Macariola v.

Asuncion

Facts:

A few years following the finality of Judge Elias B Asuncion’s judgment over an intestate succession case, he
acquired a portion of the contested property. Petitioner Bernardita Macariola was a party in said intestate
succession case. Further, it was then known that Asuncion was a stockholder and ranking officer in Traders
Manufacturing and Fishing Industries. As a result, she filed a case against Asuncion. She claims that he
violated Par 1 and 5 of Article 14 of the Code of Commerce. Said provisions prohibit a judge such as
Asuncion from participating in commercial or industrial industries within the jurisdiction of where they
discharge their duties.

Issue:
W/N Judge Asuncion violated Par 1 and 5 of Article 14 of the Code of Commerce

SC Ruling:
No. The SC, speaking through Justice Makasiar, noted that although the Code of Commerce is part of the
commercial laws of the Philippines, the mentioned provisions partake of the nature of political law. The said
provisions fall under the branch of political law (specifically administrative law) because they regulate the
relationship between the government and certain public officers and employees, like justices and judges.

Moreover, the Court declared when, “there is change of sovereignty, the political laws of the former
sovereign, whether compatible or not with those of the new sovereign, are automatically abrogated, unless
they are expressly re-enacted by affirmative act of the new sovereign.”

In addition, the Court reminded that, “while municipal laws of the newly acquired territory not in conflict with
the laws of the new sovereign continue in force without the express assent or affirmative act of the
conqueror, the political laws do not.”

In relation, there is no positive evidence which shows an enabling or affirmative act that continued the
effectivity of the aforestated provision of the Code of Commerce after the change in sovereignty.

Thus, in the case at bar, Judge Asuncion did not violate Par 1 and 5 of Article 14 of the Code of Commerce
because the provision has been deemed abrogated by the change in sovereignty from Spaniards to
Americans then finally to the Filipino people.

Since there is no positive evidence which shows an enabling act that continued the effectivity of the
contested provision after a change in sovereignty, the provision has been deemed abrogated and cannot be
applied to the case at bar.
Defensor Santiago v. COMELEC

Facts:
Atty. Jesus Delfin filed a petition requesting an amendment to the Constitution by Peoples Initiative to
COMELEC. The amendment sought to lift the term limits of elective officials. The petition asked the
COMELEC to set forth the procedure wherein the people will be duly notified of the initiative and for the
collection of signatures in support of the amendment. Petitioner Defensor Santiago assailed the
constitutionality of the Delfin petition and claims the constitutional provision on peoples initiative to amend
the Constitution can only be implemented by a law passed by Congress. Defender Santiago asserts that RA
6735 (An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum and Appropriating Funds Therefor) does
not confer such a grant.

Issue:
1. W/N R.A. No. 6735 was intended to include or cover initiative on amendments to the Constitution; and if
so, whether the Act, as worded, adequately covers such initiative.

2. W/N the rules and regulations ordered by COMELEC regarding the conduct of initiative on amendments to
the Constitution is valid

3. W/N COMELEC has jurisdiction to fix the procedural dissemination of an unsigned proposed Petition for
Initiative on the 1987 Constitution.

4. W/N the SC can take cognizance of the petition when there is a pending case before the COMELEC.

SC Ruling:

1. No. Citing Joaquin Bernas, the SC declares that Article 17 Sec. 2 is not self-executory and will not operate
without an enabling legislative act. Further, the Court dictates RA 6735 only provides the people the power to
directly propose, enact, approve, or reject (in whole or in part) laws, ordinances, or resolutions. Said law is
silent in regard to amendments to the Constitution.

2. No. For this issue, the Court upholds the maxim potestas delegata non delegari potest (what has been
delegated, cannot be delegated or as expressed).

The COMELEC cannot use the rules and regulations to carry out the purposes of RA 6735 in regard to
amendment of the Constitution by People’s Initiative since the Act does not expressly confer such a power.

The delegation is not permissible because it fails the complete and sufficient standard start. For a law to
pass the test, it must define legislative policy, mark its limits, map out its boundaries and specify the public
agency to apply it.

3. No. The Court remanded the COMELEC for acting without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in
entertaining the Delfin Petition.

COMELEC will only obtain jurisdiction over the Delfin petition if the petition has enough number of signatures
and since it does not have so, the petition has been invalidly initiated.

