Sec. 34 Indian Penal Code does not state for any specific offence.

It only lays down the rule

of evidence that in a situation, where an offence requires a particular criminal intention or
knowledge and is committed by several persons, each of them who join the act with such
knowledge or intention is liable in the same way as if it were done by him alone with that
intention or knowledge. The liability of individuals under this circumstance is called Joint
Liability. The principle of Joint Liability defined in section 34 is as follows:

Section 34 IPC states the Acts done by several persons in furtherance of Common intention.
The section explains that “When a criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance of
the common intention of all, each of such persons shall be liable for that act in the same
manner as if it were done by him alone."

The major ingredients of Sec. 34 are as follows:

(i) Criminal Act:

The section speaks of a “criminal act” being done by several persons. If the act in question is
a lawful act, this section will not apply.

It means that if the act is a lawful and not a criminal act, and if in the course of such act any
one of the persons jointly doing that act commits an offence, then only such person shall be
liable for it and not others; Section 34 shall not apply.

The words “criminal act” are wider than the words “offence”. An offence is the result of a
criminal act. A criminal act is not equivalent to an offence which is composed of a physical
act, its effect and the intention or knowledge with which the physical act is done.

It indicates the unity of criminal behaviour which results in something for which an
individual would be punishable if it were done by him alone. “Criminal acts” does not denote
a single act but refers to a whole criminal transaction in which several persons are engaged, a
transaction comprising the doing of separate acts, similar or diverse by several persons.

Cunning, J. has explained in K.E. v. Barendra Kumar, that it is impossible to conceive two
individuals doing identically the same act; such a thing is impossible.

Therefore, to have any meaning the expression “criminal act done by several persons” must
contemplate an act which can be divided into parts each part being executed by a different
person, the whole making up the “criminal act which was the common intention of all”.

(ii) “Done by several persons”:

It is necessary that the act must have been done by several persons. The offenders must be
shown to be engaged in a criminal enterprise, that is to say, though they may not be engaged
in doing the same act, each one of them must be a participant in some act connected with
their common intention. There must be evidence of some distinct act by the accused which
may be regarded as a part of the criminal act. Actual participation is necessary though the
participation may be passive.

(iii) “In furtherance of common intention”:

Criminal Intention is the highest form of blameworthiness of mind or mens rea. Intention
occupies a symbolic place in criminal law. Common intention implies a pre-arranged plan
and acting in concert pursuant to the plan. Common intention comes into being prior to the
commission of the act, which need not be a long gap. The common intention may be to do
one act and another act may be done in furtherance of the common intention. Such other act
in furtherance may be a preliminary act necessary for achieving the common intention, or it
may be done while achieving it or it may be done after achieving it.

If such other act has no connection with the common intention, it shall not be in furtherance
and consequently Section 34 shall not apply. Thus, while the common intention is to kill a
person, a theft is also committed by one of the several persons participating in the criminal
act, Section 34 shall not apply in respect of the theft which shall be the separate act of the
individual concerned and none others of the remaining persons shall be liable for it.

Emphasising this third aspect the Supreme Court in a case observed that it is true that in order
to convict persons vicariously under Section 34, I.P.C., it is not necessary to prove that each
and every one of them had indulged in overt acts. Even so, there must be material to show
that the overt act or acts of one or more of the accused was or were done in furtherance of the
common intention of all the accused.

The essence of liability to be found in the existence of common intention is that the criminal
act complained against was done by one of the accused persons in furtherance of common
intention of all, if this is shown, then the liability for the crime may be imposed on any one of
the persons in the same manner as if the act were done by him alone.

One of the earliest cases came before the court under s.34 under the principle of Joint Liability
was Barendra Kumar Ghosh v. King Emperor. In the appeal before the Privy Council, it was
held that – “criminal act means that unity of criminal behaviour which results in something for
which an individual would be responsible, if it were all done by himself alone, that is, in
criminal offence.”

The other important case came before the Supreme Court was Rangaswami v. State of Tamil
Nadu. Supreme Court held that even though the presence was established but accused did not
share common intention and he was unfamiliar with the plan. Therefore, he was acquitted all
of the charges.

In the case of Mahboob Shah v. Emperor, the appellant Mahboob Shah was of age 19 and was
convicted by Session Judge of the charge s.302 with s.34 for the murder of Allah Dad. The
Session court sentenced him for death. The High Court of Judicature also confirmed the death
sentence. On appeal before Lordship, the conviction for murder and sentence of death was
quashed due to lack of criminal intention and participation.

In Surendra Chauhan v. State of M.P., it was held that to apply this section, apart from the
fact that there should be two or more accused, two facts must be established: (1) Common
Intention (2) participation of the accused in the commission of an offence.

In the case of Suresh Sankharam Nangare v. State of Maharashtra, it was held that “if
common intention is proved but no overt act is attributed to the individual accused, section
34 IPC will be attracted as essentially it involves vicarious liability but if participation of the
accused in the crime is proved and common intention is absent, IPC section 34 cannot be
invoked.”

In Amrik Singh’s Case[i] it has been further held that though the common intention may
develop in course of the fight but there must be clear and unimpeachable evidence to justify
that inference. In the case Pandurang v. State of Hyderabad[ii], Supreme court emphasized on
this point that prior concert need not be something always very much prior to the incident,
but could well be something that may develop on the spot, on the spur of the moment. In
certain circumstances common intention may suddenly develop on the spot, which may be
inferred by the conduct of the accused. This opinion was expressed by the Supreme Court in
the case of Krishna Gobind Patil v. State of Maharashtra.

From the various interpretations of Apex Court and guideline given in different cases, we can
infer that to impose Joint Liability under section 34, establishing common intention
premeditation of minds is necessary. There should be prior meeting of minds which activated
common intention and criminal act should have been done in furtherance of common intention.