ARTICLE 35

Carlos vs. Sandoval G.R. No. 179922 December 16, 2008

Facts:
Petitioner Juan de Dios Carlos and Teofilo Carlos are brothers. During the lifetime of their father, their father
agreed to transfer his estate to Teofilo. The agreement was made in order to avoid the payment of inheritance taxes. Teofilo,
in turn, undertook to deliver and turn over the share of the other legal heir, petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos. Teofilo is married
to Felicidad and had a son Teofilo Carlos II.
When Teofilo died, his brother the petitioner commenced an action, docketed as Civil Case No. 95-135, against
respondents Felicidad and Teofilo Carlos II with the following causes of action: (a) declaration of nullity of marriage; (b)
status of a child; (c) recovery of property; (d) reconveyance; and (e) sum of money and damages. The complaint was raffled
to Branch 256 of the RTC in Muntinlupa.
Petitioner avers that the marriage between his brother Teofilo and Felicidad is null and void in view of the absence of a
marriage license and that their son, Teofilo Carlos II is neither a natural nor an adopted son of the couple.

Issue:
Can Juan de Dios Carlos the petitioner in this case file a petition for declaration of nullity on void marriage?

Decision:
A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or wife. Exceptions: (1)
Nullity of marriage cases commenced before the effectivity of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC (March 15, 2003); and (2) Marriages
celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code.
Applicable law is the law in effect at the time of the celebration of marriage. The marriage of Teofilo and Felicidad was on
May 14, 1962. The New Civil Code is the applicable law.
Under the New Civil Code which is the law in force at the time the respondents were married, or even in the Family Code,
there is no specific provision as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of marriage; however, only a party who can
demonstrate "proper interest" can file the same. A petition to declare the nullity of marriage, like any other actions, must
be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest and must be based on a cause of action.
Can petitioner demonstrate proper interest to be able to file the petition to declare the nullity of marriage between his brother
Teofilo and Felicidad?

Being not a compulsory heir of his brother Teofilo, petitioner has to first prove that Teofilo Carlos II is not a legitimate,
illegitimate, or adopted son of Teofilo and Felicidad.
The records reveal that Teofilo was predeceased by his parents. He had no other siblings but petitioner. Thus, if Teofilo II
is finally found and proven to be not a legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted son of Teofilo, petitioner succeeds to the other
half of the estate of his brother, the first half being allotted to the widow pursuant to Article 1001 of the New Civil Code,
which reads
Art. 1001 “Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-
half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other half”.
This makes petitioner a real-party-interest to seek the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage of his deceased brother
with respondent Felicidad. If the subject marriage is found to be void ab initio, petitioner succeeds to the entire estate.
But the RTC is strictly instructed to dismiss the nullity of marriage case for lack of cause of action if it is proven by evidence
that Teofilo II is a legitimate, illegitimate, or legally adopted son of Teofilo Carlos, the deceased brother of petitioner.
ARTICLE 36

LEOUEL SANTOS, petitioner vs COURT OF APPEALS, defendant

GR No. 112019. January 4, 1995

Facts:

Leouel and Julia exchanged vows on September 20, 1986. A year after the marriage, the couple when quarreling
over a number of things including the interference of Julia’s parents into their marital affairs. On May 18, 1998,
Julia finally left for the United States. Leouel was then unable to communicate with her for a period of five years
and she had then virtually abandoned their family. Leouel filed a case for nullity on the ground of psychological
incapacity. The Regional Trial Court dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. The Court of Appeals affirmed
the decision of the trial court.

Issue:

Whether or not the grounds of psychological incapacity in this case should be appreciated.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court denied the petition. Psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly
must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family
Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and
support. The psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated and must be incurable.
Mere abandonment cannot therefore qualify as psychological incapacity on the part of Julia.
 CHI MING TSOI, petitioner vs COURT OF APPEALS, defendant
GR No. 119190. January 16, 1997

Facts:

Sometime on May 22, 1988, Gina and Chi Ming Tsoi were married as evidence by their marriage contract. From
May 22, 1988, until their separation on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual contact between them. Gina made
attempts for sexual activity to no avails. Medical examinations showed that both Gina and Chi Ming Tsoi were
capaple of sexual conduct. Gina was still a virgin at the time of the medical examination. Gina filed a motion for
declaration of nullity and the Trial Court declared their marriage as void. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court’s decision. Petitioner Chi Ming Tsoi subsequently filed a motion to the Supreme Court citing that it was she
and not he that had the problem regarding sexual intimacy.

Issue:

Whether or not non-desire of sexual consumation be an indicator of psychological incapacity?

Ruling:

The Supreme Court found the petition to be bereft of merit. Since the action to declare the marriage void may be
filed by either party, the question of who refuses to have sex with the other becomes immaterial. If a
spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential marriage obligations, and
the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity
than to stubborn refusal. Aligned with this is the essential marital obligation, “the procreate children based on
the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage.”
Constant non-fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage.

After ten months of marriage, the reluctance to perform the sexual act was indicative of a hopeless situation, and
of a serious personality disorder that constitutes psychological incapacity to discharge the basic marital
covenants within the contemplation of the Family Code.
Republic vs CA and Molina (G.R. No. 108763)
Posted: August 18, 2011 in Case Digests
Tags: Marriage, Psychological Incapacity, Void Marriages
This is a petition for review on certiorari by the Solicitor General assailing the January 25, 1993 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G. R. CV No. 34858 which affirmed the May 14, 1991 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad,
Benguet, declaring the respondent Roridel Olaviano Molina and Reynaldo Molina’s marriage as void ab initio, on the
ground of “psychological incapacity” under Article 36 of the Family Code.
FACTS:

Roridel Olaviano was married to Reynaldo Molina on 14 April 1985 in Manila, and gave birth to a son a year after. Reynaldo
showed signs of “immaturity and irresponsibility” on the early stages of the marriage, observed from his tendency to spend
time with his friends and squandering his money with them, from his dependency from his parents, and his dishonesty on
matters involving his finances. Reynaldo was relieved of his job in 1986, Roridel became the sole breadwinner thereafter.
In March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and proceeded to Baguio City. Reynaldo left her and their child a
week later. The couple is separated-in-fact for more than three years.

On 16 August 1990, Roridel filed a verified petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Evidence
for Roridel consisted of her own testimony, that of two of her friends, a social worker, and a psychiatrist of the Baguio
General Hospital and Medical Center. Reynaldo did not present any evidence as he appeared only during the pre-trial
conference. On 14 May 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void. The Solicitor General appealed
to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals denied the appeals and affirmed in toto the RTC’s decision. Hence, the
present recourse.
ISSUE: Whether opposing or conflicting personalities should be construed as psychological incapacity

HELD:

The Court of Appeals erred in its opinion the Civil Code Revision Committee intended to liberalize the application of
Philippine civil laws on personal and family rights, and holding psychological incapacity as a broad range of mental and
behavioral conduct on the part of one spouse indicative of how he or she regards the marital union, his or her personal
relationship with the other spouse, as well as his or her conduct in the long haul for the attainment of the principal objectives
of marriage; where said conduct, observed and considered as a whole, tends to cause the union to self-destruct because it
defeats the very objectives of marriage, warrants the dissolution of the marriage.

