animals while in transit, and instead had some animals tied by

United States vs. Bull (1910) means of rings passed through their noses, while others were
G.R. No. 5270 | 1910-01-15 transported loose in the hold and on the deck of the vessel, and
all without bedding. As a result, the noses of some of said animals
were cruelly torn, and many of said animals were tossed about
upon the decks and hold of said vessel, and cruelly wounded
(broken legs), bruised, and killed.
Subject: The offense was committed within the territorial
jurisdiction of the courts; Even if the offense originated in the
H. N. Bull was charged and found guilty of violating Section 1 of
high seas or in a foreign country, once the punishable act
Act No. 55, as amended by section 1 of Act No. 275.
continued in territorial waters, the court has jurisdiction over the
offense; Exterritoriality privilege (exemption from local penal
Section 1 of Act No. 55 provides:
laws) accorded to foreign war vessels does not apply to foreign
merchant vessels; Theories on penal immunity enjoyed by
"The owners or masters of steam, sailing, or other vessels,
foreign merchant vessels; United States (Philippines) adopts the
carrying or transporting cattle, sheep, swine, or other animals,
English view; Treaty limitations do not affect the jurisdiction of
from one port in the Philippine Islands to another, or from any
the courts in this case; Disembarkation of the animals is not
foreign port to any port within the Philippine Islands, shall carry
necessary in order to constitute the completed offense; Allegation
with them, upon the vessels carrying such animals, sufficient
in the complaint that the act was committed willfully includes the
forage and fresh water to provide for the suitable sustenance of
allegation that it was committed knowingly; Allegations in the
such animals during the ordinary period occupied by the vessel
information need not necessarily be in the words of the statute;
in passage from the port of shipment to the port of debarkation,
Constitution of the United States does not operate within
and shall cause such animals to be provided with adequate forage
Philippine territory; Act No. 55, as amended by Act No. 275, is
and fresh water at least once in every twenty-four hours from the
valid; Defendant Bull is guilty of violation of Section 1, Act No.
time that the animals are embarked to the time of their final
55, as amended by Act No. 275
debarkation."
Facts:
Act No. 275 amended Act No. 55 by adding to Section 1 thereof
the following:
H. N. Bull was the master of the steamship Standard, a
Norwegian vessel not registered or licensed in the Philippine
"The owners or masters of steam, sailing, or other vessels,
Islands. The vessel was engaged in carrying and transporting
carrying or transporting cattle, sheep, swine, or other animals
cattle, carabaos, and other animals from the foreign port of
from one port in the Philippine Islands to another, or from any
Ampieng, Formosa to the port of Manila, Philippine Islands.
foreign port to any port within the Philippine Islands, shall provide
suitable means for securing such animals while in transit so as to
In December, 1908, H. N. Bull transported to the port of Manila,
avoid all cruelty and unnecessary suffering to the animals, and
aboard his vessel, 677 heads of cattle and carabaos, without
suitable and proper facilities for loading and unloading cattle or
providing suitable means for securing said animals while in
other animals upon or from vessels upon which they are
transit, so as to avoid cruelty and unnecessary suffering to the
transported, without cruelty or unnecessary suffering. It is
said animals. In particular, he failed to provide stalls for said
hereby made unlawful to load or unload cattle upon of from
vessels by swinging them over the side by means of ropes or
chains attached to the horns." 2. No court of the Philippine Islands had jurisdiction over an
offense or crime committed on the high seas or within the
H.N. Bull assailed his conviction and raised the following issues: territorial waters of any other country, but when she came within
3 miles of a line drawn from the headlands which embrace the
(a) whether the Philippine court had jurisdiction over an offense entrance to Manila Bay, she was within territorial waters, and a
committed on board a foreign ship by the master thereof, when new set of principles became applicable. The ship and her crew
the neglect and omission which constitutes the offense began at were then subject to the jurisdiction of the territorial sovereign
the high seas but continued during the time the ship was within subject to such limitations as have been conceded by that
the territorial waters of the United States (note: Philippines still sovereignty through the proper political agency.
under US regime at this time).
Even if the offense originated in the high seas or in a
(b) whether the court's jurisdiction is restricted by the nationality foreign country, once the punishable act continued in
of the ship territorial waters, the court has jurisdiction over the
offense
(c) whether the complaint is defective because it does not allege
that the animals were disembarked at the port of Manila 3. This offense was committed within territorial waters. From the
line which determines these waters the Standard must have
(d) whether the information is insufficient because it failed to traveled at least 25 miles before she came to anchor. During that
allege that the defendant knowingly committed the acts part of her voyage the violation of the statute continued, and as
constituting the offense far as the jurisdiction of the court is concerned, it is immaterial
that the same conditions may have existed while the vessel was
(e) whether Act No. 55 is unconstitutional for being in violation on the high seas. The offense, assuming that it originated at the
of the United States constitution port of departure in Formosa, was a continuing one, and every
element necessary to constitute it existed during the voyage
(f) whether there is sufficient evidence to support the conviction across the territorial waters. The completed forbidden act was
done within American waters, and the court therefore had
jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the offense and the person
Held: of the offender.

