The Extremism in Pakistan: A Political Study 1

DR Arshad. J. Rizvi

“The New state would be a modern democratic state with

sovereignty resting in the people and the members of the new
nation having equal rights of citizensship regardless of their
religion, caste , or creed” (Jinnah’s interview with Reuter’s
correspondence in New Delhi 1946)(1)

The Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary describes extremism as

“political, religious etc.ideas or actions that are extreme and not
normal, reasonable or acceptable to most people. Inother words,
extremism is a term used to describe the actions or ideologies of
individuals or groups outside the perceived political center of a
society; or otherwise claimed to violate common standards of ethics
and reciprocity. It is typically used in reference to political and social
ideologies seen as irrational, counterproductive, unjustifiable, or
otherwise unacceptable to a civil society. The term indicates the
illegitimacy of certain ideas or methods. According to Merriam
Webster dictionary, Extremism is a quality or state of being extreme,
especially advocacy of extreme political measures .It can also be
described as a, “political theory favouring immoderate,
uncompromising policies.Extremism is closely associated with
terrorism, as the rise of extremism can also lead to increasein
terrorist agendas. It is not a religion. It is not Islam. . It may be better
defined as a “political agenda seeking justification in religion”. (2)
Normally extremism and terrorism are considered exchangeable
words. In reality they are not. Terrorism is a physical act, whereas
extremism is a state of mind. Terrorists resort to violence in order to
achieve their objectives. Extremist preachand convince others to
follow their thoughts.There exists a clear linkage between the lack of
human security and the phenomenon of extremism. Rise in extremism
can lead to human insecurity and vice versa.

The governments of South Asian states have not been able to provide
their people with the basic, minimum humansecurity since these
states became independent. Governments and ruling classes, instead
of focusing on dealing with the issues of human survival and
development, embarked upon perpetuating their power and influence.
Subsequently, no South Asian country has been able to free itself from
discriminatory and exploitative policies, which increased insecurity
and led to therising number of communal and terrorist outfits. Despite
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the problems these outfits have created,no serious efforts were made
by the governments or the civil society to curtail the rise in extremist
trends at the initial stages. All of the regional states are facing the
menace of extremism and terrorism in one or other form.

Extremism is defined in Pakistan in a number of ways, mainly in

political, religious and social contexts. A lack of consensus even on
definitions make it difficult to arrive at a comprehensive
understanding of the phenomenon, further complicating efforts aimed
at countering extremism’ (3). Unfortunately, ‘religious extremism is the
common prevalent factor in all the visible trends and patterns of
radicalization in Pakistan’ (4)

This extremism has distorted the global image of the country and as a
matter of fact the militants have put the future security of this country
at stake. In this situation, the whole society is terrorized and fear
prevails all around. Although, ‘the nonalignment in foreign affairs, and
a federal, parliamentary, and democratic Constitution------ based on
social justice, equality, and fair play, not any theocracy---- were the
two most cherished ideals of the father of the Nation, Quaid-i-Azam
Mohammad Ali Jinnah but his death opened the door for shady
religious, political characters and theocratic slogans likes ‘obsolete
religious extrapolations and above all, demanding theocratic-
administrative set-ups, i.e. the imamate, the caliphate, and even the
Presidential form of government; the better being depicted as ‘close’
to Islam’(5). The role of Ulema also very much active for theocratic
Pakistan. The self- styled protagonists of the ‘law of Islam’ fled, after
leaving their cohorts in India, to ‘Islamize’ Pakistan. And as luck
would have it, without any repentance, they posed as the de facto
custodians of the ideological frontiers of the new state. They aroused
the religious passions of the people to get an Islamic Constitution
passed by the Constituent Assembly. One power struggle ended with
the partition as the crown was lifted from the Indian soil, and it paved
the way for another dirty power struggle inside the new state. The
trump card was “Islam”. The first political move to incorporate Islam
in the state gadget was through the Objective Resolution 1949. The
Resolution was the outcome of the intense pressurizing by the Ulema,
that acting like a blue-print outlined the aims and objectives for all the
future constitutions of Pakistan.

