, Jose Borromeo and Rogelio Cabana. Criminal informations were filed by Inquest Fiscal, marked
as Exhibits "E", "E-1 to E-8". These strikers were jailed for sometime until they were ordered release after putting up
the required bail bond. Other strikers were also arrested and brought to Camp Tomas Karingal, and after proper
investigation as to their involvement in the offense charged, they were released for lack of prima facie evidence.
They were Edwin Velarde, Bayani Perez, Daniel Bacolon, Jesus Moises, Robert Aspurias and Benigno
Barcena.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
After the strikers who were arrested were brought to Camp Tomas Karingal on 28 July 1987, the rest of the strikers
removed voluntarily their human and material barricades which were placed and posted at the road leading to the
premises of the Company. (Rollo, p. 32)
The bringing in of CAPCOM soldiers to the peaceful picket lines without any reported outbreak of violence, was
clearly in violation of the following prohibited activity under Article 264 of the Labor Code:
(d) No public official or employee, including officers and personnel of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines or the
Integrated National Police, or armed person, shall bring in, introduce or escort in any manner any individual who
seeks to replace strikers in entering or leaving the premises of a strike area, or work in place of the strikers. The
police force shall keep out of the picket lines unless actual violence or other criminal acts occur therein; Provided,
That nothing herein shall be interpreted to prevent any public officer from taking any measure necessary to maintain
peace and order, protect life and property, and/or enforce the law and legal order. (Emphasis supplied.)
As the Labor Arbiter himself found, no pervasive or widespread coercion or violence were perpetrated by the
petitioners as to warrant the presence of the CAPCOM soldiers in the picket lines. In this regard, worth quoting is the
following excerpt of the decision in Shell Oil Workers' Union vs. Shell Company of the Philippines, Ltd., 39 SCRA 276
[1971], which was decided by the Court under the old Industrial Peace Act but which excerpt still holds true:
. . . What is clearly within the law is the concerted activity of cessation of work in order that . . . employer cease and
desist from an unfair labor practice. That the law recognizes as a right. There is though a disapproval of the
utilization of force to attain such an objective. For implicit in the very concept of the legal order is the maintenance of
peaceful ways. A strike otherwise valid, if violent in character, may be placed beyond the pale. Care is to be taken,
however, especially where an unfair labor practice is involved, to avoid stamping it with illegality just because it is
tainted with such acts. To avoid rendering illusory the recognition of the right to strike, responsibility in such a case
should be individual and not collective. A different conclusion would be called for, of course, if the existence of force
while the strike lasts is pervasive and widespread, consistently and deliberately resorted to as a matter of policy. It
could be reasonably concluded then that even if justified as to ends, it becomes illegal because of the means
employed. (at p. 292.)
All told, the strike staged by the petitioners was a legal one even though it may have been called to offset what the
strikers believed in good faith to be unfair labor practices on the part of the employer (Ferrer, et al. vs. Court of
Industrial Relations, et al., 17 SCRA 352 [1966]). Verily, such presumption of legality prevails even if the allegations
of unfair labor practices are subsequently found out to be untrue (People's Industrial and Commercial Employees
and Workers Org. [FFW] vs. People's Industrial and Commercial Corporation, 112 SCRA 440 [1982]). Consonant
with these jurisprudential pronouncements, is Article 263 of the Labor Code which clearly states "the policy of the
State to encourage free trade unionism and free collective bargaining". Paragraph (b) of the same article guarantees
the workers' "right to engage in concerted activities for purposes of collective bargaining or for their mutual benefit
and protection" and recognizes the "right of legitimate labor organizations to strike and picket and of employers to
lockout" so long as these actions are "consistent with the national interest" and the grounds therefor do not involve
inter-union and intra-union disputes.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The strike being legal, the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in terminating the employment of the individual
petitioners, who, by operation of law, are entitled to reinstatement with three years backwages. Republic Act No.
6715 which amended Art. 279 of the Labor Code by giving "full backwages inclusive of allowances" to reinstated
employees, took effect fifteen days from the publication of the law on March 21, 1989. The decision of the Labor
Arbiter having been promulgated on March 16, 1988, the law is not applicable in this
case.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
WHEREFORE, the questioned decision and resolution of the NLRC as well as the decision of the Labor Arbiter are
hereby SET ASIDE and the individual petitioners are reinstated to their positions, with three years backwages and
without loss of seniority rights and other privileges. Further, respondent corporation is ordered to desist from
subcontracting work usually performed by its regular workers.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
SO ORDERED.
2 Art. 248. Unfair labor practices of employers. - It shall be unlawful for an employer to commit any of the following
unfair labor practice:
(a) To interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization;
(b) To require as a condition of employment that a person or an employee shall not join a labor organization or shall
withdraw from one to which he belongs;
(c) To contract out services or functions being performed by union members when such will interfere with, restrain or
coerce employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization;
(d) To initiate, dominate, assist or otherwise interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization,
including the giving of financial or other support to it or its organizations or supporters;
(e) To discriminate in regard to wages, hours of work, and other terms and conditions of employment in order to
encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization. Nothing in this Code or in any other law shall stop
the parties from requiring membership in a recognized collective bargaining agent as a condition of employment,
except those employees who are already members of another union at the time of the signing of the collective
bargaining agreement. Employees of an appropriate collective bargaining agent may be assessed a reasonable fee
79
equivalent to the dues and other fees paid by members of the recognized collective bargaining agent, if such non-
union members accept the benefits under the collective agreement: Provided, that the individual authorization
required under Article 242, paragraph (o) of this Code shall not apply to the non-members of the recognized
collective bargaining agent;
(f) To dismiss, discharge, or otherwise prejudice or discriminate against an employee for having given or being about
to give testimony under this Code;
(g) To violate the duty to bargain collectively as prescribed by this Code;
(h) To pay negotiation or attorney's fees to the union or its officers or agents as part of the settlement of any issue in
collective bargaining or any other dispute; or
(i) To violate a collective bargaining agreement.chanrobles virtual law library
The provisions of the preceding paragraph notwithstanding, only the officers and agents of corporations, associations
or partnerships who have actually participated in, authorized or ratified under unfair labor practices shall be held
criminally liable.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-33015 September 10, 1979
GOP-CCP WORKERS UNION, GERONIMO TRINIDAD, ROMULO FERNANDEZ, JOSE MEDENILLA, BENJAMIN
DEL ROSARIO, LEONILA DE LEON, PEDRO MARCELINO, ISABEL ENRIQUEZ, DIOSDADO MARZAN,
FERNANDO SOTELO, JUANITO MECUA, ERNESTO PUNO, ROGELIO MEDEL, ANTONIO LIMPIN, JOSE
DUSABAN, ADOLFO DIGNADICE, CRISANTO SEBASTIAN and PEDRO PUYABAN, Petitioners,
vs. COURTOF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, GENERAL OFFSET PRESS, INC., and CONTAINER CORPORATION
OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
These three related labor rases between the same union and employers and with the same factual background will
be decided jointly.
L-33015. - This case involves the legality of a strike. The GOP-CCP Workers Union and its officers appealed from
the resolution of the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) affirming the order of Judge Emiliano C. Tabigne dated
August 19, 1970. In that order, Judge Tabigne declared illegal the strike staged by the union on October 27, 1967,
held that the officers of the union had lost their employee status, and authorized their employers, General Offset
Press, Inc. and Container Corporation of the Philippines, to hire their replacements as the exigencies of their
businesses may require (Case No. 4881-ULP).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The record discloses that on April 20, 1964 the union and the two above-named corporations, with plants in the same
compound located at 62 Old Samson Road, Balintawak Quezon City and alleged to be owned by one family, entered
into collective bargaining agreements which would be effective for three years. By means of a supplementary
agreement, the three-year term was extended to July 31, 1968.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
The agreements contained arbitration clauses which outlined the grievance procedure for processing disputes
regarding the terms of employment. They also included the following no-strike and no- lockout provisions:
ARTICLE XXII - STRIKES, STOPPAGEchanrobles virtual law library
OF WORK AND SETTLEMENT chanrobles virtual law library
CLAUSE chanrobles virtual law library
Section 1. The Union agrees that during the whole period of this agreement, there shall be no strike, walkouts,
stoppage or slowdown of work, boycotts, secondary boycotts, refusals to handle any merchandise, picketing, sit
down strikes of any kind, sympathetic or general strikes, and any other interference with any of the operation of the
Company.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Section 2. The Company agrees that there shall be no lockout either during the period of this
agreement.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Section 3. In case of any alleged unfair labor practice on the part of either party, there will be no strikes, lockouts, or
any prejudicial action contemplated under the preceding Sections 1 and 2 until the question or grievance is resolved
by the proper court if not settled through a grievance procedure therein outlined. ... (Exh. A-2 and B-2).
On October 26, 1967, two CIR prosecutors filed in behalf of the union and three dismissed employees named Remus
Honofre, Anastacio Sanchez and Andres Tuatis a complainant for unfair labor practice against the two firms and their
three officers named Benito Pascual Robert Hwang and Romeo Monteyro.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
It was alleged in the complaint that the two firms failed to comply with their commitment to readjust the pay scales of
the union members and that the three employees, Honofre, Sanchez and Tuatis were dismissed because of
their union membership and activities. The case was docketed as Case No. 4873-ULP and was assigned to Judge
Ansberto Parades.
On the following day, October 27, the union, without any notice, staged a strike and established picket lines at the
plants of the two firms so as to implement their protest against the unfair labor practices complained of in Case No.
4873-ULP.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
By way of retaliation, a countercharge for unfair labor practice was filed on November 7, 1967 by another CIR
prosecutor in behalf of the two corporations against the union for having staged a strike in violation of the "no strike,
no lock out" provisions and the grievance procedure outlined in the collective bargaining agreements. That case,
dockted as Case No. 4881-ULP, was assigned to Judge Tabigne.
The union on December 20, 1967 sought the consolidation of the two cases due to Identity of parties and close
interweaving of issues but Judge Tabigne denied the consolidation.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
In January, 1968, the union received a letter from the counsel of the two corporations, manifesting a desire for the
formalization of a "return to work" agreement and requesting that the union should finalize its demands for the
renewal of the collective bargaining agreements so that the negotiations might be started. The union signified its
unqualified acceptance of that offer. It lifted its picket lines. The strikers held themselves in readiness to work
immediately.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
However, the two corporations allegedly refused to readmit the strikers with the exception of four of them. In view of
that intransigent attitude of the employers, the union amended its complaint in Case No. 4873-ULP so as to charge
such refusal as an additional unfair labor practice.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Believing that the amendment of the complaint in Case No. 4873- ULP constituted a prejudicial question in Case No.
4881-ULP, the union moved for a suspension of the proceedings in the latter case. Judge Tabigne denied the
motion. The denial was affirmed by the CIR en banc.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
After the two firms had presented their evidence in Case No. 4881-ULP in Jane, 1969, the union was required to
present its evidence. it failed to do so. Hence, Judge Tabigne in his order of April 27. 1970 considered the case
submitted for decision without the union's evidence, That order was affirmed by the CIR en banc. The union
appealed from that order but it later withdrew its appeal.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
80
As already stated, Judge Tabigne decided the case adversely to the union. His decision was affirmed by the court en
banc. Judge Tabigne found (1) that when the strike was declared, there was no grievance pending between the
union and the two employers and that, if there was such a grievance, the union did not avail itself of the procedure
delineated in the collective bargaining agreements; (2) that there was no notice of the intention to go on strike and no
such notice was filed with the Department of Labor; (3) that the strike, which contravened the said agreements, was
characterized by coercion, intimidation and threats, and (4) that by means of picketing, the strikers, with their wooden
placards, prevented the nonstriking employees from working.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Thus, Jesus C. Lopez, the plant manager of the Container Corporation of the Philippines, was threatened by the
strikers that something would happen to him if he reported for work. On another occasion, the car of Lopez, who,
with other employees, was reporting for work, was surrounded by the strikers and he was threatened with harm and
insulted in this wise: "Putang ina mo, para kang hindi Pilipino, salabusab." One of the strikers blocked the car of
Lopez by placing a placard against the windshield. It was only through the intervention of a police lieutenan" that
Lopez was able to enter the premises of his employer, As a consequence of that incident, the strikers were charged
in court with grave coercion.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
On the same occasion, Rodolfo Ganzon, the driver of the General Offset Press, Inc., while approaching the gate to
report for work, was stopped by Geronimo Trinidad, the president of the union. Trinidad sat on the hood of the truck
driven by Ganzon and told him to stop; otherwise, something might happen to him and he might not be alive the next
day. That incident also provoked the filing of a charge for grave coercion in the city court of Quezon
City.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The CIR concluded that the strike was illegal, that it was in violation of the collective bargaining agreements and that
the union did not bargain in good faith with the employers.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The union and its seventeen officers and agents, who were respondents in the unfair labor practice case, contend in
this appeal in Case No. 4881-ULP that they were denied due process of law because the case was decided solely on
the basis of complainants evidence.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
That contention is erroneous and unreasonable because the petitioners were given the opportunity to present their
evidence but, to suit their purpose, they refused to do so. Their baseless pretext was that a prejudicial question was
involved in the unfair labor practice case filed., by them. It is incontestable that they were not denied due process at
all.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Their argument that the CIR should have considered matters favorable to them although not presented in evidence is
untenable. That procedure would not be fair to the employers who are also entitled to due
process.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The petitioners argue that the CIR erred in deciding the unfair labor practice case filed by the employers without
awaiting the outcome of the prior unfair labor practice case filed by the union. That argument appears to be
preposterous in the light of subsequent events because the first unfair labor practice case was submitted for decision
in the CIR in 1974 and was decided by a Labor Arbiter in 1975 and later passed upon by the National Labor
Relations Commission and the Secretary of Labor and eventually decided by the Office of the President on
November 18,1977 (See pp. 38-40, Rollo of L- 47776).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
On the other hand, the instant case was decided by the CIR in 1970. Had it been made to await the outcome of Case
No. 4873-ULP, it might still be undecided up to this time. The wheels of justice grind slowly. Delay is the bane of
litigation.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The CIR did not gravely abuse its discretion when in its order of February 26, 1968 it denied the union's motion for
the consolidation of the two unfair labor practice cases because "the facts, circumstances and remedies or reliefs
prayed for" in the two cases "are at variance and entirely different" (pp. 78- 81,
Rollo).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The union brands as illegal the stipulation in the collective bargaining agreements that "in case of any alleged unfair
labor practice on the part of either party, there win be no strikes, lockouts, or any prejudicial action ... until the
question or grievance is resolved by the proper court if not settled through a grievance procedure therein outlined.
" chanrobles virtual law library
The union's argument in support of that contention is vague and unconvincing. No specific statutory enactment was
cited to show the illegality of that stipulation. The union merely avers that that stipulation contravenes article 1701 of
the Civil Code because it would permit capital to act oppressively against labor.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
The legality of that kind of stipulation was inferentially upheld in Liberal Labor Union vs. Philippine Can Company, 91
Phil. 72, 78, where it was ruled: "The authorities are numerous which hold that strikes held in violation of the terms
contained in a collective bargaining agreement are illegal, specially when they provide for conclusive arbitration
clauses. These agreements must be strictly adhered to and respected if their ends have to be achieved." See article
264 of the Labor Code regarding prohibition against strikes and lockouts.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library
In the Liberal Labor Union case, it appears that on February 26, 1949 the union and the company entered into a
collective bargaining agreement. It was stipulated therein that if a laborer had a complaint, the same would first be
resolved by a grievance committee. Then, if the decision was not satisfactory, the same would be referred to the top
officials of the union and the company. And if still no settlement was reached, the matter would be submitted to the
CIR.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
On March 14, 1949, the union declared a strike as a protest against the reduction of the wages of seven laborers.
Later, the union filed in the CIR a petition wherein it prayed that the strike be declared legal. It was held that the
strike was illegal because the union did not adhere to the procedure agreed upon for the settlement of
disputes.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
A strike or walkout on the basis of grievances which have not been submitted to the grievance committee, as
stipulated in the agreement of the parties sanctioned by the CIR, is premature and illegal (Insurefco Paper Pulp &
Project Workers' Union vs. Insular Sugar Refining Corporation, 95 Phil. 761. See 51 C.J.S. 1088 and 48 Am Jur 2nd
795).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The union in its fourth assignment of error argues that there is a total lack of evidence proving that the other
members of the union had any complicity in the acts of coercion, intimidation and threats committed by some strikers
like Geronimo Trinidad and Antonio Valenzuela who were both charged with grave coercion in the city
court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Trinidad was the union president. The intimidatory acts were committed in the presence of the other union members.
They did not try to restrain the commission of those acts. Their presence and inaction were tantamount to assent to
the commission of those acts.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Petitioners last assignment of error is that the CIR erred in not granting their motion of July 27, 1970 to reopen the
case. It will be recalled that Judge Tabigne in his order ofApril 27, 1970 considered the case submitted for decision
without petitioners' evidence. He decided the case on August 19, 1970. In his decision he stated that the motion for
reopening was devoid of merit because the petitioners had been accorded sufficient opportunity to present their
evidence and, therefore, the petitioners had not been denied due process.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
Petitioners invoked section 17 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, regarding "limit of effectiveness of award", to support
their contention that the denial of their motion to reopen the case was erroneous. It should be noted that under
section 17, it is not mandatory or ministerial for the CIR to reopen any question involved in its award, order or
decision. The reopening is discretionary with the CIR.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
It is doubtful whether section 17 sustains petitioners' contention that the CIR should have reopened the case three
months after it had ordered that the case was submitted for decision. The truth was that the CIR was fed up with
petitioners' dilatory tactics. Hence, it was disinclined to grant petitioners' motion to reopen the
case.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
81
The pervasive issue in this case is the legality of the strike. To be lawful, a strike must be preceded by the requisite
notice of intention to strike. It should have a lawful purpose and it should be executed through lawful means (Maria
Cristina Fertilizer Plant Employees Association vs. Maria Cristina Fertilizer Corporation, L- 33935, May 11, 1978, 83
SCRA 56, 66).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
In this case, the strike was not preceded by any notice. It was not peacefully conducted. It was in contravention of
the "no strike, no lockout" stipulations of the collective bargaining agreements. The CIR correctly concluded that it
was an illegal strike.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Since there is no merit in petitioners' appeal, Judge Tabigne's order of August 19, 1970 and the CIR's resolution of
October 9,1970 in Case No. 4881-ULP should be affirmed.
L-47776.-This is a special civil action of certiorari to set aside the decision of the Office of the President dated
November 18, 1977 which affirmed the dismissal of the charges of unfair labor practice filed by the petitioners (the
union and its one hundred eleven members) against General Offset Press, Inc. and Container Corporation of the
Philippines, repeatedly referred to as CIR Case No. 4873-ULP.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
As already stated, the said case was pending before Judge Ansberto Parades. The CIR refused to consolidate it with
the unfair labor practice case filed by the two companies against GOP-CCP Workers Union and its officers, CIR
Case No. 4881-ULP, now L-33015, which has been disposed of earlier herein. After the abolition of the CIR, Case
No. 4873-ULP was transferred to the National Labor Relations Commission.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
The Labor Arbiter in his decision of May 27, 1975 dismissed the charges and refused to rule on complainants'
petition for reinstatement with back wages because the matter of the legality of the strike was sub judice in L-33105,
ante. As already stated, that decision was affirmed by the NLRC, by the Acting Secretary of Labor and, with the
authority of the President of the Philippines, by the Presidential Assistant on Legal
Affairs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Thus, no less than four administrative officials of ascending rank ruled against the one hundred twelve petitioners.
Presidential Assistant Ronaldo B. Zamora found that it was not proven that the two companies refused to bargain, or
bargained in bad faith concerning wage adjustments. He regarded as unfounded the charge that Honofre, Sanchez
and Tuatis were dismiss because of their union activities.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
He said that their dismissal was due to causes unconnected with their union
activities.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Honofre was on an unauthorized leave of absence in view of his involvement in the alleged malversation of the
money of his co- workers in a "paluagan" system. Sanchez and Tuatis were implicated in a theft case and were
likewise on an unauthorized leave of absence because they were eluding the
police.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
These factual findings of the four administrative officials are binding on this Court and they render untenable
petitioners' argument that the public respondents committed a grave abuse of discretion in not holding that the two
companies were guilty of unfair labor practice.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
In this certiorari case, which was filed on April 18, 1978, the principal issue is whether the two companies committed
an unfair labor practice in refusing to readmit the one hundred fifteen striking members of the union despite their
unconditional and voluntary offer to return to work on January 29, 1968.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
The two companies refused to readmit the strikers because the agreement containing the conditions for their return
to work was not formalized and because of the pendency of the case wherein the employers had sought a
declaration that the strike was illegal (Annex NN and page 7 of memo, pp. 150 and 525 of
Rollo).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
In view of our finding in L-33015 or Case No. 4881-ULP that the strike was illegal, the corollary conclusion is that the
two companies did not commit any unfair labor practice in refusing to readmit the
strikers.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
And considering that, as indicated hereinafter in the third case, L-30833, another union has supplanted the petitioner,
GOP-CCP Workers Union, which at present has no member working in the two companies (Manifestation of April 16,
1979, pp. 454-6, Rollo), the cause of industrial peace would not be served if the one hundred eleven strikers or
petitioners were to be reinstated.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Therefore, the petition should be dismissed and the decision of the Office of the President dated November 18, 1977
should be upheld. The individual petitioners have lost their status as employees of the two companies because of the
illegality of their strike (Maria Cristina Fertilizer Plant Employees Association-ALU vs. Maria Cristina Fertilizer
Corporation, L33935, May 11, 1978, 83 SCRA 56,66- 67).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
However, as a matter of compassionate justice, the strikers may be considered as dismissed employees entitled to
the benefits of the Termination Pay Law as of October 27, 1967 when they stopped
working.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The two companies should give the strikers separation pay if on that date they were already entitled to the benefits of
that law (See Adame vs. Court of Industrial Relations, L-33221 and L- 33262-63, April 28, 1975, 63 SCRA 469, 484).
L-30833. -As already stated in the two preceding cases, L-33015 and L-47776, in 1967, the GOP-CCP Workers
Union had collected bargaining agreements with the General Offset Press, Inc. and the Container Corporation of the
Philippines which were effective up to July 31, 1968. On October 27, 1967, or while the said agreements were in
force, the union declared a strike as a protest against the alleged unfair labor practices committed by the said
firms.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
As a consequence of that strike, some members of the union shifted their allegiance to another union, the Philippine
Labor Alliance Council (PLAC), Local 129, GOP-CCP Chapter.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
On November 9, 1967, the PLAC filed with the Court of Industrial Relations a petition for the holding of a certification
election to determine which union should be the sole bargaining agent of the workers in the two firms. Later, the
PLAC asked that the certification election be restricted to the workers in the General Offset Press, Inc. (CIR Case
No. 2048-MC).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The GOP-CCP Workers-Union was allowed to intervene in that certification election case. The two unions agreed
that "a consent election" should be conducted by the CIR among the rank-and-file employees. Judge Amando C.
Bugayong in his order of March 18, 1969 ordered the holding of the certification election on March 28, 1969 among
the rank-and- file employees excluding those performing supervisory, confidential and managerial
functions.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Judge Bugayong in that same order allowed to participate in the election the employees who were paid monthly
(instead of only those workers who were paid daily). He also allowed to vote thirty- four employees, who were made
permanent after the strike was declared, and those members of the GOP-CCP Workers Union who were involved in
the unfair labor practice case filed by the company against the union. However, their votes were ordered segregated
for further disposition by the court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Disagreeing with those rulings of Judge Bugayong, the GOP-CCP Workers Union filed motions for reconsideration
and for the suspension of the certification election. Those motions were not resolved right away. The election was
held, as scheduled, on March 28, 1969. The GOP-CCP Workers Union did not take part in the election. The workers
voted for the PLAC as their collective bargaining agent.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
On March 31, 1969, the GOP-CCP Workers Union filed a protest against the election and prayed that it be declared
void. The PLAC filed an opposition to the protest. The CIR en banc in its resolution of June 16, 1969 affirmed Judge
82
Bugayong's order. From that resolution, the GOP-CCP Workers Union appealed to this
Court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
This Court in its resolution of December 11, 1978 required the parties to state whether there is an existing collective
bargaining agreement between the General Offset Press, Inc. and its employees and whether supervening events
have rendered the appeal moot and academic.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Respondent PLAC in its manifestation stated that a collective bargaining agreement was concluded between said
union and the company on October 21, 1969; that thereafter the agreement was renewed every three years; that the
latest one, duly certified by the Bureau of Labor Relations, is for the period from January 1, 1978 to December 31,
1980, and that at present the GOP-CCP Workers Union has no member working for the company, all the workers
being affiliated with the PLAC and they have ratified the collective bargaining agreement. The PLAC prayed that the
case be dismissed for having become moot.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Appellant union in its manifestation admitted that at present it has no member working for the company. However, it
countered that the issues in this appeal have not become moot because its members are still considered employees
of the company, who can participate in future certification elections, and that the question of their reinstatement is
pending before this Court in L- 33015, GOP-CCP Workers Union, et al. vs. Court of Industrial Relations.
Appellant union contends that it was denied substantial justice because the certification election was held
notwithstanding that it had moved for its suspension and for the reconsideration of the order scheduling
it.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
There is a ruling that in the absence of any restraining order issued by a competent court, the filing of a motion for
reconsideration with the CIR en banc does not suspendipso facto a scheduled certification election (Philex Miners
Union vs. National Mines & Allied Workers Union, 116 Phil. 1282). Appellant union argues that the ruling in
the Philexcase does not apply to this case because the motion for suspension in that case was denied before the
scheduled election was held.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
In the instant case, the CIR held that appellant's motions were dilatory. It should be recalled that, originally, appellant
union had agreed to the holding of the certification election. Foreseeing its defeat in the election, it resorted to the
expedient of asking for the suspension of the certification election.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
We hold that no injustice was perpetrated against the appellant when the certification election was held
notwithstanding the pendency of its motions for reconsideration and for the suspension of the election. The CIR
rightly sensed that those eleventh-hour maneuvers did not conduce to industrial peace and, instead, fomented
uncertainty on the matter of representation of the workers.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The prior collective bargaining agreement expired on July 31, 1968. Appellant union, as the former collective
bargaining agent, had lost the support of the majority of the workers.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
Another union had appeared on the scene. It was imperative that the question of representation should be set at rest
as soon as possible. Hence, Judge Bugayong, with the consent of the two rival unions (appellant and the PLAC set
the certification election on March 28, 1969.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Considering that the appellant union did not take part in the election and that at present it has no member working for
the company, it had ceased to have any interest in the issues raised by it, that is, whether the CIR erred in holding
that the workers paid on a monthly basis should be allowed to vote and that the votes of the strikers and the scabs
should be segregated. There is no point in resolving those issues at the behest of a union that has no member
working for the company. (See Velasco vs. Rosenberg, 29 Phil. 212, 214.) chanrobles virtual law library
WHEREFORE, the petitions in these three cases are dismissed. In L-33015, the order of Judge Tabigne dated
August 19, 1970 and the CIR's resolution of October 9, 1970 are affirmed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
In L-47776, the decision rendered by Presidential Assistant Zamora is affirmed. The prayer of the individual
petitioners for reinstatement and back wages is denied but respondents General Offset Press, Inc. and Container
Corporation of the Philippines are directed to give separation pay under the Termination Pay Law to those strikers
who were already entitled to the benefits of that law on October 27, 1967 when the illegal strike was declared and
when they should be regarded as dismissed employees.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
In L-30833, the union's appeal is dismissed for having become moot and academic. No
costs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-28607. May 31, 1971.]
SHELL OIL WORKERS’ UNION, Petitioner, v. SHELL COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES, LTD., and THE COURT
OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION: LABOR RELATIONS; MANAGEMENT PREROGATIVES; STIPULATIONS
IN EXISTING COLLECTIVE BARGAINING CONTRACT CONSTITUTE LIMITATIONS THERETO. — Management
cannot be denied the faculty of promoting efficiency and attaining economy by a study of what units are essential for
its operation. To it belongs the ultimate determination of whether services should be performed by its personnel or
contracted to outside agencies. It is the opinion of the Court, that while management has the final say on such
matter, the labor union is not to be completely left out. What was done by Shell Company in informing the Union as
to the step it was intending to take on the proposed dissolution of the security guard section to be replaced by an
outside agency is praiseworthy. There should be mutual consultation even if eventually deference is to be paid to
what management decides. Thereby, in the words of Chief Justice Warren, there is likely to be achieved "peaceful
accommodation of conflicting interests." In this particular case though, what was stipulated in an existing collective
bargaining contract certainly precluded Shell Company from carrying out what otherwise would have been within its
prerogative if to do so would be violative thereof.
2. ID.; ID.; DUTY TO BARGAIN COLLECTIVELY, EXPLAINED; NON-COMPLIANCE WITH COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING AGREEMENT CONSTITUTES UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE. — The Shell Company, in failing to
manifest fealty to what was stipulated in an existing collective bargaining contract, was thus guilty of an unfair labor
practice. Such a doctrine first found expression in Republic Savings Bank v. Court of Industrial Relations, (L-20303,
Sept. 27, 1967, 21 SCRA 226) the opinion of the Court being penned by Justice Castro. There was a reiteration of
such a view in Security Bank Employees Union v. Security Bank and Trust Company. (L-28536, April 30, 1968, 23
SCRA 503) Thus: "It being expressly provided in the Industrial Peace Act that [an] unfair labor practice is committed
by a labor union or its agent by its refusal ‘to bargain collectively with the employer’ and this Court having decided in
the Republic Savings Bank case that collective bargaining does not end with the execution of an agreement, being a
continuous process, the duty to bargain necessarily imposing on the parties the obligation to live up to the terms of
such a collective bargaining agreement if entered into, it is undeniable that non-compliance therewith constitutes an
unfair labor practice."cralaw virtua1aw library
3. ID.; ID.; UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE COMMITTED BY EMPLOYER; REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO UNION;
BELIEF IN GOOD FAITH THAT EMPLOYER COMMITTED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE RENDERS STRIKE
LEGAL. — Accordingly, the unfair labor practice strike called by the Union did have the impress of validity. Rightly,
labor is justified in making use of such a weapon in its arsenal to counteract what is clearly outlawed by the Industrial
Peace Act. That would be one way to assure that the objectives of unionization and collective bargaining would not
be thwarted. It could, of course, file an unfair labor practice case before the Court of Industrial Relations. It is not
precluded, however, from relying on its own resources to frustrate such an effort on the part of an employer. So we
83
have consistently held — and for the soundest of reasons. There is this categorical pronouncement from the present
Chief Justice: "Again, the legality of the strike follows as a corollary to the finding of fact, made in the decision
appealed from — which is supported by substantial evidence — to the effect that the strike had been triggered by the
Company’s failure to abide by the terms and conditions of its collective bargaining agreement with the Union, by the
discrimination, resorted to by the company, with regard to hire and tenure of employment, and the dismissal of
employees due to union activities, as well as the refusal of the company to bargain collectively in good faith." As a
matter of fact, this Court has gone even further. It is not even required that there be in fact an unfair labor practice
committed by the employer. It suffices, if such a belief in good faith is entertained by labor, as the inducing factor for
staging a strike. So it was clearly stated by the present Chief Justice while still an Associate Justice of this Court: "As
a consequence, we hold that the strike in question had been called to offset what petitioners were warranted in
believing in good faith to be unfair labor practices on the part of Management, that petitioners were not bound,
therefore, to wait for the expiration of thirty (30) days from notice of strike before staging the same, that said strike
was not, accordingly, illegal and that the strikers had not thereby lost their status as employees of respondents
herein."cralaw virtua1aw library
4. ID.; ID.; RIGHT TO STRIKE; WHEN STRIKE ENJOINED. — The right to self-organization so sedulously guarded
by the Industrial Peace Act explicitly includes the right "to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining and to the mutual aid or protection." From and after June 17, 1953 then, there cannot be the least doubt
that a strike as a form of concerted activity has the stamp of legitimacy. As a matter of law, even under the regime of
compulsory arbitration under the Court of Industrial Relations Act, a strike was by no means a forbidden weapon.
Such is the thought embodied in the opinion of Justice Laurel in Rex Taxicab Company v. Court of Industrial
Relations (70 Phil. 621 [1940]). Thus, "In other words, the employee, tenant or laborer is inhibited from striking or
walking out of his employment only when so enjoined by the Court of Industrial Relations and after a dispute has
been submitted thereto and pending award or decision by the court of such dispute. It follows that, as in the present
case, the employees or laborers may strike before being ordered not to do so and before an industrial dispute is
submitted to the Court of Industrial Relations, subject to the power of the latter, after hearing when public interest so
requires or when the dispute cannot, in its opinion, be promptly decided or settled, to order them to return, with the
consequence that if the strikers fail to return to work, when so ordered, the court may authorize the employer to
accept other employees or laborers." Former Chief Justice Paras, in a case not too long before the enactment of the
Industrial Peace Act, had occasion to repeat such a view. Thus: "As a matter of fact, a strike may not be staged only
when, during the pendency of an industrial dispute, the Court of Industrial Relations has issued the proper injunction
against the laborers (Section 19, Commonwealth Act No. 103, as amended). Capital need not, however, be
apprehensive about the recurrence of strikes in view of the system of compulsory arbitration by the Court of Industrial
Relations."cralaw virtua1aw library
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; UNION’S DECISION TO STAGE STRIKE ENTITLED TO RESPECT; FILING OF NOTICE OF
INTENTION TO STRIKE; WHEN NOT REQUIRED. — A strike then, in the apt phrase of Justice J.B.L. Reyes, is "an
institutionalized factor of democratic growth." This is to foster industrial democracy. Implicit in such a concept is the
recognition that concerning the ends which labor considers worthwhile, its wishes are ordinarily entitled to respect.
Necessarily so, the choice as to when such an objective may be attained by striking likewise belongs to it. There is
the rejection of the concept that an outside authority, even if governmental, should make the decisions for it as to
ends which are desirable and how they may be achieved. The assumption is that labor can be trusted to determine
for itself when the right to strike may be availed of in order to attain a successful fruition in their disputes with
management. It is true that there is a requirement in the Act that before the employees may do so, they must file with
the Conciliation Service of the Department of Labor a notice of their intention to strike. Such a requisite however, as
has been repeatedly declared by this Court, does not have to be complied with in case of unfair labor practice strike,
which certainly is entitled to greater judicial protection if the Industrial Peace Act is to be rendered meaningful. What
has been said thus far would demonstrate the unwarranted deviation of the decision now on appeal from what is
indicated by the law and authoritative decisions.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; COMMISSION OF ACTS OF VIOLENCE DURING STAGING OF STRIKE; LEGAL EFFECT
THEREOF; RESPONSIBILITY THEREFOR INDIVIDUAL NOT COLLECTIVE; RATIONALE; EXCEPTION. — A
strike otherwise valid, if violent in character, may be placed beyond the pale. Care is to be taken, however, especially
where an unfair labor practice is involved, to avoid stamping it with illegality just because it is tainted by such acts. To
avoid rendering illusory the recognition of the right to strike, responsibility in such a case should be individual and not
collective. A different conclusion would be called for, of course, if the existence of force while the strike lasts is
pervasive and widespread, consistently and deliberately resorted to as a matter of policy. It could be reasonably
concluded then that even if justified as to ends, it becomes illegal because of the means employed . . . Except on
those few days specified then, the Shell Company could not allege that the strike was conducted in a manner other
than peaceful. Under the circumstances, it would be going too far to consider that it thereby became illegal This is
not by any means to condone the utilization of force by labor to attain its objectives. It is only to show awareness that
in labor conflicts, the tension that fills the air as well as the feeling of frustration and bitterness could break out in
sporadic acts of violence. If there be in this case a weighing of interests in the balance, the ban the law imposes on
unfair labor practices by management that could provoke a strike and its requirement that it be conducted peaceably,
it would be, to repeat, unjustified, considering all the facts disclosed, to stamp the strike with illegality. It is enough
that individual liability be incurred by those guilty of such acts of violence that call for loss of employee status. Such
an approach is reflected in our recent decisions. As was realistically
BARREDO, J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; LABOR RELATIONS; RIGHT TO STRIKE; DETERMINATION OF
LEGALITY OR ILLEGALITY OF A STRIKE. — As a general rule labor’s most potent and effective weapon is the
strike, and it is but natural that when things appear to be dimming on the negotiation tables, labor should almost
instinctively take a striking posture. In other words, the determination of the legality or illegality of a strike, particularly
in this enlightened era of progressive thinking on labor-management relations is something that cannot be achieved
by mere straight-jacketed legalistic argumentation and rationalization; the process is broader and deeper than that,
for to do justice in deciding such an issue, it is imperative that utmost consideration should be given to the particular
circumstances of each case, with a view to having the most comprehensive understanding of the motivations of the
parties, in the light of human needs, on the part of labor, and in the perspective of the orderly and economical
conduct of business and industry, on the part of management. In this particular case, for instance, I cannot agree that
respondent has violated its collective bargaining agreement with petitioner, but, on the other hand, I am not ready to
conclude that for this reason, the strike here in question was consequently illegal. I hold that the two strike votes
taken by the members of the petitioning union were both premised on the sincere and honest belief that there was a
legal breach of the said agreement. That now I find, as the Industrial Court did, that technically and in truth, there
was no such infringement did not of necessity stamp the said strike with the stigma of illegality.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; RESPONSIBILITY FOR ACTS OF VIOLENCE DURING STRIKE INDIVIDUALIZED. — The Court has
individualized the respective responsibilities of the strikers herein involved because such exactly is what the justice of
the situation demands. The reinstatement of those relatively innocent cannot be but only fair and equitable and the
approval of the lay-off of those found to have acted beyond the requirements of the circumstances is founded on
sound policy. In simple terms, I hold that the mere fact that a strike is not illegal, and I want to emphasize here that
there is, in my opinion, a large shade of difference between a strike that is really justified and legal and one that is
merely held not to be illegal, cannot be an excuse for resort to violence. Even picketing which is the sister remedy of
strikes is not supposed to be completely unrestrained and unrestricted, and unprovoked violence, threats and duress
of more or less grave nature employed by strikers against person and property are twice removed from what can be
judicially tolerated. observed by the present Chief Justice, it is usually attended by "the excitement, the heat and the
passion of the direct participants in the labor dispute, at the peak thereof . . ." Barely four months ago, in Insular Life
Assurance Co., Ltd. Employees’ Association v. Insurance Life Assurance Co., Ltd. (L-25291, January 30, 1971, 37
SCRA 244) there is the recognition by this Court, speaking through Justice Castro, of picketing as such being
"inherently explosive." It is thus clear that not every form of violence suffices to affix the seal of illegality on a strike or
to cause the loss of employment by the guilty party.
The insistence on the part of respondent Shell Company of the Philippines to dissolve its security guard section,
stationed at its Pandacan Installation, notwithstanding its being embraced in, and its continuance as such thus
assured by an existing collective bargaining contract, resulted in a strike called by petitioner Shell Oil Workers’
Union, hereinafter to be designated as the Union, certified a month later on June 27, 1967 by the President to
respondent Court of Industrial Relations. Against its decision declaring the strike illegal primarily on the ground that
such dissolution was a valid exercise of a management prerogative, this appeal is taken. With due recognition that
the system of industrial democracy fostered in the regime of unionization and collective bargaining leaves room for
the free exercise of management rights, but unable to close our eyes to the violation of a contract still in force implicit
in such dissolution thus giving rise to an unfair labor practice, we cannot sustain respondent Court of Industrial
Relations. Consequently, the harsh and unwarranted sanction imposed, the dismissal of the security guards and the
84
officers of the Union, cannot stand. Insofar, however, as individual liability is deemed incurred for serious acts of
violence, whether committed by a leader or member of the Union, we leave things as adjudged.
The deep-rooted differences between the parties that led to the subsequent strike were made clear in the
presidential certification. As set forth in the opening paragraph of the decision now on appeal: "Before this Court for
resolution is the labor dispute between the petitioner Shell Oil Workers’ Union, Union for brevity, and the respondent
Shell Company of the Philippines Limited, Company for short, which was certified to this Court on June 27, 1967 by
the Office of the President of the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to the provision of Section 10 of Republic Act
No. 875. Said dispute . . .’was a result of the transfer by the Company of the eighteen (18) security guards to its other
department and the consequent hiring of a private security agency to undertake the work of said security guards.’" 1
The respective contentions of the parties were then taken up. Petitioner "filed the petition on July 7, 1967 alleging,
among others, that the eighteen (18) security guards affected are part of the bargaining unit and covered by the
existing collective bargaining contract, and as such, their transfers and eventual dismissals are illegal being done in
violation of the existing contract. It, therefore, prayed that said security guards be reinstated with full back wages
from the time of their dismissal up to the time of their actual reinstatement." 2 Then came a summary of the stand of
Shell Company: "For hours hereafter, respondent Company filed its Answer [to] the material allegations in the
Union’s petition and adverted that the issues in this case are: (1) whether or not the Company commits unfair labor
practice in contracting out its security service to an independent professional security agency and reassigning the 18
guards to other sections of the Company; (2) whether or not the dismissal of the 18 security guards are justified; and
(3) whether or not the strike called by the Union on May 25, 1967 is legal. As special and affirmative defenses, the
Company maintained that in contracting out the security service and redeploying the 18 security guards affected, it
was merely performing its legitimate prerogative to adopt the most efficient and economical method of operation; that
said guards were transferred to other sections with increase, except for four (4) guards, in rates of pay and with
transfer bonus; that said action was motivated by business consideration in line with past established practice and
made after notice to and discussion with the Union; that the 18 guards concerned were dismissed for wilfully refusing
to obey the transfer order; and that the strike staged by the Union on May 25, 1967 is illegal. Primarily, Company
prayed, among others, for the dismissal of the Union’s petition and the said Union’s strike be declared illegal followed
by the termination of the employee status of those responsible and who participated in said illegal strike." 3
The move for the dissolution of the security section by reassigning the guards to other positions and contracting out
such service to an outside security agency had its origins as far back as 1964. A study made by the Shell Company
for the purpose of improving the productivity, organization and efficiency of its Pandacan Installation recommended
its dissolution. If an outside agency to perform such service were to be hired, there would be a savings of P96,000.00
annually in addition to further economy consequent on the elimination to overtime an administration expenses. Its
implementation was scheduled for 1965. 4 There was then, in July 1966, a joint consultation by the Union and
management on the matter. At that stage, it would appear that there was no serious opposition to such a move
provided it be done gradually and in close consultation with the Union. There was even an offer of cooperation as
long as a scheme for retirement of the security guards affected or their redeployment would be followed. 5
The tentative character of such proposed dissolution was made evident by the fact however that on August 26, 1966,
a collective bargaining contract was executed between the Union and the Shell Company effective from the first of
the month of that year to December 31, 1969. It contained the usual grievance procedure and no strike clauses. 6
More relevant to the case before this Court, however, was the inclusion of the category of the security guards in such
collective bargaining contract. This was stressed in the brief for the petitioner where specific mention is made of the
agreement covering rank and file personnel regularly employed by the Company, included in which is the work area
covered by the Pandacan Installation. 7 There was likewise specific reference to such positions in the wage schedule
for hourly-rated categories appearing in an appendix thereof. 8 Mention was expressly made in another appendix of
the regular remuneration as well as premium pay and night compensation. 9 Nonetheless, Shell Company was bent
on doing away with the security guard section, to be replaced by an outside security agency. That was
communicated to the Union in a panel to panel meeting on May 3, 1967. A counter-offer on the part of the Union to
reduce the working days per week of the guards from six to five was rejected by Shell Company on the ground of its
being unusual and impracticable. Two days later, there was a meeting of the Union where a majority of the members
made clear that should there be such a replacement of the company guards by a private security agency, there
would be a strike. It was noted in the decision that when the strike vote was taken, out of 243 members, 226 were for
the approval of a motion to that effect. 10 On the afternoon of May 24, 1967, a notice of reassignment effective at 8:
00 o’clock the next morning was handed to the guards affected. At 10 :00 o’clock that evening, there was a meeting
by the Union attended by ten officers and a majority of the members wherein it was agreed viva voce that if there
would be an implementation of the circular dissolving the security section to be replaced by guards from an outside
agency, the Union would go on strike immediately. 11 The strike was declared at half-past 7:00 o’clock in the
morning of May 25, 1967 when security guards from an outside agency were trying to pass the main gate of the Shell
Company to start their work. With the picket line established, they were unable to enter. Efforts were made by the
Conciliation Service of the Department of Labor to settle the matter, but they were unsuccessful. 12 It was not until
June 27, 1967, however, that the Presidential certification came. 13 There was a return to work order on July 6, 1967
by respondent Court, by virtue of which pending the resolution of the case, the Shell Company was not to lockout the
employees involved and the employees in turn were not to strike.
The decision of respondent Court was rendered on August 5, 1967. It declared that no unfair labor practice was
committed by Shell Company in dissolving its security guards from an outside agency, as such a step was well within
management prerogative. Hence for it, the strike was illegal, there being no compliance with the statutory requisites
before an economic strike could be staged. Respondent Court sought to reinforce such a conclusion by a finding that
its purpose was not justifiable and that it was moreover carried out with violence. There was thus a failure on its part
to accord due weight to the terms of an existing collective bargaining agreement. Accordingly, as was made clear in
the opening paragraph of this opinion, we view matters differently. The strike cannot be declared illegal, there being
a violation of the collective bargaining agreement by Shell Company. Even if it were otherwise, however, this Court
cannot lend sanction of its approval to the outright dismissal of all union officers, a move that certainly would have
the effect of considerably weakening a labor organization, and thus in effect frustrate the policy of the Industrial
Peace Act to encourage unionization. To the extent, however, that the serious acts of violence occurring in the
course of the strike could be made the basis for holding responsible a leader or a member of the Union guilty of their
commission, what was decided by respondent Court should not be disturbed.
1. It is the contention of Shell Company, sustained by respondent Court, that the dissolution of the security guard
section to be replaced by an outside agency is a management prerogative. The Union argues otherwise, relying on
the assurance of the continued existence of a security guard section at least during the lifetime of the collective
bargaining agreement. The second, third and fourth assignment of errors, while they could have been more
felicitously worded, did attack the conclusion reached by respondent Court as contrary to and in violation of the
existing contract. It is to be admitted that the stand of Shell Company as to the scope of management prerogative is
not devoid of plausibility if it were not bound by what was stipulated. The growth of industrial democracy fostered by
the institution of collective bargaining with the workers entitled to be represented by a union of their choice, has no
doubt contracted the sphere of what appertains solely to the employer. It would be going too far to assert, however,
that a decision on each and every aspect of the productive process must be reached jointly by an agreement
between labor and management. Essentially, the freedom to manage the business remains with management. It still
has plenty of elbow room for making its wishes prevail. In much the same way that labor unions may be expected to
resist to the utmost what they consider to be an unwelcome intrusion into their exclusive domain, they cannot justly
object to management equally being jealous of its prerogatives.
More specifically, it cannot be denied the faculty of promoting efficiency and attaining economy by a study of what
units are essential for its operation. To it belongs the ultimate determination of whether services should be performed
by its personnel or contracted to outside agencies. It is the opinion of the Court, that while management has the final
say on such matter, the labor union is not to be completely left out. What was done by Shell Company in informing
the Union as to the step it was intending to take on the proposed dissolution of the security guard section to be
replaced by an outside agency is praise-worthy. There should be mutual consultation eventually deference is to be
paid to what management decides. Thereby, in the words of Chief Justice Warren, there is likely to be achieved
"peaceful accommodation of conflicting interest." 14 In this particular case though, what was stipulated in an existing
collective bargaining contract certainly precluded Shell Company from carrying out what otherwise would have been
within its prerogative if to do so would be violative thereof.
2. The crucial question thus is whether the then existing collective bargaining contract running for three years from
August 1, 1966 to December 31, 1969 constituted a bar to such a decision reached by management? The answer
must be in the affirmative. As correctly stressed in the brief for the petitioner, there was specific coverage concerning
the security guard section in the collective bargaining contract. It is found not only in the body thereof but in the two
appendices concerning the wage schedules as well as the premium pay and the night compensation to which the
personnel in such section were entitled. 15 It was thus an assurance of security of tenure, at least, during the lifetime
of the agreement. Nor is it a sufficient answer, as set forth in the decision of respondent Court, that while such a
85
section would be abolished, the guards would not be unemployed as they would be transferred to another position
with an increase in pay and with a transfer bonus. For what is involved is the integrity of the agreement reached, the
terms of which should be binding on both parties. One of them may be released, but only with the consent of the
other. The right to object belongs to the latter, and if exercised, must be respected. Such a state of affairs should
continue during the existence of the contract. Only thus may there be compliance with and fulfillment of the
covenants in a valid subsisting agreement.
What renders the stand of Shell Company even more vulnerable is the fact that as set forth in its brief and as found
by respondent Court as far back as 1964, it had already been studying the matter of dissolving the security guard
section and contracting out such service to an Outside agency. Apparently, it had reached a decision to that effect for
implementation the next year. In July 1966, there was a joint consultation between it and the Union on the matter.
Nonetheless on August 26, 1966, a collective bargaining contract was entered into which, as indicated above, did
assure the continued existence of the security guard section. The Shell Company did not have to agree to such a
stipulation. Or it could have reserved the right to effect a dissolution and reassign the guards. It did not do so.
Instead, when it decided to take such a step resulting in the strike, it would rely primarily on provisions in the
collective bargaining contract couched in general terms, merely declaratory of certain management prerogatives.
Considering the circumstances of record, there can be no justification then for Shell Company’s insistence on
pushing through its project of such dissolution without thereby incurring a violation of the collective bargaining
agreement.
3. The Shell Company, in failing to manifest fealty to what was stipulated in an existing collective bargaining contract,
was thus guilty of an unfair labor practice. Such a doctrine first found expression in Republic Savings Bank v. Court
of Industrial Relations, 16 the opinion of the Court being penned by Justice Castro. There was a reiteration of such a
view in Security Bank Employees Union v. Security Bank and Trust Company. 17 Thus: "It being expressly provided
in the Industrial Peace Act that [an] unfair labor practice is committed by a labor union or its agent by its refusal ‘to
bargain collectively with the employer’ and this Court having decided in the Republic Savings Bank case that
collective bargaining does not end with the execution of an agreement, being a continuous process, the duty to
bargain necessarily imposing on the parties the obligation to live up to the terms of such a collective bargaining
agreement if entered into, it is undeniable that non-compliance therewith constitutes an unfair labor practice." 18
4. Accordingly, the unfair labor practice strike called by the Union did have the impress of validity. Rightly, labor is
justified in making use of such a weapon in its arsenal to counteract what is clearly outlawed by the Industrial Peace
Act. That would be one way to assure that the objectives of unionization and collective bargaining would not be
thwarted. It could, of course, file an unfair labor practice case before the Court of Industrial Relations. It is not
precluded, however, from relying on its own resources to frustrate such an effort on the part of an employer. So we
have consistently held — and for the soundest of reasons. 19
There is this categorial pronouncement from the present Chief Justice: "Again, the legality of the strike follows as a
corollary to the finding of fact, made in the decision appealed from — which is supported by substantial evidence —
to the effect that the strike had been triggered by the Company’s failure to abide by the terms and conditions of its
collective bargaining agreement with the Union, by the discrimination, resorted to by the company, with regard to hire
and tenure of employment, and the dismissal of employees due to union activities, as well as the refusal of the
company to bargain collectively in good faith." 20 As a matter of fact, this Court has gone even further. It is not even
required that there be in fact an unfair labor practice committed by the employer. It suffices, if such a belief in good
faith is entertained by labor, as the inducing factor for staging a strike. So it was clearly stated by the present Chief
Justice while still a Associate Justice of this Court: "As a consequence, we hold that the strike in question had been
called to offset what petitioners were warranted in believing in good faith to be unfair labor practices on the part of
Management, that petitioners were not bound, therefore, to wait for the expiration of thirty (30) days from notice of
strike before staging the same, that said strike was net, accordingly, illegal and that the strikers had not thereby lost
their status as employees of respondents herein." 21
5. It would thus appear that the decision now on appeal did not reflect sufficient awareness of authoritative
pronouncements coming from this Court. What is worse, certain portions thereof yield the impression that an attitude
decidedly unsympathetic to labor’s resort to strike is evident. Such should not be the case. The right to self-
organization so sedulously guarded by the Industrial Peace Act explicitly includes the right "to engage in concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining and to the mutual aid or protection." 22 From and after June 17,
1953 then, there cannot be the least doubt that a strike as form of concerted activity has the stamp of legitimacy. As
a matter of law, even under the regime of compulsory arbitration under the Court of Industrial Relations Act, 23 a
strike was by no means a forbidden weapon. Such is the thought embodied in the opinion of Justice Laurel in Rex
Taxicab Company v. Court of Industrial Relations. 24 Thus: "In other words, the employee, tenant or laborer is
inhibited from striking or walking out of his employment only when so enjoined by the Court of Industrial Relations
and alter a dispute has been submitted thereto and pending award or decision by the court of such dispute. It follows
that, as in the present case, the employees or laborers may strike before being ordered not to do so and before an
industrial dispute is submitted to the Court of Industrial Relations, subject to the power of the latter, after hearing
when public interest so requires or when the dispute cannot, in its opinion, be promptly decided or settled, to order
them to return, with the consequence that if the strikers fail to return to work, when so ordered, the court may
authorize the employer to accept other employees or laborers." 25 Former Chief Justice Paras, in a case not too long
before enactment of the Industrial Peace Act, had occasion to repeat such a view. Thus: "As a matter of fact, a strike
may not be staged only when, during the pendency of an industrial dispute, the Court of Industrial Relations has
issued the proper injunction against the laborers (section 19, Commonwealth Act No. 103, as amended). Capital
need not, however, be apprehensive about the recurrence of strikes in view of the system of compulsory arbitration
by the Court of Industrial Relations." 26
A strike then, in the apt phrase of Justice J.B.L. Reyes, is "an institutionalized factor of democratic growth." 27 This is
to foster industrial democracy. Implicit in such a concept is the recognization that concerning the ends which labor
considers worthwhile, its wishes are ordinarily entitled to respect. Necessarily so, the choice as to when such an
objective may be attained by striking likewise belongs to it. There is the rejection of the concept that an outside
authority, even if governmental, should make the decisions for it as to ends which are desirable and how they may
be achieved. The assumption is that labor can be trusted to determine for itself when the right to strike may be
availed of in order to attain a successful fruition in their disputes with management. It is true that there is a
requirement in the Act that before the employees may do so, they must file with the Conciliation Service of the
Department of Labor a notice of their intention to strike. 28 Such a requisite however, as has been repeatedly
declared by this Court, does not have to be complied with in case of unfair labor practice strike, which certainly is
entitled to greater judicial protection if the Industrial Peace Act is to be rendered meaningful. What has been said
thus far would demonstrate the unwarranted deviation of the decision now on appeal from what is indicated by the
law and authoritative decisions.
6. Respondent Court was likewise impelled to consider the strike illegal because of the violence that attended it.
What is clearly within the law is the concerted activity of cessation of work in order that a union’s economic demands
may be granted or that an employer cease and desist from an unfair labor practice. That the law recognizes as a
right. There is though a disapproval of the utilization of force to attain such an objective. For implicit in the very
concept of a legal order is the maintenance of peaceful ways. A strike otherwise valid, if violent in character, may be
placed beyond the pale. Care is to be taken, however, especially where an unfair labor practice is involved, to avoid
stamping it with illegality just because it is tainted by such acts. To avoid rendering illusory the recognition of the right
to strike, responsibility in such a case should be individual and not collective. A different conclusion would be called
for, of course, if the existence of force while the strike lasts is pervasive and widespread, consistently and
deliberately resorted to as a matter of policy. It could be reasonably concluded then that even if justified as to ends, it
becomes illegal because of the means employed.
Respondent Court must have unduly impressed by the evidence submitted by the Shell Company to the effect that
the strike was marred by acts of force, intimidation and violence on the evening of June 14 and twice in the mornings
of June 15 and 16, 1967 in Manila. Attention was likewise called to the fact that even on the following day, with police
officials stationed at the strike-bound area, molotov bombs did explode and the streets were obstructed with wooden
planks containing protruding nails. Moreover, in the branches of the Shell Company in Iloilo City as well as in
Bacolod, on dates unspecified, physical injuries appeared to have been inflicted on management personnel.
Respondent Court in the appealed decision did penalize with loss of employment the ten individuals responsible for
such acts. For is it to be lost sight of that before the certification on June 27, 1967, one month had elapsed during
which the Union was on strike. Except on those few days specified then, the Shell Company could not allege that the
strike was conducted in a manner other than peaceful. Under the circumstances, it would be going too far to consider
that it thereby became illegal. This is not by any means to condone the utilization of force by labor to attain its
objectives. It is only to show awareness that in labor conflicts, the tension that fills the air as well as the feeling of
frustration and bitterness could break out in sporadic acts of violence. If there be in this case a weighing of interests
in the balance, the ban the law imposes on unfair labor practices by management that could provoke a strike and its
requirement that it be conducted peaceably, it would be, to repeat, unjustified, considering all the facts disclosed, to
86
stamp the strike with illegally. It is enough that individual liability be incurred by those guilty of such acts of violence
that call for loss of employee status.
Such an approach is reflected in our recent decisions. As was realistically observed by the present Chief Justice, it is
usually attended by "the excitement, the heat and the passion of the direct participants in the labor dispute, at the
peak thereof . . ." 29 Barely four months ago, in Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. Employees’ Association v. Insular
Life Assurance Co., Ltd., 30 there is the recognition by this Court, speaking through Justice Castro, of picketing as
such being "inherently explosive." 31 It is thus clear that not every form of violence suffices to affix the seal of
illegality on a strike or to cause the loss of employment by the guilty party.
7. In the light of the foregoing, there being a valid unfair labor practice strike, the loss of employment decreed by
respondent Court on all the Union officers cannot stand. The premise on which such penalty was decreed was the
illegality of the strike. We rule differently. Hence, its imposition is unwarranted. It is to be made clear, however, that
because of the commission of specific serious acts of violence, the Union’s President, Gregorio Bacsa, as well as its
Assistant Auditor, Conrado Peña, did incur such a penalty. 32
On this point, it may be observed further that even if there was a mistake in good faith by the Union that an unfair
labor practice was committed by the Shell Company when such was not the case, still the wholesale termination of
employee status of all the officers of the Union, decreed by respondent Court, hardly commends itself for approval.
Such a drastic blow to a labor organization, leaving it leaderless, has serious repercussions. The immediate effect is
to weaken the Union. New leaders may of course emerge. It would not be unlikely under the circumstances, that they
would be less than vigorous in the prosecution of labor’s claims. They may be prove to fall victims to counsels of
timidity and apprehension. At the forefront of their consciousness must be an awareness that a mistaken move could
well mean their discharge from employment. That would be to render the right to self-organization illusory.
The plain and unqualified constitutional command of protection to labor should not be lost eight of. 33 The State is
thus under obligation to lend its aid and its succor to the efforts of its labor elements to improve their economic
condition. It is now generally accepted that unionization is a means to such an end. It should be encouraged.
Thereby, labor’s strength, what there is of it, becomes solidified. It can bargain as a collectivity. Management then
will not always have the upper hand nor be in a position to ignore its just demands. That, at any rate, is the policy
behind the Industrial Peace Act. The judiciary and administrative agencies in construing it must ever be conscious of
its implications. Only thus may there be fidelity to what is ordained by the fundamental law. For if it were otherwise,
instead of protection, there would be neglect or disregard. That is to negate the fundamental principle that the
Constitution is the supreme law.
WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Court of Industrial Relations of August 5, 1967 is reversed, the finding of
illegality of the strike declared by the Shell Oil Workers’ Union on May 25, 1967 not being in accordance with law.
Accordingly, the dismissal by the Shell Company on May 27, 1967 of the eighteen security guards, 34 with the
exception of Ernesto Crisostomo, who was found guilty of committing a serious act of violence is set aside and they
are declared reinstated. The continuance of their states as such is, however, dependent on whether or not a security
guard section is provided for in the collective bargaining contract entered into after the expiration of the contract that
expired on December 31, 1969. The loss of employee status of the officers of the Union, 35 decreed by respondent
Court in its decision, is likewise set aside, except as to Gregorio Bacsa and Conrado Peña, both of whom did commit
serious acts of violence. The termination of the employee status of Nestor Samson, Jose Rey, Romeo Rosales,
Antonio Labrador and Sesinando Romero, who committed acts of violence not serious in character, is also set aside,
but while allowed to be reinstated, they are not entitled to back pay. Ricardo Pagsibigan and Daniel Barraquel, along
with the aforesaid Gregorio Bacsa, Conrado Peña and Ernesto Crisostomo, were legally penalized with dismissal
because of the serious acts of violence committed by them in the course of the strike. The rest of the employees laid
off should be reinstated with back pay to be counted from the date they were separated by virtue of the appealed
decision, from which should be deducted whatever earnings may have been received by such employees during
such period. The case is hereby remanded to respondent Court for the implementation of this decision. In
ascertaining the back wages to which the security guards are entitled, it must likewise be ascertained whether or not
the security guard section is continued after December 31, 1969. Without costs.
Separate Opinions
BARREDO, J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
To be sure, a dissent from the opinion ably written by Our learned colleague, Justice Fernando, may not be entirely
without some agree of plausibility. To begin with, the basic conclusion of fact of the Court of Industrial Relations in
the appealed decision, which by law and the previously unbroken line of decisions of this Court on the point, We
cannot lightly set aside, seem to be logical and supported by evidence not seriously disputed. Withal, when it is
considered that there is nothing in the record to show that in acting as it did in this case, respondent shall Company,
Ltd. was not actuated by any anti-union, much less anti-labor motive but by purely economic reasons of sound
management, and, in fact, petitioner does not even suggest any such purpose, one must have to hesitate and
deliberate long and hard before giving assent to a pronouncement that this respondent is guilty of unfair labor
practice, such as to legalize the strike declared by petitioner against it. I take it, however, that in a larger sense this is
a policy decision, and all things considered, particularly the constitutional injunctions on social justice and protection
to labor, I prefer to err, since the juridical considerations and equities in this case appear to my mind and conscience
to be in equipoise, on the side of labor, who, as I see it, acted in the same good faith that management did. I must
hasten to add though, that in thus referring to labor, I do not have in mind the union leaders involved in this case to
whom the Court of Industrial Relations has attributed personal reasons for their attitude, but I am thinking more of
those security guards who felt uncertain about the ultimate consequences of their transfer ordered by respondent
and naturally found nothing to hold on was the protection of the collective bargaining agreement which they had a
right to assume insured the substantial continuance of the terms and conditions of their employment contemplated in
said agreement at the time it was entered into.
Contrary to the conclusion of the distinguished writer of the main opinion, I regret to say that the record amply
supports the finding of the Industrial Court that the transfer of the eighteen security guards concerned was not a
violation of the collective bargaining agreement between petitioner and saidRespondent. The more I go over the
considerations of the appealed decision, the more I am convinced not only that the move was never tinged by any
anti-labor hue but also that respondent had from the very beginning taken petitioner and its duly authorized
representatives in its long study and deliberation of the problems, which took years, and had, in fact, consulted them
on various aspects thereof. It is not denied that the maintenance of security is not the only aspect of its multifarious
departments it has decided to contract out; petitioner did not object to the previous ones. Indeed, it is safe to
conjecture that petitioner has always seen the point of respondent, principally the economy it would achieve and the
consequent benefits labor might gain thereby. In this connection, I particularly note that there is nothing in the record
indicating that there is factual basis for petitioner’s claim that the security guards herein involved would surely suffer
economic loss as a result of their questioned transfer; respondent made it plain that overtime and other benefits
accruing to them as security guards would likewise be given to them in their new positions. And in answer to
petitioner’s almost rhetorical question, why were said guards being given additional hourly pay and lump sum
bonuses, if respondent did not feel that their rights were being violated, it is perhaps not unreasonable to suppose
that management simply felt that as the company was to save money by contracting out its security maintenance, it
was but proper that the affected sector of labor should share a part of its savings.
All these, however, do not mean, on the other hand, that petitioner’s strike should necessarily be held to be illegal. It
is always a wholesome attitude in cases of this nature to give but secondary importance to strict technicalities,
whether of substantive or remedial law, and to constantly bear in mind the human values involved which are beyond
pecuniary estimation. As a general rule, labor’s most potent and effective weapon is the strike, and it is but natural
that when things appear to be dimming on the negotiation tables, labor should almost instinatively take a striking
posture. In other words, the determination of the legality or illegality of a strike, particularly in this enlightened era of
progressive thinking on labor-management relations is something that cannot be achieved by mere straight-jacketed
legalistic argumentation and rationalization; the process is broader and deeper than that, for to do justice in deciding
such an issue, it is imperative that utmost consideration should be given to the particular circumstances of each
case, with a view to having the most comprehensive understanding of the motivations of the parties, in the light of
human needs, on the part of labor, and in the perspective of the orderly and economical conduct of business and
industry, on the part of management. In this particular case, for instance, I cannot agree that respondent has violated
its collective bargaining agreement with petitioner, but, on the other hand, I am not ready to conclude that for this
reason, the strike here in question was consequently illegal. I hold that the two strike votes taken by the members of
the petitioning union were both premised on the sincere and honest belief that there was a legal breach of the said
agreement. That now I find, as the Industrial Court did, that technically and in truth, there was no such infringement
did not of necessity stamp the said strike with the stigma of illegality.
87
It may not be amiss to add at this juncture, to allay and disabuse possible apprehension that the main opinion may
conceivably produce in some quarters, that I do not discern in it any prejudice on the part of Justice Fernando, strictly
pro-labor and anti-management. Precisely, I am giving my concurrence to the judgment in this case because I am
convinced that, fundamentally, he has also viewed the situation at hand in the light of the above considerations, even
if Our respective approaches and articulation of views have to differ, since I do not own all the perspectives whence
he gives support to his conclusions, because I personally do not find any necessity to resort to other authorities,
when I feel that plain reasoning, predicated on commonly accepted principles and reliance on one’s proper sense of
justice can suffice for the occasion.
I also concur in the sanctions ordered in the main opinion. The Court has individualized the respective
responsibilities of the strikers herein involved because such exactly is what the justice of the situation demands. The
reinstatement of those relatively innocent cannot be but only fair and equitable and the approval of the lay-off of
those found to have acted beyond the requirements of the circumstances is founded on sound policy. In simple
terms, I hold that the mere fact that a strike is not illegal, and I want to emphasize here that there is, in my opinion, a
large shade of difference between a strike that is really justified and legal and one that is merely held not to be illegal,
cannot be an excuse for resort to violence. Even picketing which is the sister remedy of strikes is not supposed to be
completely unrestrained and unrestricted, and unprovoked violence, threats and duress of more or less grave nature
employed by strikers against person and property are twice removed from what can be judicially tolerated.
13. Ibid., p. 77. The decision under review speaks of the efforts exerted by the Union leaders who were also
prominent personalities in the Shell Terminal Employees Savings and Loans Association to avoid the contemplated
strike if further financial concessions were to be extended to them. Since, however, it is obvious from the decision
itself that the strike was approved not once but twice by the Union membership, its cause being due to the
dissolution of the security guard section as noted in the Presidential certification and the pleadings of the parties, no
legal relevance is to be attributed to such activities on the part of the Union leaders in the consideration of the crucial
issues posed by this litigation.
14. Fibreboard Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 379 US 203 (1964). The relevant portion of Chief Justice
Warren’s opinion is well-worth quoting: "The Company was concerned with the high cost of its maintenance
operation. It was induced to contract out the work by assurances from independent contractors that economies could
be derived by reducing the work force, decreasing fringe benefits, and eliminating overtime payments. These have
long been regarded as matters peculiarly suitable for resolution within the collective bargaining framework, and
industrial experience demonstrates that collective negotiation has been highly successful in achieving peaceful
accommodation of the conflicting interests. Yet, it is contended that when an employer can effect cost savings in
these respects by contracting the work out, there is no need to attempt to achieve similar economies through
negotiation with existing employees or to provide them with an opportunity to negotiate a mutually acceptable
alternative. The short answer is that, although it is not possible to say whether a satisfactory solution could be
reached, national labor policy is founded upon the congressional determination that the chances are good enough to
warrant subjecting such issues to the process of collective negotiation." At pp. 212-213.
21. Ferrer v. Court of Industrial Relations, L-24267, May 31, 1966, 17 SCRA 352, 360. The Ferrer doctrine was
followed in Norton & Harrison Co. & Jackbilt Concrete Blocks Co. Labor Union v. Norton Harrison Co. & Jackbilt
Concrete Blocks Co., Inc., L-18461, Feb. 10, 1967, 19 SCRA 310.
22. Section 3 of the Industrial Peace Act reads in full: "Employees shall have the right to self-organization and to
form, join or assist labor organizations of their own choosing for the purpose of collective bargaining through
representatives of their own choosing and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining
and other mutual aid or protection. Individuals employed as supervisors shall not be eligible for membership in a
labor organization of employees under their supervision but may form separate organizations of their own."cralaw
virtua1aw library
28. Section 14 of the Industrial Peace Act provides in full:" (a) Whenever a party desires to negotiate an agreement,
it shall serve a written notice upon the other party, with a statement of its proposals. The other party shall make a
reply thereto not later than ten days from receipt of such proposals. (b) In case differences shall arise on the basis of
such proposals and reply, either party may request a conference which shall begin not later than ten days from the
making of such request. Both parties shall endeavor in such conference to settle the dispute amicably and
expeditiously. (c) If the dispute is not settled by conference and the Conciliations Service of the Department of Labor
intervenes in the dispute, it shall be the duty of each party to participate fully and promptly in such meetings and
conferences as the Service may undertake. (d) Before an employer may lockout his employees or the employees
may strike, either party as the case may be, must file with the Conciliation Service thirty days prior thereto a notice of
their intention to strike or lockout the employees. Such notice shall be in a form to be prescribed by the Chief of the
Conciliation Service."cralaw virtua1aw library
31. Ibid., p. 273. Mathews on Labor Relations and the Law was cited to this effect: "For as pointed out by one author,
‘The picket line is an explosive front, charged with the emotions and fierce loyalties of the union-management
dispute. It may be marked by colorful name-calling, intimidating threats or sporadic fights between the pickets and
those who pass the line.’" Teller was likewise cited to the effect that fist fighting between union end non-union
employees in the midst of a strike is no bar to reinstatement. At p. 272.
32. It would likewise follow that no punitive sanction should be imposed on the eighteen security guards except for
Ernesto Crisostomo who was rightfully held accountable for the act of violence attributed to him.
33. Art. XIV, Sec. 6 of the Constitution reads as follows: "The State shall afford protection to labor, especially to
working women and minors, and shall regulate the relations between landowner and tenant, and between labor and
capital in industry and in agriculture. The State may provide for compulsory arbitration." The eighteen security guards
are: E. Crisostomo, P. Falculan, B. Bicomong, F. Flores, L. Francisco, B. Velasco, D. Pascual, J. Suarez, J. Tuazon,
A. Jimenez, J. Linsangan, F. Solis, P. Carillo, V. Diaz, F. Bernardo, E. Mendoza, C. Bonus, and G. de Jesus.
34. The eighteen security guards are: E. Crisostomo, P. Falculan, B. Bicomong, F. Flores, L. Francisco, B. Velasco,
D. Pascual, B. Suarez, J. Tuazon, A. Jimenez, J. Linsangan, F. Solis, P. Carilo, V. Diaz, F. Bernardo, E. Mendoza,
C. Bunos, and G. de Jesus.
35. The thirteen officers of the Union are: G. Bacsa, E. Gaspar, E. Ocampo, D. Sahagun, J. Pilande, R. Constantino,
C. Peña, P. Calaunan, N. Samson, J. Rey, P. Sawyer, A. Talastas and J. Belangoy.
EN BANC
[G.R. Nos. L-24267-8. May 31, 1966.]
PERFECTO FERRER, OSCAR FLORES, JULIAN AGUSTIN, FELICISIMO LICHUGA, PIO SUMAGIT and
INHELDER LABORATORIES, INC. & SISTER COMPANIES EMPLOYEES UNION, Petitioners, v. COURT OF
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, INHELDER LABORATORIES INC., SAN ROQUE TRADINGCORPORATION AND/OR
HANS INHELDER, PRESIDENT AND GENERAL MANAGER, Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEE; STRIKE CALLED TO OFF-SET UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES BEFORE
EXPIRATION OF 30-DAY PERIOD; CASE AT BAR. — Petitioners filed a 30-day notice of strike upon the ground
that respondents had been "bargaining in bad faith." The management, in turn, filed unfair labor practice charges
against the Union, for alleged refusal to bargain. Meanwhile, the Management suspended, transferred and/or
demoted union members. Before the expiration of the 30-day period, petitioner declared a strike. Held: Although the
Management may have had the strict legal right to take disciplinary and other administrative measures against the
union members, however, the time chosen by the Management therefor justified the belief of the Union that the real
or main purpose of the Management was to discourage membership in the Union and to discredit the officers thereof.
The strike having been called to off-set what petitioners were warranted in believing in good faith to be unfair labor
practices on the part of the management, the petitioners were not bound to wait for the expiration of thirty (30) days
from notice of strike before staging the same. The strike was not, accordingly, illegal and the strikes had not thereby
lost their status as employees of respondents. Considering, however, that the latter have been absolved from the
charge of unfair labor practice, the reinstatement of the strikers must be without backpay.
88
These are two (2) unfair labor practice cases commenced in the Court of Industrial Relations. One (L-24268) was
filed by the Management of Inhelder Laboratories, Inc. and its sister companies (Inhelder Inc. and San Roque
Trading Corporation) against the Labor Union of employees thereof and some officers and members of the Union,
and the other (L-24267) by the latter against the former. Being interrelated, the two cases were jointly heard. In due
course, the trial Judge, Hon. Ansberto P. Paredes, rendered a decision dismissing the complaints in both cases. On
motion for reconsideration filed by the Management, the Court of Industrial Relations en banc, in a resolution penned
by Judge Emiliano C. Tabigne, and concurred "in the result" by Presiding Judge Arsenio I. Martinez and Associate
Judge Amando C. Bugayong, and with, in effect, the dissent of Judge Paredes, reconsidered the latter’s decision ,
insofar as it dismissed the complaint of the Management, and decreed that the officers and members of the Union
who had participated in a peaceful strike staged by the latter from July 1 to July 15, 1963, "be considered to have lost
their status as employees of the companies" aforementioned. Hence, this appeal by certiorari taken by the Union and
its members adversely affected by the said resolution.
The main issue in this appeal is whether said strike was illegal or not. Respondents herein maintain that it was,
because of petitioners’ failure to give a 30-day notice of their intention to strike and because the strike had allegedly
been called in bad faith. Upon the other hand, petitioners contend that it was not, for the reason that the strike was
provoked by alleged unfair labor practices on the part of the respondents and because said petitioners had acted in
good faith in staging said strike.
The records show that, immediately after an election held on March 27, 1963, in which Inhelder Laboratories, Inc.
and Sister Companies Employees Union obtained the requisite majority, the Union submitted to the Management of
said corporations a set of demands for a collective bargaining agreement(Exhibits A, A-1 and 3). This led to
negotiations, held, sometimes, with the intervention of the Conciliation Division of the Bureau of Labor, and,
sometimes, directly, between the representatives of the parties, without said intervention, and lasting for several
weeks. As an agreement was reached on some points, the same were incorporated into a draft of agreement, which,
in turn, became the basis for, or was followed by, further negotiations. As additional points of agreement were
reached, another draft of agreement was prepared.
In a meeting held before said Conciliation Division, in the morning of May 29, 1963, another such draft (Exhibit C-1)
was drawn, to which the Management refers as "final draft." However, petitioners’ representatives pressed for the
inclusion, in the agreement, of a union clause, an accumulated sick leave clause, and an accumulated vacation leave
clause, apart from the increase of the high cost of living monthly allowance from P20.00 to P30.00, the creation of a
grievance committee and a general salaryincrease. The negotiations continued in the afternoon of May 29, 1963,
and were resumed in the morning of May 30 or 31, 1963, in the course of which, respondents contend, the
Management agreed to increase the high cost of living allowance to P25.00, provided that the other demands were
withdrawn, to which petitioners allegedly gave their conformity. Another draft of agreement (Exhibit D) — which the
representative of Management, again, characterizes as "final" — was, accordingly, prepared, and the representatives
of both parties initialed it, with the understanding, according to respondents, that the agreement would be signed on
June 1, 1963. In the afternoon of May 31, 1963, petitioners’ representative called, however, that of Management and
asked for the inclusion in the agreement a union shop or union security clause. This request not having been
granted, the Union later refused to sign to agreement.
The Court of Industrial Relations en banc was of the opinion that, inasmuch as the document last mentioned (Exhibit
D) was a "final draft" of the agreement between the parties, and petitioners’ representatives had initialed said draft,
"the refusal . . . of the Union to sign the final or clean form of the contract on June 1, 1963, its refusal to honor Exhibit
D as a perfected contract and its insistence in negotiating the contract so recently after its perfection are constitutive
of bad faith" ; that the strike staged by the Union from July 1 to July 15, 1963, was illegal and those who took part in
it are deemed separated from the service.
Upon the other hand, His Honor, the trial Judge, held otherwise, upon the ground that the surrounding circumstances
were such that petitioners were reasonably justified in believing that the respondents’ acts constituted unfair labor
practices and that petitioners had to strike forthwith in order to arrest the evil effects of said practices upon the Union
and its members.
Upon a review of the record, we are inclined to agree with the latter view. That of the lower court en banc is mainly
anchored on the fact that the draft of agreement made and amended in the morning of May 30 or 31, 1963 (Exhibit
D), had been initialed by representatives of both parties and that the Management refers thereto as a "final draft." We
note, however, that the draft Exhibit C-1, prepared in the morning of May 29, 1963, is, likewise, called by the
Management as a "final" draft. Yet, admittedly, negotiations between the parties continued after the preparation of
said "final" draft, thus indicating, not only, that the alleged finality thereof reflected, at best, the unilateral opinion of
the Management, but, also, that even the latter did not consider it as expressive of a complete, definite and perfected
agreement with the petitioners, for, otherwise, the Management would not have participated in the negotiations that
took place or continued after the preparation of said Exhibit C-1.
These observations apply equally to the "draft" of agreement Exhibit D, prepared and amended in the afternoon of
May 29 and the morning of May 30 or 31, 1963. Moreover, the fact that both parties affixed their initials to this "draft"
Exhibit D does not necessarily prove that the same was more "final" than the "final draft" (Exhibit C-1) made in the
morning of May 29, 1963. Indeed, if the parties had reached, said afternoon and in the morning of May 30 or 31,
1963. a complete agreement on the terms and conditions of their proposed collective bargaining agreement, they
could have and would have signed Exhibit D that same morning, instead of agreeing that the document be formally
signed on June 1, 1963. In fact, the agreement to this effect suggests that the parties understood that a contract had
not, as yet, been perfected. As His Honor, the trial Judge, had aptly put it, Exhibit D was no more than a draft of
contract, not a contract in itself.
At this juncture, it is well to remember that, on March 29, 1963, the petitioners had written to the management the
letter Exhibit A (also marked as Exhibit 3) enclosing therewith a draft of the collective bargaining agreement (Exhibit
A-1) they would wish to have the management, as the basis for negotiations between both parties; that such
negotiations lasted from late in March to early in July, 1963; that, as they threshed out their points of difference,
those that had been settled were incorporated into another draft or agreement prepared by the management; that the
latter was followed by further negotiations on other points; that, when an agreement was reached thereon, another
draft incorporating said additional points was made; that when Exhibit D was prepared, several still pending
settlement; that among these points were the matter of inclusion in the agreement of a union shop or union security
clause, a vacation leave clause, and a sick leave clause, in addition to the increase of the high cost of living monthly
allowance from P20.00 to P30.00, and the organization of a grievance committee; that, although in the afternoon of
May 29, and the following morning or that of May 31, 1963, the management had agreed on the establishment of
said committee and the increase of the high cost of living monthly allowance to P25.00, this did not imply that
petitioners had given up their demand for a union shop or union security clause; and that, in the return-to- work
agreement signed by both parties on July 15, 1963 (Exhibits 1 and 2), said clause was, in fact, included.
In other words, contrary to what is intimated in the resolution appealed from, it is not true that petitioner had made
new demands, either on May 29 or on May 30 or 31, 1963. Indeed, the demand for a union shop or union security
clause, which was the main bone of contention, had been included in the draft of agreement Exhibit A-1 enclosed
with petitioners’ letter of March 29, 1963. What happened, merely, was that the demands incorporated in said draft
were discussed by both parties, one after the other; that an agreement on the former did not connote an
abandonment of the latter; and that, after the settlement of one issue, it was understood that the others would be
taken up thereafter.
It would appear, also, that, after the meeting with the representative of Management, in the morning of May 30, or 31,
1963, petitioners’ representatives reported to the Union the contents of Exhibit D, and that, when the Union members
learned that said document did not include the union shop or union security clause, they withdrew from their
representatives the authority to sign, on their behalf, the collective bargaining agreement with the Management.
Under these circumstances, said representatives could not validly sign said agreement, and their refusal to do so is
not and cannot be an act of bad faith.