The offense was committed within the territorial Exterritoriality privilege (exemption from local penal
jurisdiction of the courts laws) accorded to foreign war vessels does not apply to
foreign merchant vessels
1. Act No. 55 confers jurisdiction over the offense on Courts of
First Instance (CFI) or any provost court organized in the 4. The Geneva Arbitration Tribunal announced that "the privilege
province or port in which such animals are disembarked. This of exterritoriality accorded to vessels of war has been admitted
jurisdiction may be exercised by the CFI in any province into in the law of nations; not as an absolute right, but solely as a
which such ship or water craft upon which the offense or crime proceeding founded on the principle of courtesy and mutual
was committed shall come after the commission thereof. deference between nations." Such vessels are permitted during
times of peace to come and go freely. Local officials exercise but
little control over their actions, and offenses committed by their
crews are justiciable by their own officers acting under the laws
to which they primarily owe allegiance.
5. This limitation upon the general principle of territorial
sovereignty is based entirely upon comity and convenience, and
finds its justification in the fact that experience shows that such
vessels are generally careful to respect local laws and regulations
which are essential to the health, order, and well-being of the
port. But comity and convenience does not require the extension
of the same degree of exemption to merchant vessels.
Theories on penal immunity enjoyed by foreign merchant
vessels
6. There are two well-defined theories as to the extent of the
immunities ordinarily granted to merchant vessels:
(a) French theory: matters happening on board a merchant ship
which do not concern the tranquillity of the port or persons
foreign to the crew, are justiciable only by the courts of the
country to which the vessel belongs. The French courts therefore
claim exclusive jurisdiction over crimes committed on board
French merchant vessels in foreign ports by one member of the
crew against another.
(b) English theory: as soon as merchant vessels enter the ports
of a foreign state they become subject to the local jurisdiction on
all points in which the interests of the country are touched.
United States (Philippines) adopts the English view
7. Chief Justice Marshall, in the case of The Exchange, said that
----"When merchant vessels enter for the purposes of trade, it
would be obviously inconvenient and dangerous to society and
would subject the laws to continual infraction and the
government to degradation if such individual merchants did not
owe temporary and local allegiance, and were not amenable to
the jurisdiction of the country."
Treaty limitations do not affect the jurisdiction of the
courts in this case
8. Certain limitations upon the jurisdiction of the local courts are
imposed by Article 13 of the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation
between Sweden and Norway and the United States, of July 4,
1827, which concedes to the consuls, vice-consuls, or consular
agents of each country "the right to sit as judges and arbitrators
in such differences as may arise between the captains and crews
of the vessels belonging to the nation whose interests are
committed to their charge, without the interference of the local
authorities, unless the conduct of the crews or of the captains
should disturb the order or tranquillity of the country."
9. The offense with which the appellant is charged had nothing
to do with any difference between the captain and the crew. It
was a violation by the master of the criminal law of the country
into who port he came. We thus find that neither by reason of the
nationality of the vessel, the place of the commission of the
offense, or the prohibitions of any treaty or general principle of
public law, are the courts of the Philippine Islands deprived of
jurisdiction over the offense charged in the information in this
case.
Disembarkation of the animals is not necessary in order to
constitute the completed offense
10. It is further contended that the complaint is defective
because it does not allege that the animals were disembarked at
the port of Manila, an allegation which it is claimed is essential to
the jurisdiction of the court sitting at that port.
The disembarkation of the animals is not necessary in order to
constitute the completed offense, and a reasonable construction
of the language of the statute confers jurisdiction upon the court
sitting at the port into which the animals are brought. They are
then within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, and the mere
fact of their disembarkation is immaterial so far as jurisdiction is
concerned. This might be different if the disembarkation of the
animals constituted a constitutional element in the offense, but it
does not.
Allegation in the complaint that the act was committed
willfully includes the allegation that it was committed
knowingly
11. It is also contended that the information is insufficient
because it fails to allege that the defendant knowingly and
willfully failed to provide suitable means for securing said animals
while in transit, so as to avoid cruelty and unnecessary
suffering. The allegation of the complaint that the act was
committed willfully includes the allegation that it was committed
knowingly. As said in Wood house vs. Rio Grande R.R.
Company, "the word 'willfully' carries the idea, when used in
connection with an act forbidden by law, that the act must be
done knowingly or intentionally; that, with knowledge, the will
consented to, designed, and directed the act." To 'willfully' do an
act implies that it was done by design-done for a set purpose;
and I think that it would necessarily follow that it was 'knowingly'
done."
12. The evidence shows not only that the defendant's acts were
knowingly done, but his defense rests upon the assertion that
"according" to his experience, the system of carrying cattle loose
upon the decks and in the hold is preferable and more secure to
the life and comfort of the animals." It was conclusively proven
that what was done was done knowingly and intentionally.
Allegations in the information need not necessarily be in
the words of the statute
13. In charging an offense under section 6 of General Orders,
No. 58, paragraph 3, it is only necessary to state the act or
omission complained of as constituting a crime or public offense
in ordinary and concise language, without repetition. It need not
necessarily be in the words of the statute, but it must be in such
form as to enable a person of common understanding to know
what is intended and the court to pronounce judgment according
to right. A complaint which compile with this requirement is good.
14. The defendant contends that the language of the Spanish
text of the information does not charge him with failure to provide
"sufficient" and "adequate" means. The words used are "medios
suficientes" and "medios adecuados." In view of the fact that the
original complaint was prepared in English, and that the word
"suitable" is translatable by the words "adecuado," "suficiente,"
and "conveniente," according to the context and circumstances,
we determine this point against the appellant, particularly in view
of the fact that the objection was not made in the court below,
and that the evidence clearly shows a failure to provide "suitable
means for the protection of the animals."
Constitution of the United States does not operate within
Philippine territory
15. Act No. 55 penalizes acts and omissions incidental to the
transportation of live stock between foreign ports and ports of
the Philippine Islands, and had a similar statute regulating
commerce with its ports been enacted by the legislature of one
of the States of the Union, it would doubtless have been in
violation of Article I, section 3, of the Constitution of the United
States. But the Philippine Islands is not a State, and its relation
to the United States is controlled by constitutional principles
different from those which apply to States of the Union.
16. Section 3, Article IV, of the Constitution of the United States
operates only upon the States of the Union. It has no application
to the Government of the Philippine Islands. The Government of
the Philippine Islands is not a State or a Territory (of the United
States), although its form and organization somewhat resembles
that of both. It stands outside of the constitutional relation which
unites the States and Territories into the Union.
Act No. 55, as amended by Act No. 275, is valid
17. An act of the legislative authority of the Philippine
Government which has not been expressly disapproved by (US)
Congress is valid unless its subject-matter has been covered by
congressional legislation, or its enactment forbidden by some
provision of the organic laws. In order to determine the validity Magallona vs. Ermita
of Act No. 55 we must then ascertain whether the (Philippine) G.R. No. 187167 | 2011-08-16
Legislature has been expressly or by implication forbidden to
enact it.