The Court reiterated its ruling in Santos v. Court of Appeals, where psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a
mental (not physical) incapacity, existing at the time the marriage is celebrated, and that there is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of ‘psychological incapacity’ to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
Psychological incapacity must be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability. In the present case, there
is no clear showing to us that the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity; but appears to be more of a “difficulty,”
if not outright “refusal” or “neglect” in the performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing of “irreconcilable
differences” and “conflicting personalities” in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity.

The Court, in this case, promulgated the guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code,
removing any visages of it being the most liberal divorce procedure in the world: (1) The burden of proof belongs to the
plaintiff; (2) the root cause of psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint,
sufficiently proven by expert, and clearly explained in the decision; (3) The incapacity must be proven existing at the time
of the celebration of marriage; (4) the incapacity must be clinically or medically permanent or incurable; (5) such illness
must be grave enough; (6) the essential marital obligation must be embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code as
regards husband and wife, and Articles 220 to 225 of the same code as regards parents and their children; (7) interpretation
made by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church, and (8) the trial must order the fiscal and the
Solicitor-General to appeal as counsels for the State.

The Supreme Court granted the petition, and reversed and set aside the assailed decision; concluding that the marriage of
Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid.
REPUBLIC v. LOLITA QUINTERO-HAMANO, GR No. 149498, 2004-05-20
Facts:
On June 17, 1996, respondent Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of her
marriage to her husband Toshio Hamano, a Japanese national, on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Respondent alleged that in October 1986, she and Toshio started a common-law relationship in Japan. They
later lived in the Philippines for a month. Thereafter, Toshio went back to Japan and stayed there for half of
1987. On November 16, 1987, she gave birth to their... child.
On January 14, 1988, she and Toshio were married
Unknown to respondent, Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities, which
incapacity became manifest only after the... marriage. One month after their marriage, Toshio returned to
Japan and promised to return by Christmas to celebrate the holidays with his family. After sending money to
respondent for two months, Toshio stopped giving financial support. She wrote him several times but he
never... responded.
respondent learned from her friends that Toshio visited the Philippines but he did not bother to see her and
their child.
Consequently, on July 8, 1996, respondent filed an ex parte motion for leave to effect service of summons by
publication.
On August 28, 1997, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which read:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the marriage between petitioner Lolita M. Quintero- Hamano and Toshio
Hamano, is hereby declared NULL and VOID.
The Office of the Solicitor General, representing herein petitioner Republic of the Philippines, appealed to the
Court of Appeals but the same was denied
Issues:
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that respondent was able to prove the psychological incapacity of Toshio
Hamano to perform his marital obligations,
Ruling:
The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the basic
autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family.[11] Thus, any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the validity of the... marriage.
Petitioner showed that Toshio failed to meet his duty to live with, care for and support his family. He
abandoned them a month after his marriage to respondent. Respondent sent him several letters but he never
replied. He made a trip to the Philippines but did not care at all to... see his family.
We find that the totality of evidence presented fell short of proving that Toshio was psychologically
incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities. Toshio's act of abandonment was doubtlessly
irresponsible but it was never alleged nor proven to be due to some kind of... psychological illness. After
respondent testified on how Toshio abandoned his family, no other evidence was presented showing that his
behavior was caused by a psychological disorder.
 Republic vs. CA, Molina G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997 Psychological Incapacity
JANUARY 27, 2018

FACTS:

Roridel O. Molina filed a petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. The petition alleged that
after a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of “immaturity and irresponsibility” as a husband and a father since he
preferred to spend more time with his peers and friends on whom he squandered his money and that he depended on his
parents for aid and assistance, and was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels
between them.

ISSUE:

Whether or not “opposing and conflicting personalities” is equivalent to psychological incapacity.

RULING:

NO.

In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, ruled that “psychological
incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (nor physical) incapacity . . . and that (t)here is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of ‘psychological incapacity’ to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated.” Citing Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a
former presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila, Justice Vitug wrote
that “the psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.”

On the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the psychological defect spoken of is an
incapacity. It appears to us to be more of a “difficulty,” if not outright “refusal” or “neglect” in the performance of some
marital obligations. Mere showing of “irreconciliable differences” and “conflicting personalities” in no wise constitutes
psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as
married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (nor
physical) illness.

