G.R. No.

212719

INMATES OF THE NEW BILIBID PRISON, - versus - SECRETARY LEILA M. DE LIMA,

DECISION

The sole issue for resolution in these consolidated cases 1 is the legality of Section 4, Rule 1 of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations (/RR) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10592,2 which states:

SECTION 4. Prospective Application. - Considering that these Rules provide for new procedures and standards of behavior for
the grant of good conduct time allowance as provided in Section 4 of Rule V hereof and require the creation of a Management,
Screening and Evaluation Committee (MSEC) as provided in Section 3 of the same Rule, the grant of good conduct time
allowance under Republic Act No. 10592 shall be prospective in application.

The grant of time allowance of study, teaching and mentoring and of special time allowance for loyalty shall also be
prospective in application as these privileges are likewise subject to the management, screening and evaluation of the
MSEC.3

The Case

On May 29, 2013, then President Benigno S. Aquino III signed into law R.A. No. 10592, amending Articles 29, 94, 97, 98 and 99 of Act
No. 3815, or the Revised Penal Code (RPC). 4 For reference, the modifications are underscored as follows:

ART. 29. Period of preventive imprisonment deducted from term of imprisonment. - Offenders or accused who have
undergone preventive imprisonment shall be credited in the service of their sentence consisting of deprivation of liberty, with
the full time during which they have undergone preventive imprisonment if the detention prisoner agrees voluntarily in writing
after being informed of the effects thereof and with the assistance of counsel to abide by the same disciplinary rules
imposed upon convicted prisoners, except in the following cases:
1. When they are recidivists, or have been convicted previously twice or more times of any crime; and
2. When upon being summoned for the execution of their sentence they have failed to surrender voluntarily.

If the detention prisoner does not agree to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners, he shall do
so in writing with the assistance of a counsel and shall be credited in the service of his sentence with four-fifths of the time
during which he has undergone preventive imprisonment.

Credit for preventive imprisonment for the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be deducted from thirty (30) years.

Whenever an accused has undergone preventive imprisonment for a period equal to the possible maximum imprisonment of
the offense charged to which he may be sentenced and his case is not yet terminated, he shall be released immediately
without prejudice to the continuation of the trial thereof or the proceeding on appeal, if the same is under review. Computation
of preventive imprisonment for purposes of immediate release under this paragraph shall be the actual period of
detention with good conduct time allowance: Provided, however, That if the accused is absent without justifiable
cause at any stage of the trial, the court may motu proprio order the rearrest of the accused: Provided, finally, That
recidivists, habitual delinquents, escapees and persons charged with heinous crimes are excluded from the coverage
of this Act. In case the maximum penalty to which the accused may be sentenced is destierro, he shall be released after thirty
(30) days of preventive imprisonment.

ART. 94. Partial extinction of criminal liability. - Criminal liability is extinguished partially:
1. By conditional pardon;
2. By commutation of the sentence; and
3. For good conduct allowances which the culprit may earn while he is undergoing preventive imprisonment or serving
his sentence.

ART. 97. Allowance for good conduct. - The good conduct of any offender qualified for credit for preventive imprisonment
pursuant to Article 29 of this Code, or of any convicted prisoner in any penal institution, rehabilitation or detention
center or any other local jail shall entitle him to the following deductions from the period of his sentence:
1. During the first two years of (his) imprisonment, he shall he ailowed a deduction of twenty days for each month of good
behavior during detention;
2. During the third to the fifth year, inclusive, of his imprisonment, he shall be allowed a deduction of twenty-three days for
each month of good behavior during detention;
3. During the following years until the tenth year, inclusive, of imprisonment, he shall be allowed a deduction of twenty-five
days each month of good behavior during detention;
4. During the eleventh and successive years of his imprisonment, he shall be allowed a deduction of !hi!:!Y days for each
month of good behavior during detention; and
5. At any time during the period of imprisonment, he shall be allowed another deduction of fifteen days, in addition
to numbers one to four hereof, for each month of study, teaching or mentoring service time rendered.

An appeal by the accused shall not deprive him of entitlement to the above allowances for good conduct.

ART. 98. Special time allowance for loyalty. - A deduction of one fifth of the period of his sentence shall be granted to any
prisoner who, having evaded his preventive imprisonment or the service of his sentence under the circumstances
mentioned in Article 158 of this Code, gives himself up to the authorities within 48 hours following the issuance of a
proclamation announcing the passing away of the calamity or catastrophe referred to in said article. A deduction of two-fifths
of the period of his sentence shall be granted in case said prisoner chose to stay in the place of his confinement
notwithstanding the existence of a calamity or catastrophe enumerated in Article 158 of this Code.

This Article shall apply to any prisoner whether undergoing preventive imprisonment or serving sentence.

ART. 99. Who grants time allowances. - Whenever lawfully justified, the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, the Chief of
the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology and/or the Warden of a provincial, district, municipal or city jail shall
grant allowances for good conduct. Such allowances once granted shall not be revoked. (Emphases ours)

Page 1 of 53
 Pursuant to the amendatory law, an IRR was jointly issued by respondents Department of Justice (DOJ) Secretary Leila M. De
Lima and Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) Secretary Manuel A. Roxas II on March 26, 2014 and became
effective on April 18, 2014. Petitioners and intervenors assail the validity of its Section 4, Rule 1 that directs the prospective application
of the grant of good conduct time allowance (GCTA), time allowance for study, teaching and mentoring (TASTJvl), and special time
allowance for loyalty (STAL) mainly on the ground that it violates Article 22 of the RPC.

G.R. No. 212719

On June 18, 2014, a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition (with Prayer for the Issuance of a Preliminary Injunction)7 was filed
against respondents DOJ Secretary De Lima and DILG Secretary Roxas by Atty. Michael J. Evangelista acting as the attomey-in-fact8
of convicted prisoners in the New Bilibid Prison (NBP), namely: Venancio A. Roxas, Saturnino V. Paras, Edgardo G. Manuel,
Herminildo V. Cruz, Allan F. Tejada, Roberto C. Marquez, Julito P. Mondejar, Armando M. Cabuang, Jonathan 0. Crisanto, Edgar
Echenique, Janmark Saracho, Josenel Alvaran, and Crisencio Neri, Jr. (Roxas et al.). Petitioners filed the case as real parties-in-
interest and as representatives of their member organizations and the organizations' individual members, as a class suit for themselves
and in behalf of all who are similarly situated. They contend that the provisions of R.A. No. 10592 are penal in nature and beneficial to
the inmates; hence, should be given retroactive effect in accordance with Article 22 of the RPC. For them, the IRR contradicts the law it
implements. They are puzzled why it would be complex for the Bureau of Corrections (BUCOR) and the Bureau of Jail Management
and Penology (BJMP) to retroactively apply the law when the prisoners' records are complete and the distinctions between the pertinent
provisions of the RPC and R.A. No. 10592 are easily identifiable. Petitioners submit that the simple standards added by the new law,
which are matters of record, and the creation of the Management, Screening and Evaluation Committee (MSEC) should not override
the constitutional guarantee of the rights to liberty and due process of law aside from the principle that penal laws beneficial to the
accused are given retroactive effect.

Almost a month after, or on July 11, 2014, Atty. Rene A.V. Saguisag, Sr. filed a Petition (In Intervention).9 He incorporates by
reference the Roxas et al. petition, impleads the same respondents, and adds that nowhere from the legislative history of R.A. No.
10592 that it intends to be prospective in character. On July 22, 2014, the Court resolved to grant the leave to intervene and require the
adverse parties to comment thereon.

Another Petition-in-Intervention 11 was filed on October 21, 2014. This time, the Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG) served
as counsel for William M. Montinola, Fortunato P. Visto, and Arsenio C. Cabanilla (Montinola et al.), who are also inmates of the NBP.
The petition argues that Section 4, Rule I of the IRR is facially void for being contrary to the equal protection clause of the 1987
Constitution; it discriminates, without any reasonable basis, against those who would have been benefited from the retroactive
application of the law; and is also ultra vires, as it was issued beyond the authority of respondents to promulgate. In a Resolution dated
November 25, 2014, We required the adverse parties to comment on the petition-in-intervention. 12

On January 30, 2015, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Consolidated Comment13 to the Petition of Roxas et al.
and Petition-in Intervention of Atty. Saguisag, Sr. More than two years later, or on July 7, 2017, it filed a Comment14 to the Petition-in-
Intervention of Montinola et al.

G.R. No. 214637

On October 24, 2014, a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition15 was filed by Reynaldo D. Edago, Peter R. Torida, Jimmy E.
Aclao, Wilfredo V. Omeres, Pascua B. Galladan, Victor M. Macoy, Jr., Edwin C. Trabuncon, Wilfredo A. Paterno, Federico Elliot, and
Romeo R. Macolbas (Edago et al.), who are all inmates at the Maximum Security Compound of the NBP, against DOJ Secretary De
Lima, DILG Secretary Roxas, BUCOR Acting Director Franklin Jesus B. Bucayu, and BJMP Chief Superintendent (Officer-in-Charge)
Diony Dacanay Mamaril. The grounds of the petition are as follows:

A.
SECTION 4, RULE I OF THE IRR PROVIDING FOR A PROSPECTIVE APPLICATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF R.A. 10592 WAS
ISSUED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION AND THEREBY VOID
AND ILLEGAL FOR BEING CONTRARY AND ANATHEMA TOR.A. 10592.
a. R.A. 10592 does not state that its provisions shall have prospective application.
b. Section 4 of the IRR of R.A. 10592 is contrary to Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code providing that penal laws that are
beneficial to the accused shall have retroactive application. c. Section 4, Rule I of the IRR contravenes public policy and the
intent of Congress when it enacted R.A. 10592.

B.
SECTION 4, RULE I OF THE IRR WAS ISSUED BY RESPONDENTS WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK
OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION BECAUSE IT IS PATENTLY UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
a. Section 4, Rule I of the IRR violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution.
b. Section 4, Rule I of the IRR violates substantive due process. 16

Per Resolution17 dated November 11, 2014, respondents were ordered to file their comment to the petition. In compliance, BJMP Chief
Mamaril filed a Comment18 on December 10, 2014, while the OSG did the same on February 9, 20 I 519 in behalf of all the
respondents.
Subsequently, Edago et al. filed a Motion with Leave of Comito File and Admit Reply,20 attaching therein said Reply. On July 28, 2015,
We granted the motion and noted the Reply.21

The Court's Ruling

The petition is granted.

Procedural Matters

Actual case or controversy

Respondents contend that the petition of Edago et al. did not comply with all the elements of justiciability as the requirement of
an actual case or controversy vis-a-vis the requirement of ripeness has not been complied with. For them, the claimed injury of
petitioners has not ripened to an actual case requiring this Court's intervention: First, the MSEC has not been constituted yet so there is
effectively no authority or specialized body to screen, evaluate and recommend any applications for time credits based on R.A. No.
10592. Second, none of petitioners has applied for the revised credits, making their claim of injury premature, if not anticipatory. And
third, the prison records annexed to the petition are neither signed nor certified by the BUCOR Director which belie the claim of actual

Page 2 of 53
injury resulting from alleged extended incarceration. What petitioners did was they immediately filed this case after obtaining their
prison records and computing the purported application of the revised credits for GCT A under R.A. No. 10592.

We disagree.

It is well settled that no question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act may be heard and
decided unless the following requisites for judicial inquiry are present: ( a) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the
exercise of judicial power; (b) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or
issuance; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and ( d) the issue of constitutionality must be the
very !is mota of the case. 22 As to the requirement of actual case or controversy, the Court stated in Province of North Cotabato, et al.
v. Gov 't of the Rep. of the Phils. Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain (GRP), et al. :23

The power of judicial review is limited to actual cases or controversies. Courts decline to issue advisory opinions or to
resolve hypothetical or feigned problems, or mere academic questions. The · limitation of the power of judicial review
to actual cases and controversies defines the role assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite allocation of power, to
assure that the courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of government.

An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of
judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute. There must be a contrariety
of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence. x x x.

Related to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness. A question is ripe for
adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. For a case
to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something had then been accomplished or performed
by either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an
immediate or threatened injury to itself as a result of the challenged action. He must show that he has sustained or is
immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act complained of. 24

There is an actual case or controversy in the case at bar because there is a contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted
and enforced on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence. Respondents stand for the prospective application of the grant of GCTA,
TASTM, and STAL while petitioners and intervenors view that such provision violates the Constitution and Article 22 of the RPC. The
legal issue posed is ripe for adjudication as the challenged regulation has a direct adverse effect on petitioners and those detained and
convicted prisoners who are similarly situated. There exists an immediate and/or threatened injury and they have sustained -or are
immediately in danger of sustaining direct injury as a result of the act complained of. In fact, while the case is pending, petitioners are
languishing in jail. If their assertion proved to be true, their illegal confinement or detention in the meantime is oppressive. With the
prisoners' continued incarceration, any delay in resolving the case would cause them great prejudice. Justice demands that they be
released soonest, if not on time.

There is no need to wait and see the actual organization and operation of the MSEC. Petitioners Edago et al. correctly invoked
Our ruling in Pimentel, Jr. v. Hon. Aguirre.25 There, We dismissed the novel theory that people should wait for the implementing evil to
befall on them before they could question acts that are illegal or unconstitutional, and held that "[by] the mere enactment of the
questioned law or the approval of the challenged action, the dispute is said to have ripened into a judicial controversy even without any
other overt act." Similar to Pimentel, Jr., the real issue in this case is whether the Constitution and the RPC are contravened by Section
4, Rule 1 of the IRR, not whether they are violated by the acts implementing it. Concrete acts are not necessary to render the present
controversy ripe. 26 An actual case may exist even in the absence of tangible instances when the assailed IRR has actually and
adversely affected petitioners. The mere issuance of the subject IRR has led to the ripening of a judicial controversy even without any
other overt act. If this Court cannot await the adverse consequences of the law in order to consider the controversy actual and ripe for
judicial intervention, 27 the same can be said for an IRR. Here, petitioners need not wait for the creation of the MSEC and be
individually rejected in their applications. They do not need to actually apply for the revised credits, considering that such application
would be an exercise in futility in view of respondents' insistence that the law should be prospectively applied. If the assailed provision
is indeed unconstitutional and illegal, there is no better time than the present action to settle such question once and for all. 28

Legal standing

We do not subscribe to respondents' supposition that it is the Congress which may claim any injury from the alleged executive
encroachment of the legislative function to amend, modify or repeal laws and that the challenged acts of respondents have no direct
adverse effect on petitioners, considering that based on records, there was no GCT A granted to them.

It is a general rule that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest, who
stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.

Jurisprudence defines interest as "material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree, as
distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. By real interest is meant a
present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy or a future, contingent, subordinate, or
consequential interest." "To qualify a person to be a real party-in-interest in whose name an action must be
prosecuted, he must appear to be the present real owner of the right sought to be enforced."

"Legal standing" or locus standi calls for more than just a generalized grievance. The concept has been defined as a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result
of the governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.

A party challenging the constitutionality of a law, act, or statute must show "not only that the law is invalid, but also
that he has sustained or is in immediate, or imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its
enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way." It must [be] shown that he has been, or
is about to be, denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled, or that he is about to be subjected to
some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute complained of. 29

In this case, petitioners are directly affected by Section 4, Rule 1 of the IRR because they are prisoners currently serving their
respective sentences at the NBP. They have a personal stake in the outcome of this case as their stay in prison will potentially be
shortened (if the assailed provision of the IRR is declared unlawful and void) or their dates of release will be delayed (ifR.A. No. 10592
is applied prospectively). It is erroneous to assert that the questioned provision has no direct adverse effect on petitioners since there

Page 3 of 53
were no GCT As granted to them. There is none precisely because of the prospective application of R.A. No. 10592. It is a proof of the
act complained of rather than an evidence that petitioners lack legal standing. Further, the submission of certified prison records is
immaterial in determining whether or not petitioners' rights were breached by the IRR because, to repeat, the possible violation was
already fait accompli by the issuance of the IRR. The prison records were merely furnished to show that respondents have
prospectively applied R.A. No. 10592 and that petitioners will be affected thereby.

Propriety of legal remedy:

Respondents argue that the petitions for certiorari and prohibition, as well as the petitions-in-intervention, should be dismissed because
such petitions are proper only against a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Section 4, Rule 1 of the
IRR is an administrative issuance of respondents made in the exercise of their rulemaking or quasi-legislative functions.

True, a petition for certiorari and prohibition is not an appropriate remedy to assail the validity of the subject IRR as it was issued in the
exercise of respondents' rule-making or quasi-legislative function. Nevertheless, the Court has consistently held that "petitions for
certiorari and prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review, prohibit or nullify the acts of legislative
and executive officials."30

In Araullo v. Aquino 111,31 former Associate Justice, now Chief Jus.tice,

Lucas P. Bersamin, explained the remedies of certiorari and prohibition,
thus:
10
What are the remedies by which the grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government may be determined under the
Constitution?
The present Rules of Court uses two special civil actions for
determining and correcting grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. These are the special civil actions for certiorari and
prohibition, and both are governed by Rule 65. A similar remedy of
certiorari exists under Rule 64, but the remedy is expressly applicable only
to the judgments and final orders or resolutions of the Commission on
Elections and the Commission on Audit.
The ordinary nature and function of the writ of certiorari in our
present system are aptly explained in Delos Santos v. Metropolitan Bank
and Trust Company:
(2011 ).
Tailada v. Angara, 338 Phil. 546, 575 ( 1997); Ermita v. Aldecoa-Delorino, 666 Phil.
Arau/lo v. Aquino Ill, 737 Phil. 457(2014).
,22,r
11
Decision - 13 - G.R. No. 21'2719 &
G.R. No. 214637
In the common law, from which the remedy of certiorari
evolved, the writ of certiorari was issued out of Chancery, or
the King's Bench, commanding agents or officers of the inferior
courts to return the record of a cause pending before them, so as
to give the party more sure and speedy justice, for the writ
would enable the superior court to determine from an inspection
of the record whether the inferior court's judgment was rendered
without authority. The errors were of such a nature that, if
allowed to stand, they would result in a substantial injury to the
petitioner to whom no other remedy was available. If the inferior
court acted without authority, the record was then revised and
corrected in matters of law. The writ of certiorari was limited to
cases in which the inferior court was said to be exceeding its
jurisdiction or was not proceeding according to essential
requirements of law and would lie only to review judicial or
quasi-judicial acts.
The concept of the remedy of certiorari in our judicial
system remains much the same as it has been in the common
law. In this jurisdiction, however, the exercise of the power to
issue the writ of certiorari is largely regulated by laying down
the instances or situations in the Rules of Court in which a
superior court may issue the writ of certiorari to an inferior
court or officer. Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
compellingly provides the requirements for that purpose, viz.:
xxxx
The sole office of the writ of certiorari is the correction of
errors of jurisdiction, which includes the commission of grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. In this
regard, mere abuse of discretion is not enough to warrant the
issuance of the writ. The abuse of discretion must be grave,
which means either that the judicial or quasi-judicial power was
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility, or that the respondent judge,
tribunal or board evaded a positive duty, or virtually refused to
perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law,
such as when such judge, tribunal or board exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial powers acted in a capricious or whimsical manner
as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
Although similar to prohibition in that it will lie for want or excess of
jurisdiction, certiorari is to be distinguished from prohibition by the fact
that it is a corrective remedy used for the re-examination of some action of

Page 4 of 53
an inferior tribunal, and is directed to the cause or proceeding in the lower
court and not to the court itself, while prohibition is a preventative remedy
issuing to restrain future action, and is directed to the court itself. The Court
expounded on the nature and function of the writ of prohibition in Holy
Spirit Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Defensor:
A petition for prohibition is also not the proper remedy to
assail an IRR issued in the exercise of a quasi-legislative
function. Prohibition is an extraordinary writ directed against / .JY"
any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether (/
1
Decision - 14 - G.R. No. 212719 &
G.R. No. 214637
exerc1smg judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions,
ordering said entity or person to desist from further proceedings
when said proceedings are without or in excess of said entity's
or person's jurisdiction, or are accompanied with grave abuse of
discretion, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Prohibition lies
against judicial or ministerial functions, but not against
legislative or quasi-legislative functions. Generally, the purpose
of a writ of prohibition is to keep a lower court within the limits
of its jurisdiction in order to maintain the administration of
justice in orderly channels. Prohibition is the proper remedy to
afford relief against usurpation of jurisdiction or power by an
inferior court, or when, in the exercise of jurisdiction in
handling matters clearly within its cognizance the inferior court
transgresses the bounds prescribed to it by the law, or where
there is no adequate remedy available in the ordinary course of
law by which such relief can be obtained. Where the principal
relief sought is to invalidate an IRR, petitioners' remedy is an
ordinary action for its nullification, an action which properly
falls under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. In any
case, petitioners' allegation that "respondents are performing or
threatening to perform functions without or in excess of their
jurisdiction" may appropriately be enjoined by the trial court
through a writ of injunction or a temporary restraining order.
With respect to the Court, however, the remedies of certiorari and
prohibition are necessarily broader in scope and reach, and the writ of
certiorari or prohibition may be issued to correct errors of jurisdiction
committed not only by a tribunal, corporation, board or officer exercising
judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions but also to set right, undo and
restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the Government, even fl the
latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerialfimctions. This
application is expressly authorized by the text of the second paragraph of
Section 1, supra.
Thus, petitions for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate remedies
to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit or nullify the acts
of legislative and executive officials.
Necessarily, in discharging its duty under Section 1, supra, to set right
and undo any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the Government, the Court
is not at all precluded from making the inquiry provided the challenge was
properly brought by interested or affected parties. The Court has been
thereby entrusted expressly or by necessary implication with both the duty
and the obligation of determining, in appropriate cases, the validity of any
assailed legislative or executive action. This entrustment is consistent with
the republican system of checks and balances. 32
In view of the foregoing, We shall proceed to discuss the substantive
issues raised herein so as to finally resolve the question on the validity ~;,f
12 Id. at 528-531. (Citations omitted; italics in the original) (,,/ r
Decision - 15 - G.R. No. 212719 &
G.R. No. 214637
Section 4, Rule 1 of the IRR, which is purely legal in nature. This is also
because of the public importance of the issues raised, 33 and the interest of
substantial justice,34 not to mention the absence of any dispute as to any
underlying fact. 35
Hierarchy of courts
Respondents contend that the petition for certiorari and prohibition,
as well as the petitions-in-intervention, should still be dismissed for failure
to observe the rule on hierarchy of courts. According to them, this Court's
jurisdiction over actions assailing the validity of administrative issuances is
primarily appellate in nature by virtue of Section 5(2)(a), Article VIII of the
Constitution.36 An action assailing the validity of an administrative issuance
is one that is incapable of pecuniary estimation, which, under Batas
Pambansa Bilang (B.P. Blg.) 129, the Regional Trial Court {RTC) has
exclusive original jurisdiction. Further, a petition for declaratory relief filed
before the R TC, pursuant to Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules, is the proper
remedy to question the validity of the IRR.37
Indeed, under Section 19(1) of B.P. Blg. 129, the question presented
here is a matter incapable of pecuniary estimation, which exclusively and
originally pertained to the proper RTC.38 Fundamentally, there is no doubt
that this consolidated case captioned as petition for certiorari and

Page 5 of 53
prohibition seeks to declare the unconstitutionality and illegality of Section 4
Rule 1 of the IRR; thus, partaking the nature of a petition for declaratory
relief over which We only have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Section
5(2)(a), Article VIII of the Constitution. In accordance with Section 1, Rule
33 See GMA Network, Inc. v. COMELEC, 742 Phil. 174, 210 (2014), citing Dela Liana v. The
Chairperson, Commission on Audit, et al., 68 I Phil. 186, 193-195 (2012).
34 See The Chairman and Executive Director, Palawan Council for Sustainable Development, et al.
v. Lim, 793 Phil. 690, 698-701 (2016); Quinto, et al. v. COMELEC, 62 I Phil. 236, 259-260 (2009); and
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co., Inc. v. National Wages and Productivity Commission, 543 Phil. 318,
328-332 (2007).
35 Gios-Samar, Inc., represented by its Chairperson Gerardo M Malinao v. Department of
Transportation and Communications, and Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines, G.R. No. 217158,
March 12, 2019.
36 SECTION 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxxx
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of
Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international
or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation is in question.
XXX
37 Section l. Who may file petition. - Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other
written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or
any other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof bring an action in the
appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a
declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.
38 . XSeXeX T he Chairman and Executive Director, Pal aw an Council for Sustainable Development, et a~l. .. ·
v. Lim, supra note 34. ·
Decision - 16 - G.R. No. 212719 &
G.R. No. 214637
63 of the Rules, the special civil action of declaratory relief falls under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC.
Nevertheless, the judicial policy has been to entertain a direct resort to
this Court in exceptional and compelling circumstances, such as cases of
national interest and of serious implications, and those of transcendental
importance and of first impression.39 As the petitions clearly and specifically
set out special and important reasons therefor, We may overlook the Rules.
Here, petitioners Edago et al. are correct in asserting that R.A. No. 10592
and its IRR affect the entire correctional system of the Philippines. Not only
the social, economic, and moral well-being of the convicts and detainees are
involved but also their victims and their own families, the jails, and the
society at large. The nationwide implications of the petitions, the extensive
scope of the subject matter, the upholding of public policy, and the
repercussions on the society are factors warranting direct recourse to Us.
Yet more than anything, there is an urgent necessity to dispense
substantive justice on the numerous affected inmates. It is a must to treat
this consolidated case with a circumspect leniency, granting petitioners the
fullest opportunity to establish the merits of their case rather than lose
their liberty on the basis of technicalities.40 It need not be said that while
this case has been pending, their right to liberty is on the line. An extended
period of detention or one that is beyond the period allowed by law violates
the accused person's right to liberty.41 Hence, We shunt the rigidity of the
rules of procedure so as not to deprive such birthright.42 The Court
zealously guards against the curtailment of a person's basic constitutional
and natural right to liberty.43 The right to liberty, which stands second only
to life in the hierarchy of constitutional rights, cannot be lightly taken
away.44 At its core, substantive due process guarantees a right to libe11y that
cannot be taken away or unduly constricted, except through valid causes
provided by law.45

Substantive Issues

Every new law has a prospective effect. Under Article 22 of the RPC, however, a penal law that is favorable or advantageous to the
accused shall be given retroactive effect if he is not a habitual criminal. These are the rules, the exception, and the exception to the
exception on the effectivity of laws.46

In criminal law, the principle favorabilia sunt amplianda adiosa restrigenda (penal laws which are favorable to the accused are given
retroactive effect) is well entrenched. 47 It has been sanctioned since the old Penal Code. 48

x x x as far back as the year 1884, when the Penal Code took effect in these Islands until the 31st of December, 1931, the principle
underlying our laws granting to the accused in certain cases an exception to the general rule that laws shall not be retroactive when the
law in question favors the accused, has evidently been carried over into the Revised Penal Code at present in force in the Philippines
through article 22 xxx. This is an exception to the general rule that all laws are prospective, not retrospective, variously contained in the
following maxims: Lex prospicit, non respicit (the law looks forward, not backward); lex de futuro, judex de prceterito (the law provides
for the future, the judge for the past); and adopted in a modified form with a prudent limitation in our Civil Code (article 3). Conscience
and good law justify this exception, which 01S contained in the well-known aphorism: Favorabilia sunt amplianda, odiosa restringenda.
As one distinguished author has put it, the exception was inspired by sentiments of humanity, and accepted by science.49

According to Mr. Chief Justice Manuel Araullo, the principle is "not as a right" of the offender, "but founded on the very principles on
which the right of the State to punish and the commination of the penalty are based, and regards it not as an exception based on
political considerations, but as a rule founded on principles of strict justice." 50

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Further, case law has shown that the rule on retroactivity under Article 22 of the RPC applies to said Code51 and its amendments,52 as
well as to special laws,53 such as Act No. 2126,54 Presidential Decree No. 603,55 R.A. No. 7636,56 R.A. No. 8293,57 R.A. No.
8294,58 R.A. No. 9344,59 and R.A. No. 10586,60 to cite a few.