18. Act No. 55 was enacted before (US) Congress took over the Subject: National territory, UNCLOS, baselines, internal waters,
control of the (Philippine) Islands, and this act was amended by archipelagic waters
Act No. 275 after the Spooner amendment of March 2, 1901, was
passed. The military government, and the civil government later
instituted, had the power to regulate commerce between foreign
nations and the ports of the territory. This Act has remained in Facts:
force without annulment or other action by Congress, and must
be presumed to have met with its approval. We are therefore
satisfied that the Commission had, and the Legislature now has,
full constitutional power to enact laws for the regulation of
Republic Act No. 3046 (RA 3046) demarcated the baselines of the
commerce between foreign countries and the ports of the
Philippines and codified the right of State parties under the United
Philippine Islands, and that Act No. 55, as amended by Act No.
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) I over their
275, is valid.
territorial sea. The breadth, however, was not determined.
Congress amended RA 3046 by enacting Republic Act No. 9522
Defendant Bull is guilty of violation of Section 1, Act No.
to comply with the terms of UNCLOS III. RA 9522 shortened one
55, as amended by Act No. 275
baseline, optimized the location of some basepoints and classified
the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) and Scarborough Shoal as
19. Whether a certain method of handling cattle is suitable within
"regimes of islands" which generate their own maritime zones.
the meaning of the Act can not be left to the judgment of the
master of the ship. It is a question which must be determined by
the court from the evidence. On December 2, 1908, the
defendant Bull brought into and disembarked in the port and city
This original action assails the constitutionality of RA 9522 on the
of Manila certain cattle, which came from the port of Ampieng,
ground that: (1) RA 9522 reduces Philippine maritime territory in
Formosa, without providing suitable means for securing said
violation of Article 1 of the 1987 Constitution; and (2) RA 9522
animals while in transit, so as to avoid cruelty and unnecessary
opens the country's waters landwards of the baselines to
suffering to said animals, contrary to the provisions of section 1
maritime passage by all vessels and aircrafts.
of Act No. 55, as amended by section 1 of Act No. 275. The trial
court's findings were supported by the evidence. The conviction
is affirmed.
Held:
National Territory
1. UNCLOS III is not concerned with the acquisition or loss of
territory. It is a multilateral treaty regulating, among others, sea-
use rights over maritime zones and continent shelves that
UNCLOS III delimits.
2. Baseline laws are mere statutory mechanisms enacted simply
to mark-out the basepoints from which baselines are drawn to
serve as the starting points from which to measure the breadth
of the maritime zones and continental shelf.
3. The baselines of the Philippines have to be drawn in accordance
with RA 9522 because this law conforms to UNCLOS III
4. States acquire or lose territory through occupation, accretion,
cession and prescription and not by executing multilateral
treaties on the regulations of sea-use rights or enacting statutes
to comply with the treaty's terms to delimit maritime zones and
continental shelves.
Regime of Islands
5. RA 9522 which classified the KIG and Scarborough Shoal as
"regime of islands" does not weaken the Philippines' claim of
sovereignty. In fact, RA 9522 recognizes that the Philippines
exercise sovereignty and jurisdiction over these areas.
6. If RA 9522 enclosed KIG and Scarborough Shoal as part of the
Philippine archipelago, the Philippines would have committed a
breach of two provisions of UNCLOS III:
(a) Article 47 (3) of UNCLOS III requires that "[t]he drawing of
such baselines shall not depart to any appreciable extent from
the general configuration of the archipelago."
(b) Article 47 (2) of UNCLOS III requires that "the length of the
baselines shall not exceed 100 nautical miles, save for three per
cent (3%) of the total number of baselines which can reach up to
125 nautical miles."
Internal Waters
7. UNCLOS III and RA 9522 complies with the Constitution's
delineation of internal waters
8. Whether referred to as "internal waters" under Article I of the
Constitution or "archipelagic waters" under UNCLOS III, Article
49 of the UNCLOS recognizes that a State party has sovereignty
over the body of water lying landward of the baselines, including
the air space over it and the submarine areas underneath.
9. Sovereignty, however, does not preclude the operation of
international law subjecting the territorial sea or archipelagic
waters to burdens of maintaining unimpeded, expeditious
international navigation consistent with the principle of freedom