The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her husband could nor get along with each other. There
had been no showing of the gravity of the problem; neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability.
LEONILO ANTONIO v. MARIE IVONNE F. REYES, GR NO. 155800, 2006-03-10
Facts:
Petitioner and respondent met in August 1989 when petitioner was 26 years old and respondent was 36 years
of age. Barely a year after their first meeting, they got married
Out of their union, a child was born on 19 April 1991, who sadly died five (5) months later.
On 8 March 1993,[7] petitioner filed a petition to have his marriage to respondent declared null and void. He
anchored his petition for nullity on Article 36 of the Family Code alleging that respondent was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the... essential obligations of marriage. He asserted that respondent's incapacity
existed at the time their marriage was celebrated and still subsists up to the present.[8]
As manifestations of respondent's alleged psychological incapacity, petitioner claimed that respondent
persistently lied about herself, the people around her, her occupation, income, educational attainment and
other events or things,... (1) She concealed the fact that she previously gave birth to an illegitimate son,[10]
and instead introduced the boy to petitioner as the adopted child of her family.
(2) She fabricated a story that her brother-in-law, Edwin David, attempted to rape and kill her when in fact, no
such incident occurred.
(3) She misrepresented herself as a psychiatrist to her obstetrician... and told some of her friends that she
graduated with a degree in psychology, when she was neither.[13]
(4) She claimed to be a singer or a free-lance voice talent affiliated with Blackgold Recording Company
(Blackgold); yet, not a single member of her family ever witnessed her alleged singing activities with the group.
(5) She invented friends named Babes Santos and Via Marquez, and under those names, sent lengthy letters
to petitioner claiming to be from Blackgold and touting her as the "number one moneymaker" in the commercial
industry worth P2 million.
(6) She represented herself as a person of greater means, thus, she altered her payslip to make it appear that
she earned a higher income.
(7) She exhibited insecurities and jealousies over him to the extent of calling up his officemates to monitor his
whereabouts.
In support of his petition, petitioner presented
, a psychiatrist
, a clinical psychologist, who stated, based on the tests they conducted, that petitioner was essentially a
normal, introspective, shy and... conservative type of person.
On the other hand, they observed that respondent's persistent and constant lying to petitioner was abnormal or
pathological.
They further... asserted that respondent's extreme jealousy was also pathological.
After trial, the lower court gave credence to petitioner's evidence and held that respondent's propensity to lying
about almost anything-her occupation, state of health, singing abilities and her income, among others-had
been duly established. According to the trial court,... respondent's fantastic ability to invent and fabricate
stories and personalities enabled her to live in a world of make-believe. This made her psychologically
incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of giving meaning and significance to her marriage.[36]
The trial court thus declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void.
While conceding that respondent may not have been completely honest with petitioner, the Court of Appeals
nevertheless held that the... totality of the evidence presented was insufficient to establish respondent's
psychological incapacity.
Taking exception to the appellate court's pronouncement, petitioner elevated the case to this Court. He
contends herein that the evidence conclusively establish respondent's psychological incapacity.
Issues:
petitioner has established his cause of action for declaration of nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The
RTC correctly ruled, and the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court.
Ruling:
he factual findings of the RTC are now deemed binding on this Court, owing to the great weight accorded to
the opinion of the primary trier of facts, and the refusal of the Court of Appeals to dispute the veracity of these
facts. As such, it must be considered... that respondent had consistently lied about many material aspects as
to her character and personality. The question remains whether her pattern of fabrication sufficiently
establishes her psychological incapacity, consistent with Article 36 and generally, the Molina... guidelines.
the present case sufficiently satisfies the guidelines in Molina.
First. Petitioner had sufficiently overcome his burden in proving the psychological incapacity of his spouse.
Apart from his own testimony, he presented witnesses who corroborated his allegations on his wife's behavior,
and certifications from Blackgold Records and... the Philippine Village Hotel Pavillon which disputed
respondent's claims pertinent to her alleged singing career.
Second. The root cause of respondent's psychological incapacity has been medically or clinically identified,
alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by experts, and clearly explained in the trial court's decision.
Third. Respondent's psychological incapacity was established to have clearly existed at the time of and even
before the celebration of marriage. She fabricated friends and made up letters from fictitious characters well
before she married petitioner. Likewise, she... kept petitioner in the dark about her natural child's real
parentage as she only confessed when the latter had found out the truth after their marriage.
Fourth. The gravity of respondent's psychological incapacity is sufficient to prove her disability to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. It is immediately discernible that the parties had shared only a little over a
year of cohabitation before the... exasperated petitioner left his wife.
Fifth. Respondent is evidently unable to comply with the essential marital obligations as embraced by Articles
68 to 71 of the Family Code. Article 68, in particular, enjoins the spouses to live together, observe mutual love,
respect and fidelity, and render mutual... help and support. As noted by the trial court, it is difficult to see how
an inveterate pathological liar would be able to commit to the basic tenets of relationship between spouses
based on love, trust and respect.
Sixth. The Court of Appeals clearly erred when it failed to take into consideration the fact that the marriage of
the parties was annulled by the Catholic Church.
Evidently, the conclusion of psychological incapacity was arrived at not only by the trial court, but also by
canonical bodies.
Seventh. The final point of contention is the requirement in Molina that such psychological incapacity be shown
to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
Petitioner points out that one month after he and his wife initially separated, he returned to her, desiring to
make their marriage work. However, respondent's aberrant behavior remained unchanged, as she continued to
lie, fabricate stories, and maintained her excessive... jealousy. From this fact, he draws the conclusion that
respondent's condition is incurable.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
JOCELYN M. SUAZO v. ANGELITO SUAZO, GR No. 164493, 2010-03-10
Facts:
Jocelyn and Angelito were 16 years old when they first met
After months of courtship, Jocelyn went to Manila with Angelito and some friends... gone for three days... their
parents sought Jocelyn and Angelito and... after finding them, brought them back to Biñan, Laguna
Jocelyn and Angelito's marriage was arranged and they were married on March 3, 1986 in a ceremony
officiated by the Mayor of Biñan
Jocelyn and Angelito lived with Angelito's parents after their marriage
They had by this time stopped schooling.
Jocelyn took odd jobs and worked for Angelito's relatives as household help
Angelito... refused to work... and was most of the time drunk
Jocelyn urged Angelito to find work and violent quarrels often resulted because of Jocelyn's efforts
Jocelyn left Angelito sometime in July 1987... found another woman with whom he has since lived. They now
have children.
Ten years after their separation... or on October 8, 1997
Jocelyn filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code
Angelito was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential... obligations of marriage... from the
time of their marriage up to their separation in July 1987... relationship had been marred with bitter quarrels
which caused unbearable physical and emotional pains on the part of the plaintiff because defendant inflicted
physical injuries... main reason for their quarrel was always the refusal of the defendant to work or his
indolence and his excessive drinking which makes him psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital
obligations making life unbearably bitter and intolerable to the... psychological incapacity of the defendant
started from the time of their marriage and became very apparent as time went and proves to be continuous,
permanent and incurable
Angelito did not answer the petition/complaint. Neither did he submit himself to a psychological examination
with psychologist Nedy Tayag... case proceeded to trial on the merits after the trial court found that no
collusion existed between the parties
Jocelyn, her aunt Maryjane Serrano, and the psychologist testified at the trial.
The Office of the Solicitor General - representing the Republic of the Philippines - strongly opposed the petition
for declaration of nullity of the marriage... it argued that the psychologist failed to examine and test Angelito;
thus,... what she said about him was purely hearsay.
RTC annulled the marriage under the following reasoning:... there is no particular instance setforth (sic) in the
law that a person may be considered as psychologically incapacitated, there as (sic) some admitted grounds
that would render a person to be unfit to comply with his marital obligation... evidence presented by the
petitioner and the testimony of the petitioner and Dr. Tayag, points (sic) to one thing - that the petitioner failed
to establish a harmonious family life with the respondent... respondent has not shown love and respect to... the
petitioner manifested by the former's being irresponsible, immature, jobless, gambler, drunkard and worst of all
- a wife beater... petitioner... decided, after one year and four months of messy days,... to leave the
respondent.
petitioner was able to prove that right from the start of her married life with the respondent, she already
suffered from maltreatment... she is a battered wife coupled with the fact that she served as a servant in his
(sic) husband's... family.
Applying the principles and the requisites of psychological incapacity enunciated by this Court in Santos v.
Court of Appeals,[7] the RTC concluded:
The above findings of the psychologist [referring to the psychologist' testimony quoted above] would only tend
to show that the respondent was, indeed, suffering from psychological incapacity which is not only grave but
also incurable.
applying the principles set forth in the case of Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Molina, 268 SCRA 198,
wherein the Supreme Court held that
The Court is satisfied that the evidence presented and the testimony of the petitioner and
Nedy Tayag... ttesting that there is psychological incapacity on the part of the... respondent to comply with the
essential marital obligations has been sufficiently and clearly proven and, therefore, petitioner is entitled to the
relief prayed for.
The CA reversed the RTC decision, ruling that:
True, as stated in
Marcos vs Marcos 343 SCRA 755, the guidelines set in Santos vs Court of Appeals and Republic vs Court of
Appeals do not require that a physician personally examine the person to be declared psychologically
incapacitated.
Supreme Court adopted... the totality of evidence approach which allows the fact of psychological incapacity to
be drawn from evidence that medically or clinically identify the root causes of the illness
Applied in Marcos, however, the aggregate testimony of the aggrieved spouse, children, relatives and the
social worker were not found to be sufficient to prove psychological incapacity, in... the absence of any
evaluation of the respondent himself, the person whose mental and psychological capacity was in question.
In the case at bench, there is much scarcer evidence to hold that the respondent was psychologically
incapable
Only the wife gave first-hand... testimony on the behavior of the husband, and it is inconclusive... n Marcos, the
respondent may have failed to provide material support to the family and has resorted to physical abuse, but it
is still necessary to show that they were... manifestations of a deeper psychological malaise that was clinically
or medically identified
The theory of the psychologist that the respondent was suffering from an anti-social personality syndrome at
the time of the marriage was not the product of any adequate medical or... clinical investigation
Pesca vs Pesca 356
SCRA 588, or the failure or refusal to work could have been the result of rebelliousness on the part of one who
felt that he had been forced into a loveless marriage... the respondent was not under a permanent compulsion
because he had later on shown his ability to... engage in productive work and more stable relationships with
another
The element of permanence or incurability that is one of the defining characteristic of psychological incapacity
is not present.
the married life of the petitioner with the respondent was an unhappy one. But the marriage cannot for this
reason be extinguished
Issues:
whether there is basis to nullify Jocelyn's marriage with Angelito under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Ruling:
We find the petition devoid of merit. The CA committed no reversible error of law in setting aside the RTC
decision
The Law, Molina and Te
Article 36 of the Family Code... feature of this law is its intended open-ended application
We must therefore apply the law based on how the concept of psychological incapacity was shaped and
developed in jurisprudence
Santos v. Court of Appeals... psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity; (b) juridical
antecedence; and (c) incurability
The Court laid down more definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of the law in Republic v.
Court of Appeals[11] (Molina)
(1)
The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff
Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity
(2)
The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision
(3)
The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as
regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and
their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must... also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence
and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel
for the state
A later case, Marcos v. Marcos,[14] further clarified that there is no requirement that the defendant/respondent
spouse should be personally examined by a physician or psychologist... under Article 36 of the Family Code if
the totality of evidence shows that psychological incapacity exists and its gravity, juridical... antecedence, and
incurability can be duly established.
Pesca v. Pesca
Molina guidelines apply even to cases then already pending, under the reasoning that the court's interpretation
or construction establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent of the law
The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of psychological
incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage but expert opinion need not be alleged.
Te expressly stated that it is not suggesting the abandonment of Molina, but that, following Antonio v. Reyes
The need for the examination... of a party or parties by a psychiatrist or clinical psychologist and the
presentation of psychiatric experts shall now be determined by the court during the pre-trial conference.
Hernandez v. Court of Appeals... emphasizes the importance of presenting expert testimony to establish the
precise cause of a party's psychological incapacity, and to show that it existed at the inception of the marriage.
Ting v. Velez-Ting... gravity and incurability requisites
The Present Case... a. The Expert Opinion Evidence
Both the psychologist's testimony and the psychological report did not conclusively show the root cause,
gravity and incurability of Angelito's alleged psychological condition.
the psychologist evaluated Angelito's psychological... condition only in an indirect manner - she derived all her
conclusions from information coming from Jocelyn whose bias for her cause cannot of course be doubted...
finding is highly suspect, for it was based entirely on Jocelyn's assumed knowledge of Angelito's family
background and upbringing.
the psychologist merely generalized on the questions of why and to what extent was Angelito's personality
disorder grave and incurable, and on the effects of the disorder on Angelito's awareness of and his capability
to undertake the duties and responsibilities of... marriage.
b. Jocelyn's Testimony... we find Jocelyn's testimony to be insufficient
Jocelyn merely testified on Angelito's habitual drunkenness, gambling, refusal to seek employment and the
physical beatings she received from him - all of which occurred after the marriage
This is a clear evidentiary gap that materially... affects her cause, as the law and its related jurisprudence
require that the psychological incapacity must exist at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
All these simply indicate difficulty, neglect or mere refusal to perform marital obligations that, as the cited...
jurisprudence holds, cannot be considered to be constitutive of psychological incapacity in the absence of
proof that these are manifestations of an incapacity rooted in some debilitating psychological condition or
illness.
violence, standing alone, does not constitute psychological incapacity.
Jurisprudence holds that there must be evidence showing a link, medical or the like, between the acts that
manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition for lack of merit. We AFFIRM the appealed
Decision of the Court of Appeals
C AS E D I G E S T: S O C O R R O C AM AC H O - R E Y E S , V S R AM O N R E Y E S ( E X P E R T
O PI NI O N; H E AR S AY E VI DE N CE)