Neither may the Union members be held to have acted in bad faith in so withdrawing said authority from their
representatives, unless the clause aforementioned were included in the agreement. That clause was part of their
original demands, as set forth in their draft of agreement Exhibit A-1, and their representatives could not waive it
without their consent.
As a matter of fact, there is reason to believe that when petitioners’ representatives did not sign on June 1, 1963 and
subsequently thereto the draft of agreement Exhibit D, as amended and initialed on May 30 or 31, upon the ground
that they had no authority to do so without the union shop or union, the Management suspected that this was a mere
excuse put up by said representatives of petitioners herein. Hence, on June 7, 1963, the Management sent a
memorandum (Exhibits 13 and I) to all of its employees, purporting to inform them of the status of the negotiations
89
with their representative, and stating that the latter had refused to sign the draft of agreement Exhibit D — copies of
which were made available to all employees — and instead "came out with a new 1 demand — ‘Union Shop’" —
upon the ground that such was the desire of the Union members, who had allegedly disauthorized the officers of the
Union.
Soon thereafter — or from June 10 to June 15, 1963 — several members of the Union resigned therefrom
irrevocably, effective on June 15, 1963, "in view of the apparent failure of our Union officers to enter into a working
agreement with our employer for the purpose of improving our lot even in a small way." 2 Considering that this is
false, for the Management had already yielded to the demand for an increase in the high cost of living allowance and
the creation of a grievance committee; that these resignations took place immediately after the Management had
dealt with the Union members directly, through the aforementioned memorandum; and that said resignations were
conveyed in identically worded communications (Exhibits 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10), some of which were mimeographed, it
was only natural for the petitioners to believe that said resignations had been inspired, if not exacted, by the
Management, and that the latter had resorted thereto in order to exert pressured upon the Union and compel the
same to sign the draft of agreement (Exhibit D) without the union shop or union security clause. Hence, on June 13,
1963, petitioners filed a 30-day notice of strike (Exhibits 5 and E), upon the ground that respondents had been
"bargaining in bad faith." However, the Management, in turn, filed unfair labor practice charges against the Union, for
alleged refusal to bargain.
Meanwhile, and thereafter — or from June 10 to June 22, 1963 — the Management had transferred two (2) members
of the Union, suspended a third one and assigned still another to a work less dignified than that which he did before.
3 So, on June 24, 1963, petitioners filed an unfair labor practice charge against the Management, for the suspension
or demotion of union members due allegedly to union activities. On June 25, 1963, the Union gave another notice of
strike upon the ground that the Management was engaged in unfair labor practices, by suspending, demoting,
intimidating and coercing union members, on account of their union activities. Thereafter and in accordance with a
strike from June 26, 1963, the Union staged a strike from July 1 to July 15, 1963, on which latter date the strike was
called off in conformity with return-to-work agreements Exhibits 1 and 2, then signed by both parties.
Although the Management may have had the strict legal right to take against union members the disciplinary and
other administrative measures above referred to, there is no denying the fact that the time chosen by the
Management therefor, when considered in relation with the attending circumstances, reasonably justified the belief of
the Union that the real or main purpose of the Management was to discourage membership in the Union, to discredit
the officers thereof, to weaken the Union and to induce or compel the same to sign the draft of agreement Exhibit D
as amended, on May 29 and 30 or 31, 1963. As stated in the decision of His Honor, the trial Judge, said belief was
confirmed by the fact that prosecutors of the Court of Industrial Relations found sufficient grounds to file and did file,
against the Management, a complaint for unfair labor practices.
In other words, both parties had performed acts which understandably induced each to believe that the other was
guilty of such practices — although, as we now analyze the whole situation, without the excitement, the heat and the
passion of the direct participants in the labor dispute, at the peak thereof, such belief may not turn out to be borne
out by the objective realities — and both were reasonably justified in taking the counter measures adopted by them.
As a consequence, we hold that the strike in question had been called to off-set what petitioners were warranted in
believing in good faith to be unfair labor practices on the part of Management, that petitioners were not bound,
therefore, to wait for the expiration of thirty (30) days from notice of strike before staging the same, that said strike
was not, accordingly, illegal and that the strikes had not thereby lost their status as employees of respondents
herein. Upon the other hand, considering that the latter have been absolved from the charge of unfair labor practice,
the reinstatement of the strikers must be without backpay.
Wherefore, the resolution appealed from should be, as it is hereby modified accordingly, without special
pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.
EN BANC
[G.R. Nos. L-25032 and L-25037-38. October 14, 1968.]
CEBU PORTLAND CEMENT COMPANY, Petitioner, v. CEMENT WORKERS UNION, LOCAL 7-ALU and COURT
OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; INDUSTRIAL PEACE ACT; STRIKE; RETURN TO WORK ORDER;
ENFORCEMENT OF A NEW COMPANY’S POLICY WOULD CONSTITUTE A VIOLATION OF A RETURN-TO-
WORK ORDER. — Considering that an order to return to work, which the Labor Court may properly issue in the
exercise of its power of arbitration and conciliation, is intended to restore the strikers to their positions in the
company under the last terms and conditions existing before the dispute arose (Section 19, Commonwealth Act 103),
the enforcement of a new company policy, requiring the employees to use up their earned leaves instead of
accumulating them, without judicial authorization, would constitute a violation of such order for the maintenance of
status quo in the relations between the workers and the company.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; EFFECTS OF ILLEGAL STRIKE; DOCTRINE IN NATIONAL LABOR UNION, INC., ET AL., v.
PHILIPPINE MATCH FACTORY (70 Phil. 300), ABANDONED; DISMISSAL OF WORKERS WHO TOOK PART IN
THE ILLEGAL STRIKE, EXCESSIVE PENALTY. — Petitioner’s contentions that the Court of Industrial Relations
committed grave abuse of discretion, in not ordering the dismissal of the workers who actively took part in the illegal
strike, invoking in support of its contention the ruling of this Court in the case of National Labor Union, Inc., Et. Al. v.
Philippine Match Factory (70 Phil. 300), cannot be sustained. The ruling in said case has since undergone a lot of
change. In fact, a reading of the decisions of the postwar Supreme Court on the effects of an illegal strike would
reveal the marked, if gradual, departure from the aforesaid doctrine, as was to be expected, in view of the change in
the regulation of labor relations, from compulsory arbitration under Commonwealth Act 103 to free bargaining under
Republic 875. The actual break-away from the doctrine laid down in the Philippine Match Factory case came in
Dinglasan v. National Labor Union, 106 Phil. 671, when the discretionary power of the Court of Industrial Relations to
grant affirmative relief was recognized. Thus, although it was therein found that there was no lock-out committed by
the employer and that the stoppage of work was voluntary on the part of the drivers, the order of the Labor Court for
the return of said drivers to their work was sustained. Finally, in 1964, this Court ruled that striking employees are
"entitled to reinstatement whether or not the strike was the consequence of the employer’s unfair labor practice", the
only exceptions thereto being in cases where the strike was not due to any unfair labor practice on the part of the
employer and said employer has hired others to take the place of the strikers, or where the strikers have committed
unlawful conduct or violence. Thereafter, the doctrine enunciated in Interwood Employees Association v.
International Hardwood & Veneer Co., 99 Phil. 82, that good faith of the strikers in the staging of the strike is
immaterial in the determination of the legality or illegality of the strike, was abandoned. In the case of Ferrer v. CIR,
Et Al., L-24267-68 May 31, 1966, the belief of the strikers that the management was committing unfair labor practice
was properly considered in declaring an otherwise premature strike, not unlawful, and in affirming the order of the
Labor Court for the reinstatement without back wages of said employees.
Petitions filed in this Court by the Cebu Portland Cement Company (CEPOC) for review of the singledecision of the
Court of Industrial Relations, in its Cases Nos. 35-IPA, 276-ULP-Cebu and 278-ULP-Cebu, on the following
grounds:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. The findings of the Court of Industrial Relations that there was discrimination against Union members in the
assignment of work during Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays, are not supported by substantial evidence;
2. The findings of the Court of Industrial Relations that there was discrimination in the appointment of Union
members to permanent positions, are not supported by substantial evidence;
3. The management of petitioner CEPOC has power to compel its employees and workers to take vacation and/or
sick leaves of absence whenever its finances so warrant; and
4. The Court of Industrial Relations gravely abused its discretion in not ordering the dismissal from the service of the
workers or employees who actively participated in the strike of March 24, 1961.
90
On March 24, 1961, about 300 workers of CEPOC at its plant in Tinaan, Naga, Cebu City, and affiliated with the
Cement Workers Union, Local 7-ALU (hereafter referred to as the Union), staged a strike, allegedly because of
CEPOC’s refusal to honor its oral commitment to incorporate in the collective bargaining agreement, then in the
process of renewal, a provision for the collection of a monthly agency fee of P1.00 from every employee non-
member of the Union. Certified by the President of the Philippines to the Court of Industrial Relations, the case was
docketed therein as Case No. 35-IPA. At about the same time, on complaint by the Union, a case for unfair labor
practice against CEPOC was filed in the Labor Court based also on the company’s alleged refusal to bargain with the
workers (CIR Case No. 276-ULP- Cebu). Thereupon, the CEPOC similarly filed unfair labor practice charges against
the Union, for having staged an illegal strike and for having employed threats, intimidation and violence in the
prosecution of the aforesaid strike, which resulted in death to one employee and physical injuries to several others.
This case was docketed as CIR Case No. 278-ULP-Cebu. Pending final settlement of the controversy, the Labor
Court issued a return-to-work order and the strikers were able to work again on July 6, 1961.
On November 6, 1964, in a single decision rendered in the three cases, the Court declared the strike illegal, its cause
or aim being unjust, trivial and unreasonable. Accordingly, the mutual charges of unfair labor practice filed by the
parties against each other (CIR Cases Nos. 276-ULP-Cebu and 278-ULP-Cebu), arising from the same demand of
the Union for collection of agency fees from non-Union members, were dismissed. However, having also found that
there was discrimination against Union-members (a) in the assignment of employees to work on Saturdays, Sundays
and legal holidays, as well as in the night shift, and (b) in the appointment of 6 Union members to permanent
positions with lower salary range, the court below ordered the CEPOC: (1) to pay to those who were discriminated
against in the assignment of work on Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays the wages that they thus failed to
receive; (2) to pay the night premium or salary differential to those strikers who were not given change in their shift
assignments and remained in the day shift; and (3) to pay to the six employees (Dionisio Lapitan, Ponciano Mabatid,
Vicente Siarza, Sabino Canillo, Fructuoso Gil and Pedro Sanchez) the difference in wages which they to receive
because of discrimination in the classification of their positions. Additionally, finding that CEPOC’s memorandum of
April 4, 1961, issued when the labor dispute was already pending before the Labor Court, and requiring its
employees to go on 3 day sick and vacation leaves of absence every month, was made in violation of its return-to-
work order, the lower court ordered CEPOC to restore the accumulated leaves of the employees who were forced to
use such leaves and to pay the wages that they thus failed to receive. To facilitate the computation of the amounts
involved in the award, the Chief of the Examining Division of the said court was directed to examine the records and
other pertinent documents of the company relative to the service of the affected employees and to submit to the court
a corresponding report thereon. Its motion for reconsideration of the above-mentioned decision having been denied
by the court en banc, CEPOC appealed, for the reasons already stated at the beginning of this opinion.
Passing upon the Union-charge that the CEPOC discriminated against the strikers in the assignment of employees to
work on weekends and legal holidays and on the night-shift, the court below declared:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"With respect to discrimination in the assignment of work for Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays, the evidence is
clear that the strikers except a very few of them were not permitted to work on those days. Admittedly, prior to the
strike on March 24, 1961, workers performing operational work worked on Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays.
The shortage of coal and economic measure contended by CEPOC would not justify the authorization granted to the
non-strikers to continue working on those days while only a very few strikers were granted the same privilege. By
withholding this privilege to most of the strikers, they were deprived of additional compensation for work performed
on those days.
"The same justification — shortage of coal and economic measure — was interposed by CEPOC, as regard the
Union’s claim of discrimination in shift assignments. It is also claimed that before and after the strike CEPOC was
operating at a loss and in order to incur additional obligation for work rendered at night, the workers were assigned to
work in the day shift and only in cases of urgent necessity were they allowed to work during the night. But even
granting this to be true, this alone can not justify why only non-strikers were given changes in shift while strikers
remained in the day shift, thus denying them the night-work differential pay equivalent to 25% enjoyed by those
assigned in the 2nd shift (3:00 P.M. to 11:00 P.M.) and 3rd shift (11:00 P.M. to 7:00 A.M. the following day) and
greatly reducing their take home pay." (pages 13-14, Decision)
In assailing the correctness of the above conclusions of the lower court in this proceeding, petitioner confines itself to
saying that the assignment of personnel rendering work on weekends, legal holidays and at nighttime was dictated
by necessity; that considering the small volume of work to be done and the bad financial condition the company was
in, it would be poor business management to have required everybody to render such services and to pay the
corresponding extra wages. Petitioner, in so arguing, totally missed the point at issue, because the judgment of the
lower court precisely was premised on the presumption that the rotation of personnel to do extra work was proper. In
other words, the question to be resolved here is not the propriety or impropriety of the rotation measure adopted by
the company but whether or not in the execution of such measure the strikers or union-members were discriminated
against.
The court below, considering the evidence therein presented, found for the Union, and ruled that the charges of
discrimination have been duly established, a conclusion which petitioner has failed to disprove. The findings of the
lower court in this point must, therefore, be respected and maintained, particularly since appellant does not cite any
portion of the record in support of its claim that the CIR findings are without substantial evidentiary support.
As regards the alleged discrimination in the appointment of union-members Dionisio Lapitan, Ponciano Mabatid,
Vicente Siarza, Sabino Canillo, Fructuoso Gil and Pedro Sanchez, the records show that as of 1951 these
employees were occupying the positions of Mixed Control Chemists at P195.00. On June 30, 1957, they were
promoted in salary to P215.00 a month. For lack of appropriate civil service eligibility, however, their appointments
were noted as temporary by the Civil Service Commission. When the WAPCO law went into effect on July 1, 1957,
the positions of the above-named employees, based on their statements of duties, were classified as Construction
Material Chemists with Range 34, at P259.00 a month. As they protested against this classification, 1 said
employees were required to submit another statement of their respective duties, and, based on this later statement,
their positions were reclassified by WAPCO as Senior Chemical Laboratory Technician, with salary range 27, at
P183.00 a month. It is their appointment to these Positions with lower salary range that the Union contested allegedly
for being discriminatory.
Sustaining the charge that the appointment of the six employees to the reclassified positions constituted
discrimination, the lower court said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"If as alleged these mix-control chemists were reclassified to a lower position classification because of their protests
and objections to a higher classification, it is surprising why non-union members Celso Perez and Jaime Medicielo,
who were the least senior in point of service and appointment to these positions, were reclassified to Range 33, or
only one grade lower than their previous position classification of Range 34, while the rest who were more senior in
the service and were appointed much earlier to these positions were reclassified to Range 27, a difference of seven
grades from their former position classification. Apparently the job description, wherein the job classification of the
WAPCO is based, while accomplished by the employee concerned, must be with the advice and approval of the
superior in the plant and non-union members were properly advised and informed by the superior what should be
reflected in the preparation of their job description otherwise there seems to be no plausible reason why they should
not be uniformly reclassified as before if the job description submitted by them were of equal import." (pages 14-15,
Decision)
It cannot be denied that the classification of positions was undertaken not by petitioner CEPOC but by WAPCO, over
which the former has no control; that the position-classification was based on the statements of duties submitted by
the employees themselves; and that the appointments complained of were made pursuant to WAPCO’s
classification. CEPOC, nevertheless, was found guilty of discrimination in making the appointments because,
according to the lower court, the superior of the employees at the plant must have advised the non-Union members
on what to state in the job description form, inferring that no such advise was given to members of the Union;
otherwise, there was no reason why the positions involved in this case would be given a different classification and
lower salary range than the others.
It is the rule well established in this jurisdiction that for the factual findings of the Court of Industrial Relations to be
conclusive upon this Court, they must be supported at least by substantial and credible proof. 2 The reasoning given
by the lower court for its conclusion in connection with the appointments of the six-named employees, however, is as
good an admission as any that there was no evidence presented during the hearing to support the discrimination-
charge against the CEPOC, so that the finding on the latter’s culpability was made to rest only on an inference
derived from the absence or want of reason for the alleged discriminatory act. This we can not uphold. The lack of
justification for an act alleged to be discriminatory by itself, would not be that kind of evidence that could establish the
fact of discrimination. For a new inference may only be drawn from another inference, provided the first inference has
the required basis of a proved fact; 3 , and this is not so in the present cases.
91

Petitioner also seeks nullification of the Labor Court’s order to restore to the employees concerned the vacation and
sick leaves that they were forced to take in compliance with the company’s memorandum of August 4, 1961, and to
pay the wages that they failed to receive on account of such forced leaves. It is claimed that as a corporation,
petitioner has the power to compel its employees to use up their earned sick and vacation leaves when the condition
of the company’s finances so requires.
But there is hardly any controversy in this regard, because the fact that petitioner may have authority to compel its
employees to go on forced leave to avoid its accumulation has no consequence in these appeals. It may be pointed
out that the lower court’s order now in dispute was precipitated not by any lack of authority of the company but by the
court’s finding that the memorandum of August 4, 1961 was made in violation of its return-to-work order of April 8,
1961. Considering that an order to return to work, which the Labor Court may properly issue in the exercise of its
power of arbitration and conciliation, 4 is intended to restore the strikers to their positions in the company under the
last terms and conditions existing before the dispute arose, 5 the enforcement of a new company policy, requiring the
employees to use up their earned leaves instead of accumulating them, without judicial authorization, would indeed
constitute a violation of such order for the maintenance of status quo in the relations between the workers and the
company.
Petitioner Cement Company charges the Court of Industrial Relations with grave abuse of discretion for not ordering
the dismissal of the workers who actively took part in the illegal strike, invoking in support of its contention the ruling
of this Court in the case of National Labor Union, Inc., Et. Al. v. Philippine Match Factory (70 Phil. 300).
The contention can not be sustained. For while it is true that in the above-cited case, promulgated on June 27, 1940,
this Court declared:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The petitioners’ strike in the instant case is clearly unjustified. Their cessation from their employment as a result of
such an unjustified strike is one of such consequences which they must take by the choice of a remedy of their own,
outside of the statute. To compel the respondent company, under the circumstances, to readmit the petitioners to
their employment would be to lend countenance to what the Constitution and the law seek to avoid, and give
protection to those who, by their conduct, have forfeited their rights thereto."cralaw virtua1aw library
the rule on the matter has since undergone a lot of change. In fact, a reading of the decisions of the post-
war Supreme Court on the effects of an illegal strike would reveal the marked, if gradual, departure from the
aforesaid doctrine, as was to be expected, in view of the change in the regulation of labor relations from compulsory
arbitration under Commonwealth Act 103 to free bargaining under Republic Act 875.
For a time, decisions on the issue under consideration was characterized by strict adherence to the ruling in the
Philippine Match Factory case. 6 As late as 1956, this was still the prevailing rule. 7 However, although in another
case it was held that —
"But if the motive that had impelled, prompted, moved or led members of a labor union or organization to stage a
strike, even if they had acted in good faith in staging it, be unlawful, illegitimate, unjust, unreasonable or trivial, and
the CIR, the agency entrusted by the Government to determine it, finds it so, then the strike may be declared illegal.
(Interwood Employees Association v. International Hardwood & Veneer Co., 99 Phil. 82, 1956),
a dissent was already registered. Some members of the Court looked upon dismissal as excessive penalty at least
for those workers who were merely misled by their leaders to join the strike.
The actual break-away from the doctrine laid down in the Philippine Match Factory case came in Dinglasan v.
National Labor Union, 8 when the discretionary power of the Court of Industrial Relations to grant affirmative relief
was recognized. Thus, although it was therein found that there was no lock-out committed by the employer, and that
the stoppage of work was voluntary on the part of the drivers, the order of the Labor Court for the return of said
drivers to their work was sustained. Finally, in 1964, this Court ruled that striking employees are "entitled to
reinstatement whether or not the strike was the consequence of the employer’s unfair labor practice," the only
exceptions thereto being in cases where the strike was not due to any unfair labor practice on the part of the
employer and said employer has hired others to take the place of the strikers, or where the strikers have committed
unlawful conduct or violence. 9 Thereafter, the doctrine enunciated in Interwood Employees Association, supra, that
good faith of the strikers in the staging of the strike is immaterial in the determination of the legality or illegality of the
strike, was abandoned. In the case of Ferrer v. CIR, Et Al., 10 the belief of the strikers that the management was
committing unfair labor practice was properly considered in declaring an otherwise premature strike, not unlawful,
and in affirming the order of the Labor Court for the reinstatement without back wages of said employees.
In the present cases, considering that the strikers’ demand for deduction of an "agency fee" from non-members was
made in 1961, over two years before our decision in National Brewery & Allied Industries Labor Union v. San Miguel
Brewery, Inc., L-18170 (August 31, 1963) declared, for the first time, that such agency fee was not lawfully
demandable; that the strikers offered to return to work, and in fact, did return to work when so ordered by the Labor
Court; and there is no proof that all of them had resorted to, and were convicted of, unlawful acts committed in the
prosecution of the strike, we find no abuse of discretion in the denial by the court below of the company’s plea for the
dismissal of the said strikers. Of course, following the jurisprudence on the matter, the separation from the service of
those who may be found guilty of unlawful acts committed in carrying out the strike may properly be decreed. 11
For its part, on the pretext of trying to maintain the judgment on appeal, respondent Union assigns in its brief as error
allegedly committed by the lower court the declaration of the illegality of the strike of March 24, 1961. The point can
not be entertained in this proceeding. In spite of respondent’s protestations, it is evident that the assigned issue
should have been raised by an appellant. Having failed to appeal from that portion of the decision declaring the strike
illegal, the Union can no longer be heard to question that ruling which by now has become final.
WHEREFORE, with the modification that the petitioner CEPOC is not liable to pay the differential salary awarded by
the lower court to the six employees named in the complaint, there being no discrimination employed by petitioner in
the appointment of said employees to their present positions, the decision appealed from is affirmed in all other
respects. Accordingly, these cases are remanded to the lower court for compliance with the judgment herein. Costs
against petitioner.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 100167 March 2, 1995
ISALAMA MACHINE WORKS CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. HON. LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, FIFTH
DIVISION and ISALAMA MACHINE WORKS CORPORATION LABOR UNION-WORKERS ALLIANCE TRADE
UNION AND/OR HENRY BAYGAN, NATHAN PURACAN, GREGORIO LAYSON, JR., NANDY VIRTUDAZO,
JIMMY SACRO, CHARITO ESTRERA, DENISON AMBOAYEN, BIENVENIDO CABIL, MELCHOR MARTINEZ,
FLORIDAN BILAR, NOEL LAYSON, EDISON ALMORADES, MA. CELESTINA CLEMEN, LEONCIO CUIZON,
VENNIE OPORTO, RODOLFO IGNACIO and ALMIRANTE ZAGADO, Respondents.chanrobles virtual law library
This petition for certiorari assails the Decision, 1 dated 09 June 1989, of the National Labor Relations Commission
("NLRC"), Fifth Division, Cagayan de Oro City, ordering the reinstatement, without back salaries, of private
respondents, with the exception of Henry Baygan, and the Resolution 2 of 30 April 1991 of the same division denying
the motion for reconsideration and, consistent with the decision, requiring petitioner corporation to pay private
respondents, in case the latter have not been reinstated actually or by payroll, back salaries, without qualification or
deductions, from 25 July 1989 until their reinstatement (RABX Case No. 10-02-00107-
88).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
On 25 March 1987, petitioner Isalama Machine Works Corporation and private respondent Isalama Machine Works
Corporation Labor Union-Workers Alliance Trade Union entered into a collective bargaining agreement ("CBA")
covering the period from 01 November 1986 to 03 October 1989. Following the signing of the CBA, the union made
repeated demands on the corporation, allegedly to no avail, for it to comply with the CBA provisions, i.e., to furnish
the workers with safety shoes and free company laminated IDs and, in general, to improve the employees' working
conditions.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
92
On 21 December 1987, the corporation paid the workers the 13th month pay based on the average number of days
actually worked during the year. The union, through its president, private respondent Henry Baygan, demanded that
the 13th month pay should, instead, be made on the basis of a full one month basic salary. The corporation
countered that its own computation of the 13th month pay accorded with the CBA provisions and Presidential Decree
No. 851.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
On 05 January 1988, the union filed a notice of strike with the Department of Labor and Employment, Region X,
Cagayan de Oro, alleging the commission of unfair labor practice and CBA violation by the corporation. After several
conferences, the National Conciliation and Mediation Board ("NCMB") succeeded in having the dispute amicably
settled except for the 13th month pay differential which remained in contention. The union insisted that the failure of
the corporation to implement fully the 13th month pay provision of the CBA amounted to unfair labor practice. The
corporation argued that the 13th month pay was a mere money claim and therefore not a "strikeable issue." The
case was ultimately indorsed to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
The above notwithstanding, the union still went on strike on 15 February 1988. The wide publicity accorded the
strike, according to petitioner, had caused a dearth of work orders and withdrawal of existing job orders that forced it
to adopt a rotation system of work. On 22 February 1988, it also filed with the Regional Arbitration Branch 10 of the
NLRC a petition charging the union with conducting an illegal strike and engaging in an unfair labor practice (RABX
Case No. 10-02-00107-88).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
On 16 May 1988, the Executive Labor Arbiter rendered a decision holding the strike to be illegal and declaring
Baygan and the "participating" union members 3 to have thereby lost their employment status. The dismissed
employees appealed the decision of the Executive Labor Arbiter to the NLRC which, on 09 June 1989, promulgated
its herein questioned decision ordering, except for Baygan, the reinstatement, without back salaries, of the dismissed
union members.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The corporation filed a motion for reconsideration of the NLRC decision. On 30 April 1991, the NLRC resolved said
motion thusly:
ACCORDINGLY, the Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED for lack of merit. No further motion for reconsideration
shall henceforth be entertained.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Consistent with the disposition in the challenged resolution of June 9, 1989, the immediate reinstatement without
backwages of the 16 afore-named respondents to their former positions sans loss of seniority rights is hereby
ordered. The cut-off date for the forbearance in the payment of backwages is up to July 24, 1989 which on record is
the date of receipt of said disputed Resolution. Henceforth, in the event the afore-named respondents have not been
reinstated actually or by payroll, appellee is directed to pay backwages without qualifications or deductions from July
25, 1989 until they are reinstated.
SO ORDERED. 4
On 23 May 1991, the union filed with the NLRC a motion for execution of the judgment, asserting additionally that the
corporation was operating under the new trade name, "Golden Engineering," owned and managed by the same
family, of which change neither the employees nor the NLRC had been formally
notified.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
On 03 June 1991, before the motion for execution could be acted upon by the NLRC, the corporation filed the instant
petition. The Court issued, on 01 July 1991, a temporary restraining order enjoining respondent NLRC from
implementing its 09 June 1989 decision and 30 April 1991 resolution.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
Petitioner submits that private respondents cannot claim good faith in staging their strike since the attention of both
parties had been called by the conciliator at the hearings before the NCMB to the "non-strikeable" character of the
13th month pay. Private respondents continue to claim, however, that the questioned 13th month pay should be
considered a "strikeable issue." They have averred that the illegal work rotation scheme employed by petitioner has
pushed them to the honest belief that the latter has, once again, perpetrated an unfair labor
practice.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Section 3 of the "Omnibus Rules and Regulations Implementing Presidential Decree No. 851" generally states
that all employees (subject to its exclusionary clauses) shall be entitled to the 13th month pay. Its Section 4 provides
that employees "who are receiving not more than P1,000.00 a month" shall enjoy the 13th month pay "regardless of
their position, designation or employment status, and irrespective of the method by which their wages are paid,
provided that they have worked for at least one month during the calendar year." If an employee has worked for an
employer for less than a year, he may still be entitled to the full 13th month pay provided his monthly wage is
P1,000.00 or less and he has worked for the employer for at least one month.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
The CBA contains, among other things, a "no strike" clause; thus -
During the term of this Agreement, the Company stipulates and agrees that there shall be no lockouts, and the Union
in turn, as well as its officers and agents, stipulate and agree that there shall be no strike or will they authorize,
instigate or engage in any work stoppage slowdown or any other form of interruption of work by the employees and
laborers that may hamper or impede the operations of the business of the Company. 5
Parenthetically, the CBA likewise specifies that the company "agrees to grant one (1) month basic salary to all
employees-workers as Christmas bonus" in compliance with Presidential Decree No. 851 but that a violation thereof
will not constitute an unfair labor practice by an employer.
Article 248 of the Labor Code, in turn, provides:
Art. 248. Unfair labor practices of employers. - It shall be unlawful for an employer to commit any of the following
unfair labor practice:
xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library
(i) To violate a collective bargaining agreement.
The above provision, however, must be read together with Article 261 of the Labor Code;viz.:
Art. 261. Jurisdiction of Voluntary Arbitrators or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators. - The Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of
Voluntary Arbitrators shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide all unresolved grievances
arising from the interpretation or implementation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement and those arising from the
interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies referred to in the immediately preceding
article.Accordingly, violations of a Collective Bargaining Agreement, except those which are gross in character, shall
no longer be treated as unfair labor practice and shall be resolved as grievances under the Collective Bargaining
Agreement. For purposes of this article, gross violations of Collective Bargaining Agreement shall mean flagrant
and/or malicious refusal to comply with the other economic provisions of such agreement. (Emphasis supplied.)
Hence, Section 1, Rule XIII, Book V, of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code expresses:
Sec. 1. Grounds for strike and lockout. - A strike or lockout may be declared in cases of bargaining deadlocks and
unfair labor practices. Violations of collective bargaining agreements, except flagrant and/or malicious refusal to
comply with its economic provisions, shall not be considered unfair labor practice and shall not be strikeable. . . .
In this case, the real reason for the strike is clearly traceable to the unresolved dispute between the parties on 13th
month pay differentials under Presidential Decree No. 851,i.e., the proper manner of its application and computation.
The Court does not see this issue, given the aforequoted provisions of the law and its implementing rules, to be
constitutive of unfair labor practice. Section 9 of Rules and Regulations Implementing Presidential Decree No. 851, in
fact, specifically states that "(n)onpayment of the thirteenth-month pay provided by the Decree and (the) rules shall
be treated as money claims cases and shall be processed in accordance with the Rules Implementing the Labor
Code of the Philippines and the Rules of the National Labor Relations Commission."chanrobles virtual law library
93
Private respondents, indeed, showed little prudence, if at all, in their precipitate and ill-considered strike. The NLRC
likewise found private respondents to have violated Art. 264 (e) 6 of the Labor Code when they blocked and
barricaded the entrance of petitioner's premises preventing free ingress and egress. Unfortunately for petitioner,
however, the identity of those who committed those illegal acts during the strike, except for Baygan, had not been
adequately established. Specifically, the NLRC said that no sufficient evidence could be found "to pin down the
afore-named 16 respondents as having committed illegal acts during the strike," 7 that could warrant a loss of their
employment status. 8 The dismissal of Baygan, however, was warranted. Being the union president and leader of the
strike, his liability was greater than that of mere members, 9 and he had the responsibility to ensure that his followers
respected the law. 10
Petitioner tells us that it can no longer accept the strikers due to its decision to close down its operations on account
of damages and losses it has incurred because of the strike, and that Golden Engineering, which has taken over the
business, is presently owned by one Alfredo Chan and not Charlie Chan of petitioner corporation. 11 This claim raises
factual issues which evidently are still awaiting resolution by the NLRC in the motion for execution now pending
before it. It is there, not here, where these issues can be finally resolved.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library
This case arose in 1988 or prior to the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6715; accordingly, the back salaries of the
dismissed employee should be limited to three years, without deduction or qualification, following the rule
in Maranaw Hotels and Resorts Corporation vs. Court of Appeals. 12
WHEREFORE, the questioned decision and resolution of the NLRC are AFFIRMED subject to the MODIFICATION
that the back salaries ordered to be paid should be limited, without deduction or qualification, to only three (3) years.
No costs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-19778. September 30, 1964.]
CROMWELL COMMERCIAL EMPLOYEES AND LABORERS UNION (PTUC), Petitioner, v. COURT OF
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and CROMWELL COMMERCIAL CO., INC., Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS; UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE CASES; POWER TO ORDER
REINSTATEMENT OF STRIKERS WITH OR WITHOUT BACKPAY; TWO TYPES OF EMPLOYEES INVOLVED. —
Two types of employees involved in unfair labor practice cases should be distinguished, namely, those who were
discriminatorily dismissed for union activities and those who voluntarily went on strike even if it is in protest of an
unfair labor practice. Both types of employees are entitled to reinstatement.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; EXCEPTION TO RULE; EMPLOYEES GUILTY OF UNLAWFUL CONDUCT OF VIOLENCE. — From
the rule that employees who strike because of unfair labor practice are entitled to reinstatement, however, must be
excepted those who, although discriminatorily discharged, must nevertheless be denied reinstatement because of (1)
unlawful conduct or (2) because of violence.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; C.I.R. TO DETERMINE EFFECT OF MISCONDUCT OF STRIKERS. — It is not for the Supreme
Court to judge the effect of misconduct by the striking employees. That is primarily for the Court of Industrial
Relations to determine.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; C.I.R. TO DETERMINE WHETHER STRIKERS WHO FOUND OTHER EMPLOYMENT SHOULD
BE REINSTATED. — It is for the Court of Industrial Relations to determine primarily whether to deny reinstatement
to those of the strikers who might have found substantial employment elsewhere.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; DISCRIMINATORILY DISMISSED EMPLOYEES TO RECEIVE BACKPAY. — Discriminatorily
dismissed employees receive back pay from the date of the act of discrimination, that is from the day of their
discharge.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; VOLUNTARY STRIKERS NOT ENTITLED TO BACKPAY. — Those employees who voluntarily went
on strike even if in protest against what they considered unfair labor practices of the company are not entitled to
backpay. The stoppage of their work was not the direct consequence of the company’s unfair labor practice. Hence,
their economic loss should not be shifted to the employer. (See Dinglasan v. National Labor Union, 106 Phil., 671).
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; OFFER TO RETURN TO WORK MUST BE UNCONDITIONAL TO ENTITLE STRIKERS TO
BACKPAY UPON REFUSAL OF EMPLOYER TO READMIT THEM. — To be effective so as to entitle the strikers to
backpay, the offer must have been unconditional. The strikers must have offered to return to work under the same
conditions under which they worked just before their strike so that the company’s refusal would have placed on the
latter the blame for their economic loss.
8. LABOR RELATIONS; HALF BACK WAGES TO REINSTATED EMPLOYEES HELD PROPER WHILE THEIR
ACTS ARE NOT FULLY JUSTIFIED. — Half backwages instead of full backwages to some of the reinstated
employees is proper where said employees who were salesmen were not exactly justified in refusing to turn over
their collections to the company.
9. ID.; NO BACKPAY IN VOLUNTARY STRIKE EVEN IF IN PROTEST AGAINST UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE;
EXCEPTION WHERE STRIKERS ABANDON STRIKE BUT ARE REFUSED REINSTATEMENT. — Those who
strike voluntarily, even if in protest of unfair labor practice, are entitled to backpay only, when the strikers abandon
the strike and apply for reinstatement despite the unfair labor practice and the employer either refuses to reinstate
them or imposes upon their reinstatement new conditions that constitutes unfair labor practice.
On July 10, 1956, Cromwell Commercial Co. and the Cromwell Commercial Employees and Laborers Union (PTUC)
signed a collective bargaining agreement which provided, among other things, for the
following:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"3. The Company agrees to consider as permanent employees and workers all those who have rendered three (3)
months continuous, satisfactory service, and as such shall be entitled to all privileges enjoyed by all permanent and
regular employees; provided, however, that the COMPANY reserves the right to dismiss any employee for cause;"
"6. A ‘Grievance Committee’ composed of three (3) representatives appointed by the COMPANY and three (3)
UNION members elected by the UNION shall be immediately constituted. This Committee shall meet not more than
once a week as may be called by proper notice of any three (3) members of said committee to hear and decide any
differences on labor-management relations. The committee shall hear the grievance and the witnesses of the parties
concerned, if any, and shall submit its recommendation to the President of the COMPANY who shall decide the
same, within thirty (30) days from transmittal of said recommendation by the President’s representative in the
Philippines:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"7. Considering that the COMPANY has put into effect, effective April 16, 1956, a minimum wage of P140.00 a
month to permanent employees in its office and has given merit increase to a few others, the COMPANY agrees in
principle to the demand of the UNION for a general increase of salaries and wages, if the financial position of the
COMPANY shows that it can afford to give an increase after the second quarter of 1956 but reserves its decision as
to the amount. The COMPANY further reserves its right as to whether to give or not to give increases to those who
already received merit increases effective April 16, 1956, provided, however, that those whose salaries were slashed
in 1956 and were restored on April 16, 1956, shall not be considered as having received a merit increase;"
"10. That the COMPANY shall restore all salesmen to the status of salary basis effective May 1, 1956 and shall also
restore the helpers allowance of provincial salesmen effective the same date;"
94

"12. The COMPANY agrees in principle to consider the giving of a share of its profits to its employees and workers,
the amount and the time to depend in the sale discretion of the management of the COMPANY."cralaw virtua1aw
library
However, it appears that, contrary to paragraph 7, the company gave no salary increase to its employees, except to
three who were not union members, despite the fact that it had made a P90,000 profit at the close of the second
quarter of 1956.
With respect to paragraph 10 of the agreement, it appears that salesmen of the company used to be paid on a
straight salary basis. Some were receiving P300, others P320 while still others were getting P350 a month. In
addition, those assigned to the provinces were given a so-called helper’s allowance of P120 a month, a per diem of
P8 and an allowance for postage and other expenses incurred in remitting their collections. For some reason,
however, the company reduced the salary of salesmen to P200 a month and their helper’s allowance from P120 to
P60 a month, although it paid them a commission of 1 per cent of their collections.
This is the reason why paragraph 10, which provided for the restoration of cuts in the salaries and allowances of
salesmen, was inserted in the agreement. But instead of restoring the salaries in full, the company merely paid P300
even to those who, before salaries were reduced, were already receiving P320 or P350 a month. The so-called
helper’s allowance, which as already stated had been reduced from P120 to P60 a month, was not restored at all.
What is worse, effective March 1, 1957, the company reverted all salesmen to salary and commission basis, stopped
their helper’s allowance altogether and discontinued the payment of per diem and other allowances to provincial
salesmen, so much so that the latter found themselves again in the same situation they were in before the signing of
the collective bargaining agreement. Worst of all, the company increased the quotas of some salesmen and
threatened them with dismissal if they could not fill their quotas.
These changes in the working conditions in the company and the latter’s failure to carry out its part of the agreement
became a source of complaint among the employees. But beyond promising that the matter would be looked into as
soon as its President arrived from the United States, the company did nothing. The grievance machinery set up in
the agreement could not function on account of the company’s- refusal to name its representatives in the committee.
Meanwhile, daily wage employees in the shipping department began agitating for the application of paragraph 10 to
them. In a letter sent to the company on March 2, 1957, Jose J. Hernandez of the Philippine Trade Union Council
asked that these employees be put on a monthly salary basis. He also called attention to the failure of the company
to send representatives to the grievance committee.
Three days after, the company dismissed Francisco Gaddi and Cresenciano Andrada, leaders of the shipping
department employees. And so on March 7, the union dispatched another letter to the company, calling attention to
the contents of its March 2 letter and protesting the dismissal of Gaddi and Andrada. It gave the company 48 hours
within which to act on its grievance and reinstate the dismissed employees.
On March 6, the company President replied, stating in part that —
". . . Effective March 1st, I reduced all salesmen’s salaries, I discontinued the helper’s allowance and, in the case of
provincial salesmen, I discontinued the payment of any per diems."cralaw virtua1aw library
In another letter sent the following day, the company explained that the relief of Gaddi and Andrada was in line with
its policy of laying off extra employees.
From then on the relation between the company and the union steadily deteriorated.
On March 8, the company took back the keys from the warehouseman and ordered the salesmen to put their trucks
in the garage.
On March 9, the parties met to resolve their differences only to part ways later — still poles apart.
Finally, on March 11, the union struck and picketed the premises of the company.
The company in turn gave the strikers until 8 a.m. of March 14, 1957 within which to return to work otherwise they
would be considered dismissed for cause. It warned them that the strike was illegal for being against the no-strike
clause of the collective bargaining agreement.
In a conference called by the Department of Labor, the strikers offered to return to work provided the company
observed the provisions of the bargaining contract. But the company insisted that the strikers could be taken back
only under the terms of its March 1 order. As already stated, this order reverted salesmen to salary and commission
basis, abolished their helper’s allowance and stopped the payment of per diem and other allowances to provincial
salesmen.
In addition, the company set as price for continued conciliation conference the remittance by the salesmen of their
collections and the return of delivery trucks and stocks on hand. The union replied that the strikers had not lost their
employee status and that at any rate they were bonded. It offered though to deposit with the Conciliation Service of
the Department of Labor the things demanded by the company, but the company was unyielding in its demand.
Anyway, nothing came out of the conference. The employees gradually gave up the strike and the salesmen later
settled their accounts and returned the property of the company.
On September 19, 1957 this case was filed in the Court of Industrial Relations, charging the company, together with
its President and Vice President, with unfair labor practice. After trial, the court rendered judgment as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Respondent and all its officers and agents are hereby
ordered:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"(1) To cease and desist from:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
a) refusing to bargain collectively in good faith with the Union.
b) refusing to bargain collectively in good faith with respect to the grievance of the Union by appointing its
representatives to the grievance committee as provided for in the said agreement.
c) making changes in the working conditions of the salesmen who are members of the Union with respect to their
salaries and the helper’s allowance of provincial salesmen without complying with the requirements of Sec. 13 of
Republic Act 875.
"(2) To take the following affirmative acts which the Court finds will effectuate the policy of the Act:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library
a) to reinstate Francisco Gaddi with half back pay from March 5, 1957 to actual data of his reinstatement, minus
whatever salaries he might have earned during the pendency of this case, unless he has found a substantial
employment elsewhere. And with respect to Cresenciano Andrada, his one half back wages shall be from March 5,
1957 until the date he committed illegal acts in the picket line. Angel Dario is not entitled to reinstatement.
b) to reinstate salesmen Antonio Jacinto, Celestino Gualberto, Constantino Atienza, Elias Berrova, and Pedro del
Rosario with half back wages from the date they have cleared their accountabilities or responsibilities with the
Company, minus what they have earned during the pendency of the dispute unless they have found substantial
employment elsewhere. The case of Teofilo Nuñez is dismissed as heretofore indicated. With respect to Roberto
Dijamco as also mentioned, there is a pending separate unfair labor practice in the Court (Case No. 1271-ULP).
c) To reinstate all the strikers listed in Annex ‘A’ of the complaint, without backwages, in view of the circumstances,
as explained on the subject of the strike, unless they have found substantial employment elsewhere during the
pendency of this case.
"In addition, respondent is hereby ordered to post a copy of this order in the company’s bulletin board, if any or in
default thereof, in any conspicuous place at company’s premises and report to the Court as soon as possible its
compliance."cralaw virtua1aw library
95

The union moved for a reconsideration of the decision, contending that the trial judge erred (1) in awarding only half
back wages to Francisco Gaddi and the five salesmen, (2) in awarding no back wages to the rest of the strikers and
(3) in denying reinstatement to Cresenciano Andrada and Angel Dario and to those who might have found
substantially equivalent employment elsewhere. The court en banc affirmed the decision. Hence, this appeal.
The issues in this appeal relate to the power of the Court of Industrial Relations to order reinstatement and the
payment of back wages in unfair labor practice cases as a means of effectuating the policy of the law.
Section 5 (c) of the Industrial Peace Act states:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . If, after investigation, the Court shall be of the opinion that any person named in the complaint has engaged in or
is engaging in any unfair labor practice, then the Court shall state its findings of fact and shall issue and cause to be
served on such person an order requiring such person to cease and desist from such unfair labor practice and take
such affirmative action as will effectuate the policies of this Act, including (but not limited to) reinstatement of
employees with or without back-pay and including rights of the employees prior to dismissal including seniority. .
."cralaw virtua1aw library
At the outset, two types of employees involved in this case must be distinguished, namely, those who were
discriminatorily dismissed for union activities and those who voluntarily went on strike. To the first class belong
Francisco Gaddi and Cresenciano Andrada, both of whom, as earlier shown, had been dismissed for union activities,
and the five salesmen who were virtually locked out by the company when they were ordered to put their trucks in
the garage. To the second class belong those who declared a strike on March 11, 1957, following the failure of the
company-union conference to settle their dispute.
Both types of employees are entitled to reinstatement. Indeed, it is said that striking employees are entitled to
reinstatement whether or not the strike was the consequence of the employer’s unfair labor practice, unless, where
the strike was not due to any unfair labor practice, the employer has hired others to take the place of the strikers and
has promised them continued employment. (Teller, 2 Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining, Sec. 371, pp. 396-
397).
From this rule, however, must be excepted those who, although discriminatorily discharged, must nevertheless be
denied reinstatement because of (1) unlawful conduct or (2) because of violence. For while the Court of Industrial
Relations has indeed discretion in determining the remedy in case of unfair labor practice, its discretion is not
unbounded. (Big Five Products Workers Union-CLP v. Court of Industrial Relations, Et Al., G.R. No. L-17600, July
31, 1963) It cannot exercise its right beyond the point which the object of "effectuation" of the Act requires. It can not
order the reinstatement of those convicted of violence upon the employer’s property. (Rothenberg on Labor
Relations, 573-574; Philippine Education Co., Inc. v. Court of Industrial Relations, Et Al., G.R. No. L-7156, May 31,
1955; Consolidated Labor Ass’n. of the Phils. v. Marsman & Co., Inc., Et Al., G.R. No. L-17038, July 31, 1964)
Such is the case of Cresenciano Andrada and Angel Dario who were found guilty of acts of violence consisting of
hurling stones which smashed glass windows of the building of the company and the headlights of a car and the
utterance of obscenities such as "Putang ina."cralaw virtua1aw library
But the union contends that the acts committed by Andrada and Dario were not so serious as to call for the forfeiture
of their rights to reinstatement. It is not for Us to judge the effect of misconduct by employees. That is primarily for
the Court of Industrial Relations to determine. (See NLRB v. Weissman Co., 170 F(24) 952). In the absence of proof
of abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of Industrial Relations, this Court will not interfere with the exercise of
that discretion.
The same thing may be said of the denial of reinstatement to those who might have found substantial employment
elsewhere. We agree with the union that under the ruling of Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 85 L, ed.
1271 (See also Cox and Bok, Cases on Labor Law, 259, 5th ed.), the mere fact that strikers or dismissed employees
have found such employment elsewhere is not necessarily a bar to their reinstatement. 1 But it is just as true to say
that the Phelps Dodge case did not rule that in any event discriminatorily dismissed employees must be ordered
reinstated even though they have in the meanwhile found substantially equivalent employment somewhere else.
While denying that employees who have obtained equivalent employment are ineligible as a matter of law to
reinstatement, the Supreme Court of the United States at the same time denied also that the definition of the term
"employee" can be disregarded by the National Labor Relations Board in exercising its powers under Section 10(c)
of the Wagner Act, which corresponds to Section 5 (c) of our Industrial Peace Act, to direct the taking of affirmative
action by an employer to remedy unfair labor practices. According to the Court, it is for the Board in each case to
weigh the particular facts and to determine, in the exercise of wise administrative discretion, whether the Act would
best be effectuated by directing reinstatement despite the fact that the given employee has found equivalent
employment.
Obviously it was after considering the facts in this case that the Court of Industrial Relations predicated the
reinstatement of the employees concerned on the fact that they had not found substantially equivalent employment
elsewhere. Thus, it made clear in the dispositive portion of its decision that it was ordering the taking of affirmative
acts "which the Court finds will effectuate the policy of the Act." The union has not shown that in so doing the Court
of Industrial Relations abused its discretion.
Coming now to the question of backpay, the decision under review directs the company "to reinstate all the strikers
listed in Annex ‘A’ of the complaint, without back wages, in view of the circumstances, as explained on the subject of
the strike, unless they have found substantial employment elsewhere during the pendency of this case." The union
assails this order as erroneous. According to the union, it is unfair to deny backwages to the strikers after finding that
the strike declared by them was legal because it was provoked by unfair labor practices of the company. Indeed a
reading of the 46-page decision of the Court of Industrial Relations fails to yield the reason that impelled the court to
deny backwages to the strikers.
Nevertheless, We believe that the denial of backpay may be justified, although on a different ground. For this
purpose, We shall advert again to the distinction earlier made between discriminatorily dismissed employees and
those who struck, albeit in protest against the company’s unfair labor practice. Discriminatorily dismissed employees
receive back pay from the date of the act of discrimination, that is from the day of their discharge. On this score, the
pay from the date of the act of discrimination, that is from the day of their discharge. On this score, the award of
backpay to Gaddi, Andrada and the salesmen may be justified. The salesmen, as already stated, were practically
locked out when they were ordered to put their trucks in the garage; they did not voluntarily strike. (See Macleod &
Co. of the Phils. v. Progressive Federation of Labor, G.R. No. L-7887, May 31, 1955) Hence, the award of
backwages.
In contrast, the rest of the employees struck as a voluntary act of protest against what they considered unfair labor
practices of the company. The stoppage of their work was not the direct consequence of the company’s unfair labor
practice. Hence their economic loss should not be shifted to the employer. (See Dinglasan v. National Labor Union,
G.R. No. L-14183, Nov. 28, 1959). As explained by the National Labor Relations Board in the case of American
Manufacturing Co., 5 NLRB 443, "When employees voluntarily go on strike, even if in protest against unfair labor
practices, it has been our policy not to award them back pay during the strike. However, when the strikers abandon
the practices and the employer either refuses to reinstate them or imposes upon their reinstatement new conditions
that constitute unfair labor practices, We are of the opinion that the considerations impelling our refusal to award
back pay are no longer controlling. Accordingly, We hold that where, as in this case, an employer refuses to reinstate
strikers except upon their acceptance of new conditions that discriminate against them because of their union
membership or activities, the strikers who refuse to accept the conditions and are consequently refused
reinstatement are entitled to be made whole for any losses of pay they may have suffered by reason of the
respondent’s discriminatory acts." (Quoted in Teller, 2 Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining Sec. 371, pp. 997-
998)
While it is true that the strikers in this case offered to return to work on March 14, 1957, We find that their offer was
conditional. Their offer was predicated on the company’s observance of the provisions of the collective bargaining
agreement — the very bone of contention between the parties by reason of which the union walked out. To be
effective so as to entitle the strikers to backpay, the offer must have been unconditional. The strikers must have
offered to return to work under the same conditions under which they worked just before their strike so that the
company’s refusal would have placed on the latter the blame for their economic loss. But that is not the case here.
Indeed the offer of the company to accept the strikers under the conditions obtaining before the strike (without
prejudice of course to taking up the grievances of the strikers) can be considered in its favor in denying backwages
to strikers. (Dinglasan v. National Labor Union, G. R. No. L-14183, Nov. 28, 1959.)
96
Nor may it be said that the strikers could not have offered to return to work because the company dismissed them
upon their failure to return to work on March 14, 1957. For the notice given by the company was merely a "tactical"
threat designed to break the strike and not really to discharge the striking employees. (Majestic Mfg. Co., Et Al., 64
NLRB 961; Rockwood Stove Works, 63 NLRB 1297; American Mfg Co., 7 NLRB 553)
WHEREFORE, the decision and resolution of the Court of Industrial Relations appealed from are hereby affirmed,
without pronouncements as to costs.
Separate Opinions
REYES, J. B. L., J., dissenting:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
I can not agree to the ruling laid down in the opinion in so far as it denies backpay to the reinstated laborers. There is
no, dispute that the employer was the first to infringe the collective bargaining agreement by refusing to implement its
provisions, particularly by its March 1 order, and by insisting on it as a condition for taking back the strikers. I can not
see how the objectives and policies of the Industrial Peace Act can be said to be promoted by placing the economic
loss on the strikers, denying them backpay; the discouraging of unfair labor practices is certainly one of those
policies, and the denial of backpay to the victims of unfair labor practices is a direct encouragement for the employer
to continue its re-probable misconduct.
While the laborers technically violated the no-strike clause, the facts as found reveal that the employer goaded the
laborers into striking, by repeatedly violating the collective bargaining agreement and by preventing the organization
of the grievance committee through the Company’s refusal to name its representatives therein.
1. The view that discriminatorily discharged employees who have found substantially equivalent jobs elsewhere are
no longer entitle to reinstatement is based on section 2(d) of the law which defines the term "employee" as including
"any employee and not be limited to the employee of a particular employer unless the Act explicitly states otherwise
and shall include any individual whose work has ceased as consequence of, or in connection with, any current labor
dispute or because of any unfair labor practice and who has not obtained any other substantially equivalent and
regular employment."cralaw virtua1aw library
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-20667 & L-20669. October 29, 1965.]
PHILIPPINE STEAM NAVIGATION CO., Petitioner, v. PHILIPPINE MARINE OFFICERS GUILD, ET
AL., Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEE; UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE; RIGHT OF EMPLOYER TO INTERROGATE ITS
EMPLOYEES AS TO THEIR UNION AFFILIATION. — The rule in this jurisdiction is that subjection by the company
of its employees to a series of questioning regarding their membership in the union or their union activities, in such a
way as to hamper the exercise of free choice on their part, constitutes unfair labor practice (Scoty’s Department
Store v. Micaller; 52 Off. Gaz., 5119).
2. ID.; ID.; STRIKES; REINSTATEMENT OF STRIKING EMPLOYEES. — The striking employees are entitled to
reinstatement, whether or not, the strike was the consequence of the employer’s unfair labor practice, unless, where
the strike was not the consequence of any unfair labor practice, the employer has hired others to take the place of
the strikers and has promised them continued employment (Cromwell Commercial Employees and Laborers Union
(PTUC) v. C.I.R., et el., L- 19778, September 30, 1964, citing 2 Teller, LABOR DISPUTES AND COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING, Sec. 371, pp. 996-997).
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; WHEN EMPLOYER BOUND TO REINSTATE STRIKERS. — Even if the employer hires others to
replace the strikers, thereby avoiding paralysis of his business, if the strike is against an unfair labor practice on its
part, the employer is bound to reinstate the strikers.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; VOLUNTARY OFFER: TO RETURN TO WORK WITHOUT ANY CONDITION, WHEN RELEVANT. —
A voluntary offer to return to work without any condition is relevant only to the question ofpayment of back wages in
addition to reinstatement. Since in these cases no back wages were awarded, and the union has not appealed, said
question is not in point.
The present century saw in its opening decades the struggle of labor to attain equal footing with capital. Statute after
statute was passed in the Philippines to secure this end. The Philippine Constitution, adopted in 1935, made it plain
that the State can regulate the relation between labor and capital to achieve social justice. 1 Following the modern
trend, the Industrial Peace Act was passed by our Congress to effect equality between labor and capital as partners
in industry. 2 Special attention from all three branches of the government was required on the problems arising in
their relation, a relation treated as sui generis. None the less, as was to be expected, it was not infrequent that
capital would seek to preserve and labor to advance its position; the management would fight to retain old practices
and the workers cry for progressive measures; employers would desire superiority and employees equality. Hence
the continuing disputes regarding the scope and application of social and labor legislations covering the relations of
labor and capital. An instance is the dispute in the three cases at bar.
The Philippine Steam Navigation Co., Inc., hereafter referred to as PHILSTEAM, is a domestic corporation, with head
offices in Cebu City, engaged in inter-island shipping. In the year 1954 it had 16 vessels, with 8 officers to a vessel,
or a total of 128 officers.
Philippine Marine Officers Guild, herein otherwise called PMOG, is a labor union affiliated with the Federation of Free
Workers (FFW), representing, and which represented in 1954, some of PHILSTEAM’s officers.
The Cebu Seamen’s Association, CSA for short, is another labor union that represents and likewise represented in
1954 some of PHILSTEAM’s officers.
On June 15, 1954 PMOG sent PHILSTEAM a set of demands, with a request for collective bargaining. PHILSTEAM
received the letter embodying the same on June 18, 1954. Subsequently, or on June 29, 1954, PHILSTEAM
transmitted its answer to PMOG, requiring the latter to first prove its representation of a majority of PHILSTEAM’s
employees before its demands will be considered as requested. PHILSTEAM, on the same date, started
interrogating and investigating its captains, deck officers, and engineers, to find out directly from them if they had
joined PMOG or authorized PMOG to represent them.
A reply was sent by PMOG to the answer of PHILSTEAM, insisting that PHILSTEAM consider its requests and
demands first before requiring proof of majority representation. This reply was received by PHILSTEAM on July 6,
1954.
PMOG thereafter filed on July 17, 1954 a notice of intention to strike stating as reasons therefor PHILSTEAM’s
alleged refusal to bargain and unspecified unfair labor practices. The Department of Laborbrought PHILSTEAM and
PMOG to a conference on July 30, 1954, without any success.
The CSA had meanwhile also transmitted its own set of demands to PHILSTEAM. On August 16, 1954 PHILSTEAM
and CSA met. PHILSTEAM therein recognized CSA as representing the majority of its employees and proceeded to
consider CSA’s demands.
Another PHILSTEAM-PMOG conference at the Department of Labor was held on August 17, 1954, likewise to no
avail.
Subsequently, on August 24, 1954, PHILSTEAM and CSA signed a collective bargaining agreement. On the same
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date, PMOG declared a strike against PHILSTEAM. Although not the subject of the present appeal, it should also be
mentioned that the dispute included two other shipping companies, namely, Compañia Maritima and Madrigal
Shipping, and the PMOG simultaneously struck against all three companies.
Around 46 officers of PHILSTEAM joined PMOG’s strike; 15 of these later returned to work, leaving 31 PHILSTEAM
officers on strike. Pier 4 of the North Harbor of the Port of Manila, where PHILSTEAM vessels docked, was among
the area picketed during the strike.
A final conference at the Department of Labor between PHILSTEAM and PMOG on October 7, 1954 still failed to
bring the parties to an agreement.
The President of the Philippines, on January 14, 1955, certified the dispute among the aforementioned shipping
companies and their employees to the Court of Industrial Relations, as involving national interest; pursuant to
Section 10 of Republic Act 875.
The Court of Industrial Relations held preliminary conferences and on January 18, 1955 issued a return-to-work
order. The same, however, was not enforced in view of an injunction issued by this Court in another case. 3 Several
formal complaints were accordingly docketed in the Court of Industrial Relations, as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
(1) Case 6-IPA, the dispute certified to the CIR by the President
(2) Case 617-ULP filed on February 25, 1955 by PMOG against Maritima Et. Al., for unfair labor practice;
(3) Case 618-ULP filed on February 25, 1955 by PMOG against PHILSTEAM and CSA, for unfair labor practice;
(4) Case 646-ULP filed on March 29, 1955 by PMOG against Madrigal Shipping, for unfair labor practice;
(5) Case 672-ULP filed on April 30, 1955 by the Marine Officers Association of the Philippines 4 against PMOG, for
unfair labor practice;
(6) Case 1002-ULP filed on July 6, 1956 by PHILSTEAM against PMOG, for unfair labor practice.
A joint trial was held of all the cases and on December 23, 1962 the Court of Industrial Relations rendered thereon a
single decision, finding in the cases pertinent to this appeal, i.e., where PHILSTEAM is a party, as
follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(1) Case 618-ULP, PHILSTEAM committed unfair labor practice in having interfered with, restrained and coerced
employees in the exercise of their rights to self-organization;
(2) Case 1002-ULP, PMOG has not been shown to have committed unfair labor practice; and,
(3) Case 6-IPA, the strike of PMOG against PHILSTEAM was justified and lawfully carried out.
Accordingly, it stated in the dispositive portion relative to the above-mentioned cases:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby orders:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
x x x PHILSTEAM’s afore-stated interrogation squarely falls under this rule.
"2. Philippine Steam Navigation Company, its agents, successors and assigns, to cease and desist from
interrogating and investigating their employees to determine whether they have authorized Philippine Marine Officers
Guild or any other labor organization to represent them for the purpose of collective bargaining, discouraging or
trying to discourage any of such employees from remaining as a member of Philippine Marine Officers Guild or any
other labor organization, and encouraging or trying to encourage any of such employees to join Cebu Seamen’
Association or any other labor organization, and, in any manner, interfering with, restraining, or coercing their
employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization and other rights guaranteed in Section 3 of this Act; and
offer all of their striking employees immediate and full reinstatement to their former or substantially equivalent
positions, without back salaries and without prejudice to their seniority or other rights and privileges, unless they
have found substantially equivalent employment elsewhere during the pendency of this case."cralaw virtua1aw
library
PHILSTEAM moved for reconsideration but the motion was denied on May 18, 1962 by resolution of the Court of
Industrial Relations en banc. The present appeal by PHILSTEAM is from the decision and resolution en banc in Case
6-IPA, Case 618-ULP and Case 1002-ULP.
Petitioner would contend that the respondent court erred in ordering it to reinstate the PMOG strikers. In support of
this it advances the argument that, first, PHILSTEAM did not commit acts constituting unfair labor practice; and,
second, PMOG’s strike was illegal.
The finding of respondent court in Case 618-ULP, as stated, is that PHILSTEAM interfered with, coerced and
restrained employees in their rights to self-organization. The same, if true, is unfair labor practice (Section 4[a] [1],
Republic Act 875).
The acts found by respondent court constituting the foregoing unfair labor practice are (1) the interrogation and
investigation by PHILSTEAM’s supervisory officials of its captains, deck officers and engineers, to determine whether
they had authorized PMOG to act as their bargaining agent; (2) the subjection of PMOG to vilification; and (3) the
participation of PHILSTEAM’s pier superintendent in soliciting membership for a competing union.
PHILSTEAM admits that it initiated and carried out an investigation of its officers as to their membership in PMOG
and whether they had given PMOG authority to represent them in collective bargaining. The reason for this,
PHILSTEAM would however aver, was merely to ascertain for itself the existence of a duty to bargain collectively
with PMOG, a step allegedly justified by PMOG’s refusal to furnish proof of majority representation.
The asserted reason for the investigation cannot be sustained. The record discloses that such investigation was
started by PHILSTEAM even before it received PMOG’s reply stating a refusal to submit proof of majority
representation. Specifically, the investigation was put under way on June 29, 1954 — the same day PHILSTEAM
sent its request that PMOG submit proof of majority representation — whereas, PHILSTEAM knew of PMOG’s
refusal to furnish said proof only on July 6, 1954, when it received PMOG’s reply letter. The respondent court
therefore aptly concluded that PMOG’s refusal to submit evidence showing it represented a majority had nothing to
do with PHILSTEAM’s decision to carry out the investigation.
An employer is not denied the privilege of interrogating its employees as to their union affiliation, provided the same
is for a legitimate purpose and assurance is given by the employer that no reprisals would be taken against unionists.
Nonetheless, any employer who engages in interrogation does so with notice that he risks a finding of unfair labor
practice if the circumstances are such that his interrogation restrains or interferes with employees in the exercise of
their rights to self-organization. (Blue Flash Express Co., Inc., 109 NLRB 591.)
The respondent court had found that PHILSTEAM’s interrogation of its employees had in fact interfered with,
restrained and coerced the employees in the exercise of their rights to self-organization (Petition, Annex A, p. 31).
Such finding being upon questions of fact, the same cannot be reversed herein, because it is fully supported by
substantial evidence.
The rule in this jurisdiction is that subjection by the company of its employees to a series of questioning regarding
their membership in the union or their union activities, in such a way as to hamper the exercise of free choice on their
part, constitutes unfair labor practice (Scoty’s Department Store v. Micaller, 99 Phil., 962; 52 Off. Gaz., 5119).
PMOG’s subjection to vilification is likewise borne out by substantial evidence. Santiago Beliso, PHILSTEAM’s
purchasing agent, told Luis Feliciano, on August 6, 1954, that PMOG was a "money asking union," that "all the
members of the FFW are low people" and that CSA "is a good union." Fernando Guerrero, PHILSTEAM’s inter-island
manager, had authorized Beliso to assist him in his investigation of PMOG membership. The statement of Beliso was
made in the presence of PHILSTEAM office manager Ernesto Mañeru and PHILSTEAM pier superintendent Jose
Perez, and these supervisory officials did nothing to disavow Beliso’s conduct as not intended to represent
PHILSTEAM’s opinion. PHILSTEAM, through its supervisory officials, obviously made it appear to Feliciano that
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Beliso was speaking for or on behalf of the company, when he made the remarks derogatory to PMOG and favorable
to CSA. PHILSTEAM thereby interfered with Feliciano’s right to self organization.
Appellant would however assert an inconsistency on the part of respondent court in finding that Beliso was made to
appear by PHILSTEAM supervisory officials as acting for them, as testified to by Feliciano, when said court
elsewhere rejected a testimony to this effect by Eugenio Obispo.
Appellant refers to the testimony of Obispo, an engine officer, that he signed up with CSA because sometime in July
1954 he was intimidated by Santiago Beliso. Obispo’s testimony, however, referred to a different incident, wherein
there was no showing that Beliso acted in the presence and with the apparent approval of high supervisory officials
of PHILSTEAM. Furthermore, Obispo’s credibility, unlike that of Feliciano, was put in doubt because he falsely stated
that Beliso was an Assistant Manager of PHILSTEAM. We find no inconsistency or discrimination in the appreciation
of the evidence by respondent court in giving credence to Feliciano, as to one incident, while disbelieving Obispo, as
to another.
Finally, of record also stands the fact that PHILSTEAM pier superintendent Valeriano Teves helped bring about the
affiliation of Diosdado Capilitan, a PMOG member, with CSA, by telling him that his joining with CSA would not affect
his PMOG affiliation. This incident was testified to by PHILSTEAM witnesses themselves. While such a statement, if
considered as an isolated remark, may be a harmless expression of opinion, it in reality amounted to support of
CSA’s membership solicitation drive, in light of the circumstances in which it was made. For it in effect encouraged
membership in the competing union and indorsed CSA’s solicitation, at least with respect to Capilitan.
The respondent court absolved PMOG from the charge of unfair labor practice in Case 1002-ULP. The alleged
threats and violence on the part of PMOG strikers were found not sufficiently established by the evidence. And
PHILSTEAM in this appeal no longer argues that said threats and violence were committed.
Nonetheless, PHILSTEAM would contend that PMOG’s strike was illegal, for the reason that the purpose of the strike
was illegal. It is argued that PMOG staged a strike so as to compel PHILSTEAM to bargain collectively with it
notwithstanding that it was a minority union. First of all, the statement that PMOG is a minority union is not accurate.
Respondent court precisely found that there has been no proof as to which union, PMOG, CSA or any other,
represented the majority of PHILSTEAM employees. For lack of showing that CSA represented the majority, it
declared the PHILSTEAM-CSA collective bargaining agreement null and void. It stated that the parties to the dispute
were welcomed to file a petition for certification election to decide this point.
Secondly, PMOG’s strike was in retaliation to PHILSTEAM’s unfair labor practice rather than, as PHILSTEAM would
picture it, an attempt to undermine the PHILSTEAM-CSA agreement. For said agreement was signed only on August
24, 1954 but PMOG filed its notice of strike as early as July 17, 1954. PHILSTEAM’S unfair labor practice, consisting
in its interference with the employees’ rights to self-organization, started on June 29, 1954. It was because of said
unlawful act of the employer that the union struck. The notice of strike in fact mentioned company unfair labor
practices as reason for the intended strike.
From the foregoing it follows that PMOG’s strike was for a lawful purpose and, therefore, justified.
As to the question of reinstatement, we have already ruled, in Cromwell Commercial Employees and Laborers Union
(PTUC) v. C.I.R., Et Al., L-19778, September 30, 1964, that striking employees are entitled to reinstatement, whether
or not, the strike was the consequence of the employer’s unfair labor practice, unless, where the strike was not the
consequence of any unfair labor practice, the employer has hired others to take the place of the strikers and has
promised them continued employment (2 Teller, Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining, Sec. 371, pp. 996-997).
The present strike was the consequence of PHILSTEAM’s unfair labor practice. Reinstatement of the strikers, who
have not found substantially equivalent employment elsewhere, therefore follows as a matter of right,
notwithstanding that the employer has hired others to take the place of the strikers for the purpose of continuing the
operation of the plant or the business of the industry (2 Teller, op. cit., Sec. 277, p. 754).
Petitioner finally argues that reinstatement was forfeited due to the failure of the strike to paralyze the company’s
business or the failure of the employees to offer to return to work voluntarily and without any condition. As adverted
to above, even if the employer hires others to replace the strikers, thereby avoiding paralysis of his business, if the
strike is against an unfair labor practice on its part, the employer is bound to reinstate the strikers. As to the matter of
a voluntary offer to return to work without any condition, the same is relevant only to the question of payment of back
wages in addition to reinstatement. Since in these cases no back wages were awarded, and the union has not
appealed, said question is not in point.
WHEREFORE, the decision and resolution appealed from are hereby affirmed, with costs against petitioner. So
ordered.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-4423. March 31, 1952.]
UNION OF THE PHILIPPINE EDUCATION EMPLOYEES (NLU), Petitioner, v. PHILIPPINE EDUCATION
CO., Respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. EMPLOYERS AND EMPLOYEES; SALARY; RIGHT TO SALARY DURING SUSPENSION. — The provision of
par. 2, sec. 17 of Commonwealth Act No. 103 as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 355 and sec. 5 of
Commonwealth Act No. 559 does not entitle as a matter of course the suspended or discharged employees to salary
during suspension or separation without just cause. The matter of payment of wages in such case is left to the sound
discretion of the Court. The power of the Court with regard to the payment of back salary is discretionary rather than
that payment of salary is a matter of absolute right.
2. ID.; ID.; RIGHT OF STRIKING EMPLOYEES TO BACKPAY. — Where the walkout was launched for the sole
reason that the president and secretary of the Union of the Philippine Education Employees had been dismissed, the
right of the striking employees to backpay can be no greater than the right of the said president and secretary to
remuneration during their suspension. A stream can not run higher than its source.
3. ID.; STRIKE NOT JUSTIFIED. — There was therefore no urgent need for strike and if the employees struck they
did so at their risk. Until all the remedies and negotiations looking toward the adjustment or settlement of labor
disputes have been exhausted, the law does not look with favor upon resorts to radical measures, the pernicious
consequences of which transcend the rights of the immediate parties.
4. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS; EVIDENCE; WEIGHT OF FINDINGS OF EVIDENCE BY COURT OF
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS. — Findings on the weight of evidence by the Court of Industrial Relations are conclusive,
but findings unsupported by substantial or credible proof are not binding on the reviewing court.
5. EMPLOYERS AND EMPLOYEES; STRIKE; SALARY DURING THE PERIOD EMPLOYEES DID NOT REPORT
FOR WORK. — Where the strike was voluntary as it was unnecessary, the employees’ claim to remuneration for the
period they did not report for work was denied.
This is an appeal from the order of the Court of Industrial Relations in Case No. 489-V (1), entitled Union of
Philippine Education Employees v. Philippine Education Co., in so far as it denied the payment of the wages of two
reinstated officials of the petitioning Union during separation from their employment and the wages of the rest of the
Union members during a strike.
Jacinto Fabroa and Juanito Carandang, president and secretary, respectively, of the above Union having been
discharged for alleged defiance of their employer’s authority and subversive acts against the company’s interest, and
for allegedly having indulged in Union activities during office hours, and the rest of the members of the Union having
called a strike by reason of that dismissal, the Court of Industrial Relations, to which the disputes were submitted,
found the said dismissal unwarranted and the strike legal. Fabroa and Carandang were accordingly ordered
reinstated, and the other members of the Union returned to work.
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But the court refused to decree the payment of the salary of any of the dismissed or striking employees, and it was
from this portion of the order that this appeal was taken.
Paragraph 2, Section 19 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 355 and Section 5
of Commonwealth Act No. 559, provides in part that, "If it is proved that during the said period an employee or
laborer, tenant, or farm-laborer has been suspended or dismissed without just cause, the court may direct his
reinstatement and the payment of his salary or wage during the time of the suspension or dismissal, or of any sum
which he should have received had he not been suspended or dismissed, without prejudice to any criminal liability of
the employer or landlord as prescribed by section 24 of this Act.."
This provision, upon which the petitioners and appellants rely, does not entitle as a matter of course the suspended
or discharged employees to salary during suspension or separation without just cause. The matter of payment of
wages in such cases is left to the sound discretion of the court. Note that the law employs the word "may" and not
"shall" or equivalent expression, and there is nothing in the context to indicate that the first-mentioned word — may
— was not used in its usual, ordinary sense.
The discretionary character of the power of the Court of Industrial Relations receives a bolstering from Section 20 of
the same Act, as amended, which enjoins the court to proceed in the investigation, determination and decision of
controversies according to justice and equity without regard to technicalities or legal formalities. This section applies
to procedure and appreciation of evidence as well as to the merits of the case, as this Court impliedly ruled in
Antamok Goldfields Mining Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, Et Al., 70 Phil., 340, 361, 362, cited by the
appellants.
On the nature of the power of the Court with regard to the payment of back salary, Antamok Goldfields Mining Co, v.
Court of Industrial Relations, Et Al., supra, is authority for the view that that power is discretionary rather than that
payment of salary is a matter of absolute right. The Supreme Court in that case sustained the order directing the
payment of salary, not because payment is obligatory but because it is allowed by Commonwealth Act No. 103.
Did the court abuse its discretion thus conferred upon it? The answer to this question depends upon the evidence
and the circumstances surrounding the separation and the resultant strike under consideration.
It appears from the records of this appeal that on July 29, 1950, the manager of the respondent company issued a
mimeographed circular, Exhibit "A", to all its employees, informing them that as a result of the various Government
economic controls, especially controls on FOREIGN EXCHANGE and imports, the company stood to lose nearly
half of its business and, for this reason, would be forced to reduce its personnel correspondingly. "To meet this
unfortunate situation" the circular stated "that all positions will terminate September 30, 1950," but that it was the
"aim of the company to take back as many of the employees as possible, to give the utmost protection to the faithful
and loyal in so far as it is within our power to do so.."
This circular was met by the Union with a 17-point demand, a demand which was mailed on July 31 at 10:30 and
received by the management on August 1, although the letter was dated July 28 to make it appear, it would seem,
that the proposed cut in personnel was just a counter move on the part of the company.
This turn of affairs prompted the management to issue a memorandum circular on August 3, inviting the employees
to a meeting to be held that afternoon in the accounting office but making it understood that attendance was not
compulsory although everybody was requested to be present if he could possibly come. None heeded the invitation
because Carandang, signing Fabroa’s name, on the same date and before the scheduled hour, had circularized the
employees telling them not to attend. They were reminded that the Union of the Philippine Education Employees was
an affiliate of the National Labor Union; that the management had no business to deal directly with the union
members individually; that all negotiations must of necessity be conducted with the National Labor Union or its Board
of Directors; that a petition was then pending in the Court of Industrial Relations and the proposed meeting would be
highly improper. As a matter of fact, however, no case had yet been filed with the Court of Industrial Relations; the
record shows that such case was docketed only the next day, August 9, 1950, the day the employees struck.
Let us take up the matters of Fabroa’s and Carandang’s separation and the legality of the strike separately for
clearness sake; they involve different sets of facts and evidence.
Explaining the reasons for Fabroa’s and Carandang’s discharge, David G. Gunnell, general manager of the
Philippine Education Co., testified, according to the appealed decision, that he received the employee’s 17 demands
on August 8, 1950; that a week before that, he had heared of the union activities of the employees and the election
of their officers; that on August 8, 1950, he had memorandum Exhibit "C" circulated, wherein he requested the
employees to meet with him on the company’s premises; that considering Fabroa’s and Carandang’s circular, which
countermanded the manager’s, a defiance of Gunnell’s authority and an act of insubordination, he, Gunnell,
dismissed Fabroa and Carandang effective at the close of business of August 9 with pay up to that date plus one
month salary.
Francis B. Freeman, education department head, related an incident with Fabroa on the morning of July 29, 1950.
On that occasion, according to Freeman, Fabroa in a loud and arrogant tone of voice told him not to compel the
employees in Freeman’s department to sign the manager’s circular as he, Fabroa, had told them not to.
Jose Marbella, manager of the order department, testified that during the month of July he saw Fabroa leave his
desk four or five times a day, sometimes going to the toilet room and conversing there with other employees,
presumably about union affairs, and at other times talking with one of the Perez brothers although he, the witness,
did not know the subjects of the latter conversations. Marbella further declared that he having distributed the
manager’s circular on July 29, Fabroa came to see him on July 31 with a batch of copies thereof and informed him
that there was no use having the boys sign them.
Judge V. Jimenez Yanzon whose decision, upon motion for reconsideration, was ratified by a majority of the court,
said, referring to Fabroa’s conduct toward Freeman, that "it cannot then be concluded that Fabroa intentionally and
arrogantly defied his superior’s authority in the absence of definite proof that his attitude caused any commotion or
disorder in the department at the time." This conclusion, it will be noted, is of negative character in that there is no
positive finding that Fabroa did not commit the acts imputed to him. Yet, the Judge did find that in a discussion with
Freeman, "Fabroa might have been excited and his voice perhaps went a pitch high." Regarding the charge that
Fabroa and Carandang used the company’s time in union activities, these two employees were also exonerated, but
this exoneration, like their exoneration from the charge of misbehavior, was based not on a clear conviction but on
alleged lack of clear proof. Judge Yanzon merely thought that "from the testimony of the above witnesses, Fabroa’s
union activities during office hours had not been duly established." Here, again, there is manifested a feeling of
uncertainty.
From the tone of the order with reference to these two charges it is gathered that the court had doubts and gave the
employees the benefit thereof. On the other hand there lurked the distinct probability that the facts were as stated by
the company’s witnesses, and this probability might well have made the court reluctant to go more than half way,
awarding the reinstatement of the accused employees but not back salary. In other words, the court struck a
compromise.
Under the circumstances, we are not prepared to say that the court committed an error in stopping where it did.
Indeed if we were forced to express our own opinion, we might say that Fabroa’s and Carandang’s dismissal was not
entirely devoid of justification and that with their reinstatement they had reason enough to be satisfied. Certainly the
management had not been guilty of unfair labor practices. It was Fabroa and Carandang who committed acts
bordering on unfair labor practice.
It was insinuated that the company’s decision to lay off some of its employees was a retaliation to the Union’s
demands. It so happened that it was the other way around for, as has been seen, the demands were submitted after
the proposed cut in personnel was announced. There was obviously an attempt here to mislead; and there is no
doubt that Fabroa and Carandang also misled their co-employees into believing that a petition had already been
lodged with the Court of Industrial Relations.
The court made no comment on these misstatements and we are not precluded from making our own finding. Our
belief is that such misstatements as an obvious case of bad faith should not be lightly regarded.
Bearing on these misstatements is one charge on which the court failed to make a finding and which does not put
Fabroa and Carandang in good light. It is that these employees blocked the company’s entirely legitimate efforts to
explain to its personnel the precarious state of its business. Fabroa’s and Carandang’s actions were all the more
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unwarranted, in our opinion, because Gunnell’s memorandum sounded reasonable and was couched in sympathetic
and conciliatory language, and the projected meeting did not in any way tend to prejudice or compromise the
employees’ interest. On the contrary, it was to have been a good occasion for them to air their grievances, if they had
any, and to state their reasons why the contemplated layoff should not be carried out. If the Union must have
spokesmen Fabroa and Carandang were there and there was nothing to prevent representatives of the national
organization from being summoned. Coming down to the question of the legality of the strike, the ground for the
court’s denial of the employees’ claim to compensation during the period of strike, although the strike was adjudged
legal, was that the said employees "quit work voluntarily as a manifestation of protest in the action of the
management.."
Since the walkout was launched for the sole reason that Fabroa and Carandang had been dismissed, the right of the
striking employees to backpay can be no greater than the right of Fabroa and Carandang to remuneration during
their separation. A stream can not run higher than its source.
There was no justifiable cause for the employees to stop working immediately following or simultaneously with
Fabroa’s and Carandang’s dismissal. Having been paid or promised a month’s salary, Fabroa and Carandang had
the wherewithal to tide over their unemployment for at least one month, and the matter of their suspension was to
have been taken up with the Court of Industrial Relations or, as the employees had been led to believe, was already
in the hands of the court. There was therefore no urgent need for a strike and if the employees struck they did so at
their risk. Until all the remedies and negotiations looking toward the adjustment or settlement of labor disputes have
been exhausted, the law does not look with favor upon resorts to radical measures, the pernicious consequences of
which transcend the rights of the immediate parties.
For another thing, witnesses testified that during the strike a saleslady on her way to the company’s store had been
grabbed by the arm by one of the strikers and chided for going to work again, and that on August 10, 1950, three
strikers made a motion to lay hands on a clerk though they did not succeed in their attempts, thanks to the
intervention of one Leoncio Baluyot who pushed the would-be assault victim inside a store to separate him from his
assailants.
In refusing to give credence to the company’s evidence on these occurrences the court was swayed entirely by the
fact that "no incident of whatever nature had been reported to the police." It was from this fact alone that the court
concluded that "the strikers had not committed acts of violence or caused injuries to persons or damages to
properties.."