But what exactly is a penal law?

A penal provision or statute has been consistently defined by jurisprudence as follows:

A penal provision defines a crime or provides a punishment for one. 61

Penal laws and laws which, while not penal in nature, have prov1s10ns defining offenses and prescribing penalties for their violation. 62

Properly speaking, a statute is penal when it imposes punishment for an offense committed against the state which, under the
Constitution, the Executive has the power to pardon. In common use, however, this sense has been enlarged to include within the term
"penal statutes" all statutes which command or prohibit certain acts, and establish penalties for their violation, and even those which,
without expressly prohibiting certain acts, impose a penalty upon their commission. 63

Penal laws are those acts of the Legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their violations; or those that define
crimes, treat of their nature, and provide for their punishment. 64 ·

The "penal laws" mentioned in Article 22 of the RPC refer to substantive laws, not procedural rules. 65 Moreover, the mere fact that a
law contains penal provisions does not make it penal in nature. 66

In the case at bar, petitioners assert that Article 22 of the RPC applies because R.A. No. 10592 is a penal law. They claim that said law
has become an integral part of the RPC as Articles 29, 94, 97, 98 and 99 thereof. Edago et al. further argue that if an amendment to the
RPC that makes the penalties more onerous or prejudicial to the accused cannot be applied retroactively for being an ex post facto law,
a law that makes the penalties lighter should be considered penal laws in accordance with Article 22 of the RPC.

We concur.

While R.A. No. 10592 does provide/prescribe/establish a penalty67 component68 of our correctional system, not define a crime/offense
or as it addresses the rehabilitation its provisions have the purpose and effect of diminishing the punishment attached to the crime. The
further reduction on the length of the penalty of imprisonment is, in the ultimate analysis, beneficial to the detention and convicted
prisoners alike; hence, calls for the application of Article 22 of the RPC.

The prospective application of the beneficial provisions of R.A. No. 10592 actually works to the disadvantage of petitioners and those
who are similarly situated. It precludes the decrease in the penalty attached to their respective crimes and lengthens their prison stay;
thus, making more onerous the punishment for the crimes they committed. Depriving them of time off to which they are justly entitled as
a practical matter results in extending their sentence and increasing their punishment. Evidently, this transgresses the clear mandate of
Article 22 of the RPC.

In support of the prospective application of the grant of GCT A, TASTM, and STAL, respondents aver that a careful scrutiny of R.A. No.
10592 would indicate the need for "new procedures and standards of behavior" to fully implement the law by the BUCOR (as to persons
serving their sentences after conviction) and the BJMP (as to accused who are under preventive detention). It is alleged that the
amendments introduced are substantial and of utmost importance that they may not be implemented without a thorough revision of the
BUCOR and the BJMP operating 111anuals on jail management. In particular, the establishment of the MSEC is said to be an
administrative mechanism to address the policy and necessity that the BUCOR superintendents and the BJMP jail wardens must follow
uniform guidelines in managing, screening and evaluating the behavior or conduct of prisoners prior to their recommendation to the
heads of the two bureaus on who may be granted time allowances.

Respondents fail to persuade us.

Except for the benefits of TASTM and the STAL granted to a prisoner who chose to stay in the place of his confinement despite the
existence of a calamity or catastrophe enumerated in Article 158 of the RPC, the provisions of R.A. No. 10592 are mere modifications
of the RPC that have been implemented by the BUCOR prior to the issuance of the challenged IRR. In view of this, the claim of "new
procedures and standards of behavior" for the grant of time allowances is untenable. It appears that even prior to February 1, 1916
when Act No. 2557 was enacted,70 prisoners have already been entitled to deduct the period of preventive imprisonment from the
service of their sentences. In addition, good conduct time allowance has been in existence since August 30, 1906 upon the passage of
Act No. 1533.71 Said law provided for the diminution of sentences imposed upon convicted prisoners in consideration of good conduct
and diligence.72 Under Act No. 1533 and subsequently under Article 97 of the RPC, the time allowance may also apply to detention
prisoners if they voluntarily offer in writing to perform such labor as may be assigned to them. 73 Such prerequisite was removed by
R.A. No. 10592.

Subject to the review, and in accordance with the rules and regulations, as may be prescribed by the Secretary of Public Instruction, the
wardens or officers in charge of Insular or provincial jails or prisons were mandated to make and keep such records and take such
further actions as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of Act No. 1533.74 When the RPC took effect on January 1, 1932,75
the Director of Prisons was empowered to grant allowances for good conduct whenever lawfully justified.76 With the effectivity of R.A.
No. 10592 on June 6, 201'3, such authority is now vested on the Director of the BUCOR, the Chief of the BJMP and/or the Warden of a
provincial, district, municipal or city jail.77

Under the IRR of R.A. No. 10592, the MSECs are established to act as the recommending body for the grant of OCTA and TASTM.78
They are tasked to manage, screen and evaluate the behavior and conduct of a detention or convicted prisoner and to monitor and
certify whether said prisoner has actually studied, taught or performed mentoring activities. 79 The creation of the MSEC, however,
does not justify the prospective application of R.A. No. 10592. Nowhere in the amendatory law was its formation set as a precondition
before its beneficial provisions are applied. What R.A. No. 10592 only provides is that the Secretaries of the DOJ and the DILG are
authorized to promulgate rules and regulations on the classification· system for good conduct and time allowances, as may be
necessary to implement its provisions.8° Clearly, respondents went outside the bounds of their legal mandate when they provided for
rules beyond what was contemplated by the law to be enforced.

Indeed, administrative IRRs adopted by a particular department of the Government under legislative authority must be in harmony with
the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying the law's general provisions into effect. The law itself cannot be
expanded by such IRRSs, because an administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress. 81

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The contention of Edago et al. stands undisputed that, prior to the issuance of the assailed IRR and even before the enactment of R.A.
No. 10592, a Classification Board had been handling the functions of the MSEC and implementing the provisions of the RPC on time
allowances. While there is a noble intent to systematize and/or institutionalize existing set-up, the administrative and procedural
restructuring should not in any way prejudice the substantive rights of current detention and convicted prisoners.

Furthermore, despite various amendments to the law, the standard of behavior in granting GCTA remains to be "good conduct." In
essence, the definition of what constitutes "good conduct" has been invariable through the years, thus:

Act No. 1533: "not been guilty of a violation of discipline or any of the rules of the prison, and has labored with diligence and fidelity
upon all such tasks as have been assigned to him."82

BUCOR Operating Manual dated March 30, 2000: "displays good behavior and who has no record of breach of discipline or violation of
prison rules and regulations."83

IRR of R.A. No. 10592: "the conspicuous and satisfactory behavior of a detention or convicted prisoner consisting of active involvement
in rehabilitation programs, productive participation in authorized work activities or accomplishment of exemplary deeds coupled with
faithful obedience to all prison/jail rules and regulations"84

Among other data, an inmate's prison record contains information on his behavior or conduct while in prison. 85 Likewise, the
certificate/diploma issued upon successful completion of an educational program or course (i.e., elementary, secondary and college
education as well as vocational training) forms part of the record. 86 These considered, the Court cannot but share the same sentiment
of Roxas et al. It is indeed perplexing why it is complex for respondents to retroactively apply R.A. No. 10592 when all that the. MSEC
has to do is to utilize the same standard of behavior for the grant of time allowances and refer to existing prison records.

WHEREFORE, the consolidated petitions are GRANTED. Section 4, Rule 1 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act
No. 10592 is DECLARED invalid insofar as it provides for the prospective application of the grant of good conduct time allowance, time
allowance for study, teaching and mentoring, and special time allowance for loyalty. The Director General of the Bureau of Corrections
and the Chief of the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology are REQUIRED to RE-COMPUTE with reasonable dispatch the time
allowances due to petitioners and all those who are similarly situated and, thereafter, to CAUSE their immediate release from
imprisonment in case of full service of sentence, unless they are being confined thereat for any other lawful cause.

This Decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 206513, October 20, 2015

MUSTAPHA DIMAKUTA Y MARUHOM, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

The Court is now faced with one of the predicaments I discussed in my Dissenting and Concurring Opinion in Colinares v. People.1 The
question regarding the application of the Probation Law is again inescapably intertwined with the present petition. Consequently, I must
reiterate my assertions and arguments in Colinares to the case at bar.

In the present controversy, petitioner Mustapha Dimakuta y Maruhom alias Boyet was indicted for Violation of Section 5 Paragraph (b),
Article III of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7610 or the Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discriminatory Act. The
Information reads:

That on or about the 24th day of September 2005, in the City of Las Piñas, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, with lewd designs, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit a lascivious conduct
upon the person of one AAA, who was then a sixteen (16) year old minor, by then and there embracing her, touching her breast and
private part against her will and without her consent and the act complained of is prejudicial to the physical and psychological
development of the complainant.2

After trial, the RTC promulgated its Decision3 which convicted petitioner of the crime charged and sentenced him to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from ten (10) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years, four (4)
months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, with the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification. In
addition, he was directed to pay a fine of P20, 000.00, civil indemnity of P25, 000.00, and moral damages of P25, 000.00.4

Feeling aggrieved, petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals (CA) arguing, among other things, that even assuming he
committed the acts imputed, still there is no evidence showing that the same were done without the victim's consent or through force,
duress, intimidation or violence upon her. Surprisingly, when asked to comment on the appeal, the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), relying heavily on People v. Abello,5 opined that petitioner should have been convicted only of Acts of Lasciviousness under
Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) in view of the prosecution's failure to establish that the lascivious acts were attended by
force or coercion because the victim was asleep at the time the alleged acts were committed.

On June 28, 2012, the CA rendered a Decision 6 adopting the recommendation of the OSG. In modifying the RTC Decision, petitioner
was found guilty of Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC and was sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six
(6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correctional, as maximum. Likewise, he was
ordered to pay P20, 000.00 as civil indemnity and P30, 000.00 as moral damages.

Petitioner received a copy of CA Decision on July 6, 2012. 7 Instead of further appealing the case, he filed on July 23, 2012 before the
CA a manifestation with motion to allow him to apply for probation upon remand of the case to the RTC. 8 Petitioner invoked the case
of Colinares v. People9 which allowed petitioner therein to apply for probation after his sentence was later reduced on appeal by the
Supreme Court.

The CA issued a Resolution on September 3, 2012 denying petitioner's manifestation with motion. 10 It was ruled that Colinares is
inapplicable since petitioner therein raised as sole issue the correctness of the penalty imposed and claimed that the evidence
presented warranted only a conviction for the lesser offense. Instead, the appellate court viewed as appropriate the case of Lagrosa v.
People,11 wherein the application for probation was denied because petitioners therein put in issue on appeal the merits of their
conviction and did not simply assail the propriety of the penalties imposed.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration,12 but it was denied in a Resolution13 dated March 13, 2013; hence, this petition.

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The petition should be denied.

At the outset, tracing the evolution of the present Probation Law is warranted in order to better understand and apply the wisdom of its
framers to cases invoking its application.

In this jurisdiction, the concept of probation was introduced during the American colonial period.14 For juvenile delinquents, Act No.
320315 was enacted on December 3, 1924. It was later amended by Act Nos. 3309, 16 3559,17 and 3725.18 As to offenders who are
eighteen years old and above, Act No. 422119was passed by the legislature and took effect on August 7, 1935. Said Act allowed
defendants who are convicted and sentenced by a Court of First Instance or by the Supreme Court on appeal, except those who are
convicted of offenses enumerated in Section 8 thereof, 20 to be placed on probation upon application after the sentence has become
final and before its service has begun. 21 However, We declared in People v. Vera22 that Act No. 4221 is unconstitutional and void as it
constitutes an improper and unlawful delegation of legislative authority to the provincial boards.

During the martial law period, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 968 23 on July 24, 1976.
Originally, P.D. No. 968 allowed the filing of an application for probation at any time after the defendant had been convicted and
sentenced. Section 4 of which provides:

SEC. 4. Grant of Probation. - Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the court may, after it shall have convicted and sentenced a
defendant and upon application at any time of said defendant, suspend the execution of said sentence and place the defendant on
probation for such period and upon such terms and conditions as it may deem best.

Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a term of imprisonment or a fine only. An application for probation shall be
filed with the trial court, with notice to the appellate court if an appeal has been taken from the sentence of conviction. The filing of the
application shall be deemed a waiver of the right to appeal, or the automatic withdrawal of a pending appeal. An order granting or
denying probation shall not be appealable. 24

Later, the filing of an application for probation pending appeal was still allowed when Section 4 of P.D. No. 968 was amended by P.D.
No. 125725 on December 1, 1977 by providing that such application may be made after the defendant had been convicted and
sentenced but before he begins to serve his sentence. Thus:

SEC. 4. Grant of Probation. - Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the court may, after it shall have convicted and sentenced a
defendant but before he begins to serve his sentence and upon his application, suspend the execution of said sentence and
place the defendant on probation for such period and upon such terms and conditions as it may deem best.

The prosecuting officer concerned shall be notified by the court of the filing of the application for probation and he may submit his
comment on such application within ten days from receipt of the notification.

Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a term of imprisonment or a fine with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency. An application for probation shall be filed with the trial court, with notice to the appellate court if an appeal has been taken
from the sentence of conviction. The filing of the application shall be deemed a waiver of the right to appeal, or the automatic
withdrawal of a pending appeal. In the latter case, however, if the application is filed on or after the date of the judgment of the appellate
court, said application shall be acted upon by the trial court on the basis of the judgment of the appellate court.

An order granting or denying probation shall not be appealable. 26

On October 5, 1985, Section 4 was subsequently amended by P.D. No. 1990. 27 Henceforth, the policy has been to allow convicted and
sentenced defendant to apply for probation within the 15-day period for perfecting an appeal. As modified, Section 4 of the Probation
Law now reads:

SEC. 4. Grant of Probation. - Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the trial court may, after it shall have convicted and sentenced
a defendant and upon application by said defendant within the period for perfecting an appeal, suspend the execution of the
sentence and place the defendant on probation for such period and upon such terms and conditions as it may deem best; Provided,
that no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of
conviction.

Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a term of imprisonment or a fine only. An application for probation shall be
filed with the trial court. The filing of the application shall be deemed a waiver of the right to appeal.

An order granting or denying probation shall not be appealable. 28

The reason for the disallowance may be inferred from the preamble of P.D. No. 1990, thus:

WHEREAS, it has been the sad experience that persons who are convicted of offenses and who may be entitled to probation still
appeal the judgment of conviction even up to the Supreme Court, only to pursue their application for probation when their appeal is
eventually dismissed;

WHEREAS, the process of criminal investigation, prosecution, conviction and appeal entails too much time and effort, not to mention
the huge expenses of litigation, on the part of the State;

WHEREAS, the time, effort and expenses of the Government in investigating and prosecuting accused persons from the lower courts
up to the Supreme Court, are oftentimes rendered nugatory when, after the appellate Court finally affirms the judgment of conviction,
the defendant applies for and is granted probation;

WHEREAS, probation was not intended as an escape hatch and should not be used to obstruct and delay the administration of justice,
but should be availed of at the first opportunity by offenders who are willing to be reformed and rehabilitated;

WHEREAS, it becomes imperative to remedy the problems abovementioned confronting our probation system[.]

Observing the developments in our Probation Law, the Court settled in Llamado v. Court of Appeals:29

Examination of Section 4, after its amendment by P.D. No. 1257, reveals that it had established a prolonged but definite period during
which an application for probation may be granted by the trial court. That period was: "After [the trial court] shall have convicted and

Page 9 of 53
sentenced a defendant but before he begins to serve his sentence." Clearly, the cut-off time - commencement of service of sentence -
takes place not only after an appeal has been taken from the sentence of conviction, but even after judgment has been rendered by the
appellate court and after judgment has become final. Indeed, in this last situation, Section 4, as amended by P.D. No. 1257 provides
that "the application [for probation] shall be acted upon by the trial court on the basis of the judgment of the appellate court"; for the
appellate court might have increased or reduced the original penalty imposed by the trial court, x x x

xxxx

In sharp contrast with Section 4 as amended by PD No. 1257, in its present form, Section 4 establishes a much narrower period during
which an application for probation may be filed with the trial court: "after [the trial court] shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant
and - within the period for perfecting an appeal -." As if to provide emphasis, a new proviso was appended to the first paragraph of
Section 4 that expressly prohibits the grant of an application for probation "if the defendant has perfected an appeal from the judgment
of conviction." It is worthy of note too that Section 4 in its present form has dropped the phrase which said that the filing of an
application for probation means "the automatic withdrawal of a pending appeal." The deletion is quite logical since an application for
probation can no longer be filed once an appeal is perfected; there can, therefore, be no pending appeal that would have to be
withdrawn.

xxxx

We find ourselves unable to accept the eloquently stated arguments of petitioner's counsel and the dissenting opinion. We are unable
to persuade ourselves that Section 4 as it now stands, in authorizing the trial court to grant probation "upon application by [the]
defendant within the period for perfecting an appeal" and in reiterating in the proviso that

"no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected an appeal from the judgment of conviction."

did not really mean to refer to the fifteen-day period established, as indicated above, by B.P. Big. 129, the Interim Rules and Guidelines
Implementing B.P. Big. 129 and the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, but rather to some vague and undefined time, i.e., "the earliest
opportunity" to withdraw the defendant's appeal. The whereas clauses invoked by petitioner did not, of course, refer to the fifteen-day
period. There was absolutely no reason why they should have so referred to that period for the operative words of Section 4 already do
refer, in our view, to such fifteen-day period. Whereas clauses do not form part of a statute, strictly speaking; they are not part of
the operative language of the statute. Nonetheless, whereas clauses may be helpful to the extent they articulate the general purpose or
reason underlying a new enactment, in the present case, an enactment which drastically but clearly changed the substantive content of
Section 4 existing before the promulgation of P.D. No. 1990. Whereas clauses, however, cannot control the specific terms of the
statute; in the instant case, the whereas clauses of P.D. No. 1990 do not purport to control or modify the terms of Section 4 as
amended. Upon the other hand, the term "period for perfecting an appeal" used in Section 4 may be seen to furnish specification for the
loose language "first opportunity" employed in the fourth whereas clause. "Perfection of an appeal" is, of course, a term of art but it is a
term of art widely understood by lawyers and judges and Section 4 of the Probation Law addresses itself essentially to judges and
lawyers. "Perfecting an appeal" has no sensible meaning apart from the meaning given to those words in our procedural law and so the
law-making agency could only have intended to refer to the meaning of those words in the context of procedural law. 30

In Sable v. People, et al.,31 this Court stated that Section 4 of the Probation Law was amended precisely to put a stop to the practice of
appealing from judgments of conviction even if the sentence is probationable, for the purpose of securing an acquittal and applying for
the probation only if the accused fails in his bid.32 The Probation Law "expressly requires that an accused must not have appealed his
conviction before he can avail himself of probation. This outlaws the element of speculation on the part of the accused - to wager on the
result of his appeal -that when his conviction is finally affirmed on appeal, the moment of truth well nigh at hand and the service of his
sentence inevitable, he now applies for probation as an 'escape hatch,' thus rendering nugatory the appellate court's affirmance of his
conviction."33

Verily, Section 4 of the Probation Law provides that the application for probation must be filed with the trial court within the 15-day
period for perfecting an appeal. The need to file it within such period is intended to encourage offenders, who are willing to be reformed
and rehabilitated, to avail themselves of probation at the first opportunity. 34 If the application for probation is filed beyond the 15-day
period, then the judgment becomes final and executory and the lower court can no longer act on the application for probation. On the
other hand, if a notice of appeal is perfected, the trial court that rendered the judgment of conviction is divested of any jurisdiction to act
on the case, except the execution of the judgment when it has become final and executory.

In view of the latest amendment to Section 4 of the Probation Law that "no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if
the defendant has perfected an appeal from the judgment of conviction," prevailing jurisprudence35 treats appeal and probation as
mutually exclusive remedies because the law is unmistakable about it. 36 Indeed, the law is very clear and a contrary interpretation
would counter its envisioned mandate. Courts have no authority to invoke "liberal interpretation" or "the spirit of the law" where the
words of the statute themselves, and as illuminated by the history of that statute, leave no room for doubt or interpretation.37 To be sure,
the remedy of convicted felons who want to avail of the benefits of probation even after the remedy of an appeal is to go to the
Congress and ask for the amendment of the law. To surmise a converse construal of the provision would be dangerously encroaching
on the power of the legislature to enact laws and is tantamount to judicial legislation.

With due respect, however, to the ponente and the majority opinion in Colinares38 the application of the Probation Law in the said case
deserves a second hard look so as to correct the mistake in the application of the law in that particular case and in similar cases which
will be filed before the courts and inevitably elevated to Us like this petition.

To refresh, Colinares concluded that since the trial court imposed a penalty beyond what is allowed by the Probation
Law, albeit erroneously, the accused was deprived of his choice to apply for probation and instead was compelled to appeal the case.
The reprehensible practice intended to be avoided by the law was, therefore, not present when he appealed the trial court's decision.
Taking into account that the accused argued in his appeal that the evidence presented against him warranted his conviction only for
attempted, not frustrated, homicide, the majority of the Court opined that the accused had purposely sought to bring down the
impossible penalty in order to allow him to apply for probation.

It was obvious then, as it is now, that the accused in Colinares should not have been allowed the benefit of probation. As I have
previously stated and insisted upon, probation is not a right granted to a convicted offender; it is a special privilege granted by the State
to a penitent qualified offender,39 who does not possess the disqualifications under Section 9 of P.D. No. 968, as amended. 40 Likewise,
the Probation Law is not a penal law for it to be liberally construed to favor the accused. 41

In the American law paradigm, probation is considered as an act of clemency and grace, not a matter of right. 42 It is a privilege granted
by the State, not a right to which a criminal defendant is entitled.43 In City of Aberdeen v. Regan,44 it was pronounced that:

Page 10 of 53
The granting of a deferred sentence and probation, following a plea or verdict of guilty, is a rehabilitative measure and, as such, is not a
matter of right but is a matter of grace, privilege, or clemency granted to the deserving.

As such, even in the American criminal justice model, probation should be granted only to the deserving or, in our system, only to
qualified "penitent offenders" who are willing to be reformed and rehabilitated. Corollarily, in this jurisdiction, the wisdom behind the
Probation Law is outlined in its stated purposes, to wit:
(a) promote the correction and rehabilitation of an offender by providing him with individualized treatment;
(b) provide an opportunity for the reformation of a penitent offender which might be less probable if he were to serve a prison
sentence; and
(c) prevent the commission of offenses.45

As I have previously indicated in Colinares, if this Court will adopt as jurisprudential doctrine the opinion that an accused may still be
allowed to apply for probation even if he has filed a notice of appeal, it must be categorically stated that such appeal must be limited to
the following grounds:
1. When the appeal is merely intended for the correction of the penalty imposed by the lower court, which when corrected would
entitle the accused to apply for probation; and
2. When the appeal is merely intended to review the crime for which the accused was convicted and that the accused should
only be liable to the lesser offense which is necessarily included in the crime for which he was originally convicted and the
proper penalty imposable is within the probationable period.

In both instances, the penalty imposed by the trial court for the crime committed by the accused is more than six years; hence, the
sentence disqualifies the accused from applying for probation. The accused should then be allowed to file an appeal under the afore-
stated grounds to seek a review of the crime and/or penalty imposed by the trial court. If, on appeal, the appellate court finds it proper to
modify the crime and/or the penalty imposed, and the penalty finally imposed is within the probationable period, the accused should still
be allowed to apply for probation.

In addition, before an appeal is filed based on the grounds enumerated above, the accused should first file a motion for reconsideration
of the decision of the trial court anchored on the above-stated grounds and manifest his intent to apply for probation if the motion is
granted. The motion for reconsideration will give the trial court an opportunity to review and rectify any errors in its judgment, while the
manifestation of the accused will immediately show that he is agreeable to the judgment of conviction and does not intend to appeal
from it, but he only seeks a review of the crime and/or penalty imposed, so that in the event that the penalty will be modified within the
probationable limit, he will immediately apply for probation. Without such motion for reconsideration, the notice of appeal should be
denied outright.

The notice of appeal should contain the following averments:

(1) that an earlier motion for reconsideration was filed but was denied by the trial court;
(2) that the appeal is only for reviewing the penalty imposed by the lower court or the conviction should only be for a lesser crime
necessarily included in the crime charged in the information; and
(3) that the accused-appellant is not seeking acquittal of the conviction.

To note, what Section 4 of the Probation Law prohibits is an appeal from the judgment of conviction, which involves a review of the
merits of the case and the determination of whether the accused is entitled to acquittal. However, under the recommended grounds for
appeal which were enumerated earlier, the purpose of the appeal is not to assail the judgment of conviction but to question only the
propriety of the sentence, particularly the penalty imposed or the crime for which the accused was convicted, as the accused intends to
apply for probation upon correction of the penalty or conviction for the lesser offense. If the CA finds it proper to modify the sentence,
and the penalty finally imposed by the appellate court is within the probationable period, or the crime for which the accused is
eventually convicted imposes a probationable penalty, application for probation after the case is remanded to the trial court for
execution should be allowed.

It is believed that the recommended grounds for appeal do not contravene Section 4 of the Probation Law, which expressly prohibits
only an appeal from the judgment of conviction. In such instances, the ultimate reason of the accused for filing the appeal based on the
afore-stated grounds is to determine whether he may avail of probation based on the review by the appellate court of the crime and/or
penalty imposed by the trial court. Allowing the afore-stated grounds for appeal would give an accused the opportunity to apply for
probation if his ground for appeal is found to be meritorious by the appellate court, thus, serving the purpose of the Probation Law to
promote the reformation of a penitent offender outside of prison.

On the other hand, probation should not be granted to the accused in the following instances:
1. When the accused is convicted by the trial court of a crime where the penalty imposed is within the probationable period or a
fine, and the accused files a notice of appeal; and
2. When the accused files a notice of appeal which puts the merits of his conviction in issue, even if there is an alternative prayer
for the correction of the penalty imposed by the trial court or for a conviction to a lesser crime, which is necessarily included in
the crime in which he was convicted where the penalty is within the probationable period.