of navigation.
10.To comply with international law, the Congress may pass laws
designating routes within the archipelagic waters to regulate
innocent and sea lanes passage.
De Leon vs Esguerra (1987)
G.R. No. 78059 | 1987-08-31
Subject: Ratification of 1987 Constitution effectively superseded
the Provisional Constitution; Until the term of office of barangay
officials has been determined by law, the term of office of 6 years
provided for in the Barangay Election Act of 1982 should still
govern; Barangay Election Act of 1982 remains operative under
the 1987 Constitution
Facts:
In the Barangay elections held on May 17, 1982, petitioner
Alfredo De Leon was elected Barangay Captain and the other
petitioners as Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Taytay,
Rizal under Batas Pambansa Blg. 222, otherwise known as the
Barangay Election Act of 1982 (BP 222).
On February 9, 1987, petitioner Alfredo de Leon received a
Memorandum antedated December 1, 1986 but signed by
respondent OIC Governor Benjamin Esguerra on February 8,
1987 designating Florentino G. Magno as Barangay Captain of
Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal. The designation made by the
OIC Governor was "by authority of the Minister of Local
Government." A separate Memorandum, also antedated
December 1, 1986, designated respondents as members of the
Barangay Council of the same Barangay and Municipality.
Petitioners filed the present action for Prohibition to enjoin
respondents from replacing them from their respective barangay
positions. Petitioners pray that the Memoranda be declared null
and void. Petitioners maintain that pursuant to Section 3 of BP
222, their terms of office "shall be six (6) years which shall
commence on June 7, 1982 and shall continue until their
successors shall have elected and shall have qualified," or up to
June 7, 1988. It is also their position that with the ratification of
the 1987 Constitution, respondent OIC Governor no longer has
the authority to replace them and to designate their successors.
On the other hand, respondents rely on Section 2, Article III of
the Provisional Constitution, promulgated on March 25, 1986,
which provided:
"SECTION 2. All elective and appointive officials and employees
under the 1973 Constitution shall continue in office until
otherwise provided by proclamation or executive order or upon
the designation or appointment and qualification of their
successors, if such appointment is made within a period of one
year from February 25, 1986."
By reason of the foregoing provision, respondents contend that
the terms of office of elective and appointive officials were
abolished; and that the provision in the Barangay Election Act
fixing the term of office of Barangay officials to six (6) years must
be deemed to have been repealed for being inconsistent with the
aforequoted provision of the Provisional Constitution.
Held:
Ratification of 1987 Constitution effectively superseded
the Provisional Constitution
1. Petitioners, as elective officials under the 1973 Constitution,
may continue in office but should vacate their positions upon the
occurrence of any of the events mentioned. Since the
promulgation of the Provisional Constitution, there has been no
proclamation or executive order terminating the term of elective
Barangay officials. Thus, the issue for resolution is whether or not
the designation of respondents to replace petitioners was validly
made during the one-year period which ended on February 25,
1987.
2. Considering the candid Affidavit of respondent OIC Governor,
we hold that February 8, 1987, should be considered as the
effective date of replacement and not December 1, 1986 to which
it was antedated, in keeping with the dictates of justice.
3. But while February 8, 1987 is ostensibly still within the one
year deadline, the aforequoted provision in the Provisional
Constitution must be deemed to have been overtaken by Section
27, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution reading:
"Sec 27. This Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its
ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held for
the purpose and shall supersede all previous Constitutions."
4. The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on
February 2, 1987. By that date, therefore, the Provisional
Constitution must be deemed to have been
superseded. Having become inoperative, respondent OIC
Governor could no longer rely on Section 2, Article III, thereof to
designate respondents to the elective positions occupied by
petitioners.
Until the term of office of barangay officials has been
determined by law, the term of office of 6 years provided
for in the Barangay Election Act of 1982 should still govern
5. Petitioners must now be held to have acquired security of
tenure specially considering that the Barangay Election Act of