Findings on the weight of evidence by the Court of Industrial Relations are conclusive, but findings unsupported by
substantial or credible proof are not binding on the reviewing court. Now, the mere circumstance that the police was
not called had no rational probative force to discredit the testimony of otherwise credible witnesses, testimony which
had all the ring of truth. The Court overlooked the fact that the untoward incidents did not produce results serious
enough to warrant police intervention or criminal prosecution, and the more important fact that under the existing
state of passions the frustrated violence was better forgotten than kept alive for the good of all concerned.
All things considered, we are of the opinion that the court committed no error in holding that the strike was voluntary
as it was unnecessary and in denying the employees’ claim to remuneration for the period they did not report for
work.
The appealed order is affirmed without costs.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 37687 March 15, 1982
PEOPLE'S INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL EMPLOYEES AND WORKERS ORGANIZATION (FFW),
ERNESTO PAGAYATAN, ANTONIO ERIÑO, RODRIGO BOADO AND LINO FRANCISCO, Petitioners,
vs. PEOPLE'S INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL CORPORATION, FEDERATION OF TENANTS AND
LABORERS ORGANIZATION, and THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, Respondents.chanrobles virtual
law library
Petition for review of the decision and en banc resolution of the Court of Industrial Relations dated April 2, 1973 and
October 3, 1973, respectively, promulgated in three (3) consolidated cases. 1chanrobles virtual law library
The decision penned by Associate Judge Alberto S. Veloso adopting in full the report of CIR Hearing Examiner Atty.
Francisco de los Reyes made the following dispositive portion, thus - chanrobles virtual law library
After a careful review, scrutiny and evaluation of the records of these cases, as well as of every piece of evidence
adduced by the parties, pro and con, this court finds the findings of facts and conclusions of law contained in the
aforequoted Report to be amply substantiated, and, therefore, adopts the same as its
own.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, above- entitled cases should therefore be, as they are hereby ordered
DISMISSED.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
SO ORDERED.
This petition limits itself to the controversy in Case No. 4498-ULP filed by People's Industrial and Commercial
Employees and Workers Organization against People's Industrial and Commercial Corporation and the Federation of
Tenants and Laborers Organization.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
On the basis of the Examiner's Report, the following facts appear: On April 30, 1964, the Federation of Tenants and
Laborers Organization, Rizal Chapter, FTLO for short, entered into a collective bargaining agreement with
respondent People's Industrial and Commercial Corporation, hereafter referred to as PINCOCO, (Exhibits "2" and
"G"). At the time the agreement was consummated, herein individual petitioners, Ernesto Pagayatan, Antonio Eriño,
Rodrigo Boado and Lino Francisco, who were also the individual complainants in Case No. 4498-ULP, together with
those mentioned in Annex "A" of the complaint (List of some forty-five [45] other employees), were employees of
PINCOCO and members of FTLO. The relevant portions of the working agreement stipulate: chanrobles virtual law
library
xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library
Art. II. - Union Security Maintenance Shop. Those who are members in good standing of the Union before the
signing of this working agreement, shall continue to be union members in good standing as a prerequisite for
continued employment in the company.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library
Any employee covered by this agreement who during its term, should resign from the union or shall be expelled
therefrom according to its normal procedures for any of the causes hereafter enumerated, shall upon written notice
by the union directorate, be discharged from employment, provided that the causes for expulsion from the Union be
any of the following: chanrobles virtual law library
1. Working in the interest of any labor organization other than the Union which claims or exercises jurisdiction similar
to that claimed or exercised by the Union; chanrobles virtual law library
2. Refusal to pay or non-payment of Union dues and Assessment; chanrobles virtual law library
3. Disloyalty to the Union; chanrobles virtual law library
4. Separation from the Union for cause.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library
101
Art. VIII. No Strike, No Lockout. For the duration of the Agreement, the COMPANY shall not lockout its employees,
nor shall the UNION or any employee stage any strike, picket or other concerted activity other than in protest of
unfair labor practice, and the court decision in the case that may be filed in this connection shall determine the
propriety of such concerned activity under the Agreement. Violation of this paragraph shall be treated as subject to
the same sanctions as a violation of the duty to bargain collectively.
A stoppage of work or cessation of operation due to poor sales, lack of raw material, or any other business reason,
or to force majeure shall not be deemed a lockout for the purpose of the preceding paragraph. In any case that the
COMPANY should stop operations due to any of the foregoing reasons, adequate notice shall be given to the UNION
whenever possible.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
xxx xxx xxx chanrobles virtual law library
Art. XI. Duration of the Agreement. - This agreement shall take effect this - day of April, 1964 and shall only be in
effect for a period of one (1) year thereafter. Unless written notice of a desire to terminate or modify the same is
given by either party to the other at least thirty (30) days before its expiration, this agreement shall be deemed to be
renewed for another year.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
xxx xxx xxx
On October 18, 1964, it appears that with the knowledge of PINCOCO, an election of union officers of the Rizal
Chapter of FTLO was conducted by virtue of a resolution (Exhibit "2-FFW", t.s.n., pp. 24-31, October 10, 1969) and
that individual petitioners were elected as the new officers with Ernesto Pagayatan as chapter president (Exhibits "4-
FFW" and "5-FFW"). On January 10, 1965, individual petitioners together with fifty-one (51) other employees
executed a Certification (Exhibit "3-FFW") stating that they are members of the Federation of Tenants and Laborers
Organization, but as of the above date, they have changed the name of their union to People's Industrial and
Commercial Employees and Workers Organization (PICEWO) and have affiliated this new union with the Federation
of Free Workers, Ernesto Pagayatan was again made the president of the new union (PICEWO) together with the set
of officers elected with him in the last election retaining their respective positions. Further, in the same certification,
the union counsel of FTLO, Atty. David Advincula, was disauthorized to represent the signatories. The certification
contains no specific reason or cause for the change of union name. On February 10, 1965, the new union was
granted a certificate of registration by the Department of Labor (Exhibit " 1-FFW "), chanrobles virtual law library
On March 23, 1965, Ernesto Pagayatan, assuming the capacity of chapter president of FTLO and not as a president
of PICEWO, notified in writing respondent PINCOCO of their desire to terminate the working agreement. Later, a set
of collective bargaining proposals was sent in the name of PICEWO (Exhibits "e", "10" and " 11 "). PINCOCO replied
this wise: chanrobles virtual law library
xxx xxx xxx chanrobles virtual law library
That in view of the study effected by the management as to its stand with regard to the said proposals and further
submission of the same to our legal counsel for consultation and advice and considering that April 15, 1965 is a legal
holiday we cannot serve you, our formal reply within the period specified by existing
statute.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
However, we assure you of our formal reply to your proposal on April 14, 1965 and that management will endeavor
to avail of the remedies within the financial capacity of the company and other factors to be considered to meet the
terms of your proposal.
On April 13, 1965, FTLO passed a resolution expelling petitioners Ernesto Pagayatan, Antonio Eriño Rodrigo Boado
and Lino Francisco from the Federation of Tenants and Laborers Organization (FTLO) on grounds of disloyalty and
working for the interest of another labor federation (Exhibit "F"). On April 22, 1965, Ernesto Pagayatan, this time as
president of PICEWO filed a notice of strike, alleging as cause thereof respondent employer's refusal to bargain.
(Exhibit "9-H"). On April 29,1965, prompted by the demand of the majority of the FTLO directorate to enforce the
maintenance of membership shop of the working agreement, respondent PINCOCO dismissed Ernesto Pagayatan
and his companions from employment (Exhibits "12- FFW "12-A-FFW" to "12-CFFW"). On May 1, 1965, the FTLO
and respondent PINCOCO executed a collective bargaining agreement for a period of three (3) years (Exhibits "A-
CO" and "D").chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Meantime, on April 30, 1965, PICEWO, led by individual petitioners struck. Thereafter, at the behest of the FTLO,
respondent PINCOCO posted a notice for the strikers to return to work within a period of five (5) or ten (10) days or
else they shall be considered to have abandoned their work. None of the strikers returned and picketing went on for
a period of six (6) months. Later, PINCOCO again posted a notice that it had decided to resume operation on March
9, 1966, and between March 7 and 8 of the same year, all employees were advised to signify their ability to work at
which time they will be required to submit police clearances and to medical and physical examination by the
company physician, otherwise their failure to return within the period shall be considered as abandonment of work.
On March 31, 1966 petitioner-union, through its president, signified the intention to return to work beginning April 4,
1966. None of the strikers, however, were allowed to work.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
From the preceding developments, three separate cases were filed with the Court of Industrial Relations. In Case
No. 4428-ULP, FTLO indicted herein individual petitioners for unfair labor practice in staging an illegal strike after
they were already dismissed from the company. In Case No. 167-INJ, FTLO sought for the issuance of a permanent
injunction to stop the alleged illegal strike. In Case No. 4498-ULP, PICEWO sued PINCOCO and FTLO for unfair
labor practice, alleging that by illegally dismissing petitioners, the company discriminated against them in regard to
hire, tenure and/or other conditions of employment by unlawfully acceding and effecting the request of FTLO without
proper investigation thereof, with no just reason but to encourage membership in the FTLO; and that respondent
federation, in recommending and insisting on the dismissal of individual petitioners, had interfered in their right to
self-organization. (Annex "C", p. 39, Rollo) chanrobles virtual law library
After the reception of evidence, the Hearing Examiner designated by the Court of Industrial Relations, reported that
the petitioners were, beyond doubt, members of the FTLO when the Working Agreement of April 30, 1964 took effect
and that the working agreement required in Article II thereof maintenance of membership in the federation as
condition for continued employment in the company. Since the specific causes for expulsion from membership have
been enumerated, particularly that of working for the interest of another organization and disloyalty to the union, the
Hearing Examiner concluded that petitioners' conduct is within the said causes expressed in the agreement. The
Report also established that FTLO is the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of the employees which
entered into a bona fide agreement, putting a limitation of petitioners' right to leave the union and join another. The
Examiner found no unfair labor practice committed by either the FTLO or PINCOCO, and that the strike staged by
petitioners was not on account of any unfair labor practice, but, rather, done to force
recognition.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Based on the above findings, respondent court dismissed the three cases. On April 10, 1973, petitioners filed their
motion for reconsideration; same was denied in the en bancresolution of October 3, 1973. Petitioners now raise the
following assignment of errors: chanrobles virtual law library
a) The respondent court erred in holding that the Motion for Reconsideration and the Memorandum in support of the
Motion for Reconsideration were filed out of time; chanrobles virtual law library
b) The respondent court erred in holding that the strike declared by herein petitioners was intended only to force
recognition; chanrobles virtual law library
c) The respondent court erred in not declaring both respondent Corporation and respondent Federation guilty of
committing unfair labor practice; chanrobles virtual law library
d) The respondent court erred in not declaring as illegal the dismissal from employment of individual petitioners;
and chanrobles virtual law library
e) Respondent court erred in not ordering the return to work of the striking members of petitioner Union with
backwages and other fringe benefits from April 30, 1965 until their actual reporting for
work.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
102
The last day for filing the motion for reconsideration was April 9, 1973 which was a holiday (BATAAN DAY), and the
last day for filing the arguments in support of the motion for reconsideration, ten days after, was April 19, 1973, also
a holiday (MAUNDY THURSDAY). Since petitioners have filed their pleadings on the next respective business days,
that is, April 10, 1973, for the motion for reconsideration and April 23 for the arguments in support thereof (April 20 to
22 not being business days), the pleadings were, therefore, filed on time. On this procedural aspect, the resolution of
October 3, 1973 has erred. It is the policy of the law to disregard technicalities in procedure so as not to deprive the
litigant's pursuit of his substantial rights under the Rules.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Under Article 13, last paragraph, of the Civil Code, in computing the period, the first day shall be excluded, and the
last day included. And under Rule 28 of the Rules of Court, Section 1, time is computed thus - chanrobles virtual law
library
Sec. 1. How to compute time.-In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by these rules, by order of court,
or by any applicable statute, the day of the act, event, or default after the designated period of time begins to run is
not to be included. The last day of the period so computed is to be included, unless it is a Sunday or a legal holiday,
in which event the time shall run until the end of the next day which is neither a Sunday nor a holiday.
Under the second assignment of error, the question to be resolved is whether or not the petitioners' act of
disaffiliating themselves from the mother federation constitutes an act of disloyalty to the union which would warrant
their expulsion and consequently their dismissal from the company in pursuance to the union security clause
embodied in the CBA.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Petitioners contend that no disloyalty is involved since what they did on January 10, 1965 was merely to change, as
they did change, the name of Rizal Chapter of the Federation of Tenants and Laborers Organization FTLO to
People's Industrial and Commercial Employees and Workers Organization
(PICEWO).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
While We are not convinced with the petitioners' argument that the only act that they have done was to change the
name of their union for they have registered the new union and affiliated it with the Federation of Free Workers, We
rule that individual petitioners do not merit the dismissals meted by the
company.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
In Liberty Cotton Mills Workers Union vs. Liberty Cotton Mills, 2 We held that the validity of the dismissals pursuant to
the security clause of the CBA hinges on the validity of the disaffiliation of the local union from the federation. It was
further held in this case that PAFLU (the federation) had the status of an agent while the local union remained the
basic unit of association free to serve the common interest of all its members including the freedom to disaffiliate
when the circumstances warrant such an act. The Supreme Court, speaking thru Justice Esguerra, said: chanrobles
virtual law library
All these questions boil down to the single issue of whether or not the dismissal of the complaining employees,
petitioners herein, was justified or not. The resolution of this question hinges on a precise and careful analysis of the
Collective Bargaining Agreements. (Exhs. "H" and "l"). In these contracts it appears that PAFLU has been
recognized as the sole bargaining agent for all the employees of the Company other than its supervisors and security
guards. Moreover it likewise appears that "PAFLU, represented in this Act by its National Treasurer, and duly
authorized representative, ... (was) acting for and in behalf of its affiliate, the Liberty Cotton Mills Workers Union and
the employees of the Company, etc." In other words, the PAFLU, acting for and in behalf of its affiliate, had the
status of an agent while the local union remained the basic unit of the association free to serve the common interest
of all its members including the freedom to disaffiliate when the circumstances warrant. This is clearly provided in its
Constitution and By-Laws, specifically Article X on Union Affiliation, supra. At this point, relevant is the ruling in an
American case. (Harker et al. vs. Mckissock et al., 81A 2d 480, 482).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
The locals are separate and distinct units primarily designed to secure and maintain an equality of bargaining power
between the employer and their employee-members in the economic struggle for the fruits of the joint productive
effort of labor and capital; and the association of the locals into the national union (as PAFLU) was in furtherance of
the same end. These associations are consensual entities capable of entering into such legal relations with their
members. The essential purpose was the affiliation of the local unions into a common enterprise to increase by
collective action the common bargaining power in respect of the terms and conditions of labor. Yet the locals
remained the basic units of association, free to serve their own and the common interest of all, subject to the
restraints imposed by the Constitution and By-Laws of the Association, and free also to renounce the affiliation for
mutual welfare upon the terms laid down in the agreement which brought it into existence.
The right of the local members to withdraw from the federation and to form a new local depends upon the provisions
of the union's constitution, by- laws and charter. In the absence of enforceable provisions in the federation's
constitution preventing disaffiliation of a local union, a local may sever its relationship with its
parent.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
There is nothing shown in the records nor is it claimed by respondent federation that the local union was expressly
forbidden to disaffiliate from the federation. Except for the union security clause, the federation claims no other
ground in expelling four of the fifty-one who signed the certification.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
Fifty-one out of sixty employees is equivalent to eighty five percent (85%) of the total working force. This is not a
case where one or two members of the old union decided to organize another union in order to topple down the
former, but it is a case where majority of the union members decided to reorganize the union and to disaffiliate from
the mother federation.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
There is no merit to the contention of the respondent federation that the act of disaffiliation is disloyalty to the union.
The federation and the union are two different entities and it was the federation which actively initiated the dismissal
of the individual petitioners. A local union does not owe its existence to the federation to which it is affiliated. It is a
separate and distinct voluntary association owing its creation and continued existence to the will of its members. The
very essence of self-organization is for the workers to form a group for the effective enhancement and protection of
their common interests.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The third, fourth and fifth assignment of errors maybe resolved on the same issue which is the legality of the strike
and the consequences thereof.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Petitioners allege that the strike which was started on April 30, 1965 was staged because of the unfair labor practice
of the respondent company in refusing to bargain collectively with PICEWO and in dismissing individual petitioners.
The Hearing Officer in his Report which was adopted in full by the Court of Industrial Relations settled the legality of
the strike in the following manner: chanrobles virtual law library
xxx xxx xxx chanrobles virtual law library
While the reply of respondent PINCOCO to the proposal of the new union evokes ambiguity, the same may not be
treated as a refusal to bargain. At the time the letter proposal was sent, the presumed bargaining agent was the
FTLO. No showing had been made that the PICEWO, upon its organization was should should have been accorded
the status of a majority bargaining representative. The letter reply of PINCOCO, although it seem to cast doubt as to
its motivation, should not be held and taken against it as a positive design to discriminate in the absence of any
additional or corroborative showing that the new union actually represented the majority of the employees in the unit
and that this fact was known to the management.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The strike therefore of the PICEWO was not on account of any unfair labor practice acts committed by the
respondent PINCOCO. It seem to have been more of a strike to force
recognition.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
xxx xxx xxx
We do not agree with the finding of the Hearing Officer that the strike was staged to force recognition. The chain of
events which preceded the strike belie this conclusion. On April 5, 1965, Ernesto Pagayatan, the president of
PICEWO sent to the management a set of proposals for a collective bargaining agreement. The management on
April 13, 1965 replied that the formal reply to the proposals cannot be made within the reglementary period because
103
they will submit the said proposals to their legal counsel for further study and instead their reply would be made on
April 19, 1965. No reply was made on that date. On April 29, 1965, individual petitioners were dismissed. A strike
was staged the next day. One day after the petitioners struck, a new collective bargaining agreement was signed by
the respondent company and the FTLO.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The respondent company knew that a new union was formed composed of about 85% of the total number of its
employees. It was furnished a copy of the certification that the majority of the FTLO members are forming a new
union called PICEWO. The set of bargaining proposals were in the name of the new union. While a company cannot
be forced to sit down and bargain collectively with the new union since it had no notice of the union's official capacity
to act as the bargaining agent, the respondent company cannot deny that it had factual knowledge of the existence
of a majority union. It could have asked for further proof that the new union was indeed the certified bargaining agent.
It did not. Instead, it dismissed individual petitioners and signed a new CBA the day after the expiration of the old
CBA, on the pretext that FTLO was presumed to be the certified bargaining agent. Such pretext does not seem
justified nor reasonable in the face of the established fact that a new union enjoyed a majority status within the
company.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
tenure would be useless and meaningless. Labor, being the weaker in economic power and resources than capital,
deserve protection that - is actually substantial and material.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision under review is hereby SET ASIDE. The respondent
company is hereby ordered to reinstate individual petitioners and other striking members within thirty (30) days from
notice of this decision, with backwages equivalent, to three (3) years at the rates actually received by them before
their dismissal without deduction and qualification.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
In view of the length of time that this dispute has been pending, this decision shall be immediately executory upon
promulgation and notice to the parties. Without pronouncement as to costs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
SO ORDERED.

On the belief that the respondent company refused to bargain collectively with PICEWO, individual petitioners EN BANC
together with the other members staged a strike. We have in several cases ruled that a strike may be considered
legal when the union believed that the respondent company committed unfair labor acts and the circumstances G.R. No. Nos. L-30632-33 April 11, 1972
warranted such belief in good faith although subsequently such allegation of unfair labor practices are found out as
not true.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library CALTEX FILIPINO MANAGERS AND SUPERVISORS ASSOCIATION Petitioner, v.COURT OF INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS, CALTEX (PHILIPPINES), INC., W.E. MENEFEE and B.F. EDWARDS, Respondents.
Thus, in Norton and Harrison Co. and Jackbilt Blocks company Labor Union (NLU) vs. Norton and Harrison, et
al., 3 We held that "the act of the company in dismissing Arcaina done without the required fair hearing, and,
therefore, not tenable even under strict legal ground, induced the union and its members to believe that said
company was guilty of unfair labor practice although viewed now in retrospect said act would fall short of unfair labor
This is an appeal by the Caltex Filipino Managers and Supervisors' Association from the resolution en banc dated
practice. Since the strike of the union was in response to what it was warranted in believing in good faith to be unfair
May 16, 1969 of the Court of Industrial Relations affirming the decision dated February 26, 1969 of Associate Judge
labor practice on the part of the management, said strike following the berrer ruling did not result in the termination of
Emiliano C. Tabigne, Associate Judge Ansberto P. Paredes dissented from the resolution of the majority on the
the striking members' status as employees and therefore, they are still entitled to reinstatement without
ground that the Industrial Court in a representation case cannot take cognizance of the issue of illegality of a strike
backwages." chanrobles virtual law library
and proceed to declare the loss of the employee status of employees inasmuch as that matter ought to be processed
as an unfair labor practice case. Judge Tabigne's decision covers two cases, namely, Case No. 1484-MC (1) in
The Ferrer 4 ruling was also upheld in Shell Oil Workers Union vs. Shell Company of the Phil. Ltd. 5 where We stated
which he declared the strike staged on April 22, 1965 by the Association as illegal with the consequent forfeiture of
that "(i)t is not even required that there be in fact an unfair labor practice committed by the employer. It suffices, if the employee status of three employees (Jose J. Mapa, President of the Association; Dominador Mangalino, Vice-
such a belief in good faith is entertained by labor as the inducing factor for staging a strike. So it was clearly stated
President and Herminigildo Mandanas) and Case No. 4344-ULP against Caltex (Philippines), Inc., Ben F. Edwards
by the present Chief Justice while still an Associate Justice of this Court: 'As a consequence, we hold that the strike
W.E. Menefee which Judge Tabigne dismissed for lack of merit and substantial
in question had been called to offset what petitioners were warranted in believing in good faith to be unfair labor evidence.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
practices on the part of Management, that petitioners were not bound, therefore, to wait for the expiration of thirty
(30) days from notice of strike before staging the same, that said strike was not, accordingly, illegal and that the
The following proceedings gave rise to the present appeal:chanrobles virtual law library
strikers had not thereby lost their status as employees of respondents herein.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
The Caltex Filipino Managers and Supervisors' Association is a labor organization of Filipino managers supervisors
in Caltex (Philippines), Inc., respondent Company in this proceeding. After the Association was registered as a labor
The Ferrer ruling was promulgated in 1966, that in the Shell Oil case in 1971. In 1980, there was the case of Pepito
organization it sent a letter to the Company on January 21, 1965 informing the latter of the former's registration; the
vs. Secretary of Labor, L-49418, Feb. 29, 1980, where petitioner therein was separated for having been implicated in
Company replied inquiring on the position titles of the employees which the Association sought to represent. On
a pilferage case by a co-employee but was later absolved from the charge. The Supreme Court thru Chief Justice
February 8, 1965 the Association sent a set of proposals to the Company wherein one of the demands was the
Fernando ruled that the cause for his dismissal was proved non-existent or false and thus ordered his reinstatement
recognition of the Association as the duly authorized bargaining agency for managers and supervisors in the
with three years backwages, without deduction and qualification.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
Company. To this the Company countered stating that a distinction exists between representatives of management
library
and individuals employed as supervisors and that it is Company's belief that managerial employees are not qualified
for membership in a labor organization; hence, it is digested that the Association institute a certification proceeding
We adopt the Pepito ruling and We hold that the petitioners in the case at bar are entitled not only to reinstatement so as to remove any question with regard to position titles that should be included in the bargaining unit. The
but also to three years backwages without deduction and qualification. This is . justified and proper since the strike Association felt disinclined to follow the suggestion of the Company1 and so on February 22, 1965 the Company
was proved and We held the same to be not illegal but was induced in the honest belief that management had initiated a certification proceeding docketed as Case 1484-MC.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
committed unfair labor practices and, therefore, the cause of their dismissal from employment was non-existent. It is library
clear that management gave cause or reason to induce the staging of the strike by improperly refusing to recognize
the new union formed by petitioners. It has been twelve (12) years since petitioners were dismissed from their
On March 8, 1965 the Association filed notice to strike giving the following reasons:
employment and in their destitute and deplorable condition, to them the benign provisions of the New Constitution for
the protection of labor, assuring the rights of workers to self- organization, collective bargaining and security of

104
Refusal to bargain in good faith and to act on demands, a copy of which is enclosed; resort to union-busting tactics in
order to discourage the activities of the undersigned association and its members, including discrimination and
intimidation of officers and members of the association and circulation of promises of immediate benefits to be given
by the company to its employees, officers and members of this association or those intending to join the same, if the
employees concerned in due course will vote against the selection of this association as the exclusive collective
bargaining unit for managers and supervisors of the Company in the petition for certification the latter filed. (Annex
"A" of Annex "A", Petition).
On March 29, 1965, during the hearing of the certification proceedings, Judge Tabigne cautioned the parties to
maintain the status quo; he specifically advised the employees not to go on strike, making it clear, however, that in
the presence of unfair labor practices they could go on strike even without any notice. 2chanrobles virtual law library
On the basis of the strike notice filed on March 8, 1965 and in view of acts committed by the Company which the
Association considered as constituting unfair labor practice, the Association struck on April 22, 1965, after the efforts
exerted by the Bureau of Labor Relations to settle the differences between the parties failed. Then, through an
"Urgent Petition" dated April 26, 1965 filed as Case No. 1484-MC(1), or as an incident of the certification election
proceedings (Case No. 1484-MC), the Company prayed as follows:
WHEREFORE, petitioner respectfully prays this Honorable Court that:chanrobles virtual law library
1. The strike of respondent Caltex Filipino Managers and Supervisors Association be declared illegal;chanrobles
virtual law library
2. The officers and members of respondent association who have instigated, declared, encouraged and/or
participated in the illegal strike be held and punished for contempt of this Honorable Court and be declared to have
lost their employee status;chanrobles virtual law library
3. Pending hearing on the merits and upon the filing of a bond in an amount to be fixed by this Honorable Court, a
temporary injunction be issued restraining respondent association, its officers, members and representatives acting
for and on their behalf from committing, causing or directing the commission of the unlawful acts complained of,
particularly obstructing and preventing petitioner, its customers, officers and non-striking employees from entering
and going out of its various offices, in its refinery, installations, depots and terminals and the use or threat of violence
and intimidation;chanrobles virtual law library
4. After trial, said injunction be made permanent;chanrobles virtual law library
5. The damages that petitioner has suffered and will suffer up to the trial of this action be ascertained and judgment
be rendered against respondent association, its officers, members and representatives jointly and severally for the
amount thereof.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Petitioner prays for such other and further relief as this Honorable Court may deem just and equitable in the
premises. (Annex "D", Petition)
Such urgent petition was frontally met by the Association with a motion to dismiss questioning the jurisdiction of the
industrial court. The motion to dismiss was opposed by the Company and on May 17, 1965 the trial court denied the
same. Not satisfied with the order of May 17, 1965, the Association moved for its reconsideration before respondent
court en banc.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Because of the settlement between the parties on May 30, 1965 of some of their disputes, the Association filed with
respondent court under date of June 3, 1965 a manifestation (to which was attached a copy of the return-to-work
agreement signed by the parties on May 30, 1965), to the effect that the issues in Case No. 1484-MC (1) had
become moot and academic. Under date of June 15, 1965 the Company filed a counter-manifestation disputing the
representations of the Association on the effect of the return-to-work agreement. On the basis of the manifestation
and counter-manifestation, respondent court en banc issued a resolution on August 24, 1965 allowing the withdrawal
of the Association's motion for reconsideration against the order of May 17, 1965, on the theory that there was
justification for such withdrawal.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Relative to the resolution of August 24, 1965 the Company filed a motion for clarification which the Association
opposed on September 22, 1965, for it contended that such motion was in reality a motion for reconsideration and as
such filed out of time. But respondent court brushed aside the Association's opposition and proceeded to clarify the
resolution of August 24, 1965 to mean that the Company was not barred from continuing with Case No. 1484-
MC(1).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
At the hearing on September 1, 1965 of Case No. 1484-MC(1) the Association insisted that the incident had become
moot and academic and must be considered dismissed and, at the same time, it offered to present evidence, if still
necessary, in order to support its contention. Respondent court thereupon decided to secure evidence from the
parties to enlighten it on the interpretation of the provisions of the return-to-work agreement relied upon by the
Association as rendering the issues raised in Case No. 1484-MC(1) already moot and academic. Evidence having
been received, the trial court ruled in its order of February 15, 1966 that under the return-to-work agreement the
Company had reserved its rights to prosecute Case No. 1484-MC(1) and, accordingly, directed that the case be set
for hearing covering the alleged illegality of the strike. Within the prescribed period the Association filed a motion for
reconsideration of the February 15, 1966 order to which motion the Company filed its opposition and, in due course,
respondent court en banc issued its resolution dated March 28, 1966 affirming the order. Appeal from the
interlocutory order was elevated by the Association to this Court in G.R. No. L-25955, but the corresponding petition
for review was summarily "DISMISSED for being premature" under this court's resolution of May 13,
1966.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
After a protracted preliminary investigation, the Association's charge for unfair labor practices against the Company
and its officials docketed in a separate proceeding was given due course through the filing by the prosecution
division of respondent court of the corresponding complaint dated September 10, 1965, in Case No. 4344-ULP
against Caltex (Philippines), Inc., W. E. Menefee and B.F. Edwards. As noted by respondent court in its decision
under review, Case No. 4344-ULP was filed by the Association because, according to the latter, the Company and
some of its officials, including B.F. Edwards, inquired into the organization of the Association and he manifested his
antagonism to it and its President; that another Company official, W.E. Menefee issued a statement of policy
designed to discourage employees and supervisors from joining labor organizations; that the Company refused to
bargain although the Association commands majority representation; that due to the steps taken by the Company to
destroy the Association or discourage its members from continuing their union membership, the Association was
forced to file a strike notice; that on April 22, 1965 it declared a strike; and that during the strike the Company and its
officers continued their efforts to weaken the Association as well as its picket lines. The Company in its answer filed
with respondent court denied the charges of unfair labor practice.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
Considering the interrelation of the issues involved in the two cases and by agreement of the parties, the two cases
were heard jointly. This explains why only one decision was rendered by respondent court covering both Case No.
1484-MC(1), relating to the illegality of the strike as contended by the Company, and Case No. 4344-ULP, referring
to the unfair labor practice case filed by the Association against the Company, W.E. Menefee and B.F.
Edwards.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The Association assigned the following errors allegedly committed by respondent court:chanrobles virtual law library
I
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN ASSUMING JURISDICTION OVER CASE NO. 1484-MC(1).
II
ASSUMING THAT RESPONDENT COURT HAS JURISDICTION OVER CASE NO. 1484-MC(1), IT ERRED IN NOT
HOLDING THAT THE SAME ALREADY BECAME MOOT WITH THE SIGNING OF THE RETURN TO WORK
AGREEMENT ON MAY 30, 1965.
III
105
ASSUMING LIKEWISE THAT RESPONDENT COURT HAS JURISDICTION OVER CASE NO. 1484-MC(1), IT
ERRED IN HOLDING THAT CAFIMSA'S STRIKE WAS STAGED FOR NO OTHER REASON THAN TO COERCE
THE COMPANY INTO RECOGNIZING THE CAFIMSA AND THAT SUCH STRIKE WAS UNJUSTIFIED,
UNLAWFUL AND UNWARRANTED.
IV
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT'S CONCLUSION THAT CAFIMSA'S STRIKE
WAS DECLARED IN OPEN DEFIANCE OF THE MARCH 29, 1965 ORDER IN CERTIFICATION CASE NO. 1484-
MC.
V Rule 71 of the Rules of Court; and for forfeiture of the employee status of the strikers by virtue of their participation in
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING, DESPITE THE SUBSTANTIAL
CONTRARY EVIDENCE ON RECORD, THAT THE STRIKERS RESORTED TO MEANS BEYOND THE PALE OF
THE LAW IN THE PROSECUTION OF THE STRIKE AND IN DISREGARDING THE CONSIDERATION THAT THE
STRIKERS MERELY EMPLOYED LAWFUL ACTS OF SELF-PRESERVATION AND SELF-DEFENSE.
VI
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DISMISSAL BY THE TRIAL COURT OF J.J. MAPA,
CAFIMSA'S PRESIDENT, AND OTHERS, OR IN OTHERWISE PENALIZING THE STRIKERS.
VII
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE FACTS FOUND BY THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD BE ACCEPTED, IN
DISREGARD OF THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE COMPANY DAMAGING TO ITS CAUSE, OR ALTHOUGH
THE TRIAL COURT DISREGARDED THE SUBSTANTIAL INCRIMINATORY EVIDENCE AGAINST THE
COMPANY, RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN NOT APPLYING THE PRINCIPLE OF IN PARI DELICTO.
VIII
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO HOLD THAT THE COMPANY IS BARRED UNDER SECTION 9(e)
OF THE REPUBLIC ACT NO. 875 FROM SEEKING THE RELIEF PRAYED FOR IN CASE NO. 1484-MC(1).
IX
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN ENTIRELY ABSOLVING THE COMPANY FROM THE UNFAIR LABOR
PRACTICE CHARGE AND IN DISREGARDING THE SUBSTANTIAL INCRIMINATORY EVIDENCE RELATIVE
THERETO AGAINST THE COMPANY.
X Act No. 875. To adopt the view of respondent court would not only set at naught the policy of the law as embodied in
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN RENDERING JUDGEMENT FOR THE CAFIMSA IN CASE NO. 4344-ULP AND
IN NOT ORDERING THE COMPANY TO PAY BACK WAGE AND ATTORNEY'S FEES.
XI
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN PREMATURELY IMPLEMENTING THE TRIAL COURT'S DISMISSAL OF J.J.
MAPA AND DOMINADOR MANGALINO (Brief for the Petitioner, pp. 1-4).
To our mind the issues raised in this appeal may be narrowed down to the following:chanrobles virtual law library
1. whether or not the Court of Industrial Relations has jurisdiction over Case No. 1484-MC(1);chanrobles virtual law
library
2. Whether or not the strike staged by the Association on April 22, 1965 is illegal and, incident thereto, whether
respondent court correctly terminated the employee status of Jose Mapa, Dominador Mangalino and Herminigildo
Mandanas and reprimanded and admonished the other officers of the Association; and chanrobles virtual law library
3. Whether or not respondent court correctly absolved the respondents in Case No. 4344-ULP from the unfair labor
practice charge.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Respondent's court's jurisdiction over Case No. 1484-MC(1) has to be tested by the allegations of the "Urgent
Petition" dated April 26, 1965 filed by the Company in relation to the applicable provisions of law. A reading of said
pleading shows that the same is for injunctive relief under Section 9(d) of Republic Act No. 875 (Magna Carta of
Labor); for contempt, obviously pursuant to See, 6 of Commonwealth Act No. 103 in conjunction with Sec. 3 (b) of
what the Company considered as an "illegal strike."chanrobles virtual law library
It is well known that the scheme in Republic Act No. 875 for achieving industrial peace rests essentially on a free and
private agreement between the employer and his employees as to the terms and conditions under which the
employer is to give work and the employees are to furnish labor, unhampered as far as possible by judicial or
administrative intervention. On this premise the lawmaking body has virtually prohibited the issuance of injunctive
relief involving or growing out of labor disputes.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The prohibition to issue labor injunctions is designed to give labor a comparable bargaining power with capital and
must be liberally construed to that end (U.S. vs. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 79 F. Supp.
485, Certiorari denied, 69 S. Ct. 137, 335 U.S. 867, cause remanded on other grounds, 174 F. 2nd 160, 85 U.S. App.
D.C.,certiorari denied 70 S. Ct. 140, 338 U.S. 872, 94 L. Ed. 535). It is said that the prohibition creates substantive
and not purely procedural law. (Oregon Shipbuilding Corporation vs. National Labor Relations Board, 49 F. Supp.
886). Within the purview of our ruling, speaking through Justice Labrador, in Social Security Employees Association
(PAFLU), et al. vs. The Hon. Edilberto Soriano, et al. (G.R. No. L-20100, July 16, 1964, 11 SCRA 518, 520), there
can be no injunction issued against any strike except in only one instance, that is, when a labor dispute arises in an
industry indispensable to the national interest and such dispute is certified by the President of the Philippines to the
Court of Industrial Relations in compliance with Sec. 10 of Republic Act No. 875. As a corollary to this, an injunction
in an uncertified case must be based on the strict requirement See. 9 (d) of Republic Act No. 875; the purpose of
such injunction is not to enjoin the strike itself, but only unlawful activities. To the extent, then, that the Company
sought injunctive relief under Sec. 9(d) of Republic Act No.875, respondent court had jurisdiction over the Company's
"Urgent Petition" dated April 26, 1965.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
As to the "contempt aspect" of Case No. 1484-MC(1), the jurisdiction of respondent court over it cannot be seriously
questioned it appearing that Judge Tabigne in good faith thought that his "advice" to the Association during the
hearing on March 29, 1965 not to strike amounted a valid order. This is not to say, however, that respond court did
not err in finding that the advice given by Judgre Tabigne during the hearing on March 29, 1965 really constituted an
order which can be the basis of a contempt proceeding. For, in our opinion, what Judge Tabigne statement during
said hearing should be construed what actually was - an advice. To say that it was an order would be to concede that
respondent court could validly enjoin strike, especially one which is not certified in accord with Sec. 10 of Republic
the said statute against issuance of injunctions, but also remove from the hands of labor unions and aggrieved
employees an effective lawful weapon to either secure favorable action on their economic demand or to stop unfair
labor practices on the part of their employer.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
With respect to the alleged "illegality of the strike," as claimed by the Company, and the consequent forfeiture of the
employee status of the strikers, we believe these matters which are neither pertinent to nor connected with a
certification case as opined by Judge Paredes, to which we agree. Respondent court, therefore, initially erred in
entertaining this issue in Case No. 1484-MC(1). No prejudice, however, has resulted since, as correctly pointed out
by respondent court, the illegality for the strike was squarely raised by the Company as a defense in Case No. 4344-
ULP and, in any event, we observe that the Association was given all the opportunity to put forward its
evidence.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
106
We now come to the important issue as to whether the strike staged by the Association on April 22, 1965 is illegal.
From an examination of the records, we believe that the lower court erred in its findings in this
regard.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
To begin with, we view the return-to-work agreement of May 30, 1965 as in the nature of a partial compromise
between the parties and, more important, a labor contract; consequently, in the latter aspect the same "must yield to
the common good" (Art. 1700, Civil Code of the Philippines) and "(I)n case of doubt ... shall be construed in favor of
the safety and decent living for the laborer" (Art. 1702, ibid). To our mind when the Company unqualifiedly bound
itself in the return-to-work agreement that all employees will be taken back "with the same employee status prior to
April 22, 1965," the Company thereby made manifest its intention and conformity not to proceed with Case No. 1484-
MC, (c) relating the illegality of the strike incident. For while it is true that there is a reservation in the return-to-work
agreement as follows:
6. The parties agree that all Court cases now pending shall continue, including CIR Case No. 1484-MC.
we think the same is to be construed bearing in mind the conduct and intention of the parties. The failure to mention
Case No. 1484-MC(1) while specifically mentioning Case No. 1484-MC, in our opinion, bars the Company from
proceeding with the former especially in the light of the additional specific stipulation that the strikers would be taken
back with the same employee status prior to the strike on April 22, 1965. The records disclose further that, according
to Atty. Domingo E. de Lara when he testified on October 9, 1965, and this is not seriously disputed by private
respondents, the purpose of Paragraph 10 of the return-to-work agreement was, to quote in part from this witness,
"to secure the tenure of employees after the return-to-work agreement considering that as I understand there were
demotions and suspensions of one or two employees during the strike and, moreover, there was this incident Case
No. 1484-MC(1)" (see Brief for the Petition pp. 41-42). To borrow the language of Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Citizens
Labor Union Pandacan Chapter vs. Standard Vacuum Oil Company (G.R. No. L-7478, May 6, 1955), in so far as the
illegality of the strike is concerned in this proceeding and in the light of the records.
... the matter had become moot. The parties had both abandoned their original positions and come to a virtual
compromise and agreed to resume unconditionally their former relations. To proceed with the declaration of illegality
would not only breach this understanding, freely arrived at, but to unnecessarily revive animosities to the prejudice of
industrial peace. (Emphasis supplied)
Conceding arguendo that the illegality incident had not become moot and academic, we find ourselves unable to
agree with respondent court to the effect that the strike staged by the Association on April 22, 1965 was unjustified,
unreasonable and unwarranted that it was declared in open defiance of an order in Case No. 1484-MC not to strike;
and that the Association resorted to means beyond the pale of the law in the prosecution of the strike. As adverted to
above, the Association filed its notice to strike on March 8, 1965, giving reasons therefor any one of which is a valid
ground for a strike.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
In addition, from the voluminous evidence presented by the Association, it is clear that the strike of the Association
was declared not just for the purpose of gaining recognition as concluded by respondent court, but also for
bargaining in bad faith on the part of the Company and by reason of unfair labor practices committed by its officials.
But even if the strike were really declared for the purpose of recognition, the concerted activities of the officers and
members of the Association in this regard cannot be said to be unlawful nor the purpose thereof be regarded as
trivial. Significantly, in the voluntary return-to-work agreement entered into between the Company and the
Association, thereby ending the strike, the Company agreed to recognize for membership in the Association the
position titles mentioned in Annex "B" of said agreement. 3 This goes to show that striking for recognition is
productive of good result in so far as a union is concerned.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Besides, one of the important rights recognized by the Magna Carta of Labor is the right to self-organization and we
do not hesitate to say that is the cornerstone of this monumental piece of labor legislation. Indeed, because of
occasional delays incident to a certification proceeding usually attributable to dilatory tactics employed by the
employer, to a certain extent a union may be justified in resorting to a strike. We should not be understood here as
advocating a strike in order to secure recognition of a union by the employer. On the whole we are satisfied from the
records that it is incorrect to say that the strike of the Association was mainly for the purpose of securing recognition
as bargaining agent.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
As will be discussed hereinbelow, the charge of unfair labor practice against the Company is well-taken. It is,
therefore, clear error on the part of the Association is unjust, unreasonable and
unwarranted.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
We said earlier that the advice of Judge Tabigne to maintain the status quo cannot be considered as a lawful order
within the contemplation of the Magna Carta of Labor, particularly Section 10 thereof; to so regard it as an order
would be to grant respondent court authority to forbid a strike in an uncertified case which it is not empowered to do.
The fact that the strike was not staged until April 22, 1965 is eloquent proof enough of the desire of the Association
and its officers and members to respect the advice of Judge Tabigne. However, as shown in this case during the
pendency of the certification proceedings unfair labor practices were committed by the Company; hence, the
Association was justified in staging a strike and certainly this is not in violation of the advice of Judge Tabigne on
March 29, 1965.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Respondent court picked out a number of incidents, taking place during the strike, to support its conclusion that the
strikers resorted to means beyond the pale of the law in the prosecution of a strike. Thus, it made mention of the
blocking by a banca manned by two striking supervisors by the name of Dominador Mangalino and one Bonecillo of
the Caltex M/V Estrella when it was about to depart; the blocking at the refinery of the Company in Bauan, Batangas
of the LSCO WARA, the Hills Bros Pinatubo, and the Mobil Visayas so that they could not dock; the blocking by the
strikers of incoming vehicles, non-striking supervisors, and rank-and-file workers to prevent them from entering the
refinery gate in Bauan, Batangas, at the Poro Terminal, at the Company's Padre Faura office in Manila, and at the
Pandacan Terminal; that at the Legaspi and Mambulao Bulk Depots the striking supervisors refused to surrender to
their superiors the keys to the depots and storage tanks; and that also at the Legaspi Depot the truck ignition keys
were mixed up or thrown at the seats of the trucks in violation of the Company regulations in order to create
confusion and thus prevent the trucks from being used. 4To refute these and similar findings of respondent court the
Association, drawing chiefly and abundantly from the Company's own evidence, 5 called attention to the exculpatory
declarations of the Company's own witnesses 6 either establishing or tending to establish that the picketing the
strikers was generally peaceful and orderly. We find that such, indeed, was the real situation during the strike and it
would be the height of injustice to rule otherwise in the face of the records before
us.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
In ignoring strong evidence coming from the witnesses of the Company damaging to its case as well as that adduced
by the Association also damaging to the Company's case, we believe that respondent court clearly and gravely
abused its discretion thereby justifying us to review or alter its factual findings (see Philippine Educational Institution
vs. MLQSEA Faculty Association, 26 SCRA 272, 278). 7 There is thus here, to employ the language of Justice J.B.L.
Reyes in Lakas ng Pagkakaisa sa Peter Paul vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 96 Phil., 63, "an infringement of
cardinal primary rights of petitioner, and justified the interposition of the corrective powers of this Court (Ang Tibay
vs. Court of Industrial Relations and National Labor Union, 69 Phil., 635):
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish
the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented. (Chief Justice Hughes in Morgan
vs. U.S., 298 U.S. 468, 56 S. Ct. 906, 80 Law Ed. 1288.) In the language of this Court in Edwards vs. McCoy, 22
Phil., 598, "the right to adduce evidence, without the corresponding duty on the part of the board to consider it, is
vain. Such right is conspicuously futile if the person or persons to whom the evidence is presented can thrust it aside
without notice or consideration." (Ibid., p. 67) 8chanrobles virtual law library
We are convinced from the records that on the whole the means employed by the strikers during the strike, taking
into account the activities of the Company and the non-striking employees on the same occasion, cannot be labeled
as unlawful; in other words, the Company itself through the provocative, if not unlawful, acts of the non-striking
employees 9 is not entirely blameless for the isolated incidents relied upon by respondent court as tainting the
picketing of the strikers with illegality. As we said through Justice Fernando in Shell Oil Workers' Union vs. Shell
Company of the Philippines, Ltd.,
L-28607, May 31, 1971, 39 SCRA 276:
6. Respondent court was likewise impelled to consider the strike illegal because of the violence that attended it. What
is clearly within the law is the concerted activity of cessation of work in order that a union's economic demands may
be granted or that an employer cease and desist from the unfair labor practice. That the law recognizes as a right.
There is though a disapproval of the utilization of force to attain such an objective. For implicit in the very concept of
107
a legal order is the maintenance of peaceful ways. A strike otherwise valid, if violent, in character, be placed beyond
the pale. Care is to be taken, however, especially where an unfair labor practice is involved, to avoid stamping it with
illegality just because it is tainted by such acts. To avoid rendering illusory the recognition of the right to strike,
responsibility in such a case should be individual not collective. A different conclusion would be called for, of course,
if the existence of force while the strike lasts is pervasive and widespread, consistently and deliberately resorted to
as a matter of policy. It could be reasonably concluded then that even if justified as to end, it becomes illegal
because of means employed. (Ibid., p. 292; emphasis supplied).
In the same case we further observed:
... Barely four months ago, in Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. Employees' Association vs. Insular Life Assurance Co.,
Ltd., there is the recognition by this Court, speaking through Justice Castro, of picketing as such being "inherently
explosive". It is thus clear that not every form of violence suffices to affix the seal of illegality on a strike or to cause
the loss of employment of the guilty party. (Ibid., pp. 293-294; emphasis supplied)
In the cited case of Insular Life Assurance Co., Employees' Association-NATO, FGU Insurance Group Workers &
Employees Association-NATU and Insular Life Building Employees Association-NATU vs. The Insular Life insurance
Co., Ltd., FGU Insurance Group, et al., L-25291, January 30, 1971, 37 SCRA 244, we held through Justice Castro,
and this is here applicable to the contention of theAssociation, as follows:
... Besides, under the circumstances the picketers not legally bound to yield their grounds and withdraw from the
picket lines. Being where the law expects them to be in the legitimate exercise of their rights, they had every reason
to defend themselves and their rights from any assault or unlawful transgression. ... (Ibid., p. 271)
In this cited case, by the way, we reversed and set aside the decision of the Court of Industrial Relations and ordered
the Company to reinstate the dismissed workers backwages.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Let us now examine the charge of unfair labor practice which respondent court dismissed for lack of merit and
substantial evidence.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Under Sec. 14(c) of Republic Act No. 875, the parties themselves are required "to participate fully and promptly in
such meetings and conferences as the (Conciliation) Service may undertake." In this case, the parties agreed to
meet on April 21, 1965 and yet, notwithstanding this definite agreement, the Company sent no representatives. The
Company's claim to bargaining in good faith cannot be given credence in the face of the fact that W.E. Menefee the
Company's Managing Director, conveniently left Manila for Davao on April 17 or 18, 1965, as admitted by W.E.
Wilmarth. 10chanrobles virtual law library
Nowhere is there serious claim on the part of the Company that it entertains real doubt as to the majority
representation of the Association. Consider further that admittedly the certification election proceeding for the Cebu
Supervisors Union in the Company had been pending for six (6) years already. From all appearances, therefore, and
bearing in mind the deliberate failure of the Company to attend the conciliation meetings on April 19 and 21, 1965, it
is clear that the Company employed dilatory tactics doubtless to discredit CAFIMSA before the eyes of its own
members and prospective members as an effective bargaining agent, postpone eventual recognition of the
Association, and frustrate its efforts towards securing favorable action on its economic
demands.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
It is likewise not disputed that on March 4, 1965, the Company issued its statement of policy (Exh. B). At that time
the Association was seeking recognition as bargaining agent and has presented economic demands for the
improvement of the terms and conditions of employment of supervisors. The statement of policy conveyed in
unequivocal terms to all employees the following message:
We sincerely believe that good employee relations can be maintained and essential employee needs fulfilled through
sound management administration without the necessity of employee organization and representations. We respect
an employee's right to present his grievances, regardless of whether or not he is represented by a labor organization.
(Emphasis supplied)
An employee reading the foregoing would at once gain impression that there was no need to join the Association.
For he is free to present his grievances regardless of whether or not he is represented by a labor
organization.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The guilty conduct of the Company before, during after the strike of April 22, 1965 cannot escape the Court's
attention. It will suffice to mention typical instances by way of illustration. Long prior to the strike, the Company had
interferred with the Cebu Supervisors' Union by enticing Mapa into leaving the Union under the guise of promotion in
Manila; shortly before the strike, B.R. Edwards, Manager-Operations, had inquired into the formation and
organization of the petitioner Association in this case. During the strike, in addition to the culpable acts of the
Company already narrated above, due significance must be given to the inclusion initially of J.J. Mapa and A.
Buenaventura, the Association's President and Vice-President respectively, in 1965, in two coercion cases filed at
that time and their subsequent elimination from the charges the initiative of the Company after the settlement of
strike; 11 the cutting off of telephone facilities extended Association members in the refinery; and the use of a
member of the Association to spy for the company. 12 The discriminatory acts practiced by the Company against
active unionists after the strike furnish further evidence that Company committed unfair labor practices as
charged. 13 Victims of discrimination are J.J. Mapa, A.E. Buenaventura, E.F. Grey, Eulogio Manaay, 14 Pete Beltran,
Jose Dizon, Cipriano Cruz, F.S. Miranda and many others. The discrimination consisted in the Company's preferring
non-members of the Association in promotions to higher positions and humiliating active unionists by either
promoting junior supervisors over them or by reduction of their authority compared to that assigned to them before
the strike, or otherwise downgrading their positions. 15chanrobles virtual law library
Then, effective July 1, 1969, the Company terminated the employment of J.J. Mapa and Dominador Mangalino,
President and Vice-President, respectively, of the Association at that time. And this the Company did not hesitate to
do notwithstanding the Association's seasonable appeal from respondent court's decision. We perceive in this
particular action of the Company its anti-union posture and attitude. In this connection, we find merit in the claim of
petitioner that the dismissal of Mapa and Mangalino was premature considering that respondent court did not
expressly provide that such dismissal might be effected immediately despite the pendency of the appeal timely taken
by the Association. The situation would have been different had respondent court ordered the dismissal of Mapa and
Mangalino immediately. As the decision is silent on this matter the dismissal of said officers of the Association ought
to have been done only upon the finality of the judgment. Because appeal was timely taken, the Company's action is
patently premature and is furthermore evidence of its desire to punish said active
unionists.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Verily, substantial, credible and convincing evidence appear on record establishing beyond doubt the charge of
unfair labor practices in violation of Sec. 4 (a), Nos. (1), (3), (4), (5) and (6), of Republic Act No. 875. And pursuant to
the mandate of Art. 24 of the Civil Code of the Philippines that courts must be vigilant for the protection of one at a
disadvantage - and here the Association appears to be at a disadvantage in its relations with the Company as the
records show - adequate affirmative relief, including backwages, must be awarded to the strikers. It is high-time and
imperative that in order to attain the laudable objectives of Republic Act 875 calculated to safeguard the rights of
employees, the provisions thereof should be liberally construed in favor of employees and strictly against employer,
unless otherwise intended by or patent from language of the statute itself.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
The Court takes judicial notice of the considerable efforts exerted by both parties in the prosecution of respective
cases and the incidents thereof both before lower court and this Court since 1965 to date. Under the circumstances
and in conformity with Art. 2208, No. 11, the Civil Code of the Philippines, it is but just, fair and equitable that the
Association be permitted to recover attorney's fees as claimed in its tenth assignment of
error.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
WHEREFORE, respondent court's resolution en banc dated May 16, 1969, together with the decision dated
February 26, 1969, is reversed and judgment is hereby rendered as follows:chanrobles virtual law library
1. In Case No. 1484-MC(1), the Court declares the strike of the Caltex Filipino Managers and Supervisors'
Association as legal in all respects and, consequently, the forfeit of the employee status of J.J. Mapa, Dominador
Mangalino and Herminigildo Mandanas is set aside. The Company is hereby ordered to reinstate J.J. Mapa and
Dominador Mangalino to their former positions without loss of seniority and privileges, with backwages from the time
108
of dismissal on July 1, 1969. Since Herminigildo Mandanas appears to have voluntarily left the Company, no Asst. Supvr. B - Maintenance (Refinery)
reinstatement is ordered as to him.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library Supervisory Accountant (Refinery)
Communications Supervisor (Refinery)
2. In Case No. 4344-ULP, the Court finds the Company B.F. Edwards and W.E. Menefee guilty of unfair labor
practices and they are therefore ordered to cease and desist from the same. In this connection, the Company is Finally, also deemed included are all other employees excluded from the rank and file unions but not classified as
furthermore directed to pay backwages to the striking employees from April 22, 1965 to May 30, 1965 and to pay managerial, or otherwise excludable by law or applicable judicial precedents." (Annex B of Annex "B", Petition).
attorney's fees which are hereby fixed at P20,000.00.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
6 Namely, Jose M. Alejo, the Company's chief security officer; Ernesto Roy, staff assistant aid; Conrado Medrano
Costs against private respondents. and Esperidion Villanueva, two jobless persons of Bauan, Batangas; E. Baquiran and Modesto Ocoy, security guards
at the Pandacan Terminal; A Orbin; Romulo Reyes and Loreto Herrera, security guards assigned at the Caltex main
Endnotes: office; Godofredo Mesina, deputy manager for operations; Juanito Garcia, a fisherman; F. Dolezal, refinery manager;
Lucas L. Cruz, captain of the M/V Estrella; and J.J. Mapa, the Association's President (who was presented by the
1 Based apparently on the apprehension of the Association that such a proceeding might turn out to be protracted Company as its own witness on August 14, 1967) (Ibid.)
like the certification proceeding for the Cebu Supervisors Union in the Company - initiated in 1962 but still pending as
of May 29, 1968 and no collective bargaining agreement had been signed as of the latter date, as admitted by R.E. 8 This ruling was echoed in Sanchez vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 27 SCRA 490, where this Court, through
Wilmarth, the Company's labor relations manager (see Brief for the Petitioner p. 68). Justice Fernando, indicated, and this is applicable to the instant appeal: "There was thus a manifest failure to
observe the requirement that the evidence be substantial. For thereby the actuation of respondent Court was marred
3 The stipulation reads thus: by arbitrariness. That was to deprive petitioners of due process which requires reasonableness and fair play." (Ibid.,
p. 501)
"CAFIMSA members holding the following Supervisory Payroll Position Title are Recognized by the Company
9 E.g., Judge Lorenzo Relova of the Batangas Court of First Instance found the captain of the Mobil Visayas guilty of
Payroll Position Title reckless imprudence (see Decision dated February 25, 1969, Annex "Q", Petition); Jose Alejo, chief security officer
Assistant to Mgr. - National Acct. Sales of the company, was found guilty of grave coercion (see Annex "P", p. 6, Petition); and Dominador Mangalino
Jr. Sales Engineer suffered injuries at the hands of strike-breakers. (Ibid., p. 12).
Retail Development Asst.
Staff Asst. - O Marketing 12 Said disloyal CAFIMSA member was promoted by Company to the position of manager immediately after the
Sales Supervisor strike (see Brief for the Petitioner, p. 110).
Supervisory Assistant
Jr. Supervisory Assistant 14 Manaay, a supervisor, had to do even janitorial job like cleaning the toilet and the room where classes were held
Credit Assistant (Petitioner's Reply Brief, p. 15-A).
Lab. Supvr. - Pandacan
Jr. Sales Engineer B
Operations Assistant B
Field Engineer EN BANC
Sr. Opers. Supvr. - MIA A/S
Purchasing Assistant [G.R. No. L-24711. April 30, 1968.]
Jr. Construction Engineer
St. Sales Supervisor BENGUET CONSOLIDATED, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BCI EMPLOYEES & WORKERS UNION-PAFLU,
Depot Supervisor A PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR UNIONS, CIPRIANO CID and JUANITO GARCIA, Defendants-
Terminal Accountant B Appellees.
Merchandiser
Dist. Sales Prom. Supvr. SYLLABUS
Instr. - Merchandising
Asst. Dist. Accountant B 1. LABOR LAW; LABOR UNION; "PRINCIPLE OF SUBSTITUTION", MEANING OF. — The principle of substitution,
Sr. Opers. Supervisor formulated by the National Labor Relations Board, counterpart of our Court of Industrial Relations, means that where
Jr. Sales Engineer A there occurs a shift in employees’ union allegiance after the execution of a collective bargaining contract with their
Asst. Bulk Ter. Supt. employer, the employees can change their agent - the labor union, but the collective bargaining contract which is still
Sr. Opers. Supvr. subsisting, continues to bind the employees up to its expiration date. They may, however, bargain for the shortening
Credit Supervisor A . of said expiration date. And the only consideration for the "substitutionary" doctrine is the employees’ interest in the
Asst. Stores Supvr. A existing bargaining agreement; the agent’s (Union’s) interest never enters into the picture.
Ref. Supervisory Draftsman
Refinery Shift Supvr. B. 2. ID.; ID.; ID,; UNDER "SUBSTITUTIONARY DOCTRINE", EMPLOYEES CANNOT RENEGE ON THEIR
Asst. Supvr. A - Operations (Refinery) COLLECTIVE BARGAINING CONTRACT; EXCEPTION. — THE "Substitutionary doctrine" provides that the
Refinery Shift Supvr. B employees cannot revoke the validly executed collective bargaining contract with their employer by the simple
Asst. Lab. Supvr. A (Refinery) expedient of changing their bargaining agent. The new agent must respect the contract. The employees, thru their
St. Process Engineer B (Refinery) new bargaining agent, cannot renege on the collective bargaining contract, except to negotiate with management for
Asst. Supvr. A - Maintenance (Refinery)
109
the shortening thereof.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; NEW COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGENT DOES NOT AUTOMATICALLY ASSUME ALL
PERSONAL UNDERTAKINGS OF DEPOSED UNION; SUBSTITUTIONARY DOCTRINE, HELD INAPPLICABLE. —
The "Substitutionary doctrine" cannot be invoked to support the claim that a newly certified collective bargaining
agent automatically assumes all personal undertakings, such as the no-strike stipulation in this case, assumed by the
deposed union. When the BBWU bound itself and its officers not to strike, it could not bind all the rival unions
because the BBWU was the agent only of the employees, not of the other unions which possess distinct
personalities.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; LIABILITY OF LABOR UNION OR BOARD OR COMMITTEE MEMBERS FOR NON-
FULFILLMENT OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING CONTRACT. — Under Art. 1704 of the Civil Code, in collective
bargaining, the labor union or members of the board or committee signing the contract shall be liable for non-
fulfillment thereof. Where the defendants are not signatories to the contract, nor are they participants thereof, there
can be no liability on their own.
5. DAMAGES; NO LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES OF LABOR UNION, OFFICERS OR MEMBERS, IN ABSENCE OF
CLEAR PROOF; RULE OF VICARIOUS LIABILITY, REPEALED. — The rule now is that for a labor union and/or its
officers and members to be liable, there must be clear proof of actual participation in, or authorization or ratification of
the illegal acts. The rule of "vicarious liability" has since the passage of Republic Act 875 been expressly legislated
out.
6. AGENCY; EVERYTHING BINDING ON AGENT DULY AUTHORIZED BINDS PRINCIPAL, NOT VICE-VERSA. —
Everything that is binding on a duly authorized agent, acting as such, is binding on the principal; not vice-versa,
unless there is a mutual agency, or unless the agent expressly binds himself to the party with whom he contracts,
Art. 1897, Civil Code. As here, BBWU the previous agent was the one that expressly bound itself to the other party,
BENGUET, UNION, the new agent did not assume the undertaking of BBWU.
The contending parties in this case — Benguet Consolidated, Inc., ("BENGUET") on the one hand, and on the other
BCI Employees & Workers Union ("UNION") and the Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions ("PAFLU") — do
not dispute the following factual settings established by the lower court.
On June 23, 1959, the Benguet-Balatoc Workers Union ("BBWU"), for and in behalf of all BENGUET employees in
its mines and milling establishment located at Balatoc, Antamok and Acupan, Municipality of Itogon, Mt. Province,
entered into a Collective Bargaining Contract, Exh. "Z" ("CONTRACT") with BENGUET. Pursuant to its very terms,
said CONTRACT became effective for a period of four and a half (4-1/2) years, or from June 23, 1959 to December
23, 1963. It likewise embodied a No-Strike, No-Lockout clause. 1
About three years later, or on April 6, 1962, a certification election was conducted by the Department of Labor among
all the rank and file employees of BENGUET in the same collective bargaining units. UNION obtained more than
50% of the total number of votes, defeating BBWU, and accordingly, the Court of Industrial Relations, on August 18,
1962, certified UNION as the sole and exclusive collective bargaining agent of all BENGUET employees as regards
rates of pay, wages, hours of work and such other terms and conditions of employment allowed them by law or
contract.
Subsequently, separate meetings were conducted on November 22, 23 and 24, 1962 at Antamok, Balatoc and
Acupan Mines respectively by UNION. The result thereof was the approval by UNION members of a resolution 2
directing its president to file a notice of strike against BENGUET for:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1. [Refusal] to grant any amount as monthly living allowance for the workers;
"2. Violation of Agreements reached in conciliation meetings among which is the taking down of investigation [sic]
and statements of employees without the presence of union representative;
"3. Refusal to dismiss erring executive after affidavits had been presented, thereby company showing [sic] bias and
partiality to company personnel;
"4. Discrimination against union members in the enforcement of disciplinary actions."cralaw virtua1aw library
The Notice of Strike 3 was filed on December 28, 1962. Three months later, in the evening of March 2, 1963, UNION
members who were BENGUET employees in the mining camps at Acupan, Antamok and Balatoc, went on strike.
Regarding the conduct of the strike, the trial court reports: 4
". . . Picket lines were formed at strategic points within the premises of the plaintiff. The picketers, by means of
threats and intimidation, and in some instances by the use of force and violence, prevented passage thru the picket
lines by personnel of the plaintiff who were reporting for work. Human blocks were formed on points of entrance to
working areas so that even vehicles could not pass thru, while the officers of the plaintiff were not allowed for
sometime to leave the ‘staff’ area.
"The strikers forming picket lines bore placards with the letters BBWU-PAFLU written thereon, As a general rule, the
picketers were unruly, aggressive and uttered threatening remarks to staff members and non-strikers who desire to
pass thru the picket lines. On some occasions, the picketers resorted to violence by pushing back the car wherein
staff officers were riding who would like to enter the mine working area. The picketers lifted one side of the vehicle
and were in the act of overturning it when they were prevented from doing so by the timely intervention of PC
soldiers, who threw tear gas bombs to make the crowd disperse. Many of the picketers were apprehended by the PC
soldiers and criminal charges for grave coercion were filed against them before the Court of First Instance of Baguio.
Two of the strike leaders and twenty-two picketers, however, were found guilty of light coercion while nineteen other
accused were acquitted.
"There was a complete stoppage of work during the strike in all the mines. After two weeks had elapsed, repair and
maintenance of the water pump was allowed by the strikers and some of the staff members were permitted to enter
the mines, who inspected the premises in the company of PC soldiers to ascertain the extent of the damage to the
equipment and losses of company property."cralaw virtua1aw library
x x x
On May 2, 1963, the parties agreed to end the raging dispute. Accordingly, BENGUET and UNION executed the
AGREEMENT, Exh. 1. PAFLU placed its conformity thereto and said agreement was attested to by the Director of
the Bureau of Labor Relations. About a year later or on January 29, 1964, a collective bargaining contract was finally
executed between UNION-PAFLU and BENGUET. 5
Meanwhile, as a result, allegedly, of the strike staged by UNION and its members, BENGUET had to incur expenses
for the rehabilitation of mine openings, repair of mechanical equipment, cost of pumping water out of the mines,
value of explosives, tools and supplies lost and/or destroyed, and other miscellaneous expenses, all amounting to
P1,911,363.83. So, BENGUET sued UNION, PAFLU and their respective Presidents to recover said amount in the
Court of First Instance of Manila, on the sole premise that said defendants breached their undertaking in the existing
CONTRACT not to strike during the effectivity thereof.
In answer to BENGUET’s complaint, defendants unions and their respective presidents put up the following
defenses: (1) they were not bound by the CONTRACT which BBWU, the defeated union, had executed with
BENGUET; (2) the strike was due, inter alia, to unfair labor practices of BENGUET; and (3) the strike was lawful and
in the exercise of the legitimate rights of UNION-PAFLU under Republic Act 875.
Issues having been joined, trial commenced. On February 23, 1965, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing the
complaint on the ground that the CONTRACT, particularly the No-Strike clause, did not bind defendants. The latters’
counterclaim was likewise denied. Failing to get a reconsideration of said decision, BENGUET interposed the
present appeal.
The several errors assigned by BENGUET basically ask three questions:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(1) Did the Collective Bargaining Contract executed between Benguet and BBWU on June 23, 1959 and effective
until December 23, 1963 automatically bind UNION-PAFLU upon its certification, on August 18, 1962, as sole
bargaining representative of all BENGUET employees?
110
(2) Are defendants labor unions and their respective presidents liable for the illegal acts committed during the course
of the strike and picketing by some union members?
(3) Are defendants liable to pay the damages claimed by BENGUET?
In support of an affirmative answer to the first question, BENGUET first invokes the so-called "Doctrine of
Substitution" referred to in General Maritime Stevedore’s Union v. South Sea Shipping Lines, L-14689, July 26,
1960. There it was remarked:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
x x x appears:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"We also hold that where the bargaining contract is to run for more than two years, the principle of substitution may
well be adopted and enforced by the CIR to the effect that after two years of the life of a bargaining agreement, a
certification election may be allowed by the CIR, that if a bargaining agent other than the union or organization that
executed the contract, is elected, said new agent would have to respect said contract, but that it may bargain with the
management for the shortening of the life of the contract if it considers it too long, or refuse to renew the contract
pursuant to an automatic renewal clause." (Emphasis for emphasis)
x x x referred to in the contract." (Emphasis supplied)
The submission utterly fails to persuade Us. The above-quoted pronouncement was obiter dictum. The only issue in
the General Maritime Stevedores’ Union case was whether a collective bargaining agreement which had practically
run for 5 years constituted a bar to certification proceedings. We held it did not and accordingly directed the court a
quo to order certification elections. With that, nothing more was necessary for the disposition of the case. Moreover,
the pronouncement adverted to was rather premature. The possible certification of a union different from that which
signed the bargaining contract was a mere contingency then since the elections were still to be held. Clearly, the
Court was not called upon to rule on the possible effects of such proceedings on the bargaining agreement. 6
But worse, BENGUET’s reliance upon the Principle of Substitution is totally misplaced. This principle, formulated by
the NLRB 7 as its initial compromise solution to the problem facing it when there occurs a shift in employees’ union
allegiance after the execution of a bargaining contract with their employer, merely states that even during the
effectivity of a collective bargaining agreement executed between employer and employees thru their agent, the
employees can change said agent but the contract continues to bind them up to its expiration date. They may
bargain however for the shortening of said expiration date. 8
In formulating the "substitutionary" doctrine, the only consideration involved was the employees’ interest in the
existing bargaining agreement. The agent’s interest never entered the picture. In fact, the justification 9 for said
doctrine was:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . that the majority of the employees, as an entity under the statute, is the true party in interest to the contract,
holding rights through the agency of the union representative. Thus, any exclusive interest claimed by the agent is
defeasible at the will of the principal . . ." (Emphasis supplied)
Stated otherwise, the "substitutionary" doctrine only provides that the employees cannot revoke the validly executed
collective bargaining contract with their employer by the simple expedient of changing their bargaining agent. And it
is in the light of this that the phrase "said new agent would have to respect said contract" must be understood. It only
means that the employees, thru their new bargaining agent, cannot renege on their collective bargaining contract,
except of course to negotiate with management for the shortening thereof.
The "substitutionary" doctrine, therefore, cannot be invoked to support the contention that a newly certified collective
bargaining agent automatically assumes all the personal undertakings — like the no-strike stipulation here — in the
collective bargaining agreement made by the deposed union. When BBWU bound itself and its officers not to strike,
it could not have validly bound also all the other rival unions existing in the bargaining units in question. BBWU was
the agent of the employees, not of the other unions which possess distinct personalities. To consider UNION
contractually bound to the no-strike stipulation would therefore violate the legal maxim that res inter alios acta alios
nec prodest nec nocet. 10
Of course, UNION, as the newly certified bargaining agent, could always voluntarily assume all the personal
undertakings made by the displaced agent. But as the lower court found, there was no showing at all that, prior to the
strike, 11 UNION formally adopted the existing CONTRACT as its own and assumed all the liabilities imposed by the
same upon BBWU.
BENGUET also alleges that UNION is now in estoppel to claim that it is not contractually bound by the CONTRACT
for having filed on September 28, 1962, in Civil Case No. 1150 of the Court of First Instance of Baguio, entitled
"Bobok Lumber Jack Ass’n. v. Benguet Consolidated, Inc. and BCI EMPLOYEES WORKERS Union-PAFLU" 12 a
motion praying for the dissolution of the ex parte writ of preliminary injunction issued therein, wherein the following
"In that case, the CIR transferred the contractual rights of the BBWU to the defendant union. One of such rights
transferred was the right to the modified union-shop-checked off union dues arrangement now under injunction.
"The collective bargaining contract mentioned in the plaintiff’s complaint did not expire by the mere fact that the
defendant union was certified as bargaining agent in place of the BBWU. The Court of Industrial Relations in the
case above mentioned made it clear that the collective bargaining contract would be respected unless and until the
parties act otherwise. In effect, the defendant union by act of subrogation took the place of the BBWU as the UNION
There is no estoppel. UNION did not assert the above statement against BENGUET to force it to rely upon the same
to effect the union check- off in its favor. UNION and BENGUET were together as co-defendants in said Civil Case
No. 1150. Rather, the statement was directed against Bobok Lumber Jack Ass’n., plaintiff therein, to weaken its
cause of action. Moreover, BENGUET did not rely upon said statement. What prompted Bobok Lumber Jack Ass’n.
to file the complaint for declaratory relief was the fact that." . . the defendants [UNION and BENGUET] are planning
to agree to the continuation of a modified union shop in the three camps mentioned above without giving the
employees concerned the opportunity to express their wishes on the matter . . ." BENGUET even went further in its
answer filed on October 18, 1962, by asserting that." . . defendants have already agreed to the continuation of the
modified union shop provision in the collective bargaining agreement . . ." 13
Neither can we accept BENGUET’s contention that the inclusion of said aforequoted motion in the record on appeal
filed in said Civil Case No. 1150, now on appeal before Us docketed as case No. L-24729, refutes UNION’s
allegation that it has subsequently abandoned its stand against Bobok Lumber Jack Ass’n., in said case. The mere
appearance of such motion in the record on appeal is but a compliance with the procedural requirement of Rule 41,
Sec 6, of the Rules of Court, that all matters necessary for a proper understanding of the issues involved be included
in the record on appeal. This therefore cannot be taken as a rebuttal of the UNION’s explanation.
There is nothing then, in law as well as in fact, to support plaintiff BENGUET’s contention that defendants are
contractually bound by the CONTRACT. And the stand taken by the trial court all the more becomes unassailable in
the light of Art. 1704 of the Civil Code providing that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"In collective bargaining, the labor union or members of the board or committee signing the contract shall be liable for
non- fulfillment thereof." (Emphasis supplied)
There is no question, defendants were not signatories nor participants in the CONTRACT.
Lastly, BENGUET contends, citing Clause II in connection with Clause XVIII of the CONTRACT, that since all the
employees, as principals, continue being bound by the no-strike stipulation until the CONTRACT’s expiration,
UNION, as their agent, must necessarily be bound also pursuant to the Law on Agency. This is untenable. The way
We understand it, everything binding on a duly authorized agent; acting as such, is binding on the principal; not vice-
versa, unless there is mutual agency, or unless the agent expressly binds himself to the party with whom he
contracts. As the Civil Code decrees it: 14
"The agent who acts as such is not personally liable to the party with whom he contracts, unless he expressly binds
himself or exceeds the limits of his authority without giving such party sufficient notice of his powers." (Emphasis
supplied)
111

Here, it was the previous agent who expressly bound itself to the other party, BENGUET. UNION, the new agent, did
not assume this undertaking of BBWU.
In view of all the foregoing, We see no further necessity of delving further into the other less important points raised
by BENGUET in connection with the first question.
On the second question, it suffices to consider, in answer thereto, that the rule of vicarious liability has, since the
passage of Republic Act 875, been express]y legislated out. 15 The standing rule now is that for a labor union and/or
its officials and members to be liable, there must be clear proof of actual participation in or authorization or ratification
of the illegal acts. 16 While the lower court found that some strikers and picketers resorted to intimidation and actual
violence, it also found that defendants presented uncontradicted evidence that before and during the strike, the strike
leaders had time and again warned the strikers not to resort to violence but to conduct peaceful picketing only. 17
Assuming that the strikers did not heed these admonitions coming from their leaders, the failure of the union officials
to go against the erring union members pursuant to the UNION and PAFLU constitutions and by-laws exposes, at
the most, only a flaw or weakness in the defense which, however, cannot be the basis for plaintiff BENGUET to
recover.
Lastly, paragraph VI of the Answer 18 sufficiently traverses the material allegations in paragraph VI of the Complaint,
19 thus precluding a fatal admission on defendants’ part. The purpose behind the rule requiring specific denial is
obtained: defendants have set forth the matters relied upon in support of their denial. Paragraph VI of the Answer
may not be a model pleading, but it suffices for purposes of the rule. Pleadings should, after all, be liberally
construed. 20
Since defendants were not contractually bound by the no-strike clause in the CONTRACT, for the simple reason that
they were not parties thereto, they could not be liable for breach of contract to plaintiff. The lower court therefore
correctly absolved them from liability.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the lower court appealed from is hereby affirmed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
11. After the end of the strike, UNION agreed, in the return-to- work Agreement executed on May 2, 1963, to respect
the CONTRACT for the remaining period of effectivity thereof.
12. This was an action brought by one of the defeated unions seeking a declaratory judgment that UNION cannot
enter into an agreement with BENGUET to continue the modified union shop embodied in the CONTRACT and
praying that, pendente lite, BENGUET be restrained from effecting any union check-off in UNION’s favor.
18. "They deny the allegations in paragraph VI. (a) The picketing and strike of defendants were conducted
peacefully, properly and without fraud or violence; (2) It was the plaintiff that caused untold harm and damages to the
defendants by unlawfully violating and breaking up the strike and picketing."cralaw virtua1aw library
19. "That in furtherance and in connection with the strike illegally and unlawfully called, declared and enforced by
defendants, the said defendants conspiring and confabulating together ordered, caused and directed the strikers to
conduct picketing within the property of plaintiff, and by means of force, violence and intimidation prevented,
stopped, and obstructed officials of plaintiff company from going to the different offices, working areas and
underground tunnels of plaintiff company thus preventing them from doing and performing maintenance work and
taking such other measures to prevent or minimize damages to plaintiff’s property;"
EN BANC
G.R. No. Nos. L-23960-61 February 12, 1972
DIWA NG PAGKAKAISA-PAFLU, Petitioner, vs. FILTEX INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION (formerly
YUPANGCO COTTON MILLS, INC.) and the COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, Respondents.
Petition for certiorari to review the decision dated August 29, 1964 and the resolution en banc dated November 23,
1964 of the Court of Industrial Relations in Cases Nos. 2735-ULP and 2741-
ULP.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
On February 19, 1961 two (2) dismissed employees of the respondent Filtex International Corporation (formerly
known as the Yupangco Cotton Mills, Inc.), together with several companions who were admittedly not connected
with respondent corporation either as employees or former employees, decided to put up a picket line in the
premises of the corporation to compel its management to reinstate them to their former positions after earlier efforts
toward that end proved unsuccessful. When the employees on the third shift reported for work at midnight of that
date they saw the picket line and decided not to cross the same. The next day, February 20, the employees on the
morning shift did likewise.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Due to the impasse created one Jose Abejero, an employee on the morning shift who was then secretary of
petitioner Diwa Ng Pagkakaisa Labor Union, seeing that the workers could not enter freely because of the picket,
thought of reporting the incident to the officials of the PAFLU, the national labor organization to which the Diwa Ng
Pagkakaisa was affiliated. Together with the president and the vice-president of petitioner union, whom Abejero had
earlier fetched from their respective homes, they contacted Florentino Cruz, organizer of the PAFLU. That same
afternoon, primarily as a result of Cruz' intervention, the picketers lifted their picket line. The management admitted
the employees who had earlier remained outside, but refused admission to the officers of the union. Thus on the
afternoon of February 20 the temporary work stoppage caused by the picket put up by the two (2) dismissed
employees and their companions appeared to have come to an end.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
On February 22, 1961 the union sent a letter to respondent corporation requesting the officers' immediate
reinstatement and claiming that their non-admission was "an act of discrimination." On February 24 following,
respondent corporation formally defined its stand that it considered the February 19 strike "... in violation of the
existing laws of the Philippines and the Collective Bargaining Agreement and its supplements executed between the
union and the company." On that ground it refused to re-admit said officers, explaining that since the strike was
illegal they should be made to suffer the consequences.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Because of the adamant attitude of the corporation the workers and employees called a strike on February 26, 1961.
On March 22, 1961 they sent word to the corporation that "for the sake of industrial peace they are offering to return
to work immediately," setting 7:00 o'clock a.m., Friday, March 24, 1961, as the time they intended to officially report
for work. Respondent corporation, in a letter dated March 23, 1961, expressed willingness to accept the offer but
nevertheless reasserted its position that insofar as "the officers and board members of the union and all those who
committed any acts of violence or crimes punishable under the Revised Penal Code or Municipal Ordinance" were
concerned, their re-admission was out of the question.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Two cases were filed in the Court of Industrial Relations as result of the disagreement: No. 2735-ULP (Diwa Ng
Pagkakaisa-PAFLU, complainant, vs. Yupangco Cotton Mills, Inc., respondent) and No. 2741-ULP (Yupangco Cotton
Mills, Inc., complainant, vs. Diwa Ng Pagkakaisa-PAFLU, et al., respondents). In Case No. 2735-ULP, the union
charged the company with unfair labor practice, invoking section 4 (a), sub-paragraphs 1 and 4 of Republic Act No.
875, 1 in that the company refused to give work to the officers of the union as well as to the listed members thereof
simply because of their union affiliation. The union prayed, inter alia, that the company be declared guilty of unfair
labor practice as charged and that the dismissed members of complainant union be reinstated to their former
positions with full backwages from the time of their dismissal up to the time of their actual
reinstatement.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The complainant in case No. 2741-ULP, on the other hand, charged the union as well as its officers and the
members named therein with unfair labor practice in declaring a strike on February 19, 1961 in violation of the
existing collective bargaining agreement,2particularly its no-strike and grievance machinery clauses, and in
112
prosecuting the said strike with violence and intimidation against the officers of the company, committed in the
presence and with the consent and ratification of the officers of the union.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
After a joint trial of the two cases - the matters involved being closely related and the parties the same - the court a
quo rendered a decision dated August 29, 1964, the dispositive part of which reads: .
"IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING ESTABLISHED FACTS, the Court hereby declares the strike, staged by the
members of the Diwa Ng Pagkakaisa against the Filtex International Corporation (formerly Yupangco Cotton Mills) as
illegal, and likewise declares the termination of the status of those employees and workers of the company
responsible therefor. All the rest shall be reinstated. Those who have pending criminal cases connected with, or,
related to the deliberation of, or in carrying out the strike shall, in the meanwhile, in view thereof, be
suspended.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
"SO ORDERED." .
