1-United Transport Koalisyon (1-UTAK) v.

COMELEC
J. Reyes | April 14, 2015
Equal Protection – Relevance to the Purpose of the Law

DOCTRINE:
The right to participate in electoral processes is a basic and fundamental right in any
democracy. It includes not only the right to vote, but also the right to urge others to vote for a
particular candidate. The right to express one's preference for a candidate is likewise part of
the fundamental right to free speech. Thus, any governmental restriction on the right to
convince others to vote for a candidate carries with it a heavy presumption of invalidity.

SUMMARY:
For the 2013 elections, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 9615 which prohibits campaign
materials in PUVs and transport terminals. 1-UTAK (a group of PUV and transport terminal
owners) assailed the constitutionality of said Resolution. SC said Reso 9615 is NULL AND
VOID for being violative of FREE SPEECH and EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE. Free speech
was violated because the right to advertise / express preference for a specific candidate was
controlled/supervised by COMELEC (who had no authority to do so). Equal protection was
violated because the Resolution differentiated between public and private vehicle owners, but
said classification was not based on substantial differences and not germane to the purpose of
the law.

FACTS:

1. February 12, 2001 – RA 9006 aka Fair Elections Act was passed.
a. Section 9 provides:
Sec. 9. Posting of Campaign Materials. - The COMELEC may authorize political parties and party-
list groups to erect common poster areas for their candidates in not more than ten (10) public
places such as plazas, markets, barangay centers and the like, wherein candidates can post,
display or exhibit election propaganda: Provided that the size of the poster areas shall not exceed
twelve (12) by sixteen (16) feet or its equivalent.
Independent candidates with no political parties may likewise be authorized to erect common
poster areas in not more than ten (10) public places, the size of which shall not exceed four (4)
by six (6) feet or its equivalent.
Candidates may post any lawful propaganda material in private places with the consent of the
owner thereof, and in public places or property which shall be allocated equitably and impartially
among the candidates.
2. January 15, 2013 - COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 9615, which provided for the
rules implementing R.A. No. 9006 in connection with the May 13, 2013 national and local
elections and subsequent elections.
a. Section 7 provides:
SEC. 7. Prohibited Forms of Election Propaganda. - During the campaign period, it is unlawful:

xxx (f) To post, display or exhibit any election campaign or propaganda material outside
of authorized common poster areas, in public places, or in private properties without the
consent of the owner thereof.
(g) Public places referred to in the previous subsection (f) include any of the following:
xxx 5. Public utility vehicles such as buses, jeepneys, trains, taxi cabs, ferries,
pedicabs and tricycles, whether motorized or not;
 6. Within the premises of public transport terminals, such as bus terminals,
airports, seaports, docks, piers, train stations, and the like.

The violation of items [5 and 6] under subsection (g) shall be a cause for the revocation of the
public utility franchise and will make the owner and/or operator of the transportation service and/or
terminal liable for an election offense under Section 9 of Republic Act No. 9006 as implemented
by Section 18 (n) of these Rules.

3. January 30, 2013 – 1-UTAK through Melencio F. Vargas (president) sought to clarify Reso
9615 Sec 7 (g) 5 and 6.
a. 1-UTAK explained that the prohibition stated in the aforementioned provisions
impedes the right to free speech of the private owners of PUVs and transport
terminals.
b. 1-UTAK then requested the COMELEC to reconsider the implementation of the
assailed provisions and allow private owners of PUVs and transport terminals to
post election campaign materials on their vehicles and transport terminals.
4. February 5, 2013 - COMELEC issued Minute Resolution No. 13-0214, which denied 1-
UTAK’s request to reconsider the implementation of Section 7(g) 5 and 6 of Resolution
No. 9615. Explanation of COMELEC:
a. Does 1 -UTAK or any other [PUV] owners in the same po]sition possess a
franchise and/or certificate of public convenience and operate as a public utility?
i. If it does not, then the ruling in Adiong applies squarely. (See letter C
below.)
ii. If it does, then its operations will be placed directly under the supervision
and regulation of COMELEC for the duration of the election period so as to
ensure equality of opportunity, time, and space for all candidates in the
placement of political advertisements. Having placed their property for use
by the general public and having secured a license or permit to do so, 1-
UTAK and other PUV owners, as well as transport terminal owners, cannot
now complain that their property is subject to regulation by the State.
b. The Constitution itself, under Section 6, Article XII, commands that the use of
property bears a social function and all economic agents shall contribute to the
common good; and there is no higher Common good than that as espoused in
R.A. No. 9006 - the equalization of opportunities for all candidates for political office
during elections - a policy which Res. No. 9615 merely implements.
c. As required in Adiong, and in compliance with the O'Brien standards, the
prohibition furthers two important and substantial governmental interests:
i. equalizing opportunity, time, and space for all candidates
ii. putting to a stop excessive campaign spending.
The infringement of freedom is merely incidental and limited as to time. COMELEC
has not taken away all avenues of expression available to PUV and transport
terminal owners. They may express their political preferences elsewhere.
d. The exact purpose for placing political advertisements on a PUV or in transport
terminals is because
i. it is public and can be seen by all
ii. although it is true that private vehicles ply the same route as public vehicles,
there is more exposure to advertisements in PUVs than in private vehicles.