March 26, 2015

G.R. NO. 185286, AUGUST 18, 2010

SOCORRO CAMACHO-REYES, VS. RAMON REYES,
FACTS:
Marital difficulties, which mostly is due to the respondent’s actions, caused the petitioner to file a petition for declaration
of nullity of her marriage with the respondent alleging psychological incapacity to fulfill the essential marital obligations
under Article 36 of the Family Code.

Traversing the petition, respondent denied petitioner’s allegations that he was psychologically incapacitated. Respondent
maintained that he was not remiss in performing his obligations to his family—both as a spouse to petitioner and father to
their children.

[Petitioner] presented several expert witnesses to show that [respondent] is psychologically incapacitated. Clinical
psychologist Dayan diagnosed [respondent] as purportedly suffering from Mixed Personality Disorder (Schizoid
Narcissistic and Anti-Social Personality Disorder). Further, clinical psychologist Magno found [respondent] to be
suffering from an Antisocial Personality Disorder with narcissistic and dependent features, while Dr. Villegas diagnosed
[respondent] to be suffering from Personality Disorder of the anti-social type, associated with strong sense of Inadequacy
especially along masculine strivings and narcissistic features.

The RTC granted the petition and declared the marriage between the parties null and void on the ground of their
psychological incapacity.

The respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court reversed the RTC decision and declared the parties’
marriage valid and subsisting. It held that the petitioner failed to sufficiently establish the alleged psychological incapacity
of her husband, as well as of herself. It held:

“In the case at bar, we hold that the court a quo’s findings regarding the [respondent’s] alleged mixed personality
disorder, his “come and go” attitude, failed business ventures, inadequate/delayed financial support to his family, sexual
infidelity, insensitivity to [petitioner’s] feelings, irresponsibility, failure to consult [petitioner] on his business pursuits,
unfulfilled promises, failure to pay debts in connection with his failed business activities, taking of drugs, etc. are not
rooted on some debilitating psychological condition but on serious marital difficulties/differences and mere refusal or
unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage. [Respondent’s] “defects” were not present at the inception
of marriage. They were even able to live in harmony in the first few years of their marriage, which bore them two children
xxx. In fact, [petitioner] admitted in her Amended Petition that initially they lived comfortably and [respondent] would
give his salary in keeping with the tradition in most Filipino households, but the situation changed when [respondent]
resigned from the family-owned Aristocrat Restaurant and thereafter, [respondent] failed in his business ventures. It
appears, however, that [respondent] has been gainfully employed with Marigold Corporation, Inc. since 1998, which fact
was stipulated upon by the [petitioner].”

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals was correct when it rejected the testimonies of Doctors Magno and Villegas.

RULING: NO. The Supreme Court held:

Notwithstanding these telling assessments, the CA rejected, wholesale, the testimonies of Doctors Magno and Villegas for
being hearsay since they never personally examined and interviewed the respondent.
We do not agree with the CA.

The lack of personal examination and interview of the respondent, or any other person diagnosed with personality
disorder, does not per se invalidate the testimonies of the doctors. Neither do their findings automatically constitute
hearsay that would result in their exclusion as evidence.
For one, marriage, by its very definition, necessarily involves only two persons. The totality of the behavior of one spouse
during the cohabitation and marriage is generally and genuinely witnessed mainly by the other. In this case, the experts
testified on their individual assessment of the present state of the parties’ marriage from the perception of one of the
parties, herein petitioner. Certainly, petitioner, during their marriage, had occasion to interact with, and experience,
respondent’s pattern of behavior which she could then validly relay to the clinical psychologists and the psychiatrist.