In addition, Delfin’s petition is primarily to obtain assistance in his drive to gather signatures.

Thus, the petition is merely the initiatory pleading.

4. Yes, notwithstanding the fact that there is a pending motion to dismiss the Delfin petition in the COMELEC.

The Court holds judicial notice over the matter citing transcendental importance.

Reiterating its ruling in Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona, the Court states it can brush aside procedural
technicalities in order to definitely and promptly settle cases of transcendental importance to the public.
In the case at bar, an attempt to revise to make any alterations to the Constitution without an alleged
Constitutional guarantee to do so is a matter of transcendental importance.

Lambino v COMELEC

Facts: Petitioner Raul Lambino was able to procure the sufficient amount of signatures for an initiative
petition to amend the Constitution. The proposed changes would shift the Philippine Government from a
Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary government. The COMELEC denied the
petition on the grounds that the proposed amendments were not included in the petition signed by the
people.

Issue:
1. W/N the initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on amendments to the
Constitution through a people's initiative

2. W/N the initiative petition is an amendment or a revision.

SC Ruling:

1. No.The SC declared, “the ‘draft of the proposed constitutional amendment’ should be ‘ready and shown’ to
the people ‘before’ they sign such proposal.” Although the constitutional provision does not directly state the
requirement that the petition must include the full text of the proposed amendments, it is evidenced that the
framers of the Constitution intended to adopt such a requirement which is well-established in American
jurisprudence. Furthermore, the Court stated “proponents bear the burden of proving that they complied with
the constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures - that the petition contained, or incorporated by
attachment, the full text of the proposed amendments”. There is no presumption that proponents observed

2. The initiative petition intends to revise the Constitution because it moves to change the structure of
government. The Court reminded that there is no constitutional provision granting the power to revise the
Constitution through a people’s initiative. Sec 1 Art XVII dictates that the Constitution can only be revised
through a Constitutional Convention or through a 3/4 vote of all the members of Congress.
Laurel v. Misa

Facts: Peititioner Anastacio Laurel filed a petition for habeas corpus claiming that he should not be held liable
for the crime of treason which is defined and penalized by Article 14 of the Penal Code. Laurel contends that
sovereignty of the Philippines was suspended during the Japanese occupation. Thus, the mandatory
allegiance of Filipino citizens to the Philippine should also be deem suspended. In addition, Laurel claims the
change of sovereignty from the US to the Philippines abrogates the Penal Code.

Isssue

1. W/N allegiance to a sovereign government is suspended upon occupation of an invading force

2. W/N the Penal Code was still effective after a change in sovereignty.

SC Ruling

1. No. The SC ruled that citizens of the suspended sovereignty still owe their permanent allegiance to it.
Citing the case of Carlisle v US, the Court declared temporary allegiance is expected of the citizens of the
suspended sovereignty when a new occupant takes over. According to the Court, temporary allegiance is the
allegiance a “foreigner owes to the government or sovereign of the territory wherein he resides, so long as
he remains there, in return for the protection he receives, and which consists in the obedience to the laws of
the government or sovereign.” Furthermore, the adoption of the Hague Regulations in 1907 grants that
sovereignty itself is not suspended upon occupation of an invading force. Rather, what is suspended is the
authority to operate said sovereignty. Lastly, the Court reiterated that a citizen’s temporary allegiance does
not demand positive action, but only passive attitude or forbearance from adhering to the enemy by giving
the latter aid and comfort.

2. Yes. The Court proclaimed the Penal Code was still effective after the change of sovereignty from the US
to the Philippines. Citing the case of Jones v. US, the Court said the question of sovereignty is a “purely
poltical question.” It is determined by the legislative and executive departments of any government.In this
case, the sovereignty of the Commonwealth of the Philippines was not absolute. It was still subject to
limitations imposed in the Independence Act and incorporated as Ordinance appended to the Constitution.
Moreover, Section 2 Art XVI of the 1935 Constiution provides “All laws of the Philippine Islands shall remain
operative, unless inconsistent with this Constitution.” Thus, the Penal Code still functions because it did not
run counter to the 1935 Constitution.
Holy See v. Misa

Facts:
The petitioner, who exercises sovereignty over the Vatican City filed a case against private respondent,
Starbright Sales Enterprises Inc over a contract dispute. The contract involved the sale of a parcel of land to
be donated to the Archdiocese of Manila. The donation was not made for commercial purposes. The
disputed provision in the contract is centered on who among the parties is obligated to evict the squatters
residing in the property.

