Case no. 173 National Federation of Sugar Workers (NFSW) Vs.
Ovejera
The prescribed cooling-off period and the 7-day strike ban after submission of
report of strike vote are mandatory.—The foregoing provisions hardly leave any
room for doubt that the cooling-off period in Art. 264(c) and the 7-day strike ban
after the strike-vote report prescribed in Art. 264(f) were meant to be, and should
be deemed, mandatory.
When the law says “the labor union may strike” should the dispute “remain
unsettled until the lapse of the requisite number of days (cooling-off period) from
the mandatory filing of the notice,’ the unmistakable implication is that the union
may not strike before the lapse of the cooling-off period. Similarly, the mandatory
character of the 7-day strike ban after the report on the strike-vote is manifest in
the provision that “in every case,” the union shall furnish the MOLE with the results
of the voting “at least seven (7) days before the intended strike, subject to the
(prescribed) cooling-off period.” It must be stressed that the requirements of
cooling-off period and 7-day strike ban must both be complied with, although the
labor union may take a strike vote and report the same within the statutory
cooling-off period.
The cooling-off and 7-day strike ban provisions of law are reasonable and valid
restrictions on the right to strike.—The cooling-off period and the 7-day strike ban
after the filing of a strike-vote report, as prescribed in Art. 264 of the Labor Code,
are reasonable restrictions and their imposition is essential to attain the legitimate
policy objectives embodied in the law. We hold that they constitute a valid exercise
of the police power of the state.
FACTS:
Petitioner, the bargaining representative of Central Azucarera de la Carlota (CAC)
employees entered into collective bargaining agreement with CAC wherein the
parties agreed to maintain the present practice on the grant of Christmas bonus,
milling bonus and amelioration bonus equivalent to 1 1/2 month's salary.
On November 30, 1981, petitioner and respondent CAC entered into a compromise
agreement two days after the petition struck to compel payment of the 13th
month pay agreeing to abide by the final decision of the Supreme Court in any case
involving the 13th month pay if it clearly held that the employer is liable to pay the
same separate and distinct from the bonuses already given.
Meanwhile, G.R. No. 51254, Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by
Marcopper Mining Corporation which sought to annul the decision of the Labor
Deputy Minister granting the 13th month pay to its employees in addition to mid-
year and Christmas bonuses under a CBA was dismissed on June 11, 1981 on the
vote of seven (7) Justices and the motion for its reconsideration was denied by a
vote of five Justices. Thereafter, petitioner struck after six days notice with the
Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE). One day after the commencement of
the strike, petitioner filed a strike vote report with MOLE . The strike was declared
illegal by respondent Ovejera for violation of the 15 day cooling-off period and the
7 day strike ban required by B.P. 130. Without appealing to the NLRC, the present
petition was filed questioning the declaration of illegality of the strike and the
denial of the 13th month pay.
ISSUE:
Whether the strike staged by NFSW was illegal?
RULING:
Yes, NFSW strike is illegal. — The NFSW declared the strike six (6) days after filing a
strike notice, i.e., before the lapse of the mandatory cooling-off period. It also
failed to file with the MOLE before launching the strike a report on the strike-vote,
when it should have filed such report "at least seven (7) days before the intended
strike." Under the circumstances, we are perforce constrained to conclude that the
strike staged by petitioner is not in conformity with law. This conclusion makes it
unnecessary for us to determine whether the pendency of an arbitration case
against CAC on the same issue of payment of 13th month pay [R.A.B No. 512-81,
Regional Arbitration Branch No. VI-A, NLRC, Bacolod City, in which the National
Congress of Unions in the Sugar Industry of the Philippines (NACUSIP) and a
number of CAC workers are the complainants, with NFSW as Intervenor seeking the
dismissal of the arbitration case as regards unnamed CAC rank and file employees]
has rendered illegal the above strike under Art. 265 of the Labor Code which
provides:
It shall likewise be unlawful to declare a strike or lockout after assumption of
jurisdiction by the President or the Minister, or after certification or submission of
the dispute to compulsory or voluntary arbitration or during the pendency of cases
involving the same grounds for the strike or lockout.
Case no. 174. PhilTread Workers Union vs. Confesor
Argument of petitioners that Articles 263 (g) and 264 of the Labor Code do not
have any constitutional foundation is legally inconsequential.—On the issue of the
constitutionality of Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code, the same had already been
resolved in Union of Filipro Employees vs. Nestlé Philippines, Inc., to wit: At any
rate, it must be noted that Articles 263 (g) and 264 of the Labor Code have been
enacted pursuant to the police power of the State, which has been defined as the
power inherent in a government to enact laws, within constitutional limits, to
promote the order, safety, health, morals and general welfare of society (People vs.
Vera Reyes, 67 Phil. 190). The police power, together with the power of eminent
domain and the power of taxation, is an inherent power of government and does
not need to be expressly conferred by the Constitution.
Article 263 (g) does not interfere with the workers’ right to strike but merely
regulates it when in the exercise of such right national interests will be affected.—
Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code does not violate the workers’ constitutional right
to strike. The section provides in part, viz.: “When in his opinion, there exists a
labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry
indispensable to the national interest, the Secretary of Labor and Employment may
assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify the same to the
Commission for compulsory arbitration. . . .” The foregoing article clearly does not
interfere with the workers’ right to strike but merely regulates it, when in the
exercise of such right, national interests will be affected.
FACTS:
Petitioner PTWU filed a notice of strike on grounds of unfair labor practice, more
specifically union busting and violation of CBA. On the other hand, private
respondent Philtread Tire and Rubber Corporation filed a notice of lockout. It also
filed a petition to declare illegal the work slowdowns staged by the petitioner
Union. Both cases were then consolidated. Several conciliation meetings were
conducted but the parties failed to settle their dispute.
At some time, the National Labor Relations Commission declared the slowdowns
illegal. Thereafter, private respondent corporation requested the Secretary of
Labor to assume jurisdiction over the labor dispute. Secretary Confesor then issued
an order, which, among other things, certified the dispute for compulsory
arbitration. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the order but the same
was denied for lack of merit.
Petitioners questioned the constitutionality of Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code on
the ground that the Secretary of Labor’s intervention violates the workers’
constitutional right to strike, and alleged that he acted with grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the order since his power to certify a dispute for compulsory
arbitration is strictly restricted to cases involving industries that are indispensable
to national interest.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code is unconstitutional; and
2) Whether or not public respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing
the questioned order.
RULING:
1. No. Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code does not interfere with the workers’ right to
strike but merely regulates it, when in the exercise of such right, national interests
will be affected. The rights granted by the Constitution are not absolute. They are
still subject to control and limitation to ensure that they are not exercised
arbitrarily. The interests of both the employers and employees are intended to be
protected and not one of them is given undue preference.
The assumption of the Secretary of Labor of jurisdiction is in the nature of police
power measure. This is done for the promotion of the common good considering
that a prolonged strike or lockout can be inimical to the national economy. The
Secretary of Labor acts to maintain industrial peace. As articulated in International
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. vs. Secretary of Labor, it is fundamental that a statute is to be
read in a manner that would breathe life into it, rather than defeat it.
2. No.Grave abuse of discretion implies capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment. The respondent company is indispensable to national interest
considering that the tire industry has already been liberalized. Philtread supplies
22% of the tire products in the country. As observed by the Secretary of Labor, “the
Company is one of the tire manufacturers in the country employing more or less
700 workers. Any work disruption thereat, as a result of a labor dispute will
certainly prejudice the employment and livelihood of its workers and their
dependents. Furthermore, the labor dispute may lead to the possible closure of the
Company and loss of employment to hundreds of its workers. This will definitely
aggravate the already worsening unemployment situation in the country and
discourage foreign and domestic investors from further investing in the country.”
Case no. 175 PSBA vs Noriel
Once the Secretary of Labor assumes jurisdiction over, or certifies for compulsory
arbitration, a labor dispute adversely affecting the national interest, the law
mandates that if a strike or lockout has already taken place at the time of
assumption or certification, “all striking or locked out employees shall immediately
return to work and the employer shall immediately resume operations and readmit
all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike.” [Art.
263(g), Labor Code, as amended.] Far from erring, the Acting Secretary, in issuing
the return-to-work order, merely implemented the clear mandate of the law.
FACTS:
On September 8, 1987, respondent union, alleging the support of the majority of
petitioner's non-academic personnel in its Manila campus, filed with the
Department of Labor and Employment a petition for direct certification. On
September 25, 1987, a notice of strike was filed by respondent union with the
Bureau of Labor Relations, alleging union busting, coercion of employees and
harassment.
Petitioner filed on October 2, 1987, its position paper in praying for the denial of
respondent union's petition on the ground that it did not represent a majority of
the non-academic personnel, and in support thereof attached a letter from one
Josefino Sacro, who claimed to represent a group composing the majority.
However, it was only on October 8, 1987 that PSBA-AL-GRO-WELL the group that
Sacro represented, filed its application for registration as a legitimate labor
organization with the Bureau of Labor Relations.
On October 4, 1987, the members of respondent union, by a vote of 36 to 0,
decided to go on strike. Several conciliation conferences were held by the Bureau
of Labor Relations, but to no avail. The strike pushed through.
A complaint for unfair labor practice and for a declaration of illegality of the strike
with a prayer for preliminary injunction was filed by petitioner against respondent
union in the National Labor Relations Commission on October 19, 1987. The parties
were again called to conciliation conferences, including a scheduled meeting with
the Secretary of Labor and the Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations on
November 9, 1987, but petitioner refused to attend the conferences.
While the certification, strike and unfair labor practice cases were pending in the
Department of Labor and Employment, a complaint was filed in the Regional Trial
Court of Manila on October 19, 1987 by some PSBA students against petitioner and
respondent union and its members, basically seeking to enjoin respondent union
and its members from maintaining and continuing with their picket and from
barricading themselves in front of the school's main gate. A temporary restraining
order enjoining respondent union and its members from picketing and barricading
the school's main gate was issued by the presiding judge. In its answer filed on
October 28, 1987, petitioner joined the plaintiffs prayer for injunction and included
a crossclaim against respondent union, asking that it be indemnified by respondent
union for any damages that may be assessed against it and awarded P500,000.00
as and for expenses of litigation and attorney's fees. On November 6, 1987,
respondent union filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the premise that the
case involves a labor dispute over which the Regional Trial Court had no jurisdiction
On November 17, 1987, respondent Acting Secretary Noriel issued the assailed
order, which we quote in full:
“There is no doubt that the on-going labor dispute at the School adversely affects
the national interest. The School is a duly registered educational institution of
higher learning with more or less 9,000 students. The ongoing work stoppage at the
School unduly prejudices the students and will entail great loss in terms of time,
effort and money to everyone concerned. More important, it is not amiss to
mention that the school is engaged in the promotion of the physical, intellectual
and emotional well-being of the country's youth.
WHEREFORE, this Office hereby assumes jurisdiction over the labor dispute at the
Philippine School of Bus. Administration-Manila pursuant to Article 263 (g) of the
Labor Code, as amended. Accordingly, all the striking employees are directed to
return to work immediately and for the management of PSBA to accept all the
returning employees under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to the
strike. SO ORDERED.”
The members of respondent union returned to work but were allegedly prevented
by petitioner from doing so. Consequently, a motion for the issuance of a writ of
execution was filed by respondent union on November 23, 1987.
On November 23, 1987, petitioner filed the instant petition, which seeks the
nullification of the assailed order of November 17, 1987 and its enjoinment
pending resolution of the case.
ISSUE:
Whether the respondent Secretary acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with strike.” [Art. 263(g), Labor Code, as amended.] Far from erring, the Acting
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction from issuing Secretary, in issuing the return-to-work order, merely implemented the clear
such Order. mandate of the law. Thus, the contention that error attended the issuance of such
order is without any legal basis.
RULING:
NO. Secretary Noriel did exactly what he was supposed to do under the Labor
Code.—In the opinion of Acting Secretary Noriel, the labor dispute adversely
affected the national interest, affecting as it did some 9,000 students. He was
authorized by law to assume jurisdiction over the labor dispute, after finding that it
adversely affected the national interest. This power is expressly granted by Art.
263(g) of the Labor Code, as amended by B.P. Blg. 227. Acting Secretary Noriel did
exactly what he was supposed to do under the Labor Code.

Under the circumstances the Acting Secretary had the power and the duty to
assume jurisdiction over the labor dispute; No grave abuse of discretion can be
attributed to the Acting Secretary.—The Acting Secretary had the power and the
duty to assume jurisdiction over the labor dispute and, corollary to the assumption
of jurisdiction, issue a return-to-work order. Given this factual and legal backdrop,
no grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to the Acting Secretary.

The facts and the law fully support the Acting Secretary’s assumption of jurisdiction
over the labor dispute and the issuance of a return-to-work-order; Contention that
the Acting Secretary favored respondent union when he issued the assailed order
cannot be seriously considered.—Then, as discussed above in connection with
petitioner’s first argument, the facts and the law fully support the Acting
Secretary’s assumption of jurisdiction over the labor dispute and the issuance of a
return-to-work order. It may also be added that due to petitioner’s intransigent
refusal to attend the conciliation conferences called after the union struck,
assumption of jurisdiction by the Secretary of Labor and the issuance of a return-
to-work order had become the only way of breaking the deadlock and maintaining
the status quo ante pending resolution of the dispute.