A subsequent motion for reconsideration filed by herein petitioner was denied by the court en banc on November 23,
1964. Hence the instant petition for review.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Petitioner has assigned three (3) errors allegedly committed by the court a quo namely: (1) in declaring the February
19, 1961 stoppage of work as an illegal strike; (2) in holding that the strike of February 26, 1961 by members of the
union was a mere continuation of the February 19 strike; and (3) in not ordering the reinstatement with backwages of
all the members of the union listed in annex "A" of the complaint in Case No. 2735-ULP as well as of the union
officers.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
In its petition for review the union does not question that part of the decision ordering the reinstatement of "all the
rest of the workers" but prays that said decision be set aside and another one promulgated "... ordering also the
reinstatement of the officers of the union and ordering further the payment of backwages to all so ordered reinstated
including the officers of the petitioner union, from February 26, 1961 to date of their actual reinstatement, by the
respondent company or in the alternative, even only from March 3, 1963, supposed last day for the rendition of the
decision of respondent Court according to Republic Act 875 in these cases, to date of their reinstatement."
.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The basic issue is whether or not the refusal of respondent corporation to reinstate the officers and members of the
union enumerated in annex "A" of the complaint in case No. 2735-ULP was justified in the light of the facts and
circumstances.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The corporation's refusal to readmit the affected employees is sought to be justified on the ground that the February
19, 1961 stoppage of work was an illegal strike, having been staged in violation of the existing collective bargaining
agreement between the union and the corporation. The specific provisions thereof alleged to have been violated are
the no-strike and the grievance procedure clauses.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The two questions that present themselves are: (1) Was the stoppage of work on February 19, 1961 due to a strike?;
and (2) Were the officers of the union responsible therefore?.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
On the first question the record does not reveal any reason why a strike should be declared on the aforesaid date.
There were no union demands that had been categorically refused; in fact negotiations were going on between the
parties, under the supervision of the Department of Labor, in connection with a previous notice of strike filed in
November 1960. There had been no deliberations by the union officers, no decision by them to order the members to
stop working. Indeed, as far as can be gathered from the decision appealed from, it was only the midnight shift of
workers who initially did not want to cross the picket put up by two dismissed employees. When they showed up at
the company premises it was for the purpose of reporting for work, but desisted from doing so at the last minute. It is
not disputed either that union, through its officers, lost no time in putting an end to the incident, after Jose Abejero,
the secretary of the union, together with its president and vice-president and a representative of the PAFLU,
prevailed upon the employees to resume their work.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Respondent Court makes much of the letter of the PAFLU dated February 22, 1961 and addressed to the company,
and draws therefrom the conclusion that the "members and officers of the union, out of sympathy for their two
dismissed and picketing companions ... decided to strike and did in fact strike and joined the picket..." (and) that
"such behavior of the officers and members of the union was in violation of the law." We do not see the terms of the
said letter in that light. It was a letter protesting the non-admission to work of all the officers of the union "for no valid
reason at all," and recounting what happened on February 19, 1961 as follows: .
...It appears that there was an incident that took place Sunday evening on the 3rd shift where two of dismissed
employees picketed the plant protesting their dismissal. We also found that all the employees, seeing that their two
workers picketed, did not cross the picket line to report for work. Last Monday, the workers reported for work and
were all admitted except the officers of the Union.
From all the facts and circumstances, as shown by the pleadings and by the decision of the trial court itself, we find
no reason to consider the stoppage of work in the night of February 19, 1961 as a strike declared in violation of the
no-strike clause of the collective bargaining agreement or which should have been preceded by a recourse to the
grievance procedure established, let alone a strike for which the officers of the union should be held responsible.
They took steps to get the situation back to normal as soon as they were notified about it; and good labor-
management relations as well as the broader imperatives of industrial peace dictated that the spontaneous
recalcitrance of some employees, which after all had been settled without unnecessary delay, should not be made an
excuse to punish the union officers. If the said employees were readily admitted back to work there is no reason why
the officers, through whose efforts the incident was settled, should deserve a different
treatment.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The trial court found that the strike of February 26, 1971 was merely a continuation of the strike of February 19. This
finding is not justified. As already noted, work was resumed in the afternoon of February 20, 1961, and all the
employees were readmitted except the union officers. In other words the incident of February 19 was already closed;
and if a strike was called on February 26 it was because the readmission of the said officers, as demanded in the
letter of the union dated February 22, was refused. Since such refusal appears to be groundless, the fact that a strike
was called on February 26, 1961 would not affect the resolution of this case, the only issue here being the legality or
illegality of the alleged strike of February 19.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby modified by ordering the reinstatement of the officers of the union
who were refused admission by the respondent, with backwages from the date of such refusal less whatever
amounts earned by them from other employment during the same period or could have been earned with the
exercise of reasonable diligence. In assessing the backwages the guidelines indicated by this Court in the case
of Itogon-Suyoc Mines, Inc. vs. Sangilo-Itogon Workers' Union, G.R. No. L-24189, August 30, 1968, and
subsequently applied in East Asiatic Co., Ltd., et al. vs. CIR, G.R. No. L-29068, August 31, 1971, should be
observed, as follows: .
First. To be deducted from the back wages accruing to each of the laborers to be reinstated is the total amount of
earnings obtained by him from other employment(s) from the date of dismissal to the date of reinstatement. Should
the laborer decide that it is preferable not to return to work, the deduction should be made up to the time judgment
becomes final. And these, for the reason that employees should not be permitted to enrich themselves at the
expense of their employer. Besides, there is the "law's abhorrence for double compensation.
Second. Likewise, in mitigation of the damages that the dismissed respondents are entitled to, account should be
taken of whether in the exercise of due diligence respondents might have obtained income from suitable
remunerative employment. We are prompted to give out this last reminder because it is really unjust that a
discharged employee should, with folded arms, remain inactive in the expectation that a windfall would come to him.
A contrary view would breed idleness; it is conducive to lack of initiative on the part of a laborer. Both bear the stamp
of undesirability.
The record of this case is ordered remanded to the Court of Industrial Relations with instruction to ascertain the
amount of backwages due to the union officers involved, in accordance with the guidelines hereinabove set
forth.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
113
Costs against respondent Filtex International Corporation.
1 "SEC. 4. Unfair Labor Practice. -
(a) It shall be unfair labor practice for an employer:
(1) To interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed in section three;
xxx xxx xxx
(4) To discriminate in regard to hire or tenure of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor
organization: ... ."
2 Entered into on September 29, 1959 for a term of three years, with an automatic renewal clause.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-31195. June 5, 1973.]
PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYEES ORGANIZATION, NICANOR TOLENTINO, FLORENCIO
PADRIGANO, RUFINO, ROXAS, MARIANO DE LEON, ASENCION PACIENTE, BONIFACIO VACUNA,
BENJAMIN PAGCU and RODULFO MUNSOD, Petitioners, v. PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS CO., INC. and
COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, Respondents.
The petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization (hereinafter referred to as PBMEO) is a legitimate
labor union. composed of the employees of the respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., and petitioners
Nicanor Tolentino, Florencio Padrigano, Rufino Roxas, Mariano de Leon, Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio Vacuna,
Benjamin Pagcu and Rodulfo Munsod are officers and members of the petitioner Union.
Petitioners claim that on March 1, 1969, they decided to stage a mass demonstration at Malacañang on March 4,
1969, in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police, to be participated in by the workers in the first shift (from
6 A.M. to 2 P.M.) as well as those in the regular second and third shifts (from 7 A.M. to 4 P.M. and from 8 A.M. to 5
P.M., respectively); and that they informed the respondent Company of their proposed demonstration.
The questioned order dated September 15, 1969, of Associate Judge Joaquin M. Salvador of the respondent Court
reproduced the following stipulation of facts of the parties —
parties —
"3. That on March 2, 1969 complainant company learned of the projected mass demonstration at Malacanang in
protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig Police Department to be participated by the first shift (6:00 AM - 2:00
PM) workers as well as those working in the regular shifts (7:00 A.M. to 4:00 PM and 8:00 AM to 5:00 PM) in the
morning of March 4, 1969;
"4. That a meeting was called by the Company on March 3, 1969 at about 11:00 A.M. at the Company’s canteen,
and those present were: for the Company: (1) Mr. Arthus L. Ang, (2) Atty. Cesareo S. de Leon, Jr., (3) and all
department and section heads. For the PBMEO: (1) Florencio Padrigano, (2) Rufino Roxas, (3) Mariano de Leon, (4)
Asencion Paciente, (5) Bonifacio Vacuna and (6) Benjamin Pagcu.
"5. That the Company asked the union panel to confirm or deny said projected mass demonstration at Malacañang
on March 4, 1969. PBMEO, thru Benjamin Pagcu who acted as spokesman of the union panel, confirmed the
planned demonstration and stated that the demonstration or rally cannot be cancelled because it has already been
agreed upon in the meeting. Pagcu explained further that the demonstration has nothing to do with the Company
because the union has no quarrel or dispute with Management;
"6. That Management, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon, Company personnel manager, informed PBMEO that the
demonstration is an inalienable right of the union guaranteed by the Constitution but emphasized, however, that any
demonstration for that matter should not unduly prejudice the normal operation of the Company. For which reason,
the Company, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon, warned the PBMEO representatives that workers who belong to the first and
regular shifts, who without previous leave of absence approved by the Company, particularly the officers present who
are the organizers of the demonstration, who shall fail to report for work the following morning (March 4, 1969) shall
be dismissed, because such failure is a violation of the existing CBA and, therefore, would be amounting to an illegal
strike;
"7. That at about 5:00 P.M. on March 3, 1969, another meeting was convoked. Company represented by Atty. C.S.
de Leon, Jr. The Union panel was composed of: Nicanor Tolentino, Rodolfo Munsod, Benjamin Pagcu and Florencio
Padrigano. In this afternoon meeting of March 3, 1969, Company reiterated and appealed to the PBMEO
representatives that while all workers may join the Malacanang demonstration, the workers for the first and regular
shift of March 4, 1969 should be excused from joining the demonstration and should report for work; and thus utilize
the workers in the 2nd and 3rd shifts in order not to violate the provisions of the CBA, particularly Article XXIV: ‘NO
LOCKOUT — NO STRIKE’. All those who will not follow this warning of the Company shall be dismissed; De Leon
reiterated the Company’s warning that the officers shall be primarily liable being the organizers of the mass
demonstration. The union panel countered that it was rather too late to change their plans inasmuch as the
Malacanang demonstration will be held the following morning; and
"8. That a certain Mr. Wilfredo Ariston, adviser of PBMEO sent a cablegram to the Company which was received
9.50 A.M., March 4, 1969, the contents of which are as follows: ‘REITERATING REQUEST EXCUSE DAY SHIFT
EMPLOYEES JOINING DEMONSTRATION MARCH 4, 1969.’" (Pars. 3-8, Annex "F", pp. 42-43, rec.).
Because the petitioners and their members numbering about 400 proceeded with the demonstration despite the
pleas of the respondent Company that the first shift workers should not be required to participate in the
demonstration and that the workers in the second and third shifts should be utilized for the demonstration from 6
A.M. to 2 P.M. on M[arch 4, 1969, respondent Company filed on March 4, 1969, with the respondent Court, a charge
against petitioners and other employees who composed the first shift, charging them with a "violation of Section 4(a)-
6 in relation to Sections 13 and 14, as well as Section 15, all of Republic Act No. 875, and of the CBA providing for
‘No Strike and No Lockout.’" (Annex "A", pp. 19-20, rec.). The charge was accompanied by the joint affidavit of
Arthur L. Ang and Cesareo de Leon, Jr. (Annex "B", pp. 21-24, rec.). Thereafter, a corresponding complaint was
filed, dated April 18, 1969, by Acting Chief Prosecutor Antonio T. Tirona and Acting Prosecutor Linda P. Ilagan
(Annex "C", pp. 25-30, rec.).
In their answer, dated May 9, 1969, herein petitioners claim that they did not violate the existing CBA because they
gave the respondent Company prior notice of the mass demonstration on March 4, 1969; that the said mass
demonstration was a valid exercise of their constitutional freedom of speech against the alleged abuses of some
Pasig policemen; and that their mass demonstration was not a declaration of strike because it was not directed
against the respondent firm (Annex "D", pp. 31-34, rec.).
After considering the aforementioned stipulation of facts submitted by the parties, Judge Joaquin M. Salvador, in an
order dated September 15, 1969, found herein petitioner PBMEO guilty of bargaining in bad faith and herein
petitioners Florencio Padrigano, Rufino Roxas Mariano de Leon, Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio Vacuna, Benjamin
Pagcu, Nicanor Tolentino and Rodulfo Munsod as directly responsible for perpetrating the said unfair labor practice
and were, as a consequence, considered to have lost their status as employees of the respondent Company (Annex
"F", pp. 42-56, rec.).
Herein petitioners claim that they received on September 23, 1969, the aforesaid order (p. 11, rec.); and that they
filed on September 29, 1969, because September 28, 1969 fell on Sunday (p. 59, rec.), a motion for reconsideration
of said order dated September 15, 1969, on the ground that it is contrary to law and the evidence, as well as asked
for ten (10) days within which to file their arguments pursuant to Sections 15, 16 and 17 of the Rules of the CIR, as
amended (Annex "G", pp. 57-60, rec.).
114
In its opposition dated October 7, 1969, filed on October 11, 1969 (p. 63, rec.), respondent Company averred that
herein petitioners received on September 22, 1969, the order dated September 17 (should be September 15), 1969;
that under Section 15 of the amended Rules of the Court of Industrial Relations, herein petitioners had five (5) days
from September 22, 1969 or until September 27, 1969, within which to file their motion for reconsideration; and that
because their motion for reconsideration was two (2) days late, it should be accordingly dismissed, invoking Bien v.
Castillo, 1 which held among others, that a motion for extension of the five-day period for the filing of a motion for
reconsideration should be filed before the said five-day period elapses (Annex "M", pp. 61-64, rec.).
Subsequently, herein petitioners filed on October 14, 1969 their written arguments dated October 11, 1969, in
support of their motion for reconsideration (Annex "I", pp. 65-73, rec.).
In a resolution dated October 9, 1969, the respondent Court en banc dismissed the motion for reconsideration of
herein petitioners for being pro forma as it was filed beyond the reglementary period prescribed by its Rules (Annex
"J", pp. 74-75, rec.), which herein petitioners received on October 28, 1969 (pp. 12 & 76, rec.).
At the bottom of the notice of the order dated October 9, 1969, which was released on October 24, 1969 and
addressed to the counsels of the parties (pp. 75-76, rec.), appear the requirements of Sections 15, 16 and 17, as
amended, of the Rules of the Court of Industrial Relations, that a motion for reconsideration shall be filed within five
(5) days from receipt of its decision or order and that an appeal from the decision, resolution or order of the C.I.R.,
sitting en banc, shall be perfected within ten (10) days from receipt thereof (p. 76, rec.).
On October 31, 1969, herein petitioners filed with the respondent court a petition for relief from the order dated
October 9, 1969, on the ground that their failure to file their motion for reconsideration on time was due to excusable
negligence and honest mistake committed by the president of the petitioner Union and of the office clerk of their
counsel, attaching thereto the affidavits of the said president and clerk (Annexes "K", "K-1" and "K-2", rec.).
Without waiting for any resolution on their petition for relief from the order dated October 9, 1969, herein petitioners
filed on November 3, 1969, with the Supreme Court, a notice of appeal (Annex "L", pp. 88-89, rec.).
I governed," 15 even as Mr. Justice Castro relies on the balancing-of-interests test. 16 Chief Justice Vinson is partial
There is need of briefly restating basic concepts and principles which underlie the issues posed by the case at bar.
(1) In a democracy, the preservation and enhancement of the dignity and worth of the human personality is the
central core as well as the cardinal article of faith of our civilization. The inviolable character of man as an individual
must be "protected to the largest possible extent in his thoughts and in his beliefs as the citadel of his person." 2
(2) The Bill of Rights is designed to preserve the ideals of liberty, equality and security "against the assaults of
opportunism, the expediency of the passing hour, the erosion of small encroachments, and the scorn and derision of
those who have no patience with general principles." 3
In the pithy language of Mr. Justice Robert Jackson, the purpose of the Bill of Rights is to withdraw "certain subjects
from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials, and to
establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One’s rights to life, liberty and property, to free speech,
or free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to a vote; they
depend on the outcome of no elections." 4 Laski proclaimed that "the happiness of the individual, not the well-being
of the State, was the criterion by which its behaviour was to be judged. His interests, not its power, set the limits to
the authority it was entitled to exercise." 5
(3) The freedoms of expression and of assembly as well as the right to petition are included among the immunities
reserved by the sovereign people, in the rhetorical aphorism of Justice Holmes, to protect the ideas that we abhor or
hate more than the ideas we cherish; or as Socrates insinuated, not only to protect the minority who want to talk, but
also to benefit the majority who refuse to listen. 6 And as Justice Douglas cogently stresses it, the liberties of one are
the liberties of all; and the liberties of one are not safe unless the liberties of all are protected. 7
(4) The rights of free expression, free assembly and petition, are not only civil rights but also political rights essential
to man’s enjoyment of his life, to his happiness and to his full and complete fulfillment. Thru these freedoms the
citizens can participate not merely in the periodic establishment of the government through their suffrage but also in
the administration of public affairs as well as in the discipline of abusive public officers. The citizen is accorded these
rights so that he can appeal to the appropriate governmental officers or agencies for redress and protection as well
as for the imposition of the lawful sanctions on erring public officers and employees.
(5) While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of human rights over property rights is
recognized. 8 Because these freedoms are "delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society"
and the "threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently as the actual application of sanctions," they
"need breathing space to survive," permitting government regulation only "with narrow specificity." 9
Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but human rights are imprescriptible. If human rights are
extinguished by the passage of time, then the Bill of Rights is a useless attempt to limit the power of government and
ceases to be an efficacious shield against the tyranny of officials, of majorities, of the influential and powerful, and of
oligarchs - political, economic or otherwise.
In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of assembly occupy a preferred position as they are
essential to the preservation and vitality of our civil and political institutions; 10 and such priority "gives these liberties
the sanctity and the sanction not permitting dubious intrusions." 11
The superiority of these freedoms over property rights is underscored by the fact that a mere reasonable or rational
relation between the means employed by the law and its object or purpose — that the law is neither arbitrary nor
discriminatory nor oppressive — would suffice to validate a law which restricts or impairs property rights. 12 On the
other hand, a constitutional or valid infringement of human rights requires a more stringent criterion, namely
existence of a grave and immediate danger of a substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent. So it has
been stressed in the main opinion of Mr. Justice Fernando in Gonzales v. Comelec and reiterated by the writer of the
opinion in Imbong v. Ferrer. 13 It should be added that Mr. Justice Barredo in Gonzales v. Comelec, supra, like
Justices Douglas, Black and Goldberg in N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 14 believes that the freedoms of speech and of
the press as well as of peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of grievances are absolute when directed
against public officials or "when exercised in relation to our right to choose the men and women by whom we shall be
to the improbable danger rule formulated by Chief Judge Learned Hand, viz. — whether the gravity of the evil,
discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free expression as is necessary to avoid the danger. 17
II
The respondent Court of Industrial Relations, after opining that the mass demonstration was not a declaration of
strike, concluded that by their "concerted act and the occurrence of a temporary stoppage of work," herein petitioners
are guilty of bargaining in bad faith and hence violated the collective bargaining agreement with private respondent
Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc. Set against and tested by the foregoing principles governing a democratic society,
such a conclusion cannot be sustained. The demonstration held by petitioners on March 4, 1969 before Malacanang
was against alleged abuses of some Pasig policemen, not against their employer, herein private respondent firm,
said demonstration was purely and completely an exercise of their freedom of expression in general and of their right
of assembly and of petition for redress of grievances in particular before the appropriate governmental agency, the
Chief Executive, against the police officers of the municipality of Pasig. They exercised their civil and political rights
for their mutual aid and protection from what they believe were police excesses. As a matter of fact, it was the duty of
herein private respondent firm to protect herein petitioner Union and its members from the harassment of local police
officers. It was to the interest of herein private respondent firm to rally to the defense of, and to take up the cudgels
for, its employees, so that they can report to work free from harassment, vexation or peril and as a consequence
perform more efficiently their respective tasks to enhance its productivity as well as profits. Herein respondent
employer did not even offer to intercede for its employees with the local police. Was it securing peace for itself at the
expense of its workers? Was it also intimidated by the local police or did it encourage the local police to terrorize or
vex its workers? Its failure to defend its own employees all the more weakened the position of its laborers vis-a-vis
the alleged oppressive police, who might have been all the more emboldened thereby to subject its lowly employees
to further indignities.
In seeking sanctuary behind their freedom of expression as well as their right of assembly and of petition against
alleged persecution of local officialdom, the employees and laborers of herein private respondent firm were fighting
115
for their very survival, utilizing only the weapons afforded them by the Constitution — the untrammelled enjoyment of
their basic human rights. The pretension of their employer that it would suffer loss or damage by reason of the
absence of its employees from 6 o’clock in the morning to 2 o’clock in the afternoon, is a plea for the preservation
merely of their property rights. Such apprehended loss or damage would not spell the difference between the life and
death of the firm or its owners or its management. The employees’ pathetic situation was a stark reality — abused,
harassed and persecuted as they believed they were by the peace officers of the municipality. As above intimated,
the condition in which the employees found themselves vis-a-vis the local police of Pasig, was a matter that vitally
affected their right to individual existence as well as that of their families. Material loss can be repaired or adequately
compensated. The debasement of the human being — broken in morale and brutalized in spirit — can never be fully
evaluated in monetary terms. The wounds fester and the scars remain to humiliate him to his dying day, even as he
cries in anguish for retribution, denial of which is like rubbing salt on bruised tissues.
As heretofore stated, the primacy of human rights — freedom of expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition for
redress of grievances — over property rights has been sustained. 18 Emphatic reiteration of this basic tenet as a
coveted boon — at once the shield and armor of the dignity and worth of the human personality, the all-consuming
ideal of our enlightened civilization — becomes Our duty, if freedom and social justice have any meaning at all for
him who toils so that capital can produce economic goods that can generate happiness for all. To regard the
demonstration against police officers, not against the employer, as evidence of bad faith in collective bargaining and
hence a violation of the collective bargaining agreement and a cause for the dismissal from employment of the
demonstrating employees, stretches unduly the compass of the collective bargaining agreement, is "a potent means
of inhibiting speech" and therefore inflicts a moral as well as mortal wound on the constitutional guarantees of free
expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition. 19
The collective bargaining agreement which fixes the working shifts of the employees, according to the respondent
Court of Industrial Relations, in effect imposes on the workers the "duty . . . to observe regular working hours." The
strained construction of the Court of Industrial Relations that such stipulated working shifts deny the workers the right
to stage a mass demonstration against police abuses during working hours, constitutes a virtual tyranny over the
mind and life of the workers and deserves severe condemnation. Renunciation of the freedom should not be
predicated on such a slender ground.
The mass demonstration staged by the employees on March 4, 1969 could not have been legally enjoined by any
court, for such an injunction would be trenching upon the freedom of expression of the workers, even if it legally
appears to be an illegal picketing or strike. 20 The respondent Court of Industrial Relations in the case at bar
concedes that the mass demonstration was not a declaration of a strike "as the same is not rooted in any industrial
dispute although there is a concerted act and the occurrence of a temporary stoppage of work." (Annex "F", p. 45,
rec.).
The respondent firm claims that there was no need for all its employees to participate in the demonstration and that
they suggested to the Union that only the first and regular shift from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M. should report for work in order
that loss or damage to the firm will be averted. This stand failed to appreciate the sine qua non of an effective
demonstration especially by a labor union, namely the complete unity of the Union members as well as their total
presence at the demonstration site in order to generate the maximum sympathy for the validity of their cause but also
immediate action on the part of the corresponding government agencies with jurisdiction over the issues they raised
against the local police. Circulation is one of the aspects of freedom of expression. 21 If demonstrators are reduced
by one-third, then by that much the circulation of the issues raised by the demonstration is diminished. The more the
participants, the more persons can be apprised of the purpose of the rally. Moreover, the absence of one-third of
their members will be regarded as a substantial indication of disunity in their ranks which will enervate their position
and abet continued alleged police persecution. At any rate, the Union notified the company two days in advance of
their projected demonstration and the company could have made arrangements to counteract or prevent whatever
losses it might sustain by reason of the absence of its workers for one day, especially in this case when the Union
requested it to excuse only the day-shift employees who will join the demonstration on March 4, 1969 which request
the Union reiterated in their telegram received by the company at 9:50 in the morning of March 4, 1969, the day of
the mass demonstration (pp. 42-43, rec.). There was a lack of human understanding or compassion on the part of
the firm in rejecting the request of the Union for excuse from work for the day shifts in order to carry out its mass
demonstration. And to regard as a ground for dismissal the mass demonstration held against the Pasig police, not
against the company, is gross vindictiveness on the part of the employer, which is as unchristian as it is
unconstitutional.
III
The respondent company is the one guilty of unfair labor practice. Because the refusal on the part of the respondent
firm to permit all its employees and workers to join the mass demonstration against alleged police abuses and the
subsequent separation of the eight (8) petitioners from the service constituted an unconstitutional restraint on their
freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and freedom to petition for redress of grievances, the respondent firm
committed an unfair labor practice defined in Section 4(a-1) in relation to Section 3 of Republic Act No. 875,
otherwise known as the Industrial Peace Act. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 875 guarantees to the employees the
right "to engage in concerted activities for . . . mutual aid or protection" ; while Section 4(a-1) regards as an unfair
labor practice for an employer "to interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights
guaranteed in Section Three."cralaw virtua1aw library
We repeat that the obvious purpose of the mass demonstration staged by the workers of the respondent firm on
March 4, 1969, was for their mutual aid and protection against alleged police abuses, denial of which was
interference with or restraint on the right of the employees to engage in such a common action to better shield
themselves against such alleged police indignities. The insistence on the part of the respondent firm that the workers
for the morning and regular shifts should not participate in the mass demonstration, under pain of dismissal, was as
heretofore stated, "a potent means of inhibiting speech." 22
Such a concerted action for their mutual help and protection, deserves at least equal protection as the concerted
action of employees in giving publicity to a letter complaint charging a bank president with immorality, nepotism,
favoritism and discrimination in the appointment and promotion of bank employees . 23 We further ruled in the
Republic Savings Bank case, supra, that for the employees to come within the protective mantle of Section 3 in
relation to Section 4(a-1) of Republic Act No. 875, "it is not necessary that union activity be involved or that collective
bargaining be contemplated," as long as the concerted activity is for the furtherance of their interests. 24
As stated clearly in the stipulation of facts embodied in the questioned order of respondent Court dated September
15, 1969, the company, "while expressly acknowledging, that the demonstration is an inalienable right of the Union
guaranteed by the Constitution," nonetheless emphasized that "any demonstration for that matter should not unduly
prejudice the normal operation of the company" and "warned the PBMEO representatives that workers who belong to
the first and regular shifts, who without previous leave of absence approved by the Company, particularly the officers
present who are the organizers of the demonstration, who shall fail to report for work the following morning (March 4,
1969) shall be dismissed, because such failure is a violation of the existing CBA and, therefore, would be amounting
to an illegal strike (;)" (p. III, petitioner’s brief). Such threat of dismissal tended to coerce the employees from joining
the mass demonstration. However, the issues that the employees raised against the local police, were more
important to them because they had the courage to proceed with the demonstration, despite such threat of dismissal.
The most that could happen to them was to lose a day’s wage by reason of their absence from work on the day of
the demonstration. One day’s pay means much to a laborer, more especially if he has a family to support. Yet, they
were willing to forego their one-day salary hoping that their demonstration would bring about the desired relief from
police abuses. But management was adamant in refusing to recognize the superior legitimacy of their right of free
speech, free assembly and the right to petition for redress.
Because the respondent company ostensibly did not find it necessary to demand from the workers proof of the truth
of the alleged abuses inflicted on them by the local police, it thereby concedes that the evidence of such abuses
should properly be submitted to the corresponding authorities having jurisdiction over their complaint and to whom
such complaint may be referred by the President of the Philippines for proper investigation and action with a view to
disciplining the local police officers involved.
On the other hand, while the respondent Court of Industrial Relations found that the demonstration "paralyzed to a
large extent the operations of the complainant company," the respondent Court of Industrial Relations did not make
any finding as to the fact of loss actually sustained by the firm. This significant circumstance can only mean that the
firm did not sustain any loss or damage. It did not present evidence as to whether it lost expected profits for failure to
comply with purchase orders on that day; or that penalties were exacted from it by customers whose orders could not
be filled that day of the demonstration; or that purchase orders were cancelled by the customers by reason of its
failure to deliver the materials ordered; or that its own equipment or materials or products were damaged due to
absence of its workers on March 4, 1969. On the contrary, the company saved a sizable amount in the form of
wages for its hundreds of workers, cost of fuel, water and electric consumption that day. Such savings could have
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amply compensated for unrealized profits or damages it might have sustained by reason of the absence of its
workers for only one day.
IV
Apart from violating the constitutional guarantees of free speech and assembly as well as the right to petition for
redress of grievances of the employees, the dismissal of the eight (8) leaders of the workers for proceeding with the
demonstration and consequently being absent from work, constitutes a denial of social justice likewise assured by
the fundamental law to these lowly employees. Section 5 of Article II of the Constitution imposes upon the State "the
promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all of the people," which guarantee is
emphasized by the other directive in Section 6 of Article XIV of the Constitution that "the State shall afford protection
to labor . . ." Respondent Court of Industrial Relations as an agency of the State is under obligation at all times to
give meaning and substance to these constitutional guarantees in favor of the working man; for otherwise these
constitutional safeguards would be merely a lot of "meaningless constitutional patter." Under the Industrial Peace
Act, the Court of Industrial Relations is enjoined to effect the policy of the law "to eliminate the causes of industrial
unrest by encouraging and protecting the exercise by employees of their right to self-organization for the purpose of
collective bargaining and for the promotion of their moral, social and economic well-being." It is most unfortunate in
the case at bar that respondent Court of Industrial Relations, the very governmental agency designed therefor, failed
to implement this policy and failed to keep faith with its avowed mission — its raison d’etre — as ordained and
directed by the Constitution.
V
It has been likewise established that a violation of a constitutional right divests the court of jurisdiction; and as a
consequence its judgment is null and void and confers no rights. Relief from a criminal conviction secured at the
sacrifice of constitutional liberties, may be obtained through habeas corpus proceedings even long after the finality of
the judgment. Thus, habeas corpus is the remedy to obtain the release of an individual, who is convicted by final
judgment through a forced confession, which violated his constitutional right against self-incrimination; 25 or who is
denied the right to present evidence in his defense as a deprivation of his liberty without due process of law, 26 even
after the accused has already served sentence for twenty-two years. 27
Both the respondents Court of Industrial Relations and private firm trenched upon these constitutional immunities of
petitioners. Both failed to accord preference to such rights and aggravated the inhumanity to which the aggrieved
workers claimed they had been subjected by the municipal police. Having violated these basic human rights of the
laborers, the Court of Industrial Relations ousted itself of jurisdiction and the questioned orders it issued in the instant
case are a nullity. Recognition and protection of such freedoms are imperative on all public offices including the
courts 28 as well as private citizens and corporations, the exercise and enjoyment of which must not be nullified by a
mere procedural rule promulgated by the Court of Industrial Relations exercising a purely delegated legislative
power, when even a law enacted by Congress must yield to the untrammelled enjoyment of these human rights.
There is no time limit to the exercise of these freedoms. The right to enjoy them is not exhausted by the delivery of
one speech, the printing of one article or the staging of one demonstration. It is a continuing immunity, to be invoked
and exercised when exigent and expedient whenever there are errors to be rectified, abuses to be denounced,
inhumanities to be condemned. Otherwise, these guarantees in the Bill of Rights would be vitiated by a rule on
procedure prescribing the period for appeal. The battle then would be reduced to a race for time. And in such a
contest between an employer and its laborer, the latter eventually loses because he cannot employ the best and
dedicated counsel who can defend his interest with the required diligence and zeal, bereft as he is of the financial
resources with which to pay for competent legal services. 28
VI
The Court of Industrial Relations rule prescribes that a motion for reconsideration of its order or writ should be filed
within five (5) days from notice thereof and that the arguments in support of said motion shall be filed within ten (10)
days from the date of filing of such motion for reconsideration (Sec. 16). As above intimated, these rules of
procedure were promulgated by the Court of Industrial Relations pursuant to a legislative delegation. 29
The motion for reconsideration was filed on September 29, 1969, or seven (7) days from notice on September 22,
1969 of the order dated September 15, 1969 or two (2) days late. Petitioners claim that they could have filed it on
September 28, 1969, but it was a Sunday.
Does the mere fact that the motion for reconsideration was filed two (2) days late defeat the rights of the petitioning
employees? Or more directly and concretely, does the inadvertent omission to comply with a mere Court of Industrial
Relations procedural rule governing the period for filing a motion for reconsideration or appeal in labor cases,
promulgated pursuant to a legislative delegation, prevail over constitutional rights? The answer should be obvious in
the light of the aforecited cases. To accord supremacy to the foregoing rules of the Court of Industrial Relations over
basic human rights sheltered by the Constitution, is not only incompatible with the basic tenet of constitutional
government that the Constitution is superior to any statute or subordinate rules and regulations, but also does
violence to natural reason and logic. The dominance and superiority of the constitutional right over the aforesaid
Court of Industrial Relations procedural rule of necessity should be affirmed. Such a Court of Industrial Relations rule
as applied in this case does not implement or reinforce or strengthen the constitutional rights affected, but instead
constrict the same to the point of nullifying the enjoyment thereof by the petitioning employees. Said Court of
Industrial Relations rule, promulgated as it was pursuant to a mere legislative delegation, is unreasonable and
therefore is beyond the authority granted by the Constitution and the law. A period of five (5) days within which to file
a motion for reconsideration is too short, especially for the aggrieved workers, who usually do not have the ready
funds to meet the necessary expenses therefor. In case of the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, a period of
fifteen (15) days has been fixed for the filing of the motion for re hearing or reconsideration (Sec. 10, Rule 51; Sec. 1,
Rule 52; Sec. 1, Rule 56, Revised Rules of Court). The delay in the filing of the motion for reconsideration could have
been only one day if September 28, 1969 was not a Sunday. This fact accentuates the unreasonableness of the
Court of Industrial Relations rule insofar as circumstances of the instant case are concerned.
It should be stressed here that the motion for reconsideration dated September 27, 1969, is based on the ground that
the order sought to be reconsidered "is not in accordance with law, evidence and facts adduced during the hearing,"
and likewise prays for an extension of ten (10) days within which to file arguments pursuant to Sections 15, 16 and
11 of the Rules of the Court of Industrial Relations (Annex "G", pp. 57-60, rec.); although the arguments were
actually filed by the herein petitioners on October 14, 1969 (Annex "I", pp. 70-73, rec.), long after the 10 day period
required for the filing of such supporting arguments counted from the filing of the motion for reconsideration. Herein
petitioners received only on October 28, 1969 the resolution dated October 9, 1969 dismissing the motion for
reconsideration for being pro forma since it was filed beyond the reglementary period (Annex "J", pp. 74-75, rec.)
It is true that We ruled in several cases that where a motion to reconsider is filed out of time, or where the arguments
in suppf of such motion are filed beyond the 10 day reglementary period provided for by the Court of Industrial
Relations rules, the order or decision subject of reconsideration becomes final and unappealable. 29 But in all these
cases, the constitutional rights of free expression, free assembly and petition were not involved.
It is a procedural rule that generally all causes of action and defenses presently available must be specifically raised
in the complaint or answer; so that any cause of action or defense not raised in such pleadings, is deemed waived.
However, a constitutional issue can be raised any time, even for the first time on appeal, if it appears that the
determination of the constitutional issue is necessary to a decision of the case, the very lis mota of the case without
the resolution of which no final and complete determination of the dispute can be made. 30 It is thus seen that a
procedural rule of Congress or of the Supreme Court gives way to a constitutional right. In the instant case, the
procedural rule of the Court of Industrial Relations, a creature of Congress, must likewise yield to the constitutional
rights invoked by herein petitioners even before the institution of the unfair labor practice charged against them and
in their defense to the said charge.
In the case at bar, enforcement of the basic human freedoms sheltered no less by the organic law, is a most
compelling reason to deny application of a Court of Industrial Relations rule which impinges on such human rights.
30
It is an accepted principle that the Supreme Court has the inherent power to "suspend its own rules or to except a
particular case from its operation, whenever the purposes of justice require." 30 Mr. Justice Barredo in his concurring
opinion in Estrada v. Sto. Domingo 30 reiterated this principle and added that
"Under this authority, this Court is enabled to cope with all situations without concerning itself about procedural
niceties that do not square with the need to do justice, in any case, without further loss of time, provided that the right
of the parties to a full day in court is not substantially impaired. Thus, this Court may treat an appeal as
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a certiorari and vice-versa. In other words, when all the material facts are spread in the records before Us, and all the
parties have been duly heard, it matters little that the error of the court a quo is of judgment or of jurisdiction. We can
then and there render the appropriate judgment. It is within the contemplation of this doctrine that as it is perfectly
legal and within the power of this Court to strike down in an appeal acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or
committed with grave abuse of discretion, it cannot be beyond the ambit of its authority, in appropriate cases, to
reverse in a certain proceeding any error of judgment of a court a quo which cannot be exactly categorized as a flow
of jurisdiction. If there can be any doubt, which I do not entertain, on whether or not the errors this Court has found in
the decision of the Court of Appeals are short of being jurisdictional nullities or excesses, this Court would still be on
firm legal grounds should it choose to reverse said decision here and now even if such errors can be considered as
mere mistakes of judgment or only as faults in the exercise of jurisdiction, so as to avoid the unnecessary return of
this case to the lower courts for the sole purpose of pursuing the ordinary course of an appeal." (Italics supplied.) 30
Insistence on the application of the questioned Court of Industrial Relations rule in this particular case at bar would
be an unreasoning adherence to "procedural niceties," which denies justice to the herein laborers, whose basic
human freedoms, including the right to survive, must be accorded supremacy over the property rights of their
employer firm, which has been given a full hearing on this case, especially when, as in the case at bar, no actual
material damage has been demonstrated as having been inflicted on its property rights.
If We can disregard our own rules when justice requires it, obedience to the Constitution renders more imperative the
suspension of a Court of Industrial Relations rule that clashes with the human rights sanctioned and shielded with
resolute concern by the specific guarantees outlined in the organic law. It should be stressed that the application in
the instant case of Section 15 of the Court of Industrial Relations rules relied upon by herein respondent firm, is
unreasonable and therefore such application becomes unconstitutional as it subverts the human rights of petitioning
labor union and workers in the light of the peculiar facts and circumstances revealed by the record.
The suspension of the application of Section 15 of the Court of Industrial Relations rules with reference to the case at
bar, is also authorized by Section 20 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, the C.I.R. charter, which enjoins the Court of
Industrial Relations to "act according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to
technicalities or legal forms . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library
On several occasions, We emphasized this doctrine which was re-stated by Mr. Justice Barredo, speaking for the
Court, in the 1970 case of Kapisanan, etc. v. Hamilton, etc., et. al., 30 thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"As to the point that the evidence being offered by the petitioners in the motion for new trial is not ‘newly discovered,’
as such term is understood in the rules of procedure for the ordinary courts, We hold that such criterion is not binding
upon the Court of Industrial Relations. Under Section 20 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, ‘The Court of Industrial
Relations shall adopt its. rules or procedure and shall have such other powers as generally pertain to a court of
justice: Provided, however, That in the hearing, investigation and determination of any question or controversy and in
exercising any duties and power under this Act, the Court shall act according to justice and equity and substantial
merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules of
legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable.’ By this provision, the
industrial court is disengaged from the rigidity of the technicalities applicable to ordinary courts. Said court is not
even restricted to the specific relief demanded by the parties but may issue such orders as may be deemed
necessary or expedient for the purpose of settling the dispute or dispelling any doubts that may give rise to future
disputes. (Ang Tibay v. C.I.R., G.R., No. 46496, Feb. 17, 1940; Manila Trading & Supply Co. v. Phil. Labor, 71 Phil.
124.) For these reasons, We believe that this provision is ample enough to have enabled the respondent court to
consider whether or not its previous ruling that petitioners constitute a minority was founded on fact, without regard to
the technical meaning of newly discovered evidence. . . . (Alonso v. Villamor, 16 Phil. 315; Chua Kiong v. Whitaker,
46 Phil. 578)." (Italics supplied.)
To apply Section 15 of the Court of Industrial Relations rules with "pedantic rigor" in the instant case is to rule in
effect that the poor workers, who can ill-afford an alert and competent lawyer, can no longer seek the sanctuary of
the human freedoms secured to them by the fundamental law, simply because their counsel — erroneously believing
that he received a copy of the decision on September 23, 1969, instead of September 22, 1969 — filed his motion for
reconsideration on September 29, 1969, which practically is only one day late, considering that September 28, 1969
was a Sunday.
Many a time, this Court deviated from procedural technicalities when they ceased to be instruments of justice, for the
attainment of which such rules have been devised. Summarizing the jurisprudence on this score, Mr. Justice
Fernando, speaking for a unanimous Court in Palma v. Oreta, 30 stated:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"As was so aptly expressed by Justice Moreland in Alonso v. Villamor (16 Phil. 315 [1910]. The Villamor decision
was cited with approval in Register of Deeds v. Phil. Nat. Bank, 84 Phil. 600 [1949]; Potenciano v. Court of Appeals,
104 Phil. 156 [1958] and Uy v. Uy, L-14243, June 30, 1961, 2 SCRA 675.), decided as far back as 1910,
‘technicality, when it deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy,
deserves scant consideration from courts.’ (Ibid., p, 322.) To that norm, this Court has remained committed. The late
Justice Recto in Blanco v. Bernabe, (63 Phil. 124 [1936]) was of a similar mind. For him the interpretation of
procedural rule should never ‘sacrifice the ends of justice.’ While ‘procedural laws are no other than technicalities’ to
view them in their entirety, ‘they were adopted not as ends in themselves for the compliance with which courts have
been organized and function, but as means conducive to the realization of the administration of the law and of
justice. (Ibid., p. 128). We have remained steadfastly opposed, in the highly rhetorical language of Justice Felix, to ‘a
sacrifice of substantial rights of a litigant in the altar of sophisticated technicalities with impairment of the sacred
principles of justice.’ (Potenciano v. Court of Appeals, 104 Phil. 156, 161 [1958]). As succinctly put by Justice
Makalintal, they ‘should give way to the realities of the situation.’ (Urbayan v. Caltex, L-15379, Aug. 31, 1962, 5
SCRA 1016, 1019). In the latest decision in point, promulgated in 1968, (Udan v. Amon, L-24288, 1968, 23 SCRA
837 citing McEntee v. Manotok, L-14968, Oct. 27, 1961, 3 SCRA 272.) Justice Zaldivar was partial to an earlier
formulation of Justice Labrador that rules of procedure ‘are not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense’; but are
intended ‘to help secure substantial justice.’ (Ibid., p. 843) . . ." 30
Even if the questioned Court of Industrial Relations orders and rule were to be given effect, the dismissal or
termination of the employment of the petitioning eight (8) leaders of the Union is harsh for a one-day absence from
work. The respondent Court itself recognized the severity of such a sanction when it did not include the dismissal of
the other 393 employees who are members of the same Union and who participated in the demonstration against the
Pasig police. As a matter of fact, upon the intercession of the Secretary of Labor, the Union members who are not
officers, were not dismissed, and only the Union itself and its thirteen (13) officers were specifically named as
respondents in the unfair labor practice charge filed against them by the firm (pp. 16-20, respondent’s Brief; Annexes
"A", "B" and "C", pp. 20-30, rec.). Counsel for respondent firm insinuates that not all the 400 or so employees
participated in the demonstration, for which reason only the Union and its thirteen (13) officers were specifically
named in the unfair labor practice charge (p. 20, respondent’s brief). If that were so, then many, if not all, of the
morning and regular shifts reported for work on March 4, 1969 and that, as a consequence, the firm continued in
operation that day and did not sustain any damage.
The appropriate penalty — if it deserves any penalty at all — should have been simply to charge said one-day
absence against their vacation or sick leave. But to dismiss the eight (8) leaders of the petitioner Union is a most
cruel penalty, since as aforestated the Union leaders depend on their wages for their daily sustenance as well as that
of their respective families aside from the fact that it is a lethal blow to unionism, while at the same time
strengthening the oppressive hand of the petty tyrants in the localities.
Mr. Justice Douglas articulated this pointed reminder:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The challenge to our liberties comes frequently not from those who consciously seek to destroy our system of
government, but from men of goodwill — good men who allow their proper concerns to blind them to the fact that
what they propose to accomplish involves an impairment of liberty.
". . . The Motives of these men are often commendable. What we must remember, however, is that preservation of
liberties does not depend on motives. A suppression of liberty has the same effect whether the suppressor be a
reformer or an outlaw. The only protection against misguided zeal is constant alertness of the infractions of the
guarantees of liberty contained in our Constitution. Each surrender of liberty to the demands of the moment makes
easier another, larger surrender. The battle over the Bill of Rights is a never ending one.
". . . The liberties of any person are the liberties of all of us.
". . . In short, the Liberties of none are safe unless the liberties of all are protected.
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". . . But even if we should sense no danger to our own liberties, even if we feel secure because we belong to a
group that is important and respected, we must recognize that our Bill of Rights is a code of fair play for the less
fortunate that we in all honor and good conscience must be observe. 31
The case at bar is worse.
Management has shown not only lack of good-will or good intention, but a complete lack of sympathetic
understanding of the plight of its laborers who claim that they are being subjected to indignities by the local police. It
was more expedient for the firm to conserve its income or profits than to assist its employees in their fight for their
freedoms and security against alleged petty tyrannies of local police officers. This is sheer opportunism. Such
opportunism and expediency resorted to by the respondent company assaulted the immunities and welfare of its
employees. It was pure and simple selfishness, if not greed.
Of happy relevance is the 1967 case of Republic Savings Bank v. C.I.R., 32 where the petitioner Bank dismissed
eight (8) employees for having written and published "a patently libelous letter . . . to the Bank president demanding
his resignation on the grounds of immorality, nepotism in the appointment and favoritism as well as discrimination in
the promotion of bank employees." Therein, thru Mr. Justice Castro, We ruled:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"It will avail the Bank none to gloat over this admission of the respondents. Assuming that the latter acted in their
individual capacities when they wrote the letter-charge they were nonetheless protected for they were engaged in
concerted activity, in the exercise of their right of self organization that includes concerted activity for mutual aid and
protection, (Section 3 of the Industrial Peace Act . . .). This is the view of some members of this Court. For, as has
been aptly stated, the joining in protests or demands, even by a small group of employees, if in furtherance of their
interests as such, is a concerted activity protected by the Industrial Peace Act. It is not necessary that union activity
be involved or that collective bargaining be contemplated. (Annot., 6 A.L.R. 2d 416 [1949]).
x x x virtue of the laws of the Philippines with corporate address at 666 Muelle de Binondo, Manila, which is the employer
"Instead of stifling criticism, the Bank should have allowed the respondents to air their grievances.
x x x the respondents herein are either officers of respondent PBMEO or members thereof;
"The Bank defends its action by invoking its right to discipline for what it calls the respondents’ libel in giving undue
publicity to their letter-charge. To be sure, the right of self-organization of employees is not unlimited (Republic
Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 [1945]), as the right of the employer to discharge for cause (Philippine
Education Co. v. Union of Phil. Educ. Employees, L-13773, April 29, 1960) is undenied. The Industrial Peace Act
does not touch the normal exercise of the right of the employer to select his employees or to discharge them. it is
directed solely against the abuse of that right by interfering with the countervailing right of self organization (Phelps
Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 [1941]). . . .
x x x Asencion Paciente, (5) Bonifacio Vacuna and (6) Benjamin Pagcu.
"In the final sum and substance, this Court is in unanimity that the Bank’s conduct, identified as an interference with
the employees’ right of self-organization, or as a retaliatory action, and/or as a refusal to bargain collectively,
constituted an unfair labor practice within the meaning and intendment of section 4(a) of the Industrial Peace Act."
(Italics supplied.) 33
If free expression was accorded recognition and protection to fortify labor unionism in the Republic Savings case,
supra, where the complaint assailed the morality and integrity of the bank president no less, such recognition and
protection for free speech, free assembly and right to petition are rendered all the more justifiable and more
imperative in the case at bar, where the mass demonstration was not against the company nor any of its officers.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(1) setting aside as null and void the orders of the respondent Court of Industrial Relations dated September 15 and
October 9, 1969; and
(2) directing the re instatement of the herein eight (8) petitioners, with full back pay from the date of their separation
from the service until reinstated, minus one day’s pay and whatever earnings they might have realized from other
sources during their separation from the service.
With costs against private respondent Philippine Blooming Company, Inc.
Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando and Esguerra, JJ., concur.
Makalintal, C.J., took no part.
Teehankee, J., concurs in a separate opinion.
Barredo, J., dissents.
Antonio, J., concurs in the dissenting opinion.
Separate Opinions
BARREDO J.: Dissenting —
I bow in respectful and sincere admiration, but my sense of duty compels me to dissent.
The background of this case may be found principally in the stipulation of facts upon which the decision under review
is based. It is as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1. That complainant Philippine Blooming Mills, Company, Inc., is a corporation existing and operating under and by
of respondent;
"2 That Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization, PBMEO for short, is a legitimate labor organization, and
"3. That on March 2, 1969 complainant company learned of the projected mass demonstration at Malacañang in
protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig Police Department to be participated by the first shift (6:00 AM - 2:00
PM) workers as well as those working in the regular shifts (7:00 A.M. to 4:00 PM and 8:00 AM to 5:00 PM) in the
morning of March 4, 1969;
"4. That a meeting was called by the Company on March 3, 1969 at about 11:00 A.M. at the Company’s canteen,
and those present were: for the Company: (1) Mr. Arthur L. Ang, (2) Atty. Cesareo S. de Leon, Jr. (3) and all
department and section heads. For the PBMEO: (1) Florencio Padrigano, (2) Rufino Roxas, (3) Mariano de Leon, (4)
"5. That the Company asked the union panel to confirm or deny said projected mass demonstration at Malacañang
on March 4, 1969. PBMEO, thru Benjamin Pagcu who acted as the spokesman of the union panel, confirmed the
planned demonstration and stated that the demonstration or rally cannot be cancelled because it has already been
agreed upon in the meeting. Pagcu explained further that the demonstration has nothing to do with the Company
because the union has no quarrel or dispute with Management;
"6. That Management, thru Atty. C. S. de Leon, Company personnel manager, informed PBMEO that the
demonstration i9 an inalienable right of the union guaranteed by the Constitution but emphasized, however, that any
demonstration for that matter should not unduly prejudice the normal operation of the Company. For which reason,
the Company, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon, warned the PBMEO representatives that workers who belong to the first and
regular shifts, who without previous leave of absence approved by the Company, particularly the officers present who
are the organizers of the demonstration, who shall fail to report for work the following morning (March 4, 1969) shall
be dismissed, because such failure is a violation of the existing CBA and, therefore, would be amounting to an illegal
strike;
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"7. That at about 5:00 P.M. on March 3, 1969, another meeting was convoked. Company represented by Atty. C. S.
de Leon, Jr. The Union panel was composed of: Nicanor Tolentino, Rodulfo Munsod, Benjamin Pagcu and Florencio
Padrigano. In this afternoon meeting of March 3, 1969, Company reiterated and appealed to the PBMEO
representatives that while all workers may join the Malacañang demonstration, the workers for the first and regular
shift of March 4, 1969 should be excused from joining the demonstration and should report for work; and thus utilize
the workers in the 2nd and 3rd shifts in order not to violate the provisions of the CBA, particularly Article XXIV: "NO
LOCKOUT — NO STRIKE." All those who will not follow this warning of the Company shall be dismissed; De Leon
reiterated the Company’s warning that the officers shall be primarily liable being the organizers of the mass
demonstration. The union panel countered that it was rather too late to change their plans inasmuch as the
Malacañang demonstration will be held the following morning; and
"8. That a certain Mr. Wilfredo Ariston, adviser of PBMEO sent a cablegram to the Company which was received
9:50 A.M., March 4, 1969, the contents of which are as follows: ‘REITERATING REQUEST EXCUSE DAY SHIFT
EMPLOYEES JOINING DEMONSTRATION MARCH 4, 1969.’"
Additionally, the trial court found that "the projected demonstration did in fact occur and in the process paralyzed to a
large extent the operations of the complainant company." (p. 5, Annex F).
Upon these facts the Prosecution Division of the Court of Industrial Relations filed with said court a complaint for
Unfair Labor Practice against petitioners charging that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"3. That on March 4, 1969, respondents (petitioners herein) particularly those in the first shift, in violation of the
existing collective bargaining agreement and without filing the necessary notice as provided for by law, failed to
report for work, amounting to a declaration of strike;
"4. That the above acts are in violation of Section 4(a) sub-paragraph 6, in relation to Sections 13, 14 and 15 of
Republic Act No. 875, and of the collective bargaining agreement." (Pars. 3 and 4, Annex C.)
After due hearing, the court rendered judgment, the dispositive part of which reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"IN VIEW HEREOF, the respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization is found guilty of bargaining
in bad faith and is hereby ordered to cease and desist from further committing the same and its representatives
namely: respondent Florencio Padrigano, Rufino Roxas, Mariano de Leon, Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio Vacuna,
Benjamin Pagcu, Nicanor Tolentino and Rodulfo Munsod who are directly responsible for perpetrating this unfair
labor practice act, are hereby considered to have lost their status as employees of the Philippine Blooming Mills,
Inc." (p. 8, Annex F.)
Although it is alleged in the petition herein that petitioners were notified of this decision on September 23, 1969, there
seems to be no serious question that they were actually served therewith on September 22, 1969. In fact, petitioners
admitted this date of notice in paragraph 2 of their Petition for Relief dated October 30, 1969 and filed with the
industrial court on the following day. (See Annex K.)
It is not controverted that it was only on September 29, 1969, or seven (7) days after they were notified of the court’s
decision, that petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration with the industrial court; as it is also not disputed that
they filed their "Arguments in Support of the Respondents’ Motion for Reconsideration" only on October 14, 1969.
(See Annex I.) In other words, petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was filed two (2) days after the lapse of the five
(5) day period provided for the filing thereof in the rules of the Court of Industrial Relations, whereas the "Arguments"
were filed five (5) days after the expiration of the period therefor also specified in the same rules.
Accordingly, the first issue that confronts the Court is the one raised by respondent private firm, namely, that in view
of the failure of petitioners to file not only their motion for reconsideration but also their arguments in support thereof
within the periods respectively fixed in the rules therefor, the Court of Industrial Relations acted correctly and within
the law in rendering and issuing its impugned order of October 9, 1969 dismissing petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration.
Respondent’s contention presents no problem. Squarely applicable to the facts hereof is the decision of this Court in
Elizalde & Co. Inc. v. Court of Industrial Relations 1 wherein it was ruled that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"August 6, 1963. Petitioner received a copy of the decision of the then Associate Judge Arsenio I. Martinez, the
dispositive part of which was set forth earlier in this opinion.
"August 12, 1963. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. No arguments were advanced in support thereof.
"August 21, 1963. Petitioner moved for additional time to file its arguments in support of its motion to reconsider.
"August 27, 1963. Petitioner filed its arguments in support of its aforesaid motion seeking reconsideration.
"September 16, 1963. CIR en banc resolved to dismiss the motion for reconsideration. Ground therefor was that the
arguments were ‘filed out of time’.
"October 3, 1963. Petitioner filed its notice of appeal and at the same time lodged the present petition with this Court.
"Upon respondent Perlado’s return and petitioner’s brief (respondents did not file their brief), the case is now before
us for resolution.
"1. That the judgment appealed from is a final judgment — not merely an interlocutory order — there is no doubt.
The fact that there is need for computation of respondent Perlado’s overtime pay would not render the decision
incomplete. This in effect is the holding of the Court in Pan American World Airways System (Philippines) v. Pan
American Employees Association, which runs thus: ‘It is next contended that in ordering the Chief of the Examining
Division or his representative to compute the compensation due, the Industrial Court unduly delegated its judicial
functions and thereby rendered an incomplete decision. We do not believe so. Computation of the overtime pay
involves a mechanical function, at most. And the report would still have to be submitted to the Industrial Court for its
approval by the very terms of the order itself. That there was no specification of the amount of overtime pay in the
decision did not make it incomplete, since this matter would necessarily be made clear enough in the implementation
of the decision (see Malate Taxicab & Garage, Inc. v. CIR, Et Al., L-8718, May 11, 1956).’"
"2. But has that judgment reached the stage of finality in the sense that it can no longer be disturbed?
"CIR Rules of Procedure, as amended, and the jurisprudence of this Court both answer the question in the
affirmative.
"Section 15 of the CIR Rules requires that one who seeks to reconsider the judgment of the trial judge must do so
within five (5) days from the date on which he received notice of the decision, subject of the motion. Next follows
Section 16 which says that the motion must be submitted with arguments supporting the same. But if said arguments
could not be submitted simultaneously with the motion, the same section commands that ‘the movant shall file the
same within ten (10) days from the date of the filing of his motion for reconsideration’. Section 17 of the same rules
admonishes a movant that ‘(f)ailure to observe the above-specified periods shall be sufficient cause for dismissal of
the motion for reconsideration or striking out of the answer and/or the supporting arguments, as the case may be’.
"Not that the foregoing rules stand alone. Jurisprudence has since stabilized the enforceability thereof. Thus, in Bien
v. Castillo, (97 Phil. 956) we ruled that where a pro forma motion for reconsideration was filed out of time its denial is
in order pursuant to CIR rules, regardless of whether the arguments in support of said motion were or were not filed
on time. Pangasinan Employees Laborers & Tenants Association (PELTA) v. Martinez, (L-13846, May 20, 1960)
pronounced that where a motion to reconsider is filed out of time, the order or decision subject of reconsideration
becomes final. And so also, where the arguments in support of the motion for reconsideration are filed beyond the
ten-day reglementary period, the pro forma motion for reconsideration although seasonably filed must nevertheless
be denied. This in essence is our ruling in Local 7, Press & Printing Free Workers (FFW) v. Tabigne. The teaching in
Luzon Stevedoring Co., Inc. v. Court of Industrial Relations, is that where the motion for reconsideration is denied
upon the ground that the arguments in support thereof were filed out of time, the order or decision subject of the
motion becomes ‘final and unappealable’.
"We find no difficulty in applying the foregoing rules and pronouncements of this Court in the case before us. On
August 6, petitioner received a copy of the judgment of Judge Arsenio I. Martinez aforesaid. Petitioner’s motion to
reconsider — without arguments in support thereof — of August 12 was filed on time. For, August 11, the end of the
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five-day reglementary period to file a motion for reconsideration, was a Sunday. But, actually, the written arguments
in support of the said motion were submitted to the court on August 27. The period from August 12 to August 27, is a
space of fifteen (15) days. Surely enough, said arguments were filed out of time — five (5) days late. And the
judgment had become final.
"3. There is, of course, petitioner’s motion of August 21, 1963 seeking extension of time within which to present its
arguments in support of its motion. Counsel in his petition before this Court pleads that the foregoing motion was
grounded on the ‘extremely busy and difficult schedule of counsel’ which would not enable him to do so within the
stated ten-day reglementary period. The arguments were only filed on August 27 — five (5) days late, as aforesaid.
"The foregoing circumstances will not avail petitioner any. It is to be noted that the motion for expansion of time was
filed only on August 21, that is, one day before the due date which is August 22. It was petitioner’s duty to see to it
that the court act on this motion forthwith or at least inquire as to the fate thereof not later than the 22nd of August. It
did not. It merely filed its arguments on the 27th.
"To be underscored at this point is that ‘obviously to speed up the disposition of cases’, CIR ‘has a standing rule
against the extension of the ten-day period for filing supporting arguments’. That no-extension policy should have
placed petitioner on guard. It should not have simply folded its arms, sit by supinely, and relied on the court’s
generosity. To compound petitioner’s neglect, it filed the arguments only on August 27, 1953, knowing full well that
by that time the reglementary period had expired.
"Petitioner cannot complain against CIR’s ruling of September 16, 1963 dismissing the motion for reconsideration on
the ground that the supporting arguments were filed out of time. That ruling in effect denied the motion for extension.
"We rule that CIR’s judgment has become final and unappealable. We may not review the same."cralaw virtua1aw
library
Notwithstanding this unequivocal and unmistakable precedent, which has not been in any way modified, much less
revoked or reversed by this Court, the main opinion has chosen not only to go into the merits of petitioners’ pose that
the respondent court erred in holding them guilty of bargaining in bad faith but also to ultimately uphold petitioners’
claim for reinstatement on constitutional grounds.
Precisely because the conclusions of the main opinion are predicated on an exposition of the constitutional
guarantees of freedoms of speech and peaceful assembly for redress of grievances, so scholarly and masterful that
it is bound to overwhelm Us unless We note carefully the real issues in this case, I am constrained, over and above
my sincere admiration for the eloquence and zeal of Mr. Justice Makasiar’s brilliant dissertation, to dutifully state that
as presented by petitioners themselves and in the light of its attendant circumstances, this case does not call for the
resolution of any constitutional issue. Admittedly, the invocation of any constitutional guarantee, particularly when it
directly affects individual freedoms enshrined in the bill of rights, deserves the closest attention of this Court. It is my
understanding of constitutional law and judicial practices related thereto, however, that even the most valuable of our
constitutional rights may be protected by the courts only when their jurisdiction over the subject matter is
unquestionably established and the applicable rules of procedure consistent with substantive and procedural due
process are observed. No doubt no constitutional right can be sacrificed in the altar of procedural technicalities, very
often fittingly downgraded as niceties, but as far as I know, this principle is applied to annul or set aside final
judgments only in cases wherein there is a possible denial of due process. I have not come across any instance, and
none is mentioned or cited in the well-documented main opinion, wherein a final and executory judgment has been
invalidated and set aside upon the ground that the same has the effect of sanctioning the violation of a constitutional
right, unless such violation amounts to a denial of due process.
Without support from any provision of the constitution or any law or from any judicial precedent or reason of principle,
the main opinion nudely and unqualifiedly asserts, as if it were universally established and accepted as an absolute
rule, that "a violation of a constitutional right divests the court of jurisdiction; and as a consequence its judgment is
null and void and confers no rights." Chavez v. Court of Appeals, 24 SCRA 663, which is mentioned almost in
passing, does uphold the proposition that "relief from a criminal conviction secured at the sacrifice of constitutional
liberties, may be obtained through habeas corpusproceedings even after the finality of the judgment." And, of course,
Chavez is correct; as is also Abriol v. Homeres, 2 which, in principle, served as its precedent, for the very simple
reason that in both of those cases, the accused were denied due process. In Chavez, the accused was compelled to
testify against himself as a witness for the prosecution; in Abriol, the accused was denied his request to be allowed
to present evidence to establish his defense after his demurrer to the People’s evidence was denied.
As may be seen, however, the constitutional issues involved in those cases are a far cry from the one now before
Us. Here, petitioners do not claim they were denied due process. Nor do they pretend that in denying their motion for
reconsideration, "the respondent Court of Industrial Relations and private firm trenched upon any of their
constitutional immunities . . .," contrary to the statement to such effect in the main opinion. Indeed, neither in the
petition herein nor in any of the other pleading of petitioners can any direct or indirect assertion be found assailing
the impugned decision of the respondent court as being null and void because it sanctioned a denial of a valued
constitutional liberty.
In their petition, petitioners state the issue for Our resolution as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Petitioners herein humbly submit that the issue to be resolved is whether or not the respondent Court en banc under
the facts and circumstances, should consider the Motion for Reconsideration filed by your petitioners.
"Petitioners, therefore, in filing this petition for a writ of certiorari humbly beg this Honorable Court to treat this petition
under Rule 43 and 65 of the Rules of Court."cralaw virtua1aw library
"x x x
"The basic issue therefore is the application by the Court en banc of the strict and narrow technical rules of
procedure without taking into account justice, equity and substantial merits of the case."cralaw virtua1aw library
On the other hand, the complete argument submitted by petitioners on this point in their brief runs thus:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
"III: I S S U E S
"1. Does the refusal to heed a warning in the exercise of a fundamental right to peaceably assemble and petition the
government for redress of grievances constitute bargaining in bad faith? and,
"Do the facts found by the court below justify the declaration and conclusion that the union was guilty of bargaining in
bad faith meriting the dismissal of the persons allegedly responsible therefor?
"2. Was there grave abuse of discretion when the respondent court refused to act one way or another on the petition
for relief from the resolution of October 9, 1969?
IV: A R G U M E N T
The respondent Court erred in finding the petitioner union guilty of bargaining in bad faith and consequently
dismissing the persons allegedly responsible therefor, because such conclusion is contrary to the evidence on
record; that the dismissal of leaders was discriminatory.
"As a result of exercising the constitutional rights of freedom to assemble and petition the duly constituted authorities
for redress of their grievances, the petitioners were charged and then condemned of bargaining in bad faith.
"The findings that petitioners were guilty of bargaining in bad faith were not borne out by the records. It was not even
alleged nor proven by evidence. What has been alleged and which the respondent company tried to prove was that
the demonstration amounted to a strike and hence, a violation of the provisions of the ‘no-lockout — no strike’ clause
of the collective bargaining agreement. However, this allegation and proof submitted by the respondent company
were practically resolved when the respondent court in the same decision stated categorically:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library
‘The company alleges that the walkout because of the demonstration is tantamount to a declaration of a strike. We
do not think so, as the same is not rooted in any industrial dispute although there is a concerted act and the
occurrence of a temporary stoppage of work.’ (Italics supplied, p. 4, 5th paragraph, Decision.)
121

"The respondent court’s findings that the petitioner union bargained in bad faith is not tenable
because:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"First, it has not been alleged nor proven by the respondent company;
"Second, before the demonstration, the petitioner union and the respondent company convened twice in a meeting to
thresh out the matter of demonstration. Petitioners requested that the employees and workers be excused but the
respondent company instead of granting the request or even settling the matter so that the hours of work will not be
disrupted, immediately threatened the employees of mass dismissal;
"Third, the refusal of the petitioner union to grant the request of the company that the first shift shall be excluded in
the demonstration is not tantamount to bargaining in bad faith because the company knew that the officers of the
union belonged to the first shift, and that the union cannot go and lead the demonstration without their officers. It
must be stated that the company intends to prohibit its officers to lead and join the demonstration because most of
them belonged to the first shift; and
"Fourth, the findings of the respondent court that the demonstration if allowed will practically give the union the right
to change the working conditions agreed in the CBA is a conclusion of facts, opinionated and not borne by any
evidence on record. The demonstration did not practically change the terms or conditions of employment because it
was only for one (1) day and the company knew about it before it went through. We can even say that it was the
company who bargained in bad faith, when upon representation of the Bureau of Labor not to dismiss the employees
demonstrating, the company tacitly approved the same and yet while the demonstration was in progress, the
company filed a ULP Charge and consequently dismissed those who participated.
"Records of the case show that more or less 400 members of the union participated in the demonstration and yet,
the respondent court selected the eight officers to be dismissed from the union thus losing their status as employees
of the respondent company. The respondent court should have taken into account that the company’s action in
allowing the return of more or less three hundred ninety two (392) employees/members of the union is an act of
condonation and the dismissal of the eight (8) officers is an act of discrimination (Phil. Air Lines Inc., v. Phil. Air Lines
Employees Association, G.R. No. L-8197, Oct. 31, 1968). Seemingly, from the opinion stated in the decision by the
court, while there is a collective bargaining agreement, the union cannot go on demonstration or go on strike
because it will change the terms and conditions of employment agreed in the CBA. It follows that the CBA is over
and above the constitutional rights of a man to demonstrate and the statutory rights of a union to strike as provided
for in Republic Act 875. This creates a had precedent because it will appear that the rights of the union is solely
dependent upon the CBA.
"One of the cardinal primary rights which must be respected in proceedings before the Court of Industrial Relations is
that ‘the decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and
disclosed to the parties affected.’ (Interstate Commerce Commission v. L & N R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 33 S. Ct. 185, 57
Law ed. 431.) Only by confining the administrative tribunal to the evidence disclosed to the parties, can the latter be
protected in their rights to know and meet the case against them. (Ang Tibay v. CIR, G.R. No. L-45496, February 27,
1940.)
"The petitioners respectfully and humbly submit that there is no scintilla of evidence to support the findings of the
respondent court that the petitioner union bargained in bad faith. Corollary therefore, the dismissal of the individual
petitioners is without basis either in fact or in law."cralaw virtua1aw library
Additionally, in their reply they also argued that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1) That respondent court’s finding that petitioners have been guilty of bargaining in bad faith and consequently lost
their status as employees of the respondent company did not meet the meaning and comprehension of ‘substantial
merits of the case.’ Bargaining in bad faith has not been alleged in the complaint (Annex "C", Petition) nor proven
during the hearing of the case. The important and substantial merit of the case is whether under the facts and
circumstances alleged in respondent company’s pleadings, the demonstration done by the petitioners amounted to
on ‘illegal strike’ and therefore in violation of the ‘no strike — no lock out’ clause of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement. Petitioners respectfully reiterate and humbly submit, that the respondent court had altogether opined and
decided that such demonstration does not amount to a strike. Hence, with that findings, petitioners should have been
absolved of the charges against them. Nevertheless, the same respondent court disregarding, its own findings, went
out of bounds by declaring the petitioners as having ‘bargained in faith.’ The stand of the respondent court is
fallacious, as it follows the principle in logic as ‘non-siquitor’;
"2) That again respondents wanted to impress that the freedom to assemble peaceably to air grievances against the
duly constituted authorities as guaranteed in our Constitution is subject to the limitation of the agreement in the
Collective Bargaining Agreement. The fundamental rights of the petitioners to free speech and assembly is
paramount to the provision in the Collective Bargaining Agreement and such attempt to override the constitutional
provision would be null and void. These fundamental rights of the petitioners were not taken into consideration in the
deliberation of the case by the respondent court;"
Thus, it is clear from the foregoing contentions that petitioners are not raising any issue of due process. They do not
posit that the decision of the industrial court is null and void on that constitutional ground. True it is that they fault the
respondent court for having priced the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement herein involved over and
above their constitutional right to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of their grievances against the abuses
of the Pasig police, but in no sense at all do they allege or contend that such action affects its jurisdiction in a manner
that renders the proceedings a nullity. In other words, petitioners themselves consider the alleged flaw in the court’s
action as a mere error of judgment rather than that of jurisdiction which the main opinion projects for this Court to
roundly and indignantly condemn private respondent now for the grievous violation of the fundamental law the main
opinion sees in its refusal to allow all its workers to join the demonstration in question, when that specific issue has
not been duly presented to Us and properly argued, is to my mind unfair and unjust, for the simple reason that the
manner this case was brought to Us does not afford it the opportunity to be heard in regard to such supposed
constitutional transgression.
To be sure, petitioners do maintain, that respondent court committed an error of jurisdiction by finding petitioners
guilty of bargaining in bad faith when the charge against them alleged in the complaint was for having conducted a
mass demonstration, which "amounted to a strike", in violation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, but definitely,
this jurisdictional question has no constitutional color Indeed, We can even assume for the sake of argument, that the
trial judge did err in not giving preferential importance to the fundamental freedoms invoked by the petitioners over
the management and proprietary attributes claimed by the respondent private firm — still, We cannot rightly hold that
such disregard of petitioners’ priceless liberties divested His Honor of jurisdiction in the premises. The unbending
doctrine of this Court is that "decisions, erroneous or not, become final after the period fixed by law; litigations would
be endless; no questions would be finally settled; and titles to property would become precarious if the losing party
were allowed to reopen them at any time in the future." 3
I only have to add to this that the fact that the error is in the interpretation, construction or application of a
constitutional precept, not constituting a denial of due process, should not make any difference. Juridically, a party
cannot be less injured by an overlooked or erroneously sanctioned violation of an ordinary statute than by a
misconstrued or misapplied constitutional injunction affecting his individual freedoms. In both instances, there is
injustice which should be intolerable were it not for the more paramount considerations that inform the principle of
immutability of final judgments. I dare say this must be the reason why, as I have already noted, the main opinion not
cite any constitutional provision, law or rule or any judicial doctrine or principle supporting its basic holding that
infringement of constitutional guarantees, other than denial of due process, divests courts of jurisdiction to render
valid judgments.
In this connection, it must be recalled that the teaching of Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities v.
Secretary of Education, 4 following Santiago v. Far Eastern Broadcasting, 5 is that "it is one of our (the Supreme
Court’s) decisional practices that unless a constitutional point is specifically raised, insisted upon and adequately
argued, the court will not consider it." In the case at bar, the petitioners have not raised, they are not insisting upon,
much less have they adequately argued the constitutional issues so extendedly and ably discussed in the main
opinion.
Indeed, it does not seem wise and sound for the Supreme Court to hold that the erroneous resolution by a court of a
constitutional issue not amounting to a denial of due process renders its judgment or decision null and void, and,
therefore, subject to attack even after said judgment or decision has become final and executory. I have actually tried
to bring myself into agreement with the views of the distinguished and learned writer of the main opinion, if only to
122
avoid dissenting from his well prepared thesis, but its obvious incongruity with settled jurisprudence always comes to
the fore to stifle my effort.
As a matter of fact, for a moment, it appeared to me as if I could go along with petitioners under the authority of our
constitutionally irreducible appellate jurisdiction under Section 2(5) of Article VII of the 1935 Constitution of the
Philippines 6 (reenacted practically ipssisimis verbis in Section 5(2) (e) of the 1973 Constitution), only to realize upon
further reflection that the very power granted to Us to review decisions of lower courts involving questions of law (and
these include constitutional issues not affecting the validity of statutes, treaty, executive agreement, etc.) is not
unqualified but has to be exercised only in the manner provided in the law or the Rules of Court. In other words,
before We can exercise appellate jurisdiction over constitutional issues, no matter how important they may be, there
must first be a showing of compliance with the applicable procedural law or rules, among them, those governing
appeals from the Court of Industrial Relations involved herein. Consequently, if by law or rule, a judgment of the
industrial court is already final and executory, this Court would be devoid of power and authority to review, much less
alter or modify the same, absent any denial of due process or fatal defect of jurisdiction. It must be borne in mind that
the situation confronting Us now is not merely whether or not We should pass upon a question or issue not
specifically raised by the party concerned, which, to be sure, could be enough reason to dissuade Us from taking
pains in resolving the same; rather, the real problem here is whether or not We have jurisdiction to entertain it. And,
in this regard, as already stated earlier, no less than Justice Conrado Sanchez, the writer of Chavez, supra, which is
being relied upon by the main opinion, already laid down the precedent in Elizalde v. Court, supra, which for its four-
square applicability to the facts of this case, We have no choice but to follow, that is, that in view of the failure of the
petitioners to file not only their motion for reconsideration but even their argument supporting the same within the
prescribed period, "the judgment (against them) has become final, beyond recall."
Indeed, when I consider that courts would be useless if the finality and enforceability of their judgments are made
contingent on the correctness thereof from the constitutional standpoint, and that in truth, whether or not they are
correct is something that is always dependent upon combined opinion of the members of the Supreme Court, which
in turn is naturally as changeable as the members themselves are changed. I cannot conceive of anything more
pernicious and destructive to a trustful administration of justice than the idea that, even without any showing of denial
of due process or want of jurisdiction of the court, a final and executory judgment of such court may still be set aside
or reopened in instances other than those expressly allowed by Rule 38 and that of extrinsic fraud under Article
1146(1) of the Civil Code. 7 And just to emphasize the policy of the law of respecting judgments once they have
become final, even as this Court has ruled that final decisions are mute in the presence of fraud which the law
abhors, 8 it is only when the fraud is extrinsic and not intrinsic that final and executory judgments may be set aside, 9
and this only when the remedy is sought within the prescriptive period. 10
Apropos here is the following passage in Li Kim Tho v. Go Sin Kaw, 82 Phil. 776:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is essential to an effective and efficient
administration of justice that once a judgment has become final, the winning party be not, through a mere subterfuge,
deprived of the fruits of the verdict. Courts must therefore guard against any scheme calculated to bring about that
result. Constituted as they are to put an end to controversies, courts should frown upon any attempt to prolong
them."cralaw virtua1aw library
Likewise the stern admonition of Justice George Malcolm in Dy Cay v. Crossfield, 38 Phil. 521,
thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . Public policy and sound practice demand that, at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts should
become final at some definite date fixed by law. The very object for which courts were instituted was to put an end to
controversies. To fulfill this purpose and to do so speedily, certain time limits, more or less arbitrary, have to be set
up to spur on the slothful.’If a vacillating, irresolute judge were allowed to thus keep causes ever within his power, to
determine and redetermine them term after term, to bandy his judgments about from one party to the other, and to
change his conclusions as freely and as capriciously as a chamelon may change its hues, then litigation might
become more intolerable than the wrongs it is intended to redress.’ (See Arnedo v. Llorente and Liongson (1911), 18
Phil., 257.)."cralaw virtua1aw library
My disagreement with the dissenters in Republic v. Judge de los Angeles, L-26112, October 4, 1971, 41 SCRA 422,
was not as to the unalterability and invulnerability of final judgments but rather on the correct interpretation of the
contents of the judgment in question therein. Relevantly to this case at bar, I said then:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The point of res adjudicata discussed in the dissents has not escaped my attention. Neither am I overlooking the
point of the Chief Justice regarding the dangerous and inimical implications of a ruling that would authorize the
revision, amendment or alteration of a final and executory judgment. I want to emphasize that my position in this
opinion does not detract a whit from the soundness, authority and binding force of existing doctrines enjoining any
such modifications. The public policy of maintaining faith and respect in judicial decisions, which inform said
doctrines, is admittedly of the highest order I am not advocating any departure from them. Nor am I trying to put forth
for execution a decision that I believe should have been rather than what it is. All I am doing is to view not the
judgment of Judge Tengco but the decision of this Court in G.R. No. L-0950, as it is and not as I believe it should
have been, and, by this opinion, I would like to guide the court a quo as to what, in my honest view, is the true and
correct meaning and implications of the decision of this Court, not that of Judge Tengco’s."cralaw virtua1aw library
The main opinion calls attention to many instances, precisely involving cases in the industrial court, wherein this
Court refused to be constrained by technical rules of procedure in its determination to accord substantial justice to
the parties. I still believe in those decisions, some of which were penned by me. I am certain, however, that in none
of those precedents did this Court disturb a judgment already final and executory. It is too obvious to require
extended elucidation or even reference to any precedent or authority that the principle of immutability of final
judgments is not a mere technicality, and if it may be considered to be in a sense a procedural rule, it is one that is
founded on public policy and cannot, therefore, yield to the ordinary plea that it must give priority to substantial
justice.
Apparently vent on looking for a constitutional point of due process to hold on, the main opinion goes far as to
maintain that the long existing and constantly applied rule governing the filing of motions for reconsideration in the
Court of Industrial Relations, "as applied in this case does not implement or reinforce or strengthen the constitutional
rights affected, but instead constricts the same to the point of nullifying the enjoyment thereof by the petitioning
employees. Said Court of Industrial Relations Rule, promulgated as it was pursuant to a mere legislative delegation,
is unreasonable and therefore is beyond the authority granted by the Constitution and the law. A period of five (5)
days within which to file a motion for reconsideration is too short, especially for the aggrieved workers, who usually
do not have the ready funds to meet the necessary expenses therefor. In case of the Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court, a period of fifteen (15) days has been fixed for the filing of the motion for re-hearing or
reconsideration (Sec. 10, Rule 51; Sec. 1, Rule 52; Sec. 1, Rule 56, Revised Rules of Court). The delay in the filing
of the motion for reconsideration could have been only one day if September 28, 1969 was not a Sunday. This fact
accentuates the unreasonableness of the Court of Industrial Relations Rule insofar as circumstances of the instant
case are concerned."cralaw virtua1aw library
I am afraid the zeal and passion of these arguments do not justify the conclusion suggested. Viewed objectively, it
can readily be seen that there can hardly be any factual or logical basis for such a critical view of the rule in question.
Said rule provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"MOTIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION
"Sec. 15. The movant shall file the motion, in six copies, within five (5) days from the date on which he receives
notice of the order or decision, object of the motion for reconsideration, the same to be verified under oath with
respect to the correctness of the allegations of fact, and serving a copy thereof, personally or by registered mail, on
the adverse party. The latter may file an answer, in six (6) copies, duly verified under oath.
"Sec. 16. Both the motion and the answer shall be submitted with arguments supporting the same. If the arguments
can not be submitted simultaneously with said motions, upon notice to the Court, the movant shall file same within
ten (10) days from the date of the filing of his motion for reconsideration. The adverse party shall also file his answer
within ten (10) days from the receipt by him of a copy of the arguments submitted by the movant.
"Sec. 17. After an answer to the motion is registered, or after ten (10) days from the receipt of the arguments in
support of said motion having been filed, the motion shall be deemed submitted for resolution of the Court in banc,
unless it is considered necessary to hear oral arguments, in which case the Court shall issue the corresponding
order or notice to that effect.
