Ombudsman vs.

Mojica GR 146486
The case had its inception on 29 December 1999, when twenty-two officials and employees of the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman (OMB) for the Visayas, led by its two directors, filed a formal complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman
requesting an investigation on the basis of allegations that then Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas, private respondent
Arturo Mojica, committed the following: 1. Sexual harassment against Rayvi Padua-Varona; 2. Mulcting money from
confidential employees James Alueta and Eden Kiamco; and 3. Oppression against all employees in not releasing the
P7,200.00 benefits of OMB-Visayas employees. The complaints in Criminal Case No. OMB-0-00-0615 and Administrative
Case No. OMB-ADM-0-00-0316, were dismissed.

Thereupon, on 15 January 2001, the Office of the Ombudsman filed before this Court “a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and alternatively, an original special civil action for certiorari under
Sec. 1, Rule 65 of the same rules,

ISSUE: Is the Deputy Ombudsman an impeachable officer under Section 2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution?

RULING: The 1987 Constitution, the deliberations thereon, and the opinions of constitutional law experts all indicate that
the Deputy Ombudsman is not an impeachable officer. The court has likewise taken into account the commentaries of
the leading legal luminaries on the Constitution as to their opinion on whether or not the Deputy Ombudsman is
impeachable. All of them agree in unison that the impeachable officers enumerated in Section 2, Article XI of the 1986
Constitution is exclusive. In their belief, only the Ombudsman, not his deputies, is impeachable. The impeachable officers
are the President of the Philippines, the Vice-President, the members of the Supreme Court, the members of the
Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman. (see Art. XI, Sec. 2) The list is exclusive and may not be increased or
reduced by legislative enactment.

The rule that an impeachable officer cannot be criminally prosecuted for the same offenses which constitute grounds for
impeachment presupposes his continuance in office.Hence, the moment he is no longer in office because of his removal,
resignation, or permanent disability, there can be no bar to his criminal prosecution in the courts. Nor does retirement
bar an administrative investigation from proceeding against the private respondent, given that, as pointed out by the
petitioner, the former’s retirement benefits have been placed on hold in view of the provisions of Sections 12 and 13 of
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

RODANTE D. MARCOLETA v. RESURRECCION Z. BORRA and ROMEO A. BRAWNER

582 SCRA 474 (2009)

An impeachable officer who is a member of the Bar cannot be disbarred without first being impeached

Rodante D. Marcoleta filed a complaint for disbarment against respondents Commissioners Resurreccion Z. Borra and
Romeo A. Brawner of the Commission on Elections (Comelec) charging them with violating Canons 1 and 3 of the Code
of Judicial Conduct, and Canons 4, 5, 6 and 17 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics. The complaint arose from the resolution
of the Comelec’s First Division in favor of one Diogenes S. Osabel, the head of one of the factions in the party-list group
Alagad. The ponencia was written by Commissioner Borra while Commissioner Brawner concurred. The dispute was
elevated to the Comelec En Banc. The latter affirmed the decision of the Comelec’s First Division.

Brawner, in his answer asserted that the complainant should have filed an appeal via petition for certiorari to the
Supreme Court, and that being members of a constitutional body he and Borra ―are supposed to be insulated from a
disbarment complaint for being impeachable officer.‖ For his part, Borra contends that the Code of Judicial Conduct and
Canons of Judicial Ethics cannot be made to apply to him and Brawner because they are not members of the judiciary.

Marcoleta argues that Brawner and Borra cannot take refuge in their being impeachable public officers to insulate them
from any disbarment complaint. For him ―the insulation from disbarment complaint of impeachable public officers when
referring particularly to the members of the Comelec applies only to the majority of its members who should all be
members of the Philippine bar,‖ citing Section 1 (1) of Article IX-C of the Constitution.

ISSUES: Whether or not Borra and Brawner are supposed to be insulated from a disbarment case for being impeachable
officers

HELD: At the outset, the Court, guided by its pronouncements in Jarque v. Ombudsman, In Re: Raul M. Gonzales and
Cuenco v. Fernan, has laid down the rule that an impeachable officer who is a member of the Bar cannot be disbarred
without first being impeached. Marcoleta’s availment of Section 1 (1) of Article IX-C of the Constitution to skirt this rule
is specious.

It bears emphasis that the provision that majority of Comelec members should be lawyers pertains to the desired
composition of the Comelec. While the appointing authority may follow such constitutional mandate, the appointment
of a full complement of lawyers in the Comelec membership is not precluded.

At the time the present complaint was filed, Brawner and Borra and three other commissioners were all lawyers. As an
impeachable officer who is at the same time a member of the Bar, Borra must first be removed from office via the
constitutional route of impeachment before he may be held to answer administratively for his supposed errant
resolutions and actions.

The Court thus finds respondent Borra’s contention that the grounds-bases of the disbarment complaint, fastened on
supposed errors of judgment or grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts, are proper for an appeal, hence,
complainant’s remedy is judicial, not administrative.

As for complainant’s invocation of Section 58 of Article VII of the Omnibus Election Code the same relates to the quasi-
judicial function of the Comelec, which function rests on judgment or discretion, so that while it is of judicial nature or
character, it does not involve the exercise of functions of a judge.

The same provision thus directs that in the exercise of the Comelec’s quasi-judicial power, the chairman and members
should be guided by the canons of judicial ethics. It bears emphasis that the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary applies only to courts of law, of which the Comelec is not, hence, sanctions pertaining to violations
thereof are made exclusively applicable to judges and justices in the judiciary, not to quasi-judicial officers like the
Comelec chairman and members, who have their own codes of conduct to steer them.