Both instances violate the spirit and letter of the law, as Section 4 of the Probation Law prohibits granting an application for probation if
an appeal from the sentence of conviction has been perfected by the accused.

In this case, petitioner appealed the trial court's judgment of conviction before the CA alleging that it was error on the part of the RTC to
have found him guilty of violating Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610. He argued that the RTC should not have given much faith
and credence to the testimony of the victim because it was tainted with inconsistencies. Moreover, he went on to assert that even
assuming he committed the acts imputed on him, still there was no evidence showing that the lascivious acts were committed wi thout
consent or through force, duress, intimidation or violence because the victim at that time was in deep slumber. It is apparent that
petitioner anchored his appeal on a claim of innocence and/or lack of sufficient evidence to support his conviction of the offense
charged, which is clearly inconsistent with the tenor of the Probation Law that only qualified penitent offender are allowed to apply for
probation. The CA, therefore, did not err in applying the similar case of Lagrosa v. People46 wherein the protestations of petitioners
therein did not simply assail the propriety of the penalties imposed but meant a profession of guiltlessness, if not complete innocence.

To be sure, if petitioner intended in the first instance to be entitled to apply for probation he should have admitted his guilt and
buttressed his appeal on a claim that the penalty imposed by the RTC was erroneous or that he is only guilty of a lesser offense
necessarily included in the crime for which he was originally convicted. Unfortunately for him, he already perfected his appeal and it is
late in the day to avail the benefits of probation despite the imposition of the CA of a probationable penalty.

As regards the CA Decision convicting petitioner of the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC, such conclusion
clearly contravenes the law and existing jurisprudence.

Page 11 of 53
Petitioner was charged and convicted by the trial court with violation of Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610 based on the complaint
of a sixteen (16)-year-old girl for allegedly molesting her by touching her breast and vagina while she was sleeping. The provision
reads:

SEC. 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. - Children, whether male or female, who for money, profit, or any other
consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.

The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon the following:

xxxx

(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subject to other
sexual abuse; Provided, That when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335,
paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the
case may be: Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion
temporal in its medium period; x x x (Emphasis supplied)

The elements of sexual abuse are as follows:

1. The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct.
2. The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to sexual abuse.
3. The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age. 47

Under Section 5, Article III of R.A. No. 7610, a child is deemed subjected to other sexual abuse when he or she indulges in lascivious
conduct under the coercion or influence of any adult. 48 This statutory provision must be distinguished from Acts of Lasciviousness under
Articles 336 and 339 of the RPC. As defined in Article 336 of the RPC, Acts of Lasciviousness has the following elements:
(1) That the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness;
(2) That it is done under any of the following circumstances:
a. By using force or intimidation; or
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or
c. When the offended party is under 12 years of age; and
(3) That the offended party is another person of either sex.49

Article 339 of the RPC likewise punishes acts of lasciviousness committed with the consent of the offended party if done by the same
persons and under the same circumstances mentioned in Articles 337 and 338 of the RPC, to wit:
1. if committed against a virgin over twelve years and under eighteen years of age by any person in public authority, priest,
home-servant, domestic, guardian, teacher, or any person who, in any capacity, shall be entrusted with the education or
custody of the woman; or
2. If committed by means of deceit against a woman who is single or a widow of good reputation, over twelve but under
eighteen years of age.

Therefore, if the victim of the lascivious acts or conduct is over 12 years of age and under eighteen (18) years of age, the accused shall
be liable for:
1. Other acts of lasciviousness under Art. 339 of the RPC, where the victim is a virgin and consents to the lascivious acts
through abuse of confidence or when the victim is single or a widow of good reputation and consents to the lascivious acts
through deceit, or;
2. Acts of lasciviousness under Art. 336 if the act of lasciviousness is not covered by lascivious conduct as defined in R.A. No.
7610. In case the acts of lasciviousness is covered by lascivious conduct under R.A. No. 7610 and it is done through coercion
or influence, which establishes absence or lack of consent, then Art. 336 of the RPC is no longer applicable
3. Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, where there was no consent on the part of the victim to the lascivious conduct, which
was done through the employment of coercion or influence. The offender may likewise be liable for sexual abuse under R.A.
No. 7610 if the victim is at least eighteen (18) years and she is unable to fully take care of herself or protect herself from
abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or condition. 50

Article 226-A, paragraph 2 of the RPC, punishes inserting of the penis into another person's mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or
object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person if the victim did not consent either it was done through force, threat or
intimidation; or when the victim is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious; or by means of fraudulent machination or grave
abuse of authority as sexual assault as a form of rape. However, in instances where the lascivious conduct is covered by the definition
under R.A. No. 7610, where the penalty is reclusion temporal medium, and the act is likewise covered by sexual assault under Article
266-A, paragraph 2 of the RPC, which is punishable by prision mayor, the offender should be liable for violation of Section 5(b), Article
III of R.A. No. 7610, where the law provides for the higher penalty of reclusion temporal medium, if the offended party is a child victim.
But if the victim is at least eighteen (18) years of age, the offender should be liable under Art. 266-A, par. 2 of the RPC and not R.A. No.
7610, unless the victim is at least eighteen (18) years and she is unable to fully take care of herself or protect herself from abuse,
neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or condition, in which case, the offender may
still be held liable for sexual abuse under R.A. No. 7610.

There could be no other conclusion, a child is presumed by law to be incapable of giving rational consent to any lascivious act, taking
into account the constitutionally enshrined State policy to promote the physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual and social well-being of the
youth, as well as, in harmony with the foremost consideration of the child's best interests in all actions concerning him or her.51 This is
equally consistent with the with the declared policy of the State to provide special protection to children from all forms of abuse,
neglect, cruelty, exploitation and discrimination, and other conditions prejudicial to their development; provide sanctions for their
commission and carry out a program for prevention and deterrence of and crisis intervention in situations of child abuse, exploitation,
and discrimination.52 Besides, if it was the intention of the framers of the law to make child offenders liable only of Article 266-A of the
RPC, which provides for a lower penalty than R.A. No. 7610, the law could have expressly made such statements.

As correctly found by the trial court, all the elements of sexual abuse under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610 are present in the
case at bar.

First, petitioner's lewd advances of touching the breasts and vagina of his hapless victim constitute lascivious conduct as defined in
Section 32, Article XIII of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 7610:

Page 12 of 53
[T]he intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the
introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus or mouth, of any person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with an intent to abuse,
humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the
genitals or pubic area of a person.53

Second, petitioner clearly has moral ascendancy over the minor victim not just because of his relative seniority but more importantly
due to the presumed presence of mutual trust and confidence between them by virtue of an existing employment relationship, AAA
being a domestic helper in petitioner's household. Notably, a child is considered as sexually abused under Section 5(b) of R.A. No.
7610 when he or she is subjected to lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of any adult. Intimidation need not necessarily
be irresistible. It is sufficient that some compulsion equivalent to intimidation annuls or subdues the free exercise of the will of the
offended party.54 The law does not require physical violence on the person of the victim; moral coercion or ascendancy is
sufficient.55 On this point, Caballo v. People56 explicated:

As it is presently worded, Section 5, Article III of RA 7610 provides that when a child indulges in sexual intercourse or any
lascivious conduct due to the coercion or influence of any adult, the child is deemed to be a "child exploited in prostitution and
other sexual abuse." In this manner, the law is able to act as an effective deterrent to quell all forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty,
exploitation and discrimination against children, prejudicial as they are to their development.

In this relation, case law further clarifies that sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of any adult exists
when there is some form of compulsion equivalent to intimidation which subdues the free exercise of the offended party's free
will. Corollary thereto, Section 2(g) of the Rules on Child Abuse Cases conveys that sexual abuse involves the element of influence
which manifests in a variety of forms. It is defined as:

The employment, use, persuasion, inducement, enticement or coercion of a child to engage in, or assist another person to engage in,
sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct or the molestation, prostitution, or incest with children.

To note, the term "influence" means the "improper use of power or trust in any way that deprives a person of free will and substitutes
another's objective." Meanwhile, "coercion" is the "improper use of x x x power to compel another to submit to the wishes of one who
wields it."57

Finally, the victim is 16 years of age at the time of the commission of the offense. Under Section 3 (a) of R.A. No. 7610, "children" refers
to "persons below eighteen (18) years of age or those over but unable to fully take care of themselves or protect themselves from
abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or condition."

The decision of the trial court finding the petitioner guilty of Violation of Section 5(b), Article III R.A. No. 7610 should have been upheld
by the CA instead of erroneously adopting the recommendation of the OSG, which inaccurately relied on People v. Abello.58 In said
case, the decisive factor for the acquittal of the accused was not the absence of coercion or intimidation on the offended party, who was
then sleeping at the time the lascivious act was committed, but the fact that the victim could not be considered as a "child" under R.A.
No. 7610. This Court held that while the twenty-one year old woman has polio as a physical disability that rendered her incapable of
normal function, the prosecution did not present any testimonial or documentary evidence - any medical evaluation or finding from a
qualified physician, psychologist or psychiatrist - attesting that the physical condition rendered her incapable of fully taking care of
herself or of protecting herself against sexual abuse.

Thus, it is clear that petitioner could not have been entitled to apply for probation in the first place. Regrettably, since neither the
accused nor the OSG questioned the CA Decision, it has attained finality and to correct the error at this stage is already barred by the
right of the accused against double jeopardy.

Based on the above disquisitions, the petitioner should be denied the benefit of the Probation Law and that the Court should adopt the
recommendations above-stated in situations where an accused files an appeal for the sole purpose of correcting the penalty imposed to
qualify him for probation or where he files an appeal specifically claiming that he should be found guilty of a lesser offense necessarily
included with the crime originally filed with a prescribed penalty which is probationable.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 153845. September 11, 2003

EFREN SALVAN y PRESENES, Petitioner, v. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which seeks to set aside the Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
13 of Malolos, Bulacan, dated February 12, 2002, denying due course to petitioner Efren Salvans Notice of Partial Appeal, and the
Order of the same court, dated June 6, 2002, denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. 1 The petition also specifically prays for
the issuance of an Order directing the trial court to give due course to the petitioners Notice of Partial Appeal. 2

Petitioner Efren Salvan, a bus driver, was charged with Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide for the death of John Barry
Abogado, in Criminal Case No. 718-M-00 before the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 13. 3 At his arraignment,
petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge. The trial court then proceeded to receive evidence to determine the civil liability of petitioner.
During the course of the hearing, petitioner and private complainant Edna Abogado, the mother of the accused, agreed to amicably
settle the civil aspect of the case.4

On October 23, 2001, the trial court promulgated its Decision, the decretal portion of which provides:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds the accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of simple negligence
resulting in homicide as per the recitals in the information, punished under the second paragraph of Article 365 of the Revised Penal
Code, and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor. Accused is directed to pay to the heirs of the
deceased the net sum of P100, 000.00, representing the difference between the P100, 000.00 earlier paid by way of amicable
settlement herein and the sum of:
a) P50, 000.00 in actual damages;
b) P50, 000.00 in civil indemnity; and
c) P100, 000.00 in moral damages.

SO ORDERED.5

Page 13 of 53
Petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration praying for the deletion of the additional award of damages.6 He also filed an
Application for Probation on the same date. 7 On January 28, 2002, the trial court denied the petitioners Motion for Partial
Reconsideration, but gave due course to the petitioners Application for Probation. 8

Petitioner then filed a Notice of Partial Appeal on February 8, 2002. On February 12, 2002, the trial court issued the first assailed Order,
the dispositive portion of which states:

Considering that the application for probation of the accused was given due course as per the Order of this Court dated January 28,
2002, and the application for probation is deemed under the law to be a waiver of the right to appeal, the Notice of Appeal is hereby
DENIED due course.

SO ORDERED.9

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied on June 6, 2002.10

Petitioner is now before us, alleging that:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DENIED GIVING DUE COURSE TO ACCUSEDS NOTICE OF PARTIAL APPEAL
EXCLUSIVELY ON THE AWARD OF DAMAGES.11

In Rule 41 of the 1964 Rules of Court, the dismissal of appeals was governed by the following provisions:

SEC. 13. Effect of failure to file notice, bond, or record on appeal. Where the notice of appeal, appeal bond or record on appeal is not
filed within the period of time herein provided, the appeal shall be dismissed.

SEC. 14. Motion to dismiss appeal. A motion to dismiss an appeal on any of the grounds mentioned in the preceding section, may be
filed in the Court of First Instance prior to the transmittal of the record to the appellate court.

Rule 41, Section 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, provides for the grounds to dismiss appeals, to wit:

Sec. 13. Dismissal of appeal. Prior to the transmittal of the original record or the record on appeal to the appellate court, the trial court
may motu proprio or on motion dismiss the appeal for having been taken out of time or for non-payment of the docket and other lawful
fees within the reglementary period.12

The above-quoted rule limits the grounds for dismissal of appeals to very specific instances. The filing of an application for probation is
not one of them.

In the parallel case of Ortigas & Company Limited Partnership v. Velasco, 13 we held:

His Honor was apparently incognizant of the principle that dismissals of appeals from the judgment of a Regional Trial Court by the
latter are authorized only in the instances specifically set forth in Section 13, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. The succeeding provision,
Section 14 of said Rule 41, provides that (a) motion to dismiss an appeal may be filed in the (Regional Trial) Court . . . prior to the
transmittal of the record to the appellate court; and the grounds are limited to those mentioned in the preceding section, i.e., Section 13
to wit: where the notice of appeal, appeal bond, or record on appeal is not filed within the period of time herein provided . . .

These two (2) sections clearly establish that. . . . (A) Trial court may not dismiss an appeal as frivolous, or on the ground that the case
has become moot and academic, such step devolving upon the appellate courts. Otherwise, the way would be opened for (regional
trial) courts . . . to forestall review or reversal of their decisions by higher courts, no matter how erroneous or improper such decisions
should be.14

Although the aforementioned ruling was made in a civil case, we see no reason why the principles enunciated therein cannot be
applied, by analogy, to a criminal case, such as the one at bar. Thus, aside from its competence to dismiss withdrawn appeals,15 the
Regional Trial Courts power to dismiss an appeal is limited to the instances provided for in Rule 41, Section 13.

Going now to the issue of probation, we recall that the law which governs all matters relating to probation is Presidential Decree No.
968, commonly known as the Probation Law, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1990. The provision of the law that is pertinent to
the current controversy reads:

SEC. 4. Grant of Probation. Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the trial court may, after it shall have convicted and sentenced a
defendant, and upon application by said defendant within the period for perfecting an appeal, suspend the execution of the sentence
and place the defendant on probation for such period and upon such terms and conditions as it may deem best; Provided, That no
application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction.

Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a term of imprisonment or a fine only. An application for probation shall be
filed with the trial court. The filing of the application shall be deemed a waiver of the right to appeal.

An order granting or denying probation shall not be appealable.

Relying solely on the letter of the law, the filing of the application for probation should be deemed a waiver of the right to appeal.
However, in the case of Budlong v. Apalisok,16 we had occasion to rule that the above provision of the Probation Law clearly provides
only for the suspension of the sentence imposed on the accused by virtue of his application for probation. It has absolutely no bearing
on civil liability. This ruling was clarified in Salgado v. Court of Appeals,17 wherein we ruled that, although the execution of sentence is
suspended by the grant of probation, it does not follow that the civil liability of the offender, if any, is extinguished.

This intertwining of criminal and civil liability is best understood by analyzing the criminal act itself which, by its very nature, causes two
(2) classes of injury. The first is the social injury produced by the criminal act which is sought to be repaired thru the imposition of the
corresponding penalty and the second is the personal injury caused to the victim of the crime which injury is sought to be compensated
thru indemnity, which is civil in nature. 18 This has been codified in our criminal law, where every person criminally liable for a felony is
also civilly liable.19 Thus, Article 113 of the Revised Penal Code provides that, except in case of extinction of civil liability, the offender
shall continue to be obliged to satisfy the civil liability resulting from the crime committed by him, notwithstanding the fact that he has
served his sentence consisting of deprivation of liberty or other rights, or has not been required to serve the same by reason of
amnesty, pardon, commutation of sentence or any other reason. Furthermore, this principle has found its way into our rules of criminal
procedure, where it is provided that an action for recovery of civil liability is deemed instituted in the criminal action unless reserved by

Page 14 of 53
the offended party.20 And yet it must be remembered that the civil liability of the accused is not part of the penalty for the crime
committed: it is personal to the victim.21

The Probation Law prohibits a judge from entertaining or granting an application for probation if the defendant has perfected an appeal
from the judgment of conviction. The fact of conviction most certainly refers to the criminal liability of the accused, as a result of a
finding made by a judge that he is guilty of the crime charged. However, the appeal in this case involved only the civil aspect of the trial
courts judgment. Hence, we see no reason why, between the conjoined criminal and civil aspects of a felony, a line cannot be drawn
marking where the one springs from the other. Even if by definition civil liability ex delicto arises from the criminal act, once its existence
is established, it should be treated separately from the criminal liability. Indeed there is even categorical statutory basis to state that it
subsists despite the extinguishment of the criminal liability from which it arose. This was the finding in Budlong v. Apalisok and Salgado
v. Court of Appeals.

Thus, we rule that, in an appeal from a judgment of conviction, the criminal liability and the civil liability ex delicto should be considered
independently, each with its own corresponding effects. In the present case, the law that bars an appeal of the judgment of conviction,
as well as its corresponding criminal liability, should not bar an appeal of the civil aspect of the same judgment.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 13 of Malolos,
Bulacan, dated February 12, 2002, and June 6, 2002 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Let this case be REMANDED to the court of
origin which is ORDERED to give due course to the petitioners Notice of Partial Appeal.

SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v. NOEL DARILAY, Appellant.

The Spouses Pascual and Gemma Arganda were the parents of five children, the eldest of whom was Marilyn who was born on
October 24, 1988.1 The second child, Ailyn, was born on September 14, 1990.2 The couple and their children resided in Sitio
Magrimpong, Sta. Cruz, Tinambac, Camarines Sur.3The couple knew the appellant, Noel Darilay, their 15-year-old barriomate because
he and his friends frequented their house.

At 7:30 a.m. on April 19, 1997, Hercules Bon was in the house of his uncle at Magrimpong, Sta. Cruz, Tinambac, Camarines Sur. At
about 8:00 a.m., his cousin, the appellant, arrived. Their friend, Jose Delfino, also arrived. They had a drinking spree and consumed
two bottles of gin. After about thirty minutes, the appellant left because his father had arrived and was looking for him. 4

At about 9:00 a.m., Marilyn and Ailyn were asked by their parents to buy tinapa (dried fish) from a store about half a kilometer away
from their residence. They used a foot path to get to the store.After buying the dried fish, they walked back home. Momentarily, they
saw the appellant emerge from a catmon tree.5 He struck Ailyn twice with a piece of wood on her back and boxed her on the left side of
her face. She felt excruciating pain on her back and face, and all over her body.She fell unconscious.6 The appellant then struck Marilyn
twice on the back with the piece of wood.He then carried Ailyn to a grassy area and left her there. When Ailyn regained her bearings,
she looked for Marilyn but the appellant and her sister were nowhere to be found. 7

Ailyn then rushed back home and told her mother what happened to her and Marilyn. 8 Their neighbor, Allan Candelaria, then rushed to
the farm where Pascual worked as a laborer and informed him of what happened to his daughters. 9 Pascual hurried home and looked
for Marilyn in Sitio Magrimpong and within the vicinity of the river, to no avail. He rushed back home and after a while left again to
resume his search for Marilyn. Again, he failed to find her.10 He searched anew for his daughter with the help of neighbors at around
1:00 p.m., again to no avail.

At 11:00 a.m. earlier that day, Andres Arganda, the victim’s uncle reported the incident to the police station.SPO1 Teresito Porteza,
SPO1 Ernesto Ablaza and PO3 Antonio Pacardo rushed to the scene.11 With the help of tanods, they searched for Marilyn in the place
where the appellant attacked the girls. About 15 meters away, they found a yellow-and-white-colored dress,12 white panties,13 and a
slipper bearing the name of Marilyn. The dress was torn.14 In the meantime, Bon went back home and was informed that the appellant
was wanted for the injuries of Ailyn and Marilyn. He looked for the appellant and found him in the house of Jose Delfino. 15

While the policemen were conducting their investigation, the appellant arrived accompanied by PO3 Antonio Pacardo. When asked
where Marilyn was, he told the police that she was about 30 meters away. Upon the policemens failure to find the girl, the appellant
finally told them where Marilyn was and volunteered to accompany them to the place. The policemen, the appellant and Pascual
Arganda then left and proceeded to Palinao River, at Sitio Palinao, Binalay, Tinambac. They found Marilyns body in a grassy area near
bushes and trees along the Palinao River.16 She was lying face down, her legs spread apart and was completely naked. There was
blood on her nose, her mouth, and her vagina. Her hair was disheveled. Photographer John Francis Madrigal took pictures of Marilyn at
the place where she was found.17 The policemen arrested the appellant and had him detained in jail.

Municipal Health Officer Dr. Salvador V. Betito, Jr., performed an autopsy of the cadaver and prepared a report thereon which
contained the following findings:

Post-mortem examination findings:

1. Abrasions, multiple, face.
2. Avulsion, 1 cm. x 3 cms., chin.
3. Abrasions, multiple, left and right shoulder and anterior chest wall.
4. Depressed fractures, occipital bone of the head.
5. Abrasions, multiple, posterior chest wall.

Vaginal Examination:
a.Labia majora blood-stained, slightly prominent and distinctly gaping.
b.Lacerations big, at six oclock position.
c.Vaginal canal reddened, presence of oozing blood.
Conclusions:She had sexual intercourse with a man.
Cause of Death:Internal hemorrhage secondary to depressed fractures of the skull.18

The doctor testified that the most fatal wound inflicted on Marilyn was wound no. 4. He also examined Ailyn and signed a report stating
that the victim sustained the following injuries:

Medical Certificate of Ailyn Arganda

Pertinent Physical Examination Findings:

Page 15 of 53
1.Contusion, occipital aspect of the head.
2.Abrasions, multiple, posterior aspect of the chest.
3.Contusion, leftzygomatic aspect of the face.19

The appellant was charged of attempted murder under an Amended Information filed with the Regional Trial Court of Camarines Sur,
Branch 63, docketed as Criminal Case No. RTC97-202, the accusatory portion of which reads:

That on or about the 19th day of April 1997, at Sitio Magrimpong, Barangay Sta. Cruz, Municipality of Tinambac, Province of Camarines
Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts by then and there with treachery and
abuse of superior strength assaulting and hitting with a piece of wood one AILYN ARGANDA, a seven (7) year old child, who as a
consequence thereof, lost consciousness but the accused was not able to perform all the acts of execution which should have
produced the felony intended by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance, that is, due to her
tenacity to live and the fact that she was not fatally hit when she was struck with the said piece of wood, to the damage and prejudice of
said offended party.

ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.20

The appellant was, likewise, charged with rape with homicide in an Amended Information filed in the same court, docketed as Criminal
Case No. RTC97-201, the accusatory portion of which reads:

That on or about the 19th day of April 1997, at Sitio Magrimpong, Barangay Sta. Cruz, Municipality of Tinambac, Province of Camarines
Sur, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd design did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously strike with a piece of wood one Marilyn Arganda, an eight (8) year old child as a consequence
thereof she lost consciousness and when said child victim was thus unconscious or while hovering between life and death, accused
Noel Darilay did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously in order to satisfy his lust, had carnal knowledge with said child
victim by means of force as a result of which Marilyn Arganda suffered an untimely and cruel death, to the damage and prejudice of the
private offended party.

ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.21

A joint trial of the two cases thereafter ensued.

On September 5, 1997, the appellant was arraigned, assisted by counsel, and entered a plea of not guilty to the crimes charged.

The Case for the Appellant

The appellant denied killing and raping Marilyn and attempting to kill Ailyn.He claimed that Hercules Bon and Jose Delfino hit Ailyn and
Marilyn and that it was also them who raped and killed Marilyn. Although he was present when Bon and Delfino committed the crimes,
he could do nothing to prevent them.

The appellant testified that he was 15 years old. He was inveigled by Hercules Bon to indulge and use rugby in the evening of April 18,
1997.At 7:30 a.m. the next day, April 19, 1997, he was in their house at Tinambac, Sta. Cruz, Camarines Sur, with his family: his
parents, the Spouses Manuel and Julieta Darilay; and his siblings Christopher, Zarina, Midel, Francia and Shirley.When Bon fetched
him, they proceeded to the house of Jose Delfino, also in Sitio Tinambac, Sta. Cruz, Magrimpong, where they had a drinking spree. Not
content, they went to the riverbank and continued drinking. They were already inebriated. 22 They saw Marilyn and Ailyn pass by on their
way to the store of Salvacion San Andres. Bon ordered him and Delfino to follow the girls.They did as they were told. Ailyn, who was
walking ahead of her sister, was grabbed by Delfino and the appellant, while Bon overtook Marilyn. Delfino then hit Ailyn. The latter fell
to the ground, face down.Delfino and the appellant left Ailyn and went back to where Bon was. The latter proposed that they bring
Marilyn to the other side of the riverbank. The appellant and Delfino agreed. Bon and Delfino carried Marilyn, while the appellant
followed. When they reached their destination, Bon and Delfino took turns in raping Marilyn.

The appellant testified that he wanted to prevent his companions from assaulting the victim but he was afraid because Bon and Delfino
were armed with bladed weapons.23 Besides, he was already drunk and much weaker than his companions who had taken illicit
drugs.24 He then left the place and went home, leaving Bon, Delfino and Marilyn behind.Policemen later arrived at their house and
arrested and handcuffed him. He was told that Ailyn had pointed to him as the one who abducted Marilyn. The appellant insisted that
Bon and Delfino were the culprits.25 He was brought to the municipal hall where policemen forced him to admit raping and killing
Marilyn. He denied raping and killing the girl and told the policemen that Bon and Delfino were the ones who raped and killed her. 26 It
was he who pointed to the policemen and also accompanied them to where Marilyns body was found. 27

After trial, the court rendered judgment convicting the appellant of rape with homicide in Criminal Case No. RTC97-201, and attempted
murder in Criminal Case No. RTC97-202.The court appreciated in favor of the appellant the privileged mitigating circumstance of
minority, but sentenced him to reclusion perpetua for rape with homicide. The decretal portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the prosecution having proved the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, accused Noel Darilay is found guilty
of the offense of Rape with Homicide in Crim.Case No. RTC97-201 and guilty of the offense of Attempted Murder in Crim. Case No.
RTC97-202. He is ordered to suffer the following penalties:

1. In Crim. Case No. RTC97-201, Rape with Homicide, he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua;

2. To pay the heirs of Marilyn Arganda the following:

A. P75,000.00 for her death;
b. P30,000.00 for moral damages;
c. P10,000.00 for exemplary damages;
d. P20,000.00 for actual damages;

3. In Crim. Case No. RTC97-202, accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the following penalties:
A. To suffer the penalty of imprisonment of TWO (2) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY to FOUR (4) MONTHS of arresto mayor in its medium
period;
b. To pay the heirs of Ailyn Arganda the amount of P20,000.00 as moral damages and to pay the costs.