123
"Failure to observe the above specified periods shall be sufficient cause for dismissal of the motion for
reconsideration or striking out of the answer and/or the supporting arguments, as the case may be. (As amended
April 20, 1951, Court of Industrial Relations.)."cralaw virtua1aw library
As implemented and enforced in actual practice, this rule, as everyone acquainted with proceedings in the industrial
court well knows, precisely permits the party aggrieved by a judgment to file no more than a pro-forma motion for
reconsideration without any argument or lengthy discussion and with barely a brief statement of the fundamental
ground or grounds therefor, without prejudice to supplementing the same by making the necessary exposition, with
citations of laws and authorities, in the written arguments to be filed ten (10) days later. In truth, such a pro-forma
motion has the effect of just advising the court and the other party that the movant does not agree with the judgment
due to fundamental defects stated in brief and general terms. Evidently, the purpose of this requirement is to apprise
everyone concerned within the shortest possible time that a reconsideration is to be sought, and thereby enable the
parties concerned to make whatever adjustments may be warranted by the situation, in the meanwhile that the
litigation is prolonged. It must be borne in mind that cases in the industrial court may involve or affect the operation of
vital industries in which labor-management problems might require day-to-day solutions and it is to the best interests
of justice and all concerned that the attitude of each party at every important juncture of the case be known to the
other so that other avenues for earlier settlement may, if possible, be explored.
There can be no reason at all to complain that the time fixed by the rule is short or inadequate. In fact, the motion
filed by petitioners was no more than the following:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
"COME NOW movant respondents, through counsel, to this Honorable Court most respectfully moves for the
RECONSIDERATION of the Order of this Honorable Court dated September 17, 1969 on the ground that the same
is not in accordance with law, evidence and facts adduced during the hearing of the above-entitled case.
"Movant-respondents most respectfully move for leave to file their respective arguments within ten (10) days
pursuant to Section 15, 16 & 17 as amended of the Rules of Court.
"WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that this Motion for Reconsideration be admitted.
"Manila, September 27, 1969."cralaw virtua1aw library
To say that five (5) days is an unreasonable period for the filing of such a motion is to me simply incomprehensible.
What is worse in this case is that petitioners have not even taken the trouble of giving an explanation of their inability
to comply with the rule. Not only that, petitioners were also late five (5) days in filing their written arguments in
support of their motion, and, the only excuse offered for such delay is that both the President of the Union and the
office clerk who took charge of the matter forgot to do what they were instructed to do by counsel, which, according
to this Court, as I shall explain anon, "is the most hackneyed and habitual subterfuge employed by litigants who fail
to observe the procedural requirements prescribed by the Rules of Court." (Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Arca, infra).
And yet, very indignantly, the main opinion would want the Court to overlook such nonchalance and indifference.
In this connection, I might add that in my considered opinion, the rules fixing periods for the finality of judgments are
in a sense more substantive than procedural in their real nature, for in their operation they have the effect of either
creating or terminating rights pursuant to the terms of the particular judgment concerned. And the fact that the court
that rendered such final judgment is deprived of jurisdiction or authority to alter or modify the same enhances such
substantive character. Moreover, because they have the effect of terminating rights and the enforcement thereof, it
may be said that said rules partake of the nature also of rules of prescription, which again are substantive. Now, the
twin predicates of prescription are inaction or abandonment and the passage of time or a prescribed period. On the
other hand, procrastination or failure to act on time is unquestionably a form of abandonment, particularly when it is
not or cannot be sufficiently explained. The most valuable right of a party may be lost by prescription, and he has no
reason to complain because public policy demands that rights must be asserted in time, as otherwise they can be
deemed waived.
I see no justification whatsoever for not applying these self evident principles to the case of petitioners. Hence, I feel
disinclined to adopt the suggestion that the Court suspend, for the purposes of this case the rules aforequoted of the
Court of Industrial Relations. Besides, I have grave doubts as to whether we can suspend rules of other courts,
particularly one that is not under our supervisory jurisdiction, being an administrative agency under the Executive
Department. Withal, if, in order to hasten the administration of substantial justice, this Court did exercise in some
instances its reserve power to amend its rules, I am positively certain, it has never done it for the purpose of reviving
a case in which the judgment has already become final and executory.
Before closing, it may be mentioned here, that as averred in their petition, in a belated effort to salvage their cause,
petitioners filed in the industrial court on October 31, 1969 a petition for relief alleging that their failure to file their
"Arguments in Support of their Motion for Reconsideration" within the reglementary period or five (5), if not seven (7),
days late "was due to excusable negligence and honest mistake committed by the President of the respondent Union
and of the office clerk of the counsel for respondents as shown and attested in their respective affidavits", (See
Annexes K, K-1, and K-2) which in brief, consisted allegedly of the said President’s having forgotten his appointment
with his lawyer "despite previous instructions" and of the said office employee having also coincidentally forgotten "to
do the work as instructed (sic) to (him) by Atty. Osorio" because he "was too busy with clerical jobs." No sympathy at
all can be evoked by these allegations, for, under probably more justifying circumstances, this Court ruled out a
similar explanation in a previous case this wise:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"We find merit in PAL’s petition. The excuse offered by respondent Santos as reason for his failure to perfect in due
time his appeal from the judgment of the Municipal Court, that counsel’s clerk forgot to hand him the court notice, is
the most hackneyed and habitual subterfuge employed by litigants who fail to observe the procedural requirements
prescribed by the Rules of Court. The uncritical acceptance of this kind of commonplace excuses, in the face of the
Supreme Court’s repeated rulings that they are neither credible nor constitutive of excusable negligence (Gaerlan v.
Bernal, L 4039, 29 January 1952; Mercado v. Judge Domingo, L-19457, 17 December 1966) is certainly such
whimsical exercise of judgment as to be a grave abuse of discretion." (Philippine Air Lines, Inc. v. Arca, 19 SCRA
300.)
For the reason, therefore, that the judgment of the industrial court sought to be reviewed in the present case has
already become final and executory, nay, not without the fault of the petitioners, hence, no matter how erroneous
from the constitutional viewpoint it may be, it is already beyond recall, I vote to dismiss this case, without
pronouncement as to costs.
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
For having carried out a mass demonstration at Malacañang on March 4, 1969 in protest against alleged abuses of
the Pasig police department, upon two days’ prior notice to respondent employer company, as against the latter’s
insistence that the first shift 1 should not participate but instead report for work, under pain of dismissal, the industrial
court ordered the dismissal from employment of the eight individual petitioners as union officers and organizers of
the mass demonstration.
Respondent court’s order finding petitioner union guilty on respondent’s complaint of bargaining in bad faith and
unfair labor practice for having so carried out the mass demonstration, notwithstanding that it concededly was not a
declaration of strike nor directed in any manner against respondent employer, and ordering the dismissal of the union
officers, manifestly constituted grave abuse of discretion in fact and in law.
There could not be, in fact, bargaining in bad faith nor unfair labor practice since respondent firm conceded that "the
demonstration is an inalienable right of the union guaranteed by the Constitution" and the union up to the day of the
demonstration pleaded by cablegram to the company to excuse the first shift and allow it to join the demonstration in
accordance with their previous requests.
Neither could there be, in law, a willful violation of the collective bargaining agreement’s "no-strike" clause as would
warrant the union leaders’ dismissal, since as found by respondent court itself the mass demonstration was not a
declaration of a strike, there being no industrial dispute between the protagonists, but merely "the occurrence of a
temporary stoppage of work" to enable the workers to exercise their constitutional rights of free expression,
peaceable assembly and petition for redress of grievance against alleged police excesses.
Respondent court’s en banc resolution dismissing petitioners’ motion for reconsideration for having been filed two
days late, after expiration of the reglementary five-day period fixed by its rules, due to the negligence of petitioners’
124
counsel and/or the union president should likewise be set aside as a manifest act of grave abuse of discretion.
Petitioners’ petition for relief from the normal adverse consequences of the late filing of their motion for
reconsideration due to such negligence — which was not acted upon by respondent court — should have been
granted, considering the monstrous injustice that would otherwise be caused the petitioners through their summary
dismissal from employment, simply because they sought in good faith to exercise basic human rights guaranteed
them by the Constitution. It should be noted further that no proof of actual loss from the one-day stoppage of work
was shown by respondent company, providing basis to the main opinion’s premise that its insistence on dismissal of
the union leaders for having included the first shift workers in the mass demonstration against its wishes was but an
act of arbitrary vindictiveness.
Only thus could the basic constitutional rights of the individual petitioners and the constitutional injunction to afford
protection to labor be given true substance and meaning. No person may be deprived of such basic rights without
due process — which is but "responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice.
Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness avoided . . . Due process is thus hostile to any official action
marred by lack of reasonableness. Correctly it has been identified as freedom from arbitrariness." 2
Accordingly, I vote for the setting aside of the appealed orders of the respondent court and concur in the judgment
for petitioners as set forth in the main opinion.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. Nos. 92981-83 January 9, 1992
INTERNATIONAL PHARMACEUTICALS, INC., Petitioner, vs. HON. SECRETARY OF LABOR and ASSOCIATED
LABOR UNION (ALU), Respondents.
The issue before us is whether or not the Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment has the power to
assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute and its incidental controversies, including unfair labor practice cases,
causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national
interest.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The operative facts which culminated in the present recourse are undisputed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
Prior to the expiration on January 1, 1989 of the collective bargaining agreement between petitioner International
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (hereafter, Company) and the Associated Labor Union (Union, for brevity), the latter submitted
to the Company its economic and political demands. These were not met by the Company, hence a deadlock
ensued.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
On June 27, 1989, the Union filed a notice of strike with Regional Office No. VII of the National Conciliation and
Mediation Board, Department of Labor and Employment, which was docketed as NCMB-RBVII-NS-06-050-89. After
all conciliation efforts had failed, the Union went on strike on August 8, 1989 and the Company's operations were
completely paralyzed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Subsequently, three other labor cases involving the same parties were filed with the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) to wit:
1. International Pharmaceuticals, Inc. vs. Associated Labor Union, NLRC Case No. VII-09-0810-89, 1 a petition for
injunction and damages with temporary restraining order filed by the Company against the Union and some of its
members for picketing the Company's establishment in Cebu, Davao, and Metro Manila allegedly without the
required majority of the employees approving and agreeing to the strike and with simulated strike votes, in direct
violation of the provisions of their collective bargaining agreement and in total and complete defiance of the
provisions of the Labor Code;chanrobles virtual law library
2. Associated Labor Union vs. International Pharmaceuticals, Inc., et al., NLRC Case No-VII-08-0715-89, 2 a
complaint for unfair labor practice with prayer for damages and attorney's fees filed by the Union against the
Company, its personnel manager, and the Workers Alliance of Trade Unions (WATU) as a result of the Company's
refusal to include the sales workers in the bargaining unit resulting in a deadlock in the bargaining negotiations; for
coddling the respondent WATU as a separate bargaining agent of the sales workers despite a contrary ruling of the
Med-Arbiter; and undue interference by the Company in the right of the workers to self-organization through
harassment and dispersal of a peaceful picket during the strike; andchanrobles virtual law library
3. International Pharmaceuticals, Inc., et al. vs. Associated Labor Union, NLRC Case No. VII-08-0742-89, 3 a petition
to declare the strike illegal with prayer for damages filed by the Company alleging, among others, that the notice of
strike filed by the Union with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board did not conform with the requirements of
the Labor Code, and that the Union, in violation of the Labor Code provisions on the conduct of the strike, totally
blockaded and continued to blockade the ingress and egress of the Company's premises by human barricades,
placards, benches and other obstructions, completely paralyzing its business operations.
Meanwhile, considering that the Company belongs to an industry indispensable to national interest, it being engaged
in the manufacture of drugs and pharmaceuticals and employing around 600 workers, then Acting Secretary of
Labor, Ricardo C. Castro, invoking Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code, issued an order dated September 26, 1989
assuming jurisdiction over the aforesaid case docketed as NCMB-RBVII-NS-06-050-89 and directing the parties to
return to the status quo before the work stoppage. The decretal portion of the order reads:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Office hereby assumes jurisdiction over the labor dispute at the
International Pharmaceuticals, Incorporated pursuant to Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code, as
amended.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Accordingly, all striking workers are hereby directed to return to work and management to accept them under the
same terms and conditions prevailing before the work stoppage, within twenty four (24) hours from receipt of this
Order. Management is directed to post copies of this Order in three (3) conspicuous places in the company
premises.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The parties are likewise ordered to cease and desist from committing any and all acts that will prejudice either party
and aggravate the situation as well as the normalization of operations.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library
SO ORDERED. 4chanrobles virtual law library
On January 15, 1990, the Union filed a motion in NCMB-RBVII-NS-06-050-85, the case over which jurisdiction had
been assumed by the Secretary of Labor and Employment (hereafter referred to as the Secretary), seeking the
consolidation of the three NLRC cases (NLRC Cases Nos. VII-09-0810-89, VII-08-0715-89, and VII-08-0742-89) with
the first stated case.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
In an order dated January 31, 1990, Secretary of Labor Ruben D. Torres granted the motion and ordered the
consolidation of the three NLRC cases with NCMB-RBVII-NS-06-050-89, as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the Associated Labor Union's Motion to be meritorious, the same is granted and NLRC Cases
Nos. VII-09-0810-89, VII-08-0715-89 and VII-08-0742-89 are hereby ordered consolidated with the instant
proceedings. The Labor Arbiter handling the same is directed to immediately transmit the records of the said cases
to the Asst. Regional Director, DOLE Regional Office No. 7 who has been designated to hear and receive the
evidence of the parties.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
SO ORDERED. 5chanrobles virtual law library
125
The Company's subsequent motion for reconsideration of the order consolidating the cases was denied by the
Secretary on March 5, 1990. 6 Thereafter, the Assistant Regional Director of Regional Office No. VII, as directed,
assumed jurisdiction over the consolidated cases and set the same for reception of
evidence.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Petitioner Company now comes to this Court assailing the aforesaid orders and alleging grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the public respondent in the issuance thereof. The Union, as the bargaining agent of the rank and file
workers of the Company, was impleaded as the private respondent.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
Petitioner Company submits that the exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide the three NLRC cases above-specified
is vested in the labor arbiter as provided in paragraph (a) (1) and (5) of Article 217 of the Labor
Code.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Moreover, petitioner insists that there is nothing in Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code which directs the labor arbiter to
hold in abeyance all proceedings in the NLRC cases and await instruction from the Secretary. Otherwise, so it
postulates, Section 6, Rule V of the Revised Rules of the NLRC which is invoked by the Secretary is null and void
since it orders the cessation of all proceedings before the labor arbiter and orders him to await instructions from the
Secretary in labor disputes where the Secretary bas assumed jurisdiction, thereby amending Article 263 (g) of the
Labor Code by enlarging the jurisdiction of the Secretary.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Petitioner further contends that, granting arguendo that Section 6, Rule V of the Revised Rules of the NLRC is in
accordance with Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code, still the Secretary should not have ordered the consolidation of
the three unfair labor practice cases with NCMB-RBVII-NS-06-050-89, since the Secretary assumed jurisdiction only
over the deadlock in the negotiation of the collective bargaining agreement and the petition for contempt as a result
of the said deadlock.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Respondents, on the other band, assert that the authority to assume jurisdiction over labor disputes, vested in the
Secretary by Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code, extends to all questions and incidents arising therein causing or likely
to cause strikes or lockouts in industries indispensable to national interest.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
Moreover, respondents counter that Section 6, Rule V of the Revised Rules of the NLRC is in accordance with Article
263 (g) of the Labor Code, notwithstanding the provisions of Article 217 of the Labor Code. To rule otherwise, they
point out, would encourage splitting of jurisdiction, multiplicity of suits, and possible conflicting findings and decisions
which could only result in delay and complications in the disposition of the labor
disputes.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
It was also stressed that the three NLRC cases which respondent Secretary ordered consolidated with the labor
dispute over which he had assumed jurisdiction arose from or are directly related to and are incidents of the said
labor dispute.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Finally, respondents invoke the rule that all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the Labor Code
provisions should be resolved in favor of labor. By virtue of the assailed orders, the Union and its members were
relieved of the burden of having to litigate their interrelated cases in different
fora.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
There are three governing labor law provisions which are determinative of the present issue of
jurisdiction, viz.:chanrobles virtual law library
1. Article 217 (a) (1) and (5) of the Labor Code which provides:
Art. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission - (a) Except as otherwise provided under this Code the
Labor Arbiters shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide . . . the following cases involving all
workers. . . .chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
1. Unfair labor practice cases;
xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library
5. Cases arising from any violation of Article 264 of this Code, including questions involving the legality of strikes and
lockouts; . . .
2. Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code which declares:
(g) When, in his opinion, there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike of lockout in an industry
indispensable to the national interest, the Secretary of Labor and Employment may assume jurisdiction over the
dispute and decide it or certify the same to the Commission for compulsory arbitration. . . .
3. Section 6, Rule V of the Revised Rules of the NLRC which states:
Sec. 6. Disposition of cases. - . . .
Provided, that when the Minister (Secretary) of Labor and Employment has assumed jurisdiction over a strike or
lockout dispute or certified the same to the Commission, the parties to such dispute shall immediately inform the
Minister (Secretary) or the Commission as the case may be, of all cases between them pending before any Regional
Arbitration Branch, and the Labor Arbiter handling the same of such assumption or certification, whereupon all
proceedings before the Labor Arbiter concerning such cases shall cease and the Labor Arbiter shall await
instructions from the Minister (Secretary) or the Commission.
The foregoing provisions persuade us that the Secretary did not gravely abuse his discretion when he issued the
questioned orders.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
As early as 1913, this Court laid down in Herrera vs. Baretto, et al., 7 the fundamental normative rule that jurisdiction
is the authority to bear and determine a cause - the right to act in a case. However, this should be distinguished from
the exercise of jurisdiction. The authority to decide a case at all and not the decision rendered therein is what makes
up jurisdiction. Where there is jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter, the decision of all other questions
arising in the case is but an exercise of that jurisdiction. 8
In the present case, the Secretary was explicitly granted by Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code the authority to assume
jurisdiction over a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the
national interest, and decide the same accordingly. Necessarily, this authority to assume jurisdiction over the said
labor dispute must include and extend to all questions and controversies arising therefrom, including cases over
which the labor arbiter has exclusive jurisdiction.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Moreover, Article 217 of the Labor Code is not without, but contemplates, exceptions thereto. This is evident from the
opening proviso therein reading "(e)xcept as otherwise provided under this Code . . ." Plainly, Article 263 (g) of the
Labor Code was meant to make both the Secretary (or the various regional directors) and the labor arbiters share
jurisdiction, subject to certain conditions. 9 Otherwise, the Secretary would not be able to effectively and efficiently
dispose of the primary dispute. To hold the contrary may even lead to the absurd and undesirable result wherein the
Secretary and the labor arbiter concerned may have diametrically opposed rulings. As we have said, "(i)t is
fundamental that a statute is to be read in a manner that would breathe life into it, rather than defeat it." 10chanrobles
virtual law library
In fine, the issuance of the assailed orders is within the province of the Secretary as authorized by Article 263 (g) of
the Labor Code and Article 217 (a) (1) and (5) of the same Code, taken conjointly and rationally construed to
subserve the objective of the jurisdiction vested in the Secretary.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
Our pronouncement on this point should be distinguished from the situation which obtained and our consequent
ruling in Servando's, Inc. vs. The Secretary of Labor and Employment, et al. 11 wherein we referred to the appropriate
labor arbiter a case previously decided by the Secretary. The said case was declared to be within the exclusive
126
jurisdiction of the labor arbiter since the aggregate claims of each of the employees involved exceeded P5,000.00.
In Servando, the Secretary invoked his visitorial and enforcement powers to assume jurisdiction over the case, the
exclusive and original jurisdiction of which belongs to the labor arbiter. We said that to uphold the Secretary would
empower him, under his visitorial powers, to hear and decide an employee's claim of more than P5,000.00. We held
that he could not do that and we, therefore, overruled him.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
In the present case, however, by virtue of Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code, the Secretary has been conferred
jurisdiction over cases which would otherwise be under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of labor arbiters. There
was an existing labor dispute as a result of a deadlock in the negotiation for a collective bargaining agreement and
the consequent strike, over which the Secretary assumed jurisdiction pursuant to Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code.
The three NLRC cases were just offshoots of the stalemate in the negotiations and the strike. We, therefore, uphold
the Secretary's order to consolidate the NLRC cases with the labor dispute pending before him and his subsequent
assumption of jurisdiction over the said NLRC cases for him to be able to competently and efficiently dispose of the
dispute in its totality.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Petitioner's thesis that Section 6, Rule V of the Revised Rules of the NLRC is null and void has no merit. The
aforesaid rule has been promulgated to implement and enforce Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code. The rule is in
harmony with the objectives sought to be achieved by Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code, particularly the Secretary's
assumption of jurisdiction over a labor dispute and his subsequent disposition of the same in the most expeditious
and conscientious manner. To be able to completely dispose of a labor dispute, all its incidents would have to be
taken into consideration. Clearly, the purpose of the questioned regulation is to carry into effect the broad provisions
of Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
By and large, Section 6, Rule V of the Revised Rules of the NLRC is germane to the objects and purposes of Article
263 (g) of the Labor Code, and it is not in contradiction with but conforms to the standards the latter requires. Thus,
we hold that the terms of the questioned regulation are within the statutory power of the Secretary to promulgate as a
necessary implementing rule or regulation for the enforcement and administration of the Labor Code, in accordance
with Article 5 of the same Code.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Besides, to uphold petitioner Company's arguments that the NLRC cases are alien and totally separate and distinct
from the deadlock in the negotiation of the collective bargaining agreement is to sanction split jurisdiction which is
obnoxious to the orderly administration of justice. 12chanrobles virtual law library
Moreover, the rule is that all doubts in the interpretation and implementation of labor laws should be resolved in favor
of labor. In upholding the assailed orders of the Secretary, the Court is only giving meaning to this rule. The Court
should help labor authorities provide workers immediate access to their rights and benefits, without being hampered
by arbitration or litigation processes that prove to be not only nerve-wracking, but financially burdensome in the long
run. 13 Administrative rules of procedure should be construed liberally in order to promote their object and assist the
parties, especially the workingman, in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of their respective
claims and defenses. By virtue of the assailed orders. The Union and its members are relieved of the burden of
litigating their interrelated cases in different tribunals.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
WHEREFORE. there being no grave abuse of discretion committed by the Secretary of Labor and Employment, the
petition at bar is hereby DISMISSED.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 100158. June 29, 1992.]
ST. SCHOLASTICA’S COLLEGE, Petitioner, v. HON. RUBEN TORRES, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF
LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, and SAMAHAN NG MANGGAGAWANG PANG-EDUKASYON SA STA.
ESKOLASTIKA-NAFTEU, Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT; SCOPE OF POWER TO
ASSUME JURISDICTION OVER LABOR DISPUTES CAUSING OR LIKELY TO CAUSE STRIKE OR LOCKOUT IN
AN INDUSTRY INDISPENSABLE TO THE NATIONAL INTEREST. — The issue on whether respondent
SECRETARY has the power to assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute and its incidental controversies, causing or
likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest, was already settled in
International Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor and Employment (G.R. Nos. 92981-83, 9 January 1992).
Therein, We ruled that: ". . . [T]he Secretary was explicitly granted by Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code the authority
to assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable
to the national interest, and decide the same accordingly. Necessarily, this authority to assume jurisdiction over the
said labor dispute must include and extend to all questions and controversies arising therefrom, including cases over
which the Labor Arbiter has exclusive jurisdiction." And rightly so, for, as found in the aforesaid case, Article 217 of
the Labor Code did contemplate of exceptions thereto where the SECRETARY is authorized to assume jurisdiction
over a labor dispute otherwise belonging exclusively to the Labor Arbiter. This is readily evident from its opening
proviso reading" (e)xcept as otherwise provided under this Code . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUISITES BEFORE THE SECRETARY MAY TAKE COGNIZANCE OF AN INCIDENTAL ISSUE
OF A LABOR DISPUTES. — Previously, We held that Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code was broadenough to give
the Secretary of Labor and Employment the power to take jurisdiction over an issue involving unfair labor practice.
(Meycuayan College v. Drilon, G.R. No. 81144, 7 May 1990; 185 SCRA 50) At first glance, the rulings above stated
seem to run counter to that of PAL v. Secretary of Labor and Employment, (193 SCRA 223), which was cited by
petitioner. But the conflict is only apparent, not real. To recall, We ruled in the latter case that the jurisdiction of the
Secretary of Labor and Employment in assumption and/or certification cases is limited to the issues that are involved
in the disputes or to those that are submitted to him for resolution. The seeming difference is, however, reconcilable.
Since the matter on the legality or illegality of the strike was never submitted to him for resolution, he was thus found
to have exceeded his jurisdiction when he restrained the employer from taking disciplinary action against employees
who staged an illegal strike. Before the Secretary of Labor and Employment may take cognizance of an issue which
is merely incidental to the labor dispute, therefore, the same must be involved in the labor dispute itself, or otherwise
submitted to him for resolution. If it was not, as was the case in PAL v. Secretary of Labor and Employment, supra,
and he nevertheless acted on it, that assumption of jurisdiction is tantamount to a grave abuse of discretion.
Otherwise, the ruling in International Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor and Employment, supra, will apply.
The submission of an incidental issue of a labor dispute, in assumption and/or certification cases, to the Secretary of
Labor and Employment for his resolution is thus one of the instances referred to whereby the latter may exercise
concurrent jurisdiction together with the Labor Arbiters.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ACADEMIC INSTITUTIONS COVERED. — The assumption of jurisdiction by the Secretary of Labor
and Employment over labor disputes involving academic institutions was already upheld in Philippine School of
Business Administration v. Noriel (G.R. No. 80648, 15 August 1988, 164 SCRA 402) where We ruled thus: "There is
no doubt that the on-going labor dispute at the school adversely affects the national interest. The school is a duly
registered educational institution of higher learning with more or less 9,000 students. The on-going work stoppage at
the school unduly prejudices the students and will entail great loss in terms of time, effort and money to all
concerned. More important, it is not amiss to mention that the school is engaged in the promotion of the physical,
intellectual and emotional well-being of the country’s youth." Respondent UNION’s failure to immediately comply with
the return-to-work order of 5 November 1990, therefore, cannot be condoned.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PURPOSE THEREOF; CASE AT BAR. — In the instant petition, the COLLEGE in its
Manifestation, dated 16 November 1990, asked the "Secretary of Labor to take the appropriate steps under the said
circumstances." It likewise prayed in its position paper that respondent SECRETARY uphold its termination of the
striking employees. Upon the other hand, the UNION questioned the termination of its officers and members before
respondent SECRETARY by moving for the enforcement of the return-to-work orders. There is no dispute then that
the issue on the legality of the termination of striking employees was properly submitted to respondent SECRETARY
for resolution. Such an interpretation will be in consonance with the intention of our labor authorities to provide
workers immediate access to their rights and benefits without being inconvenienced by the arbitration and litigation
127
process that prove to be not only nerve-wracking, but financially burdensome in the long run. Social justice
legislation, to be truly meaningful and rewarding to our workers, must not be hampered in its application by long-
winded arbitration and litigation. Rights must be asserted and benefits received with the least inconvenience. For,
labor laws are meant to promote, not defeat, social justice (Maternity Children’s Hospital v. Hon. Secretary of Labor,
G.R. No. 78909, 30 June 1989; 174 SCRA 632). After all, Art. 4 of the Labor Code does state that all doubts in the
implementation and interpretation of its provisions, including its implementing rules and regulations, shall be resolved
in favor of labor.
5. ID.; ID.; RETURN TO WORK ORDER THEREOF; IMMEDIATELY EFFECTIVE AND EXECUTORY
NOTWITHSTANDING THE FILING OF THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATIONS; RATIONALE; CASE AT BAR.
— Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code provides that if a strike has already taken place at the time of assumption, "all
striking . . . employees shall immediately return to work." This means that by its very terms, a return-to-work order is
immediately effective and executory notwithstanding the filing of a motion for reconsideration (University of Sto.
Tomas v. NLRC, G.R. No. 89920, 18 October 1990; 190 SCRA 759). It must be strictly complied with even during the
pendency of any petition questioning its validity (Union of Filipro Employees v. Nestle’ Philippines, Inc., 192 SCRA
396). After all, the assumption and/or certification order is issued in the exercise of respondent SECRETARY’s
compulsive power of arbitration and, until set aside, must therefore be immediately complied with. The rationale for
this rule is explained in University of Sto. Tomas v. NLRC, supra, citing Philippine Air Lines Employees Association v.
Philippine Air Lines, Inc., 38 SCRA 372 (1971) thus — "To say that its (return-to-work order) effectivity must wait
affirmance in a motion for reconsideration is not only to emasculate it but indeed to defeat its import, for by then the
deadline fixed for the return to work would, in the ordinary course, have already passed and hence can no longer be
affirmed insofar as the time element is concerned."cralaw virtua1aw library
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; STRIKES DECLARED IN DEFIANCE THERETO; CONSIDERED ILLEGAL; LIABILITY OF
PARTICIPANTS. — The respective liabilities of striking union officers and members who failed to immediately
comply with the return-to-work order is outlined in Art. 264 of the Labor Code which provides that any declaration of a
strike or lockout after the Secretary of Labor and Employment has assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute is
considered an illegal act. Any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in a strike defying a return-to-work
order may, consequently, "be declared to have lost his employment status." Section 6, Rule IX, of the New Rules of
Procedure of the NLRC, which provides the penalties for defying a certification order of the Secretary of Labor or a
return-to-work order of the Commission, also reiterates the same penalty. It specifically states that non-compliance
with the aforesaid orders, which is considered an illegal act, "shall authorize the Secretary of Labor and Employment
or the Commission . . . to enforce the same under pain of loss of employment status." Under the Labor Code,
assumption and/or certification orders are similarly treated. Thus, we held in Sarmiento v. Tuico, 162 SCRA 676, that
by insisting on staging the restrained strike and defiantly picketing the company premises to prevent the resumption
of operations, the strikers have forfeited their right to be readmitted, having abandoned their positions, and so could
be validly replaced.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; EFFECTIVE FROM THE MOMENT THE EMPLOYEE DEFIES THE ORDER. — It is
clear from the provisions above quoted that from the moment a worker defies a return-to-work order, he is deemed to
have abandoned his job. It is already in itself knowingly participating in an illegal act. Otherwise, the worker will just
simply refuse to return to his work and cause a standstill in the company operations while retaining the positions they
refuse to discharge or allow the management to fill (Sarmiento v. Tuico, supra). Suffice it to say, in Federation of
Free Workers v. Inciong, supra, the workers were terminated from work after defying the return-to-work order for only
nine (9) days. It is indeed inconceivable that an employee, despite a return-to-work order, will be allowed in the
interim to stand akimbo and wait until five (5) orders shall have been issued for their return before they report back to
work. This is absurd.
8. ID.; CONSTRUCTION OF THE RULES THEREOF IN FAVOR OF LABOR; DOES NOT APPLY IN CASE OF
WILLFUL DISOBEDIENCE THERETO. — The sympathy of the Court which, as a rule, is on the side of the laboring
classes (Reliance Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 86917-18, 25 January 1991; 193 SCRA 365),
cannot be extended to the striking union officers and members in the instant petition. There was willful disobedience
not only to one but two return-to-work orders. Considering that the UNION consisted mainly of teachers, who are
supposed to be well-lettered and well-informed, the Court cannot overlook the plain arrogance and pride displayed
by the UNION in this labor dispute. Despite containing threats of disciplinary action against some union officers and
members who actively participated in the strike, the letter dated 9 November 1990 sent by the COLLEGE enjoining
the union officers and members to return to work on 12 November 1990 presented the workers an opportunity to
return to work under the same terms and conditions prior to the strike. Yet, the UNION decided to ignore the same.
The COLLEGE, correspondingly, had every right to terminate the services of those who chose to disregard the
return-to-work orders issued by respondent SECRETARY in order to protect the interests of its students who form
part of the youth of the land.
The principal issue to be resolved in this recourse is whether striking union members terminated for abandonment of
work after failing to comply with return-to-work orders of the Secretary of Labor and Employment (SECRETARY, for
brevity) should by law be reinstated.cralawnad
On 20 July 1990, petitioner St. Scholastica’s College (COLLEGE, for brevity) and private respondent Samahan ng
Manggagawang Pang-Edukasyon sa Sta. Eskolastika — NAFTEU (UNION, for brevity) initiated negotiations for a
first-ever collective bargaining agreement. A deadlock in the negotiations prompted the UNION to file on 4 October
1990 a Notice of Strike with the Department of Labor and Employment (DEPARTMENT, for brevity), docketed as
NCMB-NCR-NS-10-826-90.
On 5 November 1990, the UNION declared a strike which analyzed the operations of the COLLEGE. Affecting as it
did the interest of the students, public respondent SECRETARY immediately assumed jurisdiction over the labor
dispute and issued on the same day, 5 November 1990, a return-to-work order. The following day, 6 November
1990, the UNION was served the Order. On 7 November 1990, instead of returning to work, the UNION filed a
motion for reconsideration of the return-to-work order questioning inter alia the assumption of jurisdiction by the
SECRETARY over the labor dispute.
On 9 November 1990, the COLLEGE sent individual letters to the striking employees enjoining them to return to work
not later than 8.00 o’clock A.M. of 12 November 1990 and, at the same time, giving notice to some twenty-three (23)
workers that their return would be without prejudice to the filing of appropriate charges against them. In response, the
UNION presented a list of six (6) demands to the COLLEGE a dialogue conducted on 11 November 1990. The most
important of these demands was the unconditional acceptance back to work of the striking employees. But these
were flatly rejected.
Likewise, on 9 November 1990, respondent SECRETARY denied reconsideration of his return-to-work order and
sternly warned the striking employees to comply with its terms. On 12 November 1990, the UNION received the
Order.
Thereafter, particularly on 14 and 15 November 1990, the parties held conciliation meetings before the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board where the UNION pruned down its demands to three (3), viz.: that striking
employees be reinstated under the same terms and conditions before the strike; that no retaliatory or disciplinary
action be taken against them; and, that CBA negotiations be continued. However, these efforts proved futile as the
COLLEGE remained steadfast in its position that any return-to-work offer should be unconditional.
On 16 November 1990, the COLLEGE manifested to respondent SECRETARY that the UNION continued to defy his
return-to-work order of 5 November 1990 so that "appropriate steps under the said circumstances" may be
undertaken by him. 1
On 23 November 1990, the COLLEGE mailed individual notices of termination the striking employees, which were
received on 26 November 1990, or later. The UNION officers and members then tried to return to work but were no
longer accepted by the COLLEGE.
On 5 December 1990, a Complaint for Illegal Strike was filed against the UNION, its officers and several of its
members before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), docketed as NLRC Case No. 00-12-06256-90.
The UNION moved for the enforcement of the return-to-work order before respondent SECRETARY, citing "selective
acceptance of returning strikers" by the COLLEGE. It also sought dismissal of the complaint. Since then, no further
hearings were conducted.
Respondent SECRETARY required the parties to submit their respective position papers. The COLLEGE prayed that
128
respondent SECRETARY uphold the dismissal of the employees who defied his return-to-work order.
On 12 April 1991, respondent SECRETARY issued the assailed Order which, inter alia directed the reinstatement of
striking UNION members, premised on his finding that no violent or otherwise illegal act accompanied the conduct of
the strike and that a fledgling UNION like private respondent was "naturally expected to exhibit unbridled if
inexperienced enthusiasm, in asserting its existence." 2 Nevertheless, the aforesaid Order held UNION officers
responsible for the violation of the return-to-work orders of 5 and 9 November 1990 and, correspondingly, sustained
their termination.
Both parties moved for partial reconsideration of the Order, with petitioner COLLEGE questioning the wisdom of the
reinstatement of striking UNION members, and private respondent UNION, the dismissal of its officers.
On 31 May 1991, in a Resolution, respondent SECRETARY denied both motions. Hence, this Petition forCertiorari,
with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order.
On 26 June 1991, We restrained the SECRETARY from enforcing his assailed Orders insofar as they directed the
reinstatement of the striking workers previously terminated.chanrobles.com : virtual law library
Petitioner questions the assumption by respondent SECRETARY of jurisdiction to decide on termination disputes,
maintaining that such jurisdiction is vested instead in the Labor Arbiter pursuant to Art. 217 of the Labor Code, thus
—
"Art. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission. — (a) Except as otherwise provided under this Code,
the Labor Arbiters shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within thirty (30) calendar days
after the submission of the case by the parties for decision without extension, the following cases involving all
workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural: . . . 2. Termination disputes . . . 5. Cases arising from any violation
of Article 264 of this Code, including questions on the legality of strikes and lock-outs . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library
In support of its position, petitioner invokes Our ruling in PAL v. Secretary of Labor and Employment 3 where We
held:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The Labor Secretary exceeded his jurisdiction when he restrained PAL from taking disciplinary measures against its
guilty employees, for, under Art. 263 of the Labor Code, all that the Secretary may enjoin is the holding of the strike
but not the company’s right to take action against union officers who participated in the illegal strike and committed
illegal acts."cralaw virtua1aw library
Petitioner further contends that following the doctrine laid down in Sarmiento v. Tuico 4 and Union of Filipro
Employees v. Nestle’ Philippines, Inc., 5 workers who refused to obey a return-to-work order are not entitled to be
paid for work not done, or to reinstatement to the positions they have abandoned by reason of their refusal to return
thereto as ordered.
Taking a contrary stand, private respondent UNION pleads for reinstatement of its dismissed officers considering that
the act of the UNION in continuing with its picket was never characterized as a "brazen disregard of successive legal
orders", which was readily apparent in Union Filipro Employees v. Nestle’ Philippines, Inc., supra, nor was it a willful
refusal to return to work, which was the basis of the ruling in Sarmiento v. Tuico, supra. The failure of UNION officers
and members to immediately comply with the return-to-work orders was not because they wanted to defy said
orders; rather, they held the view that academic institutions were not industries indispensable to the national interest.
When respondent SECRETARY denied their motion, for reconsideration, however, the UNION intimated that efforts
ware immediately initiated to fashion out a reasonable return-to-work agreement with the COLLEGE, albeit, it failed.
The issue on whether respondent SECRETARY has the power to assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute and its
incidental controversies, causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national
interest, was already settled in International Pharmaceuticals, Inc. Secretary of Labor and Employment. 6 Therein,
We ruled that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . [T]he Secretary was explicitly granted by Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code the authority to assume jurisdiction
over a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest,
and decide the same accordingly. Necessarily, this authority to assume jurisdictional over the said labor dispute must
include and extend to all questions and controversies arising therefrom, including cases over which the Labor Arbiter
has exclusive jurisdiction."cralaw virtua1aw library
And rightly so, for, as found in the aforesaid case, Article 217 of the Labor Code did contemplate of exceptions
thereto where the SECRETARY is authorized to assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute otherwise belonging
exclusively to the Labor Arbiter. This is readily evident from its opening proviso reading" (e)xcept as otherwise
provided under this Code . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library
Previously, We held that Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code was broad enough to give the Secretary of Labor and
Employment the power to take jurisdiction over an issue involving unfair labor practice. 7
At first glance, the rulings above stated seem to run counter to that of PAL v. Secretary or Labor and Employment,
supra, which was, cited by petitioner. But the conflict is only apparent, not real.
To recall, We ruled in the latter case that the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Labor and Employment in assumption
and/or certification cases is limited to the issues that are involved in the disputes or to those that are submitted to him
for resolution. The seeming difference is, however, reconcilable. Since the matter on the legality or illegality of the
strike was never submitted to him for resolution, he was thus found to have exceeded his jurisdiction when he
restrained the employer from taking disciplinary action against employees who staged an illegal strike.
Before the Secretary of Labor and Employment may take cognizance of an issue which is merely incidental to the
labor dispute, therefore, the same must be involved in the labor dispute itself, or otherwise submitted to him for
resolution. If it was not, as was the case in PAL v. Secretary of Labor and Employment, supra, and he nevertheless
acted on it, that assumption of jurisdiction is tantamount to a grave abuse of discretion. Otherwise, the ruling in
International Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor and Employment, supra, will apply.
The submission of an incidental issue of a labor dispute, in assumption and/or certification cases, to the Secretary of
Labor and Employment for his resolution is thus one of the instances referred to whereby the latter may exercise
concurrent jurisdiction together with the Labor Arbiters.
In the instant petition, the COLLEGE in its Manifestation, dated 16 November 1990, asked the "Secretary of Labor to
take the appropriate steps under the said circumstances." It likewise prayed in its position paper that respondent
SECRETARY uphold its termination of the striking employees. Upon the other hand, the UNION questioned the
termination of its officers and members before respondent SECRETARY by moving for the enforcement of the
return-to-work orders. There is no dispute then that the issue on the legality of the termination of striking employees
was properly submitted to respondent SECRETARY for resolution.
Such an interpretation will be in consonance with the intention of our labor authorities to provide workers immediate
access to their rights and benefits without being inconvenienced by the arbitration and litigation process that prove to
be not only nerve-wracking, but financially burdensome in the long run. Social justice legislation, to be truly
meaningful and rewarding to our workers, must not be hampered in its application by long-winded arbitration and
litigation. Rights must be asserted and benefits received with the least inconvenience. For, labor laws are meant to
promote, not defeat, social justice (Maternity Children’s Hospital v. Hon. Secretary of Labor). 8 After all, Art. 4 of the
Labor Code does state that all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of its provisions, including its
implementing rules and regulations, shall be resolved in favor of labor.
We now come to the more pivotal question of whether striking union members, terminated for abandonment of work
after failing to comply strictly with a return-to-work order, should be reinstated.
We quote hereunder the pertinent provisions of law which govern the effects of defying a return-to-work
order:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code —
"Art. 263. Strikes, picketing, and lockouts. — . . . (g) When, in his opinion, there exists a labor dispute causing or
likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest, the Secretary of Labor and
129
Employment may assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify the same to the Commission for
compulsory arbitration. Such assumption or certification shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended
or impending strike or lockout as specified in the assumption or certification order. If one has already taken place at
the time of assumption or certification, all striking or locked out employees shall immediately return to work and the
employer shall immediately resume operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions
prevailing before the strike or lookout. The Secretary of Labor and Employment or the Commission may seek the
assistance of law enforcement agencies to ensure compliance with this provision as well as with such orders as he
may issue to enforce the same . . ." (as amended by Sec. 27, R.A. 6715; Emphasis supplied).
2. Article 264, same Labor Code —
"Art. 264. Prohibited activities. — (a) No labor organization or employer shall declare a strike or lockout without first
having bargained collectively in accordance with Title VII of this Book or without first having filed the notice required
in the preceding Article or without the necessary strike or lockout vote first having been obtained and reported to the
Ministry.
"No strike or lockout shall be declared after assumption of jurisdiction by the President or the Minister or after
certification or submission of the dispute to compulsory or voluntary arbitration or during the pendency of cases
involving the same grounds for the strike or lockout . . . (Emphasis supplied).
"Any worker whose employment has been terminated as a consequence of an unlawful lockout shall be entitled to
reinstatement with full back wages. Any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or
union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost
his employment status; Provided, That mere participation of a worker in a lawful strike shall not constitute sufficient
ground for termination of his employment, even if a replacement had been hired by the employer during such lawful
strike . . ." (Emphasis supplied).
3. Section 6, Rule IX, of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC (which took effect on 31 August 1990) —
"Section 6. Effects of Defiance. — Non-compliance with the certification order of the Secretary of Labor and
Employment or a return to work order of the Commission shall be considered an illegal act committed in the course
of the strike or lookout and shall authorize the Secretary of Labor and Employment or the Commission, as the case
may be, to enforce the same under pain or loss of employment status or entitlement to full employment benefits from
the locking-out employer or backwages, damages and/or other positive and/or affirmative reliefs, even to criminal
prosecution against the liable parties . . ." (Emphasis supplied).
Private respondent UNION maintains that the reason they failed ko immediately comply with the return-to-work order
of 5 November 1990 was because they questioned the assumption of jurisdiction of respondent SECRETARY. They
were of the impression that being an academic institution, the school could not be considered an industry
indispensable to national interest, and that pending resolution of the issue, they were under no obligation to
immediately return to work.
This position of the UNION is simply flawed. Article 263 (g) Labor Code provides that if a strike has already taken
place at the time of assumption, "all striking . . . employees shall immediately return to work." This means that by its
very terms, a return-to-work order is immediately effective and executory notwithstanding the filing of a motion for
reconsideration (University of Sto. Tomas v. NLRC). 9 It must be strictly complied with even during the pendency of
any petition questioning its validity (Union of Filipro Employees v. Nestle’ Philippines, Inc., supra) After all, the
assumption and/or certification order is issued in the exercise of respondent SECRETARY’s compulsive power of
arbitration and, until set aside, must therefore be immediately complied with.
The rationale for this rule is explained in University of Sto. Tomas v. NLRC, supra, citing Philippine Air Lines
Employees Association v. Philippine Air Lines, Inc., 10 thus —
"To say that its (return-to-work order) effectivity must wait affirmance in a motion for reconsideration is not only to
emasculate it but indeed to defeat its import, for by then the deadline fixed for the return to work would, in the
ordinary course, have already passed and hence can no longer be affirmed insofar as the time element is
concerned."cralaw virtua1aw library
Moreover, the assumption of jurisdiction by the Secretary of Labor and Employment over labor disputes involving
academic institutions was already upheld in Philippine School of Business Administration v. Noriel 11 where We
ruled thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"There is no doubt that the on-going labor dispute at the school adversely affects the national interest. The school is
a duly registered educational institution of higher learning with more or less 9,000 students. The on-going work
stoppage at the school unduly prejudices the students and will entail great loss in terms of time, effort and money to
all concerned. More important, it is not amiss to mention that the school is engaged in the promotion of the physical,
intellectual and emotional well-being of the country’s youth."cralaw virtua1aw library
Respondent UNION’s failure to immediately comply with the return-to-work order of 5 November 1990, therefore,
cannot be condoned.
The respective liabilities of striking union officers and members who failed to immediately comply with the return-to-
work order is outlined in Art. 264 of the Labor Code which provides that any declaration of a strike or lockout after the
Secretary of Labor and Employment has assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute is considered an illegal act. Any
worker or union officer who knowingly participates in a strike defying a return-to-work order may, consequently, "be
declared to have lost his employment status."cralaw virtua1aw library
Section 6, Rule IX, of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, which provides the penalties for defying a
certification order of the Secretary of Labor or a return-to-work order of the Commission, also reiterates the same
penalty. It specifically states that non-compliance with the aforesaid orders, which is considered an illegal act, "shall
authorize the Secretary of Labor and Employment or the Commission . . . to enforce the same under pain of loss of
employment status." Under the Labor Code, assumption and/or certification orders are similarly treated.
Thus, we held in Sarmiento v. Tuico, supra, that by insisting on staging the restrained strike and defiantly picketing
the company premises to prevent the resumption of operations, the strikers have forfeited their right to be readmitted,
having abandoned their positions, and so could be validly replaced.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
We recently reiterated this stance in Federation of Free Workers v. Inciong, 12 wherein we cited Union of Filipro
Employees v. Nestle’ Philippines, Inc., supra, thus —
"A strike undertaken despite the issuance by the Secretary of Labor of an assumption or certification order becomes
a prohibited activity and thus illegal, pursuant to the second paragraph of Art. 264 of the Labor Code as amended . . .
The union officers and members, as a result, are deemed to have lost their employment status for having knowingly
participated in an illegal act."cralaw virtua1aw library
Despite knowledge of the ruling in Sarmiento v. Tuico, supra, records of the case reveal that private respondent
UNION opted to defy not only the return-to-work order of 5 November 1990 but also that of 9 November 1990.
While they claim that after receiving copy of the Order of 9 November 1990 initiatives were immediately undertaken
to fashion out a return-to-work agreement with management, still, the unrebutted evidence remains that the striking
union officers and members tried to return to work only eleven (11) days after the conciliation meetings ended in
failure, or twenty (20) days after they received copy of the first return-to-work order on 5 November 1990.
The sympathy of the Court which, as a rule, is on the side of the laboring classes (Reliance Surety & Insurance Co.,
Inc. v. NLRC), 13 cannot be extended to the striking union officers and members in the instant petition. There was
willful disobedience not only to one but two return-to-work orders. Considering that the UNION consisted mainly of
teachers, who are supposed to be well-lettered and well-informed, the Court cannot overlook the plain arrogance and
pride displayed by the UNION in this labor dispute. Despite containing threats of disciplinary action against some
union officers and members who actively participated in the strike, the letter dated 9 November 1990 sent by the
COLLEGE enjoining the union officers and members to return to work on 12 November 1990 presented the workers
an opportunity to return to work under the same terms and conditions prior to the strike. Yet, the UNION decided to
ignore the same. The COLLEGE, correspondingly, had every right to terminate the services of those who chose to
disregard the return-to-work orders issued by respondent SECRETARY in order to protect the interests of its
students who form part of the youth of the land.
130

Lastly, the UNION officers and members also argue that the doctrine laid down in Sarmiento v. Tuico, supra, and
Union of Filipro Employees v. Nestle’ Philippines, Inc., supra, cannot be made applicable to them because in the
latter two cases, workers defied the return-to-work orders for more than five (5) months. Their defiance of the return-
to-work order, it is said, did not last more than a month.
Again, this line of argument must be rejected. It is clear from the provisions above quoted that from the moment a
worker defies a return-to-work order, he is deemed to have abandoned his job. It is already in itself knowingly
participating in an illegal act. Otherwise, the worker will just simply refuse to return to his work and cause a standstill
they refused to discharge or allow the management to fill (Sarmiento v. Tuico, supra). Suffice it to say, in Federation
of Free Workers v. Inciong, supra, the workers were terminated from work after defying the return-to-work order for
only nine (9) days. It is indeed inconceivable that an employee, despite a return-to-work order, will be allowed in the
interim to stand akimbo and wait until five (5) orders shall have been issued for their return before they report back to
work. This is absurd.
In fine, respondent SECRETARY gravely abused his discretion when he ordered the reinstatement of striking union
members who refused to report back to work after he issued two (2) return-to-work orders, which in itself is knowingly
participating in an illegal act. The Order in question is, certainly, contrary to existing law and jurisprudence.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The Order of 12 April 1991 and the Resolution of 31
May 1991 both issued by respondent Secretary of Labor and Employment are SET ASIDE insofar as they order the
reinstatement of striking union members terminated by petitioner, and the temporary restraining order We issued on
June 26, 1991, is made permanent.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-37662. August 30, 1974.]
RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (RCPI), Petitioner, v. PHILIPPINE COMMUNICATIONS
ELECTRONICS & ELECTRICITY WORKERS’ FEDERATION (FCWF), RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE
PHILIPPINES, INC. EMPLOYEES UNION (RCPIEU), COURT OFINDUSTRIAL RELATIONS (CIR), and SPECIAL
SHERIFF OF THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, Respondents.
The deficiency of this petition, rather marked in character, seeking as it does to set aside an alias writ of execution of
a return-to-work order of respondent Court of Industrial Relations, 1 issued as far back as 1968, was sought to be
remedied by the invocation of Presidential Decree No. 21. 2 This is shown in its prefatory statement: "Aside from the
far reaching effects a decision on the issues ventilated here will have on future cases, this case has important
implications because it involves the application and reconciliation of the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 21 in
relation to the enforcement and execution of a ‘return to work’ order, subject matter of this petition." 3 The reliance is
misplaced. It is to misread what it provides and to lose sight of what it seeks to attain. Precisely the norm therein set
forth assures further protection to labor. It certainly would stultify its purpose if it can be utilized as a weapon against
the very employees, who for a period of six years had been denied what was granted them by an order, which on its
face was immediately executory. The petition must fail.
The undisputed facts would disclose why stress was laid on the aforesaid Presidential Decree. It has all the
appearances of a last-ditch attempt. From the very petition itself, it may be gleaned that as far back as September
19, 1967, respondent Philippine Communications Electronics and Electricity Workers’ Federation presented to the
petitioner a set of proposals to be embodied in a collective bargaining agreement. As the response was negative,
the main ground being that there was already an existing collective labor contract, an impasse resulted. It was
sought to be resolved by the Bureau of Labor Relations of the Department of Labor acting as conciliator. The attempt
was unsuccessful. 4 A strike was declared on November 17, 1967. The respondent Court took over as there was an
element of an unfair labor practice. In addition, on January 3, 1968, the Secretary of Labor sent a communication to
respondent Court endorsing the labor dispute under Section 16(c) of the Minimum Wage Law. 5 There was on
February 15, 1968 a motion filed by respondent labor Union seeking an order of reinstatement pending the resolution
of the case on the merits. It was granted by respondent Court in a resolution of April 23, 1968. 6 Apparently, the
return-to-work order was not complied with, as on December 27, 1969, a writ of execution was issued by the Clerk of
Court of respondent Court requiring the reinstatement of the strikers without loss of seniority. 7 Various legal moves
were further resorted to by petitioner with the result of further delaying the implementation of the return-to-work order.
8 That led to the issuance of the order of February 15, 1973, where it took note of the obvious inability of respondent
labor union to submit documentary exhibits in support of the objection to the reinstatement, with the additional period
of grace to do so until February 3, 1973, within which to submit his offer of exhibits of writing and the counsel for now
respondent union three days after receipt of the offer in writing within which to file his objections. Then the order
continued: "Considering that February 3, 1973 had already lapsed without respondents having as yet submitted its
offer of exhibits, despite the so many chances given to it, there is now valid reason to grant the urgent motion of
petitioner." 9 The case was thus deemed submitted for resolution. Then came the resolution of October 5, 1973
which is the basis of the alias writ of execution. Its dispositive portion reads as follows:" [Wherefore], the employees
numbering 167, each one named in the dispositive portion of the above report from pp. 11 to 14 hereof, are those
who struck against the company on November 17, 1967 and who are referred to in the Resolution issued on April 23,
1968, and who should be readmitted to their respective work during the pendency of this case. The Clerk of Court is
hereby directed to issue immediately an alias and/or amended writ of execution incorporating therein the names of
the aforementioned strikers." 10
A bare recital of the above facts renders undeniable the far-from-commendable efforts of petitioner to set at naught a
return-to-work order. Considering that it is of a peremptory character and that its execution was long overdue, the
challenged actuation of respondent Court had all the earmarks of legality. Nor should the invocation of Presidential
Decree No. 21 change matters any. As earlier pointed out, the misinterpretation sought to be fastened by petitioner
on it would frustrate the salutary objective of an executive determination to foster further the welfare of labor. This
petition, as made mention of at the outset, must fail.
1. The core of the controversy is the enforcement of a return-to-work order pending the final outcome of a case with
respondent Court. It is, in the categorical language of Chief Justice Makalintal, speaking for the Court in
Philippine Air Lines Employees’ Association v. Philippine Air Lines, Inc., 11 "immediately effective and executory,
notwithstanding the fact that a motion for its reconsideration has been filed." 12 He cited in support of the above view
the cases of Bachrach Transportation Company, Inc. v. Rural Transit Shop Employees Association, 13 Philippine
Long Distance Telephone Company v. Free Telephone Workers Union, 14 and Philippine Association of Free Labor
Unions v. Salvador. 15 Its very nature, according to him, "lends itself to no other construction." 16 In the Philippine
Air Lines Employees Association v. Philippine Air Lines, Inc. case, there was a Presidential certification. It does not
call for a different conclusion, just because this case lacks that feature. In the recently decided Philippine American
Management Company, Inc. v. Philippine American Management Employees Association, 17 it was made clear that
the certification need not be presidential but could proceed from the Secretary of Labor in accordance with his
powers under the Minimum Wage Law. So it happened in this case. The attempt to cast doubt therefore on the
validity of the alias writ of execution is doomed to futility. What was done by respondent Court was precisely to
accord respect to authoritative pronouncements of this Tribunal.
2. Petitioner would allege, too late, defenses that go into the merits. Even assuming their plausibility, it would be to
lose sight of the fact that the return-to-work order was temporary in character pending the final outcome of a
controversy. It would be again to disregard controlling precedents if, as petitioner would urge on respondent Court,
the return-to-work order failed to take into consideration what it was pleased to call the termination of employment of
some of those therein covered. For it has been the constant holding of this Tribunal from the leading case of Rex
Taxicab Company v. Court of Industrial Relations, 18 that there can be no inference of separation from the service
arising from the mere fact of participation in a strike. As was stressed by Justice Laurel: "With reference to the
contention that the drivers in question, by declaring a strike, either voluntarily ceased to be employees of the
petitioner or gave just cause for their separation, it need only be stated that the declaration of a strike does not
amount to a renunciation of the employment relation . . ." 19 In affirming the above principle, he cited two American
Supreme Court decisions: National Labor Relations Board v. Mackay Radio and Telegraph Co. 20 and National
Labor Relations v. Forestall Metallurgical Corporation. 21 Since then, the doctrine has been reiterated time and time
131
again. 22
3. The flimsy and insubstantial character of the petition is thus exposed. It sought to escape the fate thus
foreordained by inviting the attention of this Tribunal to what it referred to as legal complications arising from the
enforcement of the writ of execution when considered in connection with Presidential Decree No. 21. 23 After noting
that it had to get replacements during the pendency of this case, now still unresolved after five long years, it cited
Section 11 of Presidential Decree No. 21: "No employer may shut down his establishment or dismiss or terminate the
services of regular employees with at least one year of service without the written clearance of the Secretary of
Labor." It would thus be faced, according to its petition, "with the legal problem of being exposed to violating the
provisions of said decree. This is so, because in the process of complying immediately with the alias writ of
execution, for every number of petitioners who shall be reinstated to their former positions, the corresponding
number of employees who are now holding such positions will be laid off. And laying off or dismissals cannot be
done without the written clearance of the Secretary of Labor. It is foreseen also that written clearance shall treat of
individual cases of employees to be laid off. The process therefore will involve the [employee] presenting himself to
be returned to work, and the securing of the written clearance for the dismissal of the employee whom he will
replace." 24 It would be hard put, according to it, to make a choice between a possible charge for contempt on the
one hand, and arrest and detention on the other, if it would appear that there was a violation of Presidential Decree
No. 21. The dilemma is more apparent than real. There is no conflict between the aforesaid presidential decree and
the return-to-work order. This is not the occasion to pass upon the possible adverse effects, if any, on the situation of
the replacements. It might be mentioned that under the circumstances, their tenure could be made to depend on the
outcome of the pending case and whatever valid orders may be issued in the meanwhile by respondent Court. 25 At
any rate, it goes without saying that whatever rights they have must be respected. It certainly does not rule out giving
force and effect to an order of the labor tribunal, unfortunately until now disregarded. Even on the assumption, then,
that difficulties would be attendant on the faithful observance of the return-to-work order, petitioner has nobody to
blame but itself. As far back as April 23, 1968, its obligation was clear. Instead of yielding obedience, it employed
dilatory tactics to delay its implementation. It cannot thereafter just simply fold its hands and assert that it still should
be allowed to persist in conduct marked by obstinacy it could amount, if it were otherwise, to a party benefiting from
its own defiance of a lawful order.
Nor is this the only objection to such a contention reached by petitioner. It could be that it is not fully cognizant of the
pernicious consequences which it would spawn if accorded acceptance. A presidential decree intended to ameliorate
still further the conditions of labor would be subjected to an interpretation not for its benefit but to enable an employer
to continue with a conduct that cannot be characterized as other than a disdainful indifference to a valid order. If, as
seems to be implied in its petition, it is likewise concerned with the fate of the replacements, there is nothing to
prevent it from continuing their employment. That would be, in a way, to atone for its intransigence. What is more, it
would be to accord genuine respect for the intent of Presidential Decree No. 21. What cannot be overemphasized is
that such a decree which has received the imprimatur of the present Constitution 26 is in consonance with the much
more detailed provision therein contained, intended to make a reality of governmental efforts to protect labor. It is
worded thus: "The State shall afford protection to labor, promote full employment and equality in employment, ensure
equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race, or creed, and regulate the relations between workers and
employers. The State shall assure the right of workers to self-organization, collective bargaining, security of tenure,
and just and humane conditions of work. The State may provide for compulsory arbitration." 27
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is dismissed. This decision is executory. Respondent Court should take the
necessary steps to implement this decision with all promptness and dispatch. Costs against petitioner.
1. The other respondents are Philippine Communications Electronics and Electricity Workers’ Federation (PCWF),
Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. Employees Union (RCPIEU), and Special Sheriff of the Court of
Industrial Relations.
26. According to Article XVII, Section 3, paragraph 2 of the present Constitution: "All proclamations, orders, decrees,
instructions, and acts promulgated, issued, or done by the incumbent President shall be part of the law of the land,
and shall remain valid, legal, binding, and effective even after lifting of martial law or the ratification of this
Constitution, unless modified, revoked, or superseded by subsequent proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, or
other acts of the incumbent President, or unless expressly and explicitly modified or repealed by the regular National
Assembly."cralaw virtua1aw library
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-37662 July 15, 1975
RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (RCPI), Petitioner, vs.PHILIPPINE COMMUNICATIONS
ELECTRONICS & ELECTRICITY WORKERS' FEDERATION (FCWF), RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE
PHILIPPINES, INC. EMPLOYEES UNION (RCPIEU), COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS (CIR), and SPECIAL
SHERIFF OF THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
BARREDO, J.:
Three incidents arising from Our decision in this case dated August 30, 1974: (1) Motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioner; (2) Manifestation and motion for intervention ofUnited RCPI Communications Labor Association-Philippine
Association of Free Labor Unions (URCPICLA- PAFLU); and (3) Prayer for a modified judgment filed by respondent
union, Philippine Communications, Electronics & Electricity Workers' Federation, RCPI Employees' Union
(RCPIEU).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Ichanrobles virtual law library
In its motion for reconsideration, petitioner suggests that Our decision did not resolved squarely the issue of whether
or not respondent Industrial Court gravely abused its discretion in declaring petitioner, by its order of February 15,
1973, as having waived its right to make an offer of its evidence and in forthwith considering the matter of the
implementation of the return-to-work order of April 23, 1968 as directed in the writ of execution of December 29,
1969 submitted for resolution. It is claimed that this issue is pivotal, for if it is resolved in its favor, the ordered
reinstatement of the 167 employees and workers enumerated in respondent court's order of October 5, 1973 may
not be complied with until after the issues of fact regarding their identity and status as such workers and employees
have been reviewed and passed upon in the light of the evidence offered by petitioner at the hearing. Petitioner
invokes Section 20 of Commonwealth Act 103 together with this Court's injunction in Ang Tibay vs. CIR, 69 Phil. 365,
that the industrial Court must "use the authorized legal methods of securing evidence and informing itself of acts
material and relevant to the controversy" in seeing to it "that the law is enforced." In other words, petitioner submits
that in ignoring or refusing to take into account evidence already in the record albeit not duly offered, respondent
court sacrificed substance for technicality.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
In this connection, it may be well to bear in mind, that the reasons why respondent court felt compelled to act as it did
are explained in its order of February 15, 1973 thus:
All these aforestated pleadings were set for hearing on January 29, 1973. After the parties made clear their
respective positions on the issues involved, the Court gave the counsel for respondent until February 3, 1973 within
which to submit his offer of exhibits in writing and the counsel for petitioner three (3) days after receipt of the offer in
writing within which to file his objections. Both counsel were also given by the Court ten (10) days from submission of
the objection within which to submit simultaneous memoranda (t. s. n., pp. 2-6, Jan. 29,
1973).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Considering that February 3, 1973, had already lapsed without respondents having as yet submitted its offer of
exhibits, despite the so many chances given to it, there is now valid reason to grant the urgent motion of petitioner.
(Page 58, Rollo.)
As We have said in Our decision, "(a) bare recital of the above facts renders undeniable the far-from-commendable
efforts of petitioner to set at naught a return-to-work order. Considering that it is of a peremptory character and its
execution was long overdue, the challenged actuation of respondent court had all the earmarks of legality." It is not
true then that We have not resolved the issue referred to. Indeed, all that need be added here is that while it is true
132
that labor cases, especially those involving claims for compensation due the workers, must be resolved on the basis
of all material facts, and it is the inescapable duty of all parties concerned, including the court, to disregard all
technical rules in barring 1and discovering them, on the other hand, it is as important that said cases must be decided
on time for the obvious reason that the claimants are not in a position to engage in any long drawn proceedings
without risking either their wherewithal or their convictions. The Courts cannot leave the progress of the case to the
convenience of the parties, particularly, the employer who can afford to keep it dragging. Accordingly, where the
inquiry into the material facts is unreasonably delayed by unwarranted and unexplained actuations of any of the
parties, no abuse of discretion is committed by the court if it deems the right of such offending party to present his
factual side of the issue waived.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
This is particularly true in the case at bar, for, as the record shows, the order of reinstatement which has remained
unobeyed by petitioner to this day was issued morethan seven years ago and was in fact already nearing five years
old when the above-quoted order of February 15, 1973 had to be issued in exasperation by respondent court. The
duty of the court spoken of in Ang Tibay to ferret out all facts necessary for the just determination of the rights of the
parties without regard to technical rules ceases when the court is disabled by the very indifference and inattention, if
not disregard, of a party of the orders of the court designed to expedite proceedings already being protracted through
maneuvers of the same party.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Besides, it is noteworthy that petitioner did not even care to move for the reconsideration of the order in question.
Taking the court for granted, it merely went ahead and made its required offer of evidence, at long last, eighteen
days late. If only to make all and sundry understand that no one can thus trifle with the court with impunity, petitioner
should suffer the consequences of its patent lack of diligence in the protection of its interest which it has coupled with
inexplicable failure to accord the orders of the court due attention, considering it was undertaking a task of vital public
interest, the implementation of a peremptory return-to-work order it had issued five years
back.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
It is of no consequence that respondent union's motion to strike out the offer of evidence belatedly filed by petitioner
was not resolved by respondent court. The fact of the matter is that said offer had already been deemed waived by
the court. Procedurally, therefore, there was no need to strike out something that had not been included legally in the
record.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
In view of the foregoing considerations, and for the reason that the arguments of petitioner relative to Presidential
Decree No. 21 have been more than adequately discussed in Our decision, petitioner's motion is denied for lack of
merit.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
IIchanrobles virtual law library
The motion to intervene of URCPICLA-PAFLU is likewise without merit. Aside from the fact that it had already
intervened in the court below but later on did nothing to protect its pretended rights relative to the orders assailed
here, on the merits, its position suffers from the same fatal defect of the motion for reconsideration of petitioner in
that it is premised on erroneous assumptions regarding the objective and purpose of Presidential Decree No. 21. The
members of movant union were hired or employed by petitioner in open violation of the order of reinstatement of the
Industrial Court and as such they cannot have any legal standing as employees protected by said Presidential
Decree. It would be absurd if an employer were to be required to seek prior clearance from the Department of Labor
before he can layoff workers he has hired as substitutes for strikers subsequently ordered reinstated by the courts,
particularly if the employer has, as in the instant case, hired said substitutes in violation of a restraining order not to
hire anyone without the permission of the court. The motion to intervene is, therefore,
denied.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
IIIchanrobles virtual law library
It is the plea of respondent unions for modification of Our decision that deserves favorable consideration. The prayer
is for Us to include in the judgment an award of backwages to the employees and laborers concerned, in addition to
their immediate reinstatement. The plea is opposed by petitioner upon the ground that the issue of payment of
backwages was neither raised in nor passed upon by the Industrial Court and is, in fact, not even touched in the
previous pleadings of the parties in the instant case. Additionally, it is averred that the matter is now actually being
looked into by the National Labor Relations Board, hence it is not necessary for this Court to take it
up.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
We are of the considered opinion that, indeed, the award prayed for is in order. The fact that nothing was done in the
court below about it is not a valid objection to the granting thereof. Neither can its denial be justified just because it
was not expressly demanded by respondents before Our decision was handed down. Such award is such a logical
and inescapable consequence of the order of reinstatement that actually one is incomplete without the
other.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
We are not dealing here with backwages to be paid to workers who are being ordered reinstated as a consequence
of a finding by the court that their suspension or dismissal by their employer is illegal, which, of course, is dependent
on the sound discretion of the court. (Union of Philippine Education Employees vs. Philippine Education Company,
91 Phil. 93.) In the present instance, what is involved is a failure to comply with, nay a veiled defiance by respondent
of a return-to-work order of the Industrial Court issued seven years ago. Worse, from all appearances, such
continued resistance of petitioner to said peremptory order can hardly evoke sympathy. To begin with, its attempt to
question the identity of those entitled to reinstatement claiming that they were not actually in their employ at the time
of the declaration of the strike sounds hollow. It is inconceivable that strangers and outsiders would try to be taken in
such a surreptitious manner. Neither can the allegation that petitioner has presented evidence of abandonment prior
to the strike and of resignations subsequent thereto be of help to petitioner. Voluntary abandonment of work before a
strike is too unusual to be readily credible whereas purported resignations after a strike and during the pendency of
protracted reinstatement proceedings are at least suspect and do not affect the employee status of the persons
concerned, unless there is patent evidence that the pretended abandonment or resignation was due to another
employment. 2Moreover, the proceedings below had been stalled by transparent dilatory moves of petitioner which
are basically irreconcilable with the attitude of cooperativeness and obedience an employer is expected to maintain
at all times towards orders of the court issued by virtue of powers expressly granted to it by law. (Section 10,
Republic Act 875; Section 19, Commonwealth Act 103.)chanrobles virtual law library
The Industrial Court had no discretion in the matter. There was no controversial issue of fault it had to decide. It was
a plain case of exacting the most natural sanction for a defiance of its order. If it overlooked the award, seemingly
engrossed as it was in resolving the issue of identity of the strikers raised by petitioner, that was plain error which it is
within Our prerogative to correct motu propio, as We do in appeals by writ of error in respect to a manifest error not
assigned nor discussed by appellant in his brief. (Section 7, Rule 51.) Employees and workers deprived of their
means of livelihood in defiance of a judicial order the legality of which is beyond dispute do not have to remind the
court of their right to get compensated of their lost earnings upon their actual reinstatement. Award thereof should
come as a matter of course. For us not to rule on this point now only to leave it for action by the National Labor
Relations Board and thereby give rise to another possible appeal to Us is to unnecessarily lengthen even more the
tortuous road already travelled by respondents in their effort to get what has been rightfully due them since years
ago. We would be recreant to our constitutional duty to give protection to labor that
way.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
IVchanrobles virtual law library
Taking all circumstances of this case into account, We find no justifiable reason why We cannot apply here in respect
to the amount of the award the ruling in Feati University Club vs. Feati University, G. R. No. L-35103, Aug. 15, 1974,
wherein We said:
As to the amount of backwages, the Court applies the precedent recently set inMercury Drug Co. vs. CIR (L-23357,
April 30, 1974, applied in NASSCO vs. CIR, L-31852 & L-32724, June 28, 1974 and Almira, et al vs. B. F. Goodrich
Phil., Inc., L-34974, July 25, 1974.) of fixing the amount of backwages to a just and reasonable level without
qualification or deduction so as to avoid protracted delay in the execution of the award for backwages due to
extended hearings and unavoidable delays and difficulties encountered in determining the earnings of the laid-off
employees ordered to be reinstated with backwages during the pendency of the case for purposes of deducting the
same from the gross backwages awarded.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
As has been noted, this formula of awarding reasonable net backwages without deduction or qualification relieves
the employees from proving or disproving their earnings during their lay-off and the employers from submitting
counterproofs, and obviates the twin evils of idleness on the part of the employee who would "with folded arms,
133
remain inactive in the expectation that a windfall would come to him" (Itogon Suyoc Mines, Inc. vs. Sangilo-Itogon
Workers Union, 24 SCRA 873 (1968), cited in Diwa ng Pagkakaisa vs. Filtex International Corp., 43 SCRA 287
(1972) per Makalintal, now C.J.) and attrition and protracted delay in satisfying such award on the part of
unscrupulous employers who have seized upon the further proceedings to determine the actual earnings of the
wrongfully dismissed or laid-off employees to hold unduly extended hearings for each and every employee awarded
backwages and thereby render practically nugatory such award and compel the employees to agree to
unconscionable settlements of their backwages award in order to satisfy their dire need. See La Campana Food
Products, Inc. vs. CIR, 28 SCRA 314 (1969) and Kaisahan ng Mga Manggagawa vs. La Campana Food Products,
Inc., 36 SCRA 142 (1970).
This formula of making a flat award for a given period has been adopted in subsequent cases. 3Accordingly, each of
the 167 members of respondent unions named in the decision under review and found by the Industrial Court to be
entitled to reinstatement should be paid backwages for two years, without any deduction or qualification, at the
respective rates of compensation they were receiving at the time of the strike, November 17, 1967. It goes without
saying that all those who can be shown by incontestible evidence to have died prior to the date of the strike shall be
disregarded, but the heirs of those who have died after the strike shall receive the respective proportional amounts
due their predecessors-in-interest as of the time of death, if the same occurred less than two years from the date of
the strike, and the full two-years backwages, if after two years from said date. Any amount paid by reason or on the
occasion of supposed resignations after the strike shall not be deducted.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library
Before closing, it must be mentioned that the Court understands that notwithstanding that its decision of August 30,
1974 is immediately executory, the employees concerned have not yet been reinstated up to now. Petitioner is
warned that the pendency of the present incidents is no excuse for its failure to comply immediately with said
decision and appropriate action would have to be taken to protect the dignity of the court, if such attitude
continues.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration of petitioner dated September 16, 1974 as well as the motion to
intervene of URCPICLA-PAFLU of October 16, 1974 are both denied for lack of merit. On the other hand, the motion
of respondent RCPIEU of November 6, 1974 for modification of judgment is granted, if only to complete Our
decision, which cannot be final without such award being included therein. Petitioner is ordered to pay the 167
employees and workers of petitioner enumerated in the lndustrial Court's order of October 5,1973 backwages for two
years, without any deduction or qualification, pursuant to the tenor of the above opinion. This resolution is also
immediately executory.
Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, J., concurring:chanrobles virtual law library
It has been observed, and not without justification, that the solution of labor controversies taxes to the utmost the
ingenuity courts and arbiters for what may serve to do justice in the instance may later prove to be inconvenient of
later application analogous fact situations. For in no other kind of litigation is there a greater need for sizing up
situations, very often unique in character and thus not likely to repeat themselves. Care is to be taken therefore that
while the conclusion reached in any litigation with its essentially peculiar circumstances may commend itself, the
doctrine announced does not deviate from the main stream of juristic thought. It is to the credit of the opinion of
Justice Barredo that there is adherence to prescribed norms governing labor-management relations. It is impressed
with an even greater significance for it manifests in no uncertain terms that this Court is not likely to tolerate such
conduct as that displayed by petitioner when all these past years it persistently refused to obey respondent Court's
order for immediate reinstatement. Such intransigence is unjustified even if sought to be cloaked under a claim of a
denial of procedural due process. Such behavior is antithetical to the rule of law. What was stressed in Philippine
Associations ofFree Labor Unions v. Salvador 1comes to mind. Thus: "Law stands for order, for the peaceful and
systematic adjustment of frictions and conflicts unavoidable in a modern society with its complexities and clashing
interests. The instrumentality for such balancing or harmonization is the judiciary and other agencies exercising
quasi-judicial powers. When judicial or quasi-judicial tribunals speak, what they decree must be obeyed, what they
ordain must be followed. A party dissatisfied may ask for a reconsideration and, if denied, may go on to a higher
tribunal. As long as the orders stand unmodified however, they must, even if susceptible to well-founded doubts on
jurisdictional grounds, be faithfully complied with. 2At the very least, petitioner ought to have complied if not at the first
opportunity, after it was notified of our decision promulgated on August 30, 1974. 3It did not turn out that way. Our
resolution then appropriately takes it to task. I concur and add a few words.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
1. At the outset, may I refer to what led our Division to assign another member to pen the resolution, when the usual
practice is for the ponente to speak for the Tribunal in passing upon a motion for reconsideration. As set forth by
Justice Barredo in his opening paragraph, three pleadings were filed after the promulgation of our judgment: (1) the
motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner, (2) the manifestation and motion for intervention of United RCPI
Communications Labor Association, and (3) the motion for modification of the decision filed by respondent union.
The points of law raised did call for further study. The allegation of denial of procedural due process has had to be
inquired into, even if impressed at the most with deceptive plausibility. As is made clear in the resolution, it could not
survive the test of a rigorous analysis. What is more, it was previously considered and rejected as set forth in Justice
Barredo's opinion. Nonetheless, several sessions were devoted to considering the motion for intervention and the
modification of the decision. When a consensus was reached, it was apparent that the approach followed by Justice
Barredo was the focal point on which all could agree. It was deemed best therefore for him to speak for the rest of
us.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
2. It is readily apparent that with insistence of petitioner on the claim of an alleged denial of procedural due process
being indicative not so much of reliance on applicable precedents but as a further excuse for delay, what did call for
further reflection was the motion to intervene of a union representing the temporary employees of petitioner and the
plea for the implementation of the decision rendered so that an award of backwages be granted. Candor compels the
admission that there were some misgivings on my part as to the possible adverse consequences to the former set of
workers once the order for reinstatement is implemented. If it were a case solely of management being made to bear
the burden for failure to implement an order of respondent Court, then no problem arises. It was its fault and it had no
one else to blame. Certainly it could and should be held accountable. Nonetheless, as pointed out in our resolution,
the temporary labor force ought to have been aware of the transitory character of their employment. At any rate, I do
not think that our resolution can be construed to mean any loss of whatever contractual right may have been entered
by them with petitioner. That is a matter which to my mind is not covered by what is decided today. It is in that sense
that for me there is no possible objection to the ground that the protection to labor is less than it should be 4or the
principle of social justice is disregarded. 5On this point, what for me is most creditable in our resolution is that the
long-suffering employees and laborers, who in the past had been battling in vain against the wall of resistance put up
by petitioner, would at long last receive their due. Once again, there is fealty to the concept of a compassionate
society which is even more marked under the present Constitution. 6Also, from the constitutional standpoint, that is to
render clear that in appropriate cases, the declaration of principles and state policies 7have a mandatory force of their
own and are not just mere statements of noble platitudes or glittering generalities unrelated to
reality.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
3. One last word. There is, of course, the expectation that counsel should employ all the energies at one's command
in the defense of the rights of his clients. His zeal is to be commended. He will not be true to his calling if such
qualities are lacking in his advocacy. Nonetheless, there should be awareness likewise that at a certain stage in
litigation, the appropriate course, as a matter of fact the only course, is to defer to an order of an inferior court or
administrative agency unless duly set aside. The rule of law, to repeat, cannot be satisfied with anything less. Nor is
there any justification for a member of the bar indiscriminately seizing upon any doctrine that might at most yield a
colorable appearance of validity to a legal argument, so that his client would have no reason to feel that he is less
than wholehearted in his handling of a case. The honor of the profession requires that on matters of law, it is a client
who should yield to the lawyer and not the other way around.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
There is on my part, to repeat, full agreement with what has been so ably and clearly said by Justice
Barredo.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, J., concurring:
134
It has been observed, and not without justification, that the solution of labor controversies taxes to the utmost the
ingenuity courts and arbiters for what may serve to do justice in the instance may later prove to be inconvenient of
later application analogous fact situations. For in no other kind of litigation is there a greater need for sizing up
situations, very often unique in character and thus not likely to repeat themselves. Care is to be taken therefore that
while the conclusion reached in any litigation with its essentially peculiar circumstances may commend itself, the
doctrine announced does not deviate from the main stream of juristic thought. It is to the credit of the opinion of
Justice Barredo that there is adherence to prescribed norms governing labor-management relations. It is impressed
with an even greater significance for it manifests in no uncertain terms that this Court is not likely to tolerate such
conduct as that displayed by petitioner when all these past years it persistently refused to obey respondent Court's
order for immediate reinstatement. Such intransigence is unjustified even if sought to be cloaked under a claim of a
denial of procedural due process. Such behavior is antithetical to the rule of law. What was stressed in Philippine
Associations ofFree Labor Unions v. Salvador 1comes to mind. Thus: "Law stands for order, for the peaceful and
systematic adjustment of frictions and conflicts unavoidable in a modern society with its complexities and clashing
interests. The instrumentality for such balancing or harmonization is the judiciary and other agencies exercising
quasi-judicial powers. When judicial or quasi-judicial tribunals speak, what they decree must be obeyed, what they
ordain must be followed. A party dissatisfied may ask for a reconsideration and, if denied, may go on to a higher
tribunal. As long as the orders stand unmodified however, they must, even if susceptible to well-founded doubts on
jurisdictional grounds, be faithfully complied with. 2At the very least, petitioner ought to have complied if not at the first
opportunity, after it was notified of our decision promulgated on August 30, 1974. 3It did not turn out that way. Our
resolution then appropriately takes it to task. I concur and add a few words.chanrobles virtual law library
1. At the outset, may I refer to what led our Division to assign another member to pen the resolution, when the usual
practice is for the ponente to speak for the Tribunal in passing upon a motion for reconsideration. As set forth by
Justice Barredo in his opening paragraph, three pleadings were filed after the promulgation of our judgment: (1) the
motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner, (2) the manifestation and motion for intervention of United RCPI
Communications Labor Association, and (3) the motion for modification of the decision filed by respondent union.