Even if the Court were to gauge the assailed actions of respondent Borra under the Code of Professional Responsibility,
no specific incidents and sufficient evidence can be gathered to show that respondent did engage in dishonest, immoral
or deceitful conduct in his capacity as a lawyer. It bears reiteration that the acts particularized in the complaint pertain
to respondent Borra’s duties as a Comelec commissioner.
FRANCISCO ET AL v HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
FACTS On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, sponsored by Representative Felix William
D. Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on Justice “to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner
of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF).”
On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first impeachment complaint)
against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of this Court for “culpable violation of the
Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes.” The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13,
2003 that the first impeachment complaint was “sufficient in form,”9 but voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003
for being insufficient in substance.10 To date, the Committee Report to this effect has not yet been sent to the House in
plenary in accordance with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. Four months and three weeks since the
filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint or on October 23, 2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to
dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint11 was filed with the Secretary General of the House12 by Representatives
Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. (First District, Tarlac) and Felix William B. Fuentebella (Third District, Camarines Sur) against Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House
Resolution. This second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a “Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment”
signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of Representatives.13 Since the first impeachment
complaint never made it to the floor for resolution, respondent House of Representatives concludes that the one year
bar prohibiting the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same officials could not have been violated as the
impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide and seven Associate Justices had not been initiated as the House of
Representatives, acting as the collective body, has yet to act on it. Opposing petitioners on the other hand interpreted
the word “initiate” to mean the filing of the complaint. Since there was already a first complaint that never got through
the Committee, no impeachment complaint maybe filed until the lapse of the 1 year period.

ISSUE/S 1. When is an impeachment proceeding initiated? 2. Is the second impeachment complaint valid?

HELD 1. Art. XI, Sec. 3, pars. (1), (5) & (6) of the Constitution states:

(1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment.

(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year.

(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. When sitting for that purpose, the
Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President of the Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the
Members of the Senate.

“Initiate” of course is understood by ordinary men to mean, as dictionaries do, to begin, to commence, or set going. As
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary of the English Language concisely puts it, it means “to perform or facilitate
the first action,” The Court pried the Constitutional Convention Records to ascertain the intent of the framers of the
Constitution. The framers really intended “initiate” to mean the filing of the verified complaint to the Committee on
Justice of the Lower House. This is also based on the procedure of the U.S. Congress where an impeachment is initiated
upon filing of the impeachment complaint.

2. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and referral to the
House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear.
Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same
official within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.
REPUBLIC of the PHILIPPINES, represented by SOLICITOR GENERAL JOSE C. CALIDA v. MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO,
G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018 [J. Tijam, En Banc]

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE:

Quo warranto as a remedy to oust an ineligible public official may be availed of when the subject act or omission was
committed prior to or at the time of appointment or election relating to an official’s qualifications to hold office as to
render such appointment or election invalid. Acts or omissions, even if it relates to the qualification of integrity being a
continuing requirement but nonetheless committed during the incumbency of a validly appointed and/or validly elected
official cannot be the subject of a quo warranto proceeding, but of impeachment if the public official concerned is
impeachable and the act or omission constitutes an impeachable offense, or to disciplinary, administrative or criminal
action, if otherwise.

FACTS:

This is a case for quo warranto filed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) on behalf of the Republic, seeking to
invalidate respondent’s appointment as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court for lack of “proven integrity” on account of
her failure to regularly disclose her assets, liabilities and net worth as a member of the career service prior to her
appointment to the Supreme Court, in violation of the Constitution, the Anti-Graft Law and the Code of Ethical Standards
for Public Employees.

The Court has Jurisdiction over the instant Petition for Quo Warranto

Under Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution and Section 7, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, this Court has concurrent
jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Court over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus,
quo warranto, and habeas corpus. The issue of whether a person usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises
a public office is a matter of public concern over which the government takes special interest as it obviously cannot allow
an intruder or impostor to occupy a public position.

The origin, nature and purpose of impeachment and quo warranto are materially different

Impeachment is a proceeding exercised by the legislative, as representatives of the sovereign, to vindicate the breach of
the trust reposed by the people in the hands of the public officer by determining the public officer’s fitness to stay in the
office. Meanwhile, an action for quo warranto, involves a judicial determination of the eligibility or validity of the election
or appointment of a public official based on predetermined rules.

The Petition is Not Dismissible on the Ground of Prescription

When the Solicitor General files a quo warranto petition in behalf of the people and where the interests of the public is
involved, the lapse of time presents no effective bar. A quo warranto action is a governmental function and not a
propriety function, and therefore the doctrine of laches does not apply. Indeed, when the government is the real party
in interest, and is proceeding mainly to assert its rights, there can be no defense on the ground of laches or prescription.

The Republic cannot be faulted for questioning respondent’s qualification for office only upon discovery of the cause of
ouster. Respondent was never forthright as to whether or not she filed her SALNs (statements of assets, liabilities and
net worth) covering the period of her employment in UP (University of the Philippines). Even up to the present,
respondent has not been candid on whether she filed the required SALNs or not. Hence, until recently when respondent’s
qualification for office was questioned during the hearings conducted by the House Committee on Justice on the
impeachment complaint against the respondent, there was no indication that would have prompted the Republic to
assail respondent’s appointment, much less question the wisdom or reason behind the said recommending and
appointing authorities’ actions. The defect on respondent’s appointment was therefore not discernible, but was, on the
contrary, deliberately rendered obscure.

Respondent is Ineligible as a Candidate and Nominee for the Position of Chief Justice

The JBC’s (Judicial and Bar Council’s) duty to recommend or nominate, although calling for the exercise of discretion, is
neither absolute nor unlimited. The primary limitation to the JBC’s exercise of discretion is that the nominee must possess
the minimum qualifications required by the Constitution and the laws relative to the position. While the resolution of
who to nominate as between two candidates of equal qualification cannot be dictated by this Court upon the JBC, such
surrender of choice presupposes that whosoever is nominated is not otherwise disqualified.