The accused being a minor, his father Manuel Darilay is hereby ordered to pay the heirs of Marilyn Arganda and Ailyn Arganda the
foregoing civil liabilities under Article 201, P.D. No. 603 as amended (Child and Youth Welfare Code).

Page 16 of 53
SO ORDERED.28

On appeal, the appellant assails the decision of the trial court contending that:

I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR THE CRIMES OF ATTEMPTED MURDER AND
RAPE WITH HOMICIDE WHEN THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT APPLYING THE PRIVILEGE[D] MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF MINORITY UNDER
ARTICLE 68, PAR. 1, OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. RTC97-201.

III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT APPLYING THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 192 OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREENO. 603. 29

The appellant avers that it was physically impossible for him to have raped and killed Marilyn in the vicinity of the Palinao River. As
testified to by SPO1 Teresito Porteza, one has to cross the river, then three-feet deep and strewn with big stones, to reach the place
where Marilyns body was found. The appellant reasoned that since he was only 15 years old at the time, it is inconceivable that he
could single-handedly carry a girl who weighed 18 kilos to a distance of one kilometer, even crossing the three-feet deep river in the
process.
The appellant asserts that all things considered, his testimony that Bon and Delfino carried Marilyn across the Palinao River and
brought her to the other side is believable.He also claims that Ailyn failed to see Bon and Delfino because they were covered by
grasses, the tallest of which were two feet high. Ailyns testimony, that the appellant hit her at the back, is highly improbable considering
that the evidence shows that the appellant approached her head on.The appellant insists that the prosecutor failed to prove that he
raped and killed Marilyn as Ailyn herself admitted that she did not see the appellant rape and kill her sister.As such, it was a travesty for
the trial court to convict him of rape with homicide, relying solely on Ailyns testimony that he struck Marilyn on the back twice with a
piece of wood.

The contentions of the appellant do not hold water.

First. SPO1 Porteza declared that the portion of the Palinao River which he and his companions crossed to reach the place where
Marilyn was found is the ordinary place where people use to pass in going to the other side of the river.30 If ordinary people cross the
river through that portion, there is no reason why the appellant could not have done the same. In fact, the appellant and the policemen
were able to cross the river without much ado when they went to the place where Marilyn was found.

Second. The appellant testified that he himself crossed the river when Bon and Delfino carried Marilyn, although he claimed that he
merely accompanied them.

Third. The appellant was a young man in the prime of his life while Marilyn was a girl under 12 years old, only 4 feet tall. It was, thus,
not impossible for him to have carried her across the river to the other side and dump her nearby, under the cover of bushes and trees
to prevent her body from being discovered.

Fourth. The trial court gave credence and full probative weight to the testimony of Ailyn. The legal aphorism is that the findings of facts
of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of witnesses and its assessment of their probative weight, as well as its conclusions,
based on its findings are accorded by the appellate court high respect, if not conclusive effect. The appellant failed to convince the court
that the trial court ignored, misunderstood or misinterpreted cogent facts and circumstances of substance which if considered will
change the outcome of the case. Ailyn testified how the appellant mercilessly waylaid her and Marilyn as they were on their way home,
and that she immediately told her mother that the appellant had attacked them, and that her sister was nowhere to be found:

QHow is Marilyn related to you?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

AShe is my sister.
QWho is older?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
AMarilyn.
QWhere were you and your Ate Marilyn when you were asked by your mother to buy tinapa?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
AWe were still inside the house.
QWhere do you reside?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
AMagrimpong.
QWhat barrio?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
ATinambac.
QDid you go with your sister to buy tinapa?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
AYes, sir.
ATTY. TAYER:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
QObjection Your Honor.
PROS. CU:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
This is a follow-up question, Your Honor.
COURT:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
Already answered.
PROS. CU:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
QWhere did you buy tinapa or smoked fish?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
AAte Arlyn (sic).
QWere you able to buy tinapa?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
AYes, sir.
QSo, after you bought smoked fish, what if anything, did you do next with your Ate Marilyn?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
AWe went home.
QWhile on your way home with your Ate Marilyn, what, if anything, happened?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
ASomething happened, sir.
ATTY. TAYER:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
We will object to that, no basis.
PROS. CU:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
What, if anything, happened.
COURT:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
What if anything happened when on the way going home? The witness has already answered, anyway. Proceed.

Page 17 of 53
PROS. CU:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
QYou said that while on your way home, something happened.What was this event that happened?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
ASuddenly, Noel Darilay came out from he were (sic).
QWhere did he come from?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
AFrom a catmon tree.
QWhen you saw Noel Darilay suddenly came out from a catmon tree, what if anything transpired next?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
AHe struck us.
QWhat if anything was Noel Darilay holding?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
AA wood.
QWho was the person whom Noel Darilaystruck first?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
.. .
COURT:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
Witness may answer. Who is the first one?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
AI was the one, sir.
PROS. CU:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
QIn what portion of your body wereyou struck at?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
AAt my back.
QHow many times?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
ATwo (2) times.
QNow,after you were struck by Noel Darilay with that piece of wood which he was holding, what if anything did he do next to
you?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
AHe punched me at my left cheekbone (sic).
QAfter you were punched by Noel Darilay, what if anything did he do to Marilyn?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
AHe also struck Marilyn at her back.
QAnd how many times did Noel Darilaystrike yourAte Marilyn?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
ATwice also, sir.
QWhat, if anything, did you feel when you were struck by Noel Darilay with that piece of wood?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
AI felt pain all over my body.
QWhat about when you were punched by Noel Darilay on your left cheek, what, if anything, did you feel?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
AMy face was very painful.
QAfter Noel Darilay struck your Ate Marilyn twice also at her back with that piece of wood, what if anything happened
next?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
AHe threw us on the grassy portion.
QWho first was carried by Noel Darilay to be thrown in a grassy portion then?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
AI was the one, sir.
QWhy were you not able to escape, Ailyn?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
ABecause my body was very painful.
QFor how long did you find yourself on that state or condition in the place where you were thrown at?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
AHalf an hour, sir.
QWere you able to go back to your house, Ailyn?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
AYes, sir.
QWhat time did you go back to your house?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
AAround 9:00 oclock in the morning.
QWas your Ate Marilyn with you when you went back to your house?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
ATTY. TAYER:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
Objection, leading.
COURT:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
Sustained.
PROS. CU:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
QWere you alone when you went back?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
ATTY. TAYER:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
Objection, leading.
COURT:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
Reform your question.
PROS. CU:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
QWho was with you when you went home?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
AI have no companion, sir.
QWhy, where was, if you know, your Ate Marilyn?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
AShe was gone and I did not anymore find her.
QWhen you arrived at your residence or house, who was the person inside the house?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
AMy mother, sir.
QSo, what, if anything, did you tell to your mother?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
AI told my mother that Noel struck us.
QDo you know the person of Noel Darilay?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
AYes, sir.31 ςrνll

Despite intense and grueling cross-examination by the appellants counsel, Ailyn remained steadfast and unrelenting.

Fifth. The appellant was merely clutching at straws when he attempted to pin the criminal liability on Bon and Delfino for the injuries
sustained by Ailyn and the rape and death of Marilyn. If, indeed, Bon and Delfino were involved, Ailyn would have said so when she
testified. Moreover, Ailyn identified the appellant as the only culprit. There is no evidence on record that Ailyn harbored any ill or
devious motive to point to the appellant as the sole perpetrator of the crime, for which the latter could be meted the capital penalty, if
convicted. Hence, Allyn’s testimony is entitled to full probative weight. We agree with the disquisitions of the trial court, thus:

These foregoing circumstantial evidence pieced together, points to the accused as the rapist-murderer of 8-year-old Marilyn Arganda.
The testimony of Ailyn Arganda identifying the accused having struck her and her sister on the very day of April 19, 1997 between 8:30
and 9:00 o’clock in the morning at Magrimpong, Tinambac, Camarines Sur is consistent with truth considering that it was even admitted
by the accused that about that time, they were following the two (2) sisters. However, the defense of the accused was that it was
Hercules Bon who had struck Marilyn Arganda while Ailyn Arganda was walking ahead of Marilyn was struckby Jose Delfino.This
statement of the accused is quite unbelievable over the statement of Ailyn Argandaeven [if] she testified that she was so definitethat it
was accused Noel Darilay who was alone at that time who struck her and her sister. Ailyn Arganda although she was only 8 years old is
a very much qualified witness despite her tender age because as observed by the court, she was narrating the incident in a
straightforward manner. Because of her tender age, she was asked by the prosecution whether she knows that she has to tell the truth

Page 18 of 53
and nothing but the truth in giving her testimony in court and she answered, yes, and she even testified that telling a lie i s bad. Her
testimony was likewise corroborated by the findings of Dr. Betito who conducted an autopsy examinationon the cadaver of Marilyn
Arganda and conducted a medical examination on the injuries of Ailyn Arganda. The findings of Dr. Betito was that Marilyn Arganda
suffered injuries on her head which were fatal and would cause internal hemorrhage that caused her death while in the physical
examination that he conducted on Ailyn Arganda. Dr. Betito testified that he had found contusion and abrasion on the back of the head
of Ailyn Arganda and also contusion on the left face of Ailyn Arganda.Ailyn Arganda had testified clearly that she was hittwice by the
accused and hit the back of her head and she was punched hitting her cheek and this was corroborated then by the findings of Dr.
Betito. Likewise, she testified that her sister was also struck hitting her on the head and the findings of Dr. Betito on the cadaver of
Marilyn Arganda was that she had injuries on her head which may be caused by a hard object. His alibi that he was notthe one who had
struck Marilyn and Ailyn Arganda and pointing to Hercules Bon and Jose Delfino is unbelievable considering that Ailyn Arganda
positively identified him to be the one who both (sic) struck her and her sister Marilyn on April 19, 1997.32

[T]he testimony of Ailyn Arganda was made in a straightforward manner and all the facts that she has narrated jibed with the findings of
the doctor who conducted the autopsy on the cadaver of Marilyn and conducted the medical examination on her. Her testimonies even
remained the same and she remained unshaken during the cross-examination. The witness who is of tender age such as Ailyn Arganda
is a credible witness because usually children of tender age cannot be coached and had to tell the truth of what she had experienced.
The court has no doubt as to the truthfulness of the testimony of Ailyn Arganda which is consistent with common experience in the
natural course of things coupled with the fact that it was corroborated by an expert witness who conducted [an] examination both on
Ailyn Arganda herself and on the cadaver of Marilyn Arganda.

The testimony of children of sound mind is likely to be more correct and truthful than that of older persons, so that once established that
they have fully understood the character and nature of an oath, their testimony should be given full credence. (Julio Marco v. CA and
People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 117561, June 11, 1997). 33

The Crime Committed by the Appellant in Criminal Case No. RTC97-202

We agree with the ruling of the trial court that the appellant is guilty of attempted murder for the injuries sustained by Ailyn. Under
Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, there is an attempt to commit a felony when the offender commences the commission of a felony
by direct acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution by reason of some causes or accident other than his own spontaneous
desistance. In People v. Lizada ,34 we held:

The Supreme Court of Spain, in its decision of March 21, 1892, declared that for overt acts to constitute an attempted offense, it is
necessary that their objective be known and established or such that acts be of such nature that they themselves should obviously
disclose the criminal objective necessarily intended, said objective and finality to serve as ground for designation of the offense.35

For one to be criminally liable for a consummated, frustrated or attempted homicide or murder, there must be, on the part of the
accused, an intent to kill the victim. Intent to kill is an internal act but may be proved by evidence, inter alia, that the accused used a
lethal weapon; the nature, location and number of wounds sustained by the victim; and by the words uttered by the malefactor before,
at the time or immediately after the infliction of the injuries on the victim. 36 In this case, the prosecution proved that the appellant
intended to kill the victim Ailyn because (a) he used a piece of wood; (b) he struck Ailyn twice on the back and boxed her on the face;
(c) he threw her to the ground and dragged her to a grassy area; (d) he left Ailyn all by herself. There is evidence on record that the
injuries sustained by Ailyn were mortal and could have caused her death. She recovered from her injuries in less than 5 days but not
more than 9 days. Furthermore, the crime was qualified by treachery because Ailyn, who was only 7 years old at the time, could not
defend herself against the appellant’s physical assault. Hence, the appellant is guilty of attempted murder.

The Crime Committed by the Appellant in Criminal Case No. RTC97-201

The appellant asserts that there was no eyewitness to the rape and killing of Marilyn. He contends that the prosecution failed to prove
that the appellant raped the victim and killed her on the occasion or by reason of the said rape. He should thus be acquitted of the said
crime. For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General avers that as gleaned from the evidence on record and the findings of the trial
court in its decision, the prosecution adduced circumstantial evidence to prove that the appellant raped the victim and killed her on the
occasion or by reason of said crime. Hence, it asserts, the trial court did not err in convicting the appellant of the special complex crime
of rape with homicide.

We agree with the appellant that the prosecution failed to adduce direct evidence to prove that he raped and killed Marilyn on the
occasion or by reason of the said crime. However, direct evidence is not indispensable to prove the guilt of the accused for the crime
charged; it may be proved by circumstantial evidence. In People v. Delim,37 we held, thus:

Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the existence of the main fact may be
inferred according to reason and common experience. What was once a rule of ancient practicability is now entombed in Section 4,
Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Evidence which states that circumstantial evidence, sometimes referred to as indirect or presumptive
evidence, is sufficient as anchor for a judgment of conviction if the following requisites concur:

x x xif(a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived have been established; and (c) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to warrant a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

The prosecution is burdened to prove the essential events which constitute a compact mass of circumstantial evidence, and the proof of
each being confirmed by the proof of the other, and all without exception leading by mutual support to but one conclusion: the guilt of
the accused for the offense charged. For circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all the circumstances must be
consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that accused is guilty and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis
that he is innocent, and with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt. If the prosecution adduced the requisite circumstantial
evidence to prove the guilt of accused beyond reasonable doubt, the burden of evidence shifts to the accused to controvert the
evidence of the prosecution.38

We are convinced that, based on the evidence on record and as declared by the trial court in its decision, the prosecution adduced
circumstantial evidence to prove beyond cavil that it was the appellant who raped and killed Marilyn on the occasion or by reason of the
rape. Hence, he is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape with homicide, a special complex crime.

First. The appellant alone waylaid Ailyn and Marilyn while the two were walking home after buying tinapa. The appellant hit Ailyn twice
with a piece of wood on her back and boxed the left side of her face, rendering her unconscious. The appellant also struck Marilyn with
a piece of wood on the back. After dragging Ailyn to a grassy area, he left her there.

Second. When Ailyn regained consciousness, Marilyn and the appellant were nowhere to be found.

Page 19 of 53
Third. The torn dress, the pair of panties, and a slipper were found about 15 meters away from where the two young girls were waylaid
by the appellant.

Fourth. The appellant testified that he himself accompanied the policemen and pointed to the place where Marilyn’s body was dumped,
completely naked, with blood oozing from her nose and vagina.

We are convinced that the appellant raped Marilyn about 15 meters from where he had earlier waylaid Ailyn. He then carried Marilyn
across the river where he killed her to prevent her from revealing to the authorities that she was raped. The appellant hid her body
under the bushes and trees to thus prevent police authorities from discovering that he killed Marilyn. Irrefragably, Marilyn was killed by
reason of the rape. The killing of a child, barely 9 years old, is murder. Nonetheless, the appellant is guilty of rape with homicide
because the latter crime is used in its generic sense.

The Proper Penalties against the Appellant

As found by the trial court, the appellant was over 9 years but under 15 years old when he committed the crime. The appellant acted
with discernment when he committed the same. Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the imposable penalty should be
reduced by two degrees. Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, rape with homicide is
punishable by death. Reducing the penalty by two degrees, the imposable penalty is reclusion temporal, from which the maximum of
the indeterminate penalty should be taken. To determine the minimum of the penalty, it should be reduced by one degree, which
is prision mayor. Applying the indeterminate sentence law and taking into account how the ghastly crime was committed, the appellant
should be sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of from 6 years and one day of prision mayor in its medium period, as minimum,
to 17 years and 4 months of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum.

For attempted murder, the trial court sentenced the appellant to an indeterminate penalty, from 2 months and one day to 4 months
of arresto mayor. The penalty imposed by the trial court is erroneous. The penalty of consummated murder under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, is reclusion perpetua to death.The imposable penalty should be reduced by two degrees under
Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code because the appellant is a minor. As reduced, the penalty is reclusion temporal.39 Reclusion
temporal should be reduced by two degrees lower, conformably to Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code which is prision correccional.
This penalty should be reduced by one degree, which is arresto mayor, to determine the minimum of the indeterminate penalty.
Accordingly, the appellant should be sentenced to a straight penalty of four (4) months. It goes without saying that if the trial court
decides to impose on the accused a penalty of imprisonment of one year or less, it should impose a straight penalty and not an
indeterminate penalty.

Civil Liability for the Crimes

Considering that at the time of the commission of the crime, the appellant was a minor under the parental authority of his parents, the
Spouses Manuel and Julieta Darilay are primarily and directly liable for the damages sustained by the heirs of the victims Marilyn and
Ailyn Arganda.40 Consequently, the Spouses Manuel and Julieta Darilay are hereby ordered, jointly and severally, in Criminal Case No.
RTC97-201, to pay to the heirs of the victim Marilyn Arganda, the amount of P100,000.00 as civil indemnity; 41 P50,000.00 as moral
damages;42 and P28,000.00 as exemplary -damages.43 The prosecution failed to adduce evidence in support of actual damages;
hence, the heirs of the victim are not entitled thereto. They are, however, entitled to temperate damages in the amount of P25,
000.00.44

In Criminal Case No. RTC97-202, the Spouses Manuel and Julieta Darilay are hereby ordered to pay, jointly and severally, to Ailyn
Arganda, the amount of P25,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Camarines Sur, Branch 63, is AFFIRMED
WITH MODIFICATION. In Criminal Case No. RTC97-201, the appellant is found guilty of rape with homicide under Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, and is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty from six (6) years of prision mayor in its
medium period, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum. The
Spouses Manuel and Julieta Darilay, are hereby ordered to pay, jointly and severally, to the heirs of the victim Marilyn
Arganda P100,000.00 as civil indemnity; P50,000.00 as moral damages; P25,000.00 as exemplary damages; and P25,000.00 as
temperate damages.

In Criminal Case No. RTC97-202, the appellant is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of attempted murder under Article 248 in
relation to Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, and is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment of four (4) months. The Spouses
Manuel and Julieta Darilay, are ordered to pay, jointly and severally, to Ailyn Arganda the amount of P25, 000.00 as moral damages
and P25, 000.00 as exemplary damages.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 93028 July 29, 1994

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MARTIN SIMON y SUNGA, respondent.

Herein accused-appellant Martin Simon y Sunga was charged on November 10, 1988 with a violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic
Act No. 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, under an indictment alleging that on or about
October 22, 1988, at Barangay Sto. Cristo, Guagua, Pampanga, he sold four tea bags of marijuana to a Narcotics Command
(NARCOM) poseur-buyer in consideration of the sum of P40.00, which tea bags, when subjected to laboratory examination, were found
positive for marijuana.1

Eventually arraigned with the assistance of counsel on March 2, 1989, after his rearrest following his escape from Camp Olivas, San
Fernando, Pampanga where he was temporarily detained, 2 he pleaded not guilty. He voluntarily waived his right to a pre-trial
conference,3 after which trial on the merits ensued and was duly concluded.

The evidence on record shows that a confidential informant, later identified as a NARCOM operative, informed the police unit at Camp
Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga, of the illegal drug activities of a certain "Alyas Pusa" at Sto. Cristo, Guagua, Pampanga. Capt.
Francisco Bustamante, Commanding Officer of the 3rd Narcotics Regional Unit in the camp, then formed a buy-bust team composed of
Sgt. Buenaventura Lopez, Pfc. Virgilio Villaruz and Sgt. Domingo Pejoro, all members of the same unit. After securing marked money

Page 20 of 53
from Bustamante, the team, together with their informant, proceeded to Sto. Cristo after they had coordinated with the police authorities
and barangay officers thereof. When they reached the place, the confidential informer pointed out appellant to Lopez who consequently
approached appellant and asked him if he had marijuana. Appellant answered in the affirmative and Lopez offered to buy two tea bags.
Appellant then left and, upon returning shortly thereafter, handed to Lopez two marijuana tea bags and Lopez gave him the marked
money amounting to P40.00 as payment. Lopez then scratched his head as a pre-arranged signal to his companions who were
stationed around ten to fifteen meters away, and the team closed in on them. Thereupon, Villaruz, who was the head of the back-up
team, arrested appellant. The latter was then brought by the team to the 3rd Narcotics Regional Unit at Camp Olivas on board a jeep
and he was placed under custodial investigation, with Sgt. Pejoro as the investigator. 4

Pfc. Villaruz corroborated Lopez' testimony, claiming that he saw the deal that transpired between Lopez and the appellant. He also
averred that he was the one who confiscated the marijuana and took the marked money from appellant.5

Sgt. Domingo Pejoro, for his part, declared that although he was part of the buy-bust team, he was stationed farthest from the rest of
the other members, that is, around two hundred meters away from his companions. He did not actually see the sale that transpired
between Lopez and appellant but he saw his teammates accosting appellant after the latter's arrest. He was likewise the one who
conducted the custodial investigation of appellant wherein the latter was apprised of his rights to remain silent, to information and to
counsel. Appellant, however, orally waived his right to counsel. 6

Pejoro also claimed having prepared Exhibit "G", the "Receipt of Property Seized/Confiscated" which appellant signed, admitting
therein the confiscation of four tea bags of marijuana dried leaves in his possession. Pejoro likewise informed the court below that,
originally, what he placed on the receipt was that only one marijuana leaf was confiscated in exchange for P20.00. However, Lopez and
Villaruz corrected his entry by telling him to put "two", instead of "one" and "40", instead of "20". He agreed to the correction since they
were the ones who were personally and directly involved in the purchase of the marijuana and the arrest of appellant. 7

Dr. Pedro S. Calara, a medical officer at Camp Olivas, examined appellant at 5:30 p.m. of the day after the latter's apprehension, and
the results were practically normal except for his relatively high blood pressure. The doctor also did not find any trace of physical injury
on the person of appellant. The next day, he again examined appellant due to the latter's complaint of gastro-intestinal pain. In the
course of the examination, Dr. Calara discovered that appellant has a history of peptic ulcer, which causes him to experience
abdominal pain and consequently vomit blood. In the afternoon, appellant came back with the same complaint but, except for the
gastro-intestinal pain, his physical condition remained normal.8

As expected, appellant tendered an antipodal version of the attendant facts, claiming that on the day in question, at around 4:30 p.m.,
he was watching television with the members of his family in their house when three persons, whom he had never met before suddenly
arrived. Relying on the assurance that they would just inquire about something from him at their detachment, appellant boarded a jeep
with them. He was told that they were going to Camp Olivas, but he later noticed that they were taking a different route. While on board,
he was told that he was a pusher so he attempted to alight from the jeep but he was handcuffed instead. When they finally reached the
camp, he was ordered to sign some papers and, when he refused, he was boxed in the stomach eight or nine times by Sgt. Pejoro. He
was then compelled to affix his signature and fingerprints on the documents presented to him. He denied knowledge of the P20.00 or
the dried marijuana leaves, and insisted that the twenty-peso bill came from the pocket of Pejoro. Moreover, the reason why he vomited
blood was because of the blows he suffered at the hands of Pejoro. He admitted having escaped from the NARCOM office but claimed
that he did so since he could no longer endure the maltreatment to which he was being subjected. After escaping, he proceeded to the
house of his uncle, Bienvenido Sunga, at San Matias, Guagua, reaching the place at around 6:30 or 7:30 p.m. There, he consulted a
quack doctor and, later, he was accompanied by his sister to the Romana Pangan District Hospital at Floridablanca, Pampanga where
he was confined for three days.9

Appellant's brother, Norberto Simon, testified to the fact that appellant was hospitalized at Floridablanca, Pampanga after undergoing
abdominal pain and vomiting of blood. He likewise confirmed that appellant had been suffering from peptic ulcer even before the latter's
arrest.10 Also, Dr. Evelyn Gomez-Aguas, a resident physician of Romana Pangan District Hospital, declared that she treated appellant
for three days due to abdominal pain, but her examination revealed that the cause for this ailment was appellant's peptic ulcer. She did
not see any sign of slight or serious external injury, abrasion or contusion on his body.11

On December 4, 1989, after weighing the evidence presented, the trial court rendered judgment convicting appellant for a violation of
Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment, to pay a fine
of twenty thousand pesos and to pay the costs. The four tea bags of marijuana dried leaves were likewise ordered confiscated in favor
of the Government.12

Appellant now prays the Court to reverse the aforementioned judgment of the lower court, contending in his assignment of errors that
the latter erred in (1) not upholding his defense of "frame-up", (2) not declaring Exhibit "G" (Receipt of Property Seized/Confiscated)
inadmissible in evidence, and (3) convicting him of a violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. 13

At the outset, it should be noted that while the People's real theory and evidence is to the effect the appellant actually sold only two tea
bags of marijuana dried leaves, while the other two tea bags were merely confiscated subsequently from his possession, 14 the latter not
being in any way connected with the sale, the information alleges that he sold and delivered four tea bags of marijuana dried
leaves.15 In view thereof, the issue presented for resolution in this appeal is merely the act of selling the two tea bags allegedly
committed by appellant, and does not include the disparate and distinct issue of illegal possession of the other two tea bags which
separate offense is not charged herein.16

To sustain a conviction for selling prohibited drugs, the sale must be clearly and unmistakably established. 17 To sell means to give,
whether for money or any other material consideration. 18 It must, therefore, be established beyond doubt that appellant actually sold
and delivered two tea bags of marijuana dried leaves to Sgt. Lopez, who acted as the poseur-buyer, in exchange for two twenty-peso
bills.

After an assiduous review and calibration of the evidence adduced by both parties, we are morally certain that appellant was caught
in flagrante delicto engaging in the illegal sale of prohibited drugs. The prosecution was able to prove beyond a scintilla of doubt that
appellant, on October 22, 1988, did sell two tea bags of marijuana dried leaves to Sgt. Lopez. The latter himself creditably testified as to
how the sale took place and his testimony was amply corroborated by his teammates. As between the straightforward, positive and
corroborated testimony of Lopez and the bare denials and negative testimony of appellant, the former undeniably deserves greater
weight and is more entitled to credence.

We are aware that the practice of entrapping drug traffickers through the utilization of poseur-buyers is susceptible to mistake,
harassment, extortion and abuse.19 Nonetheless, such causes for judicial apprehension and doubt do not obtain in the case at bar.
Appellant's entrapment and arrest were not effected in a haphazard way, for a surveillance was conducted by the team before the
buy-bust operation was effected.20 No ill motive was or could be attributed to them, aside from the fact that they are presumed to have

Page 21 of 53
regularly performed their official duty.21 Such lack of dubious motive coupled with the presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duty, as well as the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses, should prevail over the self-serving and
uncorroborated claim of appellant of having been framed, 22 erected as it is upon the mere shifting sands of an alibi. To top it all,
appellant was caught red-handed delivering prohibited drugs, and while there was a delimited chance for him to controvert the charge,
he does not appear to have plausibly done so.