In the modern era, a constitution is required to set limits on the

arbitrary powers of levers of the state, to ensure the fundamental
rights of the governed, and to ensure a smooth relation ship between
the two. Thus, a constitution is a social contract and above all, a
written confession of the political faith of the state. In Pakistan, the
prestigious task of the constitution- making were neither competent
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craftsmen like Jinnah nor visionary and futuristic leaders. As the

religion became politically potent force, leaders and military rulers in
Pakistan have used religion for political legitimacy and national
integration. Besides, religious identities, slogans and symbols have
often been used by political parties for political mobilization. The
ever-assertive and uncompromising religious pressure groups have
complicated the constitutional instruments by their biased and narrow
interpretations of religion. The political use of religion has heightened
religious antagonism and acrimony, besides creating space for
religious militancy and extremism. More importantly, recent years
have witnessed a resurgence of religious militancy in Pakistan, with
militant fundamentalism emerging under religious extremism.

Despite being an Islamic Republic constitutionally, there was a clear

division between politics and religion, as well as a distinction between
private and public Islam, at least in the formidable years after the
creation of Pakistan. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan,
in his inaugural address to the Pakistan Constituent Assembly on 11
August 1947,
clearly stated that religion was a private affair of the individual.
Jinnah’ interpretation of the ‘Law of Islam’ was liberal, enlightened,
and broad, contrary to the conflicting, confusing, sectarian
expositions of the Ulema, which were completely devoid of ijtehad.
Though Jinnah would never visualized formulating constitutional
principles repugnant to the injunctions of Holy Quran and the Sunnah,
his version to sectarian interpretation of Sharia by the Ulema is
evident from the following statement.

“Whose Shariat? Hanfis? Hambalis? Shafis?

Malakis? Ja’afris? I don’t want to get involved. The moment I enter
this field, the Ulema will take over for they claim to be the expert and
I certainly don’t propose to hand over the field to the Ulema….. I don’t
propose to o fall their trap” (6)

It observed that the ‘ the structure of the country began with the
existential reality of a secular organization of its government, but
religion started to be invoked to counter the rising tide of
provincialism and ethnic tensions’ which faced Pakistan just after its
inception. Although, the religion can play a positive role against
provincialism and ethnics but the strength of religious groups put all
their efforts in to declaring Pakistan as a theocratic state. The religio-
islamist groups played an important role in helping Pakistan recover
from the devastation of partition, and this gave them additional
organizational skills and helped them to established link to many
Pakistani especially the migrants from Pakistan. Liaqaut Ali Khan, the
second man encountered pressure from these religious groups about
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the theocratic character of the state and in less than two years after
the speech, the Constituent Assembly moved the Objective Resolution8
on 7 March 1949, pledging to draft an Islamic Constitution. ‘The
Objective Resolution was a master piece of vague platitudes, and it
represented a complete departure from Jinnah’s speech of August
1947’. (7) The Resolution stated:

“Whereas sovereignty over the entire universe belongs to God

Almighty alone, and the authority which He has delegated to the State
of Pakistan through its people for being exercised within the limits
prescribed by Him is a sacred trust ...Wherein the principles of
democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance and social justice, as
enunciated by Islam shall be fully observed ...Wherein the Muslims
shall be enabled to order their lives in the individual and collective
spheres in accord with the teaching and requirements of Islam as set
out in the Holy Qur'an and the Sunnah.”(8)

‘Although not enthusiastic about the creation of Pakistan, the

Islamists were also the first to demand that Islamic, and sometimes
highly sectarian, provisions be included in the yet-to-be adopted
constitution. Mawdudi led this campaign, arguing that his party alone
possessed the understanding and commitment needed to accomplish
this cherished goal.’(9) As he suggested ’the spiritual elevation is just
one aspect of Islam. Prophet’s mission was to use his moral force for
the reconstruction of the society….. Construct life on the basis of
Marufaat [virtues] and cleanse it of Munkarat [vices]. [Maulana-
Mau’dudi-1960] Most liberal Pakistanis continue to reject the
imposition of theocracy, but the demand is pressed incessantly by all
Islamists parties.