Qualifications under the Constitution cannot be waived or bargained away by the JBC

The qualifications of an aspiring Member of the Supreme Court are enshrined in Section 7, Article VIII of the Constitution.
Evidently, more than age, citizenship and professional qualifications, Our fundamental law is clear that a member of the
Judiciary must be a person of proven competence, integrity, probity and independence. Emphatically, integrity is not only
a prerequisite for an aspiring Member of the Court but is likewise a continuing requirement common to judges and
lawyers alike. To make sure that applicants to judicial positions possess these constitutionally prescribed character
requirement, the JBC was created.

Compliance with the SALN requirement indubitably reflects on a person’s integrity

Failure to file the SALN is clearly a violation of the Constitution and the law. The offense is penal in character and is a
clear breach of the ethical standards set for public officials and employees. For these reasons, a public official who has
failed to comply with the requirement of filing the SALN cannot be said to be of proven integrity and the Court may
consider him/her disqualified from holding public office. The requirement to file a SALN is not a trivial or a formal
requirement. The fundamental issue in the case at bar is not merely inaccurate entries, but the glaring absence of
respondent’s SALN for various years prior to her resignation from the U.P. College of Law.

Respondent’s ineligibility for lack of proven integrity cannot be cured by her nomination and subsequent appointment
as

Chief Justice

The evidence, as it stands before Us, shows that respondent failed to file nine SALNs in her 20-year service in U.P. College
of Law and submitted to the JBC only three out of the required ten SALNs at the time of her application as Chief Justice.
The Court cannot therefore be faulted, at least for purposes of the instant quo warranto proceedings, to conclude that
respondent not only failed to submit the SALNs to the JBC, but altogether failed to file the same.

Such failure to file and to submit the SALNs to the JBC, is a clear violation not only of the JBC rules, but also of the law
and the Constitution. For lack of proven integrity, respondent ought to have been disqualified by the JBC and ought to
have been excluded from the list of nominees transmitted to the President. As the qualification of proven integrity goes
into the barest standards set forth under the Constitution to qualify as a Member of the Court, the subsequent
nomination and appointment to the position will not qualify an otherwise excluded candidate. In other words, the
inclusion of respondent in the shortlist of nominees submitted to the President cannot override the minimum
Constitutional qualifications.

Guidelines for the Bench, the Bar and the JBC

The present is the exigent and opportune time for the Court to establish well-defined guidelines that would serve as
guide posts for the bench, the bar and the JBC, as well, in the discharge of its Constitutionally-mandated functions. In
sum, this Court holds:

(1) Quo warranto as a remedy to oust an ineligible public official may be availed of, provided that the requisites for the
commencement thereof are present, when the subject act or omission was committed prior to or at the time of
appointment or election relating to an official’s qualifications to hold office as to render such appointment or election
invalid. Acts or omissions, even if it relates to the qualification of integrity being a continuing requirement but
nonetheless committed during the incumbency of a validly appointed and/or validly elected official cannot be the subject
of a quo warranto proceeding, but of impeachment if the public official concerned is impeachable and the act or omission
constitutes an impeachable offense, or to disciplinary, administrative or criminal action, if otherwise.
(2) Members of the Judiciary are bound by the qualifications of honesty, probity, competence, and integrity.

(3) In ascertaining whether a candidate possesses such qualifications, the JBC in the exercise of its Constitutional
mandate, set certain requirements which should be complied with by the candidates to be able to qualify. These
requirements, as well as subsequent changes thereto, are announced and published to notify not only the applicants but
the public as well.

(4) If a candidate is appointed despite being unable to comply with the requirements of the JBC and despite the lack of
the aforementioned qualifications at the time of application, the appointment may be the subject of a quo warranto
provided it is filed within one year from the appointment or discovery of the defect.

(5) The willful non-filing of a SALN is an indication of dishonesty, lack of probity and lack of integrity. Moreso if the non-
filing is repeated in complete disregard of the mandatory requirements of the Constitution and the law.

(6) Consistent with the SALN laws, however, SALNs filed need not be retained after more than ten years by the receiving
office or custodian or repository unless these are the subject of investigation pursuant to the law. Thus, to be in keeping
with the spirit of the law requiring public officers to file SALNs—to manifest transparency and accountability in public
office—if public officers cannot produce their SALNs from their personal files, they must obtain a certification from the
office where they filed and/or the custodian or repository thereof to attest to the fact of filing. In the event that said
offices certify that the SALN was indeed filed but could not be located, said offices must certify the valid and legal reason
of their non-availability, such as by reason of destruction by natural calamity due to fire or earthquake, or by reason of
the allowed destruction after ten years under Section 8 of R.A. No. 6713.

Epilogue

The foregoing discourse thins down to a public officer’s accountability to the public. The very purpose and nature of
public office is grounded upon it being a public trust. A public officer who is not truthful, not forthright, in complying with
the qualifications to public office, perforce, has not legally qualified, was not legally appointed, and consequently, has
not legally assumed the said public office. The passage of time will not cure such invalidity of holding public office, much
less, foreclose the right and duty of the government, the keeper of the said public office, to oust and remove the usurper.
Azarcon vs. Sandiganbayan
Facts: Petitioner Alfredo Azarcon owned and operated an earth-moving business, hauling dirt and ore. His services were
contracted by PICOP. Occasionally, he engaged the services of sub-contractors like Jaime Ancla whose trucks were left at
the former’s premises.

On May 25, 1983, a Warrant of Distraint of Personal Property was issued by BIR commanding one of its Regional Directors
to distraint the goods, chattels or effects and other personal property of Jaime Ancla, a sub-contractor of accused Azarcon
and a delinquent taxpayer. A Warrant of Garnishment was issued to and subsequently signed by accused Azarcon
ordering him to transfer, surrender, transmit and/or remit to BIR the property in his possession owned by Ancla. Azarcon
then volunteered himself to act as custodian of the truck owned by Ancla.