Acting Secretary in issuing the return-to-work order merely implemented the clear
mandate of the law.—Once the Secretary of Labor assumes jurisdiction over, or
certifies for compulsory arbitration, a labor dispute adversely affecting the national
interest, the law mandates that if a strike or lockout has already taken place at the
time of assumption or certification, “all striking or locked out employees shall
immediately return to work and the employer shall immediately resume operations
and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the
 Case no. 176
UNIVERSITY OF IMMACULATE CONCEPCION, INC., petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE
SECRETARY OF LABOR, THE UIC TEACHING AND NON-TEACHING PERSONNEL AND
EMPLOYEES UNION, LELIAN CONCON, MARY ANN DE RAMOS, JOVITA
MAMBURAM, ANGELINA ABADILLA, MELANIE DE LA ROSA, ZENAIDA CANOY, ALMA
VILLACARLOS, JOSIE BOSTON, PAULINA PALMA GIL, GEMMA GALOPE, LEAH CRUZA,
DELFA DIAPUEZ, respondent.
Labor Law; Assumption of Jurisdiction; Management Prerogatives; While the
Court recognizes the exercise of management prerogatives and often declines to
interfere with the legitimate business decisions of the employer, this privilege is
not absolute but subject to exceptions, such as when the Secretary of Labor
assumes jurisdiction over labor disputes involving industries indispensable to the
national interest.—This Court finds no merit in the UNIVERSITY’s contention.
In Metrolab Industries, Inc. v. Roldan-Confesor, this Court declared that it
recognizes the exercise of management prerogatives and it often declines to
interfere with the legitimate business decisions of the employer. This is in keeping
with the general principle embodied in Article XIII, Section 3 of the Constitution,
which is further echoed in Article 211 of the Labor Code. However, as expressed
in PAL v. National Labor Relations Commission, this privilege is not absolute, but
subject to exceptions. One of these exceptions is when the Secretary of Labor
assumes jurisdiction over labor disputes involving industries indispensable to the
national interest under Article 263(g) of the Labor Code.
One of the substantive evils which Article 263(g) of the Labor Code seeks to curb is
the exacerbation of a labor dispute to the further detriment of the national
interest.—When the Secretary of Labor ordered the UNIVERSITY to suspend the
effect of the termination of the individual respondents, the Secretary did not
exceed her jurisdiction, nor did the Secretary gravely abuse the same. It must be
pointed out that one of the substantive evils which Article 263(g) of the Labor Code
seeks to curb is the exacerbation of a labor dispute to the further detriment of the
national interest.
Any act committed during the pendency of the dispute that tends to give rise to
further contentious issues or increase the tensions between the parties should be
considered an act of exacerbation and should not be allowed.—Indeed, it is clear
that the act of the UNIVERSITY of dismissing the individual respondents from their
employment became the impetus for the UNION to declare a second notice of
strike. It is not a question anymore of whether or not the terminated employees,
the individual respondents herein, are part of the bargaining unit. Any act
committed during the pendency of the dispute that tends to give rise to further
contentious issues or increase the tensions between the parties should be
considered an act of exacerbation and should not be allowed.
FACTS:
1. This case stemmed from the collective bargaining negotiations between
petitioner University of Immaculate Concepcion, Inc. (UNIVERSITY) and respondent
The UIC Teaching and Non-Teaching Personnel and Employees Union (UNION).
The UNION, as the certified bargaining agent of all rank and file employees of the
UNIVERSITY, submitted its collective bargaining proposals to the latter.
However, one item was left unresolved and this was the inclusion or exclusion of
the following positions in the scope of the bargaining unit:
a. Secretaries
b. Registrars
c. Accounting Personnel
d. Guidance Counselors
This matter was submitted for voluntary arbitration and resolved to exclude the
above positions in the scope of the bargaining unit.
2. Pending the resolution of its MR, the UNION filed a notice of strike on the
grounds of bargaining deadlock and unfair labor practice. During the cooling-off
period, two union members were dismissed by petitioner. Consequently, the
UNION went on strike.
3. Secretary of Labor issued an order assuming jurisdiction over the labor dispute.
The dispositive portion of the said Order states:
“WHEREFORE, ABOVE PREMISES CONSIDERED, and pursuant to Article 263 (g)
of the Labor Code, as amended, this Office hereby assumes jurisdiction over the
entire labor dispute at the University of the Immaculate Concepcion College.
Accordingly, all workers are directed to return to work within twenty-four (24)
hours upon receipt of this Order and for Management to accept them back under
the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to the strike.
 Parties are further directed to cease and desist from committing any or all acts
that might exacerbate the situation.
Finally, the parties are hereby directed to submit their respective position
papers within ten (10) days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.”
4. The UNIVERSITY gave the individual respondents two choices:
to resign from the UNION and remain employed as confidential employees or
resign from their confidential positions and remain members of the UNION.
5. The individual respondents remained steadfast in their claim that they could still
retain their confidential positions while being members or officers of the Union.
Thus the UNIVERSITY sent notices of termination to the individual respondents.
6. The UNION filed another notice of strike, this time citing as a reason the
UNIVERSITY’s termination of the individual respondents. The UNION alleged that
the UNIVERSITY’s act of terminating the individual respondents is in violation of the
Order of the Secretary of Labor.
The Secretary of Labor issued another Order reiterating the directives contained in
the January 23, 1995 Order. The Secretary also stated therein that the effects
of the termination from employment of these individual respondents be suspended
pending the determination of the legality thereof. Hence, the UNIVERSITY was
directed to reinstate the individual respondents under the same terms and
conditions prevailing prior to the labor dispute.
ISSUE: W/N CA erred in affirming the order of the Sec of Labor that suspended the
effects of the termination of the 12 employees who were not part of the bargaining
unit involved in a labor dispute over which the Sec of Labor assumed jurisdiction
NOTE: The UNIVERSITY contends that the Secretary cannot take cognizance of an
issue involving employees who are not part of the bargaining unit. It insists that
since the individual respondents had already been excluded from the bargaining
unit by a final and executory order by the panel of voluntary arbitrators, then they
cannot be covered by the Secretary’s assumption order.
HELD: NO
1. This Court finds no merit in the UNIVERSITY’s contention.
When the Secretary of Labor ordered the UNIVERSITY to suspend the effect of the
termination of the individual respondents, the Secretary did not exceed her
jurisdiction, nor did the Secretary gravely abuse the same.
It must be pointed out that one of the substantive evils which Article 263(g) of the
Labor Code seeks to curb is the exacerbation of a labor dispute to the further
detriment of the national interest. In her Order dated March 28, 1995, the
Secretary of Labor rightly held:
2. It is well to remind both parties herein that the main reason or rationale for the
exercise of the Secretary of Labor and Employment’s power under Article 263(g) of
the Labor Code, as amended, is the maintenance and upholding of the status
quowhile the dispute is being adjudicated. Hence, the directive to the parties to
refrain from performing acts that will exacerbate the situation is intended to
ensure that the dispute does not get out of hand, thereby negating the direct
intervention of this office.
The University’s act of suspending and terminating union members and the Union’s
act of filing another Notice of Strike after this Office has assumed jurisdiction are
certainly in conflict with the status quo ante. By any standards[,] these acts will not
in any way help in the early resolution of the labor dispute. It is clear that the
actions of both parties merely served to complicate and aggravate the already
strained labor-management relations.
Indeed, it is clear that the act of the UNIVERSITY of dismissing the individual
respondents from their employment became the impetus for the UNION to declare
a second notice of strike. It is not a question anymore of whether or not the
terminated employees, the individual respondents herein, are part of the
bargaining unit. Any act committed during the pendency of the dispute that tends
to give rise to further contentious issues or increase the tensions between the
parties should be considered an act of exacerbation and should not be allowed.
 Case no. 177
TRANS-ASIA SHIPPING LINES, INC.-UNLICENSED CREWS EMPLOYEES UNION–
ASSOCIATED LABOR UNIONS (TASLI-ALU) and TRANS-ASIA SHIPPING LINES INC.-
DECK AND ENGINE (LICENSED CREW)-OFFICERS UNION-ASSOCIATION OF
PROFESSIONALS, SUPERVISORS, OFFICE AND TECHNICAL EMPLOYEES UNION
(APSOTEU); AND MELCHOR VILLANUEVA, GERARDO SUAN, NESTOR SANCHEZ,
LUCAS APAS, JR., BONIFACIO YSAO, NICASIO CALAPRE, GILBERT SUMALPONG,
ARNULFO VICTORIO, ALBERTO SILVA, NEIL ARNEJO, DANILO JAYA, SOCRATES
ALCOS, ARNOLD ARCIPE, JOSEL ARRANGUEZ, OSCAR ARRANGUEZ, FRANCISCO
CUIZON, RAMON ORTEGA, FRANCISCO MANTILLA and MATEO MARAVILLAS,
petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and TRANS-ASIA SHIPPING LINES, INC.,
respondents.
When the Secretary of Labor assumes jurisdiction over a labor dispute in an
industry indispensable to national interest or certifies the same to the NLRC for
compulsory arbitration, such assumption or certification shall have the effect of
automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike or lockout.—A cursory
reading of the above provision shows that when the Secretary of Labor assumes
jurisdiction over a labor dispute in an industry indispensable to national interest or
certifies the same to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration, such assumption or
certification shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or
impending strike or lockout. Moreover, if one had already taken place, all striking
workers shall immediately return to work and the employer shall immediately
resume operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and
conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout.
Assumption of jurisdiction over a labor dispute, or the certification of the same to
the NLRC for compulsory arbitration, always co-exists with an order for workers
to return to work immediately and for employers to readmit all workers under the
same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout.—When the
Secretary exercises these powers, he is granted “great breadth of discretion” in
order to find a solution to a labor dispute. The most obvious of these powers is the
automatic enjoining of an impending strike or lockout or the lifting thereof if one
has already taken place. Assumption of jurisdiction over a labor dispute, or as in
this case the certification of the same to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration,
always co-exists with an order for workers to return to work immediately and for
employers to readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing
before the strike or lockout.
Employer’s right to transfer or assign employees from one area of operation to
another is not absolute but subject to limitations imposed by law.—Case law
recognizes the employer’s right to transfer or assign employees from one area of
operation to another. This right, however, is not absolute but subject to limitations
imposed by law. Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code constitutes one such limitation
provided by law.
Article 263(g) of the Labor Code constitutes an exception to the management
prerogative of hiring, firing, transfer, demotion and promotion of employees.—To
reiterate, Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code constitutes an exception to the
management prerogative of hiring, firing, transfer, demotion and promotion of
employees. And to the extent that Article 263 (g) calls for the admission of all
workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike, the
respondent is restricted from exercising its generally unbounded right to transfer or
reassign its employees. The respondent is mandated, under the said order, to issue
embarkation orders to the employees to enable them to report to their ship
assignments in compliance with the Order of the Secretary of Labor.
Article 263(g) of the Labor Code requires that the powers thereunder be exercised
only in labor disputes involving industries indispensable to the national interest.—
Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code has been enacted pursuant to the police power of
the State. Said provision of law requires that the powers thereunder be exercised
only in labor disputes involving industries indispensable to the national interest.
FACTS:
1. Two Unions filed a notice to strike on the ground of unfair labor practice against
Trans-asia Shipping Lines. Acting thereon to avoid work stoppage, Secretary of
Labor then issued an order certifying the labor dispute for compulsory arbitration.
Despite the aforesaid order, the petitioners went on strike paralyzing the
respondent’s operations.
2. The Secretary of Labor was thus constrained to issue the Order d directing all
striking workers “to return to work within twelve (12) hours from receipt of this
Order and for the Company to accept them back under the same terms and
conditions prevailing before the strike.”
3. 21 of the striking workers, including the individual petitioners, were dismissed
from employment by the company for alleged violation of the “cease-and-desist”
directive contained in the Order by waging an illegal strike.
The petitioners, through their respective officers, manifested their willingness to
comply with the “return-to-work” order, provided the twenty-one (21) employees
would also be allowed to report back for work. They demanded that the
respondent issue “embarkation orders” to the positions they held prior to the
strike before they lift the pickets and barricades.
4. The respondent refused, claiming that the assignment of an employee to a post
is purely a management prerogative.
The bone of contention between the petitioners, on the one hand, and the
respondent, on the other, hinged on the proper interpretation of the phrase “for
the company to accept them back under the same terms and conditions prevailing
before the strike.” The terminated workers asserted that said phrase must be
construed to mean that they be reinstated to their former assignments. The
respondent posited that it refers only to their salary grades, rank and seniority, but
cannot encompass the usurpation of management’s prerogative to determine
where its employees are to be assigned nor to determine their job assignments.
Consequently, the strike continued as the parties insisted on their respective hard-
ISSUE: W/N the CA acted contrary to law when it enjoined the secretary of Labor in
implementing its return to work orders
HELD: Yes!
1. The Orders made by the Secretary of Labor, certifying the labor dispute involving
the herein parties to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration, and enjoining the
petitioners to return to work and the respondent to admit them under the same
terms and conditions prevailing before the strike, were issued pursuant to Article
263 (g) of the Labor Code. Said provision reads:
Art. 263. Strikes, picketing, and lockouts.—. . .
(g) When, in his opinion, there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a
strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest, the Secretary
of Labor and Employment may assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or
certify the same to the Commission for compulsory arbitration. Such assumption or
certification shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or
impending strike or lockout as specified in the assumption or certification order. If
one has already taken place at the time of assumption or certification, all striking or
locked out employees shall immediately return to work and the employer shall
immediately resume operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and
conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. The Secretary of Labor and
Employment or the Commission may seek the assistance of law enforcement
agencies to ensure compliance with this provision as well as with such orders as he
may issue to enforce the same.
2. A cursory reading of the above provision shows that when the Secretary of Labor
assumes jurisdiction over a labor dispute in an industry indispensable to national
interest or certifies the same to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration, such
assumption or certification shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the
intended or impending strike or lockout. Moreover, if one had already taken
place, all striking workers shall immediately return to work and the employer shall
immediately resume operations and readmit all workers under the same terms
and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout.
3. The CA, adopting the respondent’s theory, ruled that the phrase “under the same
terms and conditions prevailing before the strike” could not encompass the
usurpation of management’s prerogative to determine where its employees are to
be assigned nor to determine their job assignments. The appellate court committed
reversible error in so ruling.
Case law recognizes the employer’s right to transfer or assign employees from one
area of operation to another. This right, however, is not absolute but subject to
limitations imposed by law. Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code constitutes one such
limitation provided by law.
In the same manner, the respondent cannot rightfully exercise its management’s
prerogative to determine where its employees are to be assigned or to determine
their job assignments in view of the explicit directive contained in the Ordersof the
Secretary of Labor to accept the striking workers back “under the same terms and
conditions prevailing prior to the strike.” The order simply means that the
employees should be returned to their ship assignments as before they staged their
strike.
3. To reiterate, Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code constitutes an exception to the
management prerogative of hiring, firing, transfer, demotion and promotion of
employees. And to the extent that Article 263 (g) calls for the admission of all
workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike, the
respondent is restricted from exercising its generally unbounded right to transfer or
reassign its employees. The respondent is mandated, under the said order, to issue
embarkation orders to the employees to enable them to report to their ship
assignments in compliance with the Order of the Secretary of Labor.

As earlier opined, Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code has been enacted pursuant to
the police power of the State. Said provision of law requires that the powers
thereunder be exercised only in labor disputes involving industries indispensable to
the national interest.