Issues:

1. W/N The Holy See is a state

2. W/N The Holy See has the right of state immunity
3. W/N the respondent can sue The Holy See

SC Ruling:

1. Yes. The SC decreed the Holy See is a state. Notwithstanding the fact that Vatican City does not meet the
established requisites of a state, it is still considered a state by the international community because it
conducts its foreign relations and transactions as the Holy See and not as Vatican City. Moreover, the
Philippines has accorded the status of the Holy See as a foreign sovereign by virtue of conducting diplomatic
relations with it

2. Yes. Repeating the jurisprudence in US v. Guinto, The Court declared the Holy See is immune from suit in
the case at bar because its acquisition and its subsequent disposal of the disputed land was governmental in
nature. Citing the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, the court evinced the right of a foreign
sovereign “to acquire property, real or personal, in a receiving state, necessary for the creation and
maintenance of its diplomatic mission.” Furthermore, the DFA officially certified that the Embassy of the Holy
See is a duly accredited diplomatic mission.

3. Yes. The SC says, “a person who feels aggrieved by the acts of a foreign sovereign can ask his own
government to espouse his cause through diplomatic channels.” The Court adds the private respondent can
request the Philippine Government, through the Foreign Office to take notice of the claims against the Holy
See. If the Foreign Office determines that the claim holds water, it is no longer a private cause. Rather, it
becomes a matter of the Philippines, as a state, asserting its own rights.
RP v. Villasor

Facts:
In the case at bar, the Republic of the Philippines filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition against the writ
of execution ordered by Judge Villasor. The contested writ of execution directed the funds and properties of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines to be awarded to an injured party.

Issues:
W/N a state is exempt from suit

SC Ruling:
Yes. The Supreme Court establishes that “the State, by virtue of its sovereignty, may not be sued in its own
courts except by express authorization by the Legislature, and to subject its officers to garnishment would be
to permit indirectly what is prohibited directly.” Because the Republic of the Philippines has not enacted a
legislation that allows it to be sued involving the circumstances present in the case, it has not given its
consent to be sued. Finally, the SC cites the case of Commissioner of Public Highways v. San Diego and
reminds the well-settled doctrine that in cases against the state, “the power of the Courts ends when
judgment is rendered.”
Sanders v. Veridiano

Facts:

Petitioners Sanders and Moreau were US officers based in a US Naval Station in Olongapo City. Due to
behavior detrimental to the workplace, the petitioners demoted the private respondents from permanent full-
time to permanent part-time. The respondents thus sued the petitioners stating that they were being sued in
their personal capacity. In response, the petitioners contend they were only performing in capacity of their
official duties. Thus, the petitioners file a petition for certiorari, prohibition and preliminary injunction against
the respondents.

Issues:

1. W/N Sanders and Moreau are immune from suit

2. W/N Philippine Courts have jurisdiction over the case

SC Ruling:

1. Yes. The Court declared that, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, Sanders and Moreau, were
performing their official duties. Additionally, the Court held that stating the government functionary is
being sued in his “personal capacity will not automatically remove him from the protection of the law of
public officers and, if appropriate, the doctrine of state immunity.” The Court added that this principle is
applicable “not only to the officers of the local state but also where the person sued in its courts pertains
to the government of a foreign state, as in the present case.” Since both petitioners are acting within the
authority conferred to them by the US Government, the government is responsible for their acts and not
the petitioners in their personal capacity. Because the US Government has not expressly waived its
immunity from suit through an act of legislature which provides for the disbursement of funds in the
occurence of such injury, Sanders and Moreau are covered by the state immunity of the US Government.
2. No. The SC deems it proper for local courts to refrain from taking judicial notice over the matter and
leaves it to the internal administration of the Olongapo Naval Base (The petitioners being US Citizens
exercising their powers as US Government functionaries over territory it has been granted jusisdiction
over.)
BOP v. BPEA

Facts:
Petioner Bureau of Printing was charged with unfair labor practices by the respondent Court of Industrial
Relations. As a result, BOP filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition to enjoin the orders issued by the
CIR. Further, BOP claims the private respondents were found to have breached the Civil Service rules and
regulations and were thusly suspended after an administrative investigation. Moreover, BOP contends it has
no juridical personality to sue and be sued because it is an agency that performs governmental functions and
is not engaged in industrial concern.