After some time, Azarcon wrote a letter to the Reg. Dir of BIR stating that while he had made representations to retain
possession of the property of Ancla, he thereby relinquishes whatever responsibility he had over the said property since
Ancla surreptitiously withdrew his equipment from him. In his reply, the BIR Reg. Dir. said that Azarcon’s failure to comply
with the provisions of the warrant did not relieve him from his responsibility.

Along with his co-accused, Azarcon was charged before the Sandiganbayan with the crime of malversation of public funds
or property. On March 8, 1994, the Sandiganbayan rendered a Decision sentencing the accused to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment ranging from 10 yrs and 1 day of prision mayor in its maximum period to 17 yrs, 4 mos and 1 day of
reclusion temporal. Petitioner filed a motion for new trial which was subsequently denied by Sandiganbayan. Hence, this
petition.

Issue: Whether or not Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a private individual designated by BIR as a custodian of
distrained property.

Held: SC held that the Sandiganbayan’s decision was null and void for lack of jurisdiction.

Sec. 4 of PD 1606 provides for the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. It was specified therein that the only instances when
the Sandiganbayan will have jurisdiction over a private individual is when the complaint charges the private individual
either as a co-principal, accomplice or accessory of a public officer or employee who has been charged with a crime within
its jurisdiction.

The Information does no charge petitioner Azarcon of becoming a co-principal, accomplice or accessory to a public officer
committing an offense under the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction. Thus, unless the petitioner be proven a public officer,
Sandiganbayan will have no jurisdiction over the crime charged.

Art. 203 of the RPC determines who public officers are. Granting that the petitioner, in signing the receipt for the truck
constructively distrained by the BIR, commenced to take part in an activity constituting public functions, he obviously
may not be deemed authorized by popular election. Neither was he appointed by direct provision of law nor by
competent authority. While BIR had authority to require Azarcon to sign a receipt for the distrained truck, the National
Internal Revenue Code did not grant it power to appoint Azarcon a public officer. The BIR’s power authorizing a private
individual to act as a depositary cannot be stretched to include the power to appoint him as a public officer. Thus, Azarcon
is not a public officer.
AMANDO A. INOCENTES VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL.

G.R. NOS. 205963-64. JULY 7, 2016

The applicable law provides that violations of R.A. No. 3019 committed by presidents,

directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or -controlled corporations, and state

universities shall be within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandganbayan. We have

clarified the provision of law defining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by explaining that

the Sandiganbayan maintains its jurisdiction over those officials specifically enumerated in (a) to

(g) of Section 4(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, regardless of their salary grades. Simply put,

those that are classified as Salary Grade 26 and below may still fall within the jurisdiction of the

Sandiganbayan, provided they hold the positions enumerated by the law. In this category, it is the

position held, not the salary grade, which determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

DUNCANO VS SANDIGANBAYAN (
G.R. NO. 191894 JULY 15, 2015

Facts: Petitioner Danilo A. Duncano is, at the time material to the case, the Regional Director of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR) with Salary Grade 26 as classified under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6758. On March 24, 2009, the Office of the
Special Prosecutor (OSP), Office of the Ombudsman, filed a criminal case against him for violation of Section 8, in relation
to Section 11 of R.A. No. 6713, allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about April 15, 2003, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused DANILO DUNCANO y ACIDO, a high ranking public officer, being the Regional
Director of Revenue Region No. 7, of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, Quezon City, and as such is under an obligation to
accomplish and submit declarations under oath of his assets, liabilities and net worth and financial and business interests,
did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally fail to disclose in his Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities and
Networth (SALN) for the year 2002, his financial and business interests/connection in Documail Provides Corporation and
Don Plus Trading of which he and his family are the registered owners thereof, and the 1993 Nissan Patrol motor vehicle
registered in the name of his son VINCENT LOUIS P. DUNCANO which are part of his assets, to the damage and prejudice
of public interest.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Issue: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the petitioner.

Held: No. The creation of the Sandiganbayan was mandated by Section 5, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution. By virtue
of the powers vested in him by the Constitution and pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081, dated September 21, 1972,
former President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued P.D. No. 1486. The decree was later amended by P.D. No. 1606, Section 20
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, P.D. No. 1860, and P.D. No. 1861.
With the advent of the 1987 Constitution, the special court was retained as provided for in Section 4, Article XI thereof.
Aside from Executive Order Nos. 14 and 14-a, and R.A. 7080, which expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, P.D.
No. 1606 was further modified by R.A. No. 7975, R.A. No. 8249, and just this year, R.A. No. 10660.

For the purpose of this case, the relevant provision is Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, which states: SEC. 4. Section 4 of the
same decree is hereby further amended to read as follows:

“SEC. 4. Jurisdiction.– The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

“A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the
accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim
capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:

“(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade
27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:

“(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers,
assessors, engineers, and other provincial department heads;

“(b) City mayor, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other
city department heads;

“(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;

“(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;

“(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of provincial director and those holding the
rank of senior superintendent or higher;

“(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman
and special prosecutor;

“(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or
educational institutions or foundations.

“(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade 27 and up under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989;

“(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;

“(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commission, without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; and

“(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27 and higher under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989.

“B. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and
employees mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation to their office.

“C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in
1986.

Yet, those that are classified as Salary Grade 26 and below may still fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan,
provided that they hold the positions enumerated by the law. In this category, it is the position held, not the salary grade,
which determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The specific inclusion constitutes an exception to the general
qualification relating to “officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher,
otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.”38 As ruled in
Inding:

Following this disquisition, the paragraph of Section 4 which provides that if the accused is occupying a position lower
than SG 27, the proper trial court has jurisdiction, can only be properly interpreted as applying to those cases where the
principal accused is occupying a position lower than SG 27 and not among those specifically included in the enumeration
in Section 4 a. (1) (a) to (g). Stated otherwise, except for those officials specifically included in Section 4 a. (1) (a) to (g),
regardless of their salary grades, over whom the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction, all other public officials below SG 27
shall be under the jurisdiction of the proper trial courts “where none of the principal accused are occupying positions
corresponding to SG 27 or higher.” By this construction, the entire Section 4 is given effect. The cardinal rule, after all, in
statutory construction is that the particular words, clauses and phrases should not be studied as detached and isolated
expressions, but the whole and every part of the statute must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts and
in order to produce a harmonious whole. And courts should adopt a construction that will give effect to every part of a
statute, if at all possible. Ut magis valeat quam pereat or that construction is to be sought which gives effect to the whole
of the statute – its every word.

The Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over violations of Section 3(a) and (e), Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, unless
committed by public officials and employees occupying positions of regional director and higher with Salary Grade “27”
or higher, under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758) in relation to their
office.

In ruling in favor of its jurisdiction, even though petitioner admittedly occupied the position of Director II with Salary
Grade “26” under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), the Sandiganbayan
incurred in serious error of jurisdiction, and acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in
suspending petitioner from office, entitling petitioner to the reliefs prayed for.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. LUIS J. MORALES

[G.R. No. 166355, May 30, 2011]

Doctrine:

A government-owned or controlled corporation must be owned by the government, and in the case of a stock
corporation, at least a majority of its capital stock must be owned by the government.

Facts:

The National Centennial Commission (NCC) and the Bases Conversion Development Authority (BCDA) organized the
Philippine Centennial Expo ’98 Corporation or Expocorp whose primary purpose was to operate, administer, manage and
develop the Philippine Centennial International Exposition 1998. The Philippine Centennial project was marred by
numerous allegations of anomalies, among them, the lack of public biddings. Both the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee
and the AHICC recommended to the Office of the Ombudsman that a more exhaustive investigation of the Philippine
Centennial project be conducted. The investigation resulted in the filing in of an Information by the Ombudsman’s Fact-
Finding and Investigation Bureau against respondent Luis J. Morales (Morales), the acting president of Expocorp at the
time relevant to the case. In the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan, Morales moved for the dismissal of the case for
lack of jurisdiction over his person and over the offense charged.
Issue:

Whether Expocorp was organized and created for the sole purpose of performing the executive functions of the National
Centennial Commission and the sovereign functions of the government, and should be considered as a public office

Held:

No. The Court here ruled that Philippine Centennial Expo ’98 Corporation is a private corporation. It was not created by
a special law but was incorporated under the Corporation Code and was registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission. It is not a government-owned or controlled corporation. Although the Bases Conversion Development
Authority owned almost all of the shares of Expocorp at the time of the latter’s incorporation, the Board of Directors of
Expocorp allowed a private corporation to buy its shares constituting 55.16% of its outstanding capital stock two months
after incorporation. With the BCDA as a minority stockholder, Expocorp cannot be characterized as a government-owned
or controlled corporation. A government-owned or controlled corporation must be owned by the government, and in
the case of a stock corporation, at least a majority of its capital stock must be owned by the government. Since Expocorp
is not a GOCC, its officers and employees are private individuals who are outside the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

People vs. Magallanes Case Digest

Jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information, and not by the result of evidence after trial.
Lack of an allegation in the informations that the offenses were committed in relation to the office of the accused PNP
officers or were intimately connected with the discharge of the functions of the accused, the subject cases come within
the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court and not of the Sandiganbayan.

Facts:

In 1994, two informations for kidnapping for ransom with murder were filed with the RTC of Bacolod City against 14
persons, 5 of whom are members of the PNP. Each of the accused pleaded not guilty upon arraignment. After, the
prosecution rested its case, the trial court started to receive the evidence for the accused.

Later, the private prosecutors moved for the transmittal of the records of the cases to the Sandiganbayan on the ground
that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the cases because the offenses charged were committed in relation to the
office of the accused PNP officers.

The trial court, thru respondent Judge, ruled that the Sandiganbayan does not have jurisdiction over the subject cases
because the informations do not state that the offenses were committed in relation to the office of the accused PNP
officers. It held that the allegation in the informations that the accused PNP officers took advantage of their office in the
commission of the offense charged is merely an allegation of an aggravating circumstance. It further stated that a public
office is not a constituent element of the offense of kidnapping with murder nor is the said offense intimately connected
with the office. It then denied the motion for transfer of the records to the Sandiganbayan and declared that the trial of
the case should continue.

The prosecution filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with a prayer for a temporary restraining order,
challenging the refusal of the judge to transfer the cases to the Sandiganbayan. The petitioner submits that the crimes
charged in the subject cases were connected with public office because the accused PNP officers, together with the
civilian agents, arrested the two swindling suspects in the course of the performance of their duty and not out of personal
motive, and if they demanded from the two suspects the production of the money of the Dumancas spouses and later
killed the two; they did so in the course of the investigation conducted by them as policemen. The petitioner further
asserts that the allegations in the informations reading "taking advantage of his position as Station Commander of the
Philippine National Police" and "taking advantage of their respective positions" presuppose the exercise of the functions
attached to the office of the accused PNP officers and are sufficient to show that the offenses charged were committed
in relation to their office.

Issues:

1. Who has jurisdiction over the cases?

2. Were the offense committed in relation to the office of the accused PNP officers?

Held:

1. The jurisdiction of a court may be determined by the law in force at the time of the commencement of the action.
When the informations in the cases were filed, the law governing the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan was P.D. 1861,
which provides that the Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over cases involving: 1) violations of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; 2) offenses committed by public officers in relation to their office, where the penalty
prescribed is higher than prision correccional or imprisonment of six (6) years, or a fine of P 6,000.00. If the penalty for
the offense charged does not exceed imprisonment of six (6) years or a fine of P6,000.00, it shall be tried by the Regional
Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court or the Municipal Circuit Trial Court.

2. It is an elementary rule that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information, and not by
the result of evidence after trial.