The Company’s operations form part of the chain of shipping services at the Port of
Cebu and other ports. Any work stoppage thereat is certain to have adverse effects
on its operations with its accompanying effects to trade, commerce and
transportation. Moreover, a strike could trigger measures from the coalition of
shipowners of which the Company is a member, that could escalate to a situation
disruptive of the tenuous peace currently obtaining at the Port of Cebu.
 Case no. 178
PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE CO., INC., petitioner, vs. MANGGAGAWA
NG KOMUNIKASYON SA PILIPINAS and the COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Labor Law; Labor Code; Secretary of Labor; The wide latitude of discretion given
the Secretary under Art. 263(g) shall and must be within the sphere of law.—
When the Secretary exercises the powers granted by Article 263(g) of the Labor
Code, he is, indeed, granted great breadth of discretion. However, the application
of this power is not without limitation, lest the Secretary would be above the law.
Discretion is defined as the act or the liberty to decide, according to the principles
of justice and one’s ideas of what is right and proper under the circumstances,
without wilfullness or favor. Where anything is left to any person to be done
according to his discretion, the law intends it must be done with a sound discretion,
and according to law. The discretion conferred upon officers by law is not a
capricious or arbitrary discretion, but an impartial discretion guided and controlled
in its exercise by fixed legal principles. It is not a mental discretion to be
exercised ex gratia, but a legal discretion to be exercised in conformity with the
spirit of the law, and in a manner to subserve and not to impede or defeat the ends
of substantial justice. From the foregoing, it is quite apparent that no matter how
broad the exercise of discretion is, the same must be within the confines of law.
Thus, the wide latitude of discretion given the Secretary under Art. 263(g) shall and
must be within the sphere of law.
FACTS:
1. The UNION learned about the redundancy program to be implemented by PLDT.
2. They filed a notice to strike because of this and on the ground of ULP. Eventually
a strike was conducted by the union and pursuant to the redundancy program 383
union members were terminated.
3. Secretary of Labor intervened and assumed jurisdiction and also issued an order
for compulsory arbitration. It also issued a return to work order EXCEPT those who
were terminated because of the redundancy program by PLDT.
ISSUE: W/N the Sec of Labor gravely abused its discretion in excluding those
affected by the redundancy program in its return to work directive
HELD: YES!
1. When the Secretary exercises the powers granted by Article 263(g) of the Labor
Code, he is, indeed, granted great breadth of discretion. However, the application
of this power is not without limitation, lest the Secretary would be above the law.
Discretion is defined as the act or the liberty to decide, according to the principles
of justice and one’s ideas of what is right and proper under the circumstances,
without wilfullness or favor. Where anything is left to any person to be done
according to his discretion, the law intends it must be done with a sound discretion,
and according to law. The discretion conferred upon officers by law is not a
capricious or arbitrary discretion, but an impartial discretion guided and controlled
in its exercise by fixed legal principles. It is not a mental discretion to be
exercised ex gratia, but a legal discretion to be exercised in conformity with the
spirit of the law, and in a manner to subserve and not to impede or defeat the ends
of substantial justice.
From the foregoing, it is quite apparent that no matter how broad the exercise of
discretion is, the same must be within the confines of law. Thus, the
wide latitude of discretion given the Secretary under Art. 263(g) shall and must be
within the sphere of law.
2. As Article 263(g) is clear and unequivocal in stating that ALL striking or locked out
employees shall immediately return to work and the employer shall immediately
resume operations and readmit ALL workers under the same terms and conditions
prevailing before the strike or lockout, then the unmistakable mandate must be
followed by the Secretary.
3. In the case of Trans-Asia Shipping Lines, Inc.-Unlicensed Crews Employees Union-
Associated Labor Unions (Tasli-Alu) v. Court of Appeals, Court held:
. . . Assumption of jurisdiction over a labor dispute, or as in this case the
certification of the same to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration, always co-exists
with an order for workers to return to work immediately and for employers to
readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the
strike or lockout.
Time and again, this Court has held that when an official bypasses the law on the
asserted ground of attaining a laudable objective, the same will not be maintained
if the intendment or purpose of the law would be defeated.
Case no. 179 St. Scholastica VS. Torres
FACTS:
Petitioner St. Scholastica's College (college) and and private respondent Samahan
ng Manggagawang Pang-Edukasyon sa Sta. Eskolastika-NAFTEU (Union) initiated
negotiations for a first-ever collective bargaining agreement. A deadlock in the
negotiations prompted the UNION to file a notice of strike with the DOLE
The UNION declared a strike which paralyzed the operations of the COLLEGE.
Affecting as it did the interest of the students, public respondent SECRETARY
immediately assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute and issued on the same
day, a return – to – work order. Instead of returning to work, the Union filed a
motion for reconsideration of the return – to – work questioning the assumption of
jurisdiction by the Sec. of Labor over the labor dispute.
The parties held conciliation meetings before the National Conciliation and
Mediation Board where the UNION pruned down its demands to three (3):
 that striking employees be reinstated under the same terms and
conditions before the strike;
 that no retaliatory or disciplinary action be taken against them; and,
 that CBA negotiations be continued.
However, these efforts proved futile as the COLLEGE remained steadfast in its
position that any return-to-work offer should be unconditional.
ISSUE:
 Whether striking union members terminated for abandonment of work
after failing to comply with return-to-work orders of the Secretary of
Labor and Employment (SECRETARY, for brevity) should by law be
reinstated
 Whether the Sec. of Labor has jurisdiction over the labor dispute.
HELD:
1. No, Article 263 (g) Art. 263. Strikes, picketing, and lockouts. „- . . . (g) When, in
his opinion, there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout
in an industry indispensable to the national interest, the Secretary of Labor and
Employment may assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify the
same to the Commission for compulsory arbitration.
Such assumption or certification shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the
intended or impending strike or lockout as specified in the assumption or
certification order.
If one has already taken place at the time of assumption or certification, all striking
or locked out employees shall immediately return to work and the employer shall
immediately resume operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and
conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout.
The Secretary of Labor and Employment or the Commission may seek the assistance
of law enforcement agencies to ensure compliance with this provision as well as
with such orders as he may issue to enforce the same
2. Article 264 Prohibited activities. (a) No labor organization or employer shall
declare a strike or lockout:
1. Without first having bargained collectively in accordance with Title VII of this
Book or
2. Without first having filed the notice required in the preceding Article or
3. Without the necessary strike or lockout vote first having been obtained and
reported to the Ministry.
No strike or lockout shall be declared:
1. after assumption of jurisdiction by the President or the Minister or
2. after certification or submission of the dispute to compulsory or voluntary
arbitration or
3. during the pendency of cases involving the same grounds for the strike or lockout
Any worker whose employment has been terminated as consequence of an unlawful
lockout shall be entitled to reinstatement with full back wages.
Any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or
union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a
strike may be declared to have lost his employment status: Provided, That mere
participation of a worker in a lawful strike shall not constitute sufficient ground for
termination of his employment, even if a replacement had been hired by the
employer during such lawful strike
3. Section 6, Rule IX, of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC - Non-compliance
with the certification order of the Secretary of Labor and Employment or a return to
work order of the Commission shall be considered an illegal act committed in the
course of the strike or lockout and shall authorize the Secretary of Labor and
Employment or the Commission, as the case may be, to enforce the same under
pain or loss of employment status or entitlement to full employment benefits from
the locking-out employer or backwages, damages and/or other positive and/or
affirmative reliefs, even to criminal prosecution against the liable parties
3. In the case at bar if a strike has already taken place at the time of assumption, all
striking employees shall immediately return to work. This means that a return-to-
work order is immediately effective and executory notwithstanding the filing of a
motion for reconsideration. It must be strictly complied with even during the
pendency of any petition questioning its validity. Thus, Any worker or union officer
who knowingly participates in a strike defying a return-to-work order may,
consequently, "be declared to have lost his employment status.”
From the moment a worker defies a return-to-work order, he is deemed to have
abandoned his job. It is already in itself knowingly participating in an illegal act.
Respondent SECRETARY gravely abused his discretion when he ordered the
reinstatement of striking union members who refused to report back to work after
he issued two (2) return-to-work orders, which in itself is knowingly participating in
an illegal act.
The Secretary of Labor is vested with jurisdiction over the labor dispute.
The Secretary of Labor and Employment in assumption and/or certification cases is
limited to the issues that are involved in the disputes or to those that are submitted
to him for resolution. The seeming difference is, however, reconcilable. Since the
matter on the legality or illegality of the strike was never submitted to him for
resolution, he was thus found to have exceeded his jurisdiction when he restrained
the employer from taking disciplinary action against employees who staged an
illegal strike.
Before the Secretary of Labor and Employment may take cognizance of an issue
which is merely incidental to the labor dispute, therefore, the same must be
involved in the labor disputed itself, or otherwise submitted to him for resolution.
If it was not, and he nevertheless acted on it, that assumption of jurisdiction is
tantamount to a grave abuse of discretion
The submission of an incidental issue of a labor dispute, in assumption and/or
certification cases, to the Secretary of Labor and Employment for his resolution is
thus one of the instances referred to whereby the latter may exercise concurrent
jurisdiction together with the Labor Arbiters.
In the instant petition, the COLLEGE in its Manifestation, asked the "Secretary of
Labor to take the appropriate steps under the said circumstances." It likewise
prayed in its position paper that respondent SECRETARY uphold its termination of
the striking employees. Upon the other hand, the UNION questioned the
termination of its officers and members before respondent SECRETARY by moving
for the enforcement of the return-to-work orders. There is no dispute then that the
issue on the legality of the termination of striking employees was properly
submitted to respondent SECRETARY for resolution.
Such an interpretation will be in consonance with the intention of our labor
authorities to provide workers immediate access to their rights and benefits
without being inconvenienced by the arbitration and litigation process that prove
to be not only nerve-wracking, but financially burdensome in the long run. Social
justice legislation, to be truly meaningful and rewarding to our workers, must not
be hampered in its application by long-winded arbitration and litigation. Rights
must be asserted and benefits received with the least inconvenience. For, labor
laws are meant to promote, not defeat, social justice. After all, Art. 4 of the Labor
Code does state that all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of its
provisions, including its implementing rules and regulations, shall be resolved in
favor of labor.
Case no. 180 International Pharma VS. Secretary of Labor
FACTS: Prior to the expiration of the CBA agreement between petitioner
International Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (Company) and the Associated Labor Union
(union), the latter submitted to the company its economic and political demands.
However, these were not met by the company, hence a deadlock ensued.
the Union filed a notice of strike with the National Conciliation and Mediation
Board, Department of Labor and Employment, After all conciliation efforts had
failed, the Union went on strike and the company’s operation were completely
paralyzed.
Subsequently, three other labor cases involving the same parties were filed with
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) to wit:
1. a petition for injunction and damages filed by the company against union for
picketing the company’s establishment
2. a complaint for unfair labor practice.
3. a petition to declare the strike illegal with prayer for damages.
Considering that the company belong to an industry indispensible to national
interest, it being engaged in the manufacture of drugs and pharmaceuticals and
employing around 600 workers, the Acting Secretary of Labor assumed jurisdiction
over the labor dispute and issued an order directing the parties to return to the
status quo before the work stoppage invoking Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code.
The union filed a motion, they questioned the power of the Sec. of Labor to
assumed jurisdiction
ISSUE: whether or not the Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment
has the power to assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute and its incidental
controversies, including unfair labor practice cases, causing or likely to cause a
strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest.
HELD:
Yes, In the present case, the Secretary was explicitly granted by Article 263(g) of
the Labor Code the authority to assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute causing or
likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national
interest, and decide the same accordingly. Necessarily, this authority to assume
jurisdiction over the said labor dispute must include and extend to all questions
and controversies arising therefrom, including cases over which the labor arbiter
has exclusive jurisdiction.
In fine, the issuance of the assailed orders is within the province of the Secretary as
authorized by Article 263(g) of the Labor Code and Article 217(a) (1) and (5) of the
same Code, taken conjointly and rationally construed to subserve the objective of
the jurisdiction vested in the Secretary.
In the present case, however, by virtue of Article 263(g) of the Labor Code, the
Secretary has been conferred jurisdiction over cases which would otherwise be
under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of labor arbiters. There was an
existing labor dispute as a result of a deadlock in the negotiation for a collective
bargaining agreement and the consequent strike, over which the Secretary
assumed jurisdiction pursuant to Article 263(g) of the Labor Code. The three NLRC
cases were just offshoots of the stalemate in the negotiations and the strike. We,
therefore, uphold the Secretary's order to consolidate the NLRC cases with the
labor dispute pending before him and his subsequent assumption of jurisdiction
over the said NLRC cases for him to be able to competently and efficiently dispose
of the dispute in its totality.
Petitioner's thesis that Section 6, Rule V of the Revised Rules of the NLRC is null and
void has no merit. The aforesaid rule has been promulgated to implement and
enforce Article 263(g) of the Labor Code. The rule is in harmony with the objectives
sought to be achieved by Article 263(g) of the Labor Code, particularly the
Secretary's assumption jurisdiction over a labor dispute and his subsequent
disposition of the same in the most expeditious and conscientious manner. To be
able to completely dispose of a labor dispute, all its incidents would have to be
taken into consideration. Clearly, the purpose of the questioned regulation is to
carry into effect the broad provisions of Article 263(g) of the Labor Code.
By and large, Section 6, Rule V of the Revised Rules of the NLRC is germane to the
objects and purposes of Article 263(g) of the Labor Code, and it is not in
contradiction with but conforms to the standards the latter requires. Thus, we hold
that the terms of the questioned regulation are within the statutory power of the
Secretary to promulgate as a necessary implementing rule or regulation for the
enforcement and administration of the Labor Code, in accordance with Article 5 of
the same Code.

Besides, to uphold petitioner Company's arguments that the NLRC cases are alien
and totally separate and distinct from the deadlock in the negotiation of the
collective bargaining agreement is to sanction split jurisdiction which is obnoxious
to the orderly administration of justice.
Case no. 181 Union of Filipino Employees VS. Nestle Philippines
FACTS:
Union of Filipino Employees - Drug, Food and Allied Industries Unions – Kilusang
Mayo Uno (UFE – DFA – KMU) was the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the
rank-and-file employees of Nestlé
The existing CBA was about to expire so the Union informed respondent company
of the intent to open a new CBA for the year 2001-2004; Nestle said it was
preparing its own proposal
Dialogue ensued but the parties failed to reach any agreement on the economic
conditions of the CBA; even conciliation proceedings failed. Nestle refused to
bargain, setting a precondition for the holding of collective bargaining negotiations
the non-inclusion of the issue of Retirement Plan
(g) To violate the duty to bargain collectively as prescribed by this
Code
There is no substantiate findings of Unfair Labor Practice. It is not enough that the
union believed that the employer committed acts of unfair labor practice when the
circumstances clearly negate even a prima facie showing to warrant such a belief
There is no per se test of good faith in bargaining. Good faith or bad faith is an
inference to be drawn from the facts. Herein, no proof was presented to exemplify
bad faith on the part of Nestlé apart from mere allegation

UFE-DFA-KMU filed a Notice of Strike predicated on Nestlé's alleged unfair labor

practices, that is, bargaining in bad faith by setting pre-conditions in the ground
rules and/or refusing to include the issue of the Retirement Plan in the CBA
negotiations

Nestle filed a Petition for Assumption of Jurisdiction with the Secretary of the DOLE
over the current dispute in order to effectively enjoin any impending strike by the
members of the UFE-DFA-KMU. Secretary assumed jurisdiction over the case and
issued an order to enjoin any strike.

Despite said order, the employee members of UFE-DFA-KMU at Nestlé's Cabuyao

Plant went on strike.

ISSUE: Whether or not Nestle’s setting of a precondition for the holding of

collective bargaining negotiations consists of Unfair Labor Practice

HELD:

No,

ART. 248. UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES OF EMPLOYERS. — It shall be unlawful for an