For another, the clinical psychologists’ and psychiatrist’s assessment were not based solely on the narration or personal
interview of the petitioner. Other informants such as respondent’s own son, siblings and in-laws, and sister-in-law (sister
of petitioner), testified on their own observations of respondent’s behavior and interactions with them, spanning the period
of time they knew him. These were also used as the basis of the doctors’ assessments.

Within their acknowledged field of expertise, doctors can diagnose the psychological make up of a person based on a
number of factors culled from various sources. A person afflicted with a personality disorder will not necessarily have
personal knowledge thereof. In this case, considering that a personality disorder is manifested in a pattern of behavior,
self-diagnosis by the respondent consisting only in his bare denial of the doctors’ separate diagnoses, does not necessarily
evoke credence and cannot trump the clinical findings of experts.

In sum, we find points of convergence & consistency in all three reports and the respective testimonies of Doctors Magno,
Dayan and Villegas, i.e.: (1) respondent does have problems; and (2) these problems include chronic irresponsibility;
inability to recognize and work towards providing the needs of his family; several failed business attempts; substance
abuse; and a trail of unpaid money obligations.
It is true that a clinical psychologist’s or psychiatrist’s diagnoses that a person has personality disorder is not
automatically believed by the courts in cases of declaration of nullity of marriages. Indeed, a clinical psychologist’s or
psychiatrist’s finding of a personality disorder does not exclude a finding that a marriage is valid and subsisting, and not
beset by one of the parties’ or both parties’ psychological incapacity.

In the case at bar, however, even without the experts’ conclusions, the factual antecedents (narrative of
events) alleged in the petition and established during trial, all point to the inevitable conclusion that respondent is
psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations.

The respondent’s pattern of behavior manifests an inability, nay, a psychological incapacity to perform the essential
marital obligations as shown by his: (1) sporadic financial support; (2) extra-marital affairs; (3) substance abuse; (4) failed
business attempts; (5) unpaid money obligations; (6) inability to keep a job that is not connected with the family
businesses; and (7) criminal charges of estafa.
PETITION GRANTED.
 VALERIO E. KALAW, Petitioner,

vs.

ELENA FERNANDEZ, Respondent.

G.R. No. 166357 January 14, 2015

Read the 2011 Kalaw v. Fernandez case digest HERE.

PONENTE: Bersamin, J.

TOPIC: Psychological incapacity, Declaration of Nullity of Marriage

FACTS:

In the case at bar, Kalaw presented the testimonies of two supposed expert witnesses who concluded
that respondent is psychologically incapacitated. Petitioner’s experts heavily relied on petitioner’s allegations of
respondent’s constant mahjong sessions, visits to the beauty parlor, going out with friends, adultery, and neglect
of their children. Petitioner’s experts opined that respondent’s alleged habits, when performed constantly to the
detriment of quality and quantity of time devoted to her duties as mother and wife, constitute a psychological
incapacity in the form of NPD.

However, the Supreme Court in its September 19, 2011 decision dismissed the complaint for declaration
of nullity of the marriage on the ground that there was no factual basis for the conclusion of psychological
incapacity.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the marriage was void on the ground of psychological incapacity.

HELD:

YES. The Court in granting the Motion for Reconsideration held that Fernandez was indeed
psychologically incapacitated as they relaxed the previously set forth guidelines with regard to this case.

Note: Molina guidelines were not abandoned, expert opinions were just given much respect in this case.

Guidelines too rigid, thus relaxed IN THIS CASE

The Court held that the guidelines set in the case of Republic v. CA have turned out to be rigid, such that
their application to every instance practically condemned the petitions for declaration of nullity to the fate of
certain rejection. But Article 36 of the Family Code must not be so strictly and too literally read and applied given
the clear intendment of the drafters to adopt its enacted version of “less specificity” obviously to enable “some
resiliency in its application.” Instead, every court should approach the issue of nullity “not on the basis of a priori
assumptions, predilections or generalizations, but according to its own facts” in recognition of the verity that no
case would be on “all fours” with the next one in the field of psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity
of marriage; hence, every “trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court
must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court.
 In the task of ascertaining the presence of psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of
marriage, the courts, which are concededly not endowed with expertise in the field of psychology,
must of necessity rely on the opinions of experts in order to inform themselves on the matter,
and thus enable themselves to arrive at an intelligent and judicious judgment. Indeed, the
conditions for the malady of being grave, antecedent and incurable demand the in-depth diagnosis by experts.

Personal examination by party not required; totality of evidence must be considered

We have to stress that the fulfillment of the constitutional mandate for the State to protect marriage as
an inviolable social institution only relates to a valid marriage. No protection can be accorded to a marriage that
is null and void

ab initio, because such a marriage has no legal existence.

There is no requirement for one to be declared psychologically incapacitated to be personally examined

by a physician, because what is important is the presence of evidence that adequately establishes the party’s
psychological incapacity. Hence, “if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.”

Verily, the totality of the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest
psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. If other evidence showing that a certain condition
could possibly result from an assumed state of facts existed in the record, the expert opinion should
be admissible and be weighed as an aid for the court in interpreting such other evidence on the causation.

Indeed, an expert opinion on psychological incapacity should be considered as conjectural or speculative

and without any probative value only in the absence of other evidence to establish causation. The expert’s
findings under such circumstances would not constitute hearsay that would justify their exclusion as evidence.

Expert opinion considered as decisive evidence as to psychological and emotional temperaments

The findings and evaluation by the RTC as the trial court deserved credence because it was in the better
position to view and examine the demeanor of the witnesses while they were testifying. The position and role of
the trial judge in the appreciation of the evidence showing the psychological incapacity were not to be
downplayed but should be accorded due importance and respect.

The Court considered it improper and unwarranted to give to such expert opinions a merely generalized
consideration and treatment, least of all to dismiss their value as inadequate basis for the declaration of the
nullity of the marriage. Instead, we hold that said experts sufficiently and competently described the
psychological incapacity of the respondent within the standards of Article 36 of the Family Code. We uphold the
conclusions reached by the two expert witnesses because they were largely drawn from the case records
and affidavits, and should not anymore be disputed after the RTC itself had accepted the veracity of the
petitioner’s factual premises.

The Court also held that the courts must accord weight to expert testimony on the psychological and
mental state of the parties in cases for the declaration of the nullity of marriages, for by the very nature of Article
36 of the Family Code the courts, “despite having the primary task and burden of decision-making,
must not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the
psychological and mental temperaments of the parties.”
Willfully exposing children to gambling constitutes neglect of parental duties

The frequency of the respondent’s mahjong playing should not have delimited our determination of the
presence or absence of psychological incapacity. Instead, the determinant should be her obvious failure to fully
appreciate the duties and responsibilities of parenthood at the time she made her marital vows. Had she fully
appreciated such duties and responsibilities, she would have known that bringing along her children of very
tender ages to her mahjong sessions would expose them to a culture of gambling and other vices that would erode
their moral fiber. Nonetheless, the long-term effects of the respondent’s obsessive mahjong playing surely
impacted on her family life, particularly on her very young children.

The fact that the respondent brought her children with her to her mahjong sessions did not only point
to her neglect of parental duties, but also manifested her tendency to expose them to a culture of gambling. Her
willfully exposing her children to the culture of gambling on every occasion of her mahjong sessions was a very
grave and serious act of subordinating their needs for parenting to the gratification of her own personal and
escapist desires.