The points of law raised did call for further study. The allegation of denial of procedural due process has had to be
inquired into, even if impressed at the most with deceptive plausibility. As is made clear in the resolution, it could not
survive the test of a rigorous analysis. What is more, it was previously considered and rejected as set forth in Justice
Barredo's opinion. Nonetheless, several sessions were devoted to considering the motion for intervention and the
modification of the decision. When a consensus was reached, it was apparent that the approach followed by Justice
Barredo was the focal point on which all could agree. It was deemed best therefore for him to speak for the rest of
us.chanrobles virtual law library
2. It is readily apparent that with insistence of petitioner on the claim of an alleged denial of procedural due process
being indicative not so much of reliance on applicable precedents but as a further excuse for delay, what did call for
further reflection was the motion to intervene of a union representing the temporary employees of petitioner and the
plea for the implementation of the decision rendered so that an award of backwages be granted. Candor compels the
admission that there were some misgivings on my part as to the possible adverse consequences to the former set of
workers once the order for reinstatement is implemented. If it were a case solely of management being made to bear
the burden for failure to implement an order of respondent Court, then no problem arises. It was its fault and it had no
one else to blame. Certainly it could and should be held accountable. Nonetheless, as pointed out in our resolution,
the temporary labor force ought to have been aware of the transitory character of their employment. At any rate, I do
not think that our resolution can be construed to mean any loss of whatever contractual right may have been entered
by them with petitioner. That is a matter which to my mind is not covered by what is decided today. It is in that sense
that for me there is no possible objection to the ground that the protection to labor is less than it should be 4or the
principle of social justice is disregarded. 5On this point, what for me is most creditable in our resolution is that the
long-suffering employees and laborers, who in the past had been battling in vain against the wall of resistance put up
by petitioner, would at long last receive their due. Once again, there is fealty to the concept of a compassionate
society which is even more marked under the present Constitution.6Also, from the constitutional standpoint, that is to
render clear that in appropriate cases, the declaration of principles and state policies 7have a mandatory force of their
own and are not just mere statements of noble platitudes or glittering generalities unrelated to reality.chanrobles
virtual law library
3. One last word. There is, of course, the expectation that counsel should employ all the energies at one's command
in the defense of the rights of his clients. His zeal is to be commended. He will not be true to his calling if such
qualities are lacking in his advocacy. Nonetheless, there should be awareness likewise that at a certain stage in
litigation, the appropriate course, as a matter of fact the only course, is to defer to an order of an inferior court or
administrative agency unless duly set aside. The rule of law, to repeat, cannot be satisfied with anything less. Nor is
there any justification for a member of the bar indiscriminately seizing upon any doctrine that might at most yield a
colorable appearance of validity to a legal argument, so that his client would have no reason to feel that he is less
than wholehearted in his handling of a case. The honor of the profession requires that on matters of law, it is a client
who should yield to the lawyer and not the other way around.chanrobles virtual law library
There is on my part, to repeat, full agreement with what has been so ably and clearly said by Justice Barredo.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-39174 May 7, 1976
JACKBILT CONCRETE BLOCK CO., INC. and ALBERT GOLDEN, Petitioners, vs. NORTON& HARRISON CO.
and JACKBILT CONCRETE BLOCK CO. LABOR UNION-NLU and COURT OF INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS, Respondents.
G.R. No. L-39186 May 7, 1976
NORTON & HARRISON CO., INC., Petitioner, vs. NORTON & HARRISON CO. and JACKBILT CONCRETE
BLOCK CO. LABOR UNION-NLU and COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, Respondents.
Petitions for review on certiorari of the Order of the Court of Industrial Relations dated December 18, 1973, and its
Resolution en banc dated July 31, 1974, both issued in its Case No. 1799-ULP.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
The factual background, common to both petitions in these two cases, is as follows: chanrobles virtual law library
In Norton & Harrison Co. & Jackbilt Concrete Block Co. Labor Union (NLU) vs. Norton & Harrison Co. & Jackbilt
Concrete Block Co., Inc. and Albert Golden, L-18461, promulgated on February 10, 1967, 19 SCRA 310, this Court,
in deciding the case ordered the respondents company and manager "to reinstate, without back wages, Jaime
Arcaina and the strikers of the union who offered to return to work on October 23, 1958, the reinstatement to be
made, in both cases, sixty days after the finality of this Court's decision herein." chanrobles virtual law library
The respondents company and manager in the aforecited case, now petitioners in the cases at bar, were absolved
from the charge of the union of unfair labor practice. However, the strikers of the union were ordered reinstated, but
without backwages, on the ground that the strike was resorted to in good faith in the belief that the managements of
the herein company-petitioners committed unfair labor practice. Said this Court in the aforesaid case:
So, also, in this case, the act of the company in dismissing Arcaina done without the required fair hearing, and,
therefore, not tenable even under strict legal ground, induced the union and its members to believe that said
company was guilty of unfair practice, altho viewed now in retrospect said act would fall short of unfair labor practice.
Since the strike of the union was in response to what it was warranted in believing in good faith to be unfair labor
practice on the part of the management, said strike, following the Ferrer ruling, did not result in the termination of the
striking members' status as employees, and, therefore, they are still entitled to reinstatement but without back
wages. (Norton & Harrison Co., etc. vs. Norton & Harrison, etc., et al., supra, 19 SCRA 310, 315).
In a motion for clarification of the decision in G.R. No. L-18461, supra, (Annex "A" of both Petitions) herein petitioners
informed this Court that they cannot accommodate and/or reinstate all the strikers, numbering about 170, without
causing a dislocation in their business and plant operations because of the automation and modernization of their
plant, which caused the reduction of the number of their employees from 228 as of October 31, 1958, to only 122 on
June 9, 1967. Herein petitioners claim that only 122 employees are required to operate, at full capacity, their
135
modernized and automated plant including the carrying out of their usual business operations; that the number of
122 employees include 35 former strikers who returned to work during the strike, 85 replacements hired during the
strike and 2 former company guards who were reassigned to other duties; that out of the 85 replacements, 70 of
them occupied positions which were held before by the strikers; that even if the services of the 70 employees
occupying positions held before by the strikers be terminated, still the strikers cannot all be accommodated and
reinstated; and that the strikers before they be reinstated should undergo the required usual physical and medical
examinations by herein petitioners' company physician, to determine their fitness for continued work and
employment.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
In a resolution dated June 20, 1967, (Annex "B", and "A-1", of the Petitions, respectively) this Court denied the
motion for clarification, which reads as follows:
Acting on respondents' motion for clarification in L-18461 (Norton & Harrison Co., etc., Labor Union vs. Norton &
Harrison Co., et al.) the Court, considering that: (1) all the matters therein brought to the attention of the Court have
allegedly taken place during the pendency of the appeal and yet they are raised only now after the decision has been
rendered herein; (2) it is not fair to reconsider the decision so as to render the strikers' right to reinstatement
dependent upon the employers' choice to abolish their positions allegedly due to operational changes that were not
seasonably invoked herein; (3) the decision is not in need of clarification; rather facts allegedly pertinent to its
execution are sought to be advanced; (4) the Court of Industrial Relations is in charge of the execution of the final
judgment of this Court; and (5) the request may be presented to the Court of Industrial Relations, submitting the
alleged facts mentioned in the motion for clarification for the purpose of determining their actual existence, without in
any way authorizing the Court of Industrial Relations to amend the Supreme Court's decision, to see how the same
could be executed, RESOLVED, to DENY said motion.
In the interim, respondent union filed with the Court of Industrial Relations two (2) motions dated October 9, 1967
and December 4, 1967, respectively, (Annexes "B" and "C", Petition of Norton & Harrison Co., Inc.) alleging that after
the Supreme Court's decision in G.R. No. L-18461, supra, had become final and executory, the union member-
strikers presented themselves for work and reinstatement with the herein petitioning companies on September 7,
1967, but were not accepted. Because of this, the union prays for the issuance of an order directing the company-
petitioners to accept in their employ its member-strikers and to pay them backwages from September 7, 1967, the
date the strikers presented themselves for work, up to the date they are
reinstated.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Petitioners interposed their opposition to the motions (see Annex "D", Petition of Norton & Harrison Co., Inc.) and
therein attached a copy of their motion for clarification, which has been the subject of a resolution of this Court under
date of June 20, 1967, supra, and submitted the same for the consideration and determination by the respondent
Court of Industrial Relations of the actual existence of the facts therein mentioned in consonance with the aforestated
resolution of this Court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
In the course of the hearings of the two afore-mentioned motions of the labor union and the opposition filed by herein
petitioners, the respondent Industrial Court issued three (3) orders dated March 23, 1970, June 16, 1970 and August
10, 1970, respectively, (Annexes "E", "F" and "G", Petition of Norton & Harrison Co., Inc.) directing the union
member-strikers listed therein to report for work with the herein company-petitioners and for the latter companies to
accept them back to work within the period given by the trial court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
Pursuant to the lower court's order of March 23, 1970, only 37 union strikers reported for work and were reinstated
by petitioner Jackbilt Concrete Blocks Co., Inc. out of the 70 strikers listed therein and in the case of the other
petitioner Norton & Harrison Co., Inc., only 14 out of the 22 strikers listed and previously working with the said
company, presented themselves for work. The rest of the strikers listed in the order of March 23, 1970 either ignored
or disobeyed said order. Of the strikers who reported for work with the company-petitioners, some have either not
submitted for medical examinations as required and did not report back anymore, or after having undergone medical
examinations, did not report back for work, or after reporting back did not continue working anymore and the others
were found suffering from tuberculosis and unfit for work at the time. Those found suffering from tuberculosis were
advised to report back for work assignment as soon as they are cured and declared physically fit for work. Those
who were found already suffering from tuberculosis when the strike was declared were paid workmen's
compensation benefits.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Pursuant to the June 16, 1970 Order of the court a quo, 44 out of the 60 strikers therein listed reported for work and
reinstatement. The rest did not report for work. Of those who reported for work, 14 of them were found suffering
tuberculosis and other sickness and as such were not physically fit for work. Thus only 30 were found fit for work, but
4 of them, however, subsequently left their work.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Under the last order of reinstatement dated August 10, 1970, all the 33 strikers mentioned therein reported for work.
But 16 of them, however, were found suffering from tuberculosis and other illness which rendered them physically
unfit for work, and as usual they were advised by the company-petitioners to report for work assignment when they
were recovered from their sickness.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Petitioners, now therefore, claim that by virtue of the three (3) orders of reinstatement above-mentioned, the
respondent Court of Industrial Relations has already complied with and has so implemented the decision and
resolution of this Court in L-18461, supra, regarding the reinstatement of the striking members of the herein
respondent union who offered to return to work on October 23, 1958, without backwages. Thus, the order of the
court a quo dated December 28, 1973, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows, -
WHEREFORE, the two motions dated October 9, 1967 and December 4, 1967 are hereby resolved in accordance
with the foregoing dispositions and respondents (now petitioners) are hereby ordered to pay the backwages of the
members of the complainant union listed in the two foregoing motions starting from September 2, 1967 (should read
September 7, 1967 per Resolution en banc of the Industrial Court dated July 31, 1974) up to the time they were
ordered reinstated by the Court on its Orders respectively dated March 23, 1970, June 16, 1970 and August 10,
1970.
came as a surprise to the herein petitioners, according to them. And so, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration
of the said order but the same was denied in a resolution en banc dated July 31, 1974, which reads as follows:
Respondent companies, through their respective counsel, in separate motions, seek reconsideration of the Order of
the Trial Court dated December 28, 1973. Complainant union likewise filed a "Motion for Clarification" on January 14,
1974, which in form and substance is a motion for reconsideration of the same
Order.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Respondents raised several grounds in support of their respective motions, but the Court en banc finds no merit in
the same. The disposition of the Trial Court, however, deserves a little discussion, i.e., the award of backwages to
the members of complainant union, listed in the two motions of complainant dated October 9, 1967, and December
4, 1967, respectively, starting from September 2, 1967, up to the time they were ordered reinstated by the Court in its
Orders, respectively dated March 23, 1970, June 16, 1970 and August 10,
1970.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
It will be noted that on February 10, 1967, in G.R. No. L-18461, the Supreme Court ordered the reinstatement of
Jaime Arcaina and the other strikers, without backwages, sixty days after the finality of the Court's decision. Thus,
the employees involved, named in complainant's two motions aforementioned, presented themselves for work on
September 7, 1967, but were not admitted by respondents.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Respondents contend that at the time the employees involved reported for work, they could not have been admitted
because their motion for clarification was then still pending resolution by this Court. This stand cannot be sustained
for the reason that the Supreme court, in resolving the respondents' motion for clarification on June 20, 1967,
explicitly ruled that this Court cannot in any way amend the Supreme Court's decision of February 10, 1967,
aforementioned. Thus, having suffered loss of wages from the date they presented themselves for work on
September 7, 1967, and were refused, the employees involved are therefore, entitled to compensation from that date
up to the time they were ordered reinstated by the Court in its Orders respectively dated March 23, 1970, June 16,
1970 and August 10, 1970.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Concerning the motion filed by complainant, the Court en banc finds no merit in the
same.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
136
The date September 2, 1967, appearing in the dispositive portion of the Order of the Trial Court sought to be
reconsidered is a clerical error and should be corrected and changed to September 7,
1967.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
WHEREFORE, let the aforementioned motions for reconsideration be, as they are hereby DENIED.
Hence these petitions for review on certiorari.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Petitioners, in their respective briefs, maintain that, (1) the Court of Industrial Relations erred in ordering them to pay
backwages to their respective striker-employees; (2) the Court of Industrial Relations erred in giving the striking
employees who did not comply with the three (3) orders of reinstatement another period of thirty (30) days within
which to still report for work; and (3) the Court of Industrial Relations erred in granting the strikers found unfit for work
because of pulmonary tuberculosis and other illness the right to separation pay and in awarding them
backwages.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Petitioners contend that the Industrial Court erred in ordering them to pay backwages to the union member-strikers
because the Supreme Court's decision in L-18461, supra was explicit in that it provided only for reinstatement
without backwages. The lower court even violated the June 20, 1967 resolution in L-18461, supra, which in effect
ordered the Industrial Court to determine the actual existence of the alleged facts mentioned in petitioners' motion for
clarification, and which states, "without in any way authorizing the Court of Industrial Relations to amend the
Supreme Court's decision, to see how the same could be executed ... " Yet the court a quo did not make any finding
on the actual existence of the facts mentioned in the motion for clarification; neither did it make any finding that the
facts therein mentioned did not at all exist. Petitioners insist that the evidence which they have presented to the trial
court proved that there was actual modernization and automation of their business operations which resulted in the
reduction of their labor force, thus rendering the reinstatement of all the strikers impossible. The impossibility of
reinstating all the strikers, petitioners contend, did not in any way empower the lower court to then and there amend
the Supreme Court's decision by awarding backwages to the strikers. Petitioners further avert that the three (3)
orders of reinstatement of the lower court did not provide for backwages, which the respondent union failed to
question at all, thus allowing said orders to become final and are, therefore, no longer subject to alteration or
amendment. Accordingly, the respondent Industrial Court acted in excess of its authority and with grave abuse of
discretion when it not only amended the Supreme Court's decision in said L-18461, but also modified its final orders
of reinstatement by awarding backwages to the strikers in its questioned order of December 28, 1973, and
resolution en banc of July 31, 1974.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Petitioners likewise contend that the Court of Industrial Relations erred in giving the strikers who did not comply with
the three (3) reinstatement orders "another chance to return to work" within the period of "30 days from receipt by
their counsel" of the order under question for the reasons that the three (3) reinstatement orders had long become
final when the order under question was issued; that the strikers concerned violated the reinstatement orders and to
give them a chance to report for work anew would be giving them premium for their defiance and violation of the
orders reinstating them to their respective jobs; that there is evidence that the strikers concerned were already
employed elsewhere as they 'are no longer interested in their reinstatement, no petition to that effect having been
filed by them. Petitioners maintain that the strikers concerned should have been declared to have forfeited their right
to reinstatement as what the respondent court had done with the strikers "who presented themselves in accordance
with the return to work Orders issued by the Court but did not submit to medical and physical examinations and did
not report back to work, or after undergoing such examinations did not continue working despite notices to them ... ."
Petitioners theorize that these strikers concerned, who did not even go through the motion of reporting for work, were
in a much worse situation than the strikers who presented themselves for work assignment, and therefore, reasons
and logic dictate that their right to reinstatement should have likewise been declared forfeited, chanrobles virtual law
library
On the third assignment of error, petitioners maintain that the grant of separation pay is proper only in cases where
there is termination of employment, which is not the situation in the case at bar. The services of the strikers found
unfit for work because of tuberculosis and other illness were not terminated, but that said strikers were advised to
report back for work as soon as they have recovered from their illness and upon proof that they are physically fit for
work. Thus, petitioners reason out, the strikers concerned were charitably given a chance to rest and to recover from
their illness. No termination or dismissal was ever made, Besides, petitioners contend that voluntary termination is
never covered by the Termination Pay Law, and in this particular case, no separation pay should be given to the
strikers concerned who would want their employment voluntary terminated as what the respondent court would want
them to do. Said the respondent court in its questioned order of December 28, 1973.
The evidence shows, however, that they were advised by the respondents to report back for work as soon as they
have recovered from their illness and that upon proof that they are physically fit for work, they would be accepted.
The Court, however, finds it equitable to grant them in lieu of recall the option to elect voluntary termination in which
case they shall be entitled to separation pay equivalent to one-half month pay for every year of actual
service.(Emphasis supplied).
Furthermore, petitioners aver that the respondent court, in awarding the strikers concerned separation pay and
backpay, acted merely on the assumption that the said strikers were physically fit for work when they reported for
work on September 7, 1967, up to the dates the three (3) orders of reinstatement were issued, considering the
absence of evidence presented by the strikers on their sound physical
condition.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
I chanrobles virtual law library
We sustain the view of the petitioners that the court a quo, in granting and ... awarding backwages to the strikers in
its order of December 28, 1973, had amended the judgment of this Court in G.R. No. L-18461. The final verdict of
this Court in L-18461 was explicit-"reinstatement but without backwages", in view of the absence of a finding that
herein company-petitioners (respondents in that case) were guilty of unfair labor practice. Had it not been for the
Court's adherence to the ruling in the Ferrer case (17 SCRA 352), reinstatement would not have been available to
the strikers. But this, certainly, is the better view than the Interwood Employees Association vs. International
Hardwood & Veneer Company of the Philippines (Interwood), L-7409, May 18, 1956, 99 Phil. 82, 88 and Lusteveco
Employees Association-CCLU et al., vs. Luzon Stevedoring Co., et al., L-18681, May 19, 1966, 17 SCRA 65, cases
where this Court held that the belief of the strikers in good faith that they were striking because of a legitimate or real
grievance against the management is immaterial, because what the strikers had in mind or believed in good faith at
the time they struck can hardly be refuted, rebutted or disproved.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
The court a quo, therefore, exceeded its authority in seeing to it that the decision of this Court should be executed,
"without in any way authorizing the Court of Industrial Relations to amend" the same, there being no showing of
unjust refusal on the part of altho herein petitioners to reinstate their striker-employees. To rule otherwise, in the face
of the uncontroverted automation and modernization of the business operations of the petitioners, would be
tantamount to exacting compliance with the impossible, unjust, or inequitable (City of Butuan vs. Ortiz, et al., 3 SCRA
659; Philippine Engineering Corporation vs. CIR, et al., 41 SCRA 89), and thus making Our decisions to hang in the
precipice of uncertainty or to remain on the brink of disaster.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
IIchanrobles virtual law library
We are also of the opinion and so hold that the strikers who failed, without proper justification, to report for work
assignment despite the issuance of the orders reinstating them to their job are deemed to have forfeited their right to
reinstatement. Their unexplained failure to request for another period or an extended period within which to comply
with the reinstatement orders and report back for work militate against them.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
In East Asiatic Co., Ltd., et al. vs. CIR, et al., G.R. No. L-29068, August 31, 1971, 40 SCRA 521, this Court had
occasion to rule that the failure to report for work when one had the opportunity to do so waived thereby his right to
reinstatement. Because of the apparent lack of interest of the strikers concerned as shown by their failure to report
for work without justifiable reason with the petitioners herein, We are constrained to declare them to have forfeited
their right to reinstatement.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
IIIchanrobles virtual law library
Likewise, We sustain the view of the petitioners that the court a quo erred in granting separation pay to the strikers
found unfit for work because of pulmonary tuberculosis and other illness considering that the services of the said
137
strikers were not actually terminated. What is on the record is the fact that the said strikers were advised by the
petitioners to report back for work as soon as they have recovered from their illness and upon proof that they are
physically fit for work, and they shall all be accepted.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The Termination Pay Law, R.A. No. 1052, as amended, requires payment of separation pay or termination pay only
in cases wherein a covered employer dismisses or terminates in its employ an employee without just cause or
advance notice. In the instant case, the employees concerned went on strike on the belief that an unfair labor
practice was committed against them by the petitioners. It was not, however, established that the petitioners did
commit any unfair labor practice. On the contrary, the petitioners were absolved of the charge of unfair labor practice.
Furthermore, the record of the case is bereft of any showing of the soundness of the physical condition of the strikers
concerned when they reported back for work with the petitioners on September 7,
1967.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
It has been held by this Court, in the recent case of Mercury Drug Co., Inc., et al. vs. CIR, et al., L-23357, April 30,
1974, 56 SCRA 694, that an employer should not be compelled to reinstate an employee who is no longer physically
fit for the job from which he was ousted. However, the employee can be reinstated after securing a certification of his
physical fitness from a government physician. * chanrobles virtual law library
WHEREFORE, the order and resolution of the court a quo dated December 28, 1973 and July 31, 1974,
respectively, are hereby ordered set aside insofar as the award of backwages, the grant of another period for the
strikers to report back for work, and the grant of separation pay are concerned. The petitioners are, however,
directed to immediately reinstate the strikers formerly found to have been suffering from tuberculosis and other
illness upon presentation by them of certification of their physical fitness for work by a government
physician.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
No pronouncement as to costs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 116128 July 12, 1996
ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONSCOMMISSION, HON. JOSE G.
DE VERA, ALLIED BANKING EMPLOYEES UNION NUBE, et.al., Respondents.
For review in these consolidated petitions is the Decision, dated May 20, 1994, of the National Labor Relations
Commission as well as its Order, dated July 8, 1994, in NLRC NCR Case No. 004005-92 and NLRC NCR Case No.
00316-92.
In its petition, 1 the Bank questions the latter portion of the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) wherein it remanded to the Labor Arbiter the issue of whether or not the forty-one (41) respondents are
entitled to back wages corresponding to the period that they should have been reinstated since 1986, pursuant to the
guideline stated in our Resolution, dated May 4, 1988.
Respondents, on the other hand, contend in their petition 2 that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in affirming
the validity of their dismissal by the Bank.
The dispute between petitioner and respondent Union started when their collective bargaining agreement which was
to expire on June 30, 1984 came up for renewal. They failed to reach an amicable settlement particularly on the
wage increase issue. Respondent Union thereupon filed a notice of strike with the Bureau of Labor Relations.
On December 16, 1984, then Minister of Labor and Employment, Blas Ople assumed jurisdiction over the dispute
pursuant to Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended. The orders enjoined the Union from
declaring a strike and the management from effecting a lock out. 3 The orders notwithstanding, respondent Union
nevertheless filed on December 20, 1984, a report on the results of the strike vote that it earlier conducted. On
January 3, 1985, respondent Union staged a strike upon the Union president's contention that the Labor Minister's
assumption order was a mere scrap of paper.
On January 4, 1985, petitioner filed with the Ministry of Labor and Employment a Manifestation and Urgent Motion
praying for a return-to-work order. On January 6, 1985, Minister Ople granted the motion and issued a return-to-work
order which included a P1,000.00 grant per employee chargeable to future CBA benefits.
In an Order, issued on January 18, 1985, Minister Ople directed the parties to continue negotiations until January 31,
1985; otherwise, if no compromise agreement is reached, he will personally resolve the bargaining deadlock.
The parties failed to break the deadlock and so, Minister Ople issued an Order, dated January 31, 1985, directing
them to incorporate in their collective agreement the awards granted. 4
On February 11, 1985, "certain members of the Union resumed the strike and, on the following days, acts of violence
were committed . . . resulting in the filing of criminal charges against some of the strikers." 5 Petitioner identified
these "certain members of the Union," numbering 271, the respondents included.
Petitioner, through notices published in the Bulletin Today, the Times Journal, and the Daily Express, directed the
striking employees to return to work not later than 1:00 p.m. of February 13, 1985.
In spite of these notices, respondents failed to report for work on the stated deadline. Respondents explained that
the resumption of their picketing activities was brought about by their belief that Minister Ople's decision, dated
January 31, 1985, was not based on justice, equity and reason.
Private respondent's posture of intransigence caused petitioner to issue notices of their termination.
Meeting the Union demands halfway, Minister Ople, on March 7, 1985, issued a Resolution modifying his January
31, 1985 Order and so the union lifted its picket lines and notified petitioner, on March 11, 1985, that the striking
employees were returning back to work. Petitioner refused to accept them back on the ground that the strikers have
already been dismissed for abandonment of work when they failed to obey the assumption order.
In order to quell further dispute, Minister Ople, on June 5, 1985, issued an Order which directed the bank to reinstate
provisionally all striking workers except (a) those who have already accepted their separation pay; (b) officers of the
union; and (c) those with pending criminal charges.
The Union then filed with us a petition for certiorari, with a prayer for the issuance of a preliminary mandatory
injunction, docketed as G.R. No. 71239. In the said petition, the union asked that the June 5, 1985 Order of Minister
Ople be modified to likewise direct the reinstatement of all union officers, employees with pending criminal cases and
employees who have received their separation pay with full back wages, emergency cost of living allowance
(ECOLA) and employee benefits counted from March 8, 1985 until actually reinstated. In a Resolution, dated June
18, 1986, we remanded the petition to the Ministry of Labor and Employment, with the instruction to resolve all
pending factual and legal issues relative to the petition.
On August 29, 1986, Minister Augusto Sanchez, the successor of Minister Ople, modified the last Order of the latter
by order the reinstatement of all striking employees, except those who have already accepted their separation pay.
The bank, as a consequence, filed a petition with the Supreme Court, docketed as G.R. No. 75749, to nullify the
aforesaid Order.
In amplification of our Resolution of September 15, 1986, we issued in G.R. No. 75749 the following Resolution,
dated May 4, 1988:
138
In a resolution dated September 15, 1986 in G.R. No. 75749, the Court issued "a Temporary Restraining Order"
enjoining enforcement of the August 29, 1986 order of the Minister of Labor and Employment only insofar as it
directs the payment of back wages, allowances, and other benefits due to the private respondents effective March
11, 1985 until their actual reinstatement. Considering, however, the financial plight of some of the private
respondents, the Court further Resolved to order the petitioner to advance the equivalent of two (2) months salary to
each of the private respondents entitled to reinstatement under the MOLE order, said amount to be repaid to the
petitioner or charged to accumulated back wages depending on the final outcome of this case' (p. 64, Rollo). A
motion for clarification of this Resolution filed by the Bank was denied.
In view of the above-mentioned resolution, Minister Sanchez' order to reinstate back to work all striking employees
except those who have accepted separation pay was ordered implemented. 6
It appears that the problem of reinstating striking employees except those who had accepted separation pay was
reduced a bit when 71 of 112 affected employees were additionally reinstated. Thus, only 41 among the individual
respondents were not reinstated.
In our Resolution dated May 4, 1988 we observed that:
The individual private respondents in G.R. No. 75749 have filed motions to cite in contempt the Bank for violation of
the Court's Resolution ordering the implementation of the reinstatement order of Minister Sanchez. They alleged that
they were "forced to file the Motions to expose and protest the unabating display of bad faith on the part of the Bank
in effecting their reinstatement. (p. 400, Rollo in 74749)."
We did not act favorably upon private respondents' "motion to cite in contempt the bank for violation of the court's
Resolution ordering the implementation of the reinstatement order of Minister Sanchez." Instead, we dismissed said
petitions of the union and the individual respondents in G.R. No. 71239, and the Bank's petition in G.R. No. 71239,
and in G.R. No. 75749; and remanded them to the Department of Labor and Employment and its pertinent agencies
for further proceedings as stated in our resolution, to wit:
A thorough review of the voluminous records of these two petitions shows that unresolved factual issues prevent a
final solution to the individual respondents' and the Bank's problems.
First, whether or not the strikes staged by the Union and the individual respondents are legal remains unresolved.
This question has been pending before the Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
even before the filing of the two petitions.
In his order dated August 29, 1986, Minister Sanchez ordered reinstatement pending the final outcome of the petition
initiated by the Bank to declare the strike illegal. The reinstatement is, therefore, provisional. A permanent
reinstatement will depend on the legality or illegality of the strike.
Second, the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) or the NLRC must also look into the roles played by the
individual respondents should the strike be declared illegal.
Third, in this Court's June 18, 1986 resolution, the respondent Minister was ordered to resolve (sic) the certain
factual questions, to wit:
There are various factual issues which must first be resolved. Counsel for the petitioners admits that the petitioners
are not authorized by the Allied Bank Employees Union nor NUBE to speak for the Union or the bargaining unit.
Neither have the petitioners any authority to file a case in behalf of the Union officers and certain separated
employees whom they want this Court to order reinstated. In fact, there are statements filed by individual petitioners
who manifest that they did not authorize the petition to be filed in their names. Counsel for the petitioners failed to
clarify at the June 18, 1986 hearing how many of the petitioners he really represents, how many workers have
received separation pay, and how many of these workers have authorized the filing of a case in their behalf.
Counsels for the parties have given this Court conflicting data on positions of terminated personnel allegedly being
filled by new employees and various other factual matters necessitating the presentation of evidence. It is also rather
odd why a petitioner union affiliated with NUBE and the Trade Union Congress of the Philippines (TUCP) or its
members should be represented in this case by the legal counsel of a rival labor federation, the Kilusang Mayo Uno
(KMU).
There is at present pending with the respondent a supplemental motion for partial reconsideration of the order now
challenged in this petition. Counsel for the petitioner admits that they have not moved in the premises and have not
asked the present Minister of the MOLE whether or not he would reconsider the questioned order issued by his
predecessor. Both parties are agreed that conciliation proceedings have not terminated and both expressed a
willingness to continue the proceedings. The issue of whether or not the strike which commenced on February 11,
1985 is legal remains pending determination by NLRC and calls for the presentation of the evidence. The status of
the pending criminal case likewise not clear. The Assistant Solicitor General who represented MOLE informed the
Court that the respondent Minister had to suspend action on the various matter pending before him because the
petitioners decided to file this petition before allowing the administrative process to make the initial determination (p.
420, Rollo in G.R. No. 71239).
These questions have not been resolved to date.
And fourth, there are likewise factual matters that have cropped up in G.R. No. 75749 with regards (sic) to which the
court has neither the means or (sic) the time to look into.
The appropriate agencies of DOLE should conduct hearings on the contention of the bank that it is now impossible to
reinstate the remaining 41 respondents inspite (sic) of its alleged bona fide attempts to find equivalent positions for
them and on the counter-contentions of the individual respondents that there was discrimination in the reinstatement
of their companions, that the contractual employees were hired to displace them, that the bank employed
harassment tactics, and that their dismissal was summary, arbitrary, and malicious in gross violation of this Court's
twin resolutions on September 17 and 29, 1986.
All the unresolved factual questions call for the presentation of evidence before the appropriate administrative
agency. They cannot be resolved through pleadings or oral arguments before the Court. 7
xxx xxx xxx
In view of this development, the respondents, including the forty-one (41) individual respondents, led by Rolando
Ocampo, Rowena Rebosa and Alfredodel Pilar, were not reinstated by the bank.
Subsequently, arbitration of the Bank's petition continued with the issues confined to these matters, viz:
(a) whether or not the subject strikes, i.e., one that took place on January 3 and 4, 1985 to March 11, 1985, were
illegal; (b) whether or not anyone of the individual respondents committed illegal acts during the duration of the
strikes; (c) whether or not the individual respondents were illegally dismissed and/or locked out; and (d) whether or
not the respondent-employees are entitled to moral and exemplary damages. 8
After weighing the arguments of both parties, the Arbiter ruled that:
There is not dispute that under Art. 263, paragraph (g) of the Labor code, as amended, the assumption by the
Secretary of Labor and Employment over a labor dispute has the automatic effect of enjoining any intended or
impending strike or lockout. When then Minister Blas Ople assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute between the
bank and the union on December 19, 1984, by operation of law, the intended strike of the respondent union was
automatically enjoined. The union cannot feign ignorance of this legal mandate. It is the law and compliance
therewith cannot be excused on the more convenient excuse of ignorance. Besides, the order of December 19, 1984
clearly reiterated such legal injunction such that the respondent union may not now be allowed to assert that it did
not violate any law or order of the lawful authorities when it staged the strike on January 3 and 4, 1985.
An assumption and/or certification order of the Secretary of Labor automatically results in a return-to-work of all
striking workers, whether or not a corresponding order has been issued by the Secretary of Labor. Once an
assumption/certification order is issued strikers are enjoined, or if one has already taken place, all strikers shall
139
immediately return to work. A strike that is undertaken despite the issuance by the Secretary of Labor of an
assumption or certification order becomes a prohibited activity and thus illegal. . . .
Admittedly by respondent union went on strike on January 3 and 4, 1985, barely sixteen (16) days after then Minister
of Labor and Employment Blas Ople assumed jurisdiction. And while the labor dispute between the parties was still
pending before Minister Blas Ople, another strike was staged on February 11, 1985 which continued up to March 11,
1985. Being in violation of the provisions of Art. 263, paragraph (g) of the Labor Code, as amended, as well as the
assumption order of December 19, 1984, both strikes are, therefore, illegal and consequently, all union officers,
namely, TomasGonzalo, Crisanto Balisi, Norberto Aguja, Benito Barrera, Hernanie Sison, Meynard Cuenca, Victor
Alvares, Inocencio Salvador, Luisito Mendoza, Arturo Villanueva, and Pedro Pascual, are declared to have lost their
employment status.
This Branch does not agree with the respondents' contention that the strike on January 3 and 4, 1985 was already
amicably settled and/or condoned by the bank when it agreed to accept back to work the striking workers. The bank
merely complied with the return-to-work order of Minister Blas Ople issued on January 6, 1985 but this did not
preclude the bank from questioning the legality or illegality of the said strike.
Nor can this Branch accede to the respondents' assertion that they are merely acting in self-defense when they
resumed their concerted activity on February 11, 1985 allegedly on account of unfair labor practices committed by
the bank's representatives and agents. Regardless of their motives, or the validity of their claims, the striking workers
must cease and/or desist from any and all acts that tend to or undernine the authority of Secretary of Labor and
Employment once an assumption order is issued. They cannot, for instance, ignore return-to-work orders, citing
unfair labor practices on the part of the company, to justify their actions. . . . 9
The Labor Arbiter qualified that, under Article 264 (a) of the Labor Code, the individual respondents other than the
union officers can be subjected to dismissal only in cases where they knowingly participated in the commission of
illegal acts during the strike. Finding that all the individual respondents who were not officers of the union did not
commit the illegal acts complained of, the Labor Arbiter held that they cannot validly be declared to have lost their
employment status.
With regard to the question of whether or not the Bank validly dismissed the respondents for their failure to obey the
return-to-work notices, the Labor Arbiter held:
. . . Implicit in the petitioner's argument is that the individual respondents by their failure to comply with the published
return-to-work order are liable for abandonment of work. Abandonment as a ground for dismissal must be shown to
be deliberate and that the employee involved has shown no more inclination to resume work. This is not true in the
instant case. At the time they were terminated by the bank, the individual respondents were then on strike, and until
the legality or illegality of the strike is resolved, the petitioner did not have any basis for terminating the individual
respondents' services. Precisely, the primary reason why the respondents struck was rooted on their conviction that
their economic demands that led to bargaining deadlock were justified. If the respondents through the strike have
shown their eagerness in improving their employment situation, how could they now be held liable for abandonment.
The grounds relied upon by the bank in terminating the individual respondents being non-existent, perforce such
subject termination must be held to be without just and valid grounds, and consequently, the individual respondents
are entitled to reinstatement with back wages from the time of their termination until their actual reinstatement. 10
Hence, the Labor Arbiter's disposition of the case, viz:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing premises being considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
a) Declaring the strikes complained of as illegal and consequently, all union officers, namely, Tomas Gonzalo,
Crisanto Balisi, Norberto Aguja, Benito Barrera, Harnanie Sison, Meynard Cuenca, Victor Alvarez, Inocencio
Salvador, Luisito Mendoza, Arturo Villanueva, and Pedro Pascual, lost their employment status;
b) Dismissing the petition to declare the strike illegal as against the other individual respondents;
c) Declaring the dismissal of the abovenamed 163 counter-complainants as illegal and ordering the petitioner Allied
BankingCorporation to pay their aggregate back wages and other computed benefits in the total sum of
P5,049,692.73;
d) Ordering the petitioner Allied Banking Corporation to reinstate the forty-one (41) counter-complainants led by
Rolando Ocampo, Rowena Rebosa and Alfredo del Pilar, to their former or substantially equivalent position with all
the rights, privileges and benefits appertaining thereto including seniority, and to pay them their backwages and other
computed benefits in the aggregate sum of P3,548,213.80 plus moral and exemplary damages in the aggregate
amount of P615,000.00; and
11
e) Ordering the petitioner Allied Banking Corporation to pay attorney's fees in the amount of P921,290.65.
On September 29, 1992, the forty-one (41) respondents who were ordered reinstated filed a "Motion to Issue Partial
Writ of Execution." This was granted by the Labor Arbiter.
On September 30, 1992, petitioner appealed from the decision of the Labor Arbiter. Respondents, on the other hand,
filed, on October 2, 1992, a partial appeal from the aforesaid decision of the Labor Arbiter praying that the decision
be modified: (1) to reflect in the computation of back wages the actual basic monthly rates of the individual union
members, including the other employees' benefits; (2) to order the payment of actual, moral, and exemplary
damages, including attorney's fees to all 163 dismissed employees; (3) to order the reinstatement of all dismissed
163 employees; and (4) to include "Innocence Salvador ". . . as one of the Union officers deemed to have lost their
employment status."
On October 6, 1992, petitioner filed a motion to quash the writ of execution. This was denied on November 5, 1992.
While the Labor Arbiter's September 4, 1992 decision and his September 30, 1992 writ of execution limited his
identification of those to be reinstated pending appeal to the forty-one (41) complaints led by Rolando Ocampo,
Rowena Rebosa and Alfredo del Pilar, he later on identified all the respondents to be reinstated in his Order, dated
November 5, 1992, rationalizing that
This alleged ground cited that other than three (3) individual respondents, namely, Rolando Ocampo, Alfredo del
Pilar and Rowena Rebosa, the thirty-eight (38) others were not identified, the petitioner-bank cannot feign its back of
awareness as to who are the thirty-eight (38) other individual respondents considering that the petitioner itself
notified the Supreme Court in its Manifestation/Motion filed on March 7, 1988 that
2. Since October 7, 1986 to date, petitioner has found equivalent positions only for 71 among 112 of those ordered
reinstated by this Honorable Court, although petitioner Bank paid their salaries and other monetary benefits
continuously from October 1986 to the present without rendering work, to the damage and prejudice of petitioner;
3. Petitioner has exhausted all possible means to look for adequate equivalent positions for the remaining 41
employees but to no avail. . . .
The petitioner attached to the said Manifestation/Motion a list of the forty-one (41) employees together with the
corresponding separation pay and other benefits they are supposed to receive. And these forty-one (41) employees
are, as follows: Daisy Adriano, Luisito Arellano, Teodoro Banaticla, Ruben Beltran, Jose Bufi, Walfrido Calcabin, Roy
Casido, Edna Cioco, Rosauro Clerigo, Mary Ann Co, Delia Conde, Judith dela Cruz, Roberta dela Cruz, Carmen
delos Santos, Rogelio Edora, Raul Gonzales, Balagtas Hernandez, Gerardo Ilano, Alan de Jesus, Hector Juliano,
Teresita Licarte, Tony Manaois, Jaime Manipis, Edgar Marcelo, Rufino Marquez, Edgardo Nicasio, Rolando
Ocampo, Irene Ocos, Herson Ozarraga, Alfredo del Pilar, Elpidio Pineda, Alfredo Raymundo, Rowena Rebosa,
Dexter Sanchez, Romeo Simon, Noel Solis, Evangeline Saulog, Fe Uy, Ruel Velarde, Veronica Villarica, and Mario
Marquez. 12
On November 19, 1992, petitioner filed with the NLRC a consolidated petition for injunction docketed as NLRC NCR
IC NO. 000316-92.
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But, before the NLRC could decide on the issue of reinstatement pending appeal, respondents filed a petition
for mandamus with us, docketed as G.R. No. 110687, to compel the Chairman of the NLRC to issue a writ of
execution as regards the reinstatement aspect of the Labor Arbiter's September 4, 1992 decision.
On December 15, 1993, we promulgated a resolution dismissing the aforesaid petition for mandamus.
On April 7, 1994, the NLRC issued an Order directing the reinstatement of forty-one (41) respondents pending
appeal and at the same time dismissing the bank's petition for injunction.
The NLRC upheld the Labor Arbiter's finding that the strikes staged by the employees of the bank on January 3 & 4,
1985 and from February 11 to March 11, 1985 were in violation of the provisions of Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code,
as amended, as well as the Assumption Order of December 19, 1984 and as such the striking union members had
lost their employment status.
However, in spite of its conclusion that the respondents were validly dismissed the NLRC opined that "the 41 . . .
respondents earned for themselves the right to be reinstated not only under Article 223 of the Labor Code, as
amended by R.A. 6715, on March 2, 1989, but retroactive September 15, 1986, the date the Supreme Court ordered
the implementation of the Order of MOLE Minister Sanchez directing the reinstatement of 'all striking employees
except those who have accepted separation pay' [as 'only 71 of the 112 affected employees' were reinstated by the
Bank (May 4, 1988 Resolution of the Supreme Court in G.R. 71239 and G.R. 75749 p. 7)]. It then remanded to the
Labor Arbiter the query of whether or not the subject forty-one (41) individual respondents, who were not reinstated
since 1986, can validly be paid back wages from September 1986 up to the time the NLRC promulgated its decision.
The dispositive portion of the assailed decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the appealed September 4, 1992 Decision insofar as concerns disposition (b) to (e) thereof, is
hereby set aside.
Our Order of April 7, 1994 is hereby reconsidered and likewise set aside. Instead, the question of whether or not the
forty-one (41). Individual Respondents (led by Rolando Ocampo, Rowena Rebosa and Alfredo del Pilar) are entitled
to back wages corresponding to the period that they should have been reinstated since 1986 is hereby remanded to
the Arbiter of origin pursuant to the earlier quoted guideline of the Supreme Court in its May 4, 1988 resolution. 13
The opposing parties moved for a reconsideration of the said decision, which motions were denied in a Resolution of
the NLRC, dated July 8, 1994.
Hence, these petitions.
The crux of the present controversy is whether or not the striking union members terminated for abandonment of
work after failing to obey the return-to-work order of the Secretary of Labor and Employment, should be reinstated
with back wages.
Respondents contend that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion when it ruled that their dismissal is legal
considering that mere participation of union members in an illegal strike should not automatically result in their
termination from employment. 14
We agree with respondents' contention that mere participation of union members in an illegal strike should not
automatically result in their termination from employment. However, the case at bar involves a different issue as a
perusal of the records shows that respondents were terminated from employment by reason of their defiance to the
return-to-work order of the Secretary of Labor. Respondents staged a strike on January 3 and 4, 1985 or fourteen
(14) days after then Labor Minister Ople assumed jurisdiction over the dispute between them and the bank.
Thereafter, respondents again staged a strike from February 11 up to March 11, 1985 while their labor dispute with
the Bank was still pending before Minister Ople.
The provisions of law which govern the effects of defying a return-to-work order are:
1) Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code
xxx xxx xxx
When, in his opinion, there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry
indispensable to the national interest, the Secretary of Labor and Employment may assume jurisdiction over the
dispute and decide it or certify the same to the Commission for compulsory arbitration. Such assumption or
certification shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike or lockout as specified in
the assumption or certification order. If one has already taken place at the time of assumption or certification, all
striking or locked out employees shall immediately return to work and the employer shall immediately resume
operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. The
Secretary of Labor and Employment or the Commission may seek the assistance of law enforcement agencies to
ensure compliance with this provision as well as with such orders as he may issue to enforce the same . . . (as
amended by Sec. 27, R.A. 6715; emphasis supplied.)
2) Article 264 (a)
No strike or lockout shall be declared after assumption of jurisdiction by the President or the Minister or after
certification or submission of the dispute to compulsory or voluntary arbitration or during the pendency of cases
involving the same grounds for the strike or lockout.
Any worker whose employment has been terminated as a consequent of an unlawful lockout shall be entitled to
reinstatement with full back wages. Any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or
union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost
his employment status: Provided, That mere participation of a worker in a lawful strike shall not constitute sufficient
ground for termination of his employment, even if a replacement had been hired by the employer during such lawful
strike.
In the case of Union of Filipro Employees v. Nestle Philippines, Inc., 15 we ruled that a strike undertaken despite the
issuance by the Secretary of Labor of an assumption or certification order becomes a prohibited activity and thus,
illegal, pursuant to Article 264 (a) of the Labor Code. Moreover, the union officers and members who have
participated in the said illegal activity, are, as a result, deemed to have lost their employment status. Thus, we held
that:
UFE completely misses the underlying principle embodied in Art. 263 (g) on the settlement of labor disputes and this
is, that assumption and certification orders are executory in character and are to bestrictly complied with by the
parties even during the pendency of any petition questioning their validity. This extraordinary authority given to the
Secretary of Labor is aimed at arriving at a peaceful and speedy solution to labor disputes, without jeopardizing
national interests.
Regardless therefore of their motives, or the validity of their claims, the striking workers must cease and/or desist
from any and all acts that tend to, or undermine this authority of the Secretary of Labor, once an assumption and/or
certification order is issued. They cannot, for instance, ignore return-to-work orders, citing unfair labor practices on
the part of the company, to justify their actions. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
One other point that must be underscored is that the return-to-work order is issued pending the determination of the
legality or illegality of the strike. It is not correct to say that it may be enforced only if the strike is legal and may be
disregarded if the strike is illegal, for the purpose precisely is to maintain the status quo while the determination is
being made. Otherwise, the workers who contend that their strike is legal can refuse to return to their work and cause
a standstill on the company operations while retaining the positions they refuse to discharge or allow the
management to fill. Worse, they will also claim payment for work not done, on the ground that they are still legally
employed although actually engaged in the activities inimical to their employer's interest.
This is like eating one's cake and having it too, and at the expense of the management. Such an unfair situation
surely was not contemplated by our labor laws and cannot be justified under the social justice policy, which is a
141
policy of fairness to both labor and management. Neither can this unseemly arrangement be sustained under the due
process clause as the order, if thus interpreted, would be plainly oppressive and arbitrary.
In the cases of Sarmiento v. Tuico, 16 and Asian Transmission Corporation v.National Labor Relations
Commission, 17 we explained the rationale for this rule:
It is also important to emphasize that the return-to-work order not so much confers a right as it imposes a duty; and
while as a right it may be waived, it must be discharged as a duty even against the worker's will. Returning to work in
this situation is not a matter of option or voluntariness but of obligation. The worker must return to his job together
with his co-workers so the operations of the company can be resumed and it can continue serving the public and
promoting its interest. That is the real reason such return can be compelled. So imperative is the order in fact that it
is not even considered violative of the right against involuntary servitude, as this Court held in Kaisahan Ng Mga
Manggagawa sa Kahoy v. Gotamco Sawmills. The worker can of course give up his work, thus severing his ties with
the company, if he does not want to obey the order; but the order must be obeyed if he wants to retain his work even
if his inclination is to strike.
This principle was reiterated in the case of St. Scholastica's College v. Torres,18 wherein we cited the case
of Federation of Free Workers v.
Inciong, 19 and held that:
A strike undertaken despite the issuance by the Secretary of Labor of an assumption or certification order becomes a
prohibited activity and thus illegal, pursuant to the second paragraph of Art. 264 of the Labor Code as amended. . . .
The Union officers and members, as a result, are deemed to have lost their employment status for having knowingly
participated in an illegal act.
Hence, respondents' failure to immediately comply with the return-to-work order dated, December 16, 1984 and
January 6, 1985 cannot be condoned.
Respondents also contend that there is nothing on record to prove that they knowingly participated in an illegal
strike. 20
Private respondents' contentions are belied by the records as there was an assumption order already issued by the
Minister of Labor when they first conducted a strike on January 3 and 4, 1985, and this assumption order was still in
effect when they struck continuously from February 11 to March 11, 1995. This knowledge of the assumption order is
manifested in their answer dated September 26, 1985, which was summarized in the Decision of the Labor Arbiter
dated September 4, 1992, the pertinent portions of which are hereby quoted:
On their part, the individual respondents in their answer dated September 26, 1985 denied that the strike on January
3 and 4, 1985 was illegal contending that there was already an amicable settlement pursuant to which the bank
agreed to accept back to work all striking employees. Further, the said respondents alleged that the bank in an Order
dated January 6, 1985 was directed to accept back all striking employees under the same terms and conditions
previous to work stoppage and this order allegedly became final and executory. Regarding the strike on February 11,
1985, the respondents argued that the same is legal for the following alleged reasons, namely: (a) they resorted to
such concerted action upon the representation of the union officers that it was legal; (b) said concerted action was
resumption of their picketing activities considering that the Order of January 31, 1985 was nothing but a mere
reiteration of the position taken by the bank on the deadlocked issues and the Minister unjustly ignored the position
of the respondents; (c) the said action was justified in view of alleged acts of the bank amounting to unfair labor
practices; and (d) the order of January 31, 1985 of the Minister has not yet become final considering that there was
filed by this union a motion for reconsideration on February 11, 1985. The respondents charged as unfair labor
practice the act of the petitioner in publishing in metropolitan newspapers the notices requiring the striking
employees to return to work under threat of disciplinary action contending that it was a coercive act which was
tantamount to interference and restraint when the publication adverted to the concerted action on February 11, 1985
as illegal. Furthermore, the respondents argued that even if the strike stage by them was illegal, they did not incur
any liability for the following stated reasons, to wit: a) the individual respondents participated in the strike on the
strength of representations/assurances made by union officers that the strike was legal; b) they have acted in good
faith and merely exercised their constitutional right to strike and engage in concerted action; c) they acted in defense
of their political and economic rights which were allegedly ignored by the Minister of Labor; d) they have acted in
peaceful and orderly manner during the picketing and they did not commit any illegal or violent act; e) they have
faithfully complied with the orders of the Minister of Labor and f) they merely acted in self-defense to repel the
continuing acts of unfair labor practices committed by the petitioner's representatives and agents. 21
Furthermore, private respondents contend that a strike is not synonymous with abandonment of work as the
employer-employee relationship is not terminated during the duration of the strike but merely suspended. They also
cited the cases of Insular Life Assurance Co. Ltd., Employees Association NATU v. The Insular Life Assurance
Co. Ltd., 22 and the case of RCPI v. Philippine Communications Electronics & Electricity Worker's
Federation, 23 wherein we held that mere failure to report for work after notice to return, does not constitute
abandonment nor bar reinstatement.
However, private respondents' failed to take into consideration the cases recently decided by this Court which
emphasized on the strict adherence to the rule that defiance of the return-to-work order of the Secretary of Labor
would constitute a valid ground for dismissal.
The respective liabilities of striking union officers and members who failed to immediately comply with the return-to-
work order, are clearly spelled out in Article 264 of the Labor Code which provides that any declaration of a strike or
lockout after the Secretary of Labor and Employment has assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute is considered
an illegal act. Therefore, any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in a strike defying a return-to-work
order may as a result thereof be considered to have lost his employment status.
Moreover, as aptly stated by the NLRC in its decision:
Abandonment of work as a ground to dismiss under Article 282 (b) of the Labor Code should not be confused with
abandonment of work under the law on strike, particularly those as provided in Article 263 (g) and Article 264 (a) of
the Labor Code. To rule that [t]o constitute abandonment of position, there must be concurrence of the intention to
abandon and some overt act from which it may be inferred that the employee concerned has no more interest in
working . . . while available as a defense against dismissals under Article 282 of the Labor Code, cannot, however,
be validly invoked in dismissals resulting from a striker's defiance of a DOLE Secretary's assumption order so clearly
spelled out in Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code, much less as a defense against the ban on strikes after assumption
of jurisdiction by . . . the Minister of Labor and Employment (Article 264 (a), Labor Code). 24
Furthermore, as non-compliance with an assumption or certification order is considered as an illegal act committed in
the course of a strike, the Ministry of Labor and Employment (now DOLE) is authorize to impose such sanctions as
may be provided for by law which may include the hiring of replacements for workers defying the order. In the case
of Jackbilt Concrete Block Company, Inc.v. Norton and Harrison Company, 25 it appeared that in an earlier decision
the Supreme Court ordered the reinstatement without back wages of the strikers who staged a strike on the good-
faith belief that the Company had committed an unfair labor practice. Some of the strikers reported for work and were
reinstated. The rest of the strikers listed in the order either ignored or disobeyed said order. Of the strikers who
reported for work, some have either not submitted themselves to medical examination as required and did not report
back anymore or after having gone through medical examination, did not report back for work, or after reporting back
for work did not continue working anymore and the others were found suffering from disease and unfit for work.
Before the Supreme Court, the Company raised in issue the employment status of the strikers who failed to comply
with the return-to-work order, contending that they should be declared to have forfeited their right to reinstatement.
Sustaining this contention, the Supreme Court said:
We are also of the opinion and so hold that the strikers who failed, without proper justification, to report for work
assignment despite the issuance of the orders reinstating them to their jobs are deemed to have forfeited their right
to reinstatement. Their unexplained failure to request for another period or an extended period within which to
comply with the reinstatement orders and report back for work militates against them.
In East Asiatic Company Ltd., et al. v. CIR, et. al., G.R. No. L-29068, August 31, 1971, 40 SCRA 521, this Court had
occasion to rule that the failure to report for work when one had the opportunity to do so waived thereby his right to
reinstatement. Because of the apparent lack of interest of the strikers concerned as shown by their failure to report
142
for work without justifiable reason with the petitioner herein, We are constrained to declare them to have forfeited
their right to reinstatement.
In the case at bar, we fully agree with the ruling of the NLRC in declaring that respondents were validly dismissed
considering their defiance of the return-to-work order issued by the Secretary of Labor. As a consequence of such
defiance, they are considered severed from their employment.
Apparently, the basis of the portion of NLRC's decision remanding the issue of back wages to the Labor Arbiter, is
this Court's Resolution dated May 4, 1988 issued in the cases of Allied Bank Employees Union-NUBE, et
al. v. Hon. Blas Ople, et al., G.R. No. 71239 and Allied Banking Corporation v. Hon. Augusto S.Sanchez, et
al., G.R. No. 75749. In the said resolution we remanded the aforecited cases to the Department of Labor, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
Considering the foregoing, the Court RESOLVED to DISMISS the instant petitions and to REMAND them to the
Department of Labor and Employment and its pertinent agencies for further proceedings as outlined in this
resolution. This action is without prejudice to either or both parties filing an appropriate and concise petition with this
Court, if they are so minded after the final administrative determination of the issues has been made. 26
Furthermore, a perusal of our Resolution reveals that the issue of whether or not the forty one (41) respondents
should be paid back wages from September, 1986 up to the date of the promulgation of the decision, was not raised
therein. Only the determination of factual matters, i.e., whether or not the strike was illegal; the roles played by
respondents should the strike be declared illegal; issue of representation and the impossibility of reinstating the 41
respondents by bank, we remanded by this Court to the DOLE.
This Resolution of ours, as must be noted, was issued when the petition to declare the strike illegal has not yet been
resolved. It was only resolved last September 4, 1992, when the NLRC issued a Decision declaring the strike illegal
and upholding the dismissal of the respondents. The reinstatement ordered by then Minister Sanchez, in his August
29, 1986 order, was only provisional and subject to the outcome of the petition to declare the strike illegal, viz:
In his order dated August 29, 1986, Minister Sanchez ordered reinstatement pending the final outcome of the petition
initiated by the Bank to declare the strike illegal. The reinstatement is, therefore, provisional. A permanent
reinstatement will depend on the legality or illegality of the strike.
As a consequence of the declaration of the illegality of the strike and the upholding of the dismissal of respondents in
the NLRC Decision, the factual matters mentioned in our Resolution dated May 4, 1988 have already become moot
and academic.
Moreover, an award of back wages is incompatible with the findings of the NLRC upholding the dismissal of
respondents.
The NLRC's disposition of the case remanding to the Labor Arbiter the issue of reinstating respondents and the
computation of their back wages is an illogical consequence of respondents' valid dismissal from their employment.
Such disposition is inconsistent with our pronouncement in the cases aforecited and should be struck down as
having been issued with grave abuse of discretion.
Respondents also contend that the NLRC should have adopted a liberal approach favoring labor which this Court
has upheld in its decisions and that the employers are urged to be more compassionate as to their workers' needs.27
We agree with respondent's contention that this Court should view with compassion the plight of the workers.
However, this sense of compassion should be coupled with a sense of fairness and justice to the parties concerned.
Hence, while social justice has an inclination to give protective to the working class, the caused of the labor sector is
not upheld at all times as the employer has also a right entitled to respect in the interest of simple fair play. 28 Thus,
in the case of St. Scholastica's College v. Torres, 29 we stated that:
The sympathy of the Court which, as a rule, is on the side of the laboring classes (Reliance Surety and Insurance
Co., Inc. v. NLRC), cannot be extended to the striking union officers and members in the instant petition. There was
willful disobedience not only to one but two return-to-work orders. Considering that the UNION consisted mainly of
teachers, who are supposed to be well-lettered and well-informed, the court cannot overlook the plain arrogance and
pride displayed by the UNION in this labor dispute. Despite containing threats of disciplinary action against some
union officers and members who actively participated in the strike, the letter dated 9 November 1990 sent by the
COLLEGE enjoining the union officers and members to return to work under the same terms and conditions prior to
the strike. Yet, the UNION decided to ignore the same. The COLLEGE, correspondingly, had every right to terminate
the services of those who chose to disregard the return-to-work orders issued by respondent SECRETARY in order
to protect the interests of its students who form part of the youth of the land.
WHEREFORE, the NLRC Decision of May 20, 1994 is AFFIRMED with respect to the finding that private
respondents were validly dismissed. However, as to its disposition that the issue of reinstatement and computation of
back wages be remanded to the Labor Arbiter, the same, being inconsistent with the finding of valid dismissal, is
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 88210. January 23, 1991.]
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., Petitioner, v. SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, FRANKLIN M.
DRILON, and PHILIPPINE AIRLINES EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (PALEA), Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; LABOR CODE; SECRETARY OF LABOR; AUTHORITY TO RESOLVE
LABOR DISPUTE, DOES NOT INCLUDE RESOLUTION OF ISSUE OF LEGALITY OR ILLEGALITY OF STRIKE. —
Under Art. 263 of the Labor Code, the Labor Secretary’s authority to resolve a labor dispute within 30 days from the
date of assumption of jurisdiction, encompasses only the issues in the dispute, not the legality or illegality of any
strike that may have been resorted to in the meantime (Binamira v. Ogan-Occena, 148 SCRA 677, 685 [1987]).
2. ID.; ID.; LABOR ARBITER; WITH SOLE JURISDICTION TO DECIDE ISSUE ON LEGALITY OF STRIKES. — The
legality or illegality of the strike was not submitted to the Secretary of Labor for resolution. The jurisdiction to decide
the legality of strikes and lock-outs is vested in Labor Arbiters, not in the Secretary of Labor. (Art. 217, par. a, subpar.
5 of the Labor Code)
3. ID.; ID.; STRIKES; CIRCUMSTANCES MANIFESTING ILLEGALITY OF STRIKE; CASE AT BAR. — PALEA’s
strike on January 20, 1989 was illegal for three (3) reasons: 1. It was premature for there was an existing CBA which
still had nine (9) months to run, i.e., up to September 30, 1989. 2. It violated the no-strike provision of the CBA; 3.
The NCMB had declared the notice of strike as "appropriate for preventive mediation."cralaw virtua1aw library
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; RIGHT OF THE EMPLOYER TO TAKE DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST UNION OFFICERS AND
MEMBERS WHO PARTICIPATED IN AN ILLEGAL STRIKE. — Since the strike was illegal, the company has a right
to take disciplinary action against the union officers who participated in it, and against any union members who
committed illegal acts during the strike. (Art. 264 of the Labor Code)
5. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION; CERTIORARI; EXCESS OF JURISDICTION; MANIFEST WHERE
THE LABOR SECRETARY RESTRAINED PAL FROM TAKING DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST ITS GUILTY
EMPLOYEES; CASE AT BAR. — The Labor Secretary exceeded his jurisdiction when he restrained PAL from taking
disciplinary action against its guilty employees, for, under Art. 263 of the Labor Code, all that the Secretary may
enjoin is the holding of the strike, but not the company’s right to take action against union officers who participated in
the illegal strike and committed illegal acts. The prohibition which the Secretary issued to PAL constitutes an unlawful
143
deprivation of property and denial of due process for it prevents PAL from seeking redress for the huge property
losses that it suffered as a result of the union’s illegal mass action.
In issue in this case is the authority of the Secretary of Labor to order the petitioner Philippine Airlines, Inc. to
reinstate officers and members of the union who participated in an illegal strike and to desist from taking any
disciplinary or retaliatory action against them.
The 1986-1989 Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between the Philippine Airlines (PAL) and the Philippine
Airlines Employees Association (PALEA) provided for pay increases for various categories of Employees in Section
1, Article V entitled "PAY SCALE." Besides the pay increases, the CBA also provided for the formation of a
PAL/PALEA Payscale Panel —
"(f) . . . to undertake the study, review, correction, updating, complete overhaul, re-classification or re-grouping of
positions as may be required of the payscale and position classification to evolve updated payscales as soon as
possible." (p. 76, Rollo.)
and that
"(iii) . . . the Payscale Panel shall exert all reasonable efforts to complete its studies so as to evolve new updated
payscale and position classification by January 01, 1988," (p. 76, Rollo.)
As agreed by the parties, the PAL/PALEA Payscale Panel was formed in due time and went to work. By July, 1988,
the Job Evaluation Committee of the panel had finished the reconciliation and initial evaluation of positions in all
departments within PAL.chanrobles.com : virtual law library
In November, 1988, the PALEA members of the panel proposed the amount of PHP 3,349 as the minimum salary
entry level for the lowest job classification (Job Grade 1), while the PAL panel members proposed PHP 2,310 and a
PHP 200 across-the-board increase for employees who could not avail of the payscale adjustments. The panel
conferences continued but there was no meeting of minds. PALEA would not accept less than the amount it
proposed, while the PAL panel members alleged that they had no authority to offer more.
PALEA accused PAL of bargaining in bad faith.
On December 29, 1988, PALEA filed with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) a notice of strike on
account of: (1) bargaining deadlock; and (2) unfair labor practice by bargaining in bad faith.
On January 3, 1989, PAL filed with the NCMB a motion to dismiss PALEA’s notice of strike for being premature as
the issues raised were not strikeable since there still existed a PAL/PALEA CBA which would not yet expire until
September 30, 1989 or with nine (9) more months to run.
During the conciliation meeting, the following evolved as the real issues:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1. determination of the minimum entry rate
"2. wage adjustment due to payscale study
"3. retroactive pay as a consequence of the upgraded payscale or goodwill bonus." (p. 38, Rollo.)
On January 6, 1989, Attorney Jesus C. Sebastian, NCMB-NCR Executive Conciliator/Mediator, advised PALEA
president, George Pulido, that the issues raised in the notice of strike were "appropriate only for preventive
mediation," hence, not valid grounds for a lawful strike. However, when subsequently a representative of NCMB
supervised the conduct of PALEA’S strike vote, PAL’s counsel was baffled for it was inconsistent with the NCMB
order treating the strike notice as preventive mediation case No. PM-01-007-89. PAL’s counsel sought clarification
from NCMB’s Sebastian. He assured PAL that the NCMB representatives could not certify the strike vote.
On January 12, 1989, PALEA submitted the strike vote results to the NCMB. The next day, January 13, 1989, PAL
petitioned Secretary of Labor Franklin Drilon to immediately assume jurisdiction over the dispute in order to avert the
impending strike. The reasons for PAL’s petition were, as stated by the Secretary himself:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The Philippine Airlines, Inc. is a corporation where the government has substantial equity holding. It is engaged in
an industry imbued with national interest. It is the flag carrier of the Republic of the Philippines. Being the sole airline
that services domestic routes, a prolonged work stoppage will push back the national economic recovery program of
the government and consequently result to enormous damage to the economy of the country. Hundreds of
thousands of people directly and indirectly dependent on the continued operations of the firm including the huge
work force of the company will likewise be prejudiced. The viability of the firm will also be endangered. These
considerations have in the past guided this Office in consistently exercising its powers under Article 263(g) of the
Labor Code, as amended, in handling labor disputes in the Company. The current situation is no exception to this
rule. This Office is of the view that the present work stoppage at Philippine Airlines, Inc. will adversely affect the
national interest. Thus, this Office hereby assumes jurisdiction over the instant dispute." (pp. 38-39, Rollo.)
Inexplicably, the Secretary failed to act promptly on PAL’s petition for his assumption of
jurisdiction.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Seven (7) days passed with no reaction from Secretary Drilon. On January 20, 1989, PALEA declared a strike
paralyzing PAL’s entire operations the next day, January 21, 1989, and resulting in serious inconvenience to
thousands of passengers who were stranded in 43 airports throughout the country, and the loss of millions of pesos
in unearned revenue for PAL. Late in the day, at 7:50 P.M., Secretary Drilon issued an order assuming jurisdiction
over the labor dispute which had already exploded into a full-blown strike, ordering the strikers to lift their pickets and
return to work, directing management to accept all returning employees, and resolving the issues subject of the
strike, by awarding the following monetary benefits to the strikers, while prohibiting the company from taking
retaliatory action against them:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . to resolve the impasse between the herein parties, this Office finds the following award just and
reasonable:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1. As far as the issue of minimum entry level is concerned, the company is directed to adjust the same to P2,500.00
from its present level effective January 1, 1989.
"2. The company is ordered to grant the amount of P3.3 million per month to cover across-the-board increases of
covered regular employees subject to the distribution of the union as embodied in their proposed scheme but in no
instance should the lowest adjustment be less than P300.00. In line with this, the scheme proposed by the union and
submitted to NCMB on January 20, 1989 is herein adopted.
"It is understood, however, that in items 1 and 2 above, the amount which is higher should be granted.
"3. A goodwill bonus in the amount of P3,000.00 to be paid in four equal pay period installments beginning February
15 and up to March 31, 1989 is hereby awarded." (p. 39, Rollo.)
Declaring the strike valid, the Secretary stated:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Except for the fact that the Union’s notice of strike was treated as a preventive mediation case (at the instance of
NCMB), it should be noted that the Union complied with all the requirements for a valid strike. It observed the
cooling-off periods required and submitted the necessary strike vote. If ever there is any ground to discipline the
Union officers for non-compliance with the law, it would be based on the ‘non-filing’ of the strike notice, which ‘non-
filing’ was a consequence of the NCMB’s efforts to create the appropriate atmosphere to resolve the dispute by
treating the notice of strike as a preventive mediation case. Otherwise put, the strike would have been legal in all
respects had not the NCMB, in its good faith effort to settle the dispute, treated the notice of strike as a case for
preventive mediation. Under these circumstances, and in the interest of industrial peace and the promotion of the
concept of preventive mediation, the parties are directed to desist from committing any retaliatory act as a result of
the work stoppage. The UNION, however, is hereby warned that in the future this office will not tolerate such conduct
and will apply the full force of the law." (pp. 3-4, Rollo.)
144
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. The Secretary denied it in a minute resolution on May 8, 1989 or
three months later.
In this petition for review, PAL avers that the Secretary of Labor gravely abused his discretion amounting to excess
or lack of jurisdiction:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. in ruling on the legality of the strike;
2. in directing PAL to desist from taking retaliatory action against the officers and members of the Union responsible
for the illegal strike; and
3. in failing to seasonably exercise his authority to avert the illegal strike and protect the rights and interests of PAL
whose business is affected with public interest.cralawnad
Under Art. 263 of the Labor Code, the Labor Secretary’s authority to resolve a labor dispute within 30 days from the
date of assumption of jurisdiction, encompasses only the issues in the dispute, not the legality or illegality of any
strike that may have been resorted to in the meantime (Binamira v. Ogan-Occena, 148 SCRA 677, 685 [1987]).
Indeed, as found by the Labor Secretary in his Order of January 21, 1989, the only issues involved in the dispute
were:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. determination of the minimum entry rate
2. wage adjustment due to payscale study
3. retroactive pay as a consequence of the upgraded payscale or goodwill bonus.
The legality or illegality of the strike was not submitted to the Secretary of Labor for resolution. The jurisdiction to
decide the legality of strikes and lock-outs is vested in Labor Arbiters, not in the Secretary of Labor. Art. 217, par. a,
subpar. 5 of the Labor Code provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Article 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission.
"(a) The Labor Arbiters shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide within thirty (30) working
days after submission of the case by the parties for decision, the following cases involving all workers, whether
agricultural or non-agricultural.
x x x promptly and use his authority to avert the illegal strike under Article 263(g) of the Labor
"5. Cases arising from any violation of Article 265 of this code, including questions involving the legality of strikes and
lockouts." (Emphasis ours.)
In ruling on the legality of the PALEA strike, the Secretary of Labor acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction.
There is merit in PAL’s contention that the Labor Secretary erred in declaring the strike valid and in prohibiting PAL
from taking retaliatory or disciplinary action against the strikers for the damages suffered by the Airline as a result of
the illegal work stoppage.
PALEA’s strike on January 20, 1989 was illegal for three (3) reasons:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. It was premature for there was an existing CBA which still had nine (9) months to run, i.e., up to September 30,
1989. The law expressly provides that neither party to a collective bargaining agreement shall terminate nor modify
such agreement during its lifetime. While either party can serve a written notice to terminate or modify the agreement
at least sixty (60) days prior to its expiration date (known as the "freedom period") it shall nevertheless be the duty of
both parties to keep the status quo and to continue in full force and effect the terms and conditions of the existing
agreement during the freedom period and/or until a new agreement is reached by them (Art. 253, Labor Code).
2. It violated the no-strike provision of the CBA, to wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The Association agrees that there shall be no strikes, walk-outs, stoppage, or slowdown of work, or any other form
of interference with any of the operations of the Company during the period between the signing of the Agreement up
to September 30, 1989." (Emphasis supplied, p. 118, Rollo.)
3. The NCMB had declared the notice of strike as "appropriate for preventive mediation." The effect of that
declaration (which PALEA did not ask to be reconsidered or set aside) was to drop the case from the docket of notice
of strikes, as provided in Rule 41 of the NCMB Rules, as if there was no notice of strike. During the pendency of
preventive mediation proceedings no strike could be legally declared. The Secretary must have thought so too, that
is why he failed to act, for a period of seven (7) days, on PAL’s petition for him to assume jurisdiction over the labor
dispute. The strike which the union mounted, while preventive mediation proceedings were ongoing, was aptly
described by the petitioner as "an ambush" (p. 2, Rollo).cralawnad
Since the strike was illegal, the company has a right to take disciplinary action against the union officers who
participated in it, and against any union members who committed illegal acts during the strike, Art. 264 of the Labor
Code provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Art. 264. Prohibited activities. — . . .
x x x
"Any worker whose employment has been terminated as a consequence of an unlawful lockout shall be entitled to
reinstatement with full back wages. Any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or
union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost
his employment status: Provided, That mere participation of a worker in a lawful strike shall not constitute sufficient
ground for termination of his employment, even if a replacement had been hired by the employer during such lawful
strike." (Emphasis supplied.)
The Labor Secretary exceeded his jurisdiction when he restrained PAL from taking disciplinary action against its
guilty employees, for, under Art. 263 of the Labor Code, all that the Secretary may enjoin is the holding of the strike,
but not the company’s right to take action against union officers who participated in the illegal strike and committed
illegal acts. The prohibition which the Secretary issued to PAL constitutes an unlawful deprivation of property and
denial of due process for it prevents PAL from seeking redress for the huge property losses that it suffered as a
result of the union’s illegal mass action.
The Secretary may have realized that he was partly to blame for PAL’s damages because of his failure to act
Code.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
Nevertheless, the Secretary’s delay does not excuse the reckless and irresponsible action of the union in declaring
the illegal strike. The liability of the union for that is primary and exclusive.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is granted. The orders dated January 21, 1989 and May 8, 1989 of the
Secretary of Labor in NCMB NCR Case No. PM-01-007-89 are set aside and nullified insofar as the said orders
declare valid the PALEA strike of January 20-21, 1989 and restrain the petitioner from taking appropriate legal action
against PALEA’s officers who led the illegal strike, and any union members who may have committed illegal acts
during said strike. The monetary benefits awarded to the union in the said orders are, however, affirmed. Costs
against respondent PALEA.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-21278. December 27, 1966.]
145
FEATI UNIVERSITY, Petitioner, v. HON. JOSE S. BAUTISTA, Presiding Judge of the Court of Industrial
Relations and FEATI UNIVERSITY FACULTY CLUB-PAFLU, Respondents.
[G.R. No. L-21462.]
FEATI UNIVERSITY, Petitioner-Appellant, v. FEATI UNIVERSITY FACULTY CLUB-PAFLU,Respondent-
Appellee.
[G.R. No. L-21500.]
FEATI UNIVERSITY, Petitioner-Appellant, v. FEATI FACULTY CLUB PAFLU, Respondent-Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. LABOR LAW; JURISDICTION; COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS; C.I.R. HAS JURISDICTION OVER
EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS OPERATED FOR PROFIT. — Where as in this case, petitioner FEATI is en
educational institution organized, operated, and maintained for profit, it is subject to the jurisdiction of the Court of
Industrial Relations in a labor dispute.
2. ID.; PRESENCE OF EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP; CASE AT BAR. — Every professor, instructor, or
teacher in the teaching staff of FEATI University has a contract with the latter for teaching services, albeit for one
semester only. The University engaged the services of the professors, provided them work, and paid them
compensation or salary for their services. Even if the University may be considered as a lessee of services under a
contract between it and the members of its Faculty, still it is included in the term "employer." Running through the
word "employ" is the thought that there has been an agreement on the part of one person to perform a certain
service in return for compensation to be paid by an employer. When you ask how a man is employed, or what is his
employment, the thought that he is under agreement to perform some service or services for another is predominant
and paramount (Ballantine Law Dictionary, Phil. Ed., p. 430, citing Pinkerton National Detective Agency v. Walker,
157 Ga., 548, 35 ALR 557).
3. ID.; SCOPE OF TERM EMPLOYER IN REP. ACT No. 875. — Sec. 2(c) of the Republic Act No. 675 does not
state that the employees included in the definition of the term "employer" are only and exclusively "industrial
establishments" ; on the contrary, the term "employer" encompasses all employers except those specifically
excluded by the Act.
4. ID.; "TEACHER" ARE CONSIDERED EMPLOYEES. — That teachers are "employees’ has been held in a number
of cases (Aebli v. Board of Education of City and County of San Francisco. 145 P. 2d 601, 62 Cal. App. 2d. 706;
Lowe & Campbell Sporting Goods Co. v. Tangipahoa Parish School Board, La. App., 15 So 2d 98,100 and other
cases). This Court in the Far Eastern University case (L-17620, Aug. 31, 1962), considered university instructors as
employees and declared Republic Act No. 875 applicable to them in their employment relations with their school.
5. ID.; ID.; TEACHERS DO NOT CEASE TO BE EMPLOYEES WHEN THEY STRIKE. — Professors and/or
instructors of the University neither ceased to be employees when they struck, for Section 2 of Republic Act No. 875
includes among employees any individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with a
current labor dispute. Striking employees maintain their status as employees of the employer (Western Castridge Co.
v. NLRB, C.C.A. 7, 189 F2d 855).
6. ID.; TEACHERS ARE NOT INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS. — The contention of the University that the
professors and/or instructors are independent contractors because the University does nor exercise control over their
work, is untenable. This Court takes judicial notice that a university controls the work of the members of its faculty;
that a university prescribes the courses of subjects that professors teach, and when and where to teach; that the
professor’s work is characterized by regularity and continuity for a fixed duration; that professors are compensated
for their services by wages and salaries, rather than by profits; that the professors and/or instructors cannot
substitute others to do their work without the consent of the university; and that the professors can be laid off if their
work is found not satisfactory. All these indicate that the university has control over their work; and professors are,
therefore, employees and not independent contractors.
7. ID.; RIGHT OF TEACHERS TO UNIONIZE. — Since members of the faculty club are employees, it follows that
they have a right to unionize in accordance with the provisions of Section 3 of the Magna Carta of Labor (Rep. Act
No 875). The right of employees to self-organization is guaranteed by the Constitution; said right would exist even if
Republic Act No. 875 is repealed and regardless of whether their employers are engaged in commerce or
not. Indeed, members of the faculty or teaching staff of private universities, college, and schools in the Philippines,
regardless of whether the university, college, or school is run for profit or not, are included in the term "employees"
as contemplated in Republic Act No. 875 and, as such, they may organize themselves pursuant to the provision of
Section 3 of said Act.
8. ID.; LABOR DISPUTE; TEST WHETHER CONTROVERSY IS A "LABOR DISPUTE." — The test of whether a
controversy comes within the definition of "labor dispute" depends on whether the controversy involves or concerns
"terms, tenure, or condition of employment" or "representation."
9. ID.; CERTIFICATION OF LABOR DISPUTE TO CIR BY PRESIDENT, PROPER. — It having been shown that the
University is an institution operated for profit; that it is an employer, and that there is an employer- employee
relationship between the University and the members of the Faculty Club, and it having been shown that a labor
dispute existed between the University and the Faculty Club, the certification by the President to the CIR of the labor
dispute as authorized by Section 10 of Republic Act No. 875 was proper.
10. ID.; POWER OF CIR AFTER CERTIFICATION OF DISPUTE. — Once the jurisdiction is acquired pursuant to the
presidential certification, the CIR may exercise its broad powers as provided in Commonwealth Act No. 103. All
phases of the labor dispute and the employer-employee relationship may be threshed out before the CIR and the
CIR may issue such order or orders as may be necessary to make effective the exercise of its jurisdiction. The
parties involved in the case may appeal to the Supreme Court from the order or orders thus issued by the CIR.
11. ID.; CERTIFICATION OF LABOR DISPUTE TO CIR IS PREROGATIVE OF THE PRESIDENT. — To certify a
labor dispute to the CIR is the prerogative of the President under the law and the CIR will not interfere in, much less
curtail, the exercise of that prerogative. The jurisdiction of the CIR in a certified case is exclusive (Rizal Cement Co.,
Inc. v. Rizal Cement Workers Union (FFW), Et Al., L-12747, July 30, 1960).
12. ID.; POWER OF CIR TO ISSUE RETURN-TO-WORK-ORDER TO STRIKERS. — When a case is certified by
the President to the Court of Industrial Relations, the case thereby comes under the operation of Commonwealth Act
No. 103, and the Court may exercise the broad powers and jurisdiction granted to it by said Act. Section 10 of
Republic Act No. 875 empowers the Court of Industrial Relations to issue an order "fixing the terms of employment."
This clause is broad enough to authorize the Court to order the strikers to return to work and the employer to readmit
them.
13. ID.; RETURN-TO-WORK-ORDER OF CIR NOT AN IMPAIRMENT OF CONTRACT. — It is clear from what has
been said that the return-to-work order cannot be considered as an impairment of the contract entered into by
petitioner with the replacements. Besides, labor contracts are subject to the special laws on labor unions, collective
bargaining, strikes and similar subjects (Art. 1700, Civil Code).
14. ID. POWER OF CIR TO PUNISH FOR CONTEMPT FOR NON-COMPLIANCE OF ITS ORDER. — The Court of
Industrial Relations, in cases involving strikes and lockouts, may compel compliance or obedience of its awards,
order or decision even if the award, order or decision is not yet final because it is appealed, and it follows that any
disobedience or non- compliance of the award, order or decision would constitute contempt against the (Court of
Industrial Relations which the court may punish as provided in the Rules of Court. This power is a special one and is
exercised only in cases involving strikes and lockouts.
15. ID.; ID.; REASON FOR SUCH POWER. — There is reason for this special power of the industrial court because
in the exercise of its jurisdiction over cases involving strikes and lockout the court has to issue orders or make
decisions that are necessary to effect a prompt solution of the labor dispute that caused the strike or the lockout, or
to effect the prompt creation of a situation that would be most beneficial to the management and the employees, and
also to the public - even if the solution may be temporary, pending the final determination of the case. Otherwise, if
the effectiveness of any order, award, or decision of the industrial court in cases involving strikes and lockouts would
146
be suspended pending appeal then it can happen that the coercive powers of the industrial court in the settlement of
the labor disputes in those cases would be rendered useless and nugatory.
