1.

Arrest
*Rule 113, Rules of Court

GERONIMO v. RAMOS
G.R. No. 192793: February 22, 2011
PERALTA, J.:

Facts: Petitioner was proclaimed winner for the mayoralty race during the May 10, 2010 Automated Elections for
the Municipality of Cajidiocan, Province of Romblon. The proclamation was based on the COC, but without the
official signed Certificate of Canvass for Proclamation (COCP). This was done with the approval of the Provincial
Board of Canvassers (PBOC) Chairman. Subsequently, private respondent Nicasio Ramos, who was also a mayoralty
candidate in the same election, requested the COMELEC to conduct a manual reconciliation of the votes cast.
Issue: Whether the respondent judge acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction

Held:
In election cases involving an act or an omission of a municipal or a regional trial court, the petition shall be filed
exclusively with the Commission on Elections, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
Since it is the COMELEC which has jurisdiction to take cognizance of an appeal from the decision of the
regional trial court in election contests involving elective municipal officials, then it is also the COMELEC which has
jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. Clearly, petitioner erred in invoking this
Court's power to issue said extraordinary writ.
The petition is dismissed.

Pagandaman v. Casar
G.R. No. 71782, April 14, 1988
NARVASA, J.:

Facts: The shooting incident by armed men in Lanao led to the issuance of a warrant of arrest. Petitioners assert that
the respondent Judge issued a warrant of arrest against fifty (50) “John Does” transgressing the Constitutional
provision requiring that such warrants should particularly describe the persons or things to be seized.

Issue: Whether said warrant is valid

Held: No. Insofar as said warrant is issued against fifty (50) “John Does” not one of whom the witnesses to the
complaint could or would identify, it is of the nature of a general warrant, one of a class of writs long proscribed as
unconstitutional and once anathematized as “totally subversive of the liberty of the subject.”[30] Clearly violative of
the constitutional injunction that warrants of arrest should particularly describe the person or persons to be
seized,[31] the warrant must, as regards its unidentified subjects, be voided.

Soliven v. Mckasiar
G.R. No. 82827 November 14, 1988
PER CURIAM:

Facts: Luis Beltran is among the petitioners in this case. He, together with others, was charged with libel by the then
president Corzaon Aquino. Cory herself filed a complaint-affidavit against him and others. Makasiar averred that
Cory cannot file a complaint affidavit because this would defeat her immunity from suit. He grounded his contention
on the principle that a president cannot be sued. However, if a president would sue then the president would allow
herself to be placed under the court’s jurisdiction and conversely she would be consenting to be sued back. Also,
considering the functions of a president, the president may not be able to appear in court to be a witness for herself
thus she may be liable for contempt.

Issue: Whether or not such immunity can be invoked by Beltran, a person other than the president.

Held: No. The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the exercise
of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive
of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office-holder’s time, also demands undivided
attention.
But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may be invoked
only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the President’s behalf. Thus, an accused like Beltran et
al, in a criminal case in which the President is the complainant cannot raise the presidential privilege as a defense to
prevent the case from proceeding against such accused.

People v. Barros
[GR 90640, 29 March 1994]
Feliciano (J)

Facts: members of the P.C. Mountain Province Command, rode the Dangwa Bus bound for Sabangan, Mountain
Province. Upon reaching Chackchakan, Bontoc, Mountain Province, the bus stopped and both, who were seated at
the back, saw Bonifacio Barros carrying a carton, board the bus and seated himself on seat 18 after putting the carton
under his seat. Thereafter, the bus continued and upon reaching Sabangan, before they alighted, it being their
station, called C2C [Fernando] Bongyao to inspect the carton under seat 18, he found out that it contained marijuana
and he asked the passengers who the owner of the carton was but nobody answered.

Issue: Whether the failure of the carton bearer to object to the search made in the moving vehicle, resulting to his
warrantless arrest, constitutes a waiver.

Held: The general rule is that a search and seizure must be carried out through or with a judicial warrant; otherwise
such search and seizure becomes "unreasonable". Hence,will be inadmissible in evidence "for any purpose in any
proceeding." Peace officers may lawfully conduct searches of moving vehicles without need of a warrant, In carrying
out warrantless searches of moving vehicles, however, peace officers are limited to routine checks, that is, the
vehicles are neither really searched nor their occupants subjected to physical or body searches, the examination of
the vehicles being limited to visual inspection. The "fruits" of the invalid search and seizure and should therefore not
have been admitted in evidence against Barros.

Morano v. Vivo
G.R. No. L-22196 June 30, 1967
SANCHEZ, J.:

Facts: Chan Sau Wah, a Chinese citizen born in Fukien, China arrived in the Philippines to visit her cousin, Samuel
Lee Malaps. She left China and her children by a first marriage: Fu Tse Haw and Fu Yan Kai both minors, in the care
of neighbors in Fukien, China. Chan Sau wah arrived in the Philippines with Fu Yan Fun, her minor son also by the
first marriage.. Born to this union on September 1962 was Esteban Morano, Jr. To prolong their stay in the
Philippines, Chan Sau Wah and Fu Yan Fun obtained several extensions. The last extension expired, the
Commissioner of Immigration ordered Chan Sau Wah and her son, Fu Yan Fun, to leave the country on or before
September 10, 1962 with a warning that upon failure so to do, he will issue a warrant for their arrest and will cause
the confiscation of their bond.

Issue: Whether or Not the issuance of the warrant of arrest is unconstitutional.

Ruling: Chan Sau Wah entered the Philippines on a tourist-temporary visitor's visa. She is a non-immigrant.
Warrants of arrest may be issued by administrative authorities only for the purpose of carrying out a final
finding of a violation of law, like an order of deportation or an order of contempt, and not for the sole purpose of
investigation or prosecution. It is also held that the requirement of probable cause is not applicable in deportation
proceedings, which are not criminal in nature. The order of deportation is purely administrative, its purpose being
not punishment but the return to his country of the alien who has violated the conditions for the admission to the
local state.

HARVEY V. DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO 162 SCRA 840; G.R. NO. 82544; 28 JUN 1988

Facts: The “Operation Report” read that Andrew Harvey was found together with two young boys. Richard Sherman
was found with two naked boys inside his room. While Van Den Elshout in the “after Mission Report” read that two
children of ages 14 and 16 has been under his care and subjects confirmed being live-in for some time now.
Seized during the petitioner’s apprehension were rolls of photo negatives and photos of suspected child
prostitutes shown in scandalous poses as well as boys and girls engaged in sex. Warrants of Arrest were issued.