employer to commit any of the following unfair labor
practices
Case no. 182
G.R. No. 120482. January 27, 1997.*
REFORMIST UNION OF R.B. LINER, INC., HEVER DETROS, ET AL., petitioners, vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, R.B. LINER, INC., BERNITA DEJERO,
FELIPE DEJERO, RODELIO DEJERO, ANA TERESA DEJERO, and RODELIO RYAN
DEJERO, respondents.
DOCTRINE:
Labor Law; Compulsory Arbitration; Strikes; When an employer accedes to the
peaceful settlement brokered by the NLRC, agreeing to accept all employees who
had not yet returned to work, it waives the issue of the illegality of the strike.
COMPULSORY ARBITRATION - “the process of settlement of labor disputes by a
government agency which has the authority to investigate and to make an award
which is binding on all the parties,” and as a mode of arbitration where the parties
are “compelled to accept the resolution of their dispute through arbitration by a
third party.”
FACTS: REFORMIST UNION was organized in May 1989 “by affiliating itself with
LakasManggagawasaPilipinas (Lakas).” Lakas filed a notice of Strike alleging ULP
committed by the private respondents. There were attempts for conciliation but
parties failed to reach an agreement. R.B. Liner, Inc. petitioned then Secretary
Franklin Drilon of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) to assume
jurisdiction over the ongoing dispute or certify it to the NLRC. The case was
dismissed after the Union and the Compay reached an agreement providing,
among other matters, for the holding of a certification election.
Lakas won in the certificate election, they presented proposal for CBA but BERNITA
DEJERO, RODELIO DEJERO refused to bargain. They filed a case in the NLRC alleging
ULP (illegal lockout), this was countered by the company saying that the union’s
strike was illegal as well as the work stoppages/boycotts staged by the petitioner.
The two cases were consolidated and simultaneously tried.
Labor Arbiter Ricardo Nora ruled that the evidence of the private respondents
indicated that indeed the petitioner union staged illegal strike for the ff reasons:
First, the Reformist failed to show and present evidence that the approval of
majority vote of its members were obtained by secret ballot before the strike;
Second, they failed to show that they submitted the strike vote to the Department
of Labor at least seven (7) days prior to the intended strike; and Third, all members
of the Reformist Union struck even before the certification election, when there
was no definitive bargaining unit duly recognized and while the conciliation process
was still on-going and in progress.
LA’s Decision: 1. Reformist’s complaint (dismissed); 2. Reformist Union
(illegal); and 3. Declaring all the Officers and Members of the Reformist to have lost
their employment status for participating in an Illegal Strike.
On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s finding that Reformist held an
illegal strike but allowed reinstatement of the dismissed employees.
Unsatisfied, the petitioners appealed to the SC.
ISSUES: 1.) WON the private respondent can contest the legality of the strike held
by the petitioners as the private respondents themselves sought compulsory
arbitration in order to resolve that very issue.
2.) WON the defiance of the petitioner to the return-to-work order is a reason to
validly dismiss the petitioners-employees.
HELD:
1. NO.
The very nature of compulsory arbitration makes the settlement binding upon the
private respondents, for compulsory arbitration has been defined both as “the
process of settlement of labor disputes by a government agency which has the
authority to investigate and to make an award which is binding on all the parties,”
and as a mode of arbitration where the parties are “compelled to accept the
resolution of their dispute through arbitration by a third party.”Clearly then, the
legality of the strike could no longer be reviewed by the Labor Arbiter, much less by
the NLRC, as this had already been resolved. It was the sole issue submitted for
compulsory arbitration by the private respondents, as is obvious from the portion
of their letter quoted above. The case certified by the Labor Secretary to the NLRC
was dismissed after the union and the company drew up the agreement mentioned
earlier. This conclusively disposed of the strike issue.
The Labor Code provides that the decision in compulsory arbitration proceedings
“shall be final and executory ten (10) calendar days after receipt thereof by the
parties.” The parties were informed of the dismissal of the case in a letter dated 14 00-04-02088-90 are SET ASIDE. Petitionersemployees are hereby awarded full back
February 1990, and while nothing in the record indicates when the said letter was wages and separation pay to be determined by the Labor Arbiter as prescribed
received by the parties, it is reasonable to infer that more than ten days elapsed— above within thirty (30) days from notice of this judgment.
hence, the NLRC decision had already become final and executory—before the
private respondents filed their complaint with the Labor Arbiter on 13 July 1990. A
final judgment is no longer susceptible to change, revision, amendment, or Note: An ordinary striking worker cannot be terminated for mere participation in
reversal. Neither the Labor Arbiter nor the NLRC, therefore, could review the same an illegal strike. There must be proof that he committed illegal acts during a strike.
issue passed upon in NLRC. The agreement entered into by the company and the (Gold City Integrated Port Service, Inc. vs. National Labor Relations Commission,
union, moreover, was in the nature of a compromise agreement While we do not 245 SCRA 627 [1995])
abandon the rule that “unfair labor practice acts are beyond and outside the
sphere of compromises,” the agreement herein was voluntarily entered into and
represents a reasonable settlement, thus binds the parties.
Art. 227. Compromise agreements.—Any compromise settlement
including those involving labor standard laws, voluntarily agreed upon
by the parties with the assistance of the Bureau or the regional office
of the Department of Labor, shall be final and binding upon the
parties. The National Labor Relations Commission or any court shall
not assume jurisdiction over issues involved therein except in case of
non-compliance thereof or if there is prima facie evidence that the
settlement was obtained through fraud, misrepresentation or
coercion.
2. NO.
It is upon the private respondents to substantiate the aforesaid defiance, as the
burden of proving just and valid cause for dismissing employees from employment
rests on the employer, and the latter’s failure to do so results in a finding that the
dismissal was unfounded.36 The private respondents fell short of discharging this
burden. Those who did not report for work after the issuance of the Labor
Secretary’s order may not have been informed of such order, or they may have
been too few so as to conclude that they deliberately defied the order. The private
respondents failed to eliminate these probabilities.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision of the National
Labor Relations Commission in NLRC NCR CA No. 004115-92, as well as that of the
Labor Arbiter in the consolidated cases of NLRC NCR Case Nos. 0003-01392-90 and
Case no. 183 Strikes held in violation of the terms contained in a collective bargaining agreement
are illegal especially when they provide for conclusive arbitration clauses
G.R. No. 119293. June 10, 2003.*
SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
FACTS: Petitioner San Miguel Corporation (SMC) and respondent Ilaw at Buklod ng
COMMISSION, Second Division, ILAW AT BUKLOD NG MANGGAGAWA (IBM),
Manggagawa (IBM), exclusive bargaining agent of petitioner’s daily-paid rank and
respondents.
file employees, executed a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) under which
they agreed to submit all disputes to grievance and arbitration proceedings. The
-A strike is considered as the most effective weapon in protecting the rights of the
CBA also included a mutually enforceable no-strike no-lockout agreement.
employees to improve the terms and conditions of their employment; One of the
procedural requisites that Article 263 of the Labor Code and its Implementing Rules
IBM, vice-president Alfredo Colomeda, filed with the National Conciliation and
prescribe is the filing of a valid notice of strike with the NCMB; This requirement has
Mediation Board (NCMB) a notice of strike against petitioner for allegedly
been held to be mandatory and the lack of which shall render a strike illegal.
committing: (1) illegal dismissal of union members, (2) illegal transfer, (3) violation
of CBA, (4) contracting out of jobs being performed by union members, (5) labor-
DOCTRINES:
only contracting, (6) harassment of union officers and members, (7) non-
Labor Law; Labor Code; Injunction; No temporary or permanent injunction or
recognition of duly-elected union officers, and (8) other acts of unfair labor
restraining order in any case involving or growing out of labor disputes shall be
practice. The next day, IBM filed another notice of strike, this time through its
issued by any court or other entity except as otherwise provided in Articles 218 and
president Edilberto Galvez, raising similar grounds: (1) illegal transfer, (2) labor-only
264 of the Labor Code —Article 254 of the Labor Code provides that no temporary
contracting, (3) violation of CBA, (4) dismissal of union officers and members, and
or permanent injunction or restraining order in any case involving or growing out of
(5) other acts of unfair labor practice.
labor disputes shall be issued by any court or other entity except as otherwise
The Galvez group subsequently requested the NCMB to consolidate its notice of
provided in Articles 218 and 264 of the Labor Code. Under the first exception,
strike with that of the Colomeda group, to which the latter opposed, alleging
Article 218 (e) of the Labor Code expressly confers upon the NLRC the power to
Galvez’s lack of authority in filing the same.
“enjoin or restrain actual and threatened commission of any or all prohibited or
Petitioner thereafter filed a Motion for Severance of Notices of Strike with Motion
unlawful acts, or to require the performance of a particular act in any labor dispute
to Dismiss, on the grounds that the notices raised non-strikeable issues and that
which, if not restrained or performed forthwith, may cause grave or irreparable
they affected four corporations which are separate and distinct from each other.
damage to any party or render ineffectual any decision in favor of such party x xx.”
After several conciliation meetings, NCMB Director Reynaldo Ubaldo found that the
The second exception, on the other hand, is when the labor organization or the
real issues involved are non-strikeable. Hence, converting their notices of strike
employer engages in any of the “prohibited activities” enumerated in Article 264.
into preventive mediation.

