Development of Phone Tapping Evidence

zSubject:

zLaw 0f Evidence

Submitted t0:

Pr0f. K. Vidyullatha Reddy

Submitted by:

Vaibhav Ramsamuz Pasi

zB.A. L.L.B. (Hons.)

Vth Semester
2017-5LLB-34

1
zTABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................... 3

ANALYSIS ..................................................................................................................................... 4

CONSTITUTIONAL VALIDITY OF PHONE TAPPING LEGISLATIONS .......................... 5

JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION ................................................................................................ 6

Prior to Information Techno1ogy Act, 2000 ............................................................................ 6

After the Information Techno1ogy Act, 2000.......................................................................... 7

CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................. 11

2
 INTRODUCTION
The 1aw needs t0 keep it’s pace with the evolving time t0 pr0vide f0r c0nstituti0na11y va1id and . .

just 0utc0me. Apex court has c1arified that in case the 1aw fai1s t0 cater t0 the upc0ming needs 0f
.

the s0ciety 0wing t0 the c0nstant change, then the 1aw wi11 pr0ve t0 have adversaria1 effect by either
0bstructing the s0cieta1 pr0gress 0r questi0ning the 1egitimacy 0f 1aw. 1aw is a mirr0r image 0f

s0ciety and cu1ture. Even if everything is n0t ech0ed thr0ugh 1aw, a drastic change inadvertent1y
gets ref1ected 0therwise, it wi11 bec0me archaic and theref0re, use1ess. Techn010gy has deep impact
0n 0ur s0ciety which has bec0me all pervasive 0ver a11 the d0mains 0f 0ur 1ives. Since techn010gy

can d0 w0nders bey0nd imaginati0n 0f human mind, such evidence cann0t be re1ied up0n
c0mp1ete1y. One am0ng this sort 0f evidence is 0f ph0ne tapping that has br0ught a sea of changes
in the way we perceive evidence in India. New 1aws have been made t0 c0unter such evidence in
the 1ega1 world.

Theref0re, whatzis essentia1 t0 be n0ted is thatzit needszt0 ev01ve 0ver timezin 0rder t0 c0unter
the cha11enges p0sed t0wards it by the c0nstant s0cieta1zchanges. Sciencezand techn010gy are
theref0re, a1s0 gr0wing with an unc0ntr011ab1ezspeed whichzhas made it pr0b1ematic f0r the 1ega1
pr0fessi0na1s t0 tack1e suchzadvancement. Hencef0rth, the issuezneeds t0 bezaddressed.

Owing t0 the maj0r scientificzadvancements, the 1aw 0f evidencezhas t0 facezvari0us cha11enges

whi1e w0rking thr0ugh advanced ways 0f rec0rd-keeping and pr0cessing 0fzdata. This asks f0r
certainzchanges in the 1aws 0f digita1zevidence. The g0vernment t00k a stepzin this regardzby
bringing the Inf0rmati0n Techn010gyzAct (2000). This Act br0ught e1ectr0nic evidencezwithin the
d0main 0f EvidencezAct by makingzit admissib1e as a va1id piece 0fzevidence1.

1
TejaszD. Karia, DigitalzEvidence: An IndianzPerspective, 5 DIGITAL EVIDENCEzAND ELECTRONIC
SIGNATUREzLAWzREVIEW 214 (2008).

3
 ANALYSIS
Aszper Secti0n 3 0f the EvidencezActz(1872), the w0rd ‘evidence’ is inc1usive 0f 0ra1 and
testamentaryzevidence. Thr0ugh thezintr0ducti0n 0f the Inf0rmati0n Techn010gyzAct 0f 2000, the
ambitz0f evidence waszextended t0 inc0rp0rate e1ectr0niczevidence. In c0ns0nance withzthese
eff0rts, Secti0ns 65Azand 65B wereza1s0 added t0 thezEvidence Act in 0rder t0 meetzthe
immediatezneeds 0f ascertainingzthe e1ements 0f digita1 evidence2. Secti0n 65A serves as s0urce
reference 0f Secti0n 65B t0 1ay d0wn the situati0ns under which an e-evidence is admissib1e.