Issues:
1) Whether or Not the Commissioner has the power to arrest and detain petitioners pending determination
of existence of probable cause.
Held: While pedophilia is not a crime under the Revised Penal Code, it violates the declared policy of the state to
promote and protect the physical, moral, spiritual and social well-being of the youth. The arrest of petitioners was
based on the probable cause determined after close surveillance of 3 months. The existence of probable cause
justified the arrest and seizure of articles linked to the offense. The articles were seized as an incident to a lawful
arrest; therefore, the articles are admissible evidences.

CALLANTA VS. VILLANUEVA 77 SCRA 377; G.R. NOS. 24646 & L-24674; 20 JUN 1977

Facts:
Petitioner questions the validity of the issuance of warrant of arrest by respondent, arguing that the City Fiscal should
have conducted the preliminary investigation. According to petitioner’s counsel, there was jurisdictional infirmity.
After the issuance of the warrants of arrest and the bail fixed at P600, petitioner posted the bail bond, thus obtaining
her provisional liberty. The City Fiscal in this case did not disagree with the judge’s investigation, and agreed with
the complaints filed.

Issue: Whether or Not petitioner’s contentions are to be given merit.

Held: Based on many precedent cases of the Supreme Court, “where the accused has filed bail and waived the
preliminary investigation proper, he has waived whatever defect, if any, in the preliminary examination conducted
prior to the issuance of the warrant of arrest”. In the case at bar, it is futile for the petitioner to question the validity
of the issuance of the warrant of arrest, because she posted the bail bond. Petitioner also erred in arguing that only
the City Fiscal can conduct a preliminary investigation.
 2. Privacy of Communication and Correspondence

SALCEDO-ORTANEZ V CA
G.R. No. 110662 | August 4, 1994 | J. Padilla

Facts:
Private respondent Rafael Ortanez filed with the Quezon City RTC a complaint for annulment of marriage
with damages against petitioner Teresita Salcedo-Ortanez, on grounds of lack of marriage license and/or
psychological incapacity of the petitioner.
Among the exhibits offered by private respondent were three (3) cassette tapes of alleged telephone
conversations between petitioner and unidentified persons.
Teresita submitted her Objection/Comment to Rafael’s oral offer of evidence.
Issue:
1. W/N the recordings of the telephone conversations are admissible in evidence.

Held:
No. Rep. Act No. 4200 entitled “An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations
of the Privacy of Communication, and for other purposes” expressly makes such tape recordings
inadmissible in evidence thus:
Absent a clear showing that both parties to the telephone conversations allowed the recording of
the same, the inadmissibility of the subject tapes is mandatory under Rep. Act No. 4200.

Felipe Navarro vs Court of Appeals

FACTS: Enrique Lingan and Stanley Jalbuena, both radio reporters went to a police station to report for a blotter.
During the course, a heated argument arose between police officer Navarro and the two reporters. Navarro then
poked his cocked firearm on the face of Jalbuena. Lingan interfered, this then irked Navarro and then and there hit
Lingan with the handle of his pistol above the left eyebrow. This caused Lingan to fall on the floor bloodied.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is an aggravating circumstance against Navarro due to the fact that he committed such
crime in the police station?

HELD: A police station is a place wherein public authorities such as policemen are engaged in the discharge of their
duties. Since Navarro, who is a cop, committed the crime inside the police station, an aggravating circumstance is
appreciated against him.as a result, there is an aggravating circumstance against Navarro due to the fact that he
committed such crime in the police station.

Cecilia Zulueta vs Court of Appeals and Alfredo Martin

(253 SCRA 699)
GR no. 107383 February 20, 1996

Facts:
Cecilia Zulueta is the Petitioner who offset the private papers of his husband Dr. Alfredo Martin. Dr. Martin
is a doctor of medicine while he is not in his house His wife took the 157 documents consisting of diaries, cancelled
check, greeting cards, passport and photograph, private respondents between her Wife and his alleged paramours,
by means of forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet. Cecilia Zulueta filed the papers for the evidence of her case
of legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine against her husband.
Issue:
The papers and other materials obtained from forcible intrusion and from unlawful means are admissible
as evidence in court regarding marital separation and disqualification from medical practice.

Ruling/Held:
The documents and papers are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring “the
privacy of communication and correspondence to be inviolable is no less applicable simply because it is the wife who
thinks herself aggrieved by her husband’s infidelity, who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to
be enforced.
The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a lawful order from a court or when
public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law.

Alejano v. Cabuay, GR 160792, August 25, 2005

FACTS: A directive was issued to all Major Service Commanders to take into custody the military personnel under
their command who took part in the Oakwood incident. Petitioners filed a petition for habeas corpus with SC. The
SC issued a resolution, which required respondents to make a return of the writ and to appear and produce the
persons of the detainees before the CA. CA dismissed the petition because the detainees are already charged of
coup d’etat. Habeas corpus is unavailing in this case as the detainees’ confinement is under a valid indictment.

ISSUE: What is the objective of the writ of habeas corpus?

HELD: The duty to hear the petition for habeas corpus necessarily includes the determination of the propriety of the
remedy. The remedy of habeas corpus has one objective: to inquire into the cause of detention of a person. The
purpose of the writ is to determine whether a person is being illegally deprived of his liberty. If the inquiry reveals
that the detention is illegal, the court orders the release of the person. If, however, the detention is proven lawful,
then the habeas corpus proceedings terminate. The use of habeas corpus is thus very limited. It is not a writ of error.
Neither can it substitute for an appeal.
 3. Freedom of Expression, Right to Assembly and Academic Freedom

FRANCISCO CHAVEZ
vs.
RAUL M. GONZALES, in his capacity as the Secretary of the Department of Justice; and NTC
G.R. No. 168338, February 15, 2008

FACTS: Sometime before 6 June 2005, the radio station dzMM aired the Garci Tapes where the parties to the
conversation discussed “rigging” the results of the 2004 elections to favor President Arroyo. On 6 June 2005,
Presidential spokesperson Bunye held a press conference in Malacañang Palace, where he played before the
presidential press corps two compact disc recordings of conversations between a woman and a man. Bunye
identified the woman in both recordings as President Arroyo but claimed that the contents of the second compact
disc had been “spliced” to make it appear that President Arroyo was talking to Garcillano.
However, on 9 June 2005, Bunye backtracked and stated that the woman’s voice in the compact discs was
not President Arroyo’s after all
ISSUE: The principal issue for resolution is whether the NTC warning embodied in the press release of 11 June 2005
constitutes an impermissible prior restraint on freedom of expression.