1982 declares it "a policy of the State to guarantee and promote
the autonomy of the barangays to ensure their fullest
development as self-reliant communities." Similarly, the 1987
Constitution ensures the autonomy of local governments and of
political subdivisions of which the barangays form a part, and
limits the President's power to "general supervision" over local
governments.
6. Relevantly, Section 8, Article X of the same 1987 Constutution
further provides in part: “Sec. 8. The term of office of elective
local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be three years . . . "
7. Until the term of office of barangay officials has been
determined by law, therefore, the term of office of six (6) years
provided for in the Barangay Election Act of 1982 should still
govern.
Barangay Election Act of 1982 remains operative under
the 1987 Constitution
8. We find nothing inconsistent between the term of six (6) years
for elective Barangay officials and the 1987 Constitution, and the
same should, therefore, be considered as still operative, pursuant
to Section 3, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution, reading:
"Sec. 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders,
proclamations, letters of instructions, and other executive
issuances not inconsistent, with this Constitution shall remain
operative until amended, repealed or revoked."
William C. Reagan, Petitioner vs Commission
of Internal Revenue
William C. Reagan, Petitioner vs
Commission of Internal Revenue
Facts:
The petitioner is a citizen of the United State and an employee of
Bendix Radio, Divison of Bendix Aviation Corporation, which provided
technical assistance to the United States Air Force was assigned at the Clark
Air Base Pampanga, honor about July 7, 19. Nine months, before his tour
duty expires, petitioner imported a tax free 1960 Cadillac car which valued
at $6443.83. More than two months after the car was imported, petitioner
requested the Clark Air Base Commander for a permit to sell the car. The
request was granted with the condition that he would sell it to a member of
the United States Armed Forces or an employee of the U.S. Military Bases.
On July 11, 1960, petitioner sold the car to Willie Johnson for
$6600, a private in US Marine Corps, Sangby Point, Cavite as shown by a bill
of sale executed at Clark Air Base. On the same date William Johnson Jr. sold
the car to Fred Meneses for P32,000 as evidence by a deed of sale executed
in Manila.
The respondent after deducting the landed cost of the car and the
personal exemption which the petitioner was entitled, fixed as his net
income arising from such transaction the amount of P17912.34 rendering him
liable for income tax of P2979.00. After paying the sum, he sought refund
from the respondent claiming that he is exempted. He filed a case within the
Court of Tax Appeals seeking recovery of the sum P2979.00 plus legal rate of
interest.
Issue:
Whether or not the said income tax of P2979.00 was legally collected by
respondent from petitioner.
Ruling:
The Philippine is an independent and sovereign country or state.
Its authority may be exercised over its entire domain. Its laws govern therein
and everyone to whom it applies must submit to its term. It does not prelude
from allowing another power to participate in the exercise of jurisdictional
rights over certain portions of its territory. Such areas sustain their status as
native soil and still subject to its authority. Its jurisdiction may be diminished
but it does not disappear.
The Clark Air Base is one of he bases under lease to the
American armed forces by virtue of the Military Bases Agreement which
states that a “national of the US serving or employed in the Philippines in
connection with the construction, maintenance, operation, or defense of the
bases and residing in the Philippines only by reason such unemployment is
not to be taxed on his income unless derived in the bases which one clearly
derived the Phil.
Therefore the Supreme Court sustained the decision of the Court
of Tax Appeals rendering the petitioner liable of the income tax arising from
the sale of his automobile that have taken place in Clark Air Field which is
within our territory to tax.
GP VS MONTE DE PIEDAD
G.R. No. L-9959 December 13, 1916
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, represented by the
Treasurer of the Philippine Islands, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EL MONTE DE PIEDAD Y CAJA DE AHORRAS DE MANILA, defendant-
appellant.
 In accordance with the doctrine of Parens Patriae. The government being the
protector of the rights of the people has the inherent supreme power to enforce
such laws that will promote the public interest. No other party has been entrusted
with such right hence as “parents” of the people the government has the right to
Facts: take back the money intended for the people.