The roots of this crisis of Muslim identity go back to the pre-partition

era. Muslims had maintained their distinct identity while living side by
side with their Hindu fellows. The issue of social purity emerged when
Akber fulfilled his ‘imperial dream’ by introducing Din-i-Illahi. It was a
conscious effort by the state to impose a superior unity and identity on
the desperate Indian communities but the Muslim clergy waged Jihad
against Akber’s ‘religion’. Mujadad Alif Sani, Shah Waliullah and other
Muslim revivalists in the subcontinent attempted to preserve the
distinct identity of the Muslim community through strict adherence to
pure Islam. In their view, Hindus and Muslims were not merely
followers of different religions but members of two different
communities or nations. This belief formed the crux of the so-called
‘two-nation theory,' which in later years was used by Muslim leaders
to justify the creation of the state of Pakistan as an independent
Muslim homeland that was separate from "Hindu India." It’s a
mockery that the Muslim clergy, who established the concept of Two
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Nation Theory for saving their identity, advocated joining hands with
the Hindus in their futile bid to oust British.

The one of the disastrous consequences of the 1857 ‘uprising’ was

the division of the Muslims into two broader groups, the Muslims who
were addressed by Sir Syed Ahmad Khan and those ideological
fundamentalists who failed to understand the future role of the
Muslims in superior, cohesive, advanced and pervasive society fueled
by the British in the subcontinent. Sir Syed asked the Muslims of his
time not to participate in politics unless and until they got modern
education. He was of the view that Muslims could not succeed in the
field of western politics without knowing the system. ‘ Misconstruing
his policies, the Ulema immediately boycotted his educational
programme, poured scorn on his social reforms, and labeled him a
‘heretic’ on account of his radical, scientific religious interpretation.’
(10)They established their own Madrassas ‘which eventually led their
‘splendid isolation’ from the Muslim political aspirations.’ (11) Two
broad categories of Muslim politics began to be distinguished even
after the creation of Pakistan. Even when the government of the new
state was coping with huge problems arising out of the partition of the
subcontinent, the Ulema began arousing the religious passions of the
people to get an ‘Islamic Constitution’.

The roots of crises of Muslim identity gained more strengthened when

Mawdudi led Jama’at with other fundamentalist parties started riots
in Lahore over the question of whether the members of the Ahmadi
sect should officially be regarded as a non-Islamic minority.

The Jama’at led by Mawdudi, arguing that his party alone committed
to accomplish this goal led a successful movement to have the small
Ahmediyya sect declared non-Muslim by the state. ‘With the ouster of
the Ahmedis from the fold, the tone was set for progressively more
Intolerant politics’. (12) To ouster the Ahmadis from the state, the sect
was also declared non-Muslim constitutionally. Islamic Republic of
Pakistan became the first Muslim country to pass a law and legally
declared Ahmadis a non-Muslim minority, giving them all the rights of
a minority that are guaranteed in its constitution. The second step
came on the scene when PNA issued the call of Nizam-i-Mustafa
which envisaged fundamental transformation of socio-economic
structure of the society. The movement used the Shariat card so
skillfully that it received unprecedented support of the masses.
Because of the pressure and violence of the movement, Bhutto had to
announce certain Islamic measures which further provided
momentum to the movement and finally the religious parties and
ulama succeeded in bringing a change in the society through another
Martial Law.
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Gen. Zia came with an Islamic agenda and political expediency also
demanded that he take a position diametrically opposed to the one
taken by his military precursors Gen. Ayub and Gen. Yahya Khan. Zia
also brought an alliance of sorts between the military and the Islam
religious parties and was very much supported by the religious parties
for its aim of moral purification of the society. The religious fervor of
PNA’s agitational movement along with Zia’s own religious orientation
constituted a powerful base for the application of Shariah in the
country. (13) The long outstanding demand of the religious parties and
Ulama seemed to be fulfilled under a dictator. In his first speech, Zia
praised the spirit of Islam that gave momentum to the PNA agitation
in the following words:

“It proves that Pakistan, which was created in the name of

Islam, will continue to survive only if it sticks to Islam. That is
why I consider introduction of Islamic system as an essential
prerequisite for the country.”(14)

Hasan Abbas defines the Islamization process in the late 70s and 80s
under Zia, as the hijacking of the Islamic slogan of the anti-Bhutto
agitation and making it his own. He seemed totally committed to the
formal and visual performance of all religious rites, while
simultaneously being quite flexible on the deeper issue of morality. (15)
.Zia also cynically used Islamic groups internally against leftist

groups. Especially the PPP, though he was not above betraying then
when he left the alliance had outlived its usefulness.