RULING:
the rule is that expression is not subject to any prior restraint or censorship because the
Constitution commands that freedom of expression shall not be abridged. Over time, however, courts have
carved out narrow and well defined exceptions to this rule out of necessity.
 The exceptions, when expression may be subject to prior restraint, apply in this jurisdiction to only
four categories of expression, namely: pornography, false or misleading advertisement, advocacy of
imminent lawless action, and danger to national security.
All other expression is not subject to prior restraint.

Soriano vs. La Guardia

G.R. No. 164785. April 29, 2009

Facts:
On August 10, 2004, at around 10:00 p.m., petitioner, as host of the program Ang Dating Daan, aired on
UNTV 37, made obscene remarks against INC. Two days after, before the MTRCB, separate but almost identical
affidavit-complaints were lodged by Jessie L. Galapon and seven other private respondents, all members of the
Iglesia ni Cristo (INC), against petitioner in connection with the above broadcast. Respondent Michael M. Sandoval,
who felt directly alluded to in petitioner’s remark, was then a minister of INC and a regular host of the TV program
Ang Tamang Daan.

Issue:
Whether or not Soriano’s statements during the televised “Ang Dating Daan” part of the religious discourse
and within the protection of Section 5, Art. III.

Held:
No. Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, therefore, and considering the adverse effect of
petitioner’s utterances on the viewers’ fundamental rights as well as petitioner’s clear violation of his duty as a public
trustee, the MTRCB properly suspended him from appearing in Ang Dating Daan for three months. Furthermore, it
cannot be properly asserted that petitioner’s suspension was an undue curtailment of his right to free speech either
as a prior restraint or as a subsequent punishment. There are few, if any, thoughts that cannot be expressed by the
use of less offensive language.

GMA NETWORK, INC., ET AL. vs. JESUS G. BUSTOS, ET AL.

G.R. No. 146848 October 17, 2006

FACTS: A Petition for Mandamus filed by the unsuccessful examinees of the physician’s licensure examinations
before the RTC of Manila to compel the PRC and the board of medical examiners to re-check and reevaluate the test
papers. As alleged, mistakes in the counting of the total scores and erroneous checking of answers to test questions
vitiated the results of the examinations. As news writer and reporter of petitioner GMA Network, Inc. assigned to
gather news from courts, among other beats, its co-petitioner Rey Vidal covered the filing of the mandamus petition.
.

ISSUE:
Whether the said news report was within the ambit of privileged communication

HELD:
Yes. The disputed news report consists merely of a summary of the allegations in the said Petition for
Mandamus filed by the medical examinees making the same fall within the protected ambit of privileged
communication. GMA and Vidal cannot be held liable for damages claimed by respondents for simply bringing to
fore information on subjects of public concern.
Privileged matters may be absolute or qualified. Absolutely privileged matters are not actionable regardless
of the existence of malice in fact.
G.R. No. 170643 September 8, 2006
JEJOMAR C. BINAY, for and in behalf of his minor daughter, JOANNA MARIE BIANCA S. BINAY,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, GENINI V. FACTAO and VICENTE G. TIROL

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J:

Facts:
In the April 15-21, 2001 issue of Pinoy Times Special Edition, an article entitled" ALYAS ERAP JR." was
published regarding the alleged extravagant lifestyle of the Binays and the assets that they acquired while in public
office. Paragraph 25 of the article reads:
Si Joanne Marie Bianca, 13 ang sinasabing ampong anak ng mga Binay, ay bumibili ng panty na
nagkakahalaga ng P1,000 ang isa, ayon sa isang writer ni Binay. Magarboang pamumuhay ng batang ito
dahil naspoiled umano ng kanyang ama.

Based on this article, Elenita S. Binay, mother of the minor Joanna Marie Bianca, filed a complaint for libel
against private respondents VPetitioner claims that the article is defamatory.
Issue:
The issue to be resolved is whether there is prima facie evidence showing that the subject article was
libelous.

Held:
Yes. The court cannot discern a legal, moral, or social duty in publishing Joanna’s status as an adopted
daughter. Neither is there any public interest respecting her purchases of panties worth P1,000. Whether she indeed
bought those panties is not something that the public can afford protection against. With this backdrop, it is obvious
that private respondents’ only motive is to embarrass Joanna before the reading public.

G.R. No. 203335, 11 February 2014

Disini, et al.
v.
The Secretary of Justice, et al.,

FACTS
Petitioners lament that libel provisions of the penal code and, in effect, the libel provisions of the
cybercrime law carry with them the requirement of “presumed malice” even when the latest jurisprudence already
replaces it with the higher standard of “actual malice” as a basis for conviction. Petitioners argue that inferring
“presumed malice” from the accused’s defamatory statement by virtue of Article 354 of the penal code infringes on
his constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression.

ISSUE
Whether or not Section 4(c)(4) of the Cybercrime Prevention Act on cyber libel affected the requirement of
“actual malice” as opposed to “presumed malice” as basis for conviction of libel.

RULING
The prosecution bears the burden of proving the presence of actual malice in instances where such element
is required to establish guilt. The defense of absence of actual malice, even when the statement turns out to be false,
is available where the offended party is a public official or a public figure, as in the cases of Vasquez (a barangay
official) and Borjal (the Executive Director, First National Conference on Land Transportation). But, where the
offended party is a private individual, the prosecution need not prove the presence of malice. The law explicitly
presumes its existence (malice in law) from the defamatory character of the assailed statement.
G.R. No. L-69500 July 22, 1985
JOSE ANTONIO U. GONZALEZ in behalf of MALAYA FILMS, LINO BROCKA, JOSE F. LACABA, and DULCE Q. SAGUISAG
Vs.
CHAIRMAN MARIA KALAW KATIGBAK, GENERAL WILFREDO C. ESTRADA (Ret.), and THE BOARD OF REVIEW FOR
MOTION PICTURES AND TELEVISION (BRMPT)
Facts: In a resolution of a sub-committee of respondent Board of October 23, 1984, a permit to exhibit the film Kapit
sa Patalim under the classification "For Adults Only," with certain changes and deletions enumerated was granted.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioners stating that the classification of the film "For Adults Only" was
without basis. 4 Then on November 12, 1984, respondent Board released its decision: "Acting on the applicant's
Motion for Reconsideration dated 29 October 1984, the Board, after a review of the resolution of the sub-committee
and an examination of the film, resolves to affirm in toto the ruling of the sub-committee.