The coercive measure of injunction may also be used to restrain an actual or

While separate preventive mediation conferences were ongoing, the Colomeda
threatened unlawful strike; It is the legal duty and obligation of the NLRC to enjoin
group filed with the NCMB a notice of holding a strike vote. Petitioner opposed by
a partial strike staged in violation of the law.—Pursuant to Article 218 (e)
filing a Manifestation and Motion to Declare Notice of Strike Vote Illegal invoking
the case of PAL v. Drilon which held that no strike could be legally declared during
the pendency of preventive mediation. NCMB Director Ubaldo in response issued
another letter to the Colomeda Group reiterating the conversion of the notice of rule on the opposition to the TRO and allowed it to lapse. NLRC issued the
strike into a case of preventive mediation and emphasizing the findings that the challenged decision, denying the petition for injunction for lack of factual basis. It
grounds raised center only on an intra-union conflict, which is not strikeable found that the circumstances at the time did not constitute or no longer constituted
an actual or threatened commission of unlawful acts.It likewise denied petitioner’s
Galvez group filed its second notice of strike against petitioner, On the same date, motion for reconsideration in its resolution Hence, this petition.
the group likewise notified the NCMB of its intention to hold a strike vote. ISSUE: The NLRC gravely abused its discretion when it failed to enforce, by
Colomeda group notified the NCMB of the results of their strike vote, which injunction, the parties’ reciprocal obligations to submit to arbitration and not to
favored the holding of a strike. In reply, NCMB issued a letter again advising them strike.WON there is a violation of the no-strike provision in the CBA
that by virtue of the PAL v. Drilon ruling, their notice of strike is deemed not to have HELD: YES.
been filed, consequently invalidating any subsequent strike for lack of compliance at the time the injunction was being sought, there existed a threat to revive the
with the notice requirement. Despite this and the pendency of the preventive unlawful strike as evidenced by the flyers then being circulated by the IBM-NCR
mediation proceedings, on June 4, 1994, IBM went on strike. The strike paralyzed Council which led the union. Article 264(a) of the Labor Code39 explicitly states
the operations of petitioner, causing it losses. that a declaration of strike without firsthaving filed the required notice is a
prohibited activity, which may be prevented through an injunction in accordance
Two days after the declaration of strike, or on June 6, 1994, petitioner filed with
with Article 254. Clearly, public respondent should have granted the injunctive
public respondent NLRC an amended Petition for Injunction with Prayer for the
relief to prevent the grave damage brought about by the unlawful strike.
Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order, Free Ingress and Egress Order and
Also noteworthy is public respondent’s disregard of petitioner’s argument pointing
Deputization Order. NLRC resolved to issue a temporary restraining order (TRO)
out the union’s failure to observe the CBA provisions on grievance and
directing free ingress to and egress from petitioner’s plants, withoutprejudice to
arbitration.the union therein violated the mandatory provisions of the CBA when it
the union’s right to peaceful picketing and continuous hearings on the injunction
filed a notice of strike with-out availing of the remedies prescribed therein. Such
case. To minimize further damage to itself, petitioner on June 16, 1994, entered
infringement of the aforecited CBA provisions constitutes further justification for
into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with the respondent-union, calling for a
the issuance of an injunction against the strike. As we said long ago: “Strikes held in
lifting of the picket lines and resumption of work in exchange of “good faith talks”
violation of the terms contained in a collective bargaining agreement are illegal
between the management and the labor management committees.
especially when they provide for conclusive arbitration clauses. These agreements
The MOA, signed in the presence of Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE)
must be strictly adhered to and respected if their ends have to be achieved.”
officials, expressly stated that cases filed in relation to their dispute will continue
and will not be affected in any manner whatsoever by the agreement. The picket
lines ended and work was then resumed.
Respondent thereafter moved to reconsider the issuance of the TRO, and sought to
dismiss the injunction case in view of the cessation of its picketing activities as a
result of the signed MOA. It argued that the case had become moot and academic
there being no more prohibited activities to restrain, be they actual or threatened.
Petitioner, however, opposed and submitted copies of flyers being circulated by
IBM, as proof of the union’s alleged threat to revive the strike. The NLRC did not
Case no. 184
No. L-30658-59. March 31, 1976 * SHELL OIL WORKERS UNION and SHELL &
AFFILIATES SUPERVISORS’ UNION, petitioners, vs. SHELL COMPANY OF THE
PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents.
DOCTRINES
Labor law; Overtime pay; In the computation of overtime pay, fringe benefits that
are only occassionally, not regularly, received, and not by all employees, are not to
be included.
Same; Same; Where provisions in the collective bargaining agreement is far beyond
the rate prescribed by law, the said CBA provisions should govern the parties
relationship with regards to computation of the employees’ overtime pay.—
FACTS:
2 cases were filed in the Trial Court, the claims against the employer Shell the
members of the petitioners’ unions were not and are not being paid their overtime
pay due them. respondent Shell Company of the Philippines filed a motion to
Dismiss but, the same was later on withdrawn, an Answer was filed instead
claiming that the employees who rendered or are rendering overtime work have
been paid and are being paid in accordance with law and their collective bargaining
agreement. It is also averred in the answer of the respondent company that the
NAWASA decision insofar as the computation of overtime pay is concerned is not
applicable to the factual situation of the case and that claims for overtime pay filed
beyond the three-year period allowed by law have already prescribed.
the trial court rendered its decision denying both petitions for lack of basisthe
petitioners elevated their cases to the Court of Industrial Relations en banc and
moved for the reconsideration of the Decision of the trial courtand reiterated their
claim for the recomputation of their overtime pay by taking into account the fringe
benefits enjoyed and adding the same to the basic rate before computing the
overtime pay. The Court of Industrial Relations en banc rendered its
Resolutiondenying the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration. Hence this petition
for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: WON the ruling in NAWASA is Applicable in this case
HELD: NO.
We rule that the NAWASA case is not in point and, therefore, is inapplicable to the
case at bar. The ruling of this Court in the NAWASA case contemplates the
regularity and continuity of the benefits enjoyed by the employees or workers (for
at least three (3) months) as the condition precedent before such additional
payments or benefits are taken into account. This is evident in the aforequoted
ruling of this Court in the NAWASA case:
The ‘regular rate’ of pay on the basis of which overtime must be
computed must reflect all payments which parties have agreed shall be
received regularly during the work week, exclusive of overtime payments.”
Walling v. Garlock Packing Co., C.C.A.N.Y., 159 F 2d 44 45. (Page 289, WORDS
And PHRASES, Permanent Edition, Vol. 36A; Italics supplied); and “As a
general rule the words ‘regular rate’ mean the hourly rate actually paid for
the normal, non-overtime work week, and an employee’s regular
compensation is the compensation which regularly and actually reaches him.
x x x x x.” (56 C.J.S. 704; Italics supplied).
Even in the definition of wage under the Minimum Wage Law, the words
“customarily furnished” are used in referring tothe additional payments or
benefits, thus,— “ ‘Wage’ paid to any employee shall mean the remuneration
or earnings, however designated, capable of being expressed in terms of
money, whether fixed or ascertained on a time, task, piece, commission
basis, or other method of calculating the same, which is payable by an
employer to an employee under a written or unwritten contract of
employment for work done or to be done or for services rendered or to be
rendered, and includes the fair and reasonable value, as determined by the
Secretary of Labor, of board, lodging, or other facilities customarily furnished
by the employer to the employee.” (Sec. 2(g), R.A. No. 602).
the collective bargaining agreement resorted to by the parties being in accordance
with R.A. 875, with its provision on overtime pay far way beyond the premium rate
provided for in Sections 4 and 5 of Commonwealth Act 444, the same should
govern their relationship. Since this is their contract entered into by them pursuant
to bargaining negotiations under existing laws, they are bound to respect it. It is the
duty of this Court to see to it that contracts between parties, not tainted with
infirmity or irregularity or illegality, be strictly complied with by the parties
themselves. This is the only way by which unity and order can be properly attained
in our society.
*sorry di ko alam kung bakit walang Strike dito? di ko alam kung tama din ba
dinigest ko. :(
Case no. 185
No. L-56856. October 23, 1984. * HENRY BACUS, MAXIMO DANGGA, SALVADOR
FLORES, VICTOR FUENTES, SANTIAGO LACQUIO, LUZ FUENTES, ELEODORO GAJO,
JUANITO GENILLA, GODOFREDO GACANG, and CALIXTO COYNO, petitioners, vs.
HON. BLAS F. OPLE, Minister of Labor and Employment and FINDLAY MILLAR
TIMBER COMPANY, respondents.
DOCTRINES
Labor Law; Mere finding of illegality of strike should not be followed by wholesale
dismissal of strikers from employment.—A mere finding of the illegality of a strike
should not be automatically followed by wholesale dismissal of the strikers from
their employment. What is more, the finding of the illegality of the strike by
respondent Minister of Labor and Employment is predicated on the evidence
ascertained through an irregular procedure conducted under the semblance of
summary methods and speedy disposition of labor disputes involving striking
employees.
Labor Law; Violation of ban on strikes against export industries, lack of strike
notice, and violation of CBA no-strike clause do not make a strike per se illegal.—
Even on the assumption that the illegality of the strike is predicated on its being a
violation of the ban or prohibition of strikes in export-oriented industries, lack of
notice-to-strike, and as a violation of the no-strike clause of the CBA, still, the
automatic finding of the illegality of the strike finds no authoritative support in the
light of the attendant circumstances. As this Court held in Cebu Portland Cement
Co. vs. Cement Workers Union, a strike staged by the workers, inspired by good
faith, does not automatically make the same illegal. In Ferrer vs. Court of Industrial
Relations, the belief of the strikers that the management was committing unfair
labor practice was properly considered in declaring an otherwise premature strike,
not unlawful, and in affirming the order of the Labor Court for the reinstatement
without backwages of said employees.
Same; In the case at bar, the strike was caused by workers’ impatience for non-
payment of salaries.—In the instant case, it is not disputed that, indeed, the
Company did not pay the salaries of the workers for one and a half months, more
or less. Such act of the Company broke the patience of the workers and those who
depended on them for support and daily subsistence. On the other hand, the act of
the workers in demanding a valid grievance for the payment of their salaries is
inspired by their honest belief that the Company was committing acts inimical to
their interests relative to wages which, basically, is a violation of the CBA existing
between the parties.
Same; Even if strike were illegal, it need not result in dismissal of employees.—Even
if declared illegal, need not have been attended with such a drastic consequence as
termination of employment relationship. This is so because, according to the Court,
of the security of tenure provision under the Constitution. Same; Charges of strike
violence should be heard anew.—In view however of the pronouncement in Shell
Oil Workers’ Union vs. Shell Company of the Phils., Ltd., supra, that if the existence
of force (acts of violence) while the strike lasts is not pervasive and widespread, nor
consistently and deliberately resorted to as a matter of policy, responsibility for
serious acts of violence should be individual and not collective, We deem it proper
under the circumstances that the charges of serious acts of violence imputed
against the herein petitioners (10 workers) must be heard anew affording the
petitioners all the opportunity to air their side in accordance with the requirements
of due process of law. Pending further proceedings and/or hearing of the serious
acts of violence imputed against the petitioners, the Company should reinstate
them to their former positions without loss of seniority rights and other privileges.
FACTS: Findlay Millar Timber Company hereinafter referred to as the Company, a
domestic corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine Laws with
principal office at Kolambugan, Lanao del Norte, is engaged in logging and
manufacture of plywood, veneer and other lumber products. The company
employs approximately 2,000 employees, 3 more or less, among whom are the
herein petitioners.
A strike was staged by the workers of Private respondent, FIndlay Miller Timber
Company. 1,400 employees, more or less, of the Company staged a mass walk-out,
allegedly without anybody leading them as it was a simultaneous, immediate and
unanimous group action and decision, to protest the non-payment of their salaries
and wages from January 1, 1979 to February 15, 1979 and the Company’s non-
compliance since 1974 with the Presidential Decrees on cost-of-living allowance,
non-payment of unused vacation and sick leaves, and non-payment of the 13th
month pay for 1977 and 1978.
It was declared illegal and a clearance to terminate the employment of the 10
petitioners were granted by then Deputy Minister of Labor and Employment,
Amado G. Inciong, acting by authority of the Minister of Labor and Employment.
Upon appeal respondent Minister of Labor and Employment, Blas F. Ople which
denied the motion for reconsideration of the said decision.
As prayed for, this Court issued a temporary restraining order 2 enjoining the
enforcement of the questioned decision
ISSUE: WON the Decision of Minister of labor and employment Inciong was
rendered with grave abuse of discretion or without or in excess of its jurisdiction
because the basis upon which the questioned decision stand, as disclosed in
petitioners’ version of the incident, is tainted with procedural infirmity which was
in violation of the constitutional guarantee of due process of law as would render
the questioned decision null and void.
HELD: YES
A mere finding of the illegality of a strike should not be automatically followed by
wholesale dismissal of the strikers from their employment. What is more, the
finding of the illegality of the strike by respondent Minister of Labor and
Employment is predicated on the evidence ascertained through an irregular
procedure conducted under the semblance of summary methods and speedy
disposition of labor disputes involving striking employees.
The relative freedom of the labor arbiter from the rigidities of procedure cannot be
invoked to evade what was clearly emphasized in the landmark case of Ang Tibay
vs. Court of Industrial Relations that all administrative bodies cannot ignore or
disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process.
As clearly pointed out in Free Employees and Workers Association (FEWA) vs. Court
of Industrial Relations, 16 this Court, speaking thru Justice J.B.L. Reyes, stated, thus:
“That the Court of Industrial Relations is only quasi-judicial in character, and not
bound by strict rules of evidence, does not mean that it can dispense with any and
all rules, even the most substantial, and those shown by experience to be essential
in arriving at the truth, x x x for the more liberal the practice in admitting
testimony, the more imperative the obligation to preserve the essential rules of
evidence by which rights are asserted or defended.” The principle of due process
furnishes a standard to which governmental action should conform in order to
impress it with the stamp of validity. Fidelity to such standard must of necessity be
the overriding concern of government agencies exercising quasi-judicial functions.
Although a speedy administration of action implies a speedy trial, speed is not the
chief objective of a trial. Respect for the rights of all parties and the requirements
of procedural due process equally apply in proceedings before administrative
agencies with quasi-judicial powers. For, the statutory grant of power to use
summary procedures should heighten a concern for due process, for judicial
perspective in administrative decision-making, and foR maintaining the vision
which led to the creation of the administrative office.
186. First City Interlink Transportation Co. vs. Roldan-Confesor
Facts:
Petitioner is a public utility corporation and the respondent is a labor
union composed of employees of the former.
The union filed a notice of strike alleging unfair labor practice of the
petitioner. Despite several conciliation conferences, the parties failed to reach
an agreement which prompted the union to hold a strike. This resulted in the
dismissal of several workers. Another notice of strike was filed and another
strike was subsequently held.
A return-to-work order was issued by the minister of labor. The
petitioner opposed the said order contending that no strike vote was obtained
and the result thereof was not submitted to the ministry of labor.
The Sheriff reported that only 66 employees reported back to work
and was accepted by the petitioner with a condition to submit certain
requirements.
The union filed a motion for award of backwages which was granted
by the Secretary of Labor.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the Strike was valid
2. What are the consequences of the aforementioned strike
Held:
1. The strike was not valid
 The union failed to conduct a strike vote despite the allegations of the
union that management failed to appear. Evidence shows that
management actively participated and was duly represented during both
conciliation proceedings.
The union also failed to observe the required seven-day strike ban from
the date the strike vote should have been reported up to the time the union
staged the strike. Only 4 days have passed upon meeting for conciliation
and the day of the strike.
The union acted in bad faith when it held the strike during the conciliation
proceedings because the parties agreed to meet further in another date but
instead, the union went on a strike.
2. Consequences of the illegal strike
Although the strike was illegal because of the commission of illegal acts,
only the union officers and strikers who engaged in violent, illegal and
criminal acts against the employer are deemed to have lost their
employment status. Union members who were merely instigated to
participate in the illegal strike should be treated differently.
Petitioner is not liable for backwages. Employees who are not guilty of
illegal acts and, therefore, are entitled to reinstatement would only be
entitled to backwages if they were refused readmission. As none of the
employees was refused readmission, no backwages are due from
petitioner.
On the other hand, employees who are entitled to be reinstated because
they did not take part in illegal acts would be entitled to separation pay in
lieu of reinstatement in view of the fact that, after all the time that this case
has been pending, reinstatement is no longer feasible. Separation pay
should be computed only up to the date when employees were supposed
to return as agreed upon by the parties. Those who failed to return will not
be entitled to separation pay after the date of the order to return.
187. Telefunken Semiconductors Employees Union vs. Secretary
Facts:
The company and the union reached a deadlock for the new CBA. The
union filed a notice of strike which was followed by the holding of the strike. A
return to work order was issued but the members of the union failed to return
to work. There was violence which resulted to injuries. The company sent a
memorandum requiring the employees to explain their failure to return to
work. No one submitted their explanation. The union members were placed
under preventive suspension and only 2 showed up for the administrative
hearing. The company sent letters of termination to those who failed to report
for work despite the return to work order.
Acting Secretary of Labor issued an order for the investigation of the
illegality of the strike. It directed the company to accept back the striking
workers except the union officers and those with pending criminal charges. The
union argued that they should not be excluded because it would, in effect, be
termination without due process.
Issue:
Whether or not the exclusion of the aforementioned members of the union is
proper
Held: No.
The effects of the illegal strikes makes a distinction between workers
and union officers who participate therein.
A union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any
worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal
acts during a strike may be declared to have lost their employment status. An
ordinary striking worker cannot be terminated for mere participation in an
illegal strike. There must be proof that he committed illegal acts during a strike.
A union officer, on the other hand, may be terminated from work when he
knowingly participates in an illegal strike, and like other workers, when he
commits an illegal act during a strike.
The liability of each of the union officers and the workers, if any, has
yet to be determined. The union alleges inadequate service upon the union
leadership of the assumption order and the return to work order. The lawyer
who was assigned by the DOLE was yet to hear and receive evidence on the
matter, and to submit a report and recommendation thereon.
To exclude the said workers in the directive to accept back the
striking workers without first determining whether they knowingly committed
illegal acts would be tantamount to dismissal without due process of the law.
 No striker should have been excluded, it appearing from the record
that the strike has yet to be ruled upon and the liability of each striker still to be
determined. This is where the state intervenes to equalize matters between
labor and management.
188. PNOC Dockyard and Engineering Corp. vs. NLRC
Facts:
The union filed a notice of strike against the company on the ground
of discrimination constituting unfair labor practice. The dispute arose from the
grant of increase in the salary of the managerial employees but not to non-
managerial employees. The acting secretary of labor certified the dispute for
compulsory arbitration but such order was not served to the union president. It
was merely given to the guard on duty at the gate of the union office. On the day
the union was supposed to strike, the company padlocked the gate and refused
entry to the employees. The union filed a complaint for illegal lock-out. A return
to work order was issued and the employee members were accepted back to
work. The company filed a petition to declare the strike illegal. After due notice
and investigation, the union officers were dismissed from employment. The
dismissed employees filed a complaint for illegal dismissal.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the strike was legal
2. What are the effects of the legal strike to the status of employment
Held:
1. The strike was legal
The notice of strike was only filed after the union members lost hope for
the redress of their grievance from the exclusion of the salary increase. They
believed that they were discriminated against since the company practice was
to grant salary increase to all employees regardless of whether they were
managerial or not. The discriminatory grant was to discourage union
membership because the managerial, professional and technical employees
were non-union members. The union complied with the requirements before
going on strike such as the strike vote by secret ballot, the submission of the
results thereof, the filing of a notice of strike and observance of the 15-day
cooling-off period.
The presumption of legality prevails even if the allegation of unfair labor
practice is subsequently found to be untrue provided that the union and its
members believed in good faith in the truth of such averment.
2. Effects of the legal strike
The dismissals were illegal. The infractions arose from the participation in
the strike. The investigation conducted by the company was in flagrant
disregard of the authority and jurisdiction of the NLRC. By filing a formal
complaint for illegal strike, it behooved petitioner to desist from undertaking
its own investigation on the same matter, concluding upon the illegality of the
union activity and dismissing outright the union officers involved. Employment
status cannot be trifled with, such that their constitutional and statutory rights
as well as those arising from valid agreements will be defeated. The
constitution itself guarantees state protection of labor and assures workers of
security of tenure in their employment.
TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT
189. Bughaw vs. Treasure Island Industrial Corporation
Facts:
Petitioner was employed as production worker by the respondent
company. The company received information that its employees were using
prohibited drugs during working hours and within the company premises. One
of the employees was caught in flagrante delicto and he implicated the
petitioner by claiming that the petitioner gave the money to buy the drugs for
their consumption for the rest of the month. Petitioner was served a
memorandum to explain and to appear before the legal counsel. He was placed
under preventive suspension. Petitioner failed to show up during the
administration hearings. The petitioner was dismissed from employment. This
resulted to the filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal. The Labor Arbiter
issued an order in favor of the petitioner which was affirmed by the NLRC. They
held that the company failed to accord due process. CA reversed the decisions.
Issue:
Whether or not there was an illegal dismissal
Held: There was just cause for the dismissal but there was an illegal dismissal.
The requirements for the lawful dismissal of an employee are two-
fold, the substantive and the procedural aspects. Not only must the dismissal be
for a just and authorized cause, the rudimentary requirements of due process –
notice and hearing – must, likewise be observed before an employee may be
dismissed. Without the concurrence of the two, the termination would, in the
eyes of the law, be illegal, for employment is a property right of which one
cannot be deprived without due process.

The two facets of a valid termination of employment are: 1) the
legality of the act of dismissal, i.e. the dismissal must be any of the just causes
provided under Art. 282 of the Labor Code; and 2) the legality of the manner of
the dismissal, which means that there must be observance of the requirements
of due process, otherwise known as the two-notice rule.
Art. 282. Termination by employer – an employer may terminate an
employment for any of the following causes:
a. Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of
the lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection
with his work;
b. Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties
c. Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in
him by his employer or his duly authorized representative;
d. Commission of a crim or offense by the employee against the
person of his employer or any immediate member of his family or
his duly authorized representative; and
e. Other causes analogous to the foregoing.
In administrative proceedings, technical rules of procedure and
evidence are not strictly applied and administrative due process cannot be fully
equated with due process in its strict judicial sense. It is sufficient that the
petitioner was implicated in the case and that there is no-counter statement
despite opportunities granted to him to submit to an investigation.
The first notice serves to appraise the employee of the particular acts
or omissions for which his dismissal is sought. The second notice seeks to
inform the employee of the employer’s decision to dismiss him. This decision
must come only after the employee is given a reasonable period from the
receipt of the first notice within which to answer the charge and ample
opportunity to be heard and defend himself with the assistance of a
representative if he so desires. This is in accordance with the express provision
of the law on the protection of labor and the broader dictates of procedural due
process. Non-compliance therewith is fatal because these requirements are
conditions sine qua non before dismissal may be validly effected.
The law mandates that it is incumbent upon the employer to prove the
validity fo the termination of the employment. Failure to discharge this
evidentiary burden would necessarily mean that the dismissal was not justified
and, therefore, illegal. In case of doubt, such case should be resolved in favor of
labor, pursuant to the social justice policy of our labor laws and Constitution.
The burden therefore is on the respondent to present clear and
unmistakable proof that petitioner was duly served a copy of the notice of
termination but he refused receipt. Bare and vague allegations as to the manner
of service and the circumstances surrounding the same would not suffice. A
mere copy of the notice of termination allegedly sent by respondent to
petitioner, without proof of receipt, or in the very least, actual service thereof
upon petitioner, does not constitute substantial evidence. It was unilaterally
prepared by the petitioner and, thus, evidently self-serving and insufficient to
convince even an unreasonable mind.
190) JAKA Food Processing Corporation v. Pacot
Facts:
Private respondents were hired by JAKA but their services were
eventually terminated on August 29, 1997 due to “dire financial straits”. It is not
disputed by the parties that the termination was effected without compliance of
Article 283 of the LC because no written notice was served on the employees and
the DOLE at least one month before the respondents’ termination.
Respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against JAKA. LA ruled
termination as illegal in favor of the complainants and ordering JAKA and its HRD
Manager to reinstate respondents with full backwages, and separation pay if
reinstatement is not possible.
Therefrom, JAKA went on appeal to the NLRC, which, in a decision dated
August 30, 1999, affirmed in toto that of the Labor Arbiter.
Issue: Whether or not there are implications where an employee is dismissed for
cause but without compliance of the notice requirement under the Labor Code
Held:
Yes. It is clear that an employer is liable for nominal damages even if the
termination were upheld due to just causes. However, it is also important to note
the different implications between a dismissal for just cause under Article 282 and
one for authorized causes under Article 283.