When the drug seized was submitted to the Crime Laboratory Service of the then Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police
(PC-INP) at Camp Olivas for examination, P/Cpl. Marlyn Salangad, a forensic chemist therein,23confirmed in her Technical Report No.
NB-448-88 that the contents of the four tea bags confiscated from appellant were positive for and had a total weight of 3.8 grams of
marijuana.24 Thus, the corpus delicti of the crime had been fully proved with certainty and conclusiveness. 25

Appellant would want to make capital of the alleged inconsistencies and improbabilities in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.
Foremost, according to him, is the matter of who really confiscated the marijuana tea bags from him since, in open court, Pejoro
asserted that he had nothing to do with the confiscation of the marijuana, but in the aforementioned "Receipt of Property
Seized/Confiscated," he signed it as the one who seized the same.26

Suffice it to say that whether it was Villaruz or Pejoro who confiscated the marijuana will not really matter since such is not an element
of the offense with which appellant is charged. What is unmistakably clear is that the marijuana was confiscated from the possession of
appellant. Even, assuming arguendo that the prosecution committed an error on who actually seized the marijuana from appellant, such
an error or discrepancy refers only to a minor matter and, as such, neither impairs the essential integrity of the prosecution evidence as
a whole nor reflects on the witnesses' honesty. 27 Besides, there was clearly a mere imprecision of language since Pejoro obviously
meant that he did not take part in the physical taking of the drug from the person of appellant, but he participated in the legal seizure or
confiscation thereof as the investigator of their unit.

Next, appellant adduces the argument that the twenty-peso bills allegedly confiscated from him were not powdered for finger-printing
purposes contrary to the normal procedure in buy-bust operations.28 This omission has been satisfactorily explained by Pfc. Virgilio
Villaruz in his testimony, as follows:

Q: Is it the standard operating procedure of your unit that in conducting such operation you do not
anymore provide a powder (sic) on the object so as to determine the thumbmark or identity of the
persons taking hold of the object?

A: We were not able to put powder on these denominations because we are lacking that kind of
material in our office since that item can be purchased only in Manila and only few are producing
that, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: Is it not a fact that your office is within (the) P.C. Crime Laboratory, CIS, as well as the office of
NICA?

A: Our office is only adjacent to those offices but we cannot make a request for that powder
because they, themselves, are using that in their own work, sir. 29

The foregoing explanation aside, we agree that the failure to mark the money bills used for entrapment purposes can under no mode of
rationalization be fatal to the case of the prosecution because the Dangerous Drugs Act punishes "any person who, unless authorized
by law, shall sell, administer, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug, or shall act as
a broker in any of such transactions."30 The dusting of said bills with phosphorescent powder is only an evidentiary technique for
identification purposes, which identification can be supplied by other species of evidence.

Again, appellant contends that there was neither a relative of his nor any barangay official or civilian to witness the seizure. He decries
the lack of pictures taken before, during and after his arrest. Moreover, he was not reported to or booked in the custody of
any barangay official or police authorities.31 These are absurd disputations. No law or jurisprudence requires that an arrest or seizure,
to be valid, be witnessed by a relative, a barangay official or any other civilian, or be accompanied by the taking of pictures. On the
contrary, the police enforcers having caught appellant in flagrante delicto, they were not only authorized but were also under the
obligation to effect a warrantless arrest and seizure.

Likewise, contrary to appellant's contention, there was an arrest report prepared by the police in connection with his apprehension. Said
Booking Sheet and Arrest Report32 states, inter alia, that "suspect was arrested for selling two tea bags of suspected marijuana dried
leaves and the confiscation of another two tea bags of suspected marijuana dried leaves." Below these remarks was affixed appellant's
signature. In the same manner, the receipt for the seized property, hereinbefore mentioned, was signed by appellant wherein he
acknowledged the confiscation of the marked bills from him. 33

However, we find and hereby declare the aforementioned exhibits inadmissible in evidence. Appellant's conformance to these
documents are declarations against interest and tacit admissions of the crime charged. They were obtained in violation of his right as a
person under custodial investigation for the commission of an offense, there being nothing in the records to show that he was assisted
by counsel.34 Although appellant manifested during the custodial investigation that he waived his right to counsel, the waiver was not
made in writing and in the presence of counsel, 35 hence whatever incriminatory admission or confession may be extracted from him,
either verbally or in writing, is not allowable in evidence. 36 Besides, the arrest report is self-serving and hearsay and can easily be
concocted to implicate a suspect.

Notwithstanding the objectionability of the aforesaid exhibits, appellant cannot thereby be extricated from his predicament since his
criminal participation in the illegal sale of marijuana has been sufficiently proven. The commission of the offense of illegal sale of
prohibited drugs requires merely the consummation of the selling transaction37 which happens the moment the buyer receives the drug
from the seller.38 In the present case, and in light of the preceding discussion, this sale has been ascertained beyond any peradventure
of doubt.

Appellant then asseverates that it is improbable that he would sell marijuana to a total stranger.39 We take this opportunity to once
again reiterate the doctrinal rule that drug-pushing, when done on a small scale as in this case, belongs to that class of crimes that may
be committed at any time and in any place. 40 It is not contrary to human experience for a drug pusher to sell to a total stranger, 41 for
what matters is not an existing familiarity between the buyer and seller but their agreement and the acts constituting the sale and
delivery of the marijuana leaves.42 While there may be instances where such sale could be improbable, taking into consideration the

Page 22 of 53
diverse circumstances of person, time and place, as well as the incredibility of how the accused supposedly acted on that occasion, we
can safely say that those exceptional particulars are not present in this case.

Finally, appellant contends that he was subjected to physical and mental torture by the arresting officers which caused him to escape
from Camp Olivas the night he was placed under custody. 43 This he asserts to support his explanation as to how his signatures on the
documents earlier discussed were supposedly obtained by force and coercion.

The doctrine is now too well embedded in our jurisprudence that for evidence to be believed, it must not only proceed from the mouth of
a credible witness but must be credible in itself such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable
under the circumstances.44 The evidence on record is bereft of any support for appellant's allegation of maltreatment. Two doctors, one
for the prosecution45 and the other for the defense,46 testified on the absence of any tell-tale sign or indication of bodily injury, abrasions
or contusions on the person of appellant. What is evident is that the cause of his abdominal pain was his peptic ulcer from which he had
been suffering even before his arrest. 47 His own brother even corroborated that fact, saying that appellant has had a history of bleeding
peptic ulcer.48

Furthermore, if it is true that appellant was maltreated at Camp Olivas, he had no reason whatsoever for not divulging the same to his
brother who went to see him at the camp after his arrest and during his detention there. 49Significantly, he also did not even report the
matter to the authorities nor file appropriate charges against the alleged malefactors despite the opportunity to do so 50 and with the
legal services of counsel being available to him. Such omissions funnel down to the conclusion that appellant's story is a pure
fabrication.

These, and the events earlier discussed, soundly refute his allegations that his arrest was baseless and premeditated for the NARCOM
agents were determined to arrest him at all costs.51 Premeditated or not, appellant's arrest was only the culmination, the final act
needed for his isolation from society and it was providential that it came about after he was caught in the very act of illicit trade of
prohibited drugs. Accordingly, this opinion could have concluded on a note of affirmance of the judgment of the trial court. However,
Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, was further amended by Republic Act No. 7659 effective December 31, 1993, 52 which
supervenience necessarily affects the original disposition of this case and entails additional questions of law which we shall now
resolve.

II

The provisions of the aforesaid amendatory law, pertinent to the adjudication of the case at bar, are to this effect:

Sec. 13. Sections 3, 4, 5, 7, 8 and 9 of Art. II of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, known as the Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1972, are hereby amended to read as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Prohibited Drugs. — The
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten
million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell,
administer, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited
drug, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 17. Section 20, Article IV of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, is
hereby amended to read as follows:
Sec. 20. Application of Penalties, Confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds or Instrument of the
Crime. — The penalties for offenses under Sections 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9 of Article II and Sections 14,
14-A, 15 and 16 of Article III of this Act shall be applied if the dangerous drugs involved is in any of
the following quantities:
xxx xxx xxx
5. 750 grams or more of indian hemp or marijuana
xxx xxx xxx
Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing quantities, the penalty shall range
from prision correccional to reclusion perpetua depending upon the quantity.

1. Considering that herein appellant is being prosecuted for the sale of four tea bags of marijuana with a total weight of only 3.8 grams
and, in fact, stands to be convicted for the sale of only two of those tea bags, the initial inquiry would be whether the patently favorable
provisions of Republic Act No. 7659 should be given retroactive effect to entitle him to the lesser penalty provided thereunder, pursuant
to Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code.

Although Republic Act No. 6425 was enacted as a special law, albeit originally amendatory and in substitution of the previous Articles
190 to 194 of the Revised Penal Code,53 it has long been settled that by force of Article 10 of said Code the beneficient provisions of
Article 22 thereof applies to and shall be given retrospective effect to crimes punished by special laws.54 The execution in said article
would not apply to those convicted of drug offenses since habitual delinquency refers to convictions for the third time or more of the
crimes of serious or less serious physical injuries, robo, hurto, estafa or falsification.55

Since, obviously, the favorable provisions of Republic Act No. 7659 could neither have then been involved nor invoked in the present
case, a corollary question would be whether this court, at the present stage, can sua sponte apply the provisions of said Article 22 to
reduce the penalty to be imposed on appellant. That issue has likewise been resolved in the cited case of People vs. Moran, et al.,
ante., thus:

. . . . The plain precept contained in article 22 of the Penal Code, declaring the retroactivity of penal laws in so far as
they are favorable to persons accused of a felony, would be useless and nugatory if the courts of justice were not
under obligation to fulfill such duty, irrespective of whether or not the accused has applied for it, just as would also all
provisions relating to the prescription of the crime and the penalty.

If the judgment which could be affected and modified by the reduced penalties provided in Republic Act No. 7659 has already become
final and executory or the accused is serving sentence thereunder, then practice, procedure and pragmatic considerations would
warrant and necessitate the matter being brought to the judicial authorities for relief under a writ of habeas corpus.56

2. Probably through oversight, an error on the matter of imposable penalties appears to have been committed in the drafting of the
aforesaid law; thereby calling for and necessitating judicial reconciliation and craftsmanship.

Page 23 of 53
As applied to the present case, Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, as now further amended, imposes the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death and a fine ranging from P500,000.00 to P10,000,000.00 upon any person who shall unlawfully sell, administer,
deliver, give away, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug. That penalty, according to the amendment to Section
20 of the law, shall be applied if what is involved is 750 grams or more of Indian hemp or marijuana; otherwise, if the quantity involved
is less, the penalty shall range from prision correccional to reclusion perpetua depending upon the quantity.

In other words, there is here an overlapping error in the provisions on the penalty of reclusion perpetua by reason of its dual imposition,
that is, as the maximum of the penalty where the marijuana is less than 750 grams, and also as the minimum of the penalty where the
marijuana involved is 750 grams or more. The same error has been committed with respect to the other prohibited and regulated drugs
provided in said Section 20. To harmonize such conflicting provisions in order to give effect to the whole law, 57 we hereby hold that the
penalty to be imposed where the quantity of the drugs involved is less than the quantities stated in the first paragraph shall range
from prision correccional to reclusion temporal, and not reclusion perpetua. This is also concordant with the fundamental rule in criminal
law that all doubts should be construed in a manner favorable to the accused.

3. Where, as in this case, the quantity of the dangerous drug is only 3.8 grams, hence covered by the imposable range of penalties
under the second paragraph of Section 20, as now modified, the law provides that the penalty shall be taken from said range
"depending upon the quantity" of the drug involved in the case. The penalty in said second paragraph constitutes a complex one
composed of three distinct penalties, that is, prision correccional,prision mayor, and reclusion temporal. In such a situation, the Code
provides that each one shall form a period, with the lightest of them being the minimum, the next as the medium, and the most severe
as the maximum period.58

Ordinarily, and pursuant to Article 64 of the Code, the mitigating and aggravating circumstances determine which period of such
complex penalty shall be imposed on the accused. The peculiarity of the second paragraph of Section 20, however, is its specific
mandate, above quoted, that the penalty shall instead depend upon the quantity of the drug subject of the criminal
transaction.59 Accordingly, by way of exception to Article 77 of the Code and to subserve the purpose of Section 20 of Republic Act No.
7659, each of the aforesaid component penalties shall be considered as a principal imposable penalty depending on the quantity of the
drug involved. Thereby, the modifying circumstances will not altogether be disregarded. Since each component penalty of the total
complex penalty will have to be imposed separately as determined by the quantity of the drug involved, then the modifying
circumstances can be used to fix the proper period of that component penalty, as shall hereafter be explained.

It would, therefore, be in line with the provisions of Section 20 in the context of our aforesaid disposition thereon that, unless there are
compelling reasons for a deviation, the quantities of the drugs enumerated in its second paragraph be divided into three, with the
resulting quotient, and double or treble the same, to be respectively the bases for allocating the penalty proportionately among the three
aforesaid periods according to the severity thereof. Thus, if the marijuana involved is below 250 grams, the penalty to be imposed shall
be prision correccional; from 250 to 499 grams, prision mayor; and 500 to 749 grams, reclusion temporal. Parenthetically, fine is
imposed as a conjunctive penalty only if the penalty is reclusion perpetua to death. 60

Now, considering the minimal quantity of the marijuana subject of the case at bar, the penalty of prision correccional is consequently
indicated but, again, another preliminary and cognate issue has first to be resolved.

4. Prision correccional has a duration of 6 months and 1 day to 6 years and, as a divisible penalty, it consists of three periods as
provided in the text of and illustrated in the table provided by Article 76 of the Code. The question is whether or not in determining the
penalty to be imposed, which is here to be taken from the penalty of prision correccional, the presence or absence of mitigating,
aggravating or other circumstances modifying criminal liability should be taken into account.

We are not unaware of cases in the past wherein it was held that, in imposing the penalty for offenses under special laws, the rules on
mitigating or aggravating circumstances under the Revised Penal Code cannot and should not be applied. A review of such doctrines
as applied in said cases, however, reveals that the reason therefor was because the special laws involved provided their own specific
penalties for the offenses punished thereunder, and which penalties were not taken from or with reference to those in the Revised
Penal Code. Since the penalties then provided by the special laws concerned did not provide for the minimum, medium or maximum
periods, it would consequently be impossible to consider the aforestated modifying circumstances whose main function is to determine
the period of the penalty in accordance with the rules in Article 64 of the Code.

This is also the rationale for the holding in previous cases that the provisions of the Code on the graduation of penalties by degrees
could not be given supplementary application to special laws, since the penalties in the latter were not components of or contemplated
in the scale of penalties provided by Article 71 of the former. The suppletory effect of the Revised Penal Code to special laws, as
provided in Article 10 of the former, cannot be invoked where there is a legal or physical impossibility of, or a prohibition in the special
law against, such supplementary application.

The situation, however, is different where although the offense is defined in and ostensibly punished under a special law, the penalty
therefor is actually taken from the Revised Penal Code in its technical nomenclature and, necessarily, with its duration, correlation and
legal effects under the system of penalties native to said Code. When, as in this case, the law involved speaks of prision
correccional, in its technical sense under the Code, it would consequently be both illogical and absurd to posit otherwise. More on this
later.

For the nonce, we hold that in the instant case the imposable penalty under Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by Republic Act No.
7659, is prision correccional, to be taken from the medium period thereof pursuant to Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code, there being
no attendant mitigating or aggravating circumstance.

5. At this juncture, a clarificatory discussion of the developmental changes in the penalties imposed for offenses under special laws
would be necessary.

Originally, those special laws, just as was the conventional practice in the United States but differently from the penalties provided in
our Revised Penal Code and its Spanish origins, provided for one specific penalty or a range of penalties with definitive durations, such
as imprisonment for one year or for one to five years but without division into periods or any technical statutory cognomen. This is the
special law contemplated in and referred to at the time laws like the Indeterminate Sentence Law 61 were passed during the American
regime.

Subsequently, a different pattern emerged whereby a special law would direct that an offense thereunder shall be punished under the
Revised Penal Code and in the same manner provided therein. Inceptively, for instance, Commonwealth Act No. 303 62 penalizing non-
payment of salaries and wages with the periodicity prescribed therein, provided:

Page 24 of 53
 Sec. 4. Failure of the employer to pay his employee or laborer as required by section one of this Act, shall prima
facie be considered a fraud committed by such employer against his employee or laborer by means of false
pretenses similar to those mentioned in article three hundred and fifteen, paragraph four, sub-paragraph two (a) of
the Revised Penal Code and shall be punished in the same manner as therein provided.63

Thereafter, special laws were enacted where the offenses defined therein were specifically punished by the penalties as technically
named and understood in the Revised Penal Code. These are exemplified by Republic Act No. 1700 (Anti-Subversion Act) where the
penalties ranged from arresto mayor to death;64 Presidential Decree No. 1612 (Anti-Fencing Decree) where the penalties run
from arresto mayor to prision mayor; and Presidential Decree No. 1866 (illegal possession and other prohibited acts involving
firearms), the penalties wherefor may involve prision mayor, reclusion temporal, reclusion perpetua or death.

Another variant worth mentioning is Republic Act No. 6539 (Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972) where the penalty is imprisonment for not
less than 14 years and 8 months and not more than 17 years and 4 months, when committed without violence or intimidation of persons
or force upon things; not less than 17 years and 4 months and not more than 30 years, when committed with violence against or
intimidation of any person, or force upon things; and life imprisonment to death, when the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped
vehicle is killed.

With respect to the first example, where the penalties under the special law are different from and are without reference or relation to
those under the Revised Penal Code, there can be no suppletory effect of the rules for the application of penalties under said Code or
by other relevant statutory provisions based on or applicable only to said rules for felonies under the Code. In this type of special law,
the legislative intendment is clear.

The same exclusionary rule would apply to the last given example, Republic Act No. 6539. While it is true that the penalty of 14 years
and 8 months to 17 years and 4 months is virtually equivalent to the duration of the medium period of reclusion temporal, such technical
term under the Revised Penal Code is not given to that penalty for carnapping. Besides, the other penalties for carnapping attended by
the qualifying circumstances stated in the law do not correspond to those in the Code. The rules on penalties in the Code, therefore,
cannot suppletorily apply to Republic Act No. 6539 and special laws of the same formulation.

On the other hand, the rules for the application of penalties and the correlative effects thereof under the Revised Penal Code, as well as
other statutory enactments founded upon and applicable to such provisions of the Code, have suppletory effect to the penalties under
the former Republic Act No. 1700 and those now provided under Presidential Decrees Nos. 1612 and 1866. While these are special
laws, the fact that the penalties for offenses thereunder are those provided for in the Revised Penal code lucidly reveals the statutory
intent to give the related provisions on penalties for felonies under the Code the corresponding application to said special laws, in the
absence of any express or implicit proscription in these special laws. To hold otherwise would be to sanction an indefensible judicial
truncation of an integrated system of penalties under the Code and its allied legislation, which could never have been the intendment of
Congress.

In People vs. Macatanda,65 a prosecution under a special law (Presidential Decree No. 533, otherwise known as the Anti-Cattle
Rustling Law of 1974), it was contended by the prosecution that Article 64, paragraph 5, of the Revised Penal Code should not apply to
said special law. We said therein that —

We do not agree with the Solicitor General that P.D. 533 is a special law entirely distinct from and unrelated to the
Revised Penal Code. From the nature of the penalty imposed which is in terms of the classification and duration of
penalties as prescribed in the Revised Penal Code, which is not for penalties as are ordinarily imposed in special
laws, the intent seems clear that P.D. 533 shall be deemed as an amendment of the Revised Penal Code, with
respect to the offense of theft of large cattle (Art. 310) or otherwise to be subject to applicable provisions thereof
such as Article 104 of the Revised Penal Code . . . . Article 64 of the same Code should, likewise, be applicable, . . . .
(Emphasis supplied.)

More particularly with regard to the suppletory effect of the rules on penalties in the Revised Penal Code to Republic Act No. 6425, in
this case involving Article 63(2) of the Code, we have this more recent pronouncement:

. . . Pointing out that as provided in Article 10 the provisions of the Revised Penal Code shall be "supplementary" to
special laws, this Court held that where the special law expressly grants to the court discretion in applying the penalty
prescribed for the offense, there is no room for the application of the provisions of the Code . . . .

The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by P.D. No. 1623, contains no explicit grant of discretion to the Court
in the application of the penalty prescribed by the law. In such case, the court must be guided by the rules prescribed
by the Revised Penal Code concerning the application of penalties which distill the "deep legal thought and centuries
of experience in the administration of criminal laws." (Emphasis ours.)66

Under the aforestated considerations, in the case of the Dangerous Drugs Act as now amended by Republic Act No. 7659 by the
incorporation and prescription therein of the technical penalties defined in and constituting integral parts of the three scales of penalties
in the Code, 67 with much more reason should the provisions of said Code on the appreciation and effects of all attendant modifying
circumstances apply in fixing the penalty. Likewise, the different kinds or classifications of penalties and the rules for graduating such
penalties by degrees should have supplementary effect on Republic Act No. 6425, except if they would result in absurdities as will now
be explained.

While not squarely in issue in this case, but because this aspect is involved in the discussion on the role of modifying circumstances,
we have perforce to lay down the caveat that mitigating circumstances should be considered and applied only if they affect
the periods and the degrees of the penalties within rational limits.

Prefatorily, what ordinarily are involved in the graduation and consequently determine the degree of the penalty, in accordance with the
rules in Article 61 of the Code as applied to the scale of penalties in Article 71, are the stage of execution of the crime and the nature of
the participation of the accused. However, under paragraph 5 of Article 64, when there are two or more ordinary mitigating
circumstances and no aggravating circumstance, the penalty shall be reduced by one degree. Also, the presence of privileged
mitigating circumstances, as provided in Articles 67 and 68, can reduce the penalty by one or two degrees, or even more. These
provisions of Articles 64(5), 67 and 68 should not apply in toto in the determination of the proper penalty under the aforestated second
paragraph of section 20 of Republic Act No. 6425, to avoid anomalous results which could not have been contemplated by the
legislature.

Thus, paragraph 5 of Article 61 provides that when the law prescribes a penalty in some manner not specially provided for in the four
preceding paragraphs thereof, the courts shall proceed by analogy therewith. Hence, when the penalty prescribed for the crime consists

Page 25 of 53
of one or two penalties to be imposed in their full extent, the penalty next lower in degree shall likewise consist of as many penalties
which follow the former in the scale in Article 71. If this rule were to be applied, and since the complex penalty in this
case consists of three discrete penalties in their full extent, that is, prision correccional, prision mayor and reclusion temporal, then one
degree lower would be arresto menor, destierro and arresto mayor. There could, however, be no further reduction by still one or two
degrees, which must each likewise consist of three penalties, since only the penalties of fine and public censure remain in the scale.

The Court rules, therefore, that while modifying circumstances may be appreciated to determine the periods of the corresponding
penalties, or even reduce the penalty by degrees, in no case should such graduation of penalties reduce the imposable penalty beyond
or lower than prision correccional. It is for this reason that the three component penalties in the second paragraph of Section 20 shall
each be considered as an independent principal penalty, and that the lowest penalty should in any event be prision correccional in
order not to depreciate the seriousness of drug offenses. Interpretatio fienda est ut res magis valeat quam pereat. Such interpretation is
to be adopted so that the law may continue to have efficacy rather than fail. A perfect judicial solution cannot be forged from an
imperfect law, which impasse should now be the concern of and is accordingly addressed to Congress.

6. The final query is whether or not the Indeterminate Sentence Law is applicable to the case now before us. Apparently it does, since
drug offenses are not included in nor has appellant committed any act which would put him within the exceptions to said law and the
penalty to be imposed does not involve reclusion perpetua or death, provided, of course, that the penalty as ultimately resolved will
exceed one year of imprisonment.68 The more important aspect, however, is how the indeterminate sentence shall be ascertained.

It is true that Section 1 of said law, after providing for indeterminate sentence for an offense under the Revised Penal Code, states that
"if the offense is punished by any other law, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of
which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the
same." We hold that this quoted portion of the section indubitably refers to an offense under a special law wherein the penalty imposed
was not taken from and is without reference to the Revised Penal Code, as discussed in the preceding illustrations, such that it may be
said that the "offense is punished" under that law.

There can be no sensible debate that the aforequoted rule on indeterminate sentence for offenses under special laws was necessary
because of the nature of the former type of penalties under said laws which were not included or contemplated in the scale of penalties
in Article 71 of the Code, hence there could be no minimum "within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code
for the offense," as is the rule for felonies therein. In the illustrative examples of penalties in special laws hereinbefore provided, this rule
applied, and would still apply, only to the first and last examples. Furthermore, considering the vintage of Act No. 4103 as earlier noted,
this holding is but an application and is justified under the rule of contemporanea expositio.69

We repeat, Republic Act No. 6425, as now amended by Republic Act No. 7659, has unqualifiedly adopted the penalties under the
Revised Penal Code in their technical terms, hence with their technical signification and effects. In fact, for purposes of determining
the maximum of said sentence, we have applied the provisions of the amended Section 20 of said law to arrive at prision
correccional and Article 64 of the Code to impose the same in the medium period. Such offense, although provided for in a special law,
is now in effect punished by and under the Revised Penal Code. Correlatively, to determine the minimum, we must apply the first part of
the aforesaid Section 1 which directs that "in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its
amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be that which, in
view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposedunder the rules of said Code, and the minimum which shall be within the
range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense." (Emphasis ours.)

A divergent pedantic application would not only be out of context but also an admission of the hornbook maxim that qui haeret in litera
haeret in cortice. Fortunately, this Court has never gone only skin-deep in its construction of Act. No. 4103 by a mere literal appreciation
of its provisions. Thus, with regard to the phrase in Section 2 thereof excepting from its coverage "persons convicted of
offenses punished with death penalty or life imprisonment," we have held that what is considered is the penalty actually imposed and
not the penalty imposable under the law, 70and that reclusion perpetua is likewise embraced therein although what the law states is "life
imprisonment".

What irresistibly emerges from the preceding disquisition, therefore, is that under the concurrence of the principles of literal
interpretation, which have been rationalized by comparative decisions of this Court; of historical interpretation, as explicated by the
antecedents of the law and related contemporaneous legislation; and of structural interpretation, considering the interrelation of the
penalties in the Code as supplemented by Act No. 4103 in an integrated scheme of penalties, it follows that the minimum of the
indeterminate sentence in this case shall be the penalty next lower to that prescribed for the offense. Thereby we shall have interpreted
the seeming ambiguity in Section 1 of Act No. 4103 in such a way as to harmonize laws with laws, which is the best mode of
interpretation.71

The indeterminate Sentence Law is a legal and social measure of compassion, and should be liberally interpreted in favor of the
accused.72 The "minimum" sentence is merely a period at which, and not before, as a matter of grace and not of right, the prisoner may
merely be allowed to serve the balance of his sentence outside of his confinement. 73 It does not constitute the totality of the penalty
since thereafter he still has to continue serving the rest of his sentence under set conditions. That minimum is only the period when the
convict's eligibility for parole may be considered. In fact, his release on parole may readily be denied if he is found unworthy thereof, or
his reincarceration may be ordered on legal grounds, even if he has served the minimum sentence.