‘The Jamat-e-Islami was of critical importance to Zia. It was the only

party with a committed cadre of loyalists that stood in readiness to
counter and blunt any anti-Zia agitation launched by any political
force.’ (16) And ‘having Zia in driver’s seat was a moment of great
pleasure and success for the Jamaat-i-Islami...Zia had long been a
devout follower of Mawdudi. In the early years of his military career
he used to circulate Mawdudi’s literature among his colleagues.
Therefore, he was taken by JI as a long awaited Godly gift’. What the
Jamaat-i-Islami( JI) and the Ulema did not realize, however , was that
it was not the person of General Zia that mattered in the realms of
power in Pakistan’s political system. The real political channels
continued to be controlled by an oligarchy dominated by the military
and civil bureaucracy.

With the transplantation of the medieval institution, the country

Undermined in its progressive elements. ‘However, there was no
single definition available to explain what Islamization was’. Pakistan
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was to be a Deobandi/Wahabi ideological state, patronized by Saudi

Arabia, by him and collaborators among the traditional Ulema and the
professional groups.

The rewriting of textbooks was accelerated to undermine this ideology

and Emphasizing the link of idea of Pakistan with the birth of Islam
with Arabian Peninsula, and claiming that Pakistan was not a
geographical entity but an ideology which reflected a unique
civilization and culture.(17) The religious institution (Madrassas) was
established all over the country. The degrees that these institutions
awarded, qualified young men to preside over Qazi courts or work as
Ulema in various departments of the government. (18). An important
consequence of his rule was the growth of sectarianism in the country,
resulting into the deepening of religious imbalances between Sunnis
and Shias on the one hand and among different Sunni groups on the
other. Emerging reality of Shia-Sunni conflict is sweeping Pakistan
now as all major religious groups have their private militias. The
Madrassas also played very vital role for enterprising of Islamic
constituencies, politically potent to vote for Islam as they did when a
referendum was held for Zia, where the choice was largely construed
as one where the people could either vote for the Quran or not’.

Zia who was very much supported by the internal Islamist groups as
an epithet of their concept of a true Islamic ruler, and on the other
hand, externally, United States added its help to establish country’s
religious testimonial during its war in Afghanistan against Soviet
Union. Interestingly, despite Zia’ contribution to the Islamic measures,
failed to threatened the political and economic status quo. The
support gave him make better his tenure with out doing any thing for
social deprivations, economic misuse, and political supremacy, which
completely remained unaffected.

Ishtiaq Ahamd in his essay ‘Reclaiming Pakistan's Pacifist Religious

Creed’ defined two causes of regimematic Islamization of Zia, he
wrote “The two epoch-making regional developments of 1979 - the
revolution in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan - were
instrumental in conservative military leader General Zia ul-Haq's
efforts to consolidate political power and institutionalize religious
radicalism in the country. Pakistan's association with the Afghan Jihad
during his rule and with the Kashmir jihad in its aftermath
strengthened radical religious tendencies in state and society. The
extremist ideologies and terrorist practices of al-Qa'ida and its local
affiliates, especially since the start of the Afghan war in 2001, also
have reinvigorated religious radicalism in the country”. (19)
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The Deobandi Ulemas and Jamaat-i-Islami were also the surrogate

political parties domestically in the Afghan jihad.9 The regional and
international climate of the 1980s favored Zia’s orthodox Islamization,
and alliance with the West served the military’s institutional interests.
As a frontline ally of the U.S. in the Soviet-Afghan war, the military
benefited from billions of dollars in military and economic assistance
while Zia promoted militant versions of Islam to fight the jihad and
counter his secular democratic foes. Not surprisingly, Islamic
movements and parties were also major beneficiaries. Jihad became
the central point of existence for a true Islamic state and society.
Madrassas mushroomed, and religious parties used militancy for
political gain. The growth in Islamic movements has continued ever
since. (20).

External actors have played a key role in legitimizing the military

regimes in Pakistan and providing it with international recognition
and substantial financial resources to maintain their power. In
particular, the support of the US and its allies during the Cold War,
the Afghan conflict and the global “War on Terror” have provided to
help Pakistan’s military regime to establish its religious permit.
Alternatively, in the early years the United States had criticized the
Islamist policies of Pakistan’s Governments. Hussain Haqqani, former
Pakistan’s Ambassador to the US wrote in the Washington Quarterly,
“In a policy statement issued on July 1, 1951, the U.S. Department of
State declared that, “[a]part from Communism, the other main threat
to American interests in Pakistan was from ‘reactionary groups of
landholders and uneducated religious leaders’ who were opposed to
the ‘present Western-minded government’ and ‘favor a return to
primitive Islamic principles.”13 However, the US did little to prevent
Pakistan from using Islam as state ideology, encouraging religious
leaders and “tying the Islamists to Pakistan’s military-civil
bureaucracy and intelligence apparatus.”(21)