Accordingly, it is wise to hold that: (1) if the dismissal is based on a just
cause under Article 282 but the employer failed to comply with the notice
requirement, the sanction to be imposed upon him should be tempered because
the dismissal process was, in effect, initiated by an act imputable to the employee;
and (2) if the dismissal is based on an authorized cause under Article 283 but the
employer failed to comply with the notice requirement, the sanction should
be stiffer because the dismissal process was initiated by the employer's exercise of
his management prerogative.
The records before us reveal that, indeed, JAKA was suffering from
serious business losses at the time it terminated respondents' employment.
It is, therefore, established that there was ground for respondents'
dismissal, i.e., retrenchment, which is one of the authorized causes enumerated
under Article 283 of the Labor Code. Likewise, it is established that JAKA failed to
comply with the notice requirement under the same Article. Considering the
factual circumstances in the instant case and the above ratiocination, the Court,
therefore, deems it proper to fix the indemnity/ nominal damages at P50,000.00.
JAKA, however should not pay separation pay. The rule, therefore, is that
in all cases of business closure or cessation of operation or undertaking of the
employer, the affected employee is entitled to separation pay. This is consistent
with the state policy of treating labor as a primary social economic force, affording
full protection to its rights as well as its welfare. The exception is when the closure
of business or cessation of operations is due to serious business losses or financial
reverses; duly proved, in which case, the right of affected employees to
separation pay is lost for obvious reasons. xxx".
Case no. 191 Standard Electric v. Standard Electric Employees Union
Facts:
Rogelio Javier was employed by the Standard Electric Manufacturing
Corporation (SEMC) on January 15, 1973 as radial spot machine operator in its
Production Department. On July 31, 1995, Javier failed to report for work. He failed
to notify the SEMC of the reason for his absences. On August 9, 1995, he was
arrested and detained for the charge of rape upon complaint of his neighbor,
Genalyn Barotilla. After the requisite preliminary investigation, an Information for
rape was filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig. On January 13, 1996, the
SEMC received a letter from Javier, through counsel, informing the SEMC that
Javier was detained for the charge of rape and for that reason failed to report for
work. He requested the SEMC to defer the implementation of its intention to
dismiss him. The SEMC denied Javier’s request and issued a Memorandum
terminating his employment for having been absent without leave (AWOL) for
more than fifteen days from July 31, 1995; and (b) for committing rape.
On May 17, 1996, the RTC issued an Order granting Javier’s demurrer to
evidence and ordered his release from jail. Shortly thereafter, Javier reported for
work, but the SEMC refused to accept him back. A grievance meeting between the
Union, Javier and the SEMC was held, but SEMC refused to re-admit Javier. On
August 2, 1996, the Union and Javier filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal against
the SEMC before the NLRC. He averred that since the reason for his detention for
rape was non-existent, the termination of his employment was illegal.
For its part, the SEMC averred that Javier’s prolonged absences caused
irreparable damages to its orderly operation; he had to be replaced so that the
continuity and flow of production would not be jeopardized. It could not afford to
wait for Javier’s indefinite return from detention, if at all. The SEMC insisted that
conformably with its Rules and Regulations, it was justified in dismissing Javier for
being absent without leave for fifteen days or so.
Issue: Whether or not Javier was illegally dismissed.
Held:
Yes. The SC held that respondent Javier’s absence from August 9, 1995
cannot be deemed as an abandonment of his work. Abandonment is a matter of
intention and cannot lightly be inferred or legally presumed from certain equivocal
acts. To constitute as such, two requisites must concur: first, the employee must
have failed to report for work or must have been absent without valid or justifiable
reason; and second, there must have been a clear intention on the part of the
employee to sever the employer-employee relationship as manifested by some
overt acts, with the second element being the more determinative factor.
Abandonment as a just ground for dismissal requires clear, willful, deliberate, and
unjustified refusal of the employee to resume his employment. Mere absence or
failure to report for work, even after notice to return, is not tantamount to
abandonment.