The informations in the court below do not indicate that the accused arrested and investigated the victims and then killed
the latter in the course of the investigation. The informations merely allege that the accused, for the purpose of extracting
or extorting the sum of P353,000.00, abducted, kidnapped, and detained the two victims, and failing in their common
purpose, they shot and killed the said victims. For the purpose of determining jurisdiction, it is these allegations that shall
control, and not the evidence presented by the prosecution at the trial.

The allegation of "taking advantage of his position" or "taking advantage of their respective positions" incorporated in
the informations is not sufficient to bring the offenses within the definition of "offenses committed in relation to public
office." In Montilla vs. Hilario, such an allegation was considered merely as an allegation of an aggravating circumstance,
and not as one that qualifies the crime as having been committed in relation to public office.

Also, in Bartolome vs. People of the Philippines, despite the allegation that the accused public officers committed the
crime of falsification of official document by "taking advantage of their official positions," this Court held that the
Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the case because "[t]he information [did] not allege that there was an intimate
connection between the discharge of official duties and the commission of the offense."

Accordingly, for lack of an allegation in the informations that the offenses were committed in relation to the office of the
accused PNP officers or were intimately connected with the discharge of the functions of the accused, the subject cases
come within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court and not of the Sandiganbayan as insisted by the petitioner.

Moreover, the Sandiganbayan has partly lost its jurisdiction over cases involving violations of R.A. 3019, as amended in
R.A. 1379 because it only retains jurisdiction on cases enumerated in subsection (a) when the public officers rank is
classified as Grade “27” or higher. In the case at bar, none of the PNP officers involved occupy a position classified as
Grade “27” or higher.
Lastly, the courts cannot be divested of jurisdiction which was already acquired before the subsequent enactment of R.A.
7975 which limited the Sandiganbayan‟s jurisdiction to officers whose rank is Grade“27” or higher. Jurisdiction once
acquired is not affected by subsequent legislative enactment placing jurisdiction in another tribunal. It remains with the
court until the case is finally terminated. Hence, cases already under the jurisdiction of the courts at the time of the
enactment of R.A. 7975 are only referred to the proper courts if trial has not yet begun at that time

Sanchez v. Demetriou
[GR Nos. 111771-77 November 9, 1993]

Facts: Information was filed against several people including the petitioner in relation with the rape-slay of Mary Eileen
Sarmenta and the killing of Allan Gomez. Sanchez has brought the petition to challenge the order of the respondent judge
denying his motion to quash the information for rape with homicide filed against him and six other persons on the ground
he is being charged with seven homicides arising from the death of only two persons. The petitioner submits that the
seven informations charging seven separate homicides are absurd because the two victims in these cases could not have
died seven times.

Issue: Whether or not the court acted properly on denying the petition of Sanchez to quash on the grounds that he is
being charged with seven homicides arising from the death of only two persons. Held: The court ruled that where there
are two or more offenders who commit rape, the homicide committed on the occasion or by reason of each rape, must
be deemed as a constituent of the special complex crime of rape with homicide. Therefore, there will be as many crimes
of rape with homicide as there are rapes committed. In effect, the presence of homicide qualifies the crime of rape,
thereby raising its penalty to the highest degree. Thus, homicide committed on the occasion or by reason of rape, loses
its character as an independent offense, but assumes a new character, and functions like a qualifying circumstance.
However,by fiction of law, it merged with rape to constitute an constituent element of a special complex crime of rape
with homicide with a specific penalty which is in the highest degree. The petitioner and his six co-accused are not charged
with only one rape committed by him in conspiracy with the other six. Each one of the seven accused is charged with
having himself raped Sarmenta instead of simply helping Sanchez in committing only one rape. In other words, the
allegation of the prosecution is that the girl was raped seven times, with each of the seven accused taking turns in abusing
her with the assistance of the other six. Afterwards, their lust satisfied, all seven of them decided to kill and thus silence
Sarmenta. Every one of the seven accused is being charged separately for actually raping Sarmenta and later killing her
instead of merely assisting the petitioner in raping and then slaying her. The separate informations filed against each of
them allege that each of the seven successive rapes is complexed by the subsequent slaying of Sarmenta and aggravated
by the killing of Allan Gomez by her seven attackers. The separate rapes were committed in succession by the seven
accused, culminating in the slaying of Sarmenta.

Synopsis of Memorandum in the case of De Lima v. Judge Guerrero et al.

Background

The Memorandum is the final submission of Senator Leila M. De Lima as petitioner in the case of De Lima v. Judge
Guerrero et. al. pending with the Supreme Court. The petition was filed by De Lima to assail the issuance of a warrant of
arrest against her by Judge Juanita Guerrero of the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa, Branch 204 in the criminal case
for Illegal Drug Trading filed by the government after the resolution of the preliminary investigation conducted by the
Department of Justice. After hearing the case in oral arguments, the Supreme Court directed the parties to submit their
memorandum.

On Constitutional Violations

The weakness of the government case against De Lima is at once apparent because of the confusion of the government
on the nature and cause of the accusation against her. From consummated drug trading, the charge against her was
changed by the government to conspiracy to commit drug trading, but without following the procedure in the
substitution of the Information. The change was made because the Information did not allege the dangerous drugs traded
and the government does not have these drugs in evidence. Evidence of the drugs is required in prosecutions for
violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act. The government theory is that evidence of the drugs is not necessary in proving
conspiracy to commit illegal drug trading. But even this theory is erroneous.

Because of this change in the government’ position, several constitutional violations were at once committed even at the
level of the Supreme Court proceedings alone. First, the change of the nature of accusation against her without the
proper substitution or amendment of the Information violates her constitutional right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against her. Second, De Lima was therefore charged, arrested and detained for a crime that was
not the one intended to be filed against her. The government wants her tried for conspiracy to commit drug trading but
the Information filed against her was for consummated drug trading. She was therefore arrested for a crime that,
according to the government’s theory, was not the one that she committed. Third, from the very start, she was already
adjudged by the government to be guilty even before any fact-finding or preliminary investigation was conducted against
her, when she was publicly tried with prejudice by the House of Representatives, and by no less than the President, his
cabinet officials, and congressional allies in public statements declaring her guilt.