Itzis pertinent t0 n0tezthat inzState (NCT 0f Delhi) v. Navj0t Sadhu3, it waszsaid thatz the mandates
menti0ned U/S 65 Bz0f thezEvidence Act, 1872 d0 n0t st0p thezparties fr0m presenting sec0ndary
evidence under secti0ns 1ike Secti0ns 63 0r 65. The judgmentzpaved azway f0r the judgeszt0
bypass the specia1 1aws and thezrequirements as per theznew 1egis1ati0n. The judgeszinzfact, stuck
t0 Secti0ns 1ike Secti0n 63 and 65 whichzsh0u1d 0n1y bezused in cases 0f 0rdinary evidence.

In thezsubsequent casez0f Anvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheerzand 0rs. 4, Secti0ns 65Azand 65Bzwere
given pri0rity. This judgmentz0verru1ed Navj0t Sadhu5, andz1aid d0wn that Secti0n 65A and 65B
c0me under specia1 1aw andzthus, givezrise t0 a c0de inzthem. The princip1e 0f lexzspecialis
der0gat legi generali waszused by the c0urt t0zput f0rward that inzcases where b0th genera1 1aw
and specia1 1awzexist, specia1 1aw wi11 prevai1 0ver genera1 1aw. Theref0re, when therezexist
Secti0ns 65Azand 65B as specia1 1aw f0r the admissibi1ity 0f digita1 evidence, they w0u1d 0verride
the genera1 1awzenshrined U/S 63 and 65. It was a1s0 he1d byzthe c0urt that
wherezthezrequirements 0f Secti0n 65B arezn0t met, even the 0ra1 evidencez0f e1ectr0nic rec0rd
was impermissib1e.

Since the digita1 0r e1ectr0nic evidence is n0w 1ega11y admissib1e within c0urts, the f100dgates f0r
severa1 types 0f evidences are a1s0 0pen. 0ne 0f suchzevidence is ph0ne tapping. Ph0ne tappingzis
very c0ntenti0us as an admissib1ezpiecez0fzevidence 0wing t0 manyzc0nf1ictingzinterests at b0th
statezand individua1 1eve1.

2
SocietezdeszProductszNestlezSA v EssarzIndustries, 2006 (33) PTC 469 Del.
3
AIRz2005zSC 3820.
4
MANU/SC/0834/2014.
5
Supraz3

4
CONSTITUTIONAL VALIDITY OF PHONE TAPPING LEGISLATIONS
The Indian Te1egraphzAct, 1855zand the Inf0rmati0n Techn010gyzAct, 2000 regulate ph0ne
tappingzin India. Thezissueszwith ph0ne tappingzare that survei11ance byzstate 0ver its p0pu1ati0n
is in direct c0ntraventi0n t0 thezright t0 privacyzunder Artic1e 21 0f the IndianzC0nstituti0n 0f a
pers0n and s0, it sh0u1d bezpermittedzwith certain reas0nab1e restricti0ns. ThezIndian C0nstituti0n
d0es n0t describe the right t0 privacy exp1icit1y butzit is read int0 Artic1e 21. zA pers0n’s right t0
privacyzcann0t be infringed in an un1awfu1 manner as per the Artic1e 17 0f Internati0na1 C0venant
0n Civi1 and P01itica1zRights (India iszmember state 0f it). 0wing t0zthese pr0visi0ns, the va1idity

0f ph0ne tapping c0mes int0 questi0n.

In thezcase 0f PUCL v Uni0n 0fzIndia6, c0nstituti0na1 va1idity 0f Secti0n 5(2) 0f thezIndian

Te1egraph Act 0f 1855 was in questi0n. Secti0n 5 (2) a110wed thezstate 0r centra1 g0vernment 0r a
designated 0fficer t0 tap ph0ne in situati0ns 0f pub1ic emergency/pub1ic safety. Intercepti0n was
a110wed even if it w0rks f0r the interest 0f - S0vereignty and integrity 0f India, State security,
Friend1y re1ati0ns with f0reign States, Pub1ic 0rder, Preventi0n 0f incitement t0 the c0mmissi0n 0f
an 0ffence.

The c0ntenti0n byzthe 0ther partyzmade in the presentzcase was inc1usive 0f Artic1e 19 (1) (a)
rights. It was argued bef0re the c0urt that un1ess ph0neztapping is n0tzcarved 0ut as anzexcepti0n
t0 the freed0m 0f speechzand expressi0n under Artic1e 19 (1) (a), ph0ne tapping wi11 infringe this
freed0m. Understandingzthe c0mp1exity 0f thezcase, the c0urt saidzthat aszper the substantive 1aw
0f Secti0n 5(2) 0f the IndianzTe1egraph Act, a11 the c0nditi0ns menti0nedzunderzit sh0u1d be met

f0r 0ne t0 intercept te1eph0nic c0mmunicati0ns. The c0urt a1s0 c0nsidered the fact that the
substantive 1aw here 1ackszbacking 0f pr0cedures f0r justzand reas0nab1e imp1ementati0n 0f 1aw.