(NOTE: 1-UTAK presented 4 issues, but Court summarized it into just one.)
ISSUE/HELD/RATIO: W/N Reso 9615 is valid regulation – NO. Section 7(g) items (5) and (6),
in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615 unduly infringe on the fundamental right of the
people to freedom of speech and the equal protection clause.
A. Free speech
1. Definition of free speech
- MEANING: It is the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of public concern
without prior restraint or censorship and subsequent punishment. Prior restraint refers to
official governmental restrictions on the press or other forms of expression in advance of
actual publication or dissemination. Freedom from prior restraint is largely freedom from
government censorship of publications, whatever the form of censorship, and regardless
of whether it is wielded by the executive, legislative or judicial branch of the government.
- IMPORTANCE: Freedom of speech and of the press enjoys a preferred status in our
hierarchy of rights. The rationale is that the preservation of other rights depends on how
well we protect our freedom of speech and of the press. It has been our constant holding
that this preferred freedom calls all the more for utmost respect when what may be
curtailed is the dissemination of information to make more meaningful the equally vital
right of suffrage.

2. The particular items in Reso 9615 unduly infringe on the right of the people to
freedom of speech.
- Posting an election campaign material during an election period in PUVs and transport
terminals carries with it the penalty of revocation of the public utility franchise and shall
make the owner thereof liable for an election offense.
- The prohibition constitutes a clear prior restraint on the right to free expression of the
owners of PUVs and transport terminals. As a result of the prohibition, owners of PUVs
and transport terminals are forcefully and effectively inhibited from expressing their
preferences under the pain of indictment for an election offense and the revocation of their
franchise or permit to operate.

3. The assailed prohibition is an invalid content-neutral regulation.

- CONTENT-NEUTRAL MEANING: A content-neutral regulation, i.e., which is merely
concerned with the incidents of the speech, or one that merely controls the time, place or
manner, and under well-defined standards, is constitutionally permissible, even if it
restricts the right to free speech, provided that the following requisites concur:
o The government regulation is within the constitutional power of the Government
o It furthers an important or substantial governmental interest
o The governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression
o The incidental restriction on freedom of expression is no greater than is essential
to the furtherance of that interest.
- RESO 9615 is a content-neutral regulation BUT IT FAILS TO SATISFY ALL OF THE
REQUISITES to be a valid content-neutral regulation. (SC said all requisites are not
satisfied, but only requisites 1 and 4 were discussed.)

4. (Requisite # 1 failed) It is not within the COMELEC’s power to supervise or regulate

the prohibition in Reso 9615.
- Adiong case: The Court, while recognizing that the COMELEC has supervisory power vis-
a-vis the conduct and manner of elections under Section 4, Article IX-C of the Constitution,
nevertheless held that such supervisory power does not extend to the very freedom of an
 individual to express his preference of candidates in an election by placing election
campaign stickers on his vehicle.
- National Press Club v. COMELEC: the grant of supervisory and regulatory powers to the
COMELEC under Section 4, Article IX-C of the Constitution, is limited to ensuring equal
opportunity, time, space, and the right to reply among candidates.
- Social Weather Stations v. COMELEC: The Court declared unconstitutional a regulation
prohibiting the release of election surveys prior to the election since it "actually suppresses
a whole class of expression, while allowing the expression of opinion concerning the same
subject matter by newspaper columnists, radio and TV commentators, armchair theorists,
and other opinion makers."
- Instant case: COMELEC's constitutionally delegated powers of supervision and regulation
do not extend to the ownership per se of PUVs and transport terminals, but only to the
franchise or permit to operate the same.
o Tatad v. Garcia: In law, there is a clear distinction between the "operation" of a
public utility and the ownership of the facilities and equipment used to serve the
public. The right to operate a public utility may exist independently and separately
from the ownership of the facilities thereof. One can own said facilities without
operating them as a public utility, or conversely, one may operate a public utility
without owning the facilities used to serve the public.