It is thus both amusing and bemusing if, in the case at bar, appellant should be begrudged the benefit of a minimum sentence within the
range of arresto mayor, the penalty next lower to prision correccional which is the maximum range we have fixed through the
application of Articles 61 and 71 of the Revised Penal Code. For, with fealty to the law, the court may set the minimum sentence at 6
months of arresto mayor, instead of 6 months and 1 day of prision correccional. The difference, which could thereby even involve only
one day, is hardly worth the creation of an overrated tempest in the judicial teapot.

ACCORDINGLY, under all the foregoing premises, the judgment of conviction rendered by the court a quo against accused-appellant
Martin Simon y Sunga is AFFIRMED, but with the MODIFICATION that he should be, as he hereby is, sentenced to serve an
indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as the minimum, to six (6) years of prision correccional, as the maximum
thereof.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. Nos. 191370-71, August 10, 2015

Page 26 of 53
RODOLFO BASILONIA, LEODEGARIO CATALAN AND JOHN BASILONIA, Petitioners, v. HON. DELANO F. VLLLARUZ, ACTING
IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, ROXAS CITY, BRANCH 16, AND DIXON
ROBLETE, Respondents.

The lone issue for resolution in this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure (Rules) with prayer
for the issuance of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order is the applicability of Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules in
criminal cases. Specifically, does a trial court have jurisdiction to grant a motion for execution which was filed almost twenty (20) years
after the date of entry of judgment? In his Orders dated December 3, 2009 1 and January 4, 2010,2 respondent Judge Delano F.
Vi11aruz of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Roxas City, Branch 16, held in the affirmative.3 We sustain in part.

The Facts

On June 19, 1987, a Decision4 was promulgated against petitioners in Criminal Case Nos. 1773, 1774 and 1775, the dispositive portion
of which states:

WHEREFORE, and in view of the foregoing considerations, this court finds the [accused] Rodolfo Basilonia, Leodegario Catalan, and
John "Jojo" Basilonia, GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT, as principals in Criminal Case No. 1773 for the murder of Atty.
Isagani Roblete on September 15, 1983 in Roxas City, Philippines, defined under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code of the
Philippines, without any aggravating or mitigating circumstance, and sentences the said [accused] to suffer an indeterminate sentence
of 12 years, 1 month and 1 day of reclusion temporal as minimum, to 20 years, and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum, and the
accessory penalties thereto; to pay and [indemnify], jointly and severally, the heirs of the deceased Atty. Isagani Roblete the sum of
1!32,100.00 representing funeral expenses, tomb, burial, and expenses for wake; the sum of 1!30,000.00 as indemnity for the death of
Atty. Isagani Roblete; the amount of lost income cannot be determined as the net income of the deceased cannot be ascertained; and
to pay the costs of suit. [Accused] Vicente Catalan and Jory Catalan are ACQUITTED for lack of evidence.

In Criminal Case No. 1775 for Frustrated Murder, this court finds the accused John "Jojo" Basilonia GUlLTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT of the crime of Frustrated Homicide, as principal, committed against the person of Rene Gonzales on September 15, 1983,
defined under Article 249, in relation to Articles 6 and 50 of the Revised Penal Code and sentences the said accused to suffer an
indeterminate sentence of 2 years, 4 months and 1 day of prision [correccional] as minimum, to 6 years, and 1 day of prision mayor as
maximum; and to pay the costs. [Accused] Rodolfo Basilonia, Leodegario Catalan, Vicente Catalan and Jory Catalan are ACQUITTED
for lack of evidence.

In Criminal Case No. 1774 for Illegal Possession of Firearm, all [accused] are ACQUITTED for insufficiency of evidence.

SO ORDERED.5

Petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal on July 30, 1987, which the trial court granted on August 3, 1987. 6

On January 23, 1989, the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the appeal for failure of petitioners to file their brief despite extensions of
time given.7

The Resolution was entered in the Book of Entries of Judgment on September 18, 1989. 8 Thereafter, the entire case records were
remanded to the trial court on October 4, 1989. 9

Almost two decades passed from the entry of judgment, on May 11, 2009, private respondent Dixon C. Roblete, claiming to be the son
of the deceased victim, Atty. Roblete, filed a Motion for Execution of Judgment. 10

He alleged, among others, that despite his request to the City Prosecutor to file a motion for execution, the judgment has not been
enforced because said prosecutor has not acted upon his request.

Pursuant to the trial court's directive, the Assistant City Prosecutor filed on May 22, 2009 an Omnibus Motion for Execution of Judgment
and Issuance of Warrant of Arrest.11

On July 24, 2009, petitioners filed before the CA a Petition for Relief of Judgment praying to set aside the June 19, 1987 trial court
Decision and the January 23, 1989 CA Resolution. 12 Further, on September 1, 2009, they filed before the trial court a Manifestation and
Supplemental Opposition to private respondent Roblete's motion.13

The trial court granted the motion for execution on December 3, 2009 and ordered the bondsmen to surrender petitioners within ten
(10) days from notice of the Order. The motion for reconsideration14filed by petitioners was denied on January 4, 2010.

Due to petitioners' failure to appear in court after the expiration of the period granted to their bondsmen, the bail for their provisional
liberty was ordered forfeited on January 25, 2010.15 On even date, the sheriff issued the writ of execution.16

The Court's Ruling

The determination of whether respondent trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
granting a motion for execution which was filed almost twenty (20) years after a judgment in a criminal case became final and executory
necessarily calls for the resolution of the twin issues of whether the penalty of imprisonment already prescribed and the civil liability
arising from the crime already extinguished. In both issues, petitioners vehemently assert that respondent trial court has no more
jurisdiction to order the execution of judgment on the basis of Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules.

We consider the issues separately.

Prescription of Penalty

With respect to the penalty of imprisonment, Act No. 3815, or the Revised Penal Code (RPC)17 governs. Articles 92 and 93 of which
provide:

ARTICLE 92. When and How Penalties Prescribe. - The penalties imposed by final sentence prescribe as follows:
1. Death and reclusion perpetua, in twenty years;
2. Other afflictive penalties, in fifteen years;
3. Correctional penalties, in ten years; with the exception of the penalty of arresto mayor, which prescribes in five years;
4. Light penalties, in one year.

Page 27 of 53
ARTICLE 93. Computation of the Prescription of Penalties. - The period of prescription of penalties shall commence to run from the
date when the culprit should evade the service of his sentence, and it shall be interrupted if the defendant should give himself up, be
captured, should go to some foreign country with which this Government has no extradition treaty, or should commit another crime
before the expiration of the period of prescription.

As early as 1952, in Infante v. Provincial Warden of Negros Occidental,18 the Court already opined that evasion of service of sentence
is an essential element of prescription of penalties. Later, Tanega v. Masakayan, et al.19 expounded on the rule that the culprit should
escape during the term of imprisonment in order for prescription of penalty imposed by final sentence to commence to run, thus:

x x x The period of prescription of penalties- so the succeeding Article 93 provides - "shall commence to run from the date when the
culprit should evade the service of his sentence."

What then is the concept of evasion of service of sentence? Article 157 of the Revised Penal Code furnishes the ready answer. Says
Article 157:

ART. 157. Evasion of service of sentence. - The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed
upon any convict who shall evade service of his sentence by escaping during the term of his imprisonment by reason of final judgment.
However, if such evasion or escape shall have taken place by means of unlawful entry, by breaking doors, windows, gates, walls, roofs,
or floors, or by using picklocks, false keys, disguise, deceit, violence or intimidation, or through connivance with other convicts or
employees of the penal institution, the penalty shall be prision correccional in its maximum period.

Elements of evasion of service of sentence are: (1) the offender is a convict by final judgment; (2) he "is serving his sentence which
consists in deprivation of liberty"; and (3) he evades service of sentence by escaping during the term of his sentence. This must be so.
For, by the express terms of the statute, a convict evades "service of his sentence" by "escaping during the term of his imprisonment by
reason of final judgment." That escape should take place while serving sentence, is emphasized by the provisions of the second
sentence of Article 157 which provides for a higher penalty if such "evasion or escape shall have taken place by means of unlawful
entry, by breaking doors, windows, gates, walls, roofs, or floors, or by using picklocks, false keys, disguise, deceit, violence or
intimidation, or through connivance with other convicts or employees of the penal institution, * * *" Indeed, evasion of sentence is but
another expression of the term "jail breaking."

A dig into legal history confirms the views just expressed. The Penal Code of Spain of 1870 in its Article 134 - from whence Articles 92
and 93 of the present Revised Penal Code originated- reads:

"Las penas impuestas por sentencia firme prescriben: Las de muerte y cadena perpetua, a los veinte años.

***

Las leves, al año.

El tiempo de esta prescripcion comenzara a correr desde el dia en que se notifique personalmente al reo la sentencia firme, o desde el
quebrantamiento de la condena, si hubiera esta comenzado a cumplirse. * * *" Note that in the present Article 93 the words "desde el
dia en que se notifique personalmente al reo la sentencia firme", written in the old code, were deleted. The omission is significant. What
remains reproduced in Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code is solely "quebrantamiento de Ia condena". And, "quebrantamiento" or
"evasion" means escape. Reason dictates that one can escape only after he has started service of sentence.

Even under the old law, Viada emphasizes, where the penalty consists of imprisonment, prescription shall only begin to run when he
escapes from confinement. Says Viada:

"El tiempo de la prescripcion empieza a contarse desde el dia en que ha tenido Iugar la notificacion personal de la sentencia firme al
reo: el Codigo de 1850 no expresaba que la notificacion hubiese de ser personal, pues en su art. 126 se consigna que el termino de Ia
prescripcion se cuenta desde que se notifique la sentencia, causa de la ejecutoria en que se imponga le pena respectiva. Luego
ausente el reo, ya no podra prescribir hoy Ia pena, pues que Ia notificacion personal no puede ser sup/ida por Ia notificacion hecha en
estrados. Dada la imprescindible necesidad del requisito de la notificacion personal, es obvio que en las penas que consisten en
privacion de libertad solo podra existir Ia prescripcion quebrantando el reo Ia condena, pues que si no se hallare ya preso pre-
ventivamente, debera siempre procederse a su encerrarniento en el acto de serle notificada personalmente la sentencia."

We, therefore, rule that for prescription of penalty of imprisonment imposed by final sentence to commence to run, the culprit should
escape during the term of such imprisonment.20

Following Tanega, Del Castillo v. Hon. Torrecampo21 held that one who has not been committed to prison cannot be said to have
escaped therefrom. We agree with the position of the Solicitor General that "escape" in legal parlance and for purposes of Articles 93
and 157 of the RPC means unlawful departure of prisoner from the limits of his custody.

Of more recent vintage is Our pronouncements in Pangan v. Hon. Gatbalite,22 which cited Tanega and Del Castillo, that the prescription
of penalties found in Article 93 of the RPC applies only to those who are convicted by final judgment and are serving sentence which
consists in deprivation of liberty, and that the period for prescription of penalties begins only when the convict evades service of
sentence by escaping during the term of his sentence.

Applying existing jurisprudence in this case, the Court, therefore, rules against petitioners. For the longest time, they were never
brought to prison or placed in confinement despite being sentenced to imprisonment by final judgment. Prescription of penalty of
imprisonment does not run in their favor. Needless to state, respondent trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in assuming
jurisdiction over the motion for execution and in eventually granting the same.

Extinction of Civil Liability

The treatment of petitioners' civil liability arising from the offense committed is different.

Elementary is the rule that every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. 23 We said in one case:

It bears repeating that "an offense as a general rule causes two (2) classes of injuries - the first is the social injury produced by the
criminal act which is sought to be repaired thru the imposition of the corresponding penalty and the second is the personal injury
caused to the victim of the crime which injury is sought to be compensated thru indemnity, which is civil in nature." (Ramos v. Gonong,

Page 28 of 53
72 SCRA 559). As early as 1913, this Court in US. v. Heery (25 Phil. 600) made it clear that the civil liability of the accused is not part of
the penalty for the crime committed. It is personal to the victim. x x x.

Under Article 112 of the RPC, civil liability established in Articles 100,25 101,26 102,27 and 10328 of the Code shall be extinguished in the
same manner as other obligations, in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Law. Since the Civil Code is the governing law, the
provisions of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, particularly Section 6, Rule 39 thereof, is applicable. It states:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

Section 6. Execution by motion or by independent action. - A final and executory judgment or order may be executed on motion within
five (5) years from the date of its entry. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may
be enforced by action. The revived judgment may also be enforced by motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry and
thereafter by action before it is barred by the statute of limitations. (6a) Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules must be read in conjunction with
Articles 1144 (3) and 1152 of the Civil Code, which provide:

Art. 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action accrues:

xxxx

(3) Upon a judgment

Art. 1152. The period for prescription of actions to demand the fulfillment of obligations declared by a judgment commences from the
time the judgment became final.

Based on the foregoing, there are two (2) modes of enforcing a final and executory judgment or order: through motion or by
independent action.

These two modes of execution are available depending on the timing when the judgment creditor invoked its right to enforce the court's
judgment. Execution by motion is only available if the enforcement of the judgment was sought within five (5) years from the
date of its entry. On the other hand, execution by independent action is mandatory if the five-year prescriptive period for execution by
motion had already elapsed. However, for execution by independent action to prosper - the Rules impose another limitation - the action
must be filed before it is barred by the statute of limitations which, under the Civil Code, is ten (10) years from the finality of the
judgment.29

An action for revival of judgment is not intended to reopen any issue affecting the merits of the case or the propriety or correctness of
the first judgment.30 The purpose is not to re-examine and re-try issues already decided but to revive the judgment; its cause of action is
the judgment itself and not the merits of the original action. 31 However, being a mere right of action, the judgment sought to be revived
is subject to defenses and counterclaims like matters of jurisdiction and those arising after the finality of the first judgment or which may
have arisen subsequent to the date it became effective such as prescription, payment, or counterclaims arising out of transactions not
connected with the former controversy.32

Once a judgment becomes final, the prevailing party is entitled as a matter of right to a writ of execution the issuance of which is the
trial court's ministerial duty, compellable by mandamus. 33 Yet, a writ issued after the expiration of the period is null and void. 34 The
limitation that a judgment be enforced by execution within the stated period, otherwise it loses efficacy, goes to the very jurisdiction of
the court. Failure to object to a writ issued after such period does not validate it, for the reason that jurisdiction of courts is solely
conferred by law and not by express or implied will of the parties. 35

Nonetheless, jurisprudence is replete with a number of exceptions wherein the Court, on meritorious grounds, allowed execution of
judgment despite non-observance of the time bar. In Lancita, et al. v. Magbanua, et al.36 it was held:

In computing the time limited for suing out an execution, although there is authority to the contrary, the general rule is that there should
not be included the time when execution is stayed, either by agreement of the parties for a definite time, by injunction, by the taking of
an appeal or writ of error so as to operate as a supersedeas, by the death of a party, or otherwise. Any interruption or delay occasioned
by the debtor will extend the time within which the writ may be issued without scire facias. x x x.37

Thus, the demands of justice and fairness were contemplated in the following instances: dilatory tactics and legal maneuverings of the
judgment obligor which redounded to its benefit;38 agreement of the parties to defer or suspend the enforcement of the
judgment;39 strict application of the rules would result in injustice to the prevailing party to whom no fault could be attributed but
relaxation thereof would cause no prejudice to the judgment obligor who did not question the judgment sought to be executed; 40 and
the satisfaction of the judgment was already beyond the control of the prevailing party as he did what he was supposed to
do.41 Essentially, We allowed execution even after the prescribed period elapsed when the delay is caused or occasioned by actions of
the judgment debtor and/or is incurred for his benefit or advantage.42

In the instant case, it is obvious that the heirs of Atty. Roblete did not file a motion for execution within the five-year period or an action
to revive the judgment within the ten-year period. Worse, other than the bare allegation that the judgment has not been enforced
because the public prosecutor has not acted on the request to file a motion for execution, no persuasive and compelling reason was
presented to warrant the exercise of Our equity jurisdiction. Unfortunately for private respondent Roblete, the instant case does not fall
within the exceptions afore-stated. It cannot be claimed that the delay in execution was entirely beyond their control or that petitioners
have any hand in causing the same.43 As regards the civil aspect of a criminal case is concerned, it is apt to point that —

Litigants represented by counsel should not expect that all they need to do is sit back and relax, and await the outcome of their case.
They should give the necessary assistance to their counsel, for at stake is their interest in the case. While lawyers are expected to
exercise a reasonable degree of diligence and competence in handling cases for their clients, the realities of law practice as well as
certain fortuitous events sometimes make it almost physically impossible for lawyers to be immediately updated on a particular client's
case.44

Aside from the civil indemnity arising from the crime, costs and incidental expenses of the suit are part of the judgment and it is
incumbent upon the prevailing party in whose favor they are awarded to submit forthwith the itemized bill to the clerk of
court.45 Manifestly, the heirs of Atty. Roblete failed to do so. Their indifference, if not negligence, is indicative of lack of interest in
executing the decision rendered in their favor. To remind, the purpose of the law in prescribing time limitations for executing judgments
or orders is to prevent obligors from sleeping on their rights. 46 Indeed, inaction may be construed as a waiver.47

To close, the Court cannot help but impress that this case could have been averted had the lower court been a competent dispenser of
justice. It is opportune to remind judges that once a judgment of conviction becomes final and executory, the trial court has the
ministerial duty to immediately execute the penalty of imprisonment and/or pecuniary penalty (fine). A motion to execute judgment of

Page 29 of 53
conviction is not necessary. With respect to the penalty of imprisonment, the trial court should cancel the bail bond and issue a warrant
of arrest, if the accused is not yet under detention. If the convicted accused is already under detention by virtue of the warrant of arrest
issued, the trial court should immediately issue the corresponding mittimus or commitment order for the immediate transfer of the
accused to the National Penitentiary to serve his sentence, if the penalty imposed requires the service of sentence in the National
Penitentiary. The commitment order should state that an appeal had been filed, but the same had been withdrawn/dismissed/decided
with finality.

If aside from the penalty of imprisonment the penalty of fine is likewise imposed, the trial court should issue at once an order requiring
the payment of fine within a reasonable period of time and, in case of nonpayment and subsidiary imprisonment is imposed, he should
likewise serve the subsidiary imprisonment. If, however, the penalty is only fine and the judgment has become final and executory, an
order should be issued by the trial court at once for the payment of the fine. And in case of non-payment, the bail bond previously
issued for his provisional liberty should be cancelled and a warrant of arrest should be issued to serve the subsidiary imprisonment, if
there is any.

In cases where the accused is a detention prisoner, i.e., those convicted of capital offenses or convicted of non-capital offenses where
bail is denied, or refused to post bail, a mittimus or commitment order should be immediately issued after the promulgation of judgment
by the trial court as long as the penalty imposed requires the service of sentence in the National Penitentiary. The filing of a motion for
reconsideration, motion for new trial, or notice of appeal should not stop the lower court from performing its ministerial duty in issuing
the commitment order, unless a special order has been issued by the Court in specific cases - to the effect that the convicted accused
shall remain under detention in the provincial jail or city jail while the motion is being heard or resolved.

In so far as the civil liability arising from the offense is concerned, a motion for execution should be filed in accordance with Section 6,
Rule 39 of the Rules and existing jurisprudence.

WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the instant petition for certiorari is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Orders dated December 3,
2009 and January 25, 2010 of Presiding Judge Delano F. Villaruz, Regional Trial Court, Roxas City, Branch 16, are AFFIRMED IN
PART only insofar as to the execution of the penalty of imprisonment is concerned. Let the records of this case be REMANDED to the
trial court for the immediate issuance of mittimus, pursuant to OCA Circular No. 40-2013, in relation to OCA Circular No. 4-92-A.

The Office of the Court Administrator is hereby DIRECTED to conduct an investigation on the possible culpability of those responsible
for the unreasonable delay in the execution of the judgment of conviction.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 210801 July 18, 2016

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. ALVIN CENIDO y PICONES and REMEDIOS CONTRERAS y
CRUZ, Accused-Appellants.

On July 7, 2014, the Court rendered its Resolution 1 (July 7, 2014 Resolution) in this case finding accused-appellants Alvin
Cenido y Picones and Remedios Contreras y Cruz (Remedios; collectively, accused-appellants) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Illegal Sale and Possession of Prohibited Drugs, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court ADOPTS the findings of fact and conclusions of law in the July 31, 2013 Decision of the [Court of Appeals] in
CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 05333 and AFFIRMS said Decision finding accused-appellants Alvin Cenido y Picones and Remedios
Contreras y Cruz GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Illegal Sale and Possession of Prohibited Drugs, respectively,
sentencing: (a) Alvin Cenido y Picones to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500,000.00 for violation of Section
5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002[";] and (b) Remedios
Contreras y Cruz to suffer the indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to thirteen (13) years, as
maximum, and to pay a fine of P300,000.00 for violation of Section 11, Article II of the same Act.

SO ORDERED.2

On August 12, 2014, accused-appellants jointly moved for reconsideration3 thereof, which the Court denied with finality in its
Resolution4 dated December 1, 2014.

Meanwhile, on April 11, 2014, the Court received a Letter5 dated April 10, 2014 from the Correctional Institution for Women informing
the Court of the death of one of the accused-appellants in this case, Remedios, on March 7, 2014.6 In a Resolution7 dated September
9, 2015, the Court required the Superintendent of the Correctional Institution for Women to furnish the Court with a certified true copy of
Remedios's death certificate and, in compliance thereto, the same was submitted by Officer-In-Charge Elsa Aquino-Alabado on
February 11,2016.8 As Remedios's death transpired before the promulgation of the Court's July 7, 2014 Resolution in this
case, i.e., when her appeal before the Court was still pending resolution, her criminal liability is totally extinguished in view of the
provisions of Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code which states:

Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. – Criminal liability is totally extinguished:

1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the
death of the offender occurs before final judgment;

xxxx

In People v. Amistoso,9 the Court explained that the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal
liability as well as his civil liability ex delicto.10 Consequently, Remedios's death on March 7, 2014 renders the Court's July 7, 2014
Resolution irrelevant and ineffectual as to her, and is therefore set aside. Accordingly, the criminal case against Remedios is dismissed.
WHEREFORE, insofar as accused-appellant Remedios Contreras y Cruz is concerned, the Resolutions dated July 7, 2014 and
December 1, 2014 of the Court are hereby SET ASIDE and Criminal Case Nos. 10-037 and 10-038 before the Regional Trial Court of
Binangonan, Rizal are DISMISSED, in view of her demise.

SO ORDERED.

Page 30 of 53
 OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT and PRESIDENTIAL ANTI-GRAFT COMMISSION, Petitioners, vs. CALIXTO R.
CATAQUIZ, Respondent.

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the January 31, 2008 Decision 1 and
the June 23, 2008 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 88736 entitled "Calixto R. Cataquiz v. Office of the
President and Concerned Employees of the LLDA (CELLDA)," which reversed and set aside the Amended Resolution3 dated February
10, 2005 of the Office of the President (OP).

The Facts

Respondent Calixto R. Cataquiz (Cataquiz) was appointed as General Manager of the Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) on
April 16, 2001.4

On April 1, 2003, a majority of the members of the Management Committee and the rank-and-file employees of the LLDA submitted to
then Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Secretary Elisea G. Gozun (Secretary Gozun) their Petition for the
Ouster of Cataquiz as LLDA General Manager 5 on the grounds of corrupt and unprofessional behavior and management
incompetence.

In response, Secretary Gozun ordered the formation of an investigating team to conduct an inquiry into the allegations against
Cataquiz. The results of the fact-finding activity were submitted in a Report6 dated May 21, 2003 in which it was determined that
respondent may be found guilty for acts prejudicial to the best interest of the government and for violations of several pertinent laws and
regulations. Consequently, the investigating team recommended that the case be forwarded to the Presidential Anti-Graft
Commission (PAGC) for proper investigation.

In her Memorandum7 for the President dated May 23, 2003, Secretary Gozun reported that there is prima facie evidence to support
some accusations against Cataquiz which may be used to pursue an administrative or criminal case against him. It was further noted
that respondent lost his leadership credibility. In light of these, she recommended that Cataquiz be relieved from his position and that
he be investigated by PAGC.

On June 6, 2003, in a letter8 to then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (President Arroyo), the Concerned Employees of the Laguna
Lake Development Authority (CELLDA), a duly organized employees union of the LLDA, expressed their support for the petition to oust
Cataquiz and likewise called for his immediate replacement.

Thereafter, CELLDA formally filed its Affidavit Complaint9 dated September 5, 2003 before PAGC charging Cataquiz with violations of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019 (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), Executive Order (E.O.) No. 292 (The Administrative Code)
and R.A. No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees), to wit:

Violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act 3019 in relation to Section 46 b(8) and (27), Chapter VI, Book V of EO 292.

a. That respondent directly transacted with 35 fishpen operators and authorized [the] payment of fishpen fees based on
negotiated prices in violation of LLDA Board Resolution No. 28, Series of 1996 as alleged.
b. That respondent allegedly approved additional fishpen areas in the Lake without the approval of the Board and in violation of
the existing Zoning and Management Plan (ZOMAP) of the Laguna de Bay that allows a carrying capacity of 10,000 hectares
[of] fishpen structures in the lake based on scientific and technical studies.
c. That respondent allegedly condoned or granted reductions of fines and penalties imposed by the Public Hearing Committee,
the duly authorized adjudicatory body of the LLDA. The condonation was allegedly without the concurrence of LLDA Board of
Directors.
d. That respondent allegedly caused the dismissal of some cases pending with the LLDA without the concurrence of the Public
Hearing Committee.
e. That on June 4, 2002, respondent allegedly appropriated and disbursed the amount of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(₱500,000.00) from LLDA funds and confidential funds without any authority from the Department of Budget and Management.
f. That respondent allegedly contracted the services of several consultants without prior written concurrence from the
Commission on Audit.
g. That on December 19, 2001, respondent allegedly appropriated and disbursed LLDA funds for the grant of gifts to indigent
residents of San Pedro, Laguna. Said appropriation is not within the approved budget neither was it sanctioned by the Board
of Directors, as alleged.
h. That respondent allegedly allowed a Taiwanese company identified as Phil-Tai Fishing and Trade Company to occupy and
utilize certain portions of LLDA facilities located at Km. 70, Barangay Bangyas, Calauan, Laguna without any contract nor
authority from the LLDA Board.
i. That respondent allegedly authorized the direct procurement of fish breeders from Delacon Realty and Development
Corporation without the required bidding in accordance with COA rules and regulations.

Violation of Section 7(d) of Republic Act 6713:

a. That respondent allegedly solicited patronage from regulated industries in behalf of RVQ Productions, Inc. for the promotion of
its film entry to the 2002 Metro Manila Film Festival entitled "Home Alone the Riber."