16. ID.; ORDER OF CIR IN CASES OF STRIKES AND LOCKOUTS ARE EXECUTORY. — By the provision of
Section 14, Commonwealth Act No. 103, an order, award or decision of the Court of Industrial Relations in cases
involving strikes and lockouts are immediately executory, so that a violation of that order would constitutes an indirect
contempt of court.
This Court, by resolution, ordered that these three cases be considered together, and the parties were allowed to file
only one brief for the three cases.
On January 14, 1963, the President of the respondent Feati University Faculty Club PAFLU — hereinafter referred to
as Faculty Club — wrote a letter to Mrs. Victoria L. Araneta, President of petitioner Feati University — hereinafter
referred to as University — informing her of the organization of the Faculty Club into a registered labor union. The
Faculty Club is composed of members who are professors and/or instructors of the University. On January 22, 1963,
the President of the Faculty Club sent another letter containing twenty six demands that have connection with the
employment of the members of the Faculty Club by the University, and requesting an answer within ten days from
receipt thereof. The President of the University answered the two letters, requesting that she be given at least thirty
days to study thoroughly the different phases of the demands. Meanwhile counsel for the University, to whom the
demands were referred, wrote a letter to the President of the Faculty Club demanding proof of its majority status-and
designation as a bargaining representative. On February 1, 1963, the President of the Faculty Club again wrote the
President of the University rejecting the latter’s request for extension of time, and on the same day he filed a notice
of strike with the Bureau of Labor alleging as reason therefor the refusal of the University to bargain collectively. The
parties were called to conferences at the Conciliation Division of the Bureau of Labor but efforts to conciliate them
failed. On February 18, 1963, the members of the Faculty Club declared a strike and established picket lines in the
premises of the University, resulting in the disruption of classes in the University. Despite further efforts of the
officials from the Department of Labor to effect a settlement of the differences between the management of the
University and the striking faculty members no satisfactory agreement was arrived at. On March 21, 1963, the
President of the Philippines certified to the Court of Industrial Relations the dispute between the management of the
University and the Faculty Club pursuant to the provisions of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 875.
In connection with the dispute between the University and the Faculty Club and certain incidents related to said
dispute, various cases were filed with the Court of Industrial Relations — hereinafter referred to as CIR. The three
cases now before this Court stemmed from those cases that were filed with the CIR.
CASE NO. G.R. NO. L-21278
On May 10, 1963, the University filed before this Court a "petition for certiorari and prohibition with writ of preliminary
injunction", docketed as G. R. No. L-21278, praying: (1) for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining
respondent Judge Jose S. Bautista of the CIR to desist from proceeding in CIR Cases Nos. 41-IPA, 1183-MC, and
V-30; (2) that the proceedings in Cases Nos. 41-IPA and 1183-MC be annulled; (3) that the orders dated March 30,
1963 and April 6, 1963 in Case No. 41-IPA, the order dated April 6, 1963 in Case No. 1183-MC, and the order dated
April 29, 1963 in Case No. V-30, all be annulled; and (4) that the respondent Judge be ordered to dismiss said cases
Nos. 41-IPA, 1183-MC and V-30 of the CIR.
On May 10, 1963, this Court issued a writ of preliminary injunction, upon the University’s filing a bond of P1,000.00,
ordering respondent Judge Jose S. Bautista, as Presiding Judge of the CIR, until further order from this Court, "to
desist and refrain from further proceeding in the premises (Cases Nos. 41-IPA, 1183-MC and V-30 of the Court of
Industrial Relations)." 1 On December 4, 1963, this Court ordered the injunction bond increased to P100, 000.00; but
on January 23, 1964, upon a motion for reconsideration by the University, this Court reduced the bond to P50,000
00.
A brief statement of the three cases — CIR Cases 41-IPA, 1183-MC and V-30 — involved in the Case G. R. No. L-
21278, is here necessary.
CIR Case No. 41-IPA, relates to the case in connection with the strike staged by the members of the Faculty Club.
As we have stated, the dispute between the University and the Faculty Club was certified on March 21, 1963 by the
President of the Philippines to the CIR. On the strength of the presidential certification, respondent Judge Bautista
set the case for hearing on March 23, 1963. During the hearing, the Judge endeavored to reconcile the parties, and it
was agreed upon that the striking faculty members would return to work and the University would readmit them under
a status quo arrangement. On that very same day, however, the University, thru counsel filed a motion to dismiss the
case upon the ground that the CIR has no jurisdiction over the case, because (1) the Industrial Peace Act is not
applicable to the University, it being an educational institution, nor to the members of the Faculty Club, they being
independent contractors; and (2) the presidential certification is violative of Section 10 of the Industrial Peace Act, as
the University is not an industrial establishment and there was no industrial dispute which could be certified to the
CIR. On March 30, 1963 the respondent Judge issued an order denying the motion to dismiss and declaring that the
Industrial Peace Act is applicable to both parties in the case and that the CIR had acquired jurisdiction over the case
by virtue of the presidential certification. In the same order, the respondent Judge, believing that the dispute could
not be decided promptly, ordered the strikers to return immediately to work and the University to take them back
under the last terms and conditions existing before the dispute arose, as per agreement had during the hearing on
March 23, 1963; and likewise enjoined the University, pending adjudication of the case, from dismissing any
employee or laborer without previous authorization from the CIR. The University filed on April 1, 1963 a motion for
reconsideration of the order of March 30, 1963 by the CIR en banc, and at the same time asking that the motion for
reconsideration be first heard by the CIR en banc. Without the motion for reconsideration having been acted upon by
the CIR en banc, respondent Judge set the case for hearing on the merits for May 8, 1963. The University moved for
the cancellation of said hearing upon the ground that the court en banc should first hear the motion for
reconsideration and resolve the issues raised therein before the case is heard on the merits. This motion for
cancellation of the hearing was denied. The respondent Judge, however, canceled the scheduled hearing when
counsel for the University manifested that he would take up before the Supreme Court, by a petition for certiorari, the
matter regarding the actuations of the respondent Judge and the issues raised in the action for reconsideration,
especially the issue’ relating to the jurisdiction of the CIR. The order of March 30, 1963 in Case 41- IPA is one of the
orders sought to be annulled in the case, G.R. No. L-21278.
Before the above-mentioned order of March 30, 1963 was issued by the respondent Judge, the University had
employed professors and/or instructors to take the places of those professors and/or instructors who had struck. On
April 1, 1963, the Faculty Club filed with the CIR in Case 41-IPA a petition to declare in contempt of court certain
parties, alleging that the University refused to accept back to work the returning strikers, in violation of the return-to-
work order of March 30, 1963. The University filed, on April 5, 1963, its opposition to the petition for contempt,
denying the allegations of the Faculty Club and alleging by way of special defense that there was still the motion for
reconsideration of the order of March 30, 1963 which had not yet been acted upon by the CIR en banc. On April 6,
1963, the respondent Judge issued an order stating that "said replacements are hereby warned and cautioned, for
the time being, not to disturb nor in any manner commit any act tending to disrupt the effectivity of the order of March
30, 1963, pending the final resolution of the same." 2 On April 8, 1963, the replacing professors and/or instructors
concerned filed, thru counsel, a motion for reconsideration by the CIR en banc of the order of respondent Judge of
April 6, 1963. This order of April 6, 1963 is one of the orders that are sought to be annulled in case G. R. No. L-
21278.
CIR Case No. 1183-MC relates to a petition for certification election filed by the Faculty Club on March 8, 1963
before the CIR, praying that it be certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of all the employees of
the University. The University filed an opposition to the petition for certification election and at the same time a
motion to dismiss said petition, raising the very same issues raised in Case No. 41-IPA, claiming that the petition did
not comply with the rules promulgated by the CIR; that the Faculty Club is not a legitimate labor union; that the
members of the Faculty Club cannot unionize for collective bargaining purposes; that the terms of the individual
contracts of the professors, instructors, and teachers, who are members of the Faculty Club, would expire on March
25 or 31, 1963; and that the CIR has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition because the Industrial Peace
Act is not applicable to the members of the Faculty Club nor to the University. This case was assigned to Judge
Baltazar Villanueva of the CIR. Before Judge Villanueva could act on the motion to dismiss, however, the Faculty
Club filed on April 3, 1963 a motion to withdraw the petition on the ground that the labor dispute (Case No. 41-IPA)
had already been certified by the President to the CIR and the issues raised in Case No. 1183-MC were absorbed by
Case No. 41-IPA. The University opposed the withdrawal, alleging that the issues raised in Case No. 1183-MC were
separate and distinct from the issues raised in Case No. 41-IPA; that the questions of recognition and majority status
in Case No. 1183-MC were not absorbed by Case No. 41-IPA; and that the CIR could not exercise its power of
147
compulsory arbitration unless the legal issue regarding the existence of employer-employee relationship was first
resolved. The University prayed that the motion of the Faculty Club to withdraw the petition for certification election
be denied, and that its motion to dismiss the petition be heard. Judge Baltazar Villanueva, finding that the reasons
stated by the Faculty Club in the motion to withdraw were well taken, on April 6, 1963, issued an order granting the
withdrawal. The University filed, on April 24, 1963, a motion for reconsideration of that order of April 6, 1963 by the
CIR en banc. This order of April 6, 1963 in Case No. 1183-MC is one of the orders sought to be annulled in the case,
G.R.-No. L-21278, now before Us.
CIR Case No. V-30 relates to a complaint for indirect contempt of court filed against the administrative officials of the
University. The Faculty Club, through the Acting Chief Prosecutor of the CIR, filed with the CIR a complaint,
docketed as Case No. V-30, charging President Victoria L. Araneta, Dean Daniel Salcedo, Executive Vice President
Rodolfo Maslog, and Assistant to the President Jose Segovia, as officials of the University, with indirect contempt of
court, reiterating the same charges filed in Case No. 41-IPA for alleged violation of the order dated March 30, 1963.
Based on the complaint thus filed by the Acting Chief Prosecutor of the CIR, respondent Judge Bautista issued on
April 29, 1963 an order commanding any officer of the law to arrest the above named officials of the University so
that they may be dealt with in accordance with law, and at the same time fixed the bond for their release at P500.00
each. This order of April 29, 1963 is also one of the orders sought to be annulled in the Case, G.R. No. L-21278.
The principal allegation of the University in its petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction in Case
G.R. No. L-21278, now before Us, is that respondent Judge Jose S. Bautista acted without, or in excess of,
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, in taking cognizance of, and in issuing the questioned orders in, CIR
Cases Nos. 41-IPA, 1183-MC and V-30. Let it be noted that when the petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction was filed on May 10, 1963 in this case, the questioned orders in CIR Cases Nos. 41-IPA, 1183-
MC and V-30 were still pending action by the CIR en banc upon motions for reconsideration filed by the University.
On June 10, 1963, the Faculty Club filed its answer to the petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction, admitting some allegations contained in the petition and denying others, and alleging special defenses
which boil down to the contentions that (1) the CIR had acquired jurisdiction to take cognizance of Case No. 41-IPA
by virtue of the presidential certification, so that it had jurisdiction to issue the questioned orders in said Case No. 41-
IPA; (2) that the Industrial Peace Act (Republic Act 875) is applicable to the University as an employer and to the
members of the Faculty Club as employees who are affiliated with a duly registered labor union, so that the Court of
Industrial Relations had jurisdiction to take cognizance of Cases Nos. 1183-MC and V-30 and to issue the
questioned orders in those two cases; and (3) that the petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction
was prematurely filed because the orders of the CIR sought to be annulled were still the subjects of pending motions
for reconsideration before the CIR en banc when said petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction
was filed before this Court.
CASE G.R. NO. L-21462
This case, G.R. No. L-21462, involves also CIR Case No. 1183-MC. As already stated Case No. 1183-MC relates to
a petition for certification election filed by the Faculty Club as a labor union, praying that it be certified as the sole and
exclusive bargaining representative of all employees of the University. This petition was opposed by the University,
and at the same time it filed a motion to dismiss said petition. But before Judge Baltazar Villanueva could act on the
petition for certification election and the motion to dismiss the same, Faculty Club filed a motion to withdraw said
petition upon the ground that the issues raised in Case No. 1183-MC were absorbed by Case No. 41-IPA which was
certified by the President of the Philippines. Judge Baltazar Villanueva, by order of April 6, 1963 granted the motion
to withdraw. The University filed a motion for reconsideration of that order of April 6, 1963 by the CIR en banc. That
motion for reconsideration was pending action by the CIR en banc when the petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction in Case G.R. No. L-21278 was filed on May 10, 1963. As earlier stated this Court, in Case G.R.
No. L-21278, issued a writ of preliminary injunction on May 10, 1963, ordering respondent Judge Bautista, until
further order from this Court, to desist and refrain from further proceeding in the premises (Cases Nos. 41-IPA, 1183-
MC and V-30 of the Court of Industrial Relations).
On June 5, 1963, that is, after this Court has issued the writ of preliminary injunction in Case G.R. No. L-21278, the
CIR en banc issued a resolution denying the motion for reconsideration of the order of April 6, 1963 in Case No-
1183-MC.
On July 8, 1963, the University filed before this Court a petition for certiorari, by way of an appeal from the resolution
of the CIR en banc, dated June 5, 1963, denying the motion for reconsideration of the order of April 6, 1963 in Case
No. 1183-MC. This petition was docketed as G.R. No. L-21462. In its petition forcertiorari, the University alleges (1)
that the resolution of the Court of Industrial Relations of June 5, 1963 was null and void because it was issued in
violation of the writ of preliminary injunction issued in Case G.R. No. L-21278; (2) that the issues of employer-
employee relationship, the alleged status as a labor union, majority representation and designation as bargaining
representative in an appropriate unit of the Faculty Club should have been resolved first in Case No. 1183-MC prior
to the determination of the issues in Case No. 41-IPA and therefore the motion to withdraw the petition for
certification election should not have been granted upon the ground that the issues in the first case have been
absorbed in the second case; and (3) the lower court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in taking cognizance of
the petition for certification election and that the same should have been dismissed instead of having been ordered
withdrawn. The University prayed that the proceedings in Case No. 1183-MC and the order of April 6, 1963 and the
resolution of June 5, 1963 issued therein be annulled, and that the CIR be ordered to dismiss Case No. 1183-MC on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
The Faculty Club filed its answer, admitting some, and denying other, allegations in the petition forcertiorari; and
specially alleging that the lower court’s order granting the withdrawal of the petition for certification election was in
accordance with law, and that the resolution of the court en banc on June 5, 1963 was not a violation of the writ of
preliminary injunction issued in Case G.R. No. L-21278 because said writ of injunction was issued against Judge
Jose S. Bautista and not against the Court of Industrial Relations, much less against Judge Baltazar Villanueva who
was the trial judge of Case No. 1183-MC.
CASE G.R. NO. L-21500
This case, G.R. No. L-21500, involves also CIR Case No. 41-IPA. As earlier stated, Case No. 41-IPA relates to the
strike staged by the members of the Faculty Club and the dispute was certified by the President of the Philippines to
the CIR. The University filed a motion to dismiss that case upon the ground that the CIR has no jurisdiction over the
case, and on March 30, 1963 Judge Jose S. Bautista issued an order denying the motion to dismiss and declaring
that the Industrial Peace Act is applicable to both parties in the case and that the CIR had acquired jurisdiction over
the case by virtue of the presidential certification; and in that same order Judge Bautista ordered the strikers to return
to work and the University to take them back under the last terms and conditions existing before the dispute arose;
and enjoined the University from dismissing any employee or laborer without previous authority from the court. On
April 1, 1963, the University filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of March 30, 1963 by the CIR en banc.
That motion for reconsideration was pending action by the CIR en banc when the petition for certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction in Case G.R. No. L-21278 was filed on May 10, 1963. As we have already
stated, this Court in said case G.R. No. L-21278, issued a writ of preliminary injunction on May 10, 1963 ordering
respondent Judge Jose S. Bautista, until further order from this Court, to desist and refrain from further proceeding in
the premises (Cases No. 41-IPA, 1183-MC and V-30 of the Court of Industrial Relations).
On July 2, 1963, the University received a copy of the resolution of the CIR en banc, dated May 7, 1963 but actually
received and stamped at the Office of the Clerk of the CIR on June 28, 1963, denying the motion for reconsideration
of the order dated March 30, 1963 in Case No. 41-IPA.
On July 23, 1963, the University filed before this Court a petition for certiorari, by way of an appeal from the
resolution of the Court of Industrial Relations en banc dated May 7, 1963 (but actually received by said petitioner on
July 2, 1963) denying the motion for reconsideration of the order of March 30, 1963 in Case No. 41-IPA. This petition
was docketed as G.R. No. L-21500. In its petition for certiorari the University alleges (1) that the resolution of the CIR
en banc, dated May 7, 1963 but filed with the Clerk of the CIR on June 28, 1963, in Case No. 41-IPA, is null and void
because it was issued in violation of the writ of preliminary injunction issued by this Court in G.R. No. L-21278; (2)
that the CIR, through its Presiding Judge, had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of Case No. 41-IPA and the order of
March 30, 1963 and the resolution dated May 7, 1963 issued therein are null and void; (3) that the certification made
by the President of the Philippines is not authorized by Section 10 of Republic Act 895, but is violative thereof; (4)
that the Faculty Club has no right to unionize or organize as a labor union for collective bargaining purposes and to
be certified as a collective bargaining agent within the purview of the Industrial Peace Act, and consequently it has
no right to strike and picket on the ground of petitioner’s alleged refusal to bargain collectively where such duty does
not exist in law and is not enforceable against an educational institution; and (5) that the return-to-work order of
March 30, 1963 is improper and illegal. The petition prayed that the proceedings in Case No. 41-IPA be annulled,
148
that the order dated March 30, 1963 and the resolution dated May 7, 1963 be revoked, and that the lower court be
ordered to dismiss Case 41-IPA on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
On September 10, 1963, the Faculty Club, through counsel, filed a motion to dismiss the petition forcertiorari on the
ground that the petition being filed by way of an appeal from the orders of the Court of Industrial Relations denying
the motion to dismiss in Case No. 41- IPA, the petition for certiorari is not proper because the orders appealed from
are interlocutory in nature.
This Court, by resolution of September 26, 1963, ordered that these three cases (G.R. Nos. L-21278, L-21462 and L-
21500) be considered together and the motion to dismiss in Case G.R. No. L-21500 be taken up when the cases are
decided on the merits after the hearing.
Brushing aside certain technical questions raised by the parties in their pleadings, We proceed to decide these three
cases on the merits of the issues raised.
The University has raised several issues in the present cases, the pivotal one being its claim that the Court of
Industrial Relations has no jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter in CIR Cases 41-IPA, 1183-MC and V-
30, brought before it, upon the ground that Republic Act No. 875 is not applicable to the University because it is an
educational institution and not an industrial establishment and hence not an "employer" in contemplation of said Act;
and neither is Republic Act No. 875 applicable to the members of the Faculty Club because the latter are
independent contractors and, therefore, not employees within the purview of the said Act.
In support of the contention that being an educational institution it is beyond the scope of Republic Act No. 875 the
University cites cases decided by this Court: Boy Scouts of the Philippines v. Juliana Araos, L-10091, Jan. 29, 1958;
University of San Agustin v. CIR, Et Al., L-12222, May 28, 1958; Cebu Chinese High School v. Philippine Land-Air-
Sea Labor Union, PLASLU, L-12015, April 22, 1959; La Consolacion College, Et. Al. v. CIR, Et Al., L 13282, April 22,
1960; University of the Philippines, Et. Al. v. CIR, Et Al., L-15416, April 28, 1960; Far Eastern University v. CIR, L
17620, August 31, 1962. We have reviewed these cases, and also related cases subsequent thereto, and We find
that they do not sustain the contention of the University. It is true that this Court has ruled that certain educational
institutions, like the University of Santo Tomas, University of San Agustin, La Consolacion College, and other juridical
entities, like the Boy Scouts of the Philippines and Manila Sanitarium, are beyond the purview of Republic Act No.
875 in the sense that the Court of Industrial Relations has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of charges of unfair
labor practice filed against them, but it is nonetheless true that the principal reason of this Court in ruling in those
cases that those institutions are excluded from the operation of Republic Act 875 is that those entities are not
organized, maintained and operated for profit and do not declare dividends to stockholders. The decision in the case
of University of San Agustin v. Court of Industrial Relations, G.R. No. L-12222, May 28, 1958, is very pertinent. We
quote a portion of the decision:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"It appears that the University of San Agustin, petitioner herein, is an educational institution conducted and managed
by a ‘religious non-stock corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines.’ It was organized
not for profit or gain or division of the dividends among its stockholders, but solely for religious and educational
purposes. It likewise appears that the Philippine Association of College and University Professors, respondent
herein, is a non-stock association composed of professors and teachers in different colleges and universities and
that since its organization two years ago, the university has adopted a hostile attitude to its formation and has tried to
discriminate, harass and intimidate its members for which reason the association and the members affected filed the
unfair labor practice complaint which initiated this proceeding. To the complaint of unfair labor practice, petitioner
filed an answer wherein it disputed the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations over the controversy on the
following grounds:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
‘(a) That complainants therein being college and/or university professors were not "industrial" laborers or employees,
and the Philippine Association of College and University Professors being composed of persons engaged in the
teaching profession, is not and cannot be a legitimate labor organization within the meaning of the law creating the
Court of Industrial Relations and defining its powers and functions;
‘(b) That the University of San Agustin, respondent therein, is not an institution established for the purpose of gain or
division of profits, and, consequently, it is not an "industrial" enterprise and the members of its teaching staff are not
engaged in "industrial" employment (U.S.T. Hospital Employees Association v. Sto. Tomas University Hospital, G.R.
No. L-6988, 24 May 1954; and San Beda College v. Court of Industrial Relations and National Labor Union, G.R. No.
L-7649, 29 October 1955; 51 O.G. (Nov. 1955) 5636-5640);
‘(c) That, as a necessary consequence, alleged controversy between therein complainants and respondent is not an
"industrial" dispute, and the Court of Industrial Relations has no jurisdiction, not only on the parties but also over the
subject matter of the complaint.’
"The issue now before us is: Since the University of San Agustin is not an institution established for profit or gain, nor
an industrial enterprise, but one established exclusively for educational purposes, can it be said that its relation with
its professors is one of employer and employee that comes under the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations?
In other words, do the provisions of the Magna Carta on unfair labor practice apply to the relation between petitioner
and members of respondent association?"
"The issue is not new. Thus, in the case of Boy Scouts of the Philippines v. Juliana V. Araos, G.R. No. L-10091,
promulgated on January 29, 1958, this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Montemayor, answered the query in the
negative in the following wise:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
‘The main issue involved in the present case is whether or not a charitable institution or one organized not for profit
but for more elevated purposes, charitable, humanitarian, etc., like the Boy Scouts of the Philippines, be included in
the definition of "employer" contained in Republic Act 875, and whether the employees of said institution fall under
the definition of "employee" also contained in the same Republic Act. If they are included, then any act which may be
considered unfair labor practice, within the meaning of said Republic Act, would come under the jurisdiction of the
Court of Industrial Relations; but if they do not fall within the scope of said Republic Act, particularly, its definitions of
employer and employee, then the Industrial Court would have no jurisdiction at all.
x x x
‘On the basis of the foregoing considerations, there is every reason to believe that our labor legislation from
Commonwealth Act No. 103, creating the Court of Industrial Relations, down through the Eight Hour Labor Law, to
the Industrial Peace Act, was intended by the Legislature to apply only to industrial employment and to govern the
relations between employers engaged in industry and occupations for purposes of profit and gain, and their industrial
employees, but not to organizations and entities which are organized, operated and maintained not for profit or gain,
but for elevated and lofty purposes, such as, charity, social service, education and instruction, hospital and medical
service, the encouragement and promotion of character, patriotism and kindred virtues in youth of the nation, etc.
‘In conclusion, we find and hold that Republic Act No. 875, particularly, that portion thereof regarding labor disputes
and unfair labor practice, does not apply to the Boy Scouts of the Philippines, end consequently, the Court of
Industrial Relations had no jurisdiction to entertain and decide the action or petition filed by respondent Araos.
Wherefore, the appealed decision and resolution of the CIR are hereby set aside, with costs against Respondent.’
"There being a close analogy between the relation and facts involved in the two cases, we cannot but conclude that
the Court of Industrial Relations has no jurisdiction to entertain the complaint for unfair labor practice lodged by
respondent association against petitioner and, therefore, we hereby set aside the order and resolution subject to the
present petition, with costs against respondent association."cralaw virtua1aw library
The same doctrine was confirmed in the case of University of Santo Tomas v. Hon. Baltazar Villanueva, Et Al., G.R.
No. L-13748, October 30, 1959, where this Court ruled that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"In the present case, the record reveals that the petitioner University of Santo Tomas is not an industry organized for
profit but an institution of learning devoted exclusively to the education of the youth. The Court of First Instance of
Manila in its decision in Civil Case No. 28870, which has long become final and consequently the settled law in the
case, found as established by the evidence adduced by the parties therein (herein petitioner and respondent labor
union) that while the University collects fees from its students, all its income is used for the improvement end
enlargement of the institution. The University declares no dividend, and the members of the corporation who founded
it, as ordained in its articles of incorporation, receive no material compensation for the time and sacrifice they render
to the University and its students. The respondent union itself in a case before the Industrial Court (Case No. 314-
149
MC) has averred that ‘the University of Santo Tomas, like the San Beda College, is an educational institution
operated not for profit but for the sole purpose of educating young men.’ (See Annex ‘B’ to petitioner’s motion to
dismiss.). It is apparent, therefore, that on the face of the record the University of Santo Tomas is not a corporation
created for profit but an educational institution and therefore not an industrial or business organization."cralaw
virtua1aw library
In the case of La Consolacion College Et. Al., v. CIR Et. Al., G.R. No. L-13282, April 22, 1960, this Court repeated
the same ruling when it said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The main issue in this appeal by petitioner is that the industrial court committed an error in holding that it has
jurisdiction to act in this case even if it involves unfair labor practice considering that the La Consolacion College is
not a business enterprise but an educational institution not organized for profit.
"If the claim that petitioner is an educational institution not operated for profit is true, which apparently is the case,
because the very court a quo found that it has no stockholder, nor capital . . . then we are of the opinion that the
same does not come under the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations in view of the ruling in the case of Boy
Scouts of the Philippines v. Juliana V. Araos, G.R. No. L-10091, decided on January 29, 1958."cralaw virtua1aw
library
It is noteworthy that the cases of the University of San Agustin, the University of Santo Tomas, and La Consolacion
College, cited above, all involve charges of unfair labor practice under Republic Act No. 875, and the uniform rulings
of this Court are that the Court of Industrial Relations has no jurisdiction over the charges because said Act does not
apply to educational institutions that are not operated or maintained for profit and do not declare dividends. On the
other hand, in the case of Far Eastern University v. CIR, Et Al., G.R. No. L-17620, August 31, 1962, this Court
upheld the decision of the Court of Industrial Relations finding the Far Eastern University, also an educational
institution, guilty of unfair labor practice. Among the findings of fact in said case was that the Far Eastern University
made profits from the school year 1952-1953 to 1958-1959. In affirming the decision of the lower court, this Court
had thereby ratified the ruling of the Court of Industrial Relations which applied the Industrial Peace Act to
educational institutions that are organized, operated and maintained for profit.
It is also noteworthy that in the decisions in the cases of the Boy Scouts of the Philippines, the University of San
Agustin, the University of Sto. Tomas, and La Consolacion College, this Court was not unanimous in the view that
the Industrial Peace Act (Republic Act No. 875) is not applicable to charitable, eleemosynary or non-profit
organizations — which include educational institutions not operated for profit. There are members of this Court who
hold the view that the Industrial Peace Act would apply also to non-profit organizations or entities — the only
exception being the Government, including any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof, in so far as
governmental functions are concerned. However, in the Far Eastern University case this Court is unanimous in
supporting the view that an educational institution that is operated for profit comes within the scope of the Industrial
Peace Act. We consider it a settled doctrine of this Court, therefore, that the Industrial Peace Act is applicable to any
organization or entity — whatever may its purpose when it was created — that is operated for profit or gain.
Does the University operate as an educational institution for profit? Does it declare dividends for its stockholders? If it
does not, it must be declared beyond the purview of Republic Act No. 875; but if it does, Republic Act No. 875 must
apply to it. The University itself admits that it has declared dividends. 3 The CIR in its order dated March 30, 1963 in
CIR Case No. 41-IPA — which order was issued after evidence was heard — also found that the University is not for
strictly educational purposes and that "It realizes profits and parts of such earning is distributed as dividends to
private stockholders or individuals (Exh. A and also 1 to 1-F, 2-x 3-x and 4-x)." 4 Under this circumstance, and in
consonance with the rulings in the decisions of this Court, above cited, it is obvious that Republic Act No. 875 is
applicable to herein petitioner Feati University.
But the University claims that it is not an employer within the contemplation of Republic Act No. 875, because it is not
an industrial establishment. At most, it says, it is only a lessee of the services of its professors and/or instructors
pursuant to a contract of services entered into between them. We find no merit in this claim. Let us clarify who is an
"employer" under the Act. Section 2(c) of said Act provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Sec. 2. Definitions. — As used in this Act —
(c) The term employer includes any person acting in the interest of an employer, directly or indirectly, but shall not
include any labor organization (otherwise than when acting as an employer) or any one acting in the capacity or
agent of such labor organization."cralaw virtua1aw library
It will be noted that in defining the term "employer" the Act uses the word "includes", which it also used in defining,
"employee" (Sec. 2[d], and "representative" (Sec. 2[h]); and not the word "means" which the Act uses in defining the
terms "court" (See 2[a]), "labor organization" (Sec. 2[e]), "legitimate labor organization" (Sec. 2[f]), "company union"
(Sec. 2[g]), "unfair labor practice" (Sec. 2[i]), "supervisor" (Sec. 2[k]), "strike" (Sec. 2[l]) and "lockout" (Sec. 2[m]) A
methodical variation in terminology is manifest. This variation and distinction in terminology and phraseology cannot
be presumed to have been the inconsequential product of an oversight; rather, it must have been the result of a
deliberate and purposeful act, more so when we consider that as legislative records show, Republic Act No. 875 had
been meticulously and painstakingly drafted and deliberated upon. In using the word "includes" and not "means",
Congress did not intend to give a complete definition of "employer", but rather that such definition should be
complementary to what is commonly understood as employer. Congress intended the term to be understood in a
broad meaning because, firstly, the statutory definition includes not only "a principal employer but also a person
acting in the interest of the employer" ; and secondly, the Act itself specifically enumerates those who are not
included in the term "employer", namely: (1) a labor organization (otherwise than when acting as an employer), (2)
anyone acting in the capacity of officer or agent of such labor organization (Sec. 2[c]), and (3) the Government and
any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof insofar as the right to strike for the purpose of securing changes or
modifications in the terms and conditions of employment is concerned (Section 11). Among these statutory
exemptions, educational institutions are not included; hence, they can be included in the term "employer." This Court,
however, has ruled that those educational institutions that are not operated for profit are not within the purview of
Republic Act No. 875. 5
As stated above, Republic Act No. 875 does not give a comprehensive but only a complementary definition of the
term "employer." The term encompasses those that are in ordinary parlance "employers." What is commonly meant
by "employer" ? The term "employer" has been given several acceptations. The lexical definition is "one who
employs; one who uses; one who engages or keeps in service;" and "to employ" is "to provide work and pay for; to
engage one’s service; to hire. (Webster’s New Twentieth Century Dictionary, 2nd ed., 1960, p. 595). The Workmen’s
Compensation Act defines employer as including "every person or association of persons, incorporated or not, public
or private, and the legal representative of the deceased employer" and "includes the owner or lessee of a factory or
establishment or place of work or any other person who is virtually the owner or manager of the business carried on
in the establishment or place of work but who, for reason that there is an independent contractor in the same, or for
any other reason, is not the direct employer of laborers employed there." (Sec. 39 (a) of Act No. 3428). The Minimum
Wage Law states that "employer includes any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of the employer in
relation to an employee and shall include the Government and the government corporations." (Rep. Act No. 602,
Sec. 2[b]). The Social Security Act defines employer as "any person, natural or juridical, domestic or foreign, who
carries in the Philippines any trade, business, industry, undertaking, or activity of any kind and uses the services of
another person who is under his orders as regards the employment, except the Government and any of its political
subdivisions, branches or instrumentalities, including corporations owned or controlled by the Government." (Rep.
Act No. 1161, Sec. 8[c]).
This Court, in the cases of the The Angat River Irrigation System, Et Al., v. Angat River Workers’ Union (PLUM), Et
Al., G.R. Nos. L-10934 and 10944, December 28, 1957, which cases involve unfair labor practices and hence within
the purview of Republic Act No. 875, defined the term employer as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"An employer is one who employs the services of others; one for whom employees work and who pays their wages
or salaries (Black Law Dictionary, 4th ed., p. 618).
"An employer includes any person acting in the interest of an employer, directly or indirectly (Sec. 2-c, Rep. Act
875)."cralaw virtua1aw library
Under none of the above definitions may the University be excluded, especially so if it is considered that every
professor, instructor or teacher in the teaching staff of the University, as per allegation of the University itself, has a
contract with the latter for teaching services, albeit for one semester only. The University engaged the services of the
professors, provided them work, and paid them compensation or salary for their services. Even if the University may
be considered as a lessee of services under a contract between it and the members of its Faculty, still it is included
150
in the term "employer." "Running through the word "employ" is the thought that there has been an agreement on the
part of one person to perform a certain service in return for compensation to be paid by an employer. When
you ask how a man is employed, or what is his employment, the thought that he is under agreement to perform some
service or services for another is predominant and paramount (Ballentine Law Dictionary, Philippine ed., p. 430,
citing Pinkerton National Detective Agency v. Walker, 157 Ga. 548, 35 A.L.P. 557, 560, 122 S.E. Rep. 202).
To bolster its claim of exemption from the application of Republic Act No. 875, the University contends that it is not
an industrial establishment within the scope of Sec. 2(c) of the Act. This contention can not be sustained. In the first
place, Sec. 2(c) of Republic Act No. 875 does not state that the employers included in the definition of the term
"employer" are only and exclusively "industrial establishments" ; on the contrary, as stated above, the term
"employer" encompasses all employers except those specifically excluded by the Act. In the second place, even the
Act itself does not refer exclusively to industrial establishment and does not confine its application thereto. This is
patent inasmuch as several provisions of the Act are applicable to non-industrial workers, such as Sec. 3, which
deals with "employees right to self-organization" ; Sections 4 and 5 which enumerate unfair labor practices; Section 8
which nullifies private contracts contravening employee rights; Section 9 which relates to injunctions in any case
involving a labor dispute; Section 11 which prohibits strikes in the government; Section 12 which provides for the
exclusive collective bargaining representation for labor organizations; Section 14 which deals with the procedure for
collective bargaining; Section 17 which treats of the rights and conditions of membership in labor organizations;
Sections 18, 19, 20 and 21 which provide respectively for the establishment of conciliation service, compilation of
collective bargaining contracts, advisory labor-management relations; Section 22 which empowers the Secretary of
Labor to make a study of labor relations; and Section 24 which enumerates the rights of labor organizations. (See
Dissenting Opinion of Justice Concepcion in Boy Scouts of the Philippines v. Juliana Araos, G.R. No. L-10091,
January 29, 1958.)
This Court, in the case of Boy Scouts of the Philippines v. Araos, supra, had occasion to state that the Industrial
Peace Act "refers only to organizations and entities created and operated for profit, engaged in a profitable trade,
occupation or industry." It cannot be denied that running a university engages time and attention; that it is an
occupation or a business from which the one engaged in it may derive profit or gain. The University is not an
industrial establishment in the sense that an industrial establishment is one that is engaged in manufacture or trade
where raw materials are changed or fashioned into finished products for use. But for the purposes of the Industrial
Peace Act the University is an industrial establishment because it is operated for profit and it employs persons who
work to earn a living. The term "industry", for the purposes of the application of our labor laws should be given a
broad meaning so as to cover all enterprises which are operated for profit and which engage the services of persons
who work to earn a living.
"The word ‘industry’ within State Labor Relations Act controlling labor relations in industry, cover labor conditions in
any field of employment where the objective is earning a livelihood on one side and gaining of a profit on the other.
Labor Law, Sec. 700 et. seq. State Labor Relations Board v. McChesney, 27 N.Y.S. 2d 266, 868." (Words and
Phrases, Permanent Edition, Vol. 21, 1960 edition p. 510).
The University urges that even if it were an employer, still there would be no employer-employee relationship
between it and the striking members of the Faculty Club because the latter are not employees within the purview of
Sec. 2(d) of Republic Act No. 875 but are independent contractors. This claim is untenable.
Section 2 (d) of Republic Act No. 875 provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"(d) The term ‘employee’ shall include any employee end shall not be limited to the employee of a particular
employer unless the act explicitly states otherwise and shall include any individual whose work has ceased as a
consequence of, or in connection with, any current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor practice and who has
not obtained any other substantially equivalent and regular employment."cralaw virtua1aw library
This definition is again, like the definition of the term "employer" [Sec. 2(c)], by the use of the term "include",
complementary. It embraces not only those who are usually and ordinarily considered employees, but also those
who have ceased as employees as a consequence of a labor dispute. The term "employee", furthermore, is not
limited to those of a particular employer. As already stated, this Court in the cases of The Angat River Irrigation
System, Et Al., v. Angat River Workers’ Union (PLUM) Et. Al., supra, has defined the term "employer" as "one who
employs the services of others; one for whom employees work and who pays their wages or salaries." Correlatively,
an employee must be one who is engaged in the service of another; who performs services for another; who works
for salary or wages. It is admitted by the University that the striking professors and/or instructors are under contract
to teach particular courses and that they are paid for their services. They are, therefore, employees of the University.
In support of its claim that the members of the Faculty Club are not employees of the University, the latter cites as
authority Francisco’s Labor Laws, 2nd ed., p. 3, which states:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"While the term ‘workers’ as used in a particular statute, has been regarded as limited to those performing physical
labor, it has been held to embrace stenographers and bookkeepers. Teachers are not included, however."cralaw
virtua1aw library
It is evident from the above-quoted authority that "teachers" are not to be included among those who perform
"physical labor", but it does not mean that they are not employees. We have checked the source of the authority,
which is 31 Am. Jur., Sec. 3, p. 835, and the latter cites Huntworth v. Tanner, 87 Wash 670, 152 P523, Ann Cas
1917 D 676. A reading of the last case confirms Our view.
That teachers are "employees" has been held in a number of cases (Aebli v. Board of Education of City and County
of San Francisco, 145 P. 2d 601, 62 Col. App. 2d. 706; Lowe & Campbell Sporting Goods Co. v. Tangipahoa Parish
School Board, La. App., 15 So. 2d 98,100; Sister Odelia v. Church of St. Andrew, 263 N. W. 111, 112, 195 Minn.
357, cited in Words and Phrases, Permanent ed., Vol. 14, pp. 806-807). This Court in the Far Eastern University
case, supra, considered university instructors as employees and declared Republic Act No. 875 applicable to them in
their employment relations with their school. The professors and/or instructors of the University neither ceased to be
employees when they struck, for Section 2 of Rep. Act 875 includes among employees any individual whose work
has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with a current labor dispute. Striking employees maintain their
status as employees of the employer. (Western Cartridge Co. v. NLRB, C.C.A. 7, 139 F 2d 855, 858).
The contention of the University that the professors and/or instructors are independent contractors, because the
University does not exercise control over their work, is likewise untenable. This Court takes judicial notice that a
university controls the work of the members of its faculty; that a university prescribes the courses or subjects that
professors teach, and when and where to teach; that the professors’ work is characterized by regularity and
continuity for a fixed duration; that professors are compensated for their services by wages and salaries, rather than
by profits; that the professors and/or instructors cannot substitute others to do their work without the consent of the
university; and that the professors can be laid off if their work is found not satisfactory. All these indicate that the
university has control over their work; and professors are, therefore, employees and not independent contractors.
There are authorities in support of this view.
"The principal consideration in determining whether a workman is an employee or an independent contractor is the
right to control the manner of doing the work, and it is not the actual exercise of the right by interfering with the work,
but the right to control, which constitutes the test. (Amalgamated Roofing Co. v. Travelers’ Ins. Co., 133 N.E. 259,
261, 300 I11. 487, quoted in Words and Phrases, Permanent ed., Vol. 14, p, 576).
"Where, under Employers’ Liability Act, A was instructed when and where to work . . . he is an employee, and not a
contractor, though paid specified sum per square." (Heine v. Hill, Harris & Co., 2 La. App. 384, 390, in Words and
Phrases, loc. cit.)
"Employees are those who are compensated for their labor or services by wages rather than by profits." (People v.
Distributors Division, Smoked Fish Workers Union, Local No. 20377, Sup. 7 N. Y. S. 2d 185, 187 in Words and
Phrases, loc. cit.)
"Services of employee or servant, as distinguished from those of a contractor, are usually characterized by regularity
and continuity of work for a fixed period or one of indefinite duration, as contrasted with employment to do a single
act or a series of isolated acts; by compensation on a fixed salary rather than one regulated by value or amount of
work; . . . Underwood v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, C.C.A., 66 F. 2d 67, 71 in Words and Phrases, op. cit.,
p. 579.)
"Independent contractors can employ others to work and accomplish contemplated result without consent of
contractee, while ‘employee’ cannot substitute another in his place without consent of his employer." (Luker Sand &
151
Gravel Co. v. Industrial Commission, 23 P. 2d 225, 82 Utah, 188, in Words and Phrases, Vol. 14 p. 576.)
Moreover, even if university professors are considered independent contractors, still they would be covered by Rep.
Act No. 875. In the case of the Boy Scouts of the Philippines v. Juliana Araos, supra, this Court observed that
Republic Act No. 875 was modeled after the Wagner Act, or the National Labor Relations Act, of the United States,
and this Act did not exclude "independent contractors" from the orbit of "employees." It was in the subsequent
legislation —the Labor Management Relation Act (Taft-Harley Act) —that "independent contractors" together with
agricultural laborers, individuals in domestic service of the home, supervisors, and others were excluded. (See
Rothenberg on Labor Relations, 1949, pp. 330-331).
It having been shown that the members of the Faculty Club are employees, it follows that they have a right to
unionize in accordance with the provisions of Section 3 of the Magna Carta of Labor (Republic Act No. 875) which
provides as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Sec. 3. Employees’ right to self-organization. —Employees shall have the right to self-organization and to form, join
or assist labor organizations of their own choosing for the purpose of collective bargaining through representatives of
their own choosing and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining and other mutual aid
or protection . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library
We agree with the statement of the lower court, in its order of March 30, 1963 which is sought to be set aside in the
instant case, that the right of employees to self-organization is guaranteed by the Constitution, that said right would
exist even if Republic Act No. 875 is repealed, and that the employees are entitled to that right regardless of whether
their employers are engaged in commerce or not. Indeed, it is Our considered view that the members of the faculty
or teaching staff of private universities, colleges, and schools in the Philippines, regardless of whether the university,
college or school is run for profit or not, are included in the term "employees" as contemplated in Republic Act No.
875 and as such they may organize themselves pursuant to the above-quoted provision of Section 3 of said Act.
Certainly, professors, instructors or teachers of private educational institutions who teach to earn a living are entitled
to the protection of our labor laws — and one such law is Republic Act No. 875.
The contention of the University in the instant case that the members of the Faculty Club can not unionize and the
Faculty Club can not exist as a valid labor organization is, therefore, without merit. The record shows that the Faculty
Club is a duly registered labor organization, and this fact is admitted by counsel for the University. 6
The other issue raised by the University is the validity of the Presidential certification. The University contends that
under Section 10 of Republic Act No. 875 the power of the President of the Philippines to certify is subject to the
following conditions, namely: (1) that there is a labor dispute, and (2) that said labor dispute exists in an industry that
is vital to the national interest. The University maintains that those conditions do not obtain in the instant case. This
contention has also no merit.
We have previously stated that the University is an establishment or enterprise that is included in the term "industry"
and is covered by the provisions of Republic Act No. 875. Now, was there a labor dispute between the University and
the Faculty Club?
Republic Act No. 875 defines a labor dispute as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The term ‘labor dispute’ includes any controversy concerning terms, tenure or conditions of employment, or
concerning the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to
arrange terms or conditions of employment regardless of whether the disputants stand in proximate relation of
employer and employee."cralaw virtua1aw library
The test of whether a controversy comes within the definition of "labor dispute" depends on whether the controversy
involves or concerns "terms, tenure or condition of employment" or "representation." It is admitted by the University,
in the instant case, that on January 14, 1963 the President of the Faculty Club wrote to the President of the
University a letter informing the latter of the organization of the Faculty Club as a labor union, duly registered with the
Bureau of Labor Relations; that again on January 22, 1963 another letter was sent, to which was attached a list of
demands consisting of 26 items, and asking the President of the University to answer within ten days from date of
receipt thereof; that the University questioned the right of the Faculty Club to be the exclusive representative of the
majority of the employees and asked proof that the Faculty Club had been designated or selected as exclusive
representative by the vote of the majority of said employees; that on February 1, 1963 the Faculty Club filed with the
Bureau of Labor Relations a notice of strike alleging as reason therefor the refusal of the University to bargain
collectively with the representative of the faculty members; that on February 18, 1963 the members of the Faculty
Club went on strike and established picket lines in the premises of the University, thereby disrupting the schedule of
classes; that on March 1, 1963 the Faculty Club filed Case No. 3666-ULP for unfair labor practice against the
University, but which was later dismissed (on April 2, 1963 after Case 41-IPA was certified to the CIR), and that on
March 7, 1966 a petition for certification election, Case No. 1183-MC, was filed by the Faculty Club in the CIR. 7 All
these admitted facts show that the controversy between the University and the Faculty Club involved terms and
conditions of employment, and the question of representation. Hence, there was a labor dispute between the
University and the Faculty Club, as contemplated by Republic Act No. 875. It having been shown that the University
is an institution operated for profit, that it is an employer, and that there is an employer-employee relationship,
between the University and the members of the Faculty Club, and it having been shown that a labor dispute existed
between the University and the Faculty Club, the contention of the University, that the certification made by the
President is not only not authorized by Section 10 of Republic Act 875 but is violative thereof, is groundless.
Section 10 of Republic Act No. 875 provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"When in the opinion of the President of the Philippines there exists a labor dispute in an industry indispensable to
the national interest and when such labor dispute is certified by the President to the Court of Industrial Relations,
said Court may cause to be issued a restraining order forbidding the employees to strike or the employer to lockout
the employees, and if no other solution to the dispute is found, the Court may issue an order fixing the terms and
conditions of employment."cralaw virtua1aw library
This Court had occasion to rule on the application of the above quoted provision of Section 10 of Republic Act No.
875. In the case of Pampanga Sugar Development Co. v. CIR, Et Al., G. R. No. L-13178, March 24, 1961, it was
held:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"It thus appears that when in the opinion of the President a labor dispute exists in an industry indispensable to
national interest and he certifies it to the Court of Industrial Relations the latter acquires jurisdiction to act thereon in
the manner provided by law. Thus the court may take either of the following courses: it may issue an order forbidding
employees to strike or the employer to lockout its employees, or, failing in this, it may issue an order fixing the terms
and conditions of employment. It has no other alternative. It can throw the case out in the assumption that the
certification was erroneous.
x x x
". . . The fact, however, is that because of the strike declared by the members of the minority union which threatens a
major industry the President deemed it wise to certify the controversy to the Court of Industrial Relations for
adjudication. This is the power that the law gives to the President the propriety of its exercise being a matter that only
devolves upon him. The same is not the concern of the industrial court. What matters is that by virtue of the
certification made by the President the case was placed under the jurisdiction of said court." (Emphasis supplied)
To certify a labor dispute to the CIR is the prerogative of the President under the law, and this Court will not interfere
in, much less curtail, the exercise of that prerogative. The jurisdiction of the CIR in a certified case is exclusive (Rizal
Cement Co., Inc. v. Rizal Cement Workers Union (FFW), Et Al., G. R. L-12747, July 30, 1960). Once the jurisdiction
is acquired pursuant to the presidential certification, the CIR may exercise its broad powers as provided in
Commonwealth Act 103. All phases of the labor dispute and the employer-employee relationship may be threshed
out before the CIR, and the CIR may issue such order or orders as may be necessary to make effective the exercise
of its jurisdiction. The parties involved in the case may appeal to the Supreme Court from the order or orders thus
issued by the CIR.
And so, in the instant case, when the President took into consideration that the University "has some 18,000
students and employed approximately 500 faculty members," that "the continued disruption in the operation of the
University will necessarily prejudice the thousand of students", and that "the dispute affects the national interest", 8
152
and certified the dispute to the CIR, it is not for the CIR nor this Court to pass upon the correctness of the reasons of
the President in certifying the labor dispute to the CIR.
The third issue raised by the University refers to the question of the legality of the return-to work order (of March 30,
1963 in Case 41-IPA) and the order implementing the same (of April 6, 1963). It alleges that the orders are illegal
upon the grounds: (1) that Republic Act No. 875, supplementing Commonwealth Act No. 103, has withdrawn from
the CIR the power to issue a return-to-work order; (2) that the only power granted by Section 10 of Republic Act No.
875 to the CIR is to issue an order forbidding the employees to strike or forbidding the employer to lockout the
employees, as the case may be, before either contingency had become a fait accompli; (3) that the taking in by the
University of replacement professors was valid, and the return-to-work order of March 30, 1963 constituted
impairment of the obligation of contracts; and (4) the CIR could not issue said order without having previously
determined the legality or illegality of the strike.
The contention of the University that Republic Act No. 875 has withdrawn the power of the Court of Industrial
Relations to issue a return-to-work order exercised by it under Commonwealth Act No. 103 can not be sustained.
When a case is certified by the President to the Court of Industrial Relations the case thereby comes under the
operation of Commonwealth Act No. 103, and the Court may exercise the broad powers and jurisdiction granted to it
by said Act. Section 10 of Republic Act No. 875 empowers the Court of Industrial Relations to issue an order "fixing
the terms of employment.’’ This clause is broad enough to authorize the Court to order the strikers to return to work
and the employer to readmit them. This Court, in the cases of the Philippine Marine Officers Association v. The Court
of Industrial Relations, Compañia Maritima, et al; and Compañia Maritima, Et. Al. v. Philippine Marine Radio Officers
Association and CIR Et. Al., G. R. Nos. L-10095 and L-10115, October 31, 1957, declared:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"We cannot subscribe to the above contention. We agree with counsel for the Philippine * Radio Officers’ Association
that upon certification by the President under Section 10 of Republic Act 875 the case comes under the operation of
Commonwealth Act 103, which enforces compulsory arbitration in cases of labor disputes in industries indispensable
to the national interest when the President certifies the case to the Court of Industrial Relations. The evident intention
of the law is to empower the Court of Industrial Relations to act in such cases, not only in the manner prescribed
under Commonwealth Act 103, but with the same broad powers and jurisdiction granted by that act. If the Court of
Industrial Relations is granted authority to find a solution to an industrial dispute and such solution consists in the
ordering of employees to return back to work, it cannot be contended that the Court of Industrial Relations does not
have the power or jurisdiction to carry that solution into effect. And of what use is its power of conciliation and
arbitration if it does not have the power and jurisdiction to carry into effect the solution it has adopted? Lastly, if the
said court has the power to fix the terms and conditions of employment, it certainly can order the return of the
workers with or without backpay as a term or condition of employment."cralaw virtua1aw library
The foregoing ruling was reiterated by this Court in the case of Hind Sugar Co. v. CIR, Et Al., G. R. No. L-13364, July
26, 1960.
When a case is certified to the CIR by the President of the Philippines pursuant to Section 10 of Republic Act No.
875, the CIR is granted authority to find a solution to the industrial dispute; and the solution which the CIR has found
under the authority of the presidential certification and conformable thereto cannot be questioned (Radio Operators
Association of the Philippines v. Philippine Marine Radio Officers Association, Et Al., L-10112, Nov. 29, 1957, 54
O.G. 3218).
Untenable also is the claim of the University that the CIR cannot issue a return-to-work order after a strike has been
declared, it being contended that under Section 10 of Republic Act No. 875 the CIR can only prevent a strike or a
lockout - when either of this situation had not yet occurred. But in the case of Bisaya Land Transportation Co. Inc. v.
Court of Industrial Relations, Et Al., No. L-10114, Nov. 26, 1957, 50 O. G. 2518, this Court
declared:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"There is no reason or ground for the contention that Presidential certification of labor dispute to the CIR is limited to
the prevention of strikes and lockouts. Even after a strike has been declared where the President believes that public
interest demands arbitration and conciliation, the President may certify the case for that purpose. The practice has
been for the Court of Industrial Relations to order the strikers to work, pending the determination of the union
demands that impelled the strike. There is nothing in the law to indicate that this practice is abolished." (Emphasis
supplied)
Likewise untenable is the contention of the University that the taking in by it of replacements was valid and the
return-to-work order would be an impairment of its contract with the replacements. As stated by the CIR in its order of
March 30, 1963, it was agreed before the hearing of Case 41-IPA on March 23, 1963 that the strikers would return to
work under the status quo arrangement and the University would readmit them, and the return-to-work order was a
confirmation of that agreement. This is a declaration of fact by the CIR which We cannot disregard. The faculty
members, by striking, have not abandoned their employment but, rather, they have only ceased from their labor
(Keith Theatre v. Vachon, Et Al., 187 A. 692). The striking faculty members have not lost their right to go back to their
positions, because the declaration of a strike is not a renunciation of their employment and their employee
relationship with the University (Rex Taxicab Co. v. CIR, Et Al., 40 O.G., No. 13, 138). The employment of
replacement was not authorized by the CIR. At most, that was a temporary expedient resorted to by the University,
which was subject to the power of the CIR to allow to continue or not. The employment of replacements by the
University prior to the issuance of the order of March 30, 1963 did not vest in the replacements a permanent right to
the positions they held. Neither could such temporary employment bind the University to retain permanently the
replacements.
"Striking employees maintained their status as employees of the employer (Western Castridge Co. v. National Labor
Relations Board, C. C. A. 139 F. 2d 855, 858); that employees who took the place of strikers do not displace them as
‘employees.’" (National Labor Relations Board v. A Sartorius & Co., C. C. A. 2, 140 F. 2d, 203, 206, 207.)
It is clear from what has been said that the return-to-work order cannot be considered as an impairment of the
contract entered into by petitioner with the replacements. Besides, labor contracts must yield to the common good
and such contracts are subject to the special laws on labor unions, collective bargaining, strikes and similar subjects
(Article 1700, Civil Code).
Likewise unsustainable is the contention of the university that the Court of Industrial Relations could not issue the
return-to-work order without having resolved previously the issue of the legality or illegality of the strike, citing as
authority therefor the case of Philippine Can Company v. Court of Industrial Relations, G. R. No. L-3021, July 13,
1950. The ruling in said case is not applicable to the case at bar, the facts and circumstances being very different.
The Philippine Can Company, case, unlike the instant case, did not involve the national interest and it was not
certified by the President. In that case the company no longer needed the services of the strikers, nor did it need
substitutes for the strikers, because the company was losing, and it was imperative that it day off such laborers as
were not necessary for its operation in order to save the company from bankruptcy. This was the reason of this Court
in ruling, in that case, that the legality or illegality of the strike should have been decided first before the issuance of
the return-to-work order. The University, in the case before Us, does not claim that it no longer needs the services of
professors and/or instructors; neither does it claim that it was imperative for it to lay off the striking professors and
instructors because of impending bankruptcy. On the contrary, it was imperative for the University to hire
replacements for the strikers. Therefore, the ruling in the Philippine Can case that the legality of the strike should be
decided first before the issuance of the return- to-work order does not apply to the case at bar. Besides, as We have
adverted to, the return-to-work order of March 30, 1963, now in question, was a confirmation of an agreement
between the University and the Faculty Club during a pre-hearing conference on March 23, 1963.
The University also maintains that there was no more basis for the claim of the members of the Faculty Club to return
to their work, as their individual contracts for teaching had expired on March 25 or 31, 1963, as the case may be, and
consequently, there was also no basis for the return-to-work order of the CIR because the contractual relationships
having ceased there were no positions to which the members of the Faculty Club could return to. This contention is
not well taken. This argument loses sight of the fact that when the professors and instructors struck on February
18,1963, they continued to be employees of the University for the purposes of the labor controversy notwithstanding
the subsequent termination of their teaching contracts, for Section 2(d) of the Industrial Peace Act includes among
employees "any individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with, any current labor
dispute or of any unfair labor practice and who has not obtained any other substantially equivalent and regular
employment."cralaw virtua1aw library
The question raised by the University was resolved in a similar case in the United States. In the case of Rapid Roller
Co. v. NLRB, 126 F. 2d. 452, we read:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"On May 9, 1939 the striking employees, eighty-four in number, offered to the company to return to their
153
employment. The company, believing it had not committed any unfair labor practice, refused the employees’ offer
and claimed the right to employ others to take the place of the strikers, as it might see fit. This constituted
discrimination in the hiring and tenure of the striking employees. When the employees went out on a strike because
of the unfair labor practice of the company, their status as employees for the purpose of any controversy growing out
of that unfair labor practice was fixed. Sec. 2 (3) of the Act. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board,
313 U.S. 177, 61 S. Ct. 845, 85 L. ed. 1271, 133 A. L. R 1217.
"For the purpose of such controversy they remained employees of the company. The company contended that they
could not be their employees in any event since the ‘contract of their employment expired by its own terms on April
23, 1939.’
"In this we think the company is mistaken for the reason we have just pointed out, that the status of the employees
on strike became fixed under Sec. 2 (3) of the Act, because of the unfair labor practice of the company which caused
the strike."cralaw virtua1aw library
The University, furthermore, claims that the information for indirect contempt filed against the officers of the
University (Case No. V-30) as well as the order of April 29, 1963 for their arrest were improper, irregular and illegal
because (1) the officers of the University had complied in good faith with the return-to-work order and in these cases
that they did not, it was due to circumstances beyond their control; (2) the return-to-work order and the order
implementing the same were illegal; and (3) even assuming that the order was legal, the same was not yet final
because there was a motion to reconsider it.
Again We find no merit in this claim of petitioner. We have already ruled that the CIR had jurisdiction to issue the
order of March 30, 1963 in CIR Case 41-IPA, and the return-to-work provision of that order is valid and legal.
Necessarily the order of April 6, 1963 implementing that order of March 30, 1963 was also valid and legal.
Section 6 of Commonwealth Act No. 103 empowers the Court of Industrial Relations or any Judge thereof to punish
direct and indirect contempt as provided in Rule 64 (now Rule 71) of the Rules of Court, under the same procedure
and penalties provided therein. Section 3 of Rule 71 enumerates the acts which would constitute indirect contempt,
among which is "disobedience or resistance to lawful writ, process, order, judgment, or command or a court," and the
person guilty thereof can be punished after a written charge has been filed and the accused has been given an
opportunity to be heard. The last paragraph of said section provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"But nothing in this section shall be so construed as to prevent the court from issuing process to bring the accused
party into court, or from holding him in custody pending such proceedings."cralaw virtua1aw library
The provision authorizes the judge to order the arrest of an alleged contemner (Francisco, Et. Al. v. Enriquez, L-
7058, March 20, 1954, 94 Phil., 603) and this, apparently, is the provision upon which respondent Judge Bautista
relied when he issued the questioned order of arrest.
The contention of petitioner that the order of arrest is illegal is unwarranted. The return-to-work order allegedly
violated was within the court’s jurisdiction to issue.
Section 14 of Commonwealth Act No. 103 provides that in cases brought before the Court of Industrial Relations
under Section 4 of the Act (referring to strikes and lockouts) the appeal to the Supreme Court from any award, order
or decision shall not stay the execution of said award, order or decision sought to be reviewed unless for special
reason the court shall order that execution be stayed. Any award, order or decision that is appealed is necessarily
not final. Yet under Section 14 of Commonwealth Act No. 103 that award, order or decision, even if not yet final, is
executory, and the stay of execution is discretionary with the Court of Industrial Relations. In other words, the Court
of Industrial Relations, in cases involving strikes and lockouts, may compel compliance or obedience of its award,
order or decision even if the award, order or decision is not yet final because it is appealed, and it follows that any
disobedience or non-compliance of the award, order or decision would constitute contempt against the Court of
Industrial Relations which the court may punish as provided in the Rules of Court. This power of the Court of
Industrial Relations to punish for contempt an act of non-compliance or disobedience of an award, order or decision,
even if not yet final, is a special one and is exercised only in cases involving strikes and lockouts. And there is
reason for this special power of the industrial court because in the exercise of its jurisdiction over cases involving
strikes and lockouts the court has to issue orders or make decisions that are necessary to effect a prompt solution of
the labor dispute that caused the strike or the lockout, or to effect the prompt creation of a situation that would be
most beneficial to the management and the employees, and also to the public — even if the solution may be
temporary, pending the final determination of the case. Otherwise, if the effectiveness of any order, award, or
decision of the industrial court in cases involving strikes and lockouts would be suspended pending appeal then it
can happen that the coercive powers of the industrial court in the settlement of the labor disputes in those cases
would be rendered useless and nugatory.
The University points to Section 6 of Commonwealth Act No. 103 which provides that "Any violation of any order,
award, or decision of the Court of Industrial Relations shall after such order, award or decision has become final,
conclusive and executory constitute contempt of court", and contends that only the disobedience of orders that are
final (meaning one that is not appealed) may be the subject of contempt proceedings. We believe that there is no
inconsistency between the above-quoted provision of Section 6 and the provision of Section 14 of Commonwealth
Act No. 103. It will be noted that Section 6 speaks of order, award or decision that is executory. By the provision of
Section 14 an order, award or decision of the Court of Industrial Relations in cases involving strikes and lockouts are
immediately executory so that a violation of that order would constitute an indirect contempt of court.
We believe that the action of the CIR in issuing the order of arrest of April 29, 1963 is also authorized under Section
19 of Commonwealth Act No. 103 which provides as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SEC. 19. Implied condition in every contract of employment. — In every contract of employment whether verbal or
written, it is an implied condition that when any dispute between the employer and the employee or laborer has been
submitted to the Court of Industrial Relations for settlement or arbitration pursuant to the provisions of this Act . . .
and pending award, or decision by the Court of such dispute . . . the employee or laborer shall not strike or walk out
of his employment when so enjoined by the Court after hearing and when public interest so requires, and if he has
already done so, that he shall forthwith return to it, upon order of the Court, which shall be issued only after hearing
when public interest so requires or when the dispute cannot, in its opinion, be promptly decided or settled; and if the
employees or laborers fail to return to work, the Court may authorize the employer to accept other employees or
laborers. A condition shall further be implied that while such dispute . . . is pending, the employer shall refrain from
accepting other employees or laborers, unless with the express authority of the Court, and shall permit the
continuation in the service of his employees or laborers under the last terms and conditions existing before the
dispute arose . . . A violation by the employer or by the employee or laborer of such an order or the implied
contractual condition set forth in this section shall constitute contempt of the Court of Industrial Relations and shall be
punished by the Court itself in the same manner with the same penalties as in the case of contempt of a Court of
First Instance . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library
We hold that the CIR acted within its jurisdiction when it ordered the arrest of the officers of the University upon a
complaint for indirect contempt filed by the Acting Special Prosecutor of the CIR in CIR Case V-30, and that order
was valid. Besides those ordered arrested were not yet being punished for contempt; but, having been charged, they
were simply ordered arrested to be brought before the Judge to be dealt with according to law. Whether they are
guilty of the charge or not is yet to be determined in a proper hearing.
Let it be noted that the order of arrest dated April 29, 1963 in CIR Case V-30 is being questioned in Case G. R. No.
L-21278 before this Court in a special civil action for certiorari. The University did not appeal from that order. In other
words, the only question to be resolved in connection with that order in CIR Case V-30 is whether the CIR had
jurisdiction, or had abused its discretion, in issuing that order. We hold that the CIR had jurisdiction to issue that
order, and neither did it abuse its discretion when it issued that order.
In Case G. R. No. L 21462 the University appealed from the order of Judge Villanueva of the CIR in Case No. 1183-
MC, dated April 6, 1963, granting the motion of the Faculty Club to withdraw its petition for certification election, and
from resolution of the CIR en banc, dated June 5, 1963, denying the motion to reconsider said order of April 6, 1963.
The ground of the Faculty Club in asking for the withdrawal of that petition for certification election was because the
issues involved in that petition were absorbed by the issues in Case 41-IPA. The University opposed the petition for
withdrawal, but at the same time it moved for the dismissal of the petition for certification election.
It is contended by the University before this Court, in G. R. No. L-21462, that the issues of employer-employee
relationship between the University and the Faculty Club, the alleged status of the Faculty Club as a labor union, its
majority representation and designation as bargaining representative in an appropriate unit of the Faculty Club
154
should have been resolved first in Case No. 1183-MC prior to the determination of the issues in Case No. 41-IPA,
and, therefore, the motion to withdraw the petition for certification election should not have been granted upon the
ground that the issues in the first case were absorbed in the second case.
We believe that these contentions of the University in Case G. R. No. L-21462 have been sufficiently covered by the
discussion in this decision of the main issues raised in the principal case, which is Case G. R. No. L-21278. After all
the University wanted CIR Case 1183- MC dismissed, and the withdrawal of the petition for certification election had
in a way produced the situation desired by the University. After considering the arguments adduced by the University
in support of its petition for certiorari by way of appeal in Case G. R. No. L-21278, We hold that the CIR did not
commit any error when it granted the withdrawal of the petition for certification election in Case No. 1183-MC. The
principal case before the CIR is Case No. 41-IPA and all the questions relating to the labor disputes between the
University and the Faculty Club may be threshed out, and decided, in that case.
In case G. R. No. L-21500 the University appealed from the order of the CIR of March 30, 1963, issued by Judge
Bautista, and from the resolution of the CIR en banc promulgated on June 28, 1963, denying the motion for the
reconsideration of that order of March 30, 1963, in CIR case No. 41-IPA. We have already ruled that the CIR has
jurisdiction to issue that order of March 30, 1963, and that order is valid, and We, therefore, hold that the CIR did not
err in issuing that order of March 30, 1963 and in issuing the resolution promulgated on June 28, 1963 (although
dated May 7, 1963) denying the motion to reconsider that order of March 30, 1963.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction in Case G. R.
No. L-21278 is dismissed and the writs prayed for therein are denied. The writ of preliminary injunction issued in
Case G. R. No. L-21278 is dissolved. The orders and resolutions appealed from, in Cases Nos. L-21462 and L-
21500, are affirmed, with costs in these three cases against the petitioner-appellant Feati University. It is so ordered.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-25003 October 23, 1981
LIWAYWAY PUBLICATIONS, INC., Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. PERMANENT CONCRETE WORKERS UNION,
Affiliated with the NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF TRADE UNIONS, HERMOGENES ATRAZO, AQUILINO
DISTOR, BENJAMIN GUTIERREZ, JOSE RAMOS, TIBURCIO MARDO, ERNESTO ALMARIO and DOMINGO
LEANO,Defendants-Appellants.
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila declaring permanent the writ of
preliminary injunction issued in this case and condemning the defendants (herein appellants) to pay plaintiff (herein
appellee), the amount of P10,152.42 with interest thereon at the legal rate from the commencement of this action
until fully paid, P1,000.00 as attorney's fees and costs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The case commenced when Liwayway Publications, Inc. brought an action in the CFI-Manila against Permanent
Concrete Workers Union, et al. for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and for damages it incurred when
its employees were prevented from getting their daily supply of newsprint from its
bodega.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Plaintiff alleged that it is a second sublessee of a part of the premises of the Permanent Concrete Products, Inc. at
1000 Cordeleria Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila from Don Ramon Roces, a first lessee from the aforesaid company. The
premises of the plaintiff is separated from the compound of Permanent Concrete Products, Inc. by a concrete and
barbed wire fence with its own entrance and road leading to the national road. This entrance is separate and distinct
from the entrance road of the Permanent Concrete Products, Inc. 1 chanrobles virtual law library
Plaintiff further alleged that it has a bodega for its newsprint in the sublet property which it uses for its printing and
publishing business. The daily supply of newsprint needed to feed its printing plant is taken from this
bodega.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
On September 10, 1964, the employees of the Permanent Concrete Products, Inc. who are representatives and
members of the defendant union declared a strike against their company.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library
On October 3, 1964 for unknown reasons and without legal justification, Permanent Concrete Workers Union and its
members picketed, stopped and prohibited plaintiff's truck from entering the compound to load newsprint from its
bodega. The union members intimidated and threatened with bodily harm the employees who were in the
truck.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
On October 6, 1964, union members stopped and prohibited the general manager, personnel manager, bodega-in-
charge and other employees of the plaintiff from getting newsprint in their bodega. 2 chanrobles virtual law library
Plaintiff made repeated demands to the defendants not to intimidate and threaten its employees with bodily harm and
not to blockade, picket or prohibit plaintiff's truck from getting newsprint in their bodega. Defendants refused and
continued to refuse to give in to the demands of the plaintiff.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
As a consequence thereof, plaintiff rented another bodega during the time members of the defendant union
prevented its employees from entering its bodega in the compound of Permanent Concrete Products, Inc. and thus
incurred expenses both in terms of bodega rentals and in transporting newsprint from the pier to the temporary
bodega.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
On December 14, 1964, the lower court issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the defendants
from: chanrobles virtual law library
(a) threatening and intimidating plaintiff's executive officers and their representatives, who are going to its bodega as
well as its employees who are getting newsprint from it;chanrobles virtual law library
(b) ordering the defendants and their representatives not to blockade and/or picket the compound and the gate of the
plaintiff; chanrobles virtual law library
(c) ordering the defendants not to stop, prohibit, molest and interfere with the free passage of the plaintiff in going in
and out of the bodega.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Defendant union moved to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds: chanrobles virtual law library
1. That this case arose out of a labor dispute involving unfair labor practices and, therefore, the Court of First
Instance where this action was brought has no jurisdiction to issue an injunction since this case fans within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations; chanrobles virtual law library
2. That plaintiff is not the real party in interest in whose name the present action may be prosecuted in accordance
with Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
On the first ground, defendants argued that the Court of Industrial Relations is vested with the exclusive power to
issue injunctions in labor disputes involving unfair labor practices and that in the long line of decisions, the Supreme
Court hat, repeatedly held that ordinary do not have jurisdiction to issue an injunction in any labor dispute particularly
when the Court of Industrial Relations has already acquired jurisdiction over it.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
As to the second ground, defendants argue that the real party in interest in this case is the Permanent Concrete
Products, Inc. against whom the defendants' strike and picket activities were directed and confined, and they point to
cases between the real parties in interest, namely: Permanent Concrete products, Inc. on one hand and the
Permanent Concrete Workers Union on the other, pending before the Court of Industrial Relations docketed therein
as CIR Case No. 156-Inj., Charge 212-ULP and Charge No. 1414-M.C.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library
Plaintiff Liwayway Publications, Inc. opposed the motion, alleging that: chanrobles virtual law library
155
1. There is no employer-employee relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant;chanrobles virtual law library
2. There is no labor dispute between them; chanrobles virtual law library
3. Plaintiff's compound is separate and distinct from the compound of the company where the defendant's are
employed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Defendants by way of reply to the abovementioned opposition argued that even if there was no employer-employee
relationship, still the Court of First Instance would have no jurisdiction to issue an injunction, citing several cases
holding that there could be a labor dispute regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in proximate relation of
employer and employee and that peaceful picketing is an extension of the freedom of speech guaranteed by the
Constitution, 3 a fundamental right granted to labor which cannot be enjoined.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
Since plaintiff averred in its complaint that "it is a second sublessee of a part of the premises of the Permanent
Concrete Products, Inc. at 1000 Cordeleria Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila from Don Ramon Roces, first lessee from the
aforementioned company, defendants contend that plaintiff has no cause of action against them but against Don
Ramon Roces under the provisions of Article 1654 of the New Civil Code which obliges the lessor to maintain the
lessee in the peaceful and adequate enjoyment of the lease for the entire duration of the
contract.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
On October 22, 1964, the lower court issued an order denying the motion to dismiss and motion to dissolve the writ
of preliminary injunction on the ground that there was no labor dispute between the plaintiff and defendant of which
the Court of Industrial Relations may take cognizance.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
On November 16, 1964, the court, on motion of the plaintiff, declared defendants in default. Defendants prayed for
the lifting of the order of default, which plaintiff opposed. In the order of December 16, 1964, the court denied the
motion to lift the order of default, and subsequently defendants' motion for reconsideration. Thereafter, the court
rendered its decision dated February 16, 1965 which declared permanent the writ of preliminary injunction and
ordered the defendants to pay the plaintiff jointly and severally the amount of ?10,152.42 with interest thereon at
legal rate from the commencement of the action until fully paid, Pl,000.00 as attorney's fees and the costs. Copy of
this decision was received by defendants on July 20, 1965 and forthwith, defendants filed the notice of appeal on
July 26, 1965.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
On October 12,1965, Liwayway Publications, Inc. filed with the Supreme Court a petition praying that a writ of
attachment be issued on any sum of money which is owing from the company to the union and to other defendants
to be used to satisfy the judgment in its favor should the same be affirmed by the Supreme
Court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Defendants filed an opposition to the petition for attachment alleging that even assuming that there is an amount
owing to the union from the company, such would be in the concept of uncollected wages due the strikers and,
therefore, cannot be subject of attachment as provided by Art. 1708 of the New Civil Code that the laborer's wages
shall not be subject to execution or attachment except for debts incurred for food, shelter, clothing and for medical
attendance.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The Supreme Court denied the above petition for attachment but without prejudice to the movant seeking remedy in
the Court of First Instance.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The sole issue raised in the instant appeal is whether or not the lower court has jurisdiction to issue a writ of
preliminary injunction considering that there was a labor dispute between Permanent Concrete Products, Inc. and
appellants for alleged unfair labor practices committed by the former.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
The first question that strikes Us to be of determinative significance is whether or not this case involves or has arisen
out of a labor dispute. If it does, then with certainty, section 9 of Republic Act 875, the "Industrial Peace Act", would
apply. If it does not, then the Rules of Court will govern the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction because it
will not partake the nature of a labor injunction which the lower court has no jurisdiction to
issue.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The record before Us reveals that appellant union and its members picketed the gate leading to appellee's bodega.
This gate is about 200 meters from the gate leading to the premises of the employer of the appellants. Appellee is
not in any way related to the striking union except for the fact that it is the sublessee of a bodega in the company's
compound. The picketers belonging to the appellant union had stopped and prohibited the truck of the appellee from
entering the compound to load newsprint from its bodega, the union members intimidating and threatening with
bodily harm the employees of the appellee who were in the truck. The union members also stopped and prohibited
the general manager, personnel manager including the man in-charge of the bodega and other employees of the
Liwayway Publications, Inc. from getting newsprint in said bodega. The business of the appellee is exclusively the
publication of the magazines Bannawag Bisaya, Hiligaynon and Liwayway weekly magazines which has absolutely
no relation or connection whatsoever with the cause of the strike of the union against their company, much less with
the terms, conditions or demands of the strikers. In such a factual situation, the query to be resolved is whether the
appellee is a third party or an "innocent bystander" whose right has been invaded and, therefore, entitled to
protection by the regular courts.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
At this juncture it is well to cite and stress the pronouncements of the Supreme Court on the right to picket. Thus, in
the case of Phil. Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU) vs. Judge Gaudencio Cloribel et al., L-25878, March 28,
1969, 27 SCRA 465, 472, the Supreme Court, speaking thru Justice J.B.L. Reyes, said: chanrobles virtual law library
The right to picket as a means of communicating the facts of a labor dispute is a phrase of the freedom of speech
guaranteed by the constitution. If peacefully carried out, it cannot be curtailed even in the absence of employer-
employee relationship.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The right is, however, not an absolute one. While peaceful picketing is entitled to protection as an exercise of free
speech, we believe that courts are not without power to confine or localize the sphere of communication or the
demonstration to the parties to the labor dispute, including those with related interest, and to insulate establishments
or persons with no industrial connection or having interest totally foreign to the context of the dispute. Thus, the right
may be regulated at the instance of third parties or "innocent. bystanders" if it appears that the inevitable result of its
exercise is to create an impression that a labor dispute with which they have no connection or interest exists
between them and the picketing union or constitute an invasion of their rights. In one case decided by this Court, we
upheld a trial court's injunction prohibiting the union from blocking the entrance to a feed mill located within the
compound of a flour mill with which the union had a dispute. Although sustained on a different ground, no connection
was found other than their being situated in the same premises. It is to be noted that in the instances cited, peaceful
picketing has not been totally banned but merely regulated. And in one American case, a picket by a labor union in
front of a motion picture theater with which the union had a labor dispute was enjoined by the court from being
extended in front of the main entrance of the building housing the theater wherein other stores operated by third
persons were located.
The same case state clearly and succinctly the rationalization for the court's regulation of the right to picket in the
following wise and manner: chanrobles virtual law library
Wellington and Galang are mere 'innocent bystanders'. They are entitled to seek protection of their rights from the
courts and the courts may, accordingly, legally extend the same. Moreover, PAFLU's right to peacefully picket
METBANK is not curtailed by the injunctions issued by respondent judge. The picket is merely regulated to protect
the rights of third parties. And the reason for this is not far-fetched. If the law fails to afford said protection, men will
endeavor to safeguard their rights by their own might, take the law in their own hands, and commit acts which lead to
breaches of the law. 'This should not be allowed to happen.
It may be conceded that the appellant Union has a labor dispute with the Permanent Concrete Products company
and that the dispute is pending before the Court of Industrial Relations docket therein as CIR Case No. 156-Inj.,
Charge 212-ULP and Charge No. 1414-M.C. Nonetheless, the rule laid down in the case of National Garment and
Textile Workers' Union (PAFLU) vs. Hon. Hermogenes Caluag, et al. G.R. No. L-9104, September 10, 1956, cited by
the appellants as authority holding that "where the Court of Industrial Relations has already acquired jurisdiction over
two unfair labor practices cases and much later on as a consequence thereof, the Court of First Instance cannot
legally issue a writ of preliminary injunction against the picketers. Besides, the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial
156
Relations is exclusive. (Sec. 5-a, Republic Act 875)" is not controlling, much less applicable to the instant case where lessor himself executed the lease, in which case the lessor is obliged to answer for said act of
the facts are essentially and materially different.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library trespass.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Neither is the case of SMB Box factory Workers' Union vs. Hon. Gustavo Victoriano, et al.G.R. No. L-12820, Dec. 29, The difference between simple trespass (perturbacion de mero hecho and legal trespass (perturbacion de derecho)
1957, where We held that "the Court of First Instance cannot take cognizance of an action for injunction where the is simply but - clearly stated in Goldstein vs. Roces case, supra, thus: chanrobles virtual law library
issue involved is interwoven with unfair labor practice cases pending in the Court of Industrial Relations," nor the rule
laid down in Erlanger & Galinger, Inc. vs. Erlanger & Galinger Employees Association-NATU,G.R. No. L-11907, June Briefly, if the act of trespass is not accompanied or preceded by anything which reveals a really juridic intention on
24, 1958,104 Phil. 17, holding that "even if no unfair labor practice suit has been filed at all by any of the parties in the part of the trespasser, in such wise that the lessee can only distinguish the material fact, stripped of all legal form
the Court of Industrial Relations at the time the present petition for injunction was filed in the court below, still the or reasons, we understand it to be trespass in fact only (de mero hecho). (pp. 566-567)
latter court would have no jurisdiction to issue the temporary restraining order prayed for if it is shown to its
satisfaction that the labor dispute arose out of unfair labor practices committed by any of the parties. The parties WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. Costs
would still have to institute the proper action in the Court of Industrial Relations, and there ask for a temporary against appellants.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
restraining order under sec. 9 (d) of the Industrial peace Act. " chanrobles virtual law library
SO ORDERED.
We cannot agree that the above rules cited by the appellants are controlling in the instant case for as We said in Phil.
Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU), et at. vs. Tan, 99 Phil. 854, that "with regard to activities that may be
enjoined, in order to ascertain what court has jurisdiction to issue the injunction, it is necessary to determine the
nature of the controversy, " (emphasis supplied) We find and hold that there is no connection between the appellee EN BANC
Liwayway publications, Inc. and the striking Union, nor with the company against whom the strikers staged the strike,
and neither are the acts of the driver of the appellee, its general manager, personnel manager, the man in-charge of G. R. No. L-53406 December 14, 1981
the bodega and other employees of the appellee in reaching the bodega to obtain newsprint therefrom to feed and
supply its publishing business interwoven with the labor dispute between the striking Union and the Permanent
NATIONAL UNION OF BANK EMPLOYEES, Petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE MINISTER OF LABOR, THE
Concrete Products company. If there is a connection between appellee publishing company and the Permanent
HONORABLE DEPUTY MINISTER OF LABOR, THE HONORABLE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF LABOR
Concrete Products company; it is that both are situated in the same premises, which can hardly be considered as
RELATIONS, PRODUCERS BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.chanrobles virtual law library
interwoven with the labor dispute pending in the Court of Industrial Relations between the strikers and their
employer.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
This is a petition for mandamus filed by petitioner Union to compel public respondents to conduct a certification
election among the rank and file employees of the respondent employer in Case No. LRD-M-8-360-79 or in the
The contention of appellants that the court erred in denying their motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint
alternative, to require the respondent Minister of Labor or his Deputy to act on private respondent's "Appeal" and on
states no cause of action, is likewise without merit.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
petitioner's "Motion to Dismiss with Motion to Execute." chanrobles virtual law library
Article 1654 of the New Civil Code cited by the appellants in support of their motion to dismiss, which obliges the
It appears that on August 17, 1979, petitioner Union filed a petition to be directly certified as collective bargaining
lessor, among others, to maintain the lessee in the peaceful and adequate enjoyment of the lease for the entire
agent of the rank and file employees of private respondent corporation (Annex "A"; p. 26,
duration of the contract, and therefore, the appellee publishing company should have brought its complaint against
rec.).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
the first sub-lessee, Don Ramon Roces, and not against the appellant Union is not in point. The acts complained of
against the striking union members are properly called mere acts of trespass (perturbacion de mero hecho) such that
following the doctrine laid down in Goldstein vs. Roces, 34 Phil. 562, the lessor shall not be obliged to answer for the On September 7, 1979, the date of the hearing, private respondent was required to submit on October 5, 1979 a
mere fact of a trespass (perturbacion de mero hecho) made by a third person in the use of the estate leased but the payroll of employees as of July 31, 1979. On the same date, in a handwritten manifestation, respondent employer
lessee shag have a direct action against the trespasser. The instant case fags squarely under the provisions of through counsel, agreed that as soon as the registration certificate of the local union was issued by the Ministry of
Article 1664 of the New Civil Code which provides as follows: chanrobles virtual law library Labor and that it was shown that the local union represents the majority of the rank and file, the Bank would
recognize the said union and would negotiate accordingly (Annex "B" p. 27,
rec.).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Art. 1664. The lessor is not obliged to answer for a mere act of trespass which a third person may cause on the use
of the thing leased; but the lessee shall have a direct action against the
intruder.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library On October 5, 1979, the above said registration certificate of the local union [Certificate No. 9352-LC, issued by the
Ministry of Labor] was secured. On October 15, 1979, petitioner filed a Manifestation and Urgent Motion to Decide
and submitted a copy of the Registration Certificate of the local union and union membership application of 183
There is a mere act of trespass when the third person claims no right whatever.
members out of more or less 259 rank and file employees of employer Bank, authorizing the National Union of Bank
Employees (NUBE) [herein petitioner] to represent them "as their sole and exclusive collective bargaining agent in all
The Goldstein doctrine had been reiterated in Reyes vs. Caltex (Phil). Inc., 84 Phil. 654;Lo Ching, et al. vs. Court of matters relating to salary rates, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment in the Producers Bank
Appeals, et al. 81 Phil. 601; Afesa vs. Ayala y Cia 89 Phil. 292; Vda. de Villaruel et al. vs. Manila Motor Co., Inc., et of the Philippines" (p. 38, rec.). Nonetheless, respondent corporation failed to submit the required payroll and the list
al. 104 Phil. 926; Heirs of B.A. Crumb, et al. vs. Rodriguez, 105 Phil. 391.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
of rank and file workers based on said payroll.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
virtual law library
On October 18, 1979, Med-Arbiter Climaco G. Plagata issued an order directing the holding of a certification election,
The obligation of the lessor under Art. 1654, New Civil Code, to maintain the lessee in the peaceful and adequate the dispositive portion of which reads: chanrobles virtual law library
enjoyment of the lease for the entire duration of the contract arises only when acts, termed as legal trespass
(perturbacion de derecho), disturb, dispute, object to, or place difficulties in the way of the lessee's peaceful
WHEREFORE, premises considered, a certification election is hereby ordered held, conducted, and supervised by
enjoyment of the premises that in some manner or other cast doubt upon the right of the lessor by virtue of which the
representation officers of this office within 20 days from receipt hereof. The same representation officers shall
conduct pre-election conferences in order to thresh out the mechanics and other minor details of this election
157
including the inclusion and exclusion proceedings to determine the qualified electors in this election. The choice shall
be either YES, for Petitioner, or No, for NO UNION DESIRED.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
SO ORDERED (Annex "C", pp. 28-29, rec.).
On October 19, 1979, respondent corporation filed a motion to suspend further proceedings in view of an allegedly
prejudicial issue consisting of a pending proceeding for cancellation of the registration of petitioning union for
allegedly engaging in prohibited and unlawful activities in violation of the laws (Annex "D" pp. 30-32,
rec.).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
On October 23, 1979, by agreement of the parties, respondent then Deputy Minister of Labor Amado Inciong, acting
for the Minister of Labor, assumed jurisdiction over the certification election case and the application for clearance to
terminate the services of thirteen (13) union officers by private respondent corporation. Thus, an order was issued on
the same date which reads: chanrobles virtual law library
On October 23, 1979 the parties entered into an agreement that the Office of the Ministry of Labor shall assume
jurisdiction over the following disputes under P.D. No. 823 in the interest of speedy labor justice and industrial peace:
1. certification election case; and chanrobles virtual law library
2. application for clearance to terminate thirteen (13) employees with preventive
suspension.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
(Agreement, October 23, 1979).
Accordingly, the Deputy Minister deputized Atty. Luna C. Piezas, Chief of the Med- Arbiter Section, National Capital
Region, to conduct summary investigations for the purpose of determining the definition of the appropriate bargaining
unit sought to be represented by the petitioning union as wen as compliance with the 30% mandatory written consent
in support of the petition under the bargaining unit as shall have been defined.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
On the application for clearance to terminate with preventive suspension, this Office deems it necessary, for the
mutual protection of each party's interest and to assure continuance of the exercise of their respective rights within
legal limits, to lift the imposition of preventive suspension on the subject employees. The lifting of the preventive
suspension shall include Messrs. Castro and Sumibcay who are presently on leave of absence with pay in
pursuance of the agreement reached at the level of the Regional Director. Further, should the two (2) employees'
leave credits be exhausted, they are to go on leave without pay, but this shall not be construed as done in pursuance
of the preventive suspension.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Finally, the lifting of the preventive suspension shall be without prejudice to the continuance of the hearing on the
application for clearance involving the thirteen (13) employees the determination of the merits of which shall be
disposed of at the Regional level (Annex "E", pp. 33-34, rec.).
Hence, Med-Arbiter Luna Piezas conducted hearings but withdrew, in view of the alleged utter disrespect for
authority, gross bad faith, malicious refusal to appreciate effective, prompt and honest service and resorting in
malicious and deliberate lying in dealing with Ministry of Labor officials by a certain Mr. Jun Umali, spokesman of the
Producers' Bank Employees Association. The case was then transferred to Med-Arbiter Alberto Abis on November 7,
1979 (Annex " F ", p. 35, rec.).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
During the hearing on November 9, 1979, respondent Bank failed to submit a list of rank and file employees
proposed to be excluded from the bargaining unit. Respondent Bank's counsel however, in a verbal manifestation
pressed for the exclusion of the following personnel from the bargaining unit:
1. Secretaries; chanrobles virtual law library
2. Staff of Personnel Department; chanrobles virtual law library
3. Drivers; chanrobles virtual law library
4. Telephone Operators; chanrobles virtual law library
5. Accounting Department; chanrobles virtual law library
6. Credit Investigators; chanrobles virtual law library
7. Collectors; chanrobles virtual law library
8. Messengers; chanrobles virtual law library
9. Auditing Department Personnel; chanrobles virtual law library
10. Signature Verifiers; chanrobles virtual law library
11. Legal Department Personnel; chanrobles virtual law library
12. Loan Security Custodians; and chanrobles virtual law library
13. Trust Department Personnel.
On November 19, 1979, Med-Arbiter Alberto Abis Jr. ordered the holding of certification election among the rank and
file employees but sustained the stand of respondent company as to the exclusion of certain employees. Thus, the
pertinent portion of said order reads:chanrobles virtual law library
After a careful perusal of the records, evaluation of the evidence on hand and consideration of the positions taken by
the parties, we find and so hold that Petitioner-Union has substantially complied with the mandatory and jurisdictional
requirement of 30% subscription of all the employees in the bargaining unit as prescribed by Section 2, Rule 5, Book
V of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code. Submission by the Petitioner during the hearing of
copies of the application and membership forms of its members wherein they have duly authorized Petitioner 'as
their sole and exclusive collective bargaining agent constitutes substantial compliance of the mandatory and
jurisdictional 30% subscription requirement, it appearing from the records that out of the 264 total rank and file
employees, 188 are union members who have so authorized Petitioner to
represent.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
With respect to respondent bank's motion to suspend the proceedings in the instant case pending resolution of the
cancellation proceedings now pending in the Bureau of Labor Relations, we find that the same is not tenable in the
absence of a restraining order.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
In consideration of the agreement of the parties, it is hereby ordered that the scope or coverage of the appropriate
bargaining unit should include the Head Office of the Producers Bank of the Philippines and all its branch offices and
shall comprise of an the regular rank and file employees of the bank. Excluded are all managerial and supervisory
employees, probationary, contractual and casual employees and security guards. It is further ordered that by virtue
and in consonance with industry practice as revealed by the CBAs of 18 banks submitted by Petitioner-Union, the
following positions should likewise be excluded from the bargaining unit; Secretaries of bank officials; employees of
the Personnel Department; EXCEPT Manuel Sumibcay Primi Zamora and Carmelita Sy; employees of the
Accounting Department; employees of the Legal Department employees of the Trust Department, credit
investigators, telephone operators, and loan security custodians. Signature verifiers, drivers, messengers and other
non-confidential employees included in the bank's list of proposed exclusions should be allowed to vote, but the
votes should be segregated as challenged. In case a doubt arises as to whether or not the position held by an
employee is confidential in nature, the employee should be allowed to vote, but his vote should be segregated as
challenged .
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, it is hereby ordered that a certification election be
conducted among the regular rank and file employees of the Producers Bank of the Philippines (the appropriate
bargaining unit of which is defined above) after the usual pre-election conference called to formulate the list of
qualified voters and discuss the mechanics of the election.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
It is further ordered that the election in the bank's branches outside the Metro Manila area be conducted by the
appropriate Regional Offices of the Ministry of Labor having jurisdiction over
them.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
SO ORDERED (pp. 5-7, Annex "G"; pp. 41-43, rec.; emphasis supplied).
On November 29, 1979, petitioner filed a partial appeal to the Director of Bureau of Labor Relations questioning the
exclusions made by Med-Arbiter Abis of those employees who are not among those expressly enumerated under the
158
law to be excluded. It vigorously urged the inclusion of the rest of the employees which is allegedly the usual practice
in the banking industry. It likewise urged the holding of a certification election allowing all those excluded by Med-
Arbiter Abis to vote but segregating their votes as challenged in the meantime. Hence, it averred: chanrobles virtual
law library
It is in the position of the petitioner that notwithstanding the statements above that the petition for certification should
be held immediately by allowing all those not excluded from Arbiter Abis' order to vote without prejudice to a final
decision on the matters subject of these appeal. Which we also submit that in order to expedite the proceedings
these exclusions should also be allowed to vote even pending resolution of the appeal but segregating them for
further consideration (pp. 3-4, Annex "H"; p. 46- 47, rec.).
On December 4, 1979, respondent bank likewise appealed from the aforesaid November 19, 1979 order of Med-
Arbiter Alberto Abis, Jr. to the Minister of Labor on the following grounds: chanrobles virtual law library
(1) that the act of Med-Arbiter Abis in issuing the abovesaid Order is ultra vires, full and complete jurisdiction over the
questioned petition being vested in the office of the Minister of Labor and hence the only adjudicative body
empowered to resolve the petition;chanrobles virtual law library
(2) that the fact that petitioner's Union registration was subject of cancellation proceedings with the Bureau of Labor
Relations rendered the issuance of the abovequestioned Order directing the holding of a certification election
premature; and chanrobles virtual law library
(3) that the bargaining unit was not appropriately defined [Annex " I " pp. 49-57, rec.].
On December 7, 1979, the entire records of the case were allegedly elevated as an appealed case by Regional
Director Francisco L. Estrella to the Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations and was docketed thereat as appealed
case No. A-1599-79.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
On January 21, 1980, the Union of Producers Bank Employees Chapter-NATU filed a motion to intervene in the said
petition for certification election alleging among other things that it has also some signed up members in the
respondent Bank and consequently has an interest in the petition for certification election filed by petitioner as it will
directly affect their rights as to who will represent the employees in the collective bargaining negotiations (Annex "P";
pp. 100-101, rec.).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
On January 24, 1980, the Bureau of Labor Relations Director Carmelo C. Noriel rendered a decision affirming the
Med-Arbiter's order with certain modifications, the pertinent portion of which reads: chanrobles virtual law library
Preliminarily, the issue of jurisdiction is being raised by respondent bank but we need not be drawn into nor tarry in
this issue but instead proceed to consider the merits of the case. Suffice it rather to say that the appealed order was
signed by the med-arbiter a quo and the records of the case were elevated on appeal to this Bureau by the Regional
Director of the National Capital Region. Besides respondent should not unduly press the jurisdictional issue. Such
question does not lead nor contribute to the resolution of the real pressing issue-the certification election issue. What
is at stake here is the right of the employees to organize and be represented for collective bargaining purposes by a
union at the respondent bank where none existed up to the present time. On this consideration alone, respondent's
vigorous objection alleging want of jurisdiction cracks from tangency of the
issue.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library
The matter of defining the bargaining unit, that is to say the appropriateness thereof, usually presents for
determination three questions to wit, the general type of the bargaining unit or whether it should be an industrial unit
embracing an the employees in a broad class or a craft unit that is confined to a small specialized group within a
broad class, the scope of the bargaining unit or whether it would embrace all employees in a given class at only one
plant or at several plants of an employer, and the specific composition of the bargaining unit, that is, whether or not
the unit should include employees of different occupational groups, like clerks, inspectors, technical employees, etc.
On these questions, we are not without legal guidelines. The law and the Rules are clear. The petition for certification
election, whether filed by a legitimate labor organization or by an employer case, shall contain inter alia, the
description of the bargaining unit which shall be the employer unit unless circumstances otherwise require. Thus, the
policy under the Labor Code on the matter of fixing the bargaining unit is to favor larger units and this is sought to be
implemented on a two-tiered basis. On the lower tier, the law mandates the employer unit as the normal unit of
organization at the company level, thus discouraging if not stopping fragmentation into small craft or occupational
units as what prevailed prior to the Labor Code. But the Code envisions further consolidation into larger bargaining
units. Thus, on the higher tier, the law mandates the eventual restructuring of the labor movement along the "one
union, one industry" basis. There should therefore be no doubt as to the law and policy on the fixing of the
appropriate bargaining unit which is generally the employer unit. Applying this rule to the instant case, the
appropriate bargaining unit should embrace all the regular rank and file employees at the head as well as branch
offices of respondent bank. Of course, the exception to this employer unit rule is when circumstances otherwise
require. But such is not at issue here, respondent not having adduced circumstances that would justify a contrary
composition of the bargaining unit.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Respondent however insists on the definition of the appropriate bargaining unit upon the question of whether or not
to exclude admittedly regular rank and file employees which it considers confidential, managerial and technical. This
question, it should be pointed out, does not enter the matter of defining the bargaining unit. The definition of the
appropriate unit refers to the grouping or more precisely, the legal collectivity of eligible employees for purposes of
collective bargaining. The presumption is that these employees are entitled to the rights to self-organization and
collective bargaining, otherwise they would not be, in the first place be considered at all in the determination of the
appropriate bargaining unit.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The question therefore of excluding certain rank and file employees for being allegedly confidential, managerial or
technical does not simply involve a definition of the bargaining unit but rather raises the fundamental issue of
coverage under or eligibility for the exercise of the workers' rights to self-organization and collective bargaining. On
this score, the law on coverage and exclusion on the matter should by now be very clear. Article 244 of the Labor
Code states that all persons employed in commercial, industrial and agricultural enterprises, including religious,
charitable, medical or educational institutions operating for profit shall have the right to self-organization and to form,
join, or assist labor organizations for purposes of collective bargaining. Articles 245 and 246 (ibid) provide that
security guards and managerial employees are not eligible to form, assist or join any labor organization. As defined
by the Code, a managerial employee is one who is vested with powers or prerogatives to lay down and execute
management policies and/or to hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees, or to
effectively recommend such managerial actions. All employees not falling within this definition are considered rank
and file employees for purposes of self-organization and collective bargaining.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
It is in the light of the foregoing provisions of law that the challenged order, in so far as it excludes all managerial and
supervisory employees, secretaries of bank officials, credit investigators, telephone operators, loan security
custodians, employees in the accounting, auditing, legal, trust and personnel departments respectively, should be
modified for being either superfluous, discriminatory or simply contrary to law. The express exclusion of managerial
employees in the Order is superfluous for the same is already provided for by law and is presumed when the
bargaining unit was defined as comprising all the regular rank and file employees of the bank. It is also anomalous
and discriminatory when it excluded employees of the personnel department but included specific individuals like
Manuel Simibcay Primi Zamora and Carmelita Sy. Exclusion as managerial employee is not based on the personality
of the occupant but rather on the nature and function of the position. The exclusion of the other positions is likewise
contrary to law, there being no clear showing that they are managerial employees. The mere fact of being a
supervisor or a confidential employee does not exclude him from coverage. He must strictly come within the category
of a managerial employee as defined by the Code. The Constitution assures to all workers such rights to self-
organization and collective bargaining. Exclusions, being the exception and being in derogation of such constitutional
mandate, should be construed in strictissimi juris.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Furthermore, to uphold the order of exclusion would be to allow the emasculation of the workers' right to self-
organization and to collective bargaining, statutory rights which have received constitutional recognition when they
were enshrined in the 1973 Constitution. Indeed, the further rulings that 'other non-confidential employees included
in the bank's list of proposed exclusion be allowed to vote but the votes should be segregated as challenged and that
in case of doubt as to whether or not the position held by an employee is confidential in nature, the employee should
159
be allowed to vote but his vote should be segregated as challenged' both complete the said order's self-nullifying
effects.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
At the most and indeed as a policy, exclusion of confidential employees from the bargaining unit is a matter for
negotiation and agreement of the parties. Thus, the parties may agree in the CBA, to exclude certain highly
confidential positions from the bargaining unit. Absent such agreement, coverage must be observed. In any event,
any negotiation and agreement can come after the representation issue is resolved and this is just the situation in the
instant case.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
In fine, the appropriate bargaining unit shall include a regular rank and file employees of the respondent including the
positions excluded in the challenged order dated 19 November 1979, with the exception of the secretaries to the
Bank President, Executive Vice-President, Senior Vice President and other Vice-Presidents as agreed upon by the
parties during the hearings.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Respondent vehemently interposes also the pendency of cancellation proceedings against petitioner as a prejudicial
issue which should suspend the petition for certification election.
We cannot fully concur with this contention Unless there is an order of cancellation which is final the union's
certificate of registration remains and its legal personality intact. It is entitled to the rights and privileges accorded by
law, including the right to represent its members and employees in a bargaining unit for collective bargaining
purposes including participation in a representation proceeding. This is especially true where the grounds for the
cancellation of its union certificate do not appear indubitable.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The rights of workers to self-organization finds general and specific constitutional guarantees. Section 7, Article IV of
the Philippine Constitution provides that the right to form associations or societies purposes not contrary to law shall
not be abridged. This right more pronounced in the case of labor. Section 9, Article II (ibid) specifically declares that
the State shall assure the rights of workers to self-organization ,collective bargaining, security of tenure and just and
humane conditions of work. Such constitutional guarantees should not be lightly taken much less easily nullified. A
healthy respect for the freedom of association demands that acts imputable to officers or members be not easily
visited with capital punishments against the association itself.
On the 30% consent requirement, respondent contends that the bargaining unit is not appropriately defined 'hence,
the med-arbiter's finding that there was compliance with the 30% 'jurisdictional requirement is patently erroneous. To
this we must disagree. As earlier stated, the definition of the appropriate bargaining unit does not call for an actual
head count or Identification of the particular employees belonging thereto. That is done in the pre-election
conference. It is sufficient that the bargaining unit is defined such that the employees who are part thereof may be
readily ascertained for purposes of exclusions and inclusions during the pre-election conference when the list of
eligible voters are determined.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
In this regard, respondent does not really seriously question the 264 total number of employees except for the
alleged exclusion which should reduce the number thus allegedly affecting the sufficiency of the supporting
signatures submitted. We have already ruled against the exclusions as violative of the constitutional guarantee of
workers' right to self-organization. Consequently, since 188 of the 264 employees subscribed to the petition, which
constitutes 70% of the total employees in bargaining unit, the 30% consent requirement has been more than
sufficiently complied with. In any case, even if we grant the alleged exclusions totalling about 45, the same will not
give any refuge to respondent's position. For assuming momentarily that the exclusions are valid, the same will not
fatally affect the 30% consent compliance.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Finally, lest it be so easily forgotten, a certification election is but an administration device for determining the true
choice of the employees in the appropriate bargaining unit as to their bargainer representative. Unnecessary
obstacles should not therefore be thrown on its way. Rather, the parties should take their case, if they have, directly
to the real and ultimate arbiter on the matter, the employees sought to be represented in the bargaining
unit.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, the Order dated 19 November 1979 calling for a
certification election is hereby affirmed with the modification that the same shall be conducted among all the regular
rank and file employees of the respondent bank at its head and branch offices, including those excluded in said
Order, except only the positions of secretary to the Bank President, Executive Vice-President and other Vice-
Presidents which agreed to be excluded from the bargaining unit by the parties during the hearings. The choice shall
be between the petitioner and no union.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Let the certification election be conducted within twenty (20) days from receipt hereof. The pre-election conference
shall be immediately called to thresh out the mechanics of the election. The list of qualified voters shall be based on
the July 1979 payroll of the company.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
SO ORDERED (pp. 5-9, Annex "J" pp. 63-67, rec.; emphasis supplied).
On February 11, 1980, petitioner received an undated and unverified appeal of the respondent bank to the Minister
of Labor questioning the decision of Bureau of Labor Relations Director Carmelo C. Noriel which appeal alleged
that: chanrobles virtual law library
I. THE QUESTIONED ORDER IS NULL AND VOID FOR HAVING BEEN ISSUED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION SINCE -chanrobles virtual law library
(i) It is this Honorable Office, not the BLR, that has jurisdiction over the parties' appeals from the Order of Med-
Arbiter Alberto A. Abis, Jr.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
II. ASSUMING, AD ARGUENDO, THAT THE BLR HAS JURISDICTION, THE APPEALED ORDER IS
NONETHELESS NULL AND VOID, THE BLR HAVING GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN NOT FINDING
THAT THE ORDER, DATED NOVEMBER 19, 1979, OF MED-ARBITER ABIS IS NULL AND VOID FOR HAVING
BEEN ISSUED WITHOUT AUTHORITY/JURISDICTION CONSIDERING THAT -
(i) Full and complete jurisdiction over this petition is vested in this Office, which, under P.D. 823, as amended, and
by agreement of the parties, is the adjudicative body solely and exclusively empowered to resolve this
petition.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
(ii) The fact that petitioner's Union registration is now the subject of cancellation proceedings before the BLR renders
the issuance of an Order directing the holding of a certification election premature; and chanrobles virtual law library
(iii) The bargaining unit is not appropriately defined; hence, the BLR'S and before it, the Med-Arbiter's finding that
there was compliance with the 30% jurisdictional requirement is completely without basis and, therefore, grossly
erroneous.
III. THE MOTION FOR INTERVENTION FILED BY INTERVENOR UNION OF PRODUCERS BANK EMPLOYEE'S
CHAPTER-NATU WHICH THE BLR, FOR UNKNOWN REASON(S), FAILED TO RESOLVE, RENDERS
IMPERATIVE THE REDETERMINATION OF WHETHER OR NOT THE MANDATORY 30% JURISDICTIONAL
REQUIREMENT HAS BEEN MET. (Pp. 2-3, Annex "K", pp. 69-70, rec.).
On February 21, 1980, petitioner union filed a manifestation on respondent's undated and unverified appeal (Annex
"L"; pp. 91-94, rec.).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
On the same date, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss with motion to execute (Annex " M " pp. 95-96,
rec.).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
On March 3, 1980, petitioner filed an urgent motion to resolve respondent's appeal together with pertitioner's motion
to dismiss and motion for execution ( Annex "N"; pp. 97-98, rec.).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
On March 14, 1980, petitioner received a copy of a letter endorsement dated March 7, 1980 which reads: chanrobles
virtual law library
160
Respectfully referred to the Honorable Minister of Labor, the herein attached Motion to Execute and Manifestation to
Dismiss with Motion to Execute and Manifestation on Respondent's undated and unverified Appeal dated Feb. 21,
1980 and February 20, 1980 respectively, for appropriate action.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
In a memorandum dated 9 November 1979, the Deputy Minister of Labor completely inhibited himself in this case (p.
169, rec.).
Public respondent Director Carmelo C. Noriel did not proceed to hold the certification election, neither did the
Minister of Labor act on the appeal of private respondent and on petitioner's motion to dismiss with motion to
execute.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition on March 19, 1980.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
On May 2, 1980, private respondent Bank filed its comments (pp. 111-122,
rec.).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
On June 25, 1980, public respondents filed their comment (pp. 131-142, rec.).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
On August 16, 1980, petitioner filed its memorandum (pp. 155-169, rec.).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library
On September 2, 1980, private respondent Bank filed its memorandum (pp. 179-197,
rec.).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
On October 1, 1980, public respondents filed a manifestation in lieu of memorandum alleging inter
alia that: chanrobles virtual law library
1. The instant petition for mandamus seeks to compel the respondent Minister of Labor to act on respondent
Producers Bank's Appeal and on petitioner's motion to execute the decision of respondent Director of Labor
Relations dated January 24, 1980, directing the holding of a certification election in said bank; chanrobles virtual law
library
2. The said petition, however, is now moot and academic because:
(a) Respondent Minister of Labor had already acted on the said appeal in his decision dated April 11, 1980 the
dispositive portion of which is as follows: chanrobles virtual law library
Wherefore, respondent Bank's Appeal is hereby dismissed and the validity of the Decision of January 24, 1980,
herein adopted is hereby recognized. No motion for reconsideration of this Order shall be
entertained.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
(b) Petitioner may now file, if it so desires, with respondent Director of Labor Relations, a motion for the execution of
his decision so that the certification election can be held at respondent bank;
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the instant petition be dismissed for being moot and academic (pp. 201-
202, rec.; emphasis supplied).
On October 10, 1980, petitioner filed a "Manifestation Re: Decision of the Minister of Labor" alleging among other
things that.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library
2. Petitioner had not received any copy of such April 11, 1980 decision of the Minister of Labor mentioned by the
Honorable Solicitor General. In fact, the Comment of the public respondents dated June 11, 1980 signed by
Assistant Solicitor General Octavio R. Ramirez and Trial Attorney Elihu A. Ybañez made no mention of the same in
the private respondent's memorandum of September 2, 1980" (p. 204, rec.).
On October 28, 1980, petitioner filed a comment on manifestation of the Honorable Solicitor General dated 30
September 1980 and motion alleging therein that despite inquiries made, no official copy of the alleged April 11,
1980 decision of the Minister of Labor mentioned in the manifestation of the Solicitor General has been furnished the
petitioner. Hence, it prayed that the Minister of Labor be requested to submit to this Court a certified copy of the
aforesaid April 11, 1986 decision of the Minister of Labor. chanrobles virtual law library
On October 30, 1980, petitioner filed a manifestation and comment stating that: chanrobles virtual law library
1. On October 29, 1980, it received a copy of the decision of the Honorable Minister of Labor in Case No. NCR-LRD-
8-360-79 as may be seen from Annex "A".chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
2. The decision is dated October 23, 1980 and not April 11, 1980 as stated in the Manifestation in Lieu of
Memorandum of the Office of the Honorable Solicitor General, dated 30 September
1980.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
3. Petitioner respectfully request an explanation from the public respondents on this apparent discrepancy which has
in fact misled even this Honorable Court (p. 21 1, rec.).
On November 11, 1980, private respondent Bank filed a manifestation/motion stating that the aforementioned April
11, 1980 decision of the Minister of Labor is non- existent, as in fact the Minister of Labor issued an order affirming
the decision of BLR Director Noriel only on October 23, 1980.
xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library
3. Notwithstanding the issuance of the October 23, 1980 Order by the Minister of Labor, the Bank respectfully
submits that this petition for mandamus, initiated by petitioner on March 19, 1980 and given due course by this
Honorable Court should not be dismissed. The petitioner herein prays from this Honorable Court that public
respondents be ordered to conduct the certification election as ordered by Med-Arbiter Plagata, Abis and BLR
Director Noriel among the rank-and-file employees ... of the Bank. Alternatively, the petitioner prays that the Minister
of Labor or his Deputy be required "to act forthwith" on the appeal filed by petitioner herein As could be gleaned
clearly from the allegations and prayer in this petition for mandamus, the petitioner primarily seeks the holding of a
certification election Only secondarily is it asking this Court to command the Minister of Labor or his Deputy to
resolve the appeal filed by the Bank.
4. The affirmance by the Minister of the disputed order of BLR Director Noriel thus renders moot and academic only
the secondary or alternative prayer of the Union in this mandamus case. What still remains for resolution by this
Honorable Courts the issue squarely put before it on the propriety or impropriety of holding a certification
election. This issue has been traversed by the petitioner and the Bank in their respective memoranda filed with this
Court, with the Bank stressing that a certification election would be improper because, among others, the petitioning
Union violated the strike ban, there is a pending case for cancellation of its registration certificate, and applications
for clearance to dismiss the Union's striking members are pending approval by the BLR
Director.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
5. A dismissal of this petition for mandamus would unduly delay the resolution of the issue of whether a certification
election should be held or not.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, it is respectfully moved that this Honorable Court rule on the issue of whether or not
a certification election should be held under circumstances obtaining in the present case (pp. 214-216, rec.;
emphasis supplied).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
On November 24, 1980, public respondents filed a reply to the manifestation and comment of petitioner explaining
the discrepancy of the two dates-October 23, 1980, the actual date of the order of the Minister of Labor affirming the
decision of the BLR Director and April 11, 1980, the date mentioned by the Solicitor General as the alleged date of
161
the aforesaid order of the Minister of Labor. Thus, the pertinent portion of the letter of Director Noriel to the Solicitor
General likewise explaining the apparent discrepancy of the aforesaid dates reads: chanrobles virtual law library
It should likewise invite your attention to the date of the Order which is October 23, 1980 and not April 11, 1980 as
indicated in the "Manifestation in Lieu of Memorandum" dated September 30, 1980 of the Solicitor General filed with
the Supreme Court. The April 11, 1980 date must have been based on a draft order which was inadvertently included
in the records of the case that was forwarded to your office. We wish to point out, however, that the dispositive
portion as quoted in the Manifestation is exactly the same as that in the Order eventually signed and released by the
Labor Minister on October 23, 1980 (p. 220, rec.).
Public respondents further averred that "(I)n any event, whether the order is dated April 11, 1980 or October 23,
1980 will not matter since both 'orders' dismissed the appeal of the respondent Bank, upon which dismissal the
Manifestation in Lieu of Memorandum dated September 30, 1980, of public respondents, was based." Public
respondents thus reiterated their prayer that the instant petition be dismissed for being allegedly moot and academic
(pp. 219-222, rec.).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
On December 5, 1980, petitioner filed a comment to manifestation/motion of counsel for private respondent
alleging inter alia that "... should the Honorable Court be minded to resolve the issue raised in the
Manifestation/Motion of private respondent-i.e.-whether the alleged strike ban violation is a bar to a certification
election, it will be noted that the matter of whether there has been a 'violation' of the strike ban or not is still to be
heard by the Regional Director through Labor Arbiter Crescencio Trajano after this Honorable Court dismissed G.R.
No. L-52026 on the matter of jurisdiction competence of the Regional Director to hear the question raised therein. To
the present, although, the Regional Director has commenced to act on the case, there is no decision on whether the
strike ban has been violated by the petitioner union." Petitioner union vigorously asserted that while private
respondent Bank has a pending petition for cancellation of the registration certificate of herein petitioner union, it is
still premature for private respondent Bank to claim that the petitioner union has violated the strike ban. Petitioner
then alleged that "(T)here is also no proof or decision that acts indulged in by the petitioner and its
members amounted to a strike and even assuming arguendo that such act (which was the holding of a meeting for
30 minutes before office time in the morning) constitutes a 'strike' and further that such act violates the strike ban. It
has been held through Honorable Justice Antonio P. Barredo in Petrophil. vs. Malayang Manggagawa sa ESSO (75
SCRA 73) that only the leaders and members who participated in the illegal activity are held responsible. If this were
so, then the rest of the members who are innocent are still entitled to the benefits of collective bargaining. There is
thus no need to delay the holding of a certification election on the alleged ground that there is a pending action of the
respondent company against the petitioner union for 'violation of the strike ban' " (pp. 226-227,
rec.).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
It is likewise pointed out by petitioner union that even if it would be ultimately confirmed that indeed petitioner union
has violated the strike ban, cancellation of the registration certificate of petitioner union is not the only disciplinary
action or sanction provided for under the law but other penalties may be imposed and not necessarily cancellation of
its registration certificate.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
On January 12, 1981, pursuant to the resolution of this Court dated December 4, 1980, petitioner union filed its
rejoinder which reiterated the stand of the Solicitor General that the present case has become moot and academic by
virtue of the decision of the Minister of Labor affirming the decision of the BLR Director which ordered a certification
election (p. 230, rec.).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
It is quite obvious from the facts set forth above that the question of jurisdiction vigorously asserted by herein private
respondent Bank has become moot and academic.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
What therefore remains for this Court to resolve is the issue as to whether or not a certification election should be
held under the circumstances obtaining in the present case. Is it proper to order a certification election despite the
pendency of the petition to cancel herein petitioner union's certificate of registration? chanrobles virtual law library
The Court rules in the affirmative. The pendency of the petition for cancellation of the registration certificate of herein
petitioner union is not a bar to the holding of a certification election. The pendency of the petition for cancellation of
the registration certificate of petitioner union founded on the alleged illegal strikes staged by the leaders and
members of the intervenor union and petitioner union should not suspend the holding of a certification election,
because there is no order directing such cancellation (cf. Dairy Queen Products Company of the Philippines, Inc. vs.
Court of Industrial Relations, et al. No. L-35009, Aug. 31, 1977). In said Dairy Queen case, one of the issues raised
was whether the lower court erred and concomitantly committed grave abuse of discretion in disregarding the fact
that therein respondent union's permit and license have been cancelled by the then Department of Labor and
therefore could not be certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of the rank and file employees of
therein petitioner company.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
While the rationale of the decision was principally rested on the subsequent rescission of the decision ordering the
cancellation of the registration certificate of the respondent union, thereby restoring its legal personality and an the
rights and privileges accorded by law to a legitimate organization, this Court likewise declared: "There is no showing,
however, that when the respondent court issued the order dated December 8, 1971, certifying the Dairy Queen
Employees Association CCLU as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of all regular rank and file
employees of the Dairy Queen Products Company of the Philippines, Inc., for purposes of collective bargaining with
respect to wages, rates of pay, hours of work and other terms and conditions for appointment, the order of
cancellation of the registration certificate of the Dairy Queen Employees Association-CC-1,U had become final" 78
SCRA 444-445. supra, emphasis supplied).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
It may be worthy to note also that the petition for cancellation of petitioner union's registration certificate based on the
alleged illegal strikes staged on October 12, 1979 and later November 5-7, 1979 was evidently intended to delay the
early disposition of the case for certification election considering that the same was apparently filed only after the
October 18, 1979 Order of Med-Arbiter Plagata which directed the holding of a certification
election.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Aside from the fact that the petition for cancellation of the registration certificate of petitioner union has not yet been
finally resolved, there is another fact that militates against the stand of private respondent Bank, the liberal approach
observed by this Court as to matters of certification election. In a recent case, Atlas Free Workers Union (AFWU)-
PSSLU Local vs. Hon. Carmelo C. Noriel, et al. (No. 51005, May 26, 1981), "[T]he Court resolves to grant the
petition (for mandamus) in line with the liberal approach consistently adhered to by this Court in matters of
certification election. The whole democratic process is geared towards the determination of representation, not only
in government but in other sectors as well, by election. Thus, the Court has declared its commitment to the view that
a certification election is crucial to the institution of collective bargaining, for it gives substance to the principle of
majority rule as one ' of the basic concepts of a democratic policy" (National Mines and Allied Workers Union vs.
Luna, 83 SCRA 610).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Likewise, Scout Ramon V. Albano Memorial College vs. Noriel, et al. (L-48347, Oct. 3, 1978, 85 SCRA 494, 497,
498), this Court citing a long catena of cases ruled: chanrobles virtual law library
... The institution of collective bargaining is, to recall Cox, a prime manifestation of industrial democracy at work. The
two parties to the relationship, labor and management, make their own rules by coming to terms. That is to govern
themselves in matters that really count. As labor, however, is composed of a number of individuals, it is
indispensable that they be represented by a labor organization of their choice. Thus may be discerned how crucial is
a certification election. So our decisions from the earliest case of PLDT Employees Union v. PLDT Co. Free
Telephone Workers Union to the latest, Philippine Communications, Electronics & Electricity Workers' Federation
(PCWF) v. Court of Industrial Relations, had made clear. The same principle was again given expression in language
equally emphatic in the subsequent case of Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions v. Bureau of Labor
Relations: 'Petitioner thus appears to be woefully lacking in awareness of the significance of a certification election
for the collective bargaining process. It is the fairest and most effective way of determining which labor organization
can truly represent the working force. It is a fundamental postulate that the will of the majority, if given expression in
an honest election with freedom on the part of the voters to make their choice, is controlling. No better device can
assure the institution of industrial democracy with the two parties to a business enterprise, management and labor,
establishing a regime of self-rule.' That is to accord respect to the policy of the Labor Code, indisputably partial to the
holding of a certification election so as to arrive in a manner definitive and certain concerning the choice of the labor
organization to represent the workers in a collective bargaining unit (emphasis supplied).
It is true that under Section 8, Rule II, Book V of the Labor Code, cancellation of registration certificate may be
imposed on the following instances: chanrobles virtual law library
162
(a) Violation of Articles 234, 238, 239 and 240 of the Code;chanrobles virtual law library
(b) Failure to comply with Article 237 of the Code; chanrobles virtual law library
(c) Violation of any of the provisions of Article 242 of the Code; and chanrobles virtual law library
(d) Any violation of the provisions of this Book.
The aforementioned provisions should be read in relation to Article 273, Chapter IV, Title VIII which explicitly
provides:chanrobles virtual law library
Art. 273. Penalties. - (a) Violation of any provision of this Title shall be punished by a fine of One Thousand Pesos [P
l, 000.00] to Ten Thousand Pesos [P 10, 000.00] and/or imprisonment of one (1) year to five (5)
years.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
(b) Any person violating any provision of this Title shall be dealt with in accordance with General Order No. 2-A and
General Order No. 49.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
(c) Violation of this Title by any legitimate labor organization shall be grounds for disciplinary action including, but not
limited to, the cancellation of its registration permit.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
x x x x x x x x xchanrobles virtual law library
(emphasis supplied).
From the aforequoted provisions, We are likewise convinced that as it can be gleaned from said provisions,
cancellation of the registration certificate is not the only resultant penalty in case of any violation of the Labor
Code.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Certainly, the penalty imposable should be commensurate to the nature or gravity of the Legal activities conducted
and to the number of members and leaders of the union staging the illegal
strike.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
As aptly ruled by respondent Bureau of Labor Relations Director Noriel: "The rights of workers to self-organization
finds general and specific constitutional guarantees. Section 7, Article IV of the Philippine Constitution provides that
the right to form associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged. This right is more
pronounced in the case of labor. Section 9, Article II (ibid) specifically declares that the State shall assure the rights
of workers to self-organization, collective bargaining, security of tenure and just and humane conditions of work.
Such constitutional guarantees should not be lightly taken much less easily nullified. A healthy respect for the
freedom of association demands that acts imputable to officers or members be not easily visited with capital
punishments against the association itself" (p. 8, Annex "J"; p. 66, rec.).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
WHEREFORE, THE WRIT OF mandamus PRAYED FOR IS GRANTED AND RESPONDENT BLR DIRECTOR
NORIEL HEREBY ORDERED TO CALL AND DIRECT THE IMMEDIATE HOLDING OF A CERTIFICATION
ELECTION. NO COSTS.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-49580 January 17, 1983
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR UNIONS (PAFLU), CATALINO LUZANO, FELICIANO RUBIO,
PRUDENCIO JALANDONI, RODOLFO ANASTACIO, DOMINADOR REUBAL, DOMINGO BARREDO, ELISEO
CARPIO, LEONARDO ESPEJON, RUFINO AGUA, WILFREDO ADEFUIN, NICASIO MORDENO, JOSE
FERRERAS, HONORIO UNTAL and APOLINARIO DIZON, Petitioners, vs. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
RIZAL, HON. EUTROPIO MIGRINO, PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS COMPANY, INC. and ALFREDO
CHING, Respondents.
The question raised in this certiorari and prohibition proceeding is the lack of jurisdiction of respondent Court of First
Instance of Rizal to entertain a criminal suit arising from what is alleged to be, an illegal strike. Such a question was
raised in a motion to quash on the ground that the then applicable Presidential Decrees 1precluded the fiscal from
filing any information without exhausting the jurisdictional requisites. The failure to do so was for petitioner
even more objectionable because the labor dispute which gave rise to such a strike had been
settled.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The information sets forth the acts by which the criminal liability of petitioners is predicated. Thus: "That on or about
the 19th day of February, 1976, in the Municipality of Pasig, Province of Rizal, Philippines, a place within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, who are officers and/or members of the Philippine
Association of Free labor Unions (PAFLU) Luzano Faction and who are laborers of the Philippine Blooming Mills
Company, Inc., a corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine Laws which is engaged in the
manufacture, production and/or processing of various steel products, a VITAL INDUSTRY, conspiring and
confederating together, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously stage or declare a strike by
establishing picket lines in front of the factory of the Philippine Blooming Mills Company, Inc., thus resulting in work
stoppage and paralization of various works and projects in the factory premises, to the damage and prejudice of the
said factory." 2Upon the filing of the petition, this Court required comment on the part of the respondents and issued
atemporary restraining order. The jurisdictional question involved arose from the fact that there was then a pending
case before the National Labor Relations Commission. For petitioners, it was impressed with a pre-judicial character.
Its resolution then was called for before a strike can be stigmatized as illegal. Moreover, it was contended that the
National Labor Relations Commission and eventually the then Secretary of Labor, not the courts that should
determine its legality or illegality. In their comment, private respondents argued that the criminal case could proceed
as no labor dispute was involved. Hence, there was no jurisdictional infirmity that could call for the grant of the writ
prayed for. For reasons to be given, we find for petitioners.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
1. There is much to be said for the jurisdictional issue raised. If apparently there is a failure on the part of
respondents to take into consideration the force and effect of Presidential Decree No. 849 amending Presidential
Decree No. 823. Section 1 of the latter decree reads as follows: "It is the policy of the State to encourage trade
unionism and free collective bargaining within the framework of compulsory and voluntary arbitration and therefore all
forms of strikes, picketing and lockouts are hereby strictly prohibited." 3It was issued on November 3, 1975. Clearly
there was a flat prohibition of the right to strike. Then came on December 16, 1975 the amendatory Presidential
Decree. By virtue thereof, certain strikes were deemed illegal primarily those in vital industries. There is even then
exception provided for, namely that "any legitimate labor union may strike and any employer may lockout in
establishments not covered by General Order No. 5 only on grounds of unresolved economic issues in collective
bargaining, in which case the union or the employer shall file a notice with the Bureau of Labor Relations at least 30
days before the intended strike or lockout." 4The Decree goes on to state: "Should the dispute remain unsettled
thereafter, the union may go on strike and the employer may lockout unless the President or his duly authorized
representative certifies the dispute to the National Labor Relations Commission for compulsory arbitration in the
interest of national security or public safety, public order, the protection of public health or morals, or the protection of
the rights and freedom of others. Such certification shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the strike or
lockout." 5What is more the amendatory Decree specifically recognizes the right to strike. Thus: "If not certified, the
union may strike and the employer may lockout."6Even if it be assumed, therefore, that private respondents are
engaged in a vital industry, a point this Court does not have to decide, the question of whether or not the strike is
tainted with illegality remains. At the very least then, the filing of the information on July 1, 1976 was
premature.chanrobles virtual law library
2. That conclusion receives reinforcement from the submission of petitioners that the National Labor Relations
Commission, ultimately the President for certification purposes, that determines the question of legality or lack of it.
That is to conform with what this Court has so long and so consistently held on this issue. That principle was followed
as far back as the Court of Industrial Relations Act. It was to such tribunal that the primary jurisdiction was vested.
163
The rationale is not difficult to discern. For in the language ofSecurity Bank Employees Union-NATU v. Security Bank
& Trust Co., 7it was "better equipped by training, experience, and background to handle labor controversies ... ." 8In
the Philippine American Management & Financing Co., Inc. v. Management & Supervisors Association of the Phil-
American Mgt. & Financing Co., Inc., 9this Court even went to the extent of holding that a petition for declaratory
relief regarding the interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement was wither the jurisdiction of the then Court of
Industrial Relations. So it should be under the present Labor Code, with its avowed philosophy of leaving to the
appropriate Ministry of Labor agencies, rather than to the Court, the settlement of labor disputes. For respondents to
assert that a strike does not involve a controversy of that kind is to lose sight of
realities.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
3. What justifies the interposition of the corrective authority of this Tribunal even more is the fact that the information
is limited to petitioners having engaged in picketing. It need not be stressed that peaceful picketing is embraced in
freedom of expression. As emphatically declared in Philippine Commercial & Industrial Bank v. Philnabank
Employees' Association: 10"From the time of Mortera v. Court of Industrial Relations, a 1947 decision this Court has
been committed to the view that peaceful picketing is part of the freedom of speech guarantee of the
Constitution." 11Reference was made in such opinion to Associated Labor Union v. Gomez. 12In that case, the Court
characterized the orders complained of as being "fatally defective, suffering as it did from the infirmity that peaceful
picketing was enjoined." 13It is in that sense that Presidential Decree No. 849 was a step in the right direction for the
status of picketing was again accorded due recognition, chanrobles virtual law library
4. The present law on the subject, Batas Pambansa Blg. 227, is even more emphatic: "(e) No person engaged in
picketing shall commit any act of violence, coercion or intimidation or obstruct the free ingress to or egress from the
employer's premises for lawful purposes, or obstruct public thorough fares." 14That makes it even more imperative
that this petition be granted. For it is therein provided: "All laws, decrees, rules and regulations or parts thereof
inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed or modified accordingly." 15The Act was made to take effect upon its
approval which took place on June 1, 1982, when President Marcos affixed his signature. Since it is the penal aspect
of Presidential Decree No. 823 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 849 that is the basis for the criminal action, it
follows that whatever offense might have been committed is now no longer
punishable.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted and the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 19214 of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Branch VI, declared null and void and of no force and effect. The writ of prohibition is likewise
granted, respondent Judge Eutropio Migri�o or whoever would be appointed to the appropriate branch of the
Regional Trial Court prohibited from acting in any wise or form except to dismiss the aforesaid case. The temporary
restraining order issued in tills case is made permanent. Costs against private respondent.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-26346. February 27, 1971.]
PHILIPPINE FEDERATION OF PETROLEUM WORKERS (PFPW) and MALAYANG MANGGAGAWA SA
ESSO, Petitioners, v. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and ESSO STANDARD EASTERN,
INC.,Respondents.
[G.R. No. L-26355. February 27, 1971]
ESSO STANDARD EASTERN, INC., Petitioner, v. PHILIPPINE FEDERATION OF PETROLEUM WORKERS
(PFPW), MALAYANG MANGGAGAWA SA ESSO and the COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, Respondents.
Two separate appeals from a decision of the Court of Industrial Relations on an industrial dispute and strike declared
on February 19, 1965, by members of the Malayang Manggagawa sa Esso (MME) and certified on November 5,
1965 to said court by the President of the Philippines.
On November 13, 1965, the striking union, MME, affiliate of the Philippine Federation of Petroleum Workers and the
employer-company, Esso Standard Eastern, Inc. (ESSO), concluded without the trial court’s intervention, a return to
work agreement pending the resolution of their labor dispute by the industrial court, and jointly sought the court’s
approval thereof, which was granted in a partial, decision dated November 27, 1965, enjoining the parties comply
with the terms thereof.
This gave a peculiar aspect to the case at bar, as noted by the trial court itself in its decision in that "the parties to the
labor dispute have agreed on a set of proposals to be litigated as issues in this case, and the same parties have by
express stipulation reserved determination of other issues in cases now pending determination in other branches of
this Court."cralaw virtua1aw library
Thus, of eleven demands filed by the striking union after the filing of the joint motion for approval of the return to work
agreement dated November 12, 1965 — although the trial court had earlier issued in open court an order on
November 5, 1965, for the union to formalize in a petition all its demands in connection with the case — the trial court
in its decision at bar dismissed outright four demands since they "are not any of those specifically provided as
litigable issues in these proceedings and are issues in the other cases pending before the different salas of the court
of industrial relations. The parties themselves by the terms of their Return to Work Agreement of November 12, 1965
have reserved these cases for judicial determination in the different salas where they are now pending
consideration."cralaw virtua1aw library
These four dismissed demands 1 involved three demands of the striking union for reinstatement with back wages of
its members, strike duration pay and discharge of all scabs, strike breakers or replacements and the giving back of
such positions to the returnees to work, and stoppage of further acts of discrimination and coercion against the
striking union’s members — and were held by the trial court to depend on the determination of the legality of the
strike as well as the alleged confabulation between the company and a rival union, the Citizens Labor Union (CLU),
which were issues reserved by the parties’ agreement for resolution by other branches of the industrial court in two
other pending cases of unfair labor practice (Cases Nos. 4289-ULP and 4301-ULP). The fourth dismissed demand
was for the company to turn over to MME the union dues checked off under the company’s collective bargaining
agreement with its rival CLU from employees who are (MME) members, which the trial court held should be resolved
in the pending certification election case (Case No. 1459-MC).
This left six demands 2 to be passed upon by the trial court in the case below. The irregularity and undesirability of
such a splitting of the issues and piece-meal procedure could not but be noted by the trial court itself in its decision in
this wise: "Before proceeding, however, with the determination of the demands so mentioned, it must be emphasized
that this is a proceeding arising out of a certification by the President of the Philippines, pursuant to Section 10 of
Republic Act No. 875. It indicates the degree of urgency required in the settlement of the terms and conditions of
employment involved in the labor dispute. If in the course of arriving at a fair and just determination certain aspects
obtaining in the other cases between the parties have to be resolved, or that certain evidentiary matters might come
up for evaluation, which aspects and/or matters may likewise be subject to a similar or different evaluation in the
other cases between the same parties, then this Court may not shirk from its duty to determine the same, in
compliance with the directives of the presidential certification and the mandates of the law decreeing such
certification."cralaw virtua1aw library
While none of the parties specifically assigned as error this irregular procedure, (since they were mainly responsible
therefor in having split the issues and expressly reserved other issues for determination in the other case pending in
other branches of the industrial court), the Court takes note thereof and declares that such a procedure was
erroneous. As noted by the trial court itself, this proceeding arises out of a certification by the President of the
Philippines under section 10 of Republic Act No. 875 3 and per se indicates the degree Or urgency required in the
settlement of the terms and conditions of employment involved in the labor dispute. The industrial court, in such
cases, is empowered to act therein with the broad powers and jurisdiction granted it by law, 4 including the power of
conciliation and compulsory arbitration; it is empowered to order the return to work of the workers with or with out
backpay, and "shall not be restricted to the specific relief or demands made by the parties to the industrial dispute,
but may include in the award, order or decision any matter or determination which may be deemed necessary or
expedient for the purpose of settling the dispute or of preventing further industrial disputes." 5
Where the industrial dispute has been certified by the President to the industrial court, therefore, all issues involved
in the industrial dispute should be aired and determined in the case, where the dispute as certified by the President is
docketed. The parties should not be permitted to isolate other germane issues or demands and reserve them for
determination in the other cases pending before other branches of the industrial court, as was done here. All such
164
other pending cases should be consolidated in, or at least jointly tried 6 by, the branch which has taken cognizance
of the case over the certified industrial dispute towards the end that all the issues and demands may be finally
determined and the dispute definitely settled, rather than merely arrive at a piece-meal settlement as in the case at
bar, with the added disadvantage as noted by the trial court that in passing upon certain issues before it, it would
have to rule upon certain aspects likewise involved in the other cases and on which the other branches might reach a
contrary evaluation and conclusion.
Concretely applied to the case at bar, the trial court, therefore, should not have approved the return to work
agreement submitted independently and with exclusion of relevant issues by the parties, but as the branch where the
dispute as certified by the President was docketed, required the consolidation, or arranged with the other branches
for the joint trial, of all the other cases pending in the other branches, with the certification and compulsory arbitration
case before it, after which it could have issued a return to work order, and thus avoided the anomalous situation
confronting us where the full resolution this certified dispute is deferred and made to await and depend on the
separate decisions of the other branches of the industrial court in other cases. Certainly, the issues involved in said
cases and covered by the four demands of the striking union dismissed outright by the trial court (since the parties
were erroneously permitted to reserve them for separate determination by the other branches of the industrial court,
as above stated) — dealing as they do with alleged acts of discrimination and coercion against the members of the
striking union (MME) and of alleged confabulation between the company and the union (CLU) as well as with the
legality of the strike — were hardly segregable from the very core of the dispute which the trial court was empowered
and called to settle as a whole.
We believe that this would have been the most expeditious procedure to resolve all issues in the urgent industrial
dispute certified to the industrial court as involving the national interest, unlike that followed in the case at bar, where
the lower court was compelled to hand down its piece-meal decision instead of conclusively settling the dispute as
authorized by law, since resolution of the other related cases had to await the decision yet to be handed down by the
other branches where they were pending. As a practical matter, this would have saved the time of the industrial court
and parties and would avoid needless duplication of effort and hearings. More importantly, as a matter of public
interest — since all the issues involved in the cases which gave rise to the industrial dispute and strike were all
related and did not involve mere economic demands but unfair labor practice charges which are specially impressed
with public interest — public policy would have been subserved by the consolidation or joint trial of all the cases to
enable the industrial court to discharge its task of finally settling the dispute once and for all and preventing further
industrial disputes, rather than leaving a number of related issues unresolved to await the decisions of other
branches of said court.
In the light of this fait accompli which impeded the total settlement of the urgent dispute to the prejudice of the
workers, the Court will proceed to the review of the trial court’s decision on the limited issues and demands taken
cognizance of and subject of the present appeals. These six demands of the striking union were the
following:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"No. 1. — That the position of Assistant truck drivers or truck helpers and fillers should not be abolished.;
"No. 2. — In the event that the Can Plant is closed, all employees therein will be transferred to other plant duties and
their position titled will not be changed nor will their wages presently earned be reduced;
"No. 3. — No change in terms and conditions of employment of employees assigned now to the Manila International
Airport or JOCASP which includes, among others, meal allowances and overtime shall be made;
"No. 5. — That Rodolfo Espiritu and Reynaldo Recio, Vice-President and Secretary, respectively, of Petitioner union
be reinstated immediately;
"No. 7. — The retirement age of employees shall be 60, as has been the previous practice of the Company, and all
those who have been retired by the Company at earlier than the age be 60 shall be reinstated; and
"No. 9. — The memorandum of agreement dated January 6, 1965 be declared invalid and that any loss of benefits
by reason of the enforcement of such agreement be restored to the employees concerned."cralaw virtua1aw library
In ruling upon these demands, the trial court first gave the following background facts:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The predecessor of the respondent company was Standard Vacuum Co. In 1960, the latter was split into the
present company and Mobil Philippines. The respondent absorbed all the working force in Luzon (t.s.n. 35, 36, Feb.
18, 1966; 23-24, Feb. 17, 1966). The Pandacan terminal to which most of the employees involved in this case were
assigned is the main distribution center for bulk and package products both during the time of Standard Vacuum
Company and subsequently when the splitting of this company took place afterwards. Because of this development
plus improved and more efficient operating conditions, respondent company realized that it has extra or excess
personnel, which later on were termed redundant employees.
"On April 8, 1963, respondent company and the Citizens Labor Union (the majority bargaining representative)
executed a Collective Bargaining Agreement (Exhibits ‘M’ & ‘1’) for a period of three years (up to July 8, 1966). At the
time of signing of this Agreement, almost all if not all of the present members of the petitioner MME were then
members of the contracting union including its incumbent president.
"Among the pertinent provisions of this Agreement as following and we quote:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"‘Section 1, Article II — Nothing in this Agreement contained shall be deemed to limit the Company in any way in the
exercise of the regular and customary functions of Management.
"‘Section 2 (supra) — The Union acknowledges that the Company, in the exercise of these functions of
management, has the sole end exclusive right among others, but not limited to, determine the number and locations
of the work sites; select and direct the working force; assign work including the transfer of tasks among and between
the jobs; change the means, methods, processes and schedule of operations; determine the complement and
schedule of the various units, promote, transfer, lay off employees; maintain order, suspend, demote, discipline and
discharge employees for causes; and maintain the efficiency of employees.
"‘It is expressly understood that the exercise by the Company of any of the foregoing functions shall not alter any of
the specific provisions of this Agreement, nor shall they be used to discriminate against any employee because of
membership in the Union. It is further understood that, in determining reassignments, employees will be assigned
normally to related and comparable work whenever this is feasible and consistent with efficient operations. Such
reassignments will be prompted normally by emergencies, operational needs of the business and/or lack of work.
x x x
"‘Section 2, Article IX — An employee who has completed three (3) consecutive years of service, but less than ten
(10) years of service, and who is terminated by the Company, will be granted a termination allowance of three (3)
weeks’ base pay for each year of credited service.
"‘An employee who has completed ten (10) or more consecutive years of service and who is terminated by the
Company will be granted a termination allowance of ore (1) month’s base pay for each year of credited service.
x x x
"There appears to be no dispute as far as the validity or this Collective Bargaining Agreement is concerned. What
appears to be in controversy is the interpretation of the different provisions of the same.
"In the Memorandum dated September 30, 1963 (Exh.’15’), approximately five months after the above-mentioned
Collective Bargaining Agreement, respondent company offered a special separation payment due to extensive
redundancy existing at its Pandacan Terminal. The memorandum in question indicated that the same is by
application on a voluntary basis, and the deadline for the filing of applications was set on October 4, 1963.
"On November 8, 1963, another agreement appears to have been executed between the Citizens Labor Union and
respondent company (Exh.’17’). This agreement while emphasizing that the same is not a renegotiation of the
165
Agreement of April 8, 1963, superseded and added certain terms and conditions of the said April 8, 1963 Agreement.
"The relevant portions of the Agreement are quoted as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"x x x
"‘Regular employees may continue to work up to the age of sixty (60) so they may enjoy Social Security Benefits
provided the employee upon examination is found to be medically and physically fit.
"‘x x x
"‘9. This agreement shall not in any way be considered as a renegotiation or change in any term or condition in the
Working Agreement of April 8, 1963 or a waiver of the rights, responsibilities and obligations of each party to the
other as contained therein, and that said Working Agreement of April 8, 1963 will continue in full force and effect until
its expiration date, without modification of any kind whatsoever.
"On January 6, 1965 another Memorandum of Agreement was executed between the Citizens Labor Union and
respondent company (Exh.’B’). It is to be noted that this Agreement was acknowledged before a Notary Public on
January 15, 1965. Emphasis was again laid in this Agreement that the same is to be considered as a renegotiation or
a change of the Collective Bargaining Agreement on April 8, 1963. The terms and conditions of this Agreement
(Exh.’B’) are substantial similar to terms and conditions of the Return to Work Agreement of November 12, 1965, and
the retirement age of eligible employees was placed at 55 years.
"‘It is well to pause and note certain significant aspects of the circumstances thus far narrated as follows:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
(a) The present members of the MME, with the exception of one admitted by petitioner, were all member of the
Citizens Labor Union at the time the Agreement 8, 1963 was executed as well as the Agreement 8, 1963;
(b) That respondent company, as early as April 8, 1963, has the acknowledged right to terminate employees covered
by the agreement either due to excess of work force or improved means, of operation;
(c) That the different Agreements, e.g. of April 8, 1963, November 8, 1963, January 6, 1965 cannot be dissociated
and be treated as independent of each other in view of the express provisions in the latter agreement that whatever
has been agreed upon cannot be considered as a renegotiation of April 8, 1963 Agreement;
(d) That in the several agreements mentioned (Exh.’M’, Exh ‘17’, Exh.’B’) the retirement age has been variously
mentioned at either 55 or 60 years of age;
(e) That it was only on the Agreement of January 6, 1965 that the respondent company seemed to have actively and
compulsorily exercised its rights to terminate its employees under certain conditions due to redundancy;
(f) The principle of seniority seems to be the main and only factor, hence the LIFO lists, meaning last in-first out,
where the less senior employees are first to be terminated. While the Agreement of April 8, 1963 speaks of ability to
perform the work and physical fitness (Article X, Exh.’M’) before length of service is taken into consideration, yet it is
likewise to be noted that this sole criterion or seniority in respect to termination due to redundancy has not been
seriously questioned, nor was it ever made an issue. In fact petitioner MME in certain portions of the evidence
questioned that some employees who were less senior were said to have been excluded from the lists.
"The succeeding events after January 1, 1965 Agreement and before the strike of February 19, 1965 seem to be in a
confused state. At one point petitioner MME it would seem knew of this Agreement of January 6, 1965 and this was
one of the reasons of the strike (t.s.n. 10, Nov. 6, 1965). In another instance the same petitioner said they saw this
Agreement while they were already on strike (t.s.n. 44, Dec. 2, 1965). At any rate it would seem that the petitioner
MME was apprised of the terms of the January 6, 1965 Agreement in the conciliation talks prior to the strike (t.s.n.
35, Dec. 3, 1965). It is likely therefore, that one of the reasons for the strike of the petitioner on Feb. 19, 1965 was
their disagreement to the said Agreement of Jan. 6, 1965.
"On February 15, 1965, the president of petitioner MME sent a letter to the Superintendent of respondent’s
Pandacan Terminal (Exh.’H’ and ‘6’) protesting the notice from respondent’s Dispatching Office that drivers of tank
trucks ‘are being required to proceed to their respective destination without being accompanied by one (1) truck
helper each, as usual.’ Petitioner claimed that this was a change in a condition of employment which may not be
done without a Court order — referring to the proceedings in 1459-MC quoted above.
"The following day, February 16, 1965, respondent company’s Terminal Superintendent answered ‘That inasmuch as
you are bringing to our attention a grievance regarding working conditions, we suggest that you follow the grievance
procedure as stipulated in the Working Agreement under Article ‘12’ (Exhibit ‘8’).
"Another letter was sent by petitioner MME (Exh.’7’) stating therein the status quo mentioned during the hearing of
Case No. 1459 MC, that no grievance could be possible, as petitioner claims that under the contract [it is] the
Citizens Labor Union and not the petitioner MME who must bring the matter as a grievance and the former cannot be
expected to file the grievance because "it has in fact agreed to the abolition of the position of truck helpers and other
bargainable positions in the contract.’ The letter, also stated the suspension of two (2) truck drivers on February 16,
1966, (sic) both MME members, for refusal to drive [without] the usual truck helpers. And on February 17, 1965, two
more drivers were suspended, for the same reason.
"The above incidents starting with the hearing of February 22, 1965 up to the dismissal of the four (4) truck drivers
mentioned, is (sic) claimed by the petitioner MME as one of their reasons for striking.
"On February 19, 1965 petitioner MME struck."cralaw virtua1aw library
The trial court in its decision denied five of the demands, and granted that against the reduction of the retirement age
of the employees from 60 years to 55 years, subject to certain conditions therein stated, as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"(1) By way of supplementing the Partial Decision of this Court of November 27, 1965 and relative to Demands Nos.
1, 2, 3, 5 and 9.
"(a) Respondent company is allowed to abolish the positions of Assistant Truck Drivers or truck helpers and fillers;
"(b) The can plant of respondent company is hereby allowed to be closed and those employees if any, remaining as
Can Plant Operators after the redundancy program is completed will be transferred to other plant duties and, when
reassigned, their position titles will not be changed nor will their wages presently earned be reduced;
"(c) The terms and conditions of employment of employees assigned to the Manila International Airport of JOCASP
shall be the terms embodied in paragraph 5(f) of the Return to Work Agreement of November 12, 1965;
"(d) The immediate reinstatement of Rodolfo Espiritu and Reynaldo Recio is denied. Respondent company is,
however, enjoined to give preference to the re-employment of three persons;
"(e) The Memorandum Agreement of January 6, 1965 (Exhibit ‘B’) is hereby declared valid, without prejudice to
issues arising from the same and now pending in CIR Cases Nos. 3903-ULP, 3934-ULP, 1459-MC, 4289-ULP and
4301-ULP as mentioned in paragraph 7 of the Return to Work Agreement of November 12, 1965;
"(2) Demand No. 7 is granted subject to the following conditions:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"(a) All employees who were retired at 55 years or over and below 60 years shall be entitled to reinstatement,
provided, any benefits received by them on account of said retirement shall first be reimbursed to respondent
company, to start not less than sixty (60) days from receipt of this Decision and to be deducted monthly from their
pay envelopes in twelve equal installments." 7
Hence, these appeals by the parties, after the industrial court’s en banc denial of their respective motions for partial
reconsideration of the portions of the decision adverse to them.
1. We shall start this review with the major demand of the striking union (MME) for maintenance of the retirement age
166
of the company’s employees at age 60 in accordance with the collective bargaining agreement with the CLU and for
the reinstatement of those employees retired at an earlier age under the company’s supplementary agreement of
January 6, 1965 with the CLU. A resolution of this issue will help in considering the other demands as denied by
respondent court and appealed from in turn by the MME. As stated above, this was the only demand of the MME
granted by respondent court and from which the company has appealed.
Respondent court thus laid the basis for the granting of this demand: "One of the provisions of the Agreement of
November 8, 1963 is to the effect that regular employees may continue to work up to the age of 60. Then in the
Memorandum of Agreement of January 6, 1965, this age was reduced to 55 years. It must be remembered that the
benefits and advantages of a Collective Bargaining Agreement once made by the duly recognized bargaining
representative are open and available to all employees within the coverage of the agreement. The respondent
company having agreed at one instance to the 60 years age retirement cannot now renege on this provision no
matter how monetarily attractive is the retirement benefit. It is here where the Court should legitimately interfere
because retirement is more than a mere term or condition of employment. It involves the livelihood and welfare of the
employee himself. The same may be subject to bargaining or negotiations, but once agreed, every employee within
the appropriate unit who is expected to avail of such benefit cannot be deprived of the same by subsequent
negotiations of the representative union." Respondent court, however, ordered that the amounts received by the
prematurely retired employees whose reinstatement it had ordered should be reimbursed to the company by
deduction from their pay envelopes in twelve equal installments.
On appeal, the company contends that its retirement of such employees at age 55 or over and below 60, for a period
of one year as provided for in its memorandum of agreement of January 6,1965 with the CLU as the employees’
bargaining agent, and in pursuance of its legitimate redundancy program, was valid and legal.
No error was committed by respondent court since it correctly held that as the retirement age of the company’s
workers was definitely fixed at 60 years in the supplemental agreement of November 8, 1963, such retirement age,
assuring the very livelihood and welfare of employees and their security of employment, became the law between the
company and each of its employees for the duration of the stipulated three-year period of their collective bargaining
agreement up to July 8, 1966. The same could no longer be subject to revision or reduction during the life of the
agreement without the consent or ratification of the employees, and no worker could be deprived of such vested
contractual right by subsequent unauthorized negotiations of the representative union. 8
This view is further strengthened when it is taken into account that in December, 1964, a good number of the
company’s employees, said to be a majority, disaffiliated from the CLU which had concluded the subsisting
agreement of April 8, 1963 and joined the MME; on January 7, 1965, the MME filed with the industrial court its
petition for certification election (Case 1459-MC) praying that it be certified, in lieu of the CLU, as the exclusive
bargaining agent of all the employees and authorized to administer the agreement during its remaining term on the
ground that it represented the majority of said employees and that the CLU had lost its majority status and could no
longer be considered as their bargaining representative; at the certification election conducted by the Labor
Department on March 22, 1965, pursuant to the industrial court’s order, which the CLU boycotted, the MME obtained
the votes of more than one-half of the rank and file employees of the ESSO Pandacan Terminal Unit eligible to vote
(185 out of 202 employees who voted, from a total 351 employees eligible to vote) and was certified on April 26,
1965 by the industrial court as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of the employees.
The case was elevated by the CLU to this Court by its petitions of May 9, 1965 and June 10, 1965, both entitled
Citizens Labor Union-CLU v. C.I.R. 9 Since the bargaining agreement had thereafter expired on July 8, 1966, and in
view of "the manifestation, advanced with vehemence, of both the CLU and the ESSO that after the secret ballot
election held on March 22, 1965, the employee composition has substantially changed because a great number of
the employees and laborers in the Pandacan Terminal unit have left their employment, retired, or been compulsorily
laid off with the approval of the CIR. On its part, ESSO further claims that the salient facts obtaining in the two cases
before us have been so altered by the lapse of time and by developments shaped and brought about by the parties
themselves, that ‘nothing will be gained if an altered factual situation is compelled to await a decision applicable to an
entirely different set of facts,’" this Court ordered the remand of the cases to the industrial court for further action as
warranted by the environmental circumstances.
Against the above backdrop, the facts noted by the industrial court that the agreement dated January 6, 1965
between the CLU and the company was actually acknowledged before a notary public only on January 15, 1965
(after the MME’s petition for certification election challenging the CLU’s majority status had been filed on January 7,
1965) and that "it was only on the agreement of January 6, 1965 that the respondent company seemed to have
actively and compulsorily exercised its rights to terminate its employees under certain conditions due to redundancy"
gain great significance.
The company thereby at its own risk, aware as it was of the binding effect of the retirement age of 60 fixed in the
subsisting agreement, which by its own terms "is the full settlement between the parties for the duration (t)hereof"
(Article XVI) and of the uncertain majority status of the CLU by virtue of the disaffiliation of a great number of its
members who joined the MME, entered into the so-called supplementary agreement of January 6, 1965 and sought
to enforce the reduced retirement age of 55 therein provided, notwithstanding the express disclaimer therein that it
"shall not in any way be considered as a renegotiation or change in any term or condition in the Working Agreement
of April 8, 1963 . . . and that said Working Agreement . . . will continue in full force and effect until its expiration date,
without modification of any kind whatever."cralaw virtua1aw library
Prior to the agreement dated January 6, 1965 or January 15, 1965, the date of its acknowledgment, as noted by the
industrial court, the company had not sought to actively and compulsorily retire its employees at 55 or to terminate
them under its so-called excess employees or redundancy program. The split of its predecessor company, Stanvac,
into ESSO and Mobil Philippines, which caused its so-called redundant employees allegedly by its absorption of all
the working force in Luzon, had occurred since 5 years ago in 1960. Yet, it had renewed on April 8, 1963 a three-
year collective bargaining agreement with the CLU as the full settlement of the terms and conditions of employment
of its employees for the duration of the agreement.
The company was apparently satisfied with the status quo of its relations with the employees as long as they all
pertained to the CLU, for it had agreed to no cutbacks of redundant employees, nor does it claim to have incurred
losses in its business. 10 Yet, when the MME came on the scene and claimed to be entitled to be the recognized
representative of the employees under the subsisting agreement, it forced the situation and entered into the
agreement of January 6, 1965 with the CLU to advance the retirement age to 55 and to enforce other cut-backs of its
employees, knowing full well that the very authority of the CLU to represent the employees who had precisely
disaffiliated from the CLU and joined the MME was open to serious question and was being ventilated before the
industrial court.
Then, too, even if the CLU could legally be considered by it as the representative of the employees, the CLU had no
authority to negotiate on, much less waive, the vested contractual right of the employees to their security of
employment up to age 60. It hardly seems disputable, then, that its agreement of January 6, 1965 with the CLU
served both the company’s and the CLU’s ends to thwart the majority support for the MME, which had won the
certification election held on March 22, 1965. Thus, in their common stand in CLU v. CIR, supra, with the passage of
time, they did succeed in effect in nullifying the results of the election and by virtue of the company’s sudden
realization of its redundancy program and unrelenting enforcement thereof, pursuant to its January 6, 1965
agreement with the CLU, were able to use it to represent to this Court in the said case that "the employee
composition has substantially changed because a great number of the employees and laborers in the Pandacan
Terminal unit have left their employment, retired, or been compulsorily laid off with the approval of the CIR."cralaw
virtua1aw library
The industrial court’s disauthorization of the advanced retirement must, therefore, be affirmed. However, in view of
the time that has elapsed since its decision of April 27, 1966 without its reinstatement order for the employees
prematurely retired at 55 years or over and below 60 years having been implemented due to this appeal, and they
must by now have reached the stipulated retirement age of 60, the award should be modified to the effect that all
such compulsorily prematurely retired employees shall be paid back wages from date of such premature retirement
to the date of their contractual compulsory retirement at age 60; they shall be entitled likewise to the retirement
benefits stipulated under the collective bargaining agreement of April 8, 1963 or subsequent renewals thereof from
which must be deducted, however, the amount of any benefits received by them on account of and at the time of
their premature retirement.
2. Conformably to the foregoing, respondent court’s denial of the MME’s two demands against the abolition of the
positions of assistant truck drivers or truck helpers and fillers and against the company’s change of the terms and
conditions of employment of employees assigned to the MIA or JOCASP (demands Nos. 1 and 3, resolved in
paragraph 1 [a] and [c] of the decision’s dispositive part, supra) should be set aside.
167

The two separate positions of assistant truck drivers or truck helpers and fillers, with their corresponding wage rates,
were duly provided for and defined in the collective bargaining agreement. The assistants’ work in the care of the
huge delivery trucks, some of whom have 24,000 liters capacity and several compartments, and in the unloading of
products at delivery points and standing by with a fire extinguisher while the driver operates the truck’s pumping unit
for unloading, the fillers’ work of loading the tank trucks at the terminal compound, and the transfer of their duties to
the driver alone, who was given an increased wage of P1.60 a day for the filling of the truck and driving without a
helper, were discussed by the parties at the trial.
The MME also objected to the assignment to the Manila International Airport or JOCASP units of the company of
employees formerly assigned to the Pandacan terminal, without transportation and meal allowances which were
discontinued by the company, notwithstanding the additional financial burden on the employees who had made their
residence at Pandacan, which instead gave them a wage increase of P1.60 per day.
Respondent court denied the MME’s demands, ruling that it did not wish to substitute its judgment "for a purely
management function who is in a better position to determine its day to day business operations."cralaw virtua1aw
library
The actions of the company in abolishing the positions and withdrawing the benefits previously enjoyed by the
employees by virtue of its agreement of January 6, 1965 with the CLU, whose right to represent the employees was
being challenged by the MME, were tainted, however, as stated above, by their common end of thwarting the
majority support for the MME. Indeed, as of the time of the execution of said agreement of January 6, 1965, whereby
the CLU strangely enough yielded hard-won benefits end terms of employment in the collective bargaining
agreement, the record does not indicate that the company was justified in considering the CLU as the majority
bargaining representative, for its loss of majority status was in fact borne out by the results of the March 22, 1965
certification election. The benefits of the subsisting collective bargaining agreement may not be peremptorily
modified without the 30-day notice required by law 11 nor summarily set aside and disregarded, since relations
between capital and labor are not merely contractual but are impressed with public interest such that labor contracts
must yield to the common good. 12 There is no claim here that the employees had been duly notified by the CLU of,
much less that they had ratified, the modifications provided in the January 6, 1965 agreement which worked against
their interest. 13
3. Respondent court’s resolution of the MME’s two other demands (Nos. 2 and 5, resolved in paragraph 1 [b] and [d]
of the decision’s dispositive part, supra), allowing the closure of the company’s can plant and denying the
reinstatement of the MME’s vice president and secretary, the former having voluntarily applied for and secured
termination benefits, apparently bear the MME’s acquiescence. They have not been assigned as errors in the MME’s
brief and respondent court’s action on these two items is affirmed.
4. On the MME’s sixth demand (No. 9), respondent court’s resolution declared valid the memorandum agreement of
January 6, 1965 assailed by the MME "without prejudice to issues arising from the same and now pending in CIR
Cases Nos. 3903-ULP, 3934-ULP, 1459-MC, 4289-ULP and 4301-ULP as mentioned in paragraph 7 of the Return to
Work Agreement of November 12, 1965." This appears to be in consonance with the parties’ express reservation for
separate determination of other issues in the other cases pending in other branches of the industrial court, dealt with
in the first part of this decision. The MME in its brief has not raised specific particulars wherein its members have
been prejudiced by said agreement and on which the Court can pass judgment. Respondent court, while declaring
the said agreement valid, made the express reservation that it was not passing upon the MME’s charges of
discrimination on the part of the company in the implementation of the agreement and expressly held that "Both
parties it must be reiterated, have reserved these discriminatory aspects for determination in the different cases now
pending, also in this Court. Since these matters are not necessary in the determination of the issues before this
Court certainly their final resolution are left to the various cases in the other salas." Respondent court’s action, as
thus qualified, is therefore affirmed.
5. With regard to the MME’s demand that the company turn over to it the union dues checked off under the
company’s collective bargaining agreement with the CLU from employees who disaffiliated from CLU and instead
joined it (MME), respondent court had dismissed the same, on the ground that its resolution properly pertained to the
certification election case between the rival unions. Respondent court committed no error in refusing MME’s demand
for the turn over to it of the checked off dues, since its right thereto depended upon its officially replacing the CLU as
the certified bargaining representative of the employees.
The MME contends in its brief on appeal, however, that respondent court erred in allowing the company to continue
checking off the union dues for the CLU despite the employees disaffiliation from said union and their written
individual revocation of their previous check-off authorizations. The company in turn justified its action of continuing
to make such deductions and remitting the checked-off dues to the CLU on the ground that its collective bargaining
agreement with the CLU provided that the check-off authorization would be irrevocable for the three-year duration of
the agreement as a security for the union (CLU).
It was error on the part of respondent court to allow the company to continue the check off of dues for the CLU of
employees who had withdrawn their authorization by virtue of their affiliation with the MME. As stated by Justice
Montemayor in Pagkakaisa . . . (PAFLU) v. Enriquez, 14 the employees’ check off authorization, even if declared
irrevocable, is good only as long as they remain members of the union concerned, because as such members they
were obliged to pay the corresponding dues and assessments to their union;" (H)owever, the moment that they
separated from and left the union and joined another labor organization, then they were no longer obliged to pay said
dues and assessments; naturally, there would be no longer any reason or occasion for the company to continue
making deductions."cralaw virtua1aw library
However, since after the expiry of the CLU’s bargaining agreement on December 31, 1966, respondent court had
directed that all union dues checked off from all employees be deposited in court pending the results of the new
certification election (Case No. 1820-MC) and the company duly complied therewith, 15 the question has become
moot.
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered affirming the decision appealed from insofar as paragraph 1, sub-
paragraphs (b), (d) and (e) as well as paragraph 2, sub-paragraph (a) of the dispositive part thereof (supra) 16 are
concerned; the award in said paragraph 2(a) disauthorizing the advanced retirement of employees is however
modified in the manner indicated in the paragraph of paragraph 1 of this decision. 17 The respondent court’s denial
of the two demands covered in paragraph 1(a) and (c) of the dispositive part of the appealed decision is set abide,
and the abolished positions and withdrawn benefits are ordered restored, as prayed for. With costs in both cases
against Esso Standard Eastern, Inc.
1. These four demands were numbered Nos. 4, 8, 10 and 11 in the list filed by the union.
2. The eleventh demand (No. 6) was that the company should not declare any position redundant without notice or
he the side. of the unions. It was considered by the trial court as a restatement of the union’s stand against the
company’s redundancy program" for reassignment of excess employees and abolition of certain job positions, and is
taken up in the trial court’s decision.
3. "SEC. 10. Labor Disputes in Industries Indispensable to the National Interest. — When in the opinion of the
President of the Philippines there exists a labor dispute in an industry indispensable to the national interest and when
such labor dispute is certified by the President to the Court of Industrial Relations, said Court may cause to be issued
a restraining order forbidding the employees to strike or the employer to lockout the employees, pending an
investigation by the Court, and if no other solution to the dispute is found, the Court may issue order fixing the terms
and conditions of employment.
6. See Phil. Steam Navigation Co. v. Phil. Marine Officers Guild, Et Al., 15 SCRA 174 (Oct. 29, 1965), where various
unfair labor practices filed by the union against three shipping companies as well as against the union were jointly
tried case over the certified industrial dispute, and a single decision rendered resolving all the issues.
11. "SEC. 13. . . . (W)here there is in effect a collective bargaining agreement, the duty to bargain collectively shall
also mean that neither party shall terminate or modify such agreement, unless it has served a written notice upon the
other party of the proposed termination or modification at least thirty days prior to the expiration date of the
agreement, or in the absence of an express provision concerning the period of validity of such agreement prior to the
time it is intended to have such termination or modification take effect." (RA 875).
168