Issue: Whether the rating made with grave abuse of discretion

Held:
Roth- Sex and obscenity are not synonymous. Obscene material is material which deals with sex in a manner
appealing to prurient interest. The portrayal of sex, e.g., in art, literature and scientific works, is not itself sufficient
reason to deny material the constitutional protection of freedom of speech and press. Sex, a great and mysterious
motive force in human life has indisputably been a subject of absorbing interest to mankind through the ages; it is
one of the vital problems of human interest and public concern.
But, sadly, THERE WERE NOT ENOUGH VOTES TO MAINTAIN THAT THERE WAS GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION. The supporting evidence was in the fact that some scenes were not for young people.

MTRCB v. ABS-CBN
G.R. No. 155282. January 17, 2005
J. Sandoval Gutierrez

Facts:
Respondent abs-cbn aired “Prosti-tuition”, an episode of the TV program “The Inside Story” produced and
hosted by respondent Legarda. It depicted female students moonlighting as prostitutes to enable them to pay for
their tuition fees. PWU was named as the school of some of the students involved and the façade of the PWU building
served as the background of the episode. This caused upsoar in the PWU community and they filed a letter-complaint
to the MTRCB.

After hearing and submission of the parties’ memoranda, MTRCB investigating committee ordered the
respondents to pay P20,000 for non-submission of the program MTRCB affirmed the ruling Respondents filed a
special civil action for certiorari with RTC QC.

Issue:
Whether the MTRCB has the power or authority to review the “Inside Story” prior its exhibition or broadcast
by TV.

Held:

The court in INC v. CA rules that PD 1986 gives MTRCB the power to screen, review and examine ALL TV
PROGRAMS *LESSON* where the law does not make any exceptions, courts may not exempt something therefrom,
unless there is compelling reason apparent in the law to justify it.
Thus, when the law says “all TV programs”, the word all covers all tv programs whether religious, public
affairs, news docu, etc. It then follows that since the Inside Story is a TV Program, MTRCB has the power to review
it.
SOCIAL WEATHER STATIONS, INC.
VS.
JUDGE MAXIMIANO C. ASUNCION

FACTS:
Published under the by-line of one Marichu Villanueva and titled “Judiciary worse than PNP,” an item in the
June 17, 1993 issue of the Manila Standard, a metropolitan daily, reported that the results of the latest opinion polls
conducted by the Ateneo Social Weather Station, as Social Weather Stations, Inc. (or SWS) is also known, showed
the Judiciary to have an even lower satisfaction rating that the Philippine National Police. The item went on to state
that the President and his Cabinet had been briefed on the results of the survey by Professors Mahar Mangahas and
Felipe Miranda of the SWS, and that Malacanang had expressed concern over the Judiciary’s law standing.

ISSUE:
Whether the Order dated 17 June 1993 is violative of the constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech
and freedom from prior restraint.

HELD:
No. What was clearly implicit in the newspaper report about the results of the SWS poll - in the words of
Judge Asuncion, “that the people have more confidence with the police than with the judges” – in light of the fact,
of which judicial notice is taken, that said report came out at a time when there already was widespread publicity
adverse to the judiciary, there can be no doubt of its clear tendency to degrade the administration of justice. Thus,
Judge Asuncion can hardly be faulted for what, at a minimum, he must have felt duty-bound to doing the
circumstances.

Blo Umpar Adiong

vs.
Commision on Elections
(G.R. No. 1013956, March 31, 1992)

FACTS:
Blo Umpar Adiong, a senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections assails that the Comelec’s
Resolution which prohibits the posting of decals and stickers in mobile places like cars and other moving vehicles is
violative of Section 82 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 11(a) of Republic Act No. 6646. In addition, the
petitioner believes that with the ban on radio, television and print political advertisements, he, being a neophyte in
the field of politics stands to suffer grave and irreparable injury with his prohibition. The posting of decals and
stickers on cars and other moving vehicles would be his last medium to inform the electorate that he is a senatorial
candidate in May 11,1992 elections.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Comelec may prohibit the posting of decals and stickers on “mobile” places, public or
private, and limit their location or publication to the authorized posting areas that it fixes.

RULING:
The portion of Section 15(a) of Resolution No. 2347 of the Comelec providing that “decals and stickers may
be posted only in any authorized posting areas provided in paragraph (f) of Section 21 hereof” is declared NULL AND
VOID. The Comelec’s probation on posting decals and stickers on “mobile” places whether public or private except
in designated areas provided for by the Comelec itself is also NULL AND VOID on constitutional grounds.

Pablito Sanidad
vs
Commission on Elections
73 SCRA 333

Facts:
On 2 Sept 1976, Marcos issued PD No. 991 calling for a national referendum on 16 Oct 1976 for the Citizens
Assemblies to resolve, among other things, the issues of martial law, the interim assembly. On September 27, 1976,
Sanidad filed a Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the Commission on Elections from holding
and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to declare without force and effect Presidential Decree
Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they propose amendments to the Constitution, as well as Presidential Decree No.
1031, insofar as it directs the Commission on Elections to supervise, control, hold, and conduct the Referendum-
Plebiscite scheduled on October 16, 1976.Petitioners contend the Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16 has no
constitutional or legal basis.

ISSUE: Whether or not Marcos can validly propose amendments to the Constitution.

HELD: Yes. The amending process both as to proposal and ratification raises a judicial question. This is especially
true in cases where the power of the Presidency to initiate the amending process by proposals of amendments, a
function normally exercised by the legislature, is seriously doubted. Under the terms of the 1973 Constitution, the
power to propose amendments to the Constitution resides in the interim National Assembly during the period of
transition (Sec. 15, Transitory Provisions). After that period, and the regular National Assembly in its active session,
the power to propose amendments becomes ipso facto the prerogative of the regular National Assembly .
ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 133486, January 28, 2000

Facts:
ABS-CBN raised a petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) en banc Resolution No. 98-14191 dated April 21, 1998. In the said Resolution, the poll body
RESOLVED to approve the issuance of a restraining order to stop ABS-CBN or any other groups, its agents or
representatives from conducting such exit survey and to authorize the Honorable Chairman to issue the same.
The electoral body believed that such project might conflict with the official COMELEC count, as well as the
unofficial quick count of the National Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL).

Issue:
Whether or not the assailed resolution is valid.

Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court ruled that the absolute ban imposed by the COMELEC cannot be justified. It does
not leave open any alternative channel of communication to gather the type of information obtained through exit
polling. On the other hand, there are other valid and reasonable ways and means to achieve the COMELEC end of
avoiding or minimizing disorder and confusion that may be brought about by exit surveys.
A specific limited area for conducting exit polls may be designated. Only professional survey groups may be allowed
to conduct the same. Pollsters may be kept at a reasonable distance from the voting center.