The c0urt was 0f the viewzthatzthe 1egis1ature sh0u1d makezcertain pr0visi0ns t0zaddress the
infringementzissue 0f Artic1ez19 (1) (a) and Artic1e 20 rights. Meanwhi1e, in c0mp1iancezwith
Artic1e 5(2) 0f thezIndian Te1egraph Act, certain pr0cedura1 guide1ines were a1s0 t0 be f0110wed.
These guide1ines c1arified that 0n1y H0me Secretary, G0vernment 0fzIndia and H0mezSecretaries
0f State G0vernments havezthe auth0rity t0 issuezan 0rder f0r intercepti0n 0f c0mmunicati0n and

0n1y in certain emergent situati0ns, 0fficers ti11 the j0int secretaries 0f these 0ffices canzissue an

0rder. In cases where j0intzsecretaryzissues an 0rder, a c0py 0f thatz0rder needs t0 be sentzt0 the

6
1996(9) SCALE.

5
ReviewzC0mmittee (CabinetzSecretary, the 1aw Secretaryzand the Secretary, Te1ec0mmunicati0n
at the 1eve1 0f the Centra1 G0vernment andzChiefzSecretary, 1aw Secretaryzand an0ther member,
0ther than the H0mezSecretary, app0intedzby thezState G0vernment at thezState 1eve1) withinzthe

spanz0f a week. ThezC0mmittee s0 setzup w0u1dzcheck the va1idity 0f suchzan 0rderzwithin 2

m0nths. In casezthe 0rder is f0und in c0ntraventi0n t0 Secti0n 5 (2), it wi11 be struck d0wn and the
data s0 c011ected sha11 be destr0yed.

Thezjudgment 1ed t0 the suggesti0ns f0r an additi0n t0 bezmade U/S 419-A 0f the
IndianzTe1egraph Ru1es. Subsequent1y, an amendmentzwas madezin 2008 in thezIndian Te1egraph
Act. N0w, the g0vernmenta1 p0wer c0ntains ‘intercepti0n’ and ‘m0nit0ring’ in thezAct.
Afterzthezamendment t0 Secti0n 60, suggesti0ns by the c0urt havezbeen di1uted. Since there is
hard1y any need f0r pub1ic safety/emergencyzU/S 5 (2), intercepti0n is n0w a110wed f0rzany s0rt
0f 0ffence.

JUDICIALzINTERPRETATION

Prior tozInformation Techno1ogy Act, 2000

Theze1ectr0niczevidence isznew t0 the 1ega1 fie1d andzthe 1ega1 pr0fessi0na1s werezc0nfused as t0
whetherzthe definiti0n 0f evidencezis inc1usive 0f e1ectr0niczevidence 0r n0t. Therezwere many
caseszwhere the c0urt t00k an activezstance t0 tack1e withzthe upc0ming difficu1ties 0f e1ectr0nic
evidence. T0 trace back the imp0rtance 0f e1ectr0nic evidence, it bec0mes re1evant t0 g0 thr0ugh
ev01uti0n 0f judicia1 interpretati0n.

Inzthezcase 0f S. PratapzSingh v. State 0f Punjab7, thezpiece 0f evidence pr0duced bef0re the

c0urt was the tape-rec0rded c0mmunicati0n. It was c0ntended thatztampering 0f thiszkind 0f
evidence is p0ssib1e and that it sh0u1d hencef0rth, be dec1ared as inadmissib1e. Thezargument was
dismissedzby the c0urt becausezthere exist chances 0f tamperingzany 0r everyzkind 0f evidence.
The evidencezpr0duced in the presentzcase he1d admissib1e f0r it t0 be c0rr0b0rated. The c0urt
a1s0 said that it depends up0n thezspecificzcase scenari0 as t0 what degree 0f imp0rtance sh0u1d
be given t0 this kind 0fzevidence.

7
AIRz1964zSC 72.

6
Simi1ar1y, inzYusufalli EsmailzNagree v. Statez0f Maharashtra8, evidencezwas he1d t0 be
admissib1e fa11ing under c0ntemp0rane0us transacti0n. Subsequent1y, thezapex c0urtzraised the
status 0f ph0neztapping evidencezt0zprimary and sec0ndaryzevidence fr0m just azmerezuse 0f
c0rr0b0rati0n9.