Thanks to state patronage, some mere Islamic groups and leaders

possess significant political power. Successive governments, and espe-
cially the military regimes, have sought to build their support and
legitimacy through engagement with religious leaders. The military
has relied on these religious allies to counter civilian opposition,
primarily in the form of the Pakistan People’s Party and Pakistan
Muslim League (Nawaz), which dominated politics during the
democratic interlude of the 1990s. Civil society organizations have
grown in depth and capacity during the past decade. Civil society is
largely involved in welfare or development issues, but there are few
organizations engaged in research or advocacy. In practice, there are
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limited openings for these organizations to engage the government in

a substantive policy dialogue and few incentives for government to
listen to them.

Exploring the Causes:

Professor Anwer Syed divided the Muslim ideological leadership in

British India into two groups----- Muslim nationalists like Sir Syed,
Iqbal and Jinnah and their opponents like Moulana Mawdudi . (22)
Mawdudi led the drive to conclude the cherished goal. Although not
enthusiastic about Pakistan’s creation, but after its emergence, the
Islamists were also the first to give a severe blow to secular forces by
stressing upon Islamic society and an orthodox Islamic state. They
also raised their voice for highly sectarian provisions are included in
the yet-to-be adopted constitution. (23) Pakistan is the best example of
culmination of cooperation and then confrontation between political
and extremist elements. Since its birth in 1947, Pakistan – politically
unstable, economically weak and militarily confronted – has grappled
with a range of internal and external threats. Internally, the Army and
Islamists groups’ (having common domestic enemy---- the secular
mainstream parties) teamwork imbued the seed of fundamentalism
which tilted towards extremism and moreover, an impulsive
geopolitical situation makes it defenseless to all kinds of radical
threats. The extremism has taken deep roots in Pakistani society due
its different phases of religious interpretation, political history, bad
governance, assorted opus of society, ethno – cultural communities
and various nationalities. Let’s try to focus on factors causes the
turbulent history of the country

 Religion and its use

Religions have made a worldwide political come-back. Apart from
personal religious faith which respects the democratic rule of law, the
politicized religion of fundamentalist claims is undergoing a revival in
all cultures and in some places is even making bids for state power. As
Huntington sweepingly attributes the use of religion to achieve
political supremacy and a corresponding inability to co-operate with
other religious groupings first and foremost to Islam. (24) Since
Pakistan's beginnings as a homeland for Muslims of British India in
1947, Islam has been the one thread creating a national identity in a
state otherwise divided along ethnic, provincial, cultural, religious,
class, and linguistic lines. Civilian and military leaders have used
Islam to gain legitimacy for their rule and as tools of state policy,
strengthening the role of religious parties in politics and society.‘It is
the implementation of this right that unfortunately provides one
community an edge over the others and hence leads to exploitation
and even violence in the name of religion’ (25).
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However, since violence and extremism is not just an intellectual

interpretation of religious tradition, as detailed analyses have shown,
but primarily an expression of social, economic and political crises
and conflicts, such a containment policy requires a comprehensive,
multi-dimensional and long-term action strategy. In order to be
realistic and successful, this strategy must combine social, economic
and political elements effectively and convincingly. (26)

 The Military ---- religious nexus

Under military ruler Zia ul-Haq from 1977-1988, Islamization

acquired the full backing of the state, say some scholars. Zia co-opted
the religious parties, notably the JI, and undertook a process of
Islamization that included introduction of new Islamic laws, setting up
a federal sharia court, making Islamic education compulsory in
schools, and promoting religious schools or madrassas. He took steps
to Islamize the army by including Islamic teachings into the military's
training. He strssed that ‘ the armed forces bear the sacred
responcibility for safegaurding Pakistan’s ideology frontiers.’ Under
the rule of Gen. Zia Islamization of the society took deep roots. This
was the beginning of sectarianism in Pakistan and radical Islam.
These various sectarian groups later on have been seeped deep into
violence and terrorist activities have links and collaboration with
Taliban groups. ‘The Islamization by Zia was not acceptable to Shia
thus bringing differences between Shias and Sunnis and large scale
sectarian violence’ (27)