Moreover, respondent Javier’s acquittal for rape makes it more
compelling to view the illegality of his dismissal. The trial court dismissed the case
for “insufficiency of evidence,” and such ruling is tantamount to an acquittal of the
crime charged, and proof that respondent Javier’s arrest and detention were
without factual and legal basis in the first place.
The petitioner acted with precipitate haste in terminating respondent
Javier’s employment on January 30, 1996, on the ground that he had raped the
complainant therein. Respondent Javier had yet to be tried for the said charge. In
fine, the petitioner prejudged him, and preempted the ruling of the RTC. The
petitioner had, in effect, adjudged respondent Javier guilty without due process of
law. While it may be true that after the preliminary investigation of the complaint,
probable cause for rape was found and respondent Javier had to be detained, these
cannot be made as legal bases for the immediate termination of his employment.
Moreover, the petitioner did not accord respondent Javier an opportunity
to explain his absences from July 31, 1995. The petitioner’s reliance on the alleged
Letter dated August 17, 1995 is misplaced. There is no evidence on record that
respondent Javier received such letter, and its sudden presence is highly suspect.
The Court agrees with respondent Javier’s observation that the letter was not
mentioned nor annexed in the petitioner’s Position Paper, Rejoinder and even in its
Opposition to the Appeal. The letter surfaced only on a much later date, in 1999,
when it was formally offered in evidence[26] and referred to in the petitioner’s
Memorandum before the Labor Arbiter – a clear inference that the said letter was
but an afterthought to justify petitioner’s termination of respondent Javier’s
employment.
Further, the Court cannot subscribe to the petitioner’s contention that
the due process requirement relative to the dismissal of respondent Javier was duly
complied with when he was allowed to explain his side during the grievance
machinery conferences. Indeed, in the case at bar, the petitioner did not conduct
any investigation whatsoever prior to his termination, despite being informed of
respondent Javier’s predicament by the latter’s siblings, his Union and his counsel.
The meetings held pursuant to the grievance machinery provisions of the collective
bargaining agreement were only done after his dismissal had already taken effect
on February 5, 1996. Clearly, well-meaning these conferences might be, they
cannot cure an otherwise unlawful termination. It bears stressing that for a
dismissal to be validly effected, the twin requirements of due process – notice and
hearing – must be observed. In dismissing an employee, an employer has the
burden of proving that the former worker has been served two notices: (1) one to
apprise him of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought; and
(2) the other to inform him of his employer’s decision to dismiss him. As to the
requirement of a hearing, the essence of due process lies in an opportunity to be
heard, and not always and indispensably in an actual hearing.
Petition is dismissed.
Case no. 192 Manebo v. NLRC
Facts:
Manebo was terminated from employment as bus comptroller from
Tritran Bus Co. for alleged serious misconduct committed against the firm’s
operation manager and company president. He failed to follow instructions to see
the company president at his Caloocan office due to the Grievance Committee
hearing being held the same day.
The Labor Arbiter found the respondent guilty of serious misconduct for
having purportedly hurled upon the operations manager "reproaching words" on
17 May 1990 and of wilful disobedience for refusing to comply with the order of
the president to see the latter on 21 June 1990.
Petitioner seasonably appealed the decision to the NLRC. In its Decision
of 31 August 1992,9 the NLRC (Third Division) affirmed the Labor Arbiter's decision.
Issue: Whether or not Manebo’s dismissal is justified
Held:
No. In order that an employer may terminate an employee on the ground
of willful disobedience to the former's orders, regulations, or instructions, it must
be established that the said orders, regulations, or instructions are (1) reasonable
and lawful, (2) sufficiently known to the employee, and (3) in connection with the
duties which the employee has been engaged to discharge. In the instant case, the
private respondents have not shown that the instruction or order of the personnel
manager for the petitioner to appear before the company president is connected
with the discharge of his duty as a comptroller of the company.
ART. 282 Termination of the Employer
Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of
his employer or representative in connection of his work.
 Thus, in Gold City Integrated Port Services, Inc. vs. NLRC, the Court ruled:
Willful disobedience of the employer's lawful orders, as a just cause for
the dismissal of an employee, envisages the concurrence of at least two (2)
requisites: the employee's assailed conduct must have been willful or intentional,
the willfulness being characterized by a "wrongful and perverse attitude"; and the
other violated must have been reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee
and must pertain to the duties which he has been engaged to discharge.
In the instant case, the private respondents have not even endeavored to
show that the directive or order pertained to the regular duties of the petitioner as
a comptroller. The purpose therefor was not revealed to the petitioner. It is highly
plausible that the president wanted to extract from the petitioner, as a condition to
the "final approval", an apology for his past misdeeds.
The primary aim then of the directive was wholly unrelated to the
petitioner's duties. It was to extract a whimsical and oppressive condition. It was,
as well, unreasonable and extremely difficult to comply with since the petitioner
was attending a conference of the Grievance Committee held fifty kilometers away
from where he was ordered to go. It was clearly a peremptory summons meant to
put the petitioner "in his proper place." Disobedience thereof, even if willful,
cannot be a ground for the dismissal of the petitioner. In any event, the petitioner's
disobedience can by no means be characterized as willful.
The Court therefore rules for the petitioner and orders his reinstatement.
Case no. 193 Aguilar v. NLRC
Facts:
Aguilar works for the restaurant of Wack Wack Golf and Country Club.
Because the restaurant was suffering losses, the club imposed a patronage fee of
Php2000 per month wherein all members must consume at least Php2000 worth of
food from the restaurant every month, otherwise the said amount will still be
charged to their account. On several occasions, Aguilar consumed food from the
restaurant and charged them against the patronage fees of club members who do
not consume their patronage fee. She explained that she did not realize that the
club rules for members’ guests/visitors also apply to EEs (Club rule: Non-members,
guests or visitors cannot sign food chits for and in behalf of members). Aguilar was
investigated but still continued the misconduct, so she was terminated. She filed
for illegal dismissal, hence this case.
Labor Arbiter rendered his decision, in favor of the complainant and
against the respondents ordering the latter, to reinstate complainant to her former
position without loss of seniority rights and with full backwages from the time she
was illegally dismissed up to the time she is actually reinstated.
On appeal, the NLRC reversed LA’s decision.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner violated any company rules and regulations when
she signed the chits for and in behalf of CLUB members
Held:
Yes
House Rule (A), Section 15 (a) and House Rule (B), Section 7 are as
follows:
Rule A: General
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 15. . . . (a) Non-members, guests or visitors cannot sign chits for and
in behalf of members.
Rule B: Minors and Children
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 7. That the spouses and dependents be allowed to sign chits for
themselves and their guests for F & B and other facilities; provided however, that in
case of green fees, the legitimate spouse of a member can sign chits for their
guests but only when playing at the West Course and provided further that the
member should expressly authorize it in writing.
The above-quoted rules are applicable to petitioner. There is no showing
that petitioner was unaware of said rules and regulations. All she invokes is that the
same is not applicable to her being merely an employee of the CLUB.
Article 282 of the Labor Code provides in part:
Art. 282. Termination by Employer. — An employer may terminate an
employment for any of the following causes: a) Serious misconduct or willful
disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or
representative in connection with his work.
xxx xxx xxx
Willful disobedience of the employer's lawful orders, as a just cause for
the dismissal of an employee, envisages the concurrence of at least two (2)
requisites: the employee's assailed conduct must have been willful or intentional,
the willfulness being characterized by a "wrongful and perverse attitude." The
order violated must have been reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee
and must pertain to the duties which he had been engaged to discharge.
By petitioner's own admission, she continued signing the restaurant and
Bar Grill bills or chits chargeable to the patronage fee of the CLUB members Cepeda
and Gonzales even after she had been investigated for such misconduct on January
29, 1988 and after she was already made aware that non-members like her cannot
sign chits for and in behalf of the CLUB members.
We agree with the NLRC that the acts of herein complainant is defiantly
disobeying the rules of the company even after investigation, shows her cavalier
attitude which leaves the management no other recourse but to terminate her
services.
Case no. 194 - JARDINE DAVIES, INC., Petitioner, v. THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION, JARDINE DAVIES EMPLOYEES UNION (FFW) and
VIRGILIO REYES
[G.R. No. 76272. July 28, 1999.]
FATCS: Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in general trading, including
the exclusive distribution in the country of the world-renowned "Union 76"
lubricating oil manufactured by Unoco Philippines, Inc. Private respondent was a
former sales representative of petitioner.
Petitioner engaged the services of a private investigation agency to conduct
surveillance and investigation pertinent to reports that some of petitioner’s
products, particularly the "Union 76" lubricating oil, were being illegally
manufactured, blended, packed and distributed. Consequently, a private
investigator of the said investigation agency, confirmed that there were really fake
"Union 76" lubricating oil in the market and reported further that the same were
indeed being illegally manufactured, blended, packed and distributed by private
respondent Virgilio Reyes.
Thereafter, a criminal complaint for violation of Article 189 on unfair competition
of the Revised Penal Code 2 was filed against private respondent and others.
Subsequently, private respondent was likewise charged administratively for having
committed serious misconduct inimical to the interest of petitioner company.
Accordingly, he was advised to go on an indefinite leave. This eventually led to his
termination from employment on February 23, 1983.
Meanwhile, all the materials seized by virtue of the search warrant issued were
released by order of the same court in view of a petition filed by private
respondent’s younger brother, Donato Reyes. He further proved that he was legally
engaged in the business of general merchandising, operating under the trade name
of Lubrix Conglomerate, a single proprietorship duly licensed by the government in
dealing with oil and lubricant products.
Relying on the foregoing facts, private respondent sued petitioner for illegal
dismissal. But the Labor Arbiter, Manuel R. Caday, dismissed his complaint.
In a Decision dated September 24, 1985, the labor arbiter is convinced that private
respondent was personally involved in the aforementioned illegal activity, the labor
arbiter ruled that the private respondent committed an act of serious misconduct,
fraud or wilful breach of trust reposed in him by petitioner, a just cause for
terminating employment.
Private respondent appealed to the NLRC. In its Decision dated March 17, 1986, the
NLRC reversed the labor arbiter’s judgment on the ground that there is no cogent
reason for petitioner to lose its trust and confidence on private respondent, there
being "no shadow of an act amounting to serious misconduct, fraud or breach of
trust" on the part of private Respondent. The NLRC disposed of the case as follows:j
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision appealed from is hereby SET
ASIDE and a new one entered ordering the respondent-appellee to reinstate
complainant-appellant with full backwages without deduction or qualification
whatsoever for earning elsewhere and without loss of seniority rights.
It’s motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed the instant
petition before us.
ISSUE: Whether public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in
reversing the labor arbiter’s judgment which found a just and valid cause for
dismissal of private respondent by petitioner.
RULING: No. Private respondent’s dismissal was found illegal. In order to constitute
a just cause for dismissal, the act complained of must be "work-related" such as
would show the employee concerned to be unfit to continue working for the
employer. It is sufficient that there is some basis for such loss of confidence, such
as when the employer has reasonable ground to believe that the employee
concerned is responsible for the purported misconduct, and the nature of his
participation therein renders him unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded
of his position. However, the right of an employer to dismiss employees on account
of loss of trust and confidence must not be exercised arbitrarily and without
showing just cause, so as not to render the employee’s constitutional right to
security of tenure nugatory. The ground must be founded on facts established by
the employer who must clearly and convincingly prove by substantial evidence the
facts and incidents upon which loss of confidence in the employee may be fairly
made to rest; otherwise the dismissal will be rendered illegal.
In the case at bar, private respondent was suspended and eventually dismissed for
allegedly committing fraudulent acts and unfairly competing with petitioner. To
justify its administrative action, petitioner somehow grave credence to the
surveillance report implicating private respondent in the illegal manufacture,
blending, packing and distribution of petitioner’s products. For evidently, the
surveillance report is unreliable. As found by the NLRC, the conclusions therein
were mere deductions not supported by any substantial corroborating evidence.
Public respondent also observed that the petitioner failed to show concrete
evidence to controvert the proof presented by private respondent that the packing
of genuine "Union 76" oil in small containers was in support of the marketing policy
of petitioner. Accordingly, public respondent cannot be faulted in concluding that
petitioner failed to substantiate its claim as to the actual existence of fake "Union
76" products.
With the finding that private respondent was illegally dismissed, an award of
backwages is proper. Considering that private respondent was terminated from the
service on February 23, 1983, he is entitled to backwages up to three years only,
computed on the basis of his last monthly salary or pay.
In addition to backwages, illegally dismissed employees are entitled to either
reinstatement, if feasible, or separation pay, if reinstatement is no longer viable. In
our view, the circumstances obtaining in this case would not warrant the
reinstatement of the private Respondent. Thus, a more equitable disposition would
be an award of separation pay equivalent to one (1) month’s pay for every year of
service with petitioner, a fraction of at least six (6) months being considered as one
(1) whole year. In the computation of separation pay, the three-year period
wherein backwages are awarded must be included.
195 - JACKSON BUILDING CONDOMINIUM CORPORATION and/or RAZUL
REQUESTO, petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and FERDINAND GUMOGDA,
respondents.
G.R. No. 111515 July 14, 1995
FACTS: On November 22, 1989, private respondent was employed as a janitor by
petitioner with a monthly salary of P2,340.00 or a daily wage of P90.00.
On November 15, 1992, private respondent filed a 45-day leave of absence from
November 15, 1991 to December 29, 1991 to undergo an appendectomy, which
would necessitate complete bed rest for about thirty days from the date of
operation as shown by his medical certificate. This was granted by petitioner.
On January 3, 1992, private respondent informed petitioner Razul Requesto,
president of petitioner corporation, that he was physically fit to assume his work.
However, petitioners refused to accept him back contending that he had
abandoned his work.
On March 24, 1992, private respondent filed with the Labor Arbiter a complaint
against petitioners for illegal dismissal, underpayment of wages and non-payment
of thirteenth-month pay and service-incentive leave pay.
On July 12, 1992, petitioners submitted their position paper wherein they alleged
that private respondent was not dismissed but was merely advised to rest for
health reasons until he could procure a medical certificate attesting that he was fit
to work. They further alleged that private respondent failed to return to his
workplace or to submit the required medical certificate.
On October 30, 1992, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision in favor of private
respondent.
Petitioners then appealed to NLRC, alleging that the Labor Arbiter committed grave
abuse of discretion. .However, NLRC affirmed in toto the decision of the Labor
Arbiter. A subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied.
ISSUE: 1.) Whether private respondent abandoned his work; and 2.) Whether
petitioners are liable for the payment of private respondent's back wages,
differential pay, thirteenth-month pay and service-incentive leave pay for 1991.
RULING: 1.) No. For abandonment to be a valid ground for dismissal, two requisites
must be present: the intention by an employee to abandon coupled with an overt
act from which it may be inferred that the employee had no more intention to
resume his work.
In the instant case, the said requisites are not present. The private respondent was
ready to assume his responsibilities considering that he had fully recovered from
the operation. Furthermore, the filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal by private
respondent is inconsistent with the allegation of petitioners that he had abandoned
his job. Surely, an employee's posture will be illogical if he abandons his work and
then immediately files an action for his reinstatement.
2.) Yes. The law on the matter refutes this legal challenge of petitioners.
Section 31 of R.A. No. 6715 which amended Article 279 of the Labor Code of the
Philippines provides that "an employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall
be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges
without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full back wages,
inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent
computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time
of his actual reinstatement."
The award of back wages by NLRC to private respondent was predicated on the
ground that he was illegally dismissed and not on his failure to report for work.
Private respondent is likewise entitled to the thirteenth-month pay. Presidential
Decree No. 851, as amended by Memorandum Order No. 28, provides that
employees are entitled to the thirteenth-month pay benefit regardless of their
designation and irrespective of the method by which their wages are paid.
196 - ARC-MEN FOOD INDUSTRIES, INC., Petitioner, v. NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION and FABIAN ALCOMENDRAS, Respondents.
[G.R. No. 113721. May 7, 1997.]
FACTS: Private respondent alleges that he was a regular employee of the petitioner
firm as a company driver from September 1985 until he was unlawfully terminated
on January 23, 1990. That as a company driver he was required to render his
services to both the petitioner’s food and construction business; that since his
employment, he has never enjoyed the minimum wage, ECOLA and service
incentive leave pay.
Private respondent has been in the employ for four years and four months of which
he has been rendering faithful services and following the rules and regulations of
the company.
Rising to their defense, petitioner belied the allegations of the private respondent.
They claimed that private respondent was not illegally dismissed from his
employment but it was he who has abandoned his work.
Anent the issue of termination, petitioner disclosed that from December 2, 1989 up
to February 25, 1990, the plant was not in full operation and employees directly
connected with the plant including herein complainant were advised of the
shutdown and were told not to report for work. To prove that private respondent
was not terminated on January 23, 1990 is the fact that on January 29, 1990, he
secured and was given a cash advance of P700.00 as shown by the Temporary Cash
Advance Slip. It is inconceivable for the company to give cash advance "against
salary deductions" if he was already terminated on January 23, 1990 or six days
before private respondent was given the said cash advance.
Another evidence that private respondent was not dismissed is the fact that
petitioner formally advised him to report for work on February 25, 1990 which was
hand-delivered by Noli Paglinawan. Despite being advised to report for work
private respondent refused.
As shown in their Summary of Plant Operations will show that there were only two
(2) days of operation, on December 1, 1989 and February 20, 1990. There was no
operation for the whole month of January, 1990. As alleged, the private respondent
was included in the temporary lay-off during this period (from December 2, 1990
up to February 20, 1990) considering that there was no plant operation. However,
contrary to the allegation of the petitioner, they also presented the number of days
worked by the private respondent wherein for the month of December 1 to 31,
1989, the latter had worked for twenty-one (21) days and for January 1 to 20, 1990,
he worked 16.5 days. Assuming that there were only two days plant operation from
December 1, 1989 to February 20, 1990, then it is presumed that private
respondent was still reporting for duty during that period not for the hauling of
banana peelings but for some other purpose for which the respondent is engaged.
Thereafter, for unknown reason, private respondent was not anymore required to
work effective January 23, 1990, hence, he filed his complaint on February 5, 1990.
From the foregoing facts, the Labor Arbiter concluded that "the allegation that it
was private respondent who had abandoned his job is belied by the fact that he
immediately filed his complaint after he was terminated from his work on January
23, 1990" and that the report-to-work letter dated February 25, 1990 and cash
advance slip dated January 29, 1990 were dubious, the former being a mere after-
thought and the latter bearing an alleged forged signature of private Respondent.
Petitioner appealed to the NLRC but the NLRC upheld the findings of the Labor
Arbiter. NLRC echoing as it did that petitioner’s "theory of abandonment is contrary
to logic and sound reasoning in view of the immediate filing of the complaint for
illegal dismissal" and declaring that petitioner had not validly discharged its burden
of proving that the termination was for a valid or authorized cause.
ISSUE: Whether private respondent abandoned his work.
RULING: Yes. The over-reliance of both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC on the
notion that the filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal is inconsistent with the
employer’s defense of abandonment by the employee of his work. The Labor
Arbiter and the NLRC, instead of at least reviewing whatever countervailing
evidence private respondent had vis-a-vis petitioner’s documentary proofs, simply
swept under the rug the issues of lay-off and abandonment of work, relying as they
did on the earlier mentioned notion of the inconsistency between the filing of a
complaint for illegal dismissal and the interposing of the defense of abandonment
by the employee of his work. The evidence on record indeed clearly shows that
private respondent was not illegally dismissed. He was temporarily laid off in view
of the temporary shut down of petitioner’s operations. When he was asked to
report back to work, he refused.
In the face of solid evidence of petitioner’s temporary plant shutdown during the
time that private respondent claims to have been illegally dismissed and of private
respondent’s receipt of notice to return to work and his refusal to do so, with full
awareness on the part of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC as to the related
circumstance of the pendency of a criminal charge by petitioner against private
respondent, and considering the utter lack of evidence in negation of petitioner’s
own documentary evidence formidably establishing the veracity of its defense, it
was grave abuse of decision on the part of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC to have
found petitioners liable for having illegally terminated private Respondent.
The management can temporarily suspend business operations or undertakings for
a period not exceeding six (6) months without having to pay separation pay to
workers, but the suspension must be done bona fide and not for the purpose of
defeating the rights of employees. Within this period, the employer-employee
relationship shall be deemed suspended.
Thus, when petitioner was to resume its operations on February 26, 1990, it sent a
notice to private respondent on February 25, 1990, however, private respondent
refused to receive said letter and did not report for work as required of him. Such
being the case, petitioner cannot compel private respondent to report for work.
The decision to resume his work as dump truck driver rests solely on him.
197 - PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and EDUARDO V. MATURAN,
respondents.
G.R. No. 114920 August 23, 1995
The instant petition involves the dismissal of private respondent Eduardo Maturan,
a bank teller of petitioner bank's General Santos City branch, whose services were
terminated on July 18, 1991 allegedly for incurring a cash shortage in the amount of
P10,000.00, for failure to return the P8,000.00 cash withdrawal of a client, Rebecca
Salud, and for extending unauthorized accommodations to clients. A complaint for
illegal dismissal was filed before the NLRC Sub-Regional Arbitration Branch No. XI in
General Santos City which thereafter rendered a decision, dated May 7, 1992,
declaring herein petitioner guilty of illegal dismissal and ordering the reinstatement
of respondent Maturan to his former position without loss of seniority rights and
privileges, and with payment of his back wages, allowances and other benefits from
the time of his illegal dismissal until promulgation of the decision, moral and
exemplary damages, and attorney's fees.
In so ruling, the labor arbiter declared that the penalty of dismissal is too harsh
considering that it had not been shown that private respondent had acted in bad
faith and with malice; that, on the contrary, if respondent was really guilty, he
would not have resorted to "client checking" because it would only expose his
anomaly, whereas he could just have immediately declared the amount he
supposedly abstracted as cash shortage; that the shortage had already been paid
for; and that respondent's dismissal is irregular in that it was "union motivated,"
plus the fact that it took some time before respondent's immediate superiors and
other bank officers actually conducted an investigation on the matter.
On appeal, public respondent NLRC rendered a resolution promulgated on March
8, 1993 which reversed and set aside the decision of the labor arbiter, declaring as
valid the dismissal of respondent and, accordingly, dismissing the complaint for lack
of merit. However, said resolution was subsequently reconsidered and modified in
another resolution of the same commissioners promulgated on December 15,
1993, with the following dispositive portion:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the resolution of the
Commission dated March 8, 1993 is hereby Modified in the
sense that respondent bank is hereby ordered to reinstate
complainant but without backwages from the time he was
terminated up to the promulgation of the decision of the Labor
Arbiter. Complainant shall be reinstated to a comparable
position like that of a Customer Relations Assistant in lieu of the
position of a teller. In case reinstatement is no longer feasible,
the determination of which is tasked to the Labor Arbiter below
during the execution stage, complainant is entitled to
separation pay fixed in the amount of one (1) month salary,
inclusive of other fringe benefits based on his latest salary for
every year of service, a fraction of six (6) months to be
considered as one (1) whole year. In the alternative,
complainant may be allowed to avail of the company
retirement plan if he qualifies, or whichever has greater
benefits.
Finally, respondent is further ordered to pay complainant his
accrued backwages from the time it was withheld during the
pendency of the appeal up to the rendition of this judgment.
No costs.
ISSUE: Whether loss of trust and confidence justifies the dismissal of the private
respondent.
RULING: No. Respondent Maturan was involved in a single incident of cash
shortage in the amount of P10,000.00. As correctly found by the labor arbiter,
respondent is not a habitual violator, which undesirable category would have
warranted his dismissal.
In Allied Banking Corporation case, there was a provision in the collective
bargaining agreement which granted a yearly allowance for tellers to cover
shortages which they may incur during the year. Thus, the NLRC held that this, in
effect, is a recognition that among the hazards of tellers is the incidence of
shortages and overages up to a certain limit. This very provision, therefore, is a
clear indication that such errors are understandingly viewed and forgiven provided
they do not go beyond the allowable limit.
The ruling therein supports the labor arbiter's observation that "in tellering,
regardless of how long one has been in the trade, and how careful one is, there is
no guarantee that one can never incur cash shortage or overage. No teller for that
matter can testify that in his stint as such, everyday his actual cash on hand always
tallies with the figure appearing in the teller's validating machine tape as the
'should be cash on hand'. Cash shortages and overages are but ordinary and normal
banking activities." As a matter of fact, it is not disputed that there were other
shortages or overages incurred by the other tellers in petitioner's General Santos
City branch at about the same time that this particular infraction of private
respondent occurred.
We must add, however, that these occurrences are subject to certain limitations,
depending on the amount involved as well as the number and the gravity of the
infractions. As earlier explained, we do not find the infraction committed by private
respondent to be so grave as to warrant his dismissal. We are not even inclined to
conform with the penalty imposed by respondent NLRC, that is, the non-payment
of back wages from the time of respondent's dismissal up to the rendition of the
decision of the labor arbiter (or from July 18, 1991 to May 7, 1992), considering
that he has already paid, through salary deductions, the amount of P10,000.00.
Moreover, this mode of payment was even recommended for approval by no less
than the Manager, Mr. Cubar and, as the records reveal, it can be safely assumed
that the same was approved because the amount was fully paid by respondent on
March 28, 1990. The imposition of a penalty is, therefore, unwarranted.
The manner by which private respondent dealt with the missing money only serves
to emphasize his good faith.
To be a valid ground for dismissal, loss of trust and confidence must be based on a
wilful breach of trust. And, as realistically stressed by the Solicitor General, unless
based on a ground provided by law and supported by substantial evidence,
dismissal will be disallowed, for what is at stake is not only the employee's position,
but also his means of livelihood. Considering that private respondent was acting in
good faith, his dismissal would run counter to such established doctrinal rulings.
There is grossly insufficient evidence to warrant the dismissal of private respondent
on the ground of loss of trust and confidence. We are convinced, however, that the
filing of the complaint for illegal dismissal and the protracted proceedings with
confrontational exchanges therein between the parties have now evidently
strained their erstwhile harmonious relationship. The reinstatement of private
respondent would, in our view, no longer be beneficial to either party. An award of
back salaries and severance pay in lieu of reinstatement would thus appear to be in
order
198. Concorde Hotel v. CA
FACTS: The case concerns respondent Roberta Parado who, was hired as an
assistant cook by Petitioner Concorde Hotel from the latter’s mass recruitment
through Highlanders Management Services. Sometime in January 1997,
petitioner discovered some of its stocks and merchandise were missing and
unaccounted for in the inventory reports. Upon inquiry by the management to
its employees, they found that some of its employees were bringing home
canned goods, meat, and other properties of the hotel. An in-house
investigation was conducted and a list of alleged employees involved was
created; at the same time a copy was furnished to Highlanders Agency. When
the employees in the list were called and required to explain in writing and no
written explanations were received, this prompted the Hotel and Highlanders
Agency to issue termination notices to said employees.
After the Hotel reported the incident to the police, 8 additional names were
added given by other employees who were bothered by their conscience and
decided to reveal other persons involved in the pilferage, the respondent being
one of the eight additional names included. Afterwards, the respondent was
terminated.
Respondent filed a case for illegal dismissal with the Labor Arbiter. He argues
that the charge against him has no basis as he was one of the employees who
complained to the police that certain employees threaten them with harm at
the time the incident of pilferage was discovered. The Labor Arbiter dismissed
the Complaint. When the case was elevated to the NLRC, it was reversed and
found the dismissal without cause. The CA affirmed the decision of the NLRC.
ISSUE: Whether the respondent was terminated on the ground of loss of
confidence or breach of trust
HELD: The Court held in favour of the private respondent.
The Court held that Petitioner failed to establish the charge of loss of
confidence against the respondent that resulted from the latter’s dismissal. The
Court explained that when the Petitioner conducted an investigation and
identified the respondent as one of the perpetrators, they did not have
sufficient evidence on record or any written statement from the employees
establishing the participation of the respondent to the pilferage. The Court gave
credence to the finding of the CA that the respondent was one of those who
complained about the threats made by his co-employees at the discovery of the
pilferage.
For a dismissal to be valid, two requirements must be satisfied: (1) the
employee must be afforded due process; and (2) dismissal must be for a valid
cause. In the dismissal for a valid cause, the employer has the burden of proof
to prove that the ground of dismissal of the employee was for a valid and
authorized cause.
In relation to the ground of loss of confidence, the Supreme Court came up with
guidelines for the application of the doctrine of loss of confidence: 1) loss of
confidence which should not be simulated; 2) it should not be used as a
subterfuge for causes which are improper, illegal, or unjustified; 3) it should not
be arbitrarily asserted in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary;
and 4) it must be genuine, not a mere afterthought to justify earlier action taken
in bad faith.
199. Aurelio v. NLRC
FACTS: The case concerns Petitioner Jean Aurelio who started as a clinical
instructor and later appointed as the Dean of Nursing of Northwestern College.
The individual respondents, who are members of the Board of Directors of the
College, took over the management and introduced a series of reorganization
affecting the petitioner and her husband who was elected as an auditor. Among
the changes that affected the petitioner were the diminution of salary, her office
stripped of facilities, and asked to justify the use of the conference room used
for team teaching. From these changes, petitioner suffered indignities and
humiliation which, prompted the petitioner to write to the President of the
College taking an indefinite leave. While on leave, petitioner sent a copy of the
letter to the Secretary of Education praying for assistance. The latter referred
the letter to the DECS regional director thereby prompting an investigation on
NWC College of Nursing. After the investigation, the regional director sent the
findings and recommendations to the Secretary, confirming the allegations of
the Petitioner. The Secretary called the attention of the respondents of the
willingness of the petitioner to withdraw the leave of absence and resumption
of her duties as the Dean. Private Respondents did not answer and refused to
accept the petitioner. This prompted the Petitioner to file a case for illegal
dismissal. Private Respondents argues that the College is in financial distress,
and it uncovered irregularities allegedly committed by the Petitioner.
The Labor Arbiter dismissed the case, and the NLRC affirmed and adopted the
findings of the former.
ISSUE: Whether the petitioner was illegally dismissed on the ground of loss of
confidence or breach of trust.
HELD: The Court decided that the petitioner was not illegally dismissed, and the
dismissal was for a just and valid cause.
The Court upheld the dismissal of the petitioner in which it gave credence to
the finding of the Labor Arbiter, as adopted by the NLRC, of the irregularities
committed by the Petitioner. The Court explained that due to the position of the
Petitioner as the Dean of the College of Nursing, being a managerial position,
holding trust and confidence, the uncovered irregularities became a basis and
justifying the termination of the Petitioner.
The Court provides that “the rules of dismissal for managerial employees are
different from those governing ordinary employees for it would be unjust and
inequitable to compel an employer to continue with the employment of a
person who occupies a managerial and sensitive position despite the loss of
confidence. At the very least, the relationship must be considered seriously
strained, foreclosing the remedy of reinstatement.”
200. Etcbuan v. Sulpicio Lines
FACTS: The case concerns petitioner Vicente Etcbuan Jr who was employed as a
Chief Pursuer of respondent Sulpicio Lines Inc. As Chief Pursuer, petitioner is
the custodian of the passage tickets, bills of lading, official receipts, and tasked
to disburse the salaries of crewmen of the vessel. When the petitioner was
assigned to the M/V Surigao Princess and a new jefe de viaje was designated to
the vessel, he discovered several yellow passengers’ duplicate original of yet to
be sold or unissued passage ticket already contained the amount of P88.00.
Upon further inquiry, he found discrepancies on the prices for ticket issuances
for Children amounting to half the fare of P44.00. When word reached the
respondent, it waited until the vessel arrived in Cebu. When the vessel arrived
in Cebu, the petitioner received a memorandum of the alleged irregularity in
the ticket issuance, and instructing him to report to the main office for
investigation; he was also warned that failure to comply with the investigation
would be construed as a waiver of his right to be heard. Petitioner refuse to
acknowledge the memorandum, and a copy was sent by the respondent by mail
days later.
When he was in the respondent’s main office and was questioned, he refused to
sign the minutes, arguing that it is “self-incriminatory”. The next day, the
petitioner was replaced and he thought that he was fired from his job.
Respondent placed the petitioner in a preventive suspension pending the result
of the investigation, within the week of his suspension, petitioner filed a case
for illegal dismissal.
The Labor Arbiter found that petitioner’s dismissal was illegal for failure by the
respondent to prove the former’s wrongdoing. The NLRC affirmed the decision
of the Labor Arbiter. When the case went to the CA, it reversed and set aside the
decision of the NLRC. The CA found that the position of the petitioner involves a
high degree of trust and confidence, and found negligence on the care of the
ticketing slips sufficient ground for dismissal.
ISSUE: Whether the illegal dismissal of the petitioner on the ground of loss of
confidence is valid.
HELD: The Court decided in favour of the respondent
The Court held that the nature of the position of the petitioner involves a
substantial amount of trust and confidence on part of the employer. He
occupies a highly sensitive and critical position and may be dismissed on the
ground of trust and confidence. Even though he had no actual and direct
participation in the alleged anomalies, his failure to detect any anomaly in the
passage tickets amounts to gross negligence and incompetence; what is
material that his actuations were more than sufficient to sow in his employer
the seed of mistrust and loss of confidence.
In the case of managerial employees, proof beyond reasonable doubt is not
required, it being sufficient that there is some basis for such loss or confidence,
such as when the employer has reasonable ground to believe that the employee
concerned is responsible for the purported misconduct, and the nature of his
participation therein renders him unworthy of the trust and confidence
demanded by his position.
201. Worldwide Papermills v. NLRC
FACTS: The case concerns private respondent Edwin Sabuya who was
employed as a packer for petitioner Worldwide Papermills. The private
respondent in the years 1986-1990, incurred multiple absences apart from the
excused absences of vacation and sick leave given by petitioner. In each year,
respondent was given stern warnings and suspensions for his continued
absences, and every time he would be counseled to improve his attendance.
Even with the intervention of the Union president and the execution of a
promissory note that should he exceed the limit of the number of absences, he
would be terminated, it showed no improvement on his attendance. In the year
1991, when he committed the same pattern of absences and filed for a sick
leave, the petitioner sent a company nurse to check the respondent’s condition,
only to find out that the respondent was moonlighting as a pedicab diver.
Petitioner then sent a memorandum requiring respondent to explain why no
disciplinary action should be imposed upon him for his excessive absences
without official leave. Respondent gave his answer, but it was not satisfactory
to the petitioner, thus terminating him from the company. This prompted the
petitioner to file a case for illegal dismissal.
The Labor Arbiter found the dismissal illegal for failure to afford due process
and no just cause for the dismissal. The NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter’s
decision finding the dismissal was for a just cause.
ISSUE: Whether the amount of absences/ tardiness of the respondent
amounted to a just cause for dismissal
HELD: The Court decided in favour of the petitioner holding the dismissal was
for a just cause on the ground of amount of absences/tardiness.
The Court held that in the span of years of service in the company, respondent
was repeatedly admonished, warned, and suspensions for incurring excessive
unauthorized absences, and when the respondent was visited by the company
nurse only to find that he was moonlighting as a pedicab driver when he filed
for a sick leave in 1991. These acts constitute gross and habitual neglect of
duties. The Court quoted the decision of the NLRC that provides, “having shown
compassion by imposing numerous light penalties against the [respondent] for
his repeated unauthorized absences, the [petitioner] should not now be
penalize for having been merciful by denying him the tight to finally imposed
the penalty of dismissal against the former.”
Case No 202
Austria vs NLRC
Facts: Pastor Dionisio Austria has been working for the Seventh-Day Adventist for
28 years. He started as a literature evangelist and worked his way up the ladder
and eventually became a pastor. One day, there was an issue with regard to
remittance of church tithes and offerings collected by his wife to which the head of
SDA authorized. Because of the malicious allegations and accusations, in the
meeting that was called, a commotion transpired inside one of their offices where
Pastor Dionisio attempted to overturn a table, scattered books, and threw a phone.
No one was physically hurt in the incident and there was no intent or attempt to do
so. Pastor Austria eventually received a letter for dismissal due to lost of trust and
confidence. He filed for illegal dismissal, hence this case. (EE won)
Issue: Whether or not Austria is guilty of Fraud or Serious Misconduct?
Held: No. Art 282 (c) of the LC states that the breach of trust is willful if it is done
intentionally, knowingly and purposely, without justifiable excuse, as distinguished
from an act done carelessly, thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently. It must rest
on substantial grounds and not on the ER’s arbitrariness, whims, caprices or
suspicion. For misconduct to be serious, it must be of such grave and aggravated
character and not merely trivial or unimportant.
Misconduct has been defined as improper or wrong conduct. It is the
transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a
dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies wrongful intent and not mere
error in judgment
The act of petitioner in banging the attaché case on the table, throwing the
telephone and scattering the books in the office of Pastor Buhat, although
improper, cannot be considered as grave enough to be considered as serious
misconduct. After all, as correctly observed by the Labor Arbiter, though petitioner
committed damage to property, he did not physically assault Pastor Buhat or any
other pastor present during the incident.
The cited actuation of petitioner does not justify the ultimate penalty of dismissal
from employment
Case No 203
Felix vs Enertech Sytem Industries
Facts: Petitioner and three other employees were assigned to install a smokestack
at the Big J Feedmills in Sta. Monica, Bulacan. During the entire period they were
working, petitioner and his companions accomplished daily time records (DTRs).
Petitioner wrote in his DTR that he had worked eight hours a day on the basis of
which his wages were computed. The work was estimated to be completed within
seven days, but it actually took the about two weeks, before it was finished.
On that day, petitioner and his three co-employees were each given notice by
respondent that they were falsifying their DTRs and that said act constitutes a
violation of Company Code on Employees. Petitioner and his co-workers were
placed under preventive suspension. Petitioner filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal
Issue: Whether they were validly dismissed?
Held: Yes. One of the responsibilities of an employee is to observe the proper
decorum within the employer’s work premises. He must follow company rules and
regulations. Failure to observe company rules and regulations constitutes a ground
for suspension or dismissal from employment.
The elements of a valid dismissal due to serious misconduct are as follows:
a) it must be serious;
b) it must relate to the performance of the employee’s duties;
and c) it must show that the employee has become unfit to continue working for
the employer.
ART. 282. Termination by employer. An employer may terminate an employment
for any of the following causes:
(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders
of his employer or representative in connection with his work;
 (c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his
employer or duly authorized representative;
FALSIFYING TIME CARDS OR ANY OTHER TIMEKEEPING RECORDS OR DRAWING
SALARY/ALLOWANCE BY VIRTUE OF FALSIFIED TIME CARDS – constitutes serious
misconduct. Employer cannot trust complainant again and place the future and
welfare of the company to shenanigans who try to defraud it