SOCIAL WEATHER STATIONS, INCORPORATED and KAMAHALAN PUBLISHING CORPORATION, doing business as
MANILA STANDARD vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 147571 May 5, 2001

Facts:
Petitioner, Social Weather Stations, Inc. (SWS), is a private non-stock, non-profit social research institution
conducting surveys in various fields, including economics, politics, demography, and social development, and
thereafter processing, analyzing, and publicly reporting the results thereof.
 On the other hand, petitioner Kamahalan Publishing Corporation publishes the Manila Standard, a
newspaper of general circulation, which features news- worthy items of information including election surveys
Petitioners brought this action for prohibition to enjoin the Commission on Elections from enforcing Section 5.4 of
RA. No.9006 (Fair Election Act).

Issue:
Whether or not Section 5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 constitutes an unconstitutional abridgment of freedom of
speech, expression, and the press.

Ruling:
What test should then be employed to determine the constitutional validity of Section 5.4. The United
States Supreme Court, through Chief Justice Warren, held in United States v. O 'Brien: A Government regulation is
sufficiently justified when [1] if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; [2] if it furthers an important
or substantial governmental interest; [3] if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression; and [4] if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms of speech, expression and
press is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
This is so far the most influential test for distinguishing content-based from content neutral regulations and
is said to have "become canonical in the review of such laws."

GMA NETWORK, INC. vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 205357, September 2, 2014

Facts:
The five petitions before the Court put in issue the alleged unconstitutionality of Section 9 (a) of COMELEC
Resolution No. 9615 limiting the broadcast and radio advertisements of candidates and political parties for national
election positions to an aggregate total of one hundred twenty (120) minutes and one hundred eighty (180) minutes,
respectively. They contend that such restrictive regulation on allowable broadcast time violates freedom of the
press, impairs the people’s right to suffrage as well as their right to information relative to the exercise of their right
to choose who to elect during the forth coming elections.
Section 9 (a) provides for an “aggregate total” airtime instead of the previous “per station” airtime for political
campaigns or advertisements, and also required prior COMELEC approval for candidates’ television and radio
guestings and appearances.

Issue:
Whether or not Section 9 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 on airtime limits violates freedom of
expression, of speech and of the press.

Ruling:
YES. The Supreme Court held that the assailed rule on “aggregate-based” airtime limits is unreasonable and
arbitrary as it unduly restricts and constrains the ability of candidates and political parties to reach out and
communicate with the people.
The adverted reason for imposing the “aggregate-based” airtime limits leveling the playing field does not
constitute a compelling state interest which would justify such a substantial restriction on the freedom of candidates
and political parties to communicate their ideas, philosophies, platforms and programs of government. And, this is
specially so in the absence of a clear-cut basis for the imposition of such a prohibitive measure.

THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, REPRESENTED BY THE MOST REV. BISHOP VICENTE M. NAVARRA and THE BISHOP
HIMSELF IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE ELECTION OFFICER OF BACOLOD
CITY, ATTY. MAVIL V. MAJARUCON
G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015
Facts:
On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two tarpaulins within a private compound housing the San
Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was approximately six feet (6′) by ten feet (10′) in size. They were
posted on the front walls of the cathedral within public view. The first tarpaulin contains the message “IBASURA RH
Law” referring to the Reproductive Health Law of 2012 or Republic Act No. 10354.
The second tarpaulin is the subject of the present case. This tarpaulin contains the heading “Conscience
Vote” and lists candidates as either “(Anti-RH) Team Buhay” with a check mark, or “(Pro-RH) Team Patay” with an
“X” mark. The electoral candidates were classified according to their vote on the adoption of Republic Act No. 10354,
otherwise known as the RH Law. Those who voted for the passing of the law were classified by petitioners as
comprising “Team Patay,” while those who voted against it form “Team Buhay.”

Issues:
1. Whether or not the tarpaulin and its message are considered religious speech.

Ruling:
No.
The Court held that the churches doctrines relied upon by petitioners are not binding upon this court. The
position of the Catholic religion in the Philippines as regards the RH Law does not suffice to qualify the posting by
one of its members of a tarpaulin as religious speech solely on such basis. The enumeration of candidates on the
face of the tarpaulin precludes any doubt as to its nature as speech with political consequences and not religious
speech.

1-UNITED TRANSPORT KOALISYON (1-UTAK) vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 206020, April 14, 2015

Facts:
On January 15, 2013, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 9615, which provided for the rules
implementing R.A. No. 9006 in connection with the May 13, 2013 national and local elections and subsequent
elections. Section 7 thereof, which enumerates the prohibited forms of election propaganda.

The violation of items [5 and 6] under subsection (g) shall be a cause for the revocation of the public utility
franchise and will make the owner and/or operator of the transportation service and/or terminal liable for an
election offense under Section 9 of Republic Act No. 9006 as implemented by Section 18 (n) of these Rules.

Issue:
Whether or not Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615 are
constitutional.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that the said provisions of Resolution No. 9615 are null and void for being
repugnant to Sections 1 and 4, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.

Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615 unduly infringe on the
fundamental right of the people to freedom of speech. Central to the prohibition is the freedom of individuals, i.e.,
the owners of PUVs and private transport terminals, to express their preference, through the posting of election
campaign material in their property, and convince others to agree with them.

Social Weather Stations vs COMELEC

Facts:
Petitioner, Social Weather Stations, Inc. (SWS) is a private non-stock, non-profit social research institution
conducting surveys in various fields. On the other hand, petitioner Kamahalan Publishing Corporation publishes the
Manila Standard, a newspaper of general circulation.
 Petitioners brought this action for prohibition to enjoin the Commission on Elections from enforcing Section
5.4 of RA. No.9006 (Fair Election Act), which provides that: “Surveys affecting national candidates shall not be
published fifteen (15) days before an election and surveys affecting local candidates shall not be published seven (7)
days before an election”.

Issue:
Whether or not Section 5.4 of RA 9006 constitutes an unconstitutional abridgment of freedom of speech,
expression and the press.

Ruling:
Yes. It constitutes an unconstitutional abridgement of freedom of expression, speech and the press. To
summarize, the Supreme Court held that §5.4 is invalid because (1) it imposes a prior restraint on the freedom of
expression, (2) it is a direct and total suppression of a category of expression even though such suppression is only
for a limited period, and (3) the governmental interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by means other than
suppression of freedom of expression.
It has been held that mere legislative preferences or beliefs respecting matters of public convenience may
well support regulation directed at other personal activities, but be insufficient to justify such as diminishes the
exercise of rights so vital to the maintenance of democratic institutions.

Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines vs. Duque III

Facts:
Executive Order No. 51 (Milk Code) was issued by President Corazon Aquino on October 28, 1986 by virtue
of the legislative powers granted to the president under the Freedom Constitution. One of the preambular clauses
of the Milk Code states that the law seeks to give effect to Article 112 of the International Code of Marketing of
Breast milk Substitutes (ICMBS), a code adopted by the World Health Assembly (WHA) in 1981.
the WHA adopted several Resolutions to the effect that breastfeeding should be supported, promoted and
protected, hence, it should be ensured that nutrition and health claims are not permitted for breast milk substitutes.
In 1990, the Philippines ratified the International Convention on the Rights of the Child.
Issue:
Whether Administrative Order or the Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations (RIRR) issued by the
Department of Health (DOH) is not constitutional;

Ruling:
YES. Under Article 23, recommendations of the WHA do not come into force for members, in the same way
that conventions or agreements under Article 19 and regulations under Article 21 come into force. Article 23 of the
WHO Constitution reads:
Consequently, legislation is necessary to transform the provisions of the WHA Resolutions into domestic
law. The provisions of the WHA Resolutions cannot be considered as part of the law of the land that can be
implemented by executive agencies without the need of a law enacted by the legislature.

Bayan vs. Executive Secretary Ermita

488 SCRA 226, April 25, 2006

Facts:
BAYAN’s rally was violently dispersed. Petitioners were injured, arrested and detained when a peaceful
mass action they was preempted and violently dispersed by the police.
KMU asserts that the right to peaceful assembly, are affected by Batas Pambansa No. 880 and the policy of
“Calibrated Preemptive Response” (CPR) being followed to implement it. KMU, et al., claim that on October 4, 2005,
a rally KMU co-sponsored was to be conducted at the Mendiola bridge but police blocked them along C.M. Recto
and Lepanto Streets and forcibly dispersed them, causing injuries to several of their members. a multi-sectoral rally
which KMU also co-sponsored was scheduled to proceed along España Avenue in front of the UST and going towards
Mendiola bridge. Police officers blocked them along Morayta Street and prevented them from proceeding further.
They were then forcibly dispersed, causing injuries on one of them. Three other rallyists were arrested.

Issue:
Whether or Not BP 880 and the CPR Policy unconstitutional.

Ruling:
No question as to standing. Their right as citizens to engage in peaceful assembly and exercise the right of
petition, as guaranteed by the Constitution, is directly affected by B.P. No. 880. B.P. 880 is not an absolute ban of
public assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the time, place and manner of the assemblies. It refers to
all kinds of public assemblies that would use public places. The reference to “lawful cause” does not make it content-
based because assemblies really have to be for lawful causes; otherwise they would not be “peaceable” and entitled
to protection. Maximum tolerance is for the protection and benefit of all rallyists and is independent of the content
of the expressions in the rally. There is, likewise, no prior restraint, since the content of the speech is not relevant to
the regulation.

Integrated Bar of the Philippines vs. Mayor Lito Atienza

613 SCRA 518

Facts:
In June 2006, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) filed an application for a rally permit with the office
of Manila Mayor Jose “Lito” Atienza. The IBP sought their rally to be staged at the Mendiola Bridge. Atienza granted
the permit but indicated thereon that IBP is only allowed to stage their rally at the Plaza Miranda, a freedom park.
IBP President Jose Anselmo Cadiz received the rally permit on the day before the scheduled rally. Cadiz
immediately went to the Court of Appeals to assail the permit because what Atienza did was only a partial grant
which was alleged to be a violation of the constitutional right to freedom of expression and a grave abuse of
discretion on the part of Atienza.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the certiorari case Cadiz filed against Atienza is a prejudicial question to the criminal case
filed against him
Ruling:
1. No. It is improper for Cadiz to raise the issue of prejudicial question at this stage and in this certiorari case.
Under the Rules of Court, a prejudicial question is a ground to suspend the criminal proceeding. However,
Cadiz must first file a petition to suspend the criminal proceeding in the said criminal case. The
determination of the pendency of a prejudicial question should be made at the first instance in the criminal
action, and not before the Supreme Court in an appeal from the civil action.

Miriam College Foundation, Inc. v CA

348 SCRA 265 December 15, 2000

FACTS:
The members of the editorial board of the Miriam College Foundation’s school paper were subjected to
disciplinary sanction by the College Discipline Committee after letters of complaint were filed before the Board
following the publication of the school paper that contains obscene, vulgar, and sexually explicit contents. Prior to
the disciplinary sanction to the defendants they were required to submit a written statement to answer the
complaints against them to the Discipline Committee but the defendants, instead of doing so wrote to the
Committee to transfer the case to the DECS which they alleged to have the jurisdiction over the issue. Pushing
through with the investigation ex parte the Committee found the defendants guilty and imposed upon them
disciplinary sanctions.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Discipline Board of Miriam College has jurisdiction over the defendants.

HELD:
Section 5 (2), Article XIV of the Constitution guarantees all institutions of higher learning academic freedom.
This institutional academic freedom includes the right of the school or college to decide for itself, its aims and
objectives, and how best to attain them free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding
public welfare calls for some restraint. Such duty gives the institution the right to discipline its students and inculcate
upon them good values, ideals and attitude. The right of students to free speech in school is not always absolute.
The court upheld the right of students for the freedom of expression but it does not rule out disciplinary actions of
the school on the conduct of their students.

Re: Letter of the UP Law Faculty entitled “Restoring Integrity: A Statement by the Faculty of the University of the
Philippines College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court.”

Facts:
Allegations of plagiarism were hurled by Atty. Harry L. Roque, Jr. and Atty. Romel R. Bagares against Justice
Mariano C. Del Castillo for his ponencia in the case of Vinuya v. Executive Secretary. In said case, the Court denied
the petition for certiorari filed by Filipino comfort women to compel certain officers of the executive department to
espouse their claims for reparation and demand apology from the Japanese government for the abuses committed
against them by the Japanese soldiers during World War II. Attys. Roque and Bagares represent the comfort women
in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary, which is presently the subject of a motion for reconsideration.

Issue:
Does the Show Cause Resolution deny respondents their freedom of expression?

Held:
No. A reading of the show cause resolution will plainly show that it was neither the fact that respondents had
criticized a decision of the court nor that they had charged one of its members of plagiarism that motivated the said
resolution. Respondents who are neither parties nor counsels in the vinuya case, have expressed their opinions in
favor of the petitioners in the said pending case for the proper disposition and consideration of the court that gave
rise to the said resolution. The show cause resolution painstakingly enumerated the statements that the court
considered excessive and uncalled for under the circumstances surrounding the issuance, publication and letter
submission to this court of the UP law faculty’s restoring integrity statement.