5. (Requisite # 4 failed) Reso 9615 is not necessary to further the stated governmental
interest i.e., ensuring equal opportunity, time and space among candidates aimed
at the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.
- There is absolutely no necessity to restrict the right of the owners of PUVs and transport
terminals to free speech to further the governmental interest. While ensuring equality of
time, space, and opportunity to candidates is an important and substantial governmental
interest and is essential to the conduct of an orderly election, this lofty aim may be
achieved sans any intrusion on the fundamental right of expression.
o While Reso 9615 was promulgated by the COMELEC to implement the provisions
of R.A. No. 9006, the prohibition on posting of election campaign materials on
PUVs and transport terminals was not provided for therein.
o There are more than sufficient provisions in our present election laws that would
ensure equal time, space, and opportunity to candidates in elections.
 Section 6 of R.A. No. 9006 mandates that "all registered parties and bona
fide candidates shall have equal access to media time and space" and
outlines the guidelines to be observed in the implementation thereof.
 Section 9 of R.A. No. 9006 authorizes political parties and party-list groups
and independent candidates to erect common poster areas and candidates
to post lawful election campaign materials in private places, with the
consent of the owner thereof, and in public places or property, which are
allocated equitably and impartially.
 Section 13 of R.A. No. 7166 provides for the authorized expenses of
registered political parties and candidates for every voter; it affords
candidates equal opportunity in their election campaign by regulating the
amount that should be spent for each voter.
 Section 14 of R.A. No. 7166 requires all candidates and treasurers of
registered political parties to submit a statement of all contributions and
expenditures in connection with the election.
 Section 14 is a post-audit measure that aims to ensure that the candidates
did not overspend in their election campaign, thereby enforcing the grant
of equal opportunity to candidates under Section 13.
 o A strict implementation of the foregoing provisions of law would suffice to achieve
the governmental interest of ensuring equal time, space, and opportunity for
candidates in elections. There is thus no necessity of still curtailing the right to free
speech of the owners of PUVs and transport terminals by prohibiting them from
posting election campaign materials on their properties.

B. Equal protection clause

1. Definition of equal protection
- "Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated
alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. Similar subjects, in other
words, should not be treated differently, so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly
discriminate against others."
- "The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just those of the
legislature. Its inhibitions cover all the departments of the government including the
political and executive departments, and extend to all actions of a state denying equal
protection of the laws, through whatever agency or whatever guise is taken."
- Nevertheless, the guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in
the application of the laws to all citizens of the state. Equality of operation of statutes does
not mean their indiscriminate operation on persons merely as such, but on persons
according to the circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity of
rights. The Constitution does not require that things, which are different in fact, be treated
in law as though they were the same. The equal protection clause does not forbid
discrimination as to things that are different.

2. The classification in Reso 9615 is impermissible for not being based on substantial
distinction and is not germane to the purpose of the law.
- In order that there can be valid classification so that a discriminatory governmental act
may pass the constitutional norm of equal protection, it is necessary that the four requisites
of valid classification be complied with, namely:
o It must be based upon substantial distinctions
o It must be germane to the purposes of the law
o It must not be limited to existing conditions only
o It must apply equally to all members of the class.
- A distinction exists between PUVs and transport terminals and private vehicles and other
properties in that the former, to be considered as such, needs to secure from the
government either a franchise or a permit to operate. Nevertheless, as pointed out earlier,
the prohibition imposed under Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615
regulates the ownership per se of the PUV and transport terminals; the prohibition does
not in any manner affect the franchise or permit to operate of the PUV and transport
terminals.
- NO SUBSTANTIAL DISTINCTION between owners of PUVs and transport terminals and
owners of private vehicles and other properties.
o REASON: The ownership of PUVs and transport terminals, though made available
for use by the public, remains private. If owners of private vehicles and other
properties are allowed to express their political ideas and opinion by posting
election campaign materials on their properties, there is no cogent reason to deny
the same preferred right to owners of PUVs and transport terminals.
- NOT SUFFICIENT JUSTIFICATION that PUVs and transport terminals are made
available for use by the public.
o REASON: Any election campaign material that would be posted on PUVs and
transport terminals would be seen by many people. However, election campaign
 materials posted on private vehicles and other places frequented by the public
would also be seen by many people. Thus, there is no reason to single out owners
of PUVs and transport terminals in the prohibition against posting of election
campaign materials.
- NOT GERMANE TO THE PURPOSE OF LAW: Classifying owners of PUVs and transport
terminals apart from owners of private vehicles and other properties bears no relation to
the stated purpose of Reso 9615, i.e., to provide equal time, space and opportunity to
candidates in elections. To stress, PUVs and transport terminals are private properties.
Indeed, the nexus between the restriction on the freedom of expression of owners of PUVs
and transport terminals and the government's interest in ensuring equal time, space, and
opportunity for candidates in elections was not established by the COMELEC.
-
DISPOSITIVE:
- Petition granted.
- Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615 issued by
the Commission on Elections are hereby declared NULL and VOID for being repugnant to
Sections 1 and 4, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.