A devastating earthquake took place in the Philippines sometimes in 1863.

Contributions amounting to $400,000 were collected during the Spanish regime
for the relief of the victims of an earthquake. Out of the aid, $80,000.00 was left
untouched. The Monte de Piedad, a charitable institution, in need for more
working capital, petitioned the Governor-General for the transfer of $80,000 as a
loan. Republic v. Sandiganbayan, Ramas and Dimaano
G.R. No. 104768 | 2003-07-21
In June 1893, the Department of Finance called upon the Monte de Piedad to
return the $80,000. The respondent bank declined to comply with this order upon
the ground that only the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands and not the
Department of Finance had the right to order the reimbursement. Subject: PCGGJurisdiction, Revolutionary
Government, International Law

On account of various petitions of the persons, the Philippine Islands, through the
Attorney-General, bring suit against the Monte de Piedad for a recover of the
$80,000, together with interest, for the benefit of those persons or their heirs.
After due trial, judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of
$80,000 gold or its equivalent in Philippine currency, together with legal interest
from February 28, 1912, and the costs of the cause.
Facts:

The defendant appealed. One of the assignment of errors made by the defendant
was to question the competence of the plaintiff (government) to bring the action,
contending that the suit could be instituted only by the intended beneficiaries
themselves or by their heirs.