4. Freedom of Religion

ANG LADLAD VS. COMELEC

618 SCRA 32 (2010)

FACTS:
Petitioner is a national organization which represents the lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and trans-genders. It
filed a petition for accreditation as a party-list organization to public respondent. However, due to moral grounds,
the latter denied the said petition. To buttress their denial, COMELEC cited certain biblical and quranic passages in
their decision. It also stated that since their ways are immoral and contrary to public policy, they are considered
nuissance. In fact, their acts are even punishable under the Revised Penal Code in its Article 201.
 A motion for reconsideration being denied, Petitioner filed this instant Petition on Certiorari under Rule 65
of the ROC.
AngLadlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the exclusion by using religious
dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees against the establishment of religion.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the respondent violated the Non-establishment clause of the Constitution;
HELD:
Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that “[n]o law shall be made respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” At bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is
“government neutrality in religious matters.” Clearly, “governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent
with this policy of neutrality.” We thus find that it was grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the
COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad. Be it noted that government action
must have a secular purpose.

IGLESIA NI CRISTO VS. COURT OFAPPEALS

[259 SCRA 529; G.R. NO. 119673; 26 JUL 1996]

FACTS:
Petitioner has a television program entitled" Ang Iglesia ni Cristo" aired on Channel 2 every Saturday and
on Channel 13 every Sunday. The program presents and propagates petitioner’s religious beliefs, doctrines and
practices often times incomparative studies with other religions. Petitioner submitted to the respondent Board of
Review for Moving Pictures and Television the VTR tapes of its TV program Series Nos. 116, 119, 121 and 128. The
Board classified the series as "X" or not for public viewing on the ground that they "offend and constitute an attack
against other religions which is expressly prohibited by law

ISSUE:
Whether or Not the "ang iglesia ni cristo" program is not constitutionally protected as a form of religious
exercise and expression.

HELD:
Yes. Any act that restrains speech is accompanied with presumption of invalidity. It is the burden of the
respondent Board to overthrow this presumption. If it fails to discharge this burden, its act of censorship will be
struck down. This is true in this case. So-called "attacks" are mere criticisms of some of the deeply held dogmas and
tenets of other religions. RTC’s ruling clearly suppresses petitioner’s freedom of speech and interferes with its right
to free exercise of religion. “attack” is different from “offend “any race or religion. Under our constitutional scheme,
it is not the task of the State to favor any religion by protecting it against an attack by another religion.

ESTRADA VS. ESCRITOR

[492 SCRA 1 ; AM NO P-02-1651; 22 JUN 2006]

FACTS:
Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City. She has been living with Quilapio, a
man who is not her husband, for more than twenty five years and had a son with him as well. Respondent’s husband
died a year before she entered into the judiciary while Quilapio is still legally married to another woman.
Complainant Estrada requested the Judge of said RTC to investigate respondent. According to complainant,
respondent should not be allowed to remain employed therein for it will appear as if the court allows such act.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the State could penalize respondent for such conjugal arrangement.

HELD:
 No. The State could not penalize respondent for she is exercising her right to freedom of religion. The free
exercise of religion is specifically articulated as one of the fundamental rights in our Constitution. As Jefferson put
it, it is the most inalienable and sacred of human rights. The State’s interest in enforcing its prohibition cannot be
merely abstract or symbolic in order to be sufficiently compelling to outweigh a free exercise claim. In the case at
bar, the State has not evinced any concrete interest in enforcing the concubinage or bigamy charges against
respondent or her partner. Thus the State’s interest only amounts to the symbolic preservation of an unenforced
prohibition.

5. Liberty of Abode and Freedom of Movement

Marcos vs. Manglapus,

[G.R. # 88211 September 15, 1989]

FACTS:
Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency and was forced into exile. Corazon Aquino’s
ascension into presidency was challenged by failed coup attempts as well as by plots of Marcos loyalists and the
Marcoses themselves. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the Philippines to die. But President
Aquino, considering the dire consequences to the nation of his return has stood firmly on the decision to bar the
return of Mr. Marcos and his family. Hence, this petition for mandamus and prohibition asks the Courts to order the
respondents to issue travel documents to Mr. Marcos and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the
implementation of the President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the President has the power to bar the return of Marcos to the Philippines.

HELD:
Petition Dismissed. The request of the Marcoses must not be treated only in the light of constitutional
provisions, it must be treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed to those residual unstated powers of the
President which are implicit in to the paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard and protect general welfare.
Such request or demand should submit to the exercise of a broader discretion on the part of the President to
determine whether it must be granted or denied.

Gudani vs. Senga

498 SCRA 671 (2006)

FACTS:
Senator Rodolfo Biazon invited several senior officers of the AFP, including Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan,
to appear at a public hearing before the Senate Committee on National Defense and Security to shed light on the
“Hello Garci” controversy. Gudani and Balutan were directed by AFP Chief of Staff Gen. Senga, per instruction of
Pres. Arroyo, not testify before said Committee. On the very day of the hearing, President Gloria-Macapagal-Arroyo
issued Executive Order No. 464 enjoining officials of the executive department including the military establishment
from appearing in any legislative inquiry without her approval.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not may the President prevent a member of the armed forces from testifying before a legislative
inquiry?

HELD:
1. Yes. The President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of her power as commander-in-chief, and
that as a consequence a military officer who defies such injunction is liable under military justice. Our ruling
that the President could, as a general rule, require military officers to seek presidential approval before
appearing before Congress is based foremost on the notion that a contrary rule unduly diminishes the
 prerogatives of the President as commander-in-chief. Congress holds significant control over the armed
forces in matters such as budget appropriations and the approval of higher-rank promotions, yet it is on
the President that the Constitution vests the title as commander-in-chief and all the prerogatives and
functions appertaining to the position.

Right to Information

Tanada, et al. v. Tuvera, et al.

FACTS:
Petitioners Senator Lorenzo Tañada, Atty. Abraham Sarmiento, and the Movement of Attorneys for
Brotherhood, Integrity and Nationalism, Inc. invoked due process in demanding the disclosure of a number of
presidential decrees which they claimed had not been published as required by law. The government argued that
while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was “otherwise provided,” as when the decrees
themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their approval. In the decision of this
case on April 24, 1985, the Court affirmed the necessity for the publication of some of these decrees. The Court
ordered the respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished Presidential Issuances which are of general
force and effect.
ISSUE
Whether or not a publication shall be made in publications of general circulation.