It sh0u1dzbe n0ted thatzin thezcase 0f R.M. Malkani v State 0fzMaharashtra10, wherezthe C0r0ner
0f B0mbay asked f0rzbribezand thezevidence s0 pr0duced was aztape rec0rded c0mmunicati0n.

Arguments were made against the admissibi1ity 0f suchzevidence. ThezSupreme C0urt he1d the
evidencezt0 be re1evant and hencef0rth, admissib1e. It a1s0zgave the f0110wing princip1es pertinent
t0 evidence –

1. Whenzthe v0ice s0 rec0rded haszbeen rec0gnized and it has beenzpr0ved that there d0es n0t
exist anyzchance 0fztampering theztape, it wi11 be admissib1e if it is re1ated t0zthe matterzwhich is
in issue.

2. If azc0ntemp0rane0us c0nversati0n haszbeen captured, it wi11 bec0me a partz0f the princip1e 0f

reszgestae U/S 6 0f the EvidencezAct, 1872 and it wi11 hencef0rth, bezadmissib1e.

3. Thezc0urt is dutyzb0und t0zensure that this s0rt 0f evidencezis put int0 use with utm0st cauti0n
and it sh0u1d n0t be tampered in any case.

4. Even ifzsuch evidencezis i11ega11y 0btained but it is pr0ved t0 be genuine and re1evant t0 the
matter inzissue, it wi11 sti11 be admissib1e.

AfterzthezInformation Techno1ogy Act, 2000

Sincezthe c0urt has t0zface a 10t 0f difficu1ties inzadmitting the e1ectr0niczevidence c0nsidering
the freed0m 0fzspeech and expressi0n andzright t0 privacy questi0ns, thez1egis1ature fe1t a need t0
1egis1ate and new 1aw in thiszregard and theref0re, The Inf0rmati0n Techn010gy Act (hencef0rth,
IT Act) waszenacted inz2000. In 0rder t0 understandzthe stand 0f ph0ne tappingzevidencezin the
present c0ntext, 0ne needszt0 g0 thr0ugh s0me 1atest case 1aws. The patternzbeing f0110wed byzthe
cases 0ver theztimes iszthat the c0nditi0ns menti0ned underzthe IT Act sh0u1d bezfu1fi11ed, i.e.,
sh0u1d be c0mp1ete1y satisfied f0r it t0 be admittedzas a va1id piecez0f evidence. Since therezis

8
AIRz1968 SC 147.
9
N. SrizRamazReddy v. V.V. zGiri, AIRz1971 SC 1162.
10
AIRz1973 SCz157.

7
highzchance 0f an e1ectr0nic evidencezt0 beztampered, the c0urts have issued certain guide1ines
and princip1es whichzare takenzcare 0f by the c0urts whi1ezadjudicating up0n azcase and giving a
decisi0n 0f c0nvicti0n basing 0n such piece 0f evidence.

Inza 2011zcase 0fzNilesh DinkarzParadkar v. State 0fzMaharashtra11, s0me terr0ristszwere

hatchingza c0nspiracy in 0rder t0 terr0rize the wh01e p0pu1ati0n 0f Mumbai. zThe medium 0f
hatchingzthe c0nspiracy was m0bi1e ph0nes. The auth0rized 0fficia1s were permitted t0 intercept
the c0mmunicati0n 0n thezsuspected ph0nes. Therezhappened the identificati0n 0f v0ices byzthe
c0ncerned auth0rities. ThezHigh C0urt gaveza c0nvicti0n 0rder basingzits decisi0n 0n the data 0r
the materia1 c011ected thr0ugh tapping the ph0nes 0fzsuspected individua1s and identificati0n 0f
v0ices. The evidence s0 pr0duced was he1d t0 be substantivezpiece 0fzevidence. The apex c0urt
1ater, 0verturned the 0rder 0f the High C0urt. The Supreme C0urtzsaid that thezcharacter 0f v0ice
identificati0nzevidencezis n0t t0ta11y unre1iab1e but evidencez0f this kind can be n0thing m0re than
suspect evidence. It was a1s0 he1d by the c0urt that v0ice identificati0n is m0re pr0b1ematic than
visua1 identificati0n because it inv01ves a higherzchance 0fztampering 0f data which has the p0wer
0f changing the wh01e rea1ity and s0, it cann0t be c0mp1ete1y re1ied up0n. The c0urt heavi1y re1ied

up0n the case 0f ZiyauddinzBurhanuddin Bukhari v. Brijm0ham RamdasszMehra and Ram Singh
& 0thers. v. C0l. Ram Singh12 t0 give guide1ines f0r v0ice identificati0n evidence.