The respondent revealed her wanton disregard for her children’s moral and mental development. This
disregard violated her duty as a parent to safeguard and protect her children.

FALLO:

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the Motion for Reconsideration; REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision
promulgated on September 19, 2011; and REINSTATES the decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court
declaring the marriage between the petitioner and the respondent on November 4, 1976 as NULL AND VOID AB
JN/TIO due to the psychological incapacity of the parties pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code.
TANI-DE LA FUENTE v. DE LA FUENTE
MARIA TERESA B. TANI-DE LA FUENTE, petitioner, vs. RODOLFO DE LA FUENTE, JR.,respondent.

G.R. NO. 188400

March 08, 2017

Facts:
On June 21, 1984, Maria Teresa Tani and Rodolfo De la Fuente Jr. got married in Mandaluyong City after being
in a relationship for five (5) years. They had two children.
While they were still sweethearts, Maria Teresa already noticed that Rodolfo was an introvert and was prone to
jealousy. His attitude worsened as they went on with their marital life. His jealousy became so severe that he even poked a
gun to his 15 year old cousin and he treated Maria Teresa like a sex slave who made the latter feel maltreated and
molested. Sometime in 1986, the couple quarreled because Rodolfo suspected that Maria Teresa was having an affair. In
the heat of their quarrel, Rodolfo poked a gun at Maria Teresa's head. She left and never saw Rodolfo again after that, and
supported their children by herself.
On June 3, 1999, Maria Teresa filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. As support to her petitions, clinical
psychologist, Dr. Arnulfo V. Lopez was presented as an expert witness. However, Rodolfo did not file any responsive
pleading. The trial court eventually deemed his non-appearance as a waiver of his right to present evidence.
Before the promulgation of its decision, on June 26, 2002, the trial court directed the Office of the Solicitor
General to submit its comment on Maria Teresa's formal offer of evidence. The Office of the Solicitor General was also
directed to submit its certification. The Office of the Solicitor General, however, failed to comply with the trial court's
orders; thus, the case was submitted for decision without the certification and comment from the Office of the Solicitor
General. On August 14, 2002, the trial court promulgated its decision granting the petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage.
On August 20, 2002, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a motion for reconsideration. The Office of the
Solicitor General explained that it was unable to submit the required certification because it had no copies of the
transcripts of stenographic notes. It was also unable to inform the trial court of its lack of transcripts due to the volume of
cases it was handling On September 13 2002, the trial court denied the motion for reconsideration..
The Office of the Solicitor General filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals. It argued that the trial court erred
a) in deciding the case without the required certification from the Office of the Solicitor General, 58 and b) in giving
credence to Dr. Lopez's conclusion of Rodolfo's severe personality disorder. It held that Dr. Lopez's finding was based on
insufficient data and did not follow the standards set forth in the Molina case. Still, Rodolfo did not file any responsive
pleading.
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC. In its resolution dated May 25, 2009, CA denied the
motion for reconsideration filed by Maria Teresa.
On July 24, 2009, Maria Teresa filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari. This time Rodolfo filed a Comment 70
stating that he was not opposing Maria Teresa's Petition since "[h]e firmly believes that there is in fact no more sense in
adjudging him and petitioner as married."

Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in denying the petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage.
Held:
Yes, the Court of Appeals erred in denying the petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
Contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, we find that there was sufficient compliance with Molina to warrant the
nullity of petitioner's marriage with respondent. Petitioner was able to discharge the burden of proof that respondent
suffered from psychological incapacity. The Court of Appeals is mistaken when it chided the lower court for giving undue
weight to the testimony of Dr. Lopez since he had no chance to personally conduct a thorough study and analysis of
respondent's mental and psychological condition.

Camacho-Reyes v. Reyes states that the non-examination of one of the parties will not automatically render as hearsay
or invalidate the findings of the examining psychiatrist or psychologist, since "marriage, by its very definition,
necessarily involves only two persons. The totality of the behavior of one spouse during the cohabitation and marriage
is generally and genuinely witnessed mainly by the other.
Article 68 of the Family Code obligates the husband and wife "to live together, observe mutual love, respect and
fidelity, and render mutual help and support." In this case, petitioner and respondent may have lived together, but the facts
narrated by petitioner show that respondent failed to, or could not, comply with the obligations expected of him as a
husband. He was even apathetic that petitioner filed a petition for declaration of nullity of their marriage.
The incurability and severity of respondent's psychological incapacity were likewise discussed by Dr. Lopez. He
vouched that a person with paranoid personality disorder wouldrefuse to admit that there was something wrong and that
there was a need for treatment. This was corroborated by petitioner when she stated that respondent repeatedly refused
treatment. Petitioner consulted a lawyer, a priest, and a doctor, and suggested couples counseling to respondent; however,
respondent refused all of her attempts at seeking professional help. Respondent also refused to be examined by Dr. Lopez.
Dr. Lopez concluded that because of respondent's personality disorder, he is incapacitated to perform his marital
obligations of giving love, respect, and support to the petitioner. He recommends that the marriage be annulled.
Respondent's repeated behavior of psychological abuse by intimidating, stalking, and isolating his wife from her
family and friends, as well as his increasing acts of physical violence, are proof of his depravity, and utter lack of
comprehension of what marriage and partnership entail. It would be of utmost cruelty for this Court to decree that
petitioner should remain married to respondent. After she had exerted efforts to save their marriage and their family,
respondent simply refused to believe that there was anything wrong in their marriage. This shows that respondent truly
could not comprehend and perform his marital obligations. This fact is persuasive enough for this Court to believe that
respondent's mental illness is incurable.
`The petition is granted.
Republic Act No. 8533 February 23, 1998

AN ACT AMENDING TITLE I, CHAPTER 3, ARTICLE 39 OF EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 209, OTHERWISE
KNOWN AS THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, NULLIFYING THE PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD FOR
ACTION OR DEFENSES GROUNDED ON PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:

Section 1. Title I, Chapter 3, Article 39 of Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as the Family Code of
the Philippines, is hereby amended to read as follows:

"TITLE I – MARRIAGE
"CHAPTER 3 – VOID AND VOIDABLE MARRIAGES

"Art. 39. The action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage shall not prescribe."

Section 2. Effectivity clause. – This Act shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following its publication in the
Official Gazette or in two (2) newspapers of general circulation.