Violation of Section 5(a) of Republic Act 6713:

a. That respondent allegedly failed to act promptly and expeditiously on official documents, requests, papers or letters sent by
the public or those which have been processed and completed staff work for his appropriate action.10

On December 5, 2003, PAGC issued a Resolution 11 recommending to the President that the penalty of dismissal from the service with
the accessory penalties of disqualification for re-employment in the public service and forfeiture of government retirement benefits be
imposed upon Cataquiz.

Thereafter, on December 8, 2003, Cataquiz was replaced by Fatima A.S. Valdez, who then assumed the position of Officer-in-
Charge/General Manager and Chief Operating Officer of the LLDA by virtue of a letter of appointment dated December 3, 2003 issued
by President Arroyo.12

In its Decision13 dated June 29, 2004, the OP adopted by reference the findings and recommendations of PAGC. The dispositive
portion thereof reads:

Page 31 of 53
WHEREFORE, as recommended by the PAGC, respondent Calixto R. Cataquiz, is hereby DISMISSED FROM THE SERVICE, with the
accessory penalties of disqualification from re-employment to government service and forfeiture of retirement benefits, effective
immediately upon receipt of this order.

SO ORDERED.

Aggrieved, Cataquiz filed his Motion for Reconsideration and/or for New Trial14 dated August 4, 2004, arguing that: (1) prior to the
issuance by the PAGC of its Resolution and by the OP of its Decision, he was already removed from office, thereby making the issue
moot and academic; and (2) he cannot be found guilty for violating a resolution which was foreign to the charges against him or for acts
which did not constitute sufficient cause for his removal in office, as shown by acts and documents which subsequently became
available to him, entitling him to a new trial.

On February 10, 2005, the OP issued an Amended Resolution, 15 imposing on Cataquiz the penalties of disqualification from re-
employment in the government service and forfeiture of retirement benefits, in view of the fact that the penalty of dismissal was no
longer applicable to him because of his replacement as General Manager of the LLDA.

Cataquiz elevated his case to the CA via a petition for review 16 dated March 2, 2005, raising the same issues presented in his Motion
for Reconsideration and/or New Trial before the OP.

The CA promulgated its Decision on January 31, 2008, which reversed and set aside the Amended Resolution of the OP. In so
resolving, the CA reasoned that the accessory penalties of disqualification from employment in the government service and forfeiture of
retirement benefits could no longer be imposed because the principal penalty of dismissal was not enforced, following the rule that the
accessory penalty follows the principal penalty. The CA also agreed with Cataquiz that he could not be held liable for a violation of
Board Resolution No. 68 of the LLDA, which when examined, was found not to be related to fishpen awards. If at all, the applicable rule
would be Board Resolution No. 28, as suggested by Cataquiz himself. Said resolution though would be an invalid basis because it was
not approved by the President pursuant to Section 4(k) of R.A. No. 4850 (An Act Creating the Laguna Lake Development Authority).
Finally, the CA found that the offenses charged against Cataquiz under R.A. No. 4850 constituted acts that were within his authority as
general manager of the LLDA to perform.

Not in conformity, the OP and the PAGC (petitioners) filed this petition for review.

After the submission of respondent’s comment17 and the petitioners’ reply,18 Cataquiz filed an Urgent Motion for Judicial Notice19 dated
August 13, 2009 urging the Court to take judicial notice of the Resolution 20 rendered by the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) on
November 30, 2004 which recommended the dismissal of the charges against him for violation of R.A. No. 3019.

The Issues

Petitioners cite the following errors as grounds for the allowance of the petition:

I.

The Court of Appeals gravely erred when it reversed in toto the findings of the OP and PAGC without stating clearly and
distinctly the reasons therefor, which is contrary to the Constitution and the Rules of Court; the findings of the Court of
Appeals are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based.

II.

The Court of Appeals erred because its judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;

III.

The Court of Appeals erred when it went beyond the issues of the case;

IV.

The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to the findings of the OP, PAGC and DENR Fact Finding Committee, [and]

V.

The OP and PAGC correctly found respondent to be unfit in public service, thus it did not err in imposing the accessory
penalties of disqualification from employment in the government service and forfeiture of retirement benefits. 21

Cataquiz, on the other hand, submits the following arguments in his Memorandum: 22

I.

The dismissal by the Ombudsman of the cases against the respondent under the same set of facts further constitute the law
of the case between the parties which necessitates the dismissal of this appeal and further supports the correctness of the
decision of the Court of Appeals.

II.

The Court of Appeals did not commit any error when it reversed the amended resolution of the petitioner Office of the
President.23

The issues can be condensed into four essential questions:

(1) Whether the CA made an incorrect determination of the facts of the case warranting review of its factual findings by the Court;
(2) Whether the dismissal by the Ombudsman of the charges against Cataquiz serves as a bar to the decision of the OP;
(3) Whether Cataquiz can be made to suffer the accessory penalties of disqualification from re-employment in the public service
and forfeiture of government retirement benefits, despite his dismissal from the LLDA prior to the issuance by the PAGC and
the OP of their decision and resolution, respectively; and

Page 32 of 53
 (4) Whether Cataquiz can be charged with a violation of Board Resolution No. 28, despite the clerical error made by the PAGC in
indicating the Board Resolution number to be No. 68.

The Court’s Ruling

The Court finds merit in the petition.

Findings of fact of the appellate court can be reviewed

As a general rule, only questions of law can be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. 24 Since
this Court is not a trier of facts, findings of fact of the appellate court are binding and conclusive upon this Court.25 There are, however,
several recognized exceptions to this rule, namely:
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and conjectures;
(2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion;
(4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(5) When the findings of fact are conflicting;
(6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case, and the same is contrary to the
admissions of both appellant and appellee;
(7) When the findings are contrary to those of the trial court;
(8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based;
(9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs, are not disputed by the respondents;
and
(10) When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the
evidence on record.26 [Emphases supplied]

In this case, the findings of the CA are contrary to those of PAGC which recommended Cataquiz’ dismissal for violating Section 3(e) of
R.A. No. 3019, in relation to Section 46(b)(27), Chapter 6, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of E.O. 292. Likewise, the Investigating Team of
the DENR also agreed that there exists evidence that could sustain a finding of respondent’s violation of several laws and regulations.

The result of PAGC’s investigation, however, was simply brushed aside by the CA, without citing any evidence on which its findings
were based. In ignoring the meticulous discussion of PAGC’s conclusions and in absolving Cataquiz from any wrongdoing, the CA
cavalierly declared as follows:

The petitioner likewise presented to us in support of his petition the argument that he had sufficient authority to do what had been
complained against him. We have examined the charges against the provisions of R.A. No. 4850 and we found that the said acts could
be sustained because they were within his powers as general manager of the Laguna Lake Development Authority as implied from
express powers granted to him by the law. Moreover, the records of the Authority show that transactions resulting into contracts in the
Authority’s trading activities have been done by previous general managers of the Authority even without prior approval by the board.
Ordinary corporate practices likewise point out to the fact that a general manager, having the general management and control of its
business and affairs, has implied and apparent authority to do acts or make any contracts in its behalf falling within the scope of the
ordinary and usual business of the company, especially so when, relative to a contract that the petitioner had entered into with Phil-Tai
Fishing and Trade Company, the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel had formally acceded thereto.27

As plain as that, without any analysis of the evidence on record or a comprehensive discussion on how the decision was arrived at, the
CA absolved Cataquiz of the acts he was accused of committing during his service as General Manager of the LLDA.

Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution mandates that decisions must clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which
it is based. Decisions of courts must be able to address the issues raised by the parties through the presentation of a comprehensive
analysis or account of factual and legal findings of the court. 28 It is evident that the CA failed to comply with these requirements. PAGC,
in its Resolution dated December 5, 2003, discussing each of the twelve allegations against Cataquiz, determined that he should be
dismissed from the government service and that he could be held liable under Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, in relation to Section 46(b)
(27), Chapter 6, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of E.O. No. 292, to wit:

R.A. No. 3019

Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the
following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage
or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the
grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.

E.O. No. 292

Section 46. Discipline: General Provisions.

Xxx

(b) The following shall be grounds for disciplinary action:

xxx

(27) Conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service

The one-paragraph pronouncement of the CA that Cataquiz had authority to perform the acts complained of is grossly insufficient to
overturn the determination by PAGC that he should be punished for acts prejudicial to the LLDA committed during his service as
General Manager of the said agency. It should be emphasized that findings of fact of administrative agencies will not be interfered with
and shall be considered binding and conclusive upon this Court provided that there is substantial evidence to support such
findings.29 Substantial evidence has been defined as "that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to justify a conclusion"30 or "evidence commonly accepted by reasonably prudent men in the conduct of their affairs."31

Page 33 of 53
After a diligent review of the evidence presented and the pleadings filed, this Court finds that there is substantial evidence to justify the
conclusion of PAGC that Cataquiz should be punished with the penalty of dismissal, along with its accessory penalties, for committing
acts prejudicial to the best interest of the government and for giving undue advantage to a private company in the award of fishpens.
Thus, the PAGC was correct when it wrote:

I.

[I]n the first allegation, respondent Cataquiz impliedly admitted his direct transaction with 35 fishpen operators and the payment of
fishpen fees without conducting a public bidding. In respondent’s defense, he raised the invalidity of Board Resolution No. 68 [sic]
which provides for guidelines in public bidding for fishpen areas. Respondent argued that Board Resolution No. 68 [sic] is an
unreasonable exercise of the Board’s legislative power since public bidding has never been intended by RA 4850, the enabling law of
LLDA.

The Commission finds the contention of the respondent bereft of merit. Section 25-A of RA 4850 authorizes the Board to "formulate,
prescribe, amend and repeal rules and regulations to govern the conduct of business of the Authority" and it is the function of the
respondent in his capacity as General Manager "to implement and administer the policies, programs and projects approved by the
Board" pursuant to Section 26 (b) of RA 4850. While it is true that a Board Resolution draws life from the enabling statute, the
Commission cannot find any inconsistency between the former and the latter. The Board Resolution No. 68 [sic] is still within the
bounds of RA 4850 and is germane to its purpose in promoting a balanced growth of the Laguna Lake. Thus, the validity of the
questioned Resolution stands. It becomes now the duty of the respondent to implement the Resolution and not to question its legality
nor disregard it.

In the case at hand, respondent’s act of not giving credence to the Board Resolution resulted to undue prejudice to the best interest of
the public service considering that the Authority incurred Revenue loss from the direct transaction of respondent Cataquiz amounting to
Seven Hundred Fifty Five Thousand Seven Hundred Pesos ₱755,700.00.

The presumption that the official duty has been regularly performed was overcome by the fact that the government was deprived of
much needed revenue as a result of the act committed by respondent Cataquiz.

xxxx

III.

The Commission finds that the act of respondent Cataquiz in condoning penalties and reducing the fines imposed by the Public Hearing
Committee (PHC) of the LLDA has no basis in law. The premise of the respondent citing Section 26 (b) giving him the executive
prerogative and Section 4 (a) justifying the condonation and reduction is misplaced. A careful examination of the aforementioned
provisions would reveal that Section 26 (b) does not vest the respondent the executive prerogative. Said provision gives him the
authority to execute and administer the policies, plans, programs and projects approved by the Board. There is no showing that the
condonation of penalties and reduction of fines has been approved by the Board. Section 26 (b) is clear in its terms that before
respondent executes any policy, program or project, the same has to be approved by the Board. Thus, there is no executive prerogative
to speak of.

The Commission agrees with the contention of the complainant that Section 4 (d) refers to additional power and function of the
Authority and not to the respondent. Of equal importance is that Section 4 (d) does not confer him the authority to condone penalties
nor reduce fines. Said provision is referring to Orders requiring the discontinuance of pollution. When the law is clear it needs no further
interpretation.

The contention of respondent Cataquiz that there is nothing in Section 25-A that states that the approval of the Board is necessary has
no leg to stand on. Same provision gives the Board the implied power "to do such other acts and perform such other functions as may
be necessary to carry out the provisions of this Charter."

In relation to this is Section 31 of RA 4850 that gives the Board the authority to create such other divisions and positions as may be
deemed necessary for the efficient, economic and effective conduct of the activity of the Authority.

The findings of the PHC, although a recommendatory body, must be accorded great respect. The penalties imposed by the PHC cannot
be substituted by the respondent without any basis and the latter cannot simply claim that he has the sole authority to condone
penalties and reduce fines.

Evidently respondent’s act of condonation of penalties and reduction of fines was uncalled for. Thus, his act resulted to undue prejudice
to the best interest of the service and will set a dangerous precedent to the justice system of the government.

IV.

In the same vein, the dismissal of the pending case against Twenty First Century Resources Inc. by the respondent has no basis in law.
Section 26 of RA 4850 clearly enumerates the powers and functions of respondent, to wit:

"xxx.

a. Submit for consideration of the Board the policies and measures which he believes to be necessary to carry out the purposes
and provisions of this Act;
b. Execute and administer the policies, plan, programs and projects approved by the Board;
c. Direct and supervise the operation and internal administration of the Authority. The General Manager may delegate certain
administrative responsibilities to other officers of the Authority subject to the rules and regulations of the Board;
d. Appoint officials and employees below the rank of division heads to positions in the approved budget upon written
recommendation of the division head concerned using as guide the standard set forth in the Authority’s merit system;
e. Submit quarterly reports to the Board on personnel selection, placement and training;
f. Submit to the NEDA an annual report and such other reports as may be required, including the details of the annual and
supplemental budgets of the Authority;
g. Perform such other functions as may be provided by law."

From the aforementioned section, nowhere can the Commission find any grant of power to adjudicate in favor of respondent Cataquiz
and the latter cannot hide under the cloak of ‘managerial prerogative’ absent any law that justifies his act of dismissing the case. To
reiterate, the dismissal of the case against Twenty First Century is an act clearly prejudicial to the best interest of the service.

Page 34 of 53
Consequently, the Authority was deprived of a committed service to the government and this fact cannot be overlooked upon by the
Commission.
xxxx

VI.

The contract of service for consultancy duly signed by the respondent and the legal consultants of LLDA is not in accordance with
Section 212 of the Government Accounting and Auditing Manual (GAAM) 86 which provides that:

"Payment of public funds of retainer fees of private law practitioners who are so hired and employed without the prior written
concurrence and acquiescence by the Solicitor General of the Government Corporate Counsel, as the case may be, as well as the
written concurrence of the Commission on Audit, shall be disallowed in audit and the same shall be a personal liability of the official
concerned."

The contention of the respondent that the LLDA Administrative Section failed to advise him regarding the requisites laid down by law
cannot stand. Occupying an executive position, respondent is required to exercise diligence in the highest degree in the performance of
his duties. Respondent cannot pass responsibility to other Division which in the first place, he has supervision and control of, pursuant
to Section 31 of RA 4850. Supervision as defined is the overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate
officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them, the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to
make them perform their duties. Control on the other hand, is the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a
subordinate officer has done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. There is
therefore a given authority to the respondent by law to regulate the acts of the Administrative Division and respondent cannot simply
evade responsibility by invoking the shortcomings of his subordinates. In signing the contract, without verifying compliance of existing
laws, respondent falls short of the required competence expected of him in the performance of his official functions. Incompetence, has
been defined as ‘lack of ability, legal qualification or fitness to discharge the required duty; want of physical or intellectual or moral
fitness.’

xxxx

VIII.
The Commission finds that the transaction entered into by the respondent and Phil-Tai Fishing and Trade Company is violative of
Section 3 (e) of RA 3019. The elements of Section 3 (e) are as follows:

1. The accused is a public officer discharging official administrative, or judicial functions or private persons in conspiracy with
them;
2. The public officer committed the prohibited act during the performance of his official duty or in relation to his public position;
3. The public officer acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence; and
4. His action caused undue injury to the Government or any private party or gave any party any unwarranted benefit, advantage
or preference.

Applying the first element, respondent Cataquiz is a public officer within the legal term of RA 3019 which provides that "Public officer
includes elective and appointive officials and employees, permanent or temporary, whether in the classified or unclassified or exempt
from service receiving compensation, even nominal from the government xxx." Clearly, respondent is a public officer discharging official
functions in transacting with Phil-Tai to occupy and utilize portions of LLDA facilities locate (sic) at Km. 70 Brgy. Bangyas, Calauan,
Laguna.

Relating to the second element in the instant case, respondent in the exercise of his official duties allowed Phil-Tai to use the LLDA
facility without the concurrence of the Board of Directors of LLDA where the corporate powers of the Authority lies as explicitly provided
in Section 16 of RA 4850.

Applying the third element, respondent Cataquiz acted with manifest partiality when by reason of his office he allowed Phil-Tai to
occupy the LLDA facility without any contract and without the approval of the Board of Directors. The privilege granted was by virtue of
a joint venture proposal which was never authorized by the Board as admitted by the respondent in his position paper. In fact the
proposal is still awaiting resolution from the board. Partiality is synonymous with "bias" which excites a disposition to see and report
matters as they are wished for rather than as they are.

Manifest means "obvious to the understanding, evident to the mind, not obscure or hidden and is synonymous with open, clear, visible,
unmistakable, indubitable, indisputable, evident and self-evident."

There was manifest partiality when respondent Cataquiz entered a transaction with Phil-Tai disregarding the requirements set forth by
RA 4850 which requires the approval of the Board. Worse, the joint venture proposal by Phil-Tai which was accepted by the respondent
took place without any contract at all. The contention of the respondent that Phil-Tai is only given the authority to conduct a preliminary
study and including the technical survey and Pilot testing at the aforesaid facility for the purpose of determining its structural integrity
and commercial viability cannot prevail over the records available at hand.

The findings of DENR officials in their ocular inspection on May 13, 2003 would disclose that Phil-Tai is in actual possession of the
LLDA facility and personally witnessed the actual harvesting of tilapia from the fishpond owned by LLDA. The report of DENR officials
contains that the act of the respondent is prejudicial to the interest of the government mainly because there was no contract executed
between LLDA and Phil-Tai.

Moreover, the Memorandum from the Division Chief III Jose K. Cariño III of the Community Development Division would reveal that
Phil-Tai is introducing exotic aquatic species in one of the earthen ponds at LLDA Calauan Complex. RA 8550 otherwise known as the
Philippine Fisheries Code of 1998 provides that the introduction of foreign crustaceans such as crayfish in Philippine waters without a
sound ecological, biological and environmental justification based on scientific studies is prohibited. There is, therefore, an unwarranted
act by Phil-Tai which is prejudicial to the government.

Applying the fourth element in the case at bar, respondent Cataquiz gave Phil-Tai unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference when
he entertained the joint venture proposal without any consideration. In fact, as stated in respondent’s position paper, LLDA was assured
by Phil-Tai that in the event the agreement does not materialize, it will remove all its equipment without damage to the LLDA aqua
culture facilities. Be it noted that the assurance was not made in writing.

Respondent refused to discern the adverse consequences of the joint venture proposal considering that no available remedy was left to
the government in case of untoward incidents that may arise. The transaction entered into is at most unenforceable because the

Page 35 of 53
agreements therein was (sic) not put into writing. The transaction cannot be tolerated by the Commission and the unwarranted benefit
that Phil-Tai is enjoying deserves much consideration because it puts the government into a very disadvantageous situation.

xxxx

X.
The Commission finds that the promotion of the film entry of RVQ Productions by respondent Cataquiz does not offend Section 7 (d) of
RA 6713 which provides as follows:

"Public officials and employees shall not solicit or accept, directly or indirectly, any gift, gratuity, favor, entertainment, loan or anything of
monetary value from any person in the course of their official duties, or in connection with any operation being regulated by, or any
transaction which may be affected by the functions of their office."

There was no undue solicitation of patronage of the film considering that the tickets sold are voluntary participation of interested
employees. In fact, no monetary consideration was received nor accepted by the respondent.

Of important consideration, however, is the use of government vehicles in the delivery of movie tickets and the collection of payments
thereof to different industrial establishments. Respondent Cataquiz in his official capacity as the General Manager of LLDA, approved
the use of government vehicles and drivers for the promotion of the movie.

The impropriety of using government property in favor of a (sic) RVQ Production, a private entity cannot be countenanced as this is
prejudicial to the best interest of the service. The very purpose of the use of the government property has not been properly
served. 32[Underscoring supplied]

xxxx

The dismissal of the criminal case against Respondent does not bar the finding of administrative liability.

Cataquiz claims that the dismissal by the Ombudsman of the case against him constitutes the law of the case between him and the OP
which necessitates the dismissal of the petition before this Court.

At the outset, the Court would like to highlight the fact that Cataquiz never raised this issue before the CA, despite having had ample
time to do so. The records show that the Ombudsman promulgated its resolution on November 30, 2004, more than three months prior
to the filing by the respondent of his petition before the CA on March 2, 2005.33 Nevertheless, he only chose to mention this after the
CA had rendered its decision and after the submission of his comment on the petition at bench. This is evidently a desperate effort on
his part to strengthen his position and support the decision of the CA exonerating him from any administrative liability. The Court has
consistently ruled that issues not previously ventilated cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. 34 Otherwise, to consider such
issues and arguments belatedly raised by a party would be tantamount to a blatant disregard of the basic principles of fair play, justice
and due process.35 Therefore, this issue does not merit the attention of the Court.

Even if the Court were to overlook this procedural lapse, Cataquiz’ argument would still fail. The Ombudsman Resolution dated
November 30, 2004 recommending the dismissal of the charges against him pertains only to the criminal case against him and not the
administrative case, which is the subject matter of the case at bench. As can be gleaned from the Resolution, the charges referred to by
the Ombudsman were for respondent’s alleged violation of Section 3(b) and (c) of R.A. No. 3019 or for malversation of public funds and
fraud against the public treasury.36

It is a basic rule in administrative law that public officials are under a three-fold responsibility for a violation of their duty or for a wrongful
act or omission, such that they may be held civilly, criminally and administratively liable for the same act. 37 Obviously, administrative
liability is separate and distinct from penal and civil liability. 38 In the case of People v. Sandiganbayan,39 the Court elaborated on the
difference between administrative and criminal liability:

The distinct and independent nature of one proceeding from the other can be attributed to the following: first, the difference in the
quantum of evidence required and, correlatively, the procedure observed and sanctions imposed; and second, the principle that a
single act may offend against two or more distinct and related provisions of law, or that the same act may give rise to criminal as well as
administrative liability.40
Accordingly, the dismissal of the criminal case by the Ombudsman does not foreclose administrative action against Cataquiz.41 His
absolution from criminal liability is not conclusive upon the OP, which subsequently found him to be administratively liable. The
pronouncement made by the Ombudsman cannot serve to protect the respondent from further administrative prosecution. A contrary
ruling would be unsettling as it would undermine the very purpose of administrative proceedings, that is, to protect the public service
and uphold the time-honored principle that a public office is a public trust.42

Respondent can be imposed with the accessory penalties.

Removal or resignation from office is not a bar to a finding of administrative liability. 43 Despite his removal from his position, Cataquiz
can still be held administratively liable for acts committed during his service as General Manager of the LLDA and he can be made to
suffer the corresponding penalties. The subsequent finding by the OP that Cataquiz is guilty of the charges against him with the
imposition of the penalty of dismissal and its corresponding accessory penalties is valid.

It cannot be disputed that Cataquiz was a presidential appointee.44 As such, he was under the direct disciplining authority of the
President who could legitimately have him dismissed from service. This is pursuant to the well-established principle that the President’s
power to remove is inherent in his power to appoint. 45 Therefore, it is well within the authority of the President to order the respondent’s
dismissal.

Cataquiz argues that his removal has rendered the imposition of the principal penalty of dismissal impossible. Consequently, citing the
rule that the accessory follows the principal, he insists that the accessory penalties may no longer be imposed on him. 46
The respondent is mistaken.

In the case of In Re: Complaint of Mrs. Corazon S. Salvador against Spouses Noel and Amelia Serafico,47 despite the resignation from
government service by the employee found guilty of grave misconduct, disgraceful and immoral conduct and violation of the Code of
Conduct for Court Personnel, thereby making the imposition of the penalty of dismissal impossible, this Court nevertheless imposed the
accessory penalties of forfeiture of benefits with prejudice to re-employment in any branch or instrumentality of government.

Similarly instructive is the case of Pagano v. Nazarro, Jr.48 where the Court held that:

Page 36 of 53
The instant case is not moot and academic, despite the petitioner’s separation from government service. Even if the most severe of
administrative sanctions – that of separation from service – may no longer be imposed on the petitioner, there are other penalties which
may be imposed on her if she is later found guilty of administrative offenses charged against her, namely, the disqualification to hold
any government office and the forfeiture of benefits.49

Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the accessory penalties of disqualification from re-employment in public service and forfeiture of
government retirement benefits can still be imposed on the respondent, notwithstanding the impossibility of effecting the principal
penalty of dismissal because of his removal from office.

PAGC’s typographical error can be corrected.

One of the charges against Cataquiz is for directly transacting with 35 fishpen operators and authorizing payment of fishpen fees based
on negotiated prices, in contravention of the directive of Board Resolution No. 28, which requires the conduct of a public bidding. The
PAGC Resolution dated December 5, 2003, recommending the dismissal of Cataquiz erroneously indicated that he violated Board
Resolution No. 68, instead of No. 28.50 The CA then sustained his contention that he could not be found guilty for violating Board
Resolution No. 68 of the LLDA because such resolution was not related to fishpen awards and that his right to due process was
violated when the OP found him guilty of violating the said resolution. It further added that even if the respondent was charged with
acting in contravention with Board Resolution No. 28, the said resolution would be invalid for not having been duly approved by the
President.

Petitioners, however, claim that it was merely a typographical or clerical error on the part of PAGC which was unfortunately adopted by
the OP.51 Cataquiz apparently will not be unduly prejudiced by the correction of the PAGC resolution. In the counter-affidavit he filed
before the PAGC, he was able to exhaustively argue against the allegation that he had violated Board Resolution No. 28. 52 Hence, he
cannot feign ignorance of the true charges against him.

In this regard, the Court agrees with the petitioners.

It is clear from the pleadings submitted before PAGC – particularly in the Affidavit Complaint filed by CELLDA against Cataquiz and in
the Counter-Affidavit submitted by the latter – that the resolution referred to as having been violated by the respondent was Board
Resolution No. 28, and not No. 68, as was erroneously indicated in the PAGC Resolution. Thus, pursuant to the rule that the judgment
should be in accordance with the allegations and the evidence presented, 53 the typographical error contained in the PAGC Resolution
can be amended. Clerical errors or any ambiguity in a decision can be rectified even after the judgment has become final by reference
to the pleadings filed by the parties and the findings of fact and conclusions of law by the court.54

A careful perusal of the PAGC’s discussion on the violation of the questioned board resolution discloses that PAGC was undoubtedly
referring to Board Resolution No. 28 which approved the policy guidelines for public bidding of the remaining free fishpen areas in
Laguna de Bay, and not Resolution No. 68 which had nothing at all to do with fishpen awards. Therefore, the reference to Board
Resolution No. 68, instead of Board Resolution No. 28, in the PAGC Resolution is unmistakably a typographical error on the part of
PAGC but, nonetheless, rectifiable.