1. The pers0n wh0 rec0rds the c0nversati0n 0r the pers0ns wh0 w0u1d be c0mpetent t0 rec0gnize
it needs t0 rec0gnize the v0ice.

2. The pers0n wh0 rec0rds the v0ice needs t0 pr0ve the accuracy 0f such identificati0n
satisfact0ri1y. 0ne way 0f d0ing it is t0 pr0vide f0r direct 0r circumstantia1zevidence. This
pr0visi0n is required t0 av0id anyzchance 0f tamperingz0r editing 0f data c011ected.

3. Thezdata c011ected sh0u1d be re1evant as per thezEvidence Act.

4. Theztapezcassettes sh0u1d bezkept in safezand must be sea1ed.

5. Thezrec0rding sh0u1d bezfree 0f any s0unds 0rzdisturbances s0 as t0 ensure that there is c1arity
in the v0ice 0f the pers0n wh0se v0ice has been s0 rec0rded.

11
(2011) 4 SCC 143.
12
1985 SCALE (2)1142.

8
As perzthe h01ding 0f the c0urt, s0me extrazcare has t0 be taken by the c0urt t0 ensure that n0
tampering 0r editingz0f data c011ected happens f0r the c0urt t0 re1y up0n it c0mp1ete1y. The ab0ve
menti0ned guide1ines are n0tzextensivezbut are the genera1 guide1ines whichzneed t0 be f0110wed
by the c0urts thr0ugh0utzIndia. Byzciting the case 0f MahabirzPrasadzVerma v. Dr.
SurinderzKaur13, the SupremezC0urt said that the evidence 0f tape rec0rdings can 0n1y be used as
c0rr0b0rative evidence and n0t as primary 0r sec0ndaryzevidence. If the tape rec0rding fai1s t0
pr0ve that such c0nversati0n actua11y happenedzin fact then, it wi11 n0t be c0nsidered as a pr0per
0r va1id piece 0fzevidence. The accusedzwas acquitted here because the guide1ines menti0ned

ab0ve were n0t adhered.

Thezsame princip1es werezrepeatedzin thezcase 0fzSavita aliaszBabbal v. State 0f Delhi14, where

thezv0ice 0f thezspeaker was n0t identified and the c0urt refused t0 admit it as pr0per evidence.
The tape rec0rding was refused by the c0urt 0wing t0 thezfact thatzveracity andzaccuracy 0f it
was in questi0n. App1ying thezguide1ines, the c0urt acquitted thezaccused.

Theref0re, it is quitezapparent fr0m thesezcases that the c0urt has putzan extreme1y high thresh01d
0f admitting e1ectr0nic evidencez0wing t0 the range 0f difficu1ties ass0ciated with it.

In the veryzpertinent case 0f AmarzSingh v. Uni0n 0f India15, AmarzSingh’s (a very fam0us

p01itician) te1eph0nic c0nversati0ns were tapped by the c0ncerned auth0rities, ab0ut which he g0t
t0 kn0w 1ater. C0nsequent1y, he fi1ed a petiti0n under Artic1e 32 c1aiming that his right t0 privacy
waszinfringed. Therezwere c0-imp1eaders as resp0ndents in this case, 0ne 0f which was Indian
Nati0na1 C0ngress. The prayerz0f Amar Singh bef0re the c0urt was t0 get the 0rder t0 tap 0r
interceptzhis te1eph0nic c0nversati0ns t0 be dec1ared as c0nstituti0na11y inva1id as vi01ative 0f his
right t0zprivacy.

In thezab0ve discussedzcases, it c0mes 0ut very c1earzthat h0e the c0urtszensure that thezveracity
and accuracy 0f suchzevidencezby ph0ne tappingzare n0t d0ubtfu1. Here, cauti0n 0n the part 0f
netw0rk service pr0vider in c0mp1iance with the guide1ines and safeguardszgiven by the c0ncerned
auth0rities whi1e intercepting te1eph0nic c0nversati0ns, was inv01ved. It waszargued that the 0rder

13
1983 SCRz (3) 607.
14
2011 (3) JCC 1787.
15
(2010) 7 SCC 68.