RULINGS:
Yes, a publication shall be made in publications of general circulation.
All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition
for their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by
the legislature. Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its purpose is to inform the
public of the content of the law. Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of laws must be made
in the Official Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity.

In Re: Production of Court Records and Documents and the Attendance of Court officials and employees as
witnesses under the subpoenas of February 10, 2012 and the various letters for the Impeachment Prosecution
Panel dated January 19 and 25, 2012 (sulat mo to lahat)

Facts:
During the impeachment proceedings against Chief Justice Corona, the prosecution Panel manifested in a
COMPLIANCE that it would present about 100 witnesses which included Justices of the Supreme Court, and Court
officials and employees who will testify on matters internal to the Court and almost a thousand documents.
Letters were sent to the SC asking for the examination of records, and the issuance of certified true copies
of the rollos and the Agenda and Minutes of the Deliberations of various cases decided by the SC for purposes of the
-Impeachment Complaint.
Issues:
1. Whether or not court records are accessible as a policy of transparency.

Ruling:
The right to information, by its very nature and by the Constitution’s own terms, is not absolute.
In line with the public’s constitutional right to information, the Court has adopted a policy of transparency
with respect to documents in its possession or custody, necessary to maintain the integrity of its sworn duty
to adjudicate justiciable disputes. This policy is embodied in terms of Court Rules.
The rule grants access to court records to any person, subject to payment of fees and compliance
with rules; it is not necessary that the request be made by a party to the case. This grant, however, is not
 as open nor as broad as its plain terms appear to project, as it is subject to the limitations the laws and the
Court’s own rules provide.

RE: REQUEST FOR COPY OF 2008 STATEMENT OF ASSETS, LIABILITIES AND NETWORTH [SALN] AND PERSONAL
DATA SHEET OR CURRICULUM VITAE OF THE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT AND OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES
OF THE JUDICIARY. 672 SCRA 27 A. M. No. 09-8-6-SC, June 13, 2012.
Facts:
Rowena Paraan, Research Director of the PCIJ, sought copies of the SALN of the Justices of the Supreme
Court for the year 2008. She also requested for copies of the Personal Data Sheet of the Justices of this Court for the
purpose of updating their database of information on government officials.

Issues:
1.Can the SALN of justices be accessed via the right to information?
2.What are the limitations on the constitutional right to information?

Ruling:
1.Yes. The right to information goes hand-in-hand with the constitutional policies of full public disclosure
and honesty in the public service
2.The right to information is not absolute. It is further subject to such limitations as may be provided by
law. Jurisprudence has provided the following limitations to that right:(1) national security matters and intelligence
information;(2) trade secrets and banking transactions;(3) criminal matters; and(4) other confidential information
such as confidential or classified information officially known to public officers and employees by reason of their
office and not made available to the public as well as diplomatic correspondence, closed door Cabinet meetings and
executive sessions of either house of Congress, and the internal deliberations of the Supreme Court.

VILLANUEVA VS. JBC, (En banc)

G.R. No. 211833, April 07, 2015 (Decision)

FACTS:
Presiding Judge Ferdinand R. Villanueva (petitioner) applied for the vacant position of Presiding Judge in
Regional Trial Courts (RTC’s) but was not included in the list of candidates for the said position because of the Judicial
and Bar Council’s (JBC) long standing policy of opening the chance for promotion to second-level courts to, among
others, incumbent judges who have served in their current position for at least five years, and since the petitioner
has been a judge only for more than a year, he was excluded from the list. This caused the petitioner to take recourse
to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the policy of JBC requiring five years of service as judges of first-level courts before they
can qualify as applicant to second-level courts violates the equal protection clause.

RULING:
No. The equal protection clause of the Constitution does not require the universal application of the laws
to all persons or things without distinction; what it requires is simply equality among equals as determined according
to a valid classification. Consideration of experience by JBC as one factor in choosing recommended appointees does
not constitute a violation of the equal protection clause. The JBC does not discriminate when it employs number of
years of service to screen and differentiate applicants from the competition. The number of years of service provides
a relevant basis to determine proven competence which may be measured by experience, among other factors.
Antolin v. Abelardo T. Domondon, Jose A. Gangan, and Violeta J. Josef (1st Div.)
623 SCRA 163 July 5, 2010 (Decision)
Del Castillo, J.:

Facts:
Petitioner Hazel Ma. C. Antolin took the 1997 CPA Board Exams but failed, receiving failing grades from four
out of seven subjects. Convinced that she deserved to pass, she wrote to respondent Abelardo Domondon, Acting
Chairman of the Board of Accountancy, and requested that her answer sheets be re-corrected. Her answer sheets
were shown but these consisted merely of shaded marks. She requested for copies of the questionnaire, their
respective answer keys, and an explanation of the grading system used in each subject. Respondent denied the
request.

Issue:
Whether or not Antolin has a right to obtain copies of the examination papers.

Court:
The Court rules in favor of the petitioner. Section 28, Article 2 of the Constitution provides that the State
may adopt policies in the disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest while Section 7, Article 3 provides
the right of the people to information on matters of public interest. It is clear that the people’s right to information
is limited to matters of public concern and subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. The Court,
nonetheless, conceded that the CPA Board Exams are matters of public concern. The examinees in particular, would
understandably be interested in the fair and competent administration of these exams in order to ensure that only
those qualified are admitted into the accounting profession.

6. Right of Association

SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM EMPLOYEE ASSOCIATION (SSSEA), V. COURT OF APPEALS

Cortes, J.:

FACTS:
On June 11, 1987, the SSS filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint for damages with
a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners, alleging that on June 9, 1987, the officers and
members of SSSEA staged an illegal strike and barricaded the entrances to the SSS Building preventing non-striking
employees from reporting for work and SSS members from transacting business with the SSS that the strike was
reported to the Public Sector Labor – Management Council, which ordered the strikes to return to work, that the
strikers refused to return to work, and that the SSS suffered damages as a result of the strike.
ISSUE:
Whether or not employees of the Social Security System (SSS) have the right to strike.

RULING:
The 1987 Constitution, in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights provides that the State “shall
guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful
concerted activities including the right to strike in accordance with law” (Art. XIII, Sec. 31). Resort to the intent of
the framers of the organic law becomes helpful in understanding the meaning of these provisions. A reading of the
proceedings of the Constitutional Commission that drafted the 1987 Constitution would show that in recognizing
the right of government employees to organize the commissioners intended to limit the right to the formation of
unions or association only without including the right to strike.