Issue:
1. W/N the Bureau of Printing can be sued
2. W/N The Court of Industrial Relations has jurisdiction over the case

SC Ruling:
1. No. In order to discover the nature of its functions, the SC looked into the Administrative Code of 1916
which created the Bureau of Printing. The Code reveals BOP is an office of the Government that operates
under the direct supervision of the Executive Secretary and the Office of the President. Additionally, the BOP
has no corporate existence. Its appropriations are provided for in the General Appropriations Act. The Court
insisted the BOP is not engaged in business for pecuniary profit because it was designed to meet the printing
needs of the Government. The BOP is primarily a service bureau. Although, the BOP is permitted to
undertake private printing jobs, it still not to be considered as an industrial or business concern because such
relations are merely incidental to its functions. This can be evidenced in the fact that the Bureau is not
allowed to make profit. Thus, the Court reiterated the BOP cannot be sued because it is an office of the
Government, without any corporate or juridical personality.

2. No. The Court cited its numerous decisions that declare the Court of Industrial relations has no jurisdiction
to “hear and determine the complaint for unfair labor practice filed against institutions or corporations not
organized for profit and, consequently, not an industrial or business organization.” Rather, the Heads of
Bureaus and Departments are given the power to institute and investigate administrative charges against
erring subordinates. For the CIR to preside over the investigation would be an interference in the functions of
said officials.
Oposa v Factoran

Facts :
The case at bar is a suit instituted by parents on behalf of their children to stop deforestation. The petitioners
filed a mandamus case against respondent DENR Secretary to compel him to cancel all Timber License
Agreements and to prevent him from further issuing such license agreements. The children invoke their right
to a balanced healthful ecology provided by Sec 16 Art II of the Constitiution which is to be protected by the
State in its “parens patriae” capacity

Issue:
W/N the petitioners have locus standi

SC Ruling:
Yes. The Court decreed that based on the concept of “intergenerational responsibility,” the children have
locus standi. The right to a healthy environment provided by Sec 16 Art II of the Constitution effected a
resulting obligation to preserve that environment for the succeeding generations. The Court clarified that the
relation between the “right to a balanced and healthful ecology” and the “correlative duty to refrain from
impairing the environment.” In summation,The SC affirms that there is legal standing when a petitioner sues
on behalf of future generations.
Ichong v. Hernandez

Facts:

Petitioner Inchong contends the RA 1180 is discriminatory and transgresses the right to equal protection
granted by the Constitution. RA 1180 is a law which aims to nationalize the retail trade industry by restricting
engagement in retail trade to Filipinos and providing prohibitions against alien participation, as well as the
transition of the retail trade towards “Filipinization.” Thus, Inchong asks the Court to nullify RA 1180.

Issue:

W/N Legislation discretion is subject to judicial review

W/N RA 1180 violates the charter of the UDHR

W/N RA 1180 violates the Treaty of Amity of between the Philippines and China

SC Ruling

1. No. The duty of the Courts is to review the constitutionality of the laws passed by Legislature. The SC
affirmed that “courts are not supposed to override legitimate policy, and courts never inquire into the wisdom
of the law.”

2. No. The SC proclaims the UDHR is a “mere recommendation or a common standard of achievement for
all peoples and all nations.” It does not impose “strict or legal obligations regarding the rights and freedom of
their subjects.”

3. No. The Court stated what the treaty “guarantees is equality of treatment to the Chinese nationals ‘upon
the same terms as the nationals of any other country.’ " Chinese nationals are not discriminated against
because they are restricted from engaging in trade like the nationals of all other countries (with the exception
of the United States who are granted special rights by the Constitution). Furthermore, the Court cites the
case of US v. Thomson which espoused that a “treaty is always subject to qualification or amendment by a
subsequent law.” A treaty may “never curtail or restrict the scope of the police power of the State” (Plaston v.
Pennsylvania)

Casibang v Aquino

Facts:

Alleging anomalies in the counting of votes and other violations of the 1971 Election Code, petitioner Dante
Casibang filed an election protest against Remigio Yu, the elected mayor of Rosales Pangasinan. The
protest was filed the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan presided over by the respondent Judge. During
the pendency of the trial, the 1935 Constitution was replaced by the 1973 Constitution. Yu moved to dismiss
the election protest on the ground that the new Constitution divested the trial court of jurisdiction over the
matter. Petitioner contends the CFI did not lose jurisdiction to hear and decide election protests pending
before them at the time of the ratification and effectivity of the 1973 Constitution.