Case No 204
Cathedral School vs NLRC
Facts: Vallejera decided to observe life in the congregation with board and lodging.
She volunteered as a lib aide and is given allowance. Years later, she confessed that
she is no longer interested to be a nun. She pleaded, however, to be allowed to
continue living with the sisters for she had no other place to stay in, to which
request the sisters acceded and, in exchange therefor, she voluntarily continued to
assist in the school library. She formally hired as such.
She was summoned to the Office of the Directress shortly after the resignation of
the school's Chief Librarian on account of irreconcilable differences with said
respondent, for the purpose of clarifying the matter. Petitioner also informed
private respondent of the negative reports received by her office regarding the
latter's frictional working relationship with co-workers and students and reminded
private respondent about the proper attitude and behavior that should be
observed in the interest of peace and harmony in the school library. Private
respondent resented the observations about her actuations and was completely
unreceptive to the advice given by her superior. She reacted violently to
petitioner's remarks and angrily offered to resign, repeatedly saying, "OK, I will
resign. I will resign." Thereafter, without waiting to be dismissed from the meeting,
she stormed out of the office in discourteous disregard and callous defiance of
authority. She remained adamant in her refusal to submit to authority.
She was given a month to look for a job as the school had decided to accept her
resignation. Private respondent then filed a complaint for claims of benefits and
wages. She was prevented from entering the school premise in view of her
dismissal. Private respondent amended her complaint to include illegal dismissal.
LA ruled in her favour.

Issue: Whether it falls in analogous cases to terminate an employee?

Held: Yes. Respondent's disagreeable character — "quarrelsome, bossy,
unreasonable and very difficult to deal with" — are supported by the various
testimonies of several co-employees and students of the school. In fact, as earlier
stated, her overbearing personality caused the chief librarian to resign.
Furthermore, the complaints about her objectionable behavior were confirmed by
her reproachable actuations during her meeting with the petitioner directress,
when private respondent, upon being advised of the need to improve her working
relations with others, obstreperously reacted and unceremoniously walked out on
her superior, and arrogantly refused to subsequently clear up matters or to
apologize therefor. To make matters worse, she ignored the persons sent by
petitioners on separate occasions to intervene in an effort to bring the matter to a
peaceful resolution. The conduct she exhibited on that occasion smacks of sheer
disrespect and defiance of authority and assumes the proportion of serious
misconduct or insubordination, any of which constitutes just cause for dismissal
from employment.
As petitioner school is run by a religious order, it is but expected that good
behavior and proper deportment, especially among the ranks of its own
employees, are major considerations in the fulfillment of its mission. Under the
circumstances, the sisters cannot be faulted for deciding to terminate private
respondent whose presence "has become more a burden rather than a joy" and
had proved to be disruptive of the harmonious atmosphere of the school.
Case No 205
Yrasegui vs PAL
Facts: Petitioner Armando Yrasuegui was a flight steward of respondent Philippine
Airlines who was terminated due to his failure to adhere to the latter’s mandated
weight.
According to respondent’s Cabin and Crew Administration Manual, petitioner’s
ideal weight is 166lbs. However, he was unable to maintain the required weight.
For 4 years, petitioner was removed from fight duty in order to meet the weight
standards, and was even offered the services of the company physician.
Despite the leniency, petitioner still failed to comply with the company policy.
Hence, respondent was terminated for the violation of company standards on
weight requirements.
LA – ruled that petitioner was illegally dismissed. NLRC – affirmed ruling. Both
found the company standards of respondent on weight requirements to be
reasonable.
CA set aside the ruling of NLRC, and held that the failure to adhere to the weight
standards is an analogous case for the dismissal of an employee under Art. 282(e)
of the Labor Code in relation to Art. 282(a). The CA also held that the weight
standards are a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ), and if violated
“justifies an employee’s separation from the service.”
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was discriminated against when he was
dismissed by respondent.
HELD: No. The SC held that petitioner failed to prove his allegations with
particularity –i.e., he merely mentioned the names of other cabin crew members
that were overweight. Furthermore, petitioner cannot invoke the equal protection
clause guaranty of the Constitution, since such liberty is only addressed to the State
or those acting under its authority. The Bill of Rights is not meant to be invoked
against acts of private individuals.
In addition, the SC also held that the company standards/BFOQ of the respondent
is valid. Such qualifications are reasonably related or essential to the operation of
the job involved. As a common carrier, respondent is bound to observe
extraordinary diligence for the safety of its passengers. Hence, the dismissal of
petitioner is valid. His failure to comply with the weight requirement is a ground
for dismissal, as provided in Art. 282(e) of the Labor Code.
The business of PAL is air transportation. As such, it has committed itself to safely
transport its passengers. In order to achieve this, it must necessarily rely on its
employees, most particularly the cabin flight deck crew who are on board the
aircraft. The weight standards of PAL should be viewed as imposing strict norms of
discipline upon its employees. In other words, the primary objective of PAL in the
imposition of the weight standards for cabin crew is flight safety. It cannot be
gainsaid that cabin attendants must maintain agility at all times in order to inspire
passenger confidence on their ability to care for the passengers when something
goes wrong. It is not farfetched to say that airline companies, just like all common
carriers, thrive due to public confidence on their safety records. People, especially
the riding public, expect no less than that airline companies transport their
passengers to their respective destinations safely and soundly. A lesser
performance is unacceptable