 Militant Islam

Pakistan has not always been so relevant to global politics. Its

strategic relevance has varied over time which had implications for
Pakistan's role at the international level and the foreign policy options
available to its policy makers. The policy again dented when the
military occupied Pakistan’s gave its deep involvement in the civil
war in Afghanistan. It was American- Pakistani forces who countered
the Soviet forces. Established Mujahideen gathered from Afghanistan,
Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Chechnya and Uzbekistan etc. They named it
holy war (Jihad) and mostly these Mujahideen comprised of religious
Fundamentalists who were fighting in the name of religion. ‘These
Mujahideen after Soviet withdrawal were left unattended and now
they are part of Taliban or other extremist groups.’
 The establishment of Madrassas
‘A common perception is that Madrassas which are the religious
schools contain jihadi literature in their syllabus and they teach and
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preach jihad as to produce holy warriors’ (28) But many who support
Madrasa system argue that these charitable religious schools help in
raising the literacy level in Pakistan . ‘The Madrassas in Pakistan are
not a monolithic institution. The Madrassas adhere to different sects -
Deobandi, Brehlvi, Ahle Hadith and Ahle Tashi. For example, in Punjab
alone, there are around 970 Deobandi, 1,200 Brehlvi, 100 Ahle Tashi
and 170 Ahle Hadith madrassas. Each of these groups has its own
curriculum and independent sources of funding. (29) Apart from
differences in terms of faith and political affiliations, the most
analogous equation between these “prep schools for the Islamic jihad”
that they are preaching fundamentalism in poor and illiterate children
and Poverty` and extremism are usually their best friends’ (30) ‘Through
their growing network of religious schools and military training
camps, they are raising a whole new generation of radicalized
children’ (31)
 Multi-ethnic Society
We as a nation failed to build a look of a mono-cultural society. It is
diverse and multi-ethnic. Bad governance of the country botched to
integrate it in one single thread. The major factor in the present
political and ideological crisis faced by Pakistan is the denial of the
cultural and political rights of the people. The refusal to acknowledge
their distinct ethnic identities and suppression of their cultural
identities led to separatist movements, lack of trust in the centre and
loss of interest in the survival and strengthening of the state.
Sectarian bloodshed, religious strife and ethnic conflicts are some
manifestations of this approach. ‘People are disoriented, dissatisfied
and insecure; hence they are easy to be exploited’. The parasite of
Extremism can easily instill in the veins of troubled, indistinct and
ignorant people who pampered by the Madrassas. They can use for
any means, giving the attraction of some money and a few delusions
of paradise. ‘Radicalization is one of the ways through which the poor
and the dispossessed find a voice, often in the form of violent
activism. This violent action may become terrorism in its extreme
manifestations’ (32)

 Geo-Political Condition
Looking at the location of Pakistan, it is neighbored with Iran, where
the Islamic revolution took place then, it is also bordered with
Afghanistan where there have been Taliban government; another
fundamentalist government. The happenings or the setup in both the
neighbors have affected Pakistan also, where various groups have had
connections with these countries. On the other side India another
neighbor, is also facing Hindu fundamentalism and whenever get
chances Pakistan’s fundamentalist elements and fundamentalism also
rises.
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 Poor Governance
Since inception, Pakistan buffeted by numerous and serious political
crises. The all governments ‘failed to create viable political
institutions or processes capable of pursuing meaningful socio-
economic policies’ which ignited high rise in corruption and complete
mismanagement. ‘The state must practice the principle of equal
citizenship irrespective of religion, caste, ethnicity and regional
background”.(33) Extremism in Pakistan cannot be defeated until the
Pakistani government, as well as its uneasy ally, the United States,
focus on addressing the underlying causes of rising militancy.
 The wrong perception of Jihad
Another factor is the growth of autonomous Jihadist organizations for
pressurizing India on Kashmir. These extra-legal coercive
organizations began to have their own agendas leading them to join
Islamist forces including the al-Qaeda and the Taliban, operating in
Afghanistan and other parts of the Islamic world. Furthermore, the
Islamists in FATA have been strengthened by support from Jihadi
sympathetic organizations both nationally and internationally as well
as the addition to their ranks from the Diaspora emanating from
repressive Central Asian States and now from Iraq. The scaling down
of the Jihad in Kashmir led to the return of Pakistani Jihadists, who
have readily found new employment with the Talibans and are
challenging the state.
 Illiteracy and poverty
The heredity of illiteracy and poverty were the root causes of
extremism and terrorism. In 2008, unemployment in Pakistan stood
at 7.4 per cent, with more than one in five men aged 15 to 24
unable to read or write, and only one in 20 in tertiary education.
Technical and vocational education, and adult literacy, are
especially important and have been neglected the most in
Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the Tribal Areas. Illiteracy
and lack of skills provide fertile ground for those who wish to
recruit young men and women to their cause, especially when
significant monetary payments are attached. In addition, Pakistan’s
major cities and urban centers are home to an estimated 1.2
million street children. This includes beggars and scavengers who
are often very young. The law and order problem worsens their
condition as boys and girls are fair game for others who would
force them into stealing, scavenging and smuggling to survive. A
large proportion consumes readily available solvents to prevent
hunger, loneliness and fear. Such children are vulnerable to
contracting HIV/AIDS, as well as other diseases. The fear is that
many of them can potentially be recruited, trained, provided
financial security and used as suicide bombers.
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References and Notes