Issue:

W/N the respondent Court has jurisdiction over the election protest of Casibang

SC Ruling:

Yes. The SC states the case at bar does not involve a political question. Because a winner has not been
proclaimed yet, the case is still a purely justiciable question. The jurisdiction of the Courts to hear and
resolve the contested issue remains the same before and after the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution.
Consequent judgment will not encroach on the power of the President or Legislative Department in respect
to extending the terms of duly elected incumbents.
Rodriguez v. Gella

GR No L-6266 February 2, 1953

Facts:

Petitioner contends the Executive Orders issued by the president afforded to him by CA 671 (which declared
a state of war involving the Philippines) are void because they were issued after the lapse said
Commonwealth Act.

Issue:

W/N there was a valid delegation of power to the president make such issuances

W/N the President can make new appropriations through executive orders

SC Ruling:

1. No. The Court cites the constitutional provision allows the president to promulgate rules and regulations to
carry out a declared national policy upon the authorization of Congress in times of war or other national
emergency. The court states the effectivity of such authorizing law automatically ceases when it reaches the
end of the period declared by Congress. There is no need to pass a repealing act in order to stop the
delegation of emergency powers to the president.

2. No. The president must abide by the system of separation of powers mandated by the Constitution. The
president cannot supersede the limitations given to it by the Constitution even if the exercise of the
emergency powers is for the sake of speed and expediency in meeting the needs of the people.
Ynot v. IAC

Facts:

Petitioner Restituto Ynot transported 6 carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo and was caught and penalized under
EO 626-A. EO 626-A prohibits the inter-provincial transport of carabaos and carabeef and authorizes the
immediate confiscation of the said carabaos. Further, the law gives the Chairman of the National Meat
Inspection Commission the discretion to distribute the confiscated livestock to deserving farmers (charitable
institutions in the case of carabeef). Ynot assailed the constitutionality of the EO claiming it’s grant of power
to the Chairman to distribute confiscated livestock as it may see fit is invalid delegation.

Issue:

W/N EO 626-A validly delegates power to the NMIC

SC Ruling:

No. The Court states that EO 626-A is an invalid delegation of power. The Court declares the phrase “may
see fit” found in EO 626-A sets a dangerous that is ripe for perilous opportunities for “partiality, abuse, and
even corruption.” The allocation of power onto administrative authorities to determine the guilt of the
supposed offender is a “clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of
separation of powers.”
Pelaez v. Auditor General

Facts:
Pursuant to Sec 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, the president issued Executive Orders that created
33 municipalities. Petitioner Emmanuel Pelaez impugns the constitutionality of the orders stating Sec 68 of
the RAC has been impliedly repealed by RA 2370 and constitutes an undue delegation of power. RA 2370
mandates that the creation or alteration of barrios may only be done by an Act of Congress or of the
corresponding provincial board

Issues:
W/N there is a valid delegation of power

SC Ruling:

No. There was no valid delegation. Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the government
the power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to
forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law be:

(a) be complete in itself — it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by
the delegate — and

(b) fix a standard — the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable — to which the delegate
must conform in the performance of his functions.

In this case, Sec. 68 lacked any such standard. Without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate would,
in effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the essence of every law; and, without the aforementioned
standard, there would be no means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted
within or beyond the scope of his authority.

Further, although Sec. 68 provides the qualifying clause “as the public welfare may require” – which would
mean that the President may exercise such power as the public welfare may require – is present, still, such
will not replace the standard needed for a proper delegation of power. In the first place, what the phrase “as
the public welfare may require” qualifies is the text which immediately precedes hence, the proper
interpretation is “the President may change the seat of government within any subdivision to such place
therein as the public welfare may require.” Only the seat of government may be changed by the President
when public welfare so requires and NOT the creation of municipality.
The Supreme Court declared that the power to create municipalities is essentially and eminently legislative in
character not administrative (not executive).