Moreover, the respondent’s counter-affidavit shows that he had knowledge of the fact that he was being charged with violation of Board
Resolution No. 28. He even argued that the said resolution was an invalid and illegal administrative rule. His position was that the
resolution issued by the Board of Directors of LLDA was an unreasonable exercise of its legislative power because the enabling law of
LLDA, R.A. No. 4850, did not require the public bidding of free fishpen areas. 55 Then, in his motion for reconsideration before the OP,
he argued that the resolution was invalid because it was never approved by the President, contrary to Section 4(k) of R.A. No. 4850 (as
amended by Presidential Decree No. 813) which provides:

(K) For the purpose of effectively regulating and monitoring activities in Laguna de Bay. The Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction
to issue new permit for the use of the lake waters for any projects or activities in/or affecting the said lake including navigation,
construction, and operation of fishpens, fish enclosures, fish corrals and the like, and to impose necessary safeguards for lake quality
control and management and to collect necessary fees for said activities and projects: Provided, That the fees collected for fisheries
may be shared between the Authority and other government agencies and political subdivisions in such proportion as may be
determined by the President of the Philippines upon recommendation of the Authority’s Board: Provided further, That the Authority’s
Board may determine new areas of fishery development or activities which it may place under the supervision of the Bureau of
Fisheries and Aquatic Resources taking into account the overall development plans and programs for Laguna de Bay and related
bodies of water: Provided, finally, That the Authority shall subject to the approval of the President of the Philippines promulgate
such rules and regulations which shall govern fisheries development activities in Laguna de Bay which shall take into
consideration among others the following: socio-economic amelioration of bona-fide resident fishermen whether individually or
collectively in the form of cooperatives, lakeshore town development, a master plan for fish construction and operation, communal
fishing ground for lakeshore town residents, and preference to lakeshore town residents in hiring laborers for fishery projects.
[Emphasis supplied]

Regrettably, the CA sustained the respondent’s argument. A careful examination of the abovementioned law shows that presidential
approval is only required for rules and regulations which shall govern fisheries development activities in Laguna de Bay. The question
then is whether Board Resolution No. 28 falls under that category of rules subject to approval by the President. The answer is in the
negative.

The Revised Laguna de Bay Zoning and Management Plan 56 allocated 10,000 hectares of the lake surface areas for fishpen operators.
In the event that the area would not be fully occupied after all qualified operators had been assigned their respective fishpen areas, the
residual free areas would be opened for bidding to other prospective qualified applicants. Accordingly, Board Resolution No. 28 simply
set forth the guidelines for the public bidding of the remaining free fishpen areas in Laguna de Bay. 57 It did not require presidential
approval because it did not regulate any fisheries development activities. Hence, the questioned resolution cannot be declared invalid
on the basis of the CA’s ratiocination that the resolution lacked the approval of the President.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another judgment
entered reinstating the June 29, 2004 Decision of the Office of the President, as amended by its February 10, 2005 Amended
Resolution.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 196390 September 28, 2011

Page 37 of 53
 PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY (PDEA), Petitioner, vs. RICHARD BRODETT AND JORGE JOSEPH, Respondents.

Objects of lawful commerce confiscated in the course of an enforcement of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 (Republic
Act No. 9165) that are the property of a third person are subject to be returned to the lawful ownerwho is not liable for the unlawful act.
But the trial court may not release such objects pending trial and before judgment.

Antecedents

On April 13, 2009, the State, through the Office of the City Prosecutor of Muntinlupa City, charged Richard Brodett (Brodett) and Jorge
Joseph (Joseph) with a violation of Section 5, in relation to Section 26(b), of Republic Act No. 91651 in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in
MuntinlupaCity, docketed as Criminal Case No. 09-208,the accusatory portion of the information for which reads as follows:

That on or about the 19th day of September 2008, in the City of Muntinlupa, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping and aiding each other, they not being
authorized by law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously sell, trade, deliver and give away to another, sixty (60) pieces
of blue-colored tablets with Motorala (M) logos, contained in six (6) self-sealing transparent plastic sachets with recorded total net
weight of 9.8388 grams, which when subjected to laboratory examination yielded positive results for presence of
METHAMPHETAMINE, a dangerous drug.2

Also on April 16, 2009, the State, also through the Office of the City Prosecutor of Muntinlupa City, filed another information charging
only Brodett with a violation of Section 11 of R.A. No. 9165, docketed as Criminal Case No. 09-209, with the information alleging:

That on or about the 19th day of September 2008, in the City of Muntinlupa, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, not being authorized by law, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously have in his
possession, custody and control the following:

a. Four (4) yellow tablets with Playboy logos and ten (10) transparent capsules containing white powdery substance contained in
one self-sealing transparent plastic sachet having a net weight of 4.9007 grams, which when subjected to laboratory
examination yielded positive results for presence of METHYLENE DIOXYMETHAMPHETAMINE (MDMA), commonly known
as "Ecstasy", a dangerous drug;
b. Five (5) self-sealing transparent plastic sachets containing white powdery substance with total recorded net weight of 1.2235
grams, which when subjected to laboratory examination yielded positive results for presence of COCCAINE, a dangerous
drug;
c. Five (5) self-sealing transparent plastic sachets containing white powdery substance, placed in a light-yellow folded paper,
with total recorded net weight of 2.7355 grams, which when subjected to laboratory examination yielded positive results for
presence of COCCAINE, a dangerous drug;
d. Three (3) self-sealing transparent plastic sachets containing dried leaves with total recorded net weight of 54.5331 grams,
which when subjected to laboratory examination yielded positive results for presence of TETRAHYDROCANNABINOL, a
dangerous drug.3

In the course of the proceedings in the RTC, on July 30, 2009, Brodett filed a Motion To Return Non-Drug Evidence. He averred that
during his arrest, Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) had seized several personal non-drug effects from him, including a 2004
Honda Accord car with license plate no. XPF-551; and that PDEA refused to return his personal effects despite repeated demands for
their return. He prayed that his personal effects be tendered to the trial court to be returned to himupon verification. 4

On August 27, 2009, the Office of the City Prosecutor submitted its Comment and Objection,5 proposing thereby that the delivery to the
RTC of the listed personal effects for safekeeping, to be held there throughout the duration of the trial, would be to enable the
Prosecution and the Defense to exhaust their possible evidentiary value. The Office of the City Prosecutor objected to the return of the
car because it appeared to be the instrument in the commission of the violation of Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165 due to its being the
vehicle used in the transaction of the sale of dangerous drugs.

On November 4, 2009, the RTC directed the release of the car, viz:

WHEREFORE, the Director of PDEA or any of its authorized officer or custodian is hereby directed to: (1) photograph the
abovementioned Honda Accord, before returning the same to its rightful owner Myra S. Brodett and the return should be fully
documented, and (2) bring the personal properties as listed in this Order of both accused, Richard S. Brodett and Jorge J. Joseph to
this court for safekeeping, to be held as needed.

SO ORDERED.6

PDEA moved to reconsider the order of the RTC, but its motion was denied on February 17, 2010 for lack of merit, to wit:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The Order of the Court dated
November 4, 2009 is upheld.

SO ORDERED.7

Thence, PDEA assailed the order of the RTC in the Court of Appeals (CA) by petition for certiorari, claiming that the orders of the RTC
were issued in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

On March 31, 2011, the CA promulgated its Decision, 8 dismissing the petition for certiorari thusly:

Xxxx

Here it is beyond dispute that the Honda Accord subject of this petition is owned by and registered in the name of Myra S. Brodett, not
accused Richard Brodett. Also, it does not appear from the records of the case that said Myra S. Brodett has been charged of any
crime, more particularly, in the subject cases of possession and sale of dangerous drugs. Applying Section 20 of the law to the dispute
at bar, We therefore see no cogent reason why the subject Honda Accord may not be exempted from confiscation and forfeiture.

Xxxx

Page 38 of 53
We thus cannot sustain petitioner’s submission that the subject car, being an instrument of the offense, may not be released to Ms.
Brodett and should remain in custodia legis. The letters of the law are plain and unambiguous. Being so, there is no room for a contrary
construction, especially so that the only purpose of judicial construction is to remove doubt and uncertainty, matters that are not
obtaining here. More so that the required literal interpretation is consistent with the Constitutional guarantee that a person may not be
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and consequently DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.9

Hence, PDEA appeals.

Issues

Essentially, PDEA asserts that the decision of the CA was not in accord with applicable laws and the primordial intent of the framers of
R. A. No. 9165.10 It contends that the CA gravely erred in its ruling; that the Honda Accord car, registered under the name of Myra S.
Brodett (Ms.Brodett), had been seized from accused Brodett during a legitimate anti-illegal operation and should not be released from
the custody of the law; that the Motion to Return Non-Drug Evidence did not intimate or allege that the car had belonged to a third
person; and that even if the car had belonged to Ms. Brodett, a third person, her ownership did not ipso facto authorize its release,
because she was under the obligation to prove to the RTC that she had no knowledge of the commission of the crime.

In his Comment,11 Brodett counters that the petitioner failed to present any question of law that warranted a review by the Court; that
Section 20 of R. A. No. 9165 clearly and unequivocally states that confiscation and forfeiture of the proceeds or instruments of the
supposed unlawful act in favor of the Government may be done by PDEA, unless such proceeds or instruments are the property of a
third person not liable for the unlawful act; that PDEA is gravely mistaken in its reading that the third person must still prove in the trial
court that he has no knowledge of the commission of the crime; and that PDEA failed to exhaust all remedies before filing the petition
for review.

The decisive issue is whether or not the CA erred in affirming the order for the release of the car to Ms.Brodett.

Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

Applicable laws and jurisprudence on releasing property confiscated in criminal proceedings

It is not open to question that in a criminal proceeding, the court having jurisdiction over the offense has the power to order upon
conviction of an accused the seizure of (a) the instruments to commit the crime, including documents, papers, and other effects that are
the necessary means to commit the crime; and (b) contraband, the ownership or possession of which is not permitted for being illegal.
As justification for the first, the accused must not profit from his crime, or must not acquire property or the right to possession of
property through his unlawful act.12 As justification for the second, to return to the convict from whom the contraband was taken, in one
way or another, is not prudent or proper, because doing so will give rise to a violation of the law for possessing the contraband
again.13 Indeed, the court having jurisdiction over the offense has the right to dispose of property used in the commission of the crime,
such disposition being an accessory penalty to be imposed on the accused, unless the property belongs to a third person not liable for
the offense that it was used as the instrument to commit. 14

In case of forfeiture of property for crime, title and ownership of the convict are absolutely divested and shall pass to the
Government.15 But it is required that the property to be forfeited must be before the court in such manner that it can be said to be within
its jurisdiction.16

According to the Rules of Court, personal property may be seized in connection with a criminal offense either by authority of a search
warrant or as the product of a search incidental to a lawful arrest. If the search is by virtue of a search warrant, the personal property
that may be seized may be that which is the subject of the offense; or that which has been stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or
fruits of the offense; or that which has been used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense.17 If the search is an
incident of a lawful arrest, seizure may be made of dangerous weapons or anything that may have been used or may constitute proof in
the commission of an offense.18 Should there be no ensuing criminal prosecution in which the personal property seized is used as
evidence, its return to the person from whom it was taken, or to the person who is entitled to its possession is but a matter of
course,19 except if it is contraband or illegal per se. A proper court may order the return of property held solely as evidence should the
Government be unreasonably delayed in bringing a criminal prosecution. 20 The order for the disposition of such property can be made
only when the case is finally terminated.21

Generally, the trial court is vested with considerable legal discretion in the matter of disposing of property claimed as evidence, 22 and
this discretion extends even to the manner of proceeding in the event the accused claims the property was wrongfully taken from
him.23 In particular, the trial court has the power to return property held as evidence to its rightful owners, whether the property was
legally or illegally seized by the Government. 24 Property used as evidence must be returned once the criminal proceedings to which it
relates have terminated, unless it is then subject to forfeiture or other proceedings. 25

II

Order of release was premature and made in contravention of Section 20, R.A. No. 9165

It is undisputed that the ownership of the confiscated car belonged to Ms. Brodett, who was not charged either in connection with the
illegal possession and sale of illegal drugs involving Brodett and Joseph that were the subject of the criminal proceedings in the RTC, or
even in any other criminal proceedings.

In its decision under review, the CA held as follows:

A careful reading of the above provision shows that confiscation and forfeiture in drug-related cases pertains to "all the proceeds and
properties derived from the unlawful act, including but not limited to, money and other assets obtained thereby, and the instruments or
tools with which the particular unlawful act was committed unless they are the property of a third person not liable for the unlawful act."

Page 39 of 53
Simply put, the law exempts from the effects of confiscation and forfeiture any property that is owned by a third person who is not liable
for the unlawful act.

Here, it is beyond dispute that the Honda Accord subject of this petition is owned by and registered in the name of Myra S. Brodett, not
accused Richard Brodett. Also, it does not appear from the records of the case that said Myra S. Brodett has been charged of any
crime, more particularly, in the subject cases of possession and sale of dangerous drugs. Applying Section 20 of the law to the dispute
at bar, We therefore see no cogent reason why the subject Honda Accord may not be exempted from confiscation and forfeiture.

Basic is the rule in statutory construction that when the law is clear and unambiguous, the court has no alternative but to apply the
same according to its clear language. The Supreme Court had steadfastly adhered to the doctrine that the first and fundamental duty of
courts is to apply the law according to its express terms, interpretation being called only when such literal application is impossible. No
process of interpretation or construction need be resorted to where a provision of law peremptorily calls for application.

We thus cannot sustain petitioner’s submission that the subject car, being an instrument of the offense, may not be released to Ms.
Brodett and should remain in custodia legis. The letters of the law are plain and unambiguous. Being so, there is no room for a contrary
construction, especially so that the only purpose of judicial construction is to remove doubt and uncertainty, matters that are not
obtaining here. More so that the required literal interpretation is not consistent with the Constitutional guarantee that a person may not
be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law. 26 (emphases are in the original text)

The legal provision applicable to the confiscation and forfeiture of the proceeds or instruments of the unlawful act, including the
properties or proceeds derived from illegal trafficking of dangerous drugs and precursors and essential chemicals, is Section 20 of R.A.
No. 9165, which pertinently provides as follows:

Section 20.Confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds or Instruments of the Unlawful Act, Including the Properties or Proceeds
Derived from the Illegal Trafficking of Dangerous Drugs and/or Precursors and Essential Chemicals. – Every penalty imposed for the
unlawful importation, sale, trading, administration, dispensation, delivery, distribution, transportation or manufacture of any dangerous
drug and/or controlled precursor and essential chemical, the cultivation or culture of plants which are sources of dangerous drugs, and
the possession of any equipment, instrument, apparatus and other paraphernalia for dangerous drugs including other laboratory
equipment, shall carry with it the confiscation and forfeiture, in favor of the government, of all the proceeds derived from unlawful act,
including, but not limited to, money and other assets obtained thereby, and the instruments or tools with which the particular unlawful
act was committed, unless they are the property of a third person not liable for the unlawful act, but those which are not of lawful
commerce shall be ordered destroyed without delay pursuant to the provisions of Section 21 of this Act.

After conviction in the Regional Trial Court in the appropriate criminal case filed, the Court shall immediately schedule a hearing for the
confiscation and forfeiture of all the proceeds of the offense and all the assets and properties of the accused either owned or held by
him or in the name of some other persons if the same shall be found to be manifestly out of proportion to his/her lawful income:
Provided, however, That if the forfeited property is a vehicle, the same shall be auctioned off not later than five (5) days upon order of
confiscation or forfeiture.

During the pendency of the case in the Regional Trial Court, no property, or income derived therefrom, which may be confiscated and
forfeited, shall be disposed, alienated or transferred and the same shall be in custodia legis and no bond shall be admitted for the
release of the same.

The proceeds of any sale or disposition of any property confiscated or forfeited under this Section shall be used to pay all proper
expenses incurred in the proceedings for the confiscation, forfeiture, custody and maintenance of the property pending disposition, as
well as expenses for publication and court costs. The proceeds in excess of the above expenses shall accrue to the Board to be used in
its campaign against illegal drugs.27

There is no question, for even PDEA has itself pointed out, that the text of Section 20 of R. A. No. 9165relevant to the confiscation and
forfeiture of the proceeds or instruments of the unlawful act is similar to that of Article 45 of the Revised Penal Code, which states:

Article 45.Confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds or Instruments of the Crime. – Every penalty imposed for the commission of a
felony shall carry with it the forfeiture of the proceeds of the crime and the instruments or tools with which it was committed.

Such proceeds and instruments or tools shall be confiscated and forfeited in favor of the Government, unless they be the property of a
third person not liable for the offense, but those articles which are not subject of lawful commerce shall be destroyed.

The Court has interpreted and applied Article 45 of the Revised Penal Code in People v. Jose,28 concerning the confiscation and
forfeiture of the car used by the four accused when they committed the forcible abduction with rape, although the car did not belong to
any of them, holding:

xxx Article 45 of the Revised Penal Code bars the confiscation and forfeiture of an instrument or tool used in the commission of the
crime if such "be the property of a third person not liable for the offense," it is the sense of this Court that the order of the court below for
the confiscation of the car in question should be set aside and that the said car should be ordered delivered to the intervenor for
foreclosure as decreed in the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila in replevin case. xxx 29

Such interpretation is extended by analogy to Section 20, supra. To bar the forfeiture of the tools and instruments belonging to a third
person, therefore, there must be an indictment charging such third person either as a principal, accessory, or accomplice. Less than
that will not suffice to prevent the return of the tools and instruments to the third person, for a mere suspicion of that person’s
participation is not sufficient ground for the court to order the forfeiture of the goods seized.30

However, the Office of the City Prosecutor proposed through its Comment and Objection submitted on August 27, 2009 in the
RTC31 that the delivery to the RTC of the listed personal effects for safekeeping, to be held there throughout the duration of the trial,
would be to enable the Prosecution and the Defense to exhaust their possible evidentiary value. The Office of the City Prosecutor
further objected to the return of the car because it appeared to be the vehicle used in the transaction of the sale of dangerous drugs,
and, as such, was the instrument in the commission of the violation of Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165.

On its part, PDEA regards the decision of the CA to be not in accord with applicable laws and the primordial intent of the framers of R.
A. No. 9165,32 and contends that the car should not be released from the custody of the law because it had been seized from accused
Brodett during a legitimate anti-illegal operation. It argues that the Motion to Return Non-Drug Evidence did not intimate or allege that
the car had belonged to a third person; and that even if the car had belonged to Ms. Brodett, a third person, her ownership did not ipso
facto authorize its release, because she was under the obligation to prove to the RTC that she had no knowledge of the commission of
the crime. It insists that the car is a property in custodialegis and may not be released during the pendency of the trial.

Page 40 of 53
We agree with PDEA and the Office of the City Prosecutor.

We note that the RTC granted accused Brodett’s Motion to Return Non-Drug Evidence on November 4, 2009 when the criminal
proceedings were still going on, and the trial was yet to be completed. Ordering the release of the car at that point of the proceedings
was premature, considering that the third paragraph of Section 20, supra, expressly forbids the disposition, alienation, or transfer of any
property, or income derived therefrom, that has been confiscated from the accused charged under R.A. No. 9165 during the pendency
of the proceedings in the Regional Trial Court. Section 20 further expressly requires that such property or income derived therefrom
should remain in custodia legis in all that time and that no bond shall be admitted for the release of it.

Indeed, forfeiture, if warranted pursuant to either Article 45 of the Revised Penal Code and Section 20 of R.A. No. 9165, would be a
part of the penalty to be prescribed. The determination of whether or not the car (or any other article confiscated in relation to the
unlawful act) would be subject of forfeiture could be made only when the judgment was to be rendered in the proceedings. Section 20 is
also clear as to this.

The status of the car (or any other article confiscated in relation to the unlawful act) for the duration of the trial in the RTC as being in
custodia legis is primarily intended to preserve it as evidence and to ensure its availability as such. To release it before the judgment is
rendered is to deprive the trial court and the parties access to it as evidence. Consequently, that photographs were ordered to be taken
of the car was not enough, for mere photographs might not fill in fully the evidentiary need of the Prosecution. As such, the RTC’s
assailed orders were issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction for being in contravention with the
express language of Section 20 of R.A. No. 9165.

Nonetheless, the Court need not annul the assailed orders of the RTC, or reverse the decision of the CA. It appears thaton August 26,
2011 the RTC promulgated its decision on the merits in Criminal Case No. 09-208 and Criminal Case No. 09-209, acquitting both
Brodett and Joseph and further ordering the return to the accused of all non-drug evidence except the buy-bust money and the genuine
money, because:

The failure of the prosecution therefore to establish all the links in the chain of custody is fatal to the case at bar. The Court cannot
merely rely on the presumption of regularity in the performance of official function in view of the glaring blunder in the handling of the
corpus delicti of these cases. The presumption of regularity should bow down to the presumption of innocence of the accused. Hence,
the two (2) accused BRODETT and JOSEPH should be as it is hereby ACQUITTED of the crimes herein charged for Illegal Selling and
Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, for failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt,
RICHARD BRODETT y SANTOS and JORGE JOSEPH y JORDANA are ACQUITTED of the crimes charged in Criminal Case Nos. 09-
208 and 09-209.

The subject drug evidence are all ordered transmitted to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) for proper disposition. All the
non-drug evidence except the buy bust money and the genuine money are ordered returned to the accused.

The genuine money used in the buy bust operation as well as the genuine money confiscated from both accused are ordered
escheated in favor of the government and accordingly transmitted to the National Treasury for proper disposition. (Emphasis supplied)33
The directive to return the non-drug evidence has overtaken the petition for review as to render further action upon it superfluous. Yet,
the Court seizes the opportunity to perform its duty to formulate guidelines on the matter of confiscation and forfeiture of non-drug
articles, including those belonging to third persons not liable for the offense, in order to clarify the extent of the power of the trial court
under Section 20 of R.A. No. 9165.34 This the Court must now do in view of the question about the confiscation and forfeiture of non-
drug objects being susceptible of repetition in the future.35

We rule that henceforth the Regional Trial Courts shall comply strictly with the provisions of Section 20 of R.A. No. 9165, and should
not release articles, whether drugs or non-drugs, for the duration of the trial and before the rendition of the judgment, even if owned by
a third person who is not liable for the unlawful act.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition for review is DENIED.

The Office of the Court Administrator is directed to disseminate this decision to all trial courts for their guidance.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 202708, April 13, 2015

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. VICTORIANO VILLAR @ BOY, Accused-Appellant.

In an Information dated September 21, 1987, Wilson Suitos (Wilson Vic Suitos (Vic), Alvaro Suitos (Alvaro) and appellant Victoriano
Villar @ Boy (appellant), were charged with the murder of Jesus Ylarde. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. T-846.

Among the accused, Alvaro was the first to be apprehended and tried. In a Decision 1 dated August 12, 1988, the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Lingayen, Pangasinan, Branch 38, found Alvaro guilty of murder.2Alvaro appealed all the way to this Court docketed as G.R.
No. 95951. On March 24, 1993, this Court rendered its Decision3 affirming his conviction, thus:

From the foregoing, the conviction of appellant must be upheld.

After reviewing the records of the case, we find that a modification in the indemnity awarded is in order. Actual damages were proved in
the amount of P11, 575 and not P20, 000.00 as found by the trial court. In determining the loss of earning capacity of 49[-]year old
Ylarde, We use the formula for life expectancy adopted in Davila v. CA: 2/3 x (80-49) = life expectancy of 20 years. This figure is
multiplied by the annual net income of the deceased (P16, 000) equivalent to P320, 000 to fix the amount of loss of earning capacity.
Death indemnity in the amount of P50, 000.00 is also awarded.

The award of indemnity to the heirs of Jesus Ylarde is modified and accused is hereby ordered to pay: actual damages in the amount of
P11, 575; death indemnity in the amount of P50, 000.00; loss of earning capacity in the amount of P320, 000.00; and moral damages in
the amount of P20, 000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

Page 41 of 53
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED subject to the modifications stated above. Costs against the accused-
appellant.

SO ORDERED.4

Apprehended next was Wilson who pleaded not guilty during his arraignment. 5 On January 30, 1996, the RTC rendered its
Decision6 likewise finding him guilty of murder.7 Wilson appealed his conviction. On March 31, 2000, this Court, in G.R. No. 125280
rendered its Decision,8 disposing thus:

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the trial court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, finding accused-appellant WILSON SUITOS GUILTY
of MURDER and ordering him to indemnify, jointly and severally with his co-accused Alvaro Suitos, the heirs of the deceased the sum
of P11, 575.00 for actual damages, P320, 000.00 for loss of earnings of the victim and P50, 000.00 for death indemnity is AFFIRMED
with the MODIFICATION that the amount of moral damages is increased to P50, 000.00. Costs against accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.9

Next to be apprehended and tried was appellant.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On arraignment, appellant entered a plea of not guilty. 10 Trial on the merits thereafter ensued. In a Decision11 dated August 8, 2008, the
RTC convicted appellant of murder based on the eyewitness accounts of the victim's daughters. Juvy Ylarde (Juvy) testified that at
around 6 o'clock in the evening of September 5, 1987, she and her father were sitting in front of their store in Umingan, Pangasinan,
when Alvaro, Wilson and appellant suddenly emerged from the ice cream parlor located in front of their store. Alvaro shot her father first
hitting the latter on his forehead and causing him to fall down. Although the first shot proved fatal, Wilson and appellant still fired shots
at the victim. Thereafter, the trio fled from the crime scene followed by Vic who was driving a tricycle. Vivian Ylarde corroborated her
sister's testimony. She claimed that at the time of the shooting, she was studying inside their store when several shots rang out.

The RTC did not believe appellant's alibi that he was in Cubao, Quezon City at the time of the incident for being uncorroborated and
self-serving, and especially in view of his positive identification by the deceased's daughters. The RTC also considered appellant's
flight. It noted that although he knew of the charge against him as early as 1987, appellant did not surrender; instead, he went into
hiding and was apprehended only after almost 18 years. Finally, the RTC held that the killing was qualified by treachery.

The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused VICTORIANO VILLAR @ Boy is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
murder qualified by treachery under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code. He is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua,and is ordered to indemnify, jointly and severally with his co-accused Alvaro Suitos and Wilson Suitos, the heirs of the
deceased Jesus Ylarde the sum of P11,575.00 as actual damages, P320,000.00 for loss of earnings of the victim, P50,000.00 for death
indemnity and P50,000.00 for moral damages. Costs against the accused.

SO ORDERED.12

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In his brief filed before the CA, appellant contended that the prosecution failed to prove that he conspired with Alvaro and Wilson. He
argued that based on the testimony of Juvy, appellant pointed his gun at her (Juvy) not at the victim; however, when he fired, it was the
victim who was hit.

The CA however found appellant's contentions without merit. In its January 31, 2012 Decision, 13 the CA affirmed the RTC's judgment in
full. It concurred in the findings of the RTC that there was conspiracy among the assailants, i.e., - they simultaneously emerged from
the ice cream store; successively shot the victim; and fled from the crime scene together. The CA also disregarded appellant's alibi that
he was in Quezon City at the time of the shooting for being uncorroborated and self-serving, and