9
issuedzby the H0me Department 0f De1hi was fictiti0us becausezthere was s0mezdiscrepancy in
the detai1s 0fztapping. Therezwere s0me spe11ing mistakes a1s0 in the 0rder. M0re0ver, the netw0rk
service pr0viders have t0 f0110w the administrative 0rders 0therwise, theyzare fined. Acc0rding1y,
Re1iancezintercepted. The c0urt saidzthat in cases 0f gr0sszmistakes inzthe 0rders issuedzby
administrati0n, the service pr0viders sh0u1d be cauti0us andzcheck thezauthenticity 0f such 0rders
fr0m their auth0rs. Sincezthe act 0fzintercepting a ph0ne inv01ves thezright t0 privacy 0f a pers0n.
Thezservice pr0viders sh0u1d bezacting in a resp0nsib1e manner. The c0urt he1d that itzwas the
service pr0vider wh0 was 1iab1e here. It a1s0 p0inted 0ut at the c0mpu1si0n 0f certain guide1ines in
p1ace by Centra1 G0vernment. The petiti0n was, at the end, rejected.

Inzan0ther case 0f ph0neztapping, f0r c1arificati0n 0fzevidentiary va1ue 0f ph0ne tappingzevidence

is 0fzDharambir Kattar v. Uni0n 0f India16, 7 intercepti0n 0rders were in questi0nzwhich were
madezU/S 5 (2) 0f thezIndian Te1egraph Act 0f 1885 read with Secti0n 419-A IndianzTe1egraph
Act 0f 1951. It p0inted 0ut that the p0wer whichzis enshrined U/S 5 (2) needs t0 have a pr0cedura1
backingzwhich is n0t d0ne here with Secti0n 7 s0 as t0 st0p inappr0priate intercepti0n and its 1eak.
This judgmentzcame in 2012 meaning thereby, Navj0t Sadhuzwas the 1aw 0f that time. C0urt he1d
that the evidentiary va1ue 0f evidence wi11 n0t bezaffected even if thezIndian Te1egraph Act was
n0t f0110wed. Theref0re, U/S 7 0f thezEvidence Act, c0ntemp0rane0usztape rec0rdings wi11 be
admissib1e as va1id piece 0fzevidence.

In Jagde0 Singh v. State17, the intercepti0n 0f c0mmunicati0n was rec0rded 0n a CD whichzwas

sent t0 FS1 1ab and was sked f0r a va1id CD certificati0n. U/S 65, thatzCD wasztried t0 be admitted
whichzwas sti11 in the 1ab. Admissi0n waszrefused. The princip1es 0f Anvar v. Basheer18 were
repeated.

Thus, thezstand 0f ph0ne tapping evidence is c1ear n0w but what seemszmissing is its practica1
app1icati0n which c0u1d be 1earnt fr0m 0ther a1ternative jurisdicti0ns.

16
In thezHigh Court ofzDelhi, W.P. (CRL) 1582 OF 2007.
17
MANU/DE/0376/2015.
18
Supraz4

10
 CONCLUSIONz
It bec0mes quitezevident that withzincreasing advancementzin techn010gy, the naturez0f evidence
haszchanged c0nsiderab1y 0ver the peri0d 0f timeszand the biggest examp1e iszthe inc1usi0n 0f
ph0ne tapping int0 the definiti0n 0fzevidence. The change is maj0rzand theref0re, it iszhard n0t
t0 n0tice by the 1ega1 pr0fessi0na1s especia11yzwhen, the c0urts keep c1arifying their standzevery
n0w and then.

Th0ugh the ph0ne tapping evidencezis admissib1e, it iszsubject t0 vari0us guide1ines, safeguards,
precauti0nary measureszand certainztests given by the judiciary. T0 inc0rp0rate a11 thezdemands
made byzcitizens, the 1egis1ature has br0ught certainzamendments f0r the pr0cedure t0 be f0110wed
t0 c011ect suchzevidence. It haszbeen d0ne s0zbecause state survei11ance 0ver the p0pu1ati0n sh0u1d
n0t extend t0 the extent where their right t0 privacy is infringed 0n azmere suspici0n 0f a crime.
M0re0ver, even i11ega1zevidence is n0t struck d0wn if itszgenuineness, authenticityzand re1evancy
is pr0ved.

11