All the constitutional violations and disregard of the law and procedure in the filing of cases against her, as well as the
orchestrated public statements of senior government officials attacking her, reveal a pattern of political persecution,
rather than legitimate prosecution.

On Jurisdiction

The position of Senator De Lima from the outset is that neither the DOJ nor the regular trial courts has jurisdiction over
her case, whether it be for illegal drug trading as charged by the DOJ in the Information, or conspiracy to commit illegal
drug trading as proposed by the Office of the Solicitor General in its Comment to the Petition, or direct bribery, which De
Lima thinks should be the proper charge given the allegations in the Information. She maintains that being a public official
with salary grade 31 at the time of the alleged offenses, with said offenses having been allegedly committed using her
power, authority and position, the proper agencies that have jurisdiction over her case are the Ombudsman and the
Sandiganbayan.

The rationale for the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan applies in De Lima’s case. The three-justice system of the
Sandiganbayan was envisioned as a safeguard to counter the political influence of powerful public officials accused before
it, or to check any element of political persecution against the political enemies of incumbent authorities. The single-
judge system of the regular judiciary is not designed to fulfill this purpose of the Anti-Graft Court, and is therefore more
prone to powerful and irresistible political influences in its decision-making.

On top of this are the basic statutory conditions for the exercise of Sandiganbayan jurisdiction: public officials with Salary
Grade 27 and above charged with crimes committed in relation to their office. The allegations against De Lima constitute
an Information for direct bribery, not for drug trading, simply because according to the statements in the Information
itself, what she was interested in was the delivery of money from whatever source, whether this came from the trading
of illegal drugs or not. Direct bribery committed by officials with Salary Grade 27 and above involving more than one
million pesos squarely falls within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

On Judge Guerrero’s abuse of discretion

Judge Guerrero committed grave abuse of discretion when she issued a warrant of arrest against De Lima before ruling
on the issue raised by De Lima questioning her jurisdiction. She violated the Benchbook for Trial Court Judges, the
officially-adopted bible for judges and the judiciary, which provides in its Procedural Checklist that before issuing a
warrant of arrest, any judge should first check if she has jurisdiction over the case. Admittedly, Judge Guerrero issued a
warrant of arrest first before checking on her jurisdiction, upon the erroneous assumption that she has to order the arrest
of De Lima first before she can rule on issues raised against her jurisdiction.

Even without the Benchbook to remind judges of this procedure, basic substantive law and procedural considerations
put the primacy of jurisdiction over all other matters in criminal trials, because a court that tries a case without jurisdiction
cannot pass any valid judgment. The proceedings held before it will always be null and void.

In a sense, Judge Guerrero was reckless in asserting her inexistent jurisdiction, when the first consideration of a judge is
to ascertain her jurisdiction because it affects her case load and most importantly, the exercise of her power, ignorance
of which can lead to the imposition of administrative penalties against her. Rather than be cautious because of all the
red flags on her jurisdiction already raised by De Lima in her Motion to Quash, Judge Guerrero chose to ignore these red
flags, contrary to the tradition of judicial deliberation and mindfulness, especially in a case where the liberty of a person
is at stake.

Lastly, by issuing a warrant of arrest, Judge Guerrero found probable cause on the basis of the testimonies and affidavits
of convicted criminals who are disqualified by the Dangerous Drugs Act, the WPP Law, and the Rules of Court from being
discharged as State witnesses. Since these convicts cannot be allowed by law to testify in court as witnesses for the State
against De Lima, the government basically has no case against her.

On Procedural Issues

De Lima claims that she did not violate the rules on the hierarchy of courts, exhaustion of judicial remedies, and against
forum-shopping in filing the petition. Direct recourse to the Supreme Court may be allowed if the redress desired cannot
be obtained in the appropriate courts, or where exceptional and compelling circumstances justify the availing of a remedy
within and calling for the exercise of the Supreme Court’s certiorari jurisdiction.

According to De Lima, her petition is a matter of national interest and has serious implications. It warrants a deviation
from the rule on hierarchy of courts as it involves questions of first impression, the answers to which will significantly
impact the power of public institutions and the rights of citizens. The petition also involves questions of law, the
resolution of which will not only affect her but all citizens of the country. It also warrants an exercise of the Supreme
Court’s primary jurisdiction in the interest of speedy justice and to avoid future litigation.

She also claims that her petition was properly notarized and fully complied with the substantial requirements of
notarization. According to De Lima, the Supreme Court has more substantive and relevant issues to resolve than be
bothered with such narrow, formalistic pettiness and legal nitpicking on the proper accomplishment of her petition’s
verification.

In the end, De Lima asked the Supreme Court to order her immediate release from detention.
Serana v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 162059 January 22, 2008

FACTS:

Petitioner Hannah Eunice D. Serana was appointed by then President Joseph Estrada as a student regent of UP, to serve
a one-year term.

Petitioner discussed with President Estrada the renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex in UP Diliman.

Petitioner, with her siblings and relatives, registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission the Office of the
Student Regent Foundation, Inc. (OSRFI).

One of the projects of the OSRFI was the renovation of the Vinzons Hall Annex. President Estrada gave Fifteen Million
Pesos (P15,000,000.00) to the OSRFI as financial assistance for the proposed renovation. The source of the funds,
according to the information, was the Office of the President.

The renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex failed to materialize. The succeeding student regent and the Secretary General of
the KASAMA sa U.P., a system-wide alliance of student councils within the state university, consequently filed a complaint
for Malversation of Public Funds and Property with the Office of the Ombudsman.

The Ombudsman, after due investigation, found probable cause to indict petitioner and her brother Jade Ian D. Serana
for estafa.