1. Jinnah’s interview with Reuter’s correspondence in New Delhi

1946
2. Basit and Rathore, 2010, 13.
3. Basit and Rathore, 2010, 13.
4. DR Ambreen Javaid, Genesis and Effects of Religious Extremism
in Pakistan,
5. Zulafkar Khalid Maluka, The Myth of Constitutional ism in
Pakistan. ( Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1995) 2
6. Jinnah’s interview between Mahummad A. Haroon (ADC to
Jinnah in 1946) and Jinnah, quoted in Iqbal, Islamization, 40
7. Izzad- Din Pal, Pakistan Islam & Economics, ( Karachi, Oxford
University Press, 1999) 4-5
8. G.W.Choudhry, Constitutional Development in Pakistan,
( Longman, 1969) 40
9. Sibte Hasan, The Battle of Ideas in Pakistan ( Lahore: Pakistan
Publishing Huse, 1986) 72. This Study also presents innumerable
examples of rulers legitimizing their dictatorial rule on the basis of
the country of the divine right king.
10. Zulafkar Khalid Maluka, The Myth of Constitutional ism in
Pakistan. ( Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1995) 4
11. Ibid.p.101.
12. Arshi Saleem Hashi, ‘Pakistan: Politics, Religion and Extremism’
13. Zulafkar Khalid Maluka,The Myth of Constitutional ism in
Pakistan. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1995) 263
14. Ibid.p.264
15. Abbas, Hassan. 2005. Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism: Allah, the
Army and American’s Waron Terror. New York: East Gate. P.97,
queted in essay: Arshi Saleem Hashi, ‘Pakistan: Politics, Religion
and Extremism’
16. Izzad- Din Pal, Pakistan Islam & Economics, (Karachi, Oxford
University Press, 1999) 142
17. Jalal 1995, Aziz 1993
18. Arshi Saleem Hashi, ‘Pakistan: Politics, Religion and
Extremism’
19. Ishtaique Ahmad, ‘Reclaiming Pakistan's Pacifist Religious
Creed’
20. PAKISTAN: THE MULLAHS AND THE MILITARY 20 March
2003, ICG Asia Report N°49 Islamabad/Brussels.
The Extremism in Pakistan: A Political Study 14
DR Arshad. J. Rizvi

21.
Haqqani, Hussain. “Pakistan and the Islamists”.Current History,
April 2007, Vol.106 (699): 150
22. Anwar syed, Pakistan: Islam, politics and national solidarity,
Lahore, 1984, pp. 30-37.
23. Cohen, the Idea of Pakistan, 2005, p163
24. Samuel P. Huntington: The Clash of Cavitations and the
Remaking of World Order. (New York, 1996.)
25. Arshi Saleem Hashi, ‘Pakistan: Politics, Religion and Extremism’
26. Manuel Castells: The Information Age. Economy, Society and
Culture. Vol. 2: (The Power of Identity, Oxford) 2000.
27. Behera and Joseph, 2004: 183.
28. Chandran, 2003
29. Chandran, 2003
30. Ali, 2010: 375.
31. Chinoy, 2009.
32. Zaidi, 2011.
33. Mushtaq Ahamd, Politic of Power, (Royal Book, 2005)96

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