Upon herassumption to office following the EDSA Revolution, then

President Aquinoissued Executive Order No. 1 creating the
Issues:
PresidentialCommission on Good Government (PCGG). Pursuant to its
Whether or not the Philippine government is competent to file a complaint against mandate to recover allill-gotten wealth of former President Marcos, his
the respondent bank for the reimbursement of the money of the intended immediate family, relatives,subordinates and close associates, PCGG
beneficiaries? created an AFP Anti-Graft Board toinvestigate corrupt practices by AFP
personnel, whether in the active serviceor retired.

Discussions:
The AFPBoard investigated reports of unexplained wealth of Major Held:
General Ramas, the Commanding General of the Philippine Army until
1986 (with the rank ofMajor General) and filed a petitionfor forfeiture
against him and his office clerk and alleged mistress, ElizabethDimaano.

PCGG Jurisdiction

Duringthe trial, respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that

the PCGGdoes not have jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute military
officers byreason of mere position held without a showing that they
are"subordinates" of former President Marcos.
1. PCGG has no jurisdiction to investigate and cause the filing of a
forfeiture petition against Ramas and Dimaano for unexplained wealth
under RA No. 1379.

Moreover,during the raid conducted onDimaano’s residence, there were

a. Ramas is not a‘subordinate’ as the term is contemplated
items seized that were not includedin the search warrant. Respondents
under EO No. 1.
therefore seek these items to beexcluded from evidence for being illegally
seized.

b. Mere position heldby a military officer does not automatically

make him a "subordinate"as this term is used in EO No.1 absent
a showing that he enjoyed closeassociation with former
President Marcos.

Notably, the search and seizure was conducted onMarch 3, 1986 or five
days after the EDSA revolution. According to the Republic, the items
c. There must be a prima facie showing that Ramas unlawfully
seizedare admissible since at the time of their seizure, private respondents
accumulated wealth by virtue of his close association
did notenjoy any constitutional right. What was in place at the time of the
orrelation with former Pres. Marcos and/or his wife.
seizurewas a revolutionary governmentand it effectively withheld the
operation of the 1973 Constitution which wasthe basis of respondents’
exclusionary right.
d. Such closeassociation is manifested either by Ramas'
complicity with former PresidentMarcos in the accumulation of
ill-gotten wealth by the deposed President or byformer
 President Marcos' acquiescence in Ramas' own accumulation
of ill-gottenwealth if any.
2. The proper government agencies, and not the PCGG, should
investigate and prosecute forfeiture petitions not falling under EO No.
1 and its amendments. The preliminary investigation of unexplained
wealth amassed on or before 25 February 1986 falls under the
jurisdiction of the Ombudsman, while the authority to file the
corresponding forfeiture petition rests with the Solicitor General.
3. The right of the State to forfeit unexplained wealth under RA No. 1379
is not subject to prescription, laches or estoppel
Rights under theRevolutionary Government (Legality of the seizure)
4. The Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was not operative during
the interregnum
a. The EDSA Revolution took place on February 23-25, 1986.
The INTERREGNUM refers toperiod after the actualand
effective take-over of power by the revolutionary government
following thecessation of resistance by loyalist forces up
to March 24, 1986 -- immediately before the adoption ofthe
Provisional Constitution).
b. During the interregnum, a person could not invokeany
exclusionary right under a Bill of Rights because there was
neither aconstitution nor a Bill of Rights during the interregnum
During theinterregnum, the directives and orders of the
revolutionary government were thesupreme law because no
constitution limited the extent and scope of suchdirectives and
orders.
5. Nevertheless, even during the interregnum the Filipino people
continued to enjoy, under the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (Covenant) and the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (Declaration), almost the same rights found in the Bill of Rights
of the 1973 Constitution.
a. The Declaration, to which the Philippines is asignatory, provides in its
Article 17(2) that “no one shall be arbitrarilydeprived of his property.”
b. Although the signatories to the Declaration did notintend it as a legally
binding document, being only a declaration, the Courthas interpreted the
Declaration as part of the ‘generally accepted principlesof international
law’ (customaryinternational law) and binding on the State. Thus, the
revolutionarygovernment was also obligated under international law to
observe therights of individuals under the Declaration.

6. After the EDSA Revolution, theresulting government was a revolutionary

government bound by no constitution orlegal limitations except treaty
obligations that the revolutionary government,as the de jure government in
the Philippines, assumed underinternational law.

7. The search warrant, issued duringthe interregnum, was valid. However,

the seizure of the items not included inthe warrant was void, unless these
items are contraband per se, which they arenot.