Petitioner moved to quash the information. She claimed that the Sandiganbayan does not have any jurisdiction over the
offense charged or over her person, in her capacity as UP student regent, claiming that she was not a public officer since
she merely represented her peers, in contrast to the other regents who held their positions in an ex officio capacity. She
addsed that she was a simple student and did not receive any salary as a student regent.

The OMB opposed the motion. According to the Ombudsman, petitioner, despite her protestations, iwas a public officer.
As a member of the BOR, she hads the general powers of administration and exerciseds the corporate powers of UP.

The Sandiganbayan denied petitioner’s motion for lack of merit.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner is a public officer.

RULING:

Petitioner UP student regent is a public officer.

Petitioner claims that she is not a public officer with Salary Grade 27; she is, in fact, a regular tuition fee-paying student.
This is bereft of merit. It is not only the salary grade that determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The
Sandiganbayan also has jurisdiction over other officers enumerated in P.D. No. 1606.

Petitioner falls under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as she is placed there by express provision of law.

Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 explictly vested the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over Presidents, directors or
trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or
foundations. Petitioner falls under this category. As the Sandiganbayan pointed out, the BOR performs functions similar
to those of a board of trustees of a non-stock corporation. By express mandate of law, petitioner is, indeed, a public
officer as contemplated by P.D. No. 1606.

Moreover, it is well established that compensation is not an essential element of public office. At most, it is merely
incidental to the public office.

Delegation of sovereign functions is essential in the public office. An investment in an individual of some portion of the
sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public makes one a public officer.

DISINI V. SANDIGANBAYAN (G.R. NO. 180564; JUNE 22, 2010)

FACTS: On 16 February 1989, the Republic of the Philippines and Disini entered into an Immunity Agreement under which
Disini undertook to testify for the Republic and provide its lawyers with the information, affidavits, and documents they
needed in its case against Westinghouse Electric Corporation before the United States District Court of New Jersey and
in the arbitration case that Westinghouse International Projects Company and others filed against the Republic before
the International Chamber of Commerce Court of Arbitration. Disini worked for his second cousin, Herminio, as an
executive in the latter's companies from 1971 to 1984.

The Republic believed that the Westinghouse contract for the construction of the Bataan Nuclear Power Plant, brokered
by one of Herminios companies, had been attended by anomalies. In the Immunity Agreement, the Republic guaranteed
that, apart from the two Westinghouse cases, it would not compel Disini to testify in any other domestic or foreign
proceeding brought by the Republic against Herminio. Disini complied with his undertaking but 18 years later, upon the
Republic's application, the Sandiganbayan issued a subpoena against Disini, commanding him to testify and produce
documents before that court in an action that the Republic filed against Herminio.

Disini moved to quash the subpoena, invoking the Immunity Agreement.

The Sandiganbayan ignored the motion and issued a new subpoena directing him to testify before it. Subsequently, the
PCGG revoked and nullified the Immunity Agreement insofar as it prohibited the Republic from requiring Disini to testify
against Herminio. Later on, the Sandiganbayan denied Disinis motion to quash the subpoena. Disini, thus, brought the
matter to the Supreme Court. The Republic maintained that the PCGGs power to grant immunity under Section 5 of
Executive Order 14 covered only immunity from civil or criminal prosecution and did not cover immunity from providing
evidence in court.

The Republic argued that Disini's immunity from testifying against Herminio contravened the state's policy to recover ill-
gotten wealth acquired under the regime of former President Marcos. The Republic further argued that under the last
sentence of paragraph 3 of the Immunity Agreement which reads: Nothing herein shall affect Jesus P. Disini's obligation
to provide truthful information or testimony, Disini, despite the immunity given him against being compelled to testify in
other cases, was to provide truthful information or testimony in such other cases.

For his part, Disini argued that the Republic, through the PCGG, was estopped from revoking the questioned immunity
as it had made him believe that it had the authority to provide such guarantee. The Republic countered by invoking
Section 15, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution which provides that (t)he right of the State to recover properties unlawfully
acquired by public officials or employees from them or from their nominees, or transferees, shall not be barred by
prescription, laches or estoppel.

ISSUE: Did the PCGG act within its authority when it revoked and nullified the Immunity Agreement?
HELD: No. PCGG needs to fulfill its obligations honorably as Disini did. More than anyone, the government should be fair.
The language of Section 5, Executive Order 14 affords latitude to the PCGG in determining the extent of the criminal
immunity it may grant. It has discretion to grant appropriate levels of criminal immunity depending on the situation of
the witness and his relative importance to the prosecution of ill-gotten wealth cases. It can even agree, as in this case, to
conditions expressed by the witness as sufficient to induce cooperation. Trusting in the Government's honesty and
fidelity, Disini agreed and fulfilled his part of the bargain. Surely, the principle of fair play, which is the essence of due
process, should hold the Republic on to its promise.

A contract is the law between the parties; it cannot be withdrawn except by their mutual consent. This applies with more
reason in this case where Disini already complied with the terms of the Immunity Agreement. To allow the Republic to
revoke the Immunity Agreement at a late stage would run afoul of the rule that a party to a compromise cannot ask for
a rescission after it had enjoyed its benefits. The Court should not allow the Republic, to put it bluntly, to double cross
Disini. The Immunity Agreement was the result of a long drawn out process of negotiations with each party trying to get
the best concessions out of it.

The Republic did not have to enter into that agreement; it was free not to. But when it did, it needed to fulfill its
obligations honorably as Disini did. More than anyone, the government should be fair.

It has been a settled rule that by seeking affirmative relief, voluntary appearance or submission to the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan constitute waiver on the objection regarding lack of jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner.
Jurisprudence holds that an objection based on lack of jurisdiction over the person is waived when the defendant files a
motion or pleading which seeks affirmative relief other than the dismissal of the case.

PCGG's revocation of the questioned immunity and Sandiganbayan's denial of Disini's motion to quash the subpoena
were both annulled.