Approved: February 23, 1998

ARTICLE 39

REPUBLIC v. MERLINDA L. OLAYBAR, GR No. 189538, 2014-02-10

Facts:
Merlinda L. Olaybar's petition for cancellation of entries in the latter's marriage contract... the assailed Order
denied the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Republic of the
Philippines through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).
Respondent requested from the National Statistics Office (NSO) a Certificate of No Marriage (CENOMAR) as
one of the requirements for her marriage with her boyfriend of five years. Upon receipt thereof, she discovered
that she was already married to a certain
Ye Son Sune, a Korean National, on June 24, 2002, at the Office of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC),
Palace of Justice. She denied having contracted said marriage and claimed that she did not know the alleged
husband; she did not appear before the solemnizing... officer; and, that the signature appearing in the marriage
certificate is not hers.
During trial, respondent testified on her behalf and explained that she could not have appeared before Judge
Mamerto Califlores, the supposed solemnizing officer, at the time the marriage was allegedly celebrated,
because she was then in Makati working as a medical... distributor in Hansao Pharma.
she revealed that she recognized the named witnesses to the marriage as she had met them while she was
working as a receptionist in Tadels Pension House.
her name was... used by a certain Johnny Singh, who owned a travel agency, whom she gave her personal
circumstances in order for her to obtain a passport.
Respondent also presented as witness a certain Eufrocina Natinga, an employee of MTCC, Branch 1, who
confirmed that... the marriage of Ye Son Sune was indeed celebrated in their office, but claimed that the
alleged wife who appeared was definitely not respondent.
a document examiner testified that the signature appearing in the marriage contract was... forged.
RTC granted petition
RTC rendered the assailed Decision
Petitioner, however, moved for the reconsideration of the assailed Decision on the grounds that: (1) there was
no clerical spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the marriage contract for it to fall within the
provisions of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court; and
(2) granting the cancellation of all the entries in the wife portion of the alleged marriage contract is, in effect,
declaring the marriage void ab initio
Issues:
whether or not the cancellation of entries in the marriage contract which, in effect, nullifies the... marriage may
be undertaken in a Rule 108 proceeding.
Ruling:
We deny the petition.
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil
registry. The proceedings may either be summary or adversary. If the correction is clerical, then the procedure
to be adopted is summary. If the rectification affects... the civil status, citizenship or nationality of a party, it is
deemed substantial, and the procedure to be adopted is adversary.
Republic v. Valencia[19] in 1986, the Court has repeatedly ruled that "even substantial... errors in a civil
registry may be corrected through a petition filed under Rule 108, with the true facts established and the
parties aggrieved by the error availing themselves of the appropriate adversarial proceeding.
An appropriate adversary suit or... proceeding is one where the trial court has conducted proceedings where all
relevant facts have been fully and properly developed, where opposing counsel have been given opportunity to
demolish the opposite party's case, and where the evidence has been thoroughly weighed and... considered.
as long as the procedural requirements in Rule 108 are followed, it is the... appropriate adversary proceeding
to effect substantial corrections and changes in entries of the civil register
In this case, the entries made in the wife portion of the certificate of marriage are admittedly the personal
circumstances of respondent. The latter, however, claims that her signature was forged and she was not the
one who contracted marriage with the purported husband. In... other words, she claims that no such marriage
was entered into or if there was, she was not the one who entered into such contract. It must be recalled that
when respondent tried to obtain a CENOMAR from the NSO, it appeared that she was married to a certain Ye
Son Sune. She... then sought the cancellation of entries in the wife portion of the marriage certificate.
Aside from the certificate of marriage, no such evidence was presented to show the existence of marriage.
Rather, respondent showed by overwhelming evidence that no marriage was entered into and that she was not
even aware of such existence. The testimonial and documentary... evidence clearly established that the only
"evidence" of marriage which is the marriage certificate was a forgery.
in allowing the correction of the subject certificate of marriage by cancelling the wife portion thereof, the trial
court did not, in any way, declare... the marriage void as there was no marriage to speak of.
Principles:
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil
registry. The proceedings may either be summary or adversary. If the correction is clerical, then the procedure
to be adopted is summary. If the rectification affects... the civil status, citizenship or nationality of a party, it is
deemed substantial, and the procedure to be adopted is adversary.
Republic v. Valencia[19] in 1986, the Court has repeatedly ruled that "even substantial... errors in a civil
registry may be corrected through a petition filed under Rule 108, with the true facts established and the
parties aggrieved by the error availing themselves of the appropriate adversarial proceeding.
ARTICLE 40

TERRE v. TERRE
July 3, 1992 (A.M. No. 2349)

PARTIES:
Complainant: DOROTHY B. TERRE
Respondent: ATTY. JORDAN TERRE

FACTS:
On December 24, 1981, complainant Dorothy B. Terre charged respondent Jordan Terre, a member
of the Philippine Bar with “grossly immoral conduct,” consisting of contracting a second marriage
and living with another woman other than complainant, while his prior marriage with complainant
remained subsisting No judicial action having been initiated or any judicial declaration obtained as
to the nullity of such prior marriage of respondent with complainant.

Respondent was charged with abandonment of minor and bigamy by complainant. Dorothy Terre
was then married to a certain Merlito Bercenillo her first cousin, with this fact, Atty. Jordan Terre
succesfully convinced complainant that her marriage was void ab initio and they are free to contract
marriage. In their marriage license, despite her objection, he wrote “single” as her status. After
getting the complainant pregnant, Atty. Terre abandoned them and subsequently contracted another
marriage to Helina Malicdem believing again that her previous marriage was also void ab initio.

ISSUE:
(1) WON a judicial declaration of nullity is needed to enter into a subsequent marriage

HELD:
Yes. The Court considers this claim on the part of respondent Jordan Terre as a spurious defense. In
the first place, respondent has not rebutted complainant’s evidence as to the basic fact which
underscores that bad faith of respondent Terre. In the second place, the pretended defense is the
same argument by which he inveigled complainant into believing that her prior marriage or Merlito
A. Bercenilla being incestuous and void ab initio (Dorothy and Merlito being allegedly first cousins to
each other), she was free to contract a second marriage with the respondent. Respondent Jordan
Terre, being a lawyer, knew or should have known that such an argument ran counter to the
prevailing case law of the supreme Court which holds that for purposes of determining whether a
person is legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage was
null and void ab initio is essential.
 LUPO ALMODIEL ATIENZA, complainant, v.
JUDGE FRANCISCO BRILLANTES, JR., respondent.
A.M. No. MTJ-92-706. March 29, 1995.

Facts:

Respondent Judge Francisco was charged by petitioner Lupo Atienza for Gross Immorality and Appearance of
Impropriety. Francisco was alleged to be cohabiting with De Castro and thereafter married to De
Castro in California while in a subsisting marriage with one Zenaida Ongkiko. Respondent on the other hand
denies that having married o Ongkiko, although he admits having five children with her. He alleges that while he
and Ongkiko went through a marriage ceremeony before a Nueva Ecija town mayor, the same was not a valid
marriage for lack of marriage license

Issue:

Whether or not Brillantes is guilty of immorality and appearance of impropriety for contracting a second
marriage while in an exising marriage.

Ruling:

The court held that respondent is the last person allowed to invoke good faith. He made a mockery of the
institution of marriage and employed deceit to be able to cohabit with a woman, who beget him five children.
Any law student would know that a marriage license is necessary before one can get married. Respondent was
given an opportunity to correct the flaw in his first marriage when he and Ongkiko were married for the second
time. His failure to secure a marriage license on these two occasions betrays his sinister motives and ad faith. It
is evident that respondent failed to meet the standards of moral fitness for membership in legal profession. As
such, respondent is dismissed from service.
 Ty vs CA
GR No. 127406, November 27, 2000

FACTS:

Private respondent, Edgardo Reyes, was married with Anna Villanueva in a civil ceremony in March 1977 in Manila and
subsequently had a church wedding in August 1977. Both weddings were declared null and void ab initio for lack of
marriage license and consent of the parties. Even before the decree nullifying the marriage was issued, Reyes wed Ofelia
Ty herein petitioner on April 1979 and had their church wedding in Makati on April 1982. The decree was only issued in
August 1980. In January 1991, Reyes filed with RTC a complaint to have his marriage with petitioner be declared null
and void. AC ruled that a judicial declaration of nullity of the prior marriage with Anna must first be secured before a
subsequent marriage could be validly contracted. However, SC found that the provisions of the Family Code cannot be
retroactively applied to the present case for doing so would prejudice the vested rights of the petitioner and of her
children.

ISSUE: Whether or not damages should be awarded to Ofelia Ty.

HELD:

SC is in the opinion of the lower courts that no damages should be awarded to the wife who sought damages against the
husband for filing a baseless complaint causing her mental anguish, anxiety, besmirched reputation, social humiliation and
alienation from her parents. Aside from the fact, that petitioner wants her marriage to private respondent held valid and
subsisting. She is likewise suing to maintain her status as legitimate wife. To grant her petition for damages would result
to a situation where the husband pays the wife damages from conjugal or common funds. To do so, would make the
application of the law absurd. Moreover, Philippine laws do not comprehend an action for damages between husband and
wife merely because of breach of a marital obligation.
Hence, the petition was granted. Marriage between Ty and Reyes is declared valid and subsisting and the award of the
amount of P15,000 is ratified and maintained as monthly support to their 2 children for as long as they are of minor age or
otherwise legally entitled thereto.
 SANTIAGO CARINO, petitioner vs. SUSAN CARINO, defendant
G.R. No. 132529. February 2, 2001

Facts:

During the lifetime of SP04 Santiago S. Carino, he contracted two marriages, the first with Susan Nicdao Carino
with whom he had two offsprings (Sahlee and Sandee) and with Susan Yee Carino with whom he had no children
in their almost ten year cohabitation. In 1988, Santiago passed away under the care of Susan Yee who spent for
his medical and burial expenses. Both petitioner and respondent filed claims for monetary benefits and financial
assistance pertaining to the deceased from various government agencies. Nicdao was able to collect a total of
P146,000.00 and Yee received a total of P21,000.00. Yee filed an action for collection of sum of money against
Nicdao, contending that the marriage of the latter with Santiago is void ab initio because their marriage was
solemnized without the required marriage license. The trial court ruled in favor of Yee, ordering Nicdao to pay
Yee half of acquired death benefits. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.

Issue:

Whether or not the marriage of Santiago Carino and Susan Nicdao is void for lack of marriage license.

Ruling:

Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the marriage of Nicdao and Carino was solemnized in
1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage and the absence thereof, subject to certain exceptions,
renders the marriage void ab initio. In the case at bar, the marriage does not fall within any of those exceptions
and a marriage license therefore was indispensable to the validity of it. This fact is certified by the
Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila. Such being the case, the presumed validity of the marriage of
Nicdao and Carino has been sufficiently overcome and cannot stand. The marriage of Yee and Carino is void ab
initio as well for lack of judicial decree of nullity of marriage of Carino and Nicdao at the time it was contracted.
The marriages are bigamous; under Article 148 of the Family Code, properties acquired by the parties through
their actual joint contribution shall belong to the co-ownership. The decision of the trial court and Court of
Appeals is affirmed.
ARTICLE 41 AND 42

05 Republic of the Phils. Vs. Ludyson C. Catubag

G.R. NO. 210580; APRIL 18, 2018PETITIONER/S: Republic of the PhilippinesRESPONDENT/S: Ludyson Catubag
EMERGENCY RECIT:

Private Respondent’s wife left the family home. After 6 years,

Respondent filed a petition to have his wife declared presumptively dead. The RTCgranted it, but the Petitioner
challenged it, filing a Petition under Rule 65 with theCA, The CA dismissed it, ruling that the recourse was improper as
the Petitionershould have filed a MR with the RTC before elevating the case to the CA. The SC ruledthat the recourse was
proper, and that there was no well-founded belief that the wifewas dead due to the failure of Respondent to prove that he
exerted diligent effortsin searching for the absentee spouse.
DOCTRINE:
In cases of summary proceedings, a decision of the trial court can beelevated to the CA via Petition for Certiorari under
Rule 65.
FACTS:

Private Respondent Ludyson and Shanaviv were cohabiting with each otheras husband and wife, and had 2 children
together.

Ludyson and Shanaviv eventually married in 2003. The marriage wassolemnized by a Municipal Judge in Rizal,
Cagayan.

Sometime in 2006, while Ludyson was working abroad, Shanaviv left theirhous
e and never returned (Ludyson’s r
elatives took care of the children).

Ludyson flew back home and proceeded to look for his wife. He inquiredwith close friends and relatives and even
travelled as far as Bicol, where hewife was born and raised, but to no avail. He also searched various hospitalsand funeral
parlors, also to no avail.

Ludyson subsequently sought the help of Bombo Radyo to broadcast the

fact of his wife’s disappearance.

In 2012, Ludyson filed a petition with the RTC to have his wife declaredpresumptively dead.

The RTC granted the petition.

Petitioner, through the office of the SolGen, elevated the case to the CA viaPetition for Certiorari under Rule 65,
contending that Ludyson failed toestablish a well-founded belief that his wife was already dead.

The CA dismissed the petition, ruling that Petitioner should have filed a MRwith the RTC. The Petitioner filed a MR
but the CA denied the same.

ISSUE:
1.

Whether Petitioner’s resort to an appeal to the CA under Rule 65 is proper.2.

Whether the Private Respondent has complied with the requisites of apetition for declaration of presumptive death under
Art. 41 of the Family Code.
HELD:1
YES. The nature of the proceeding determines the appropriate remedy or remediesavailable. Under Art. 41 of the Family
Code, a petition for declaration of presumptivedeath is a summary proceeding. Art 253 of the same Code likewise
characterizesproceedings under Art. 41 as summary proceedings.As a consequence of this summary nature, parties cannot
seek reconsideration, norappeal decision in summary judicial proceedings under the Family Code becausethese judgments
are immediately final and executory by express mandate of law.However, parties may challenge the decision in such
proceedings through a petitionfor certiorari to question grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.As
previously held by the Court in
Republic vs. Sareňogon, Jr.
, in a summaryproceeding for the declaration for presumptive death, if a party is aggrieved by thedecision of the RTC,
then a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 should be filed withthe CA. any subsequent decision by the CA may be
elevated to the SC via Petition forReview on Certiorari under Rule 45.
2
NO. There are 4 requisites under Art. 41 that must be complied with for thedeclaration of presumptive death to prosper:1.

The absent spouse has been missing for 4 consecutive years, or 2 if suchspouse was in danger of death when the
disappearance occurred;2.

The present spouse wants to remarry;3.

The present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and4.

The present spouse files for a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee. In this case,
Ludyson has complied with the 1st, 2nd, and 4th requisites, nut has not satisfied the 3rd requisite as he has not established
a well-founded belief that theabsentee is dead. Such belief must result from diligent efforts to locate the absent spouse.
Ludyson failed to establish his allegations. He did not present the friends andfamily he claims to have made inquiries to.
While he did have a certification from Bombo Radyo’s manager, he did not seek help from government agencies like the
police or NBI. Ludyson’s assertion, uncorroborated by evidence, falls short of the diligence required to engender a well-
founded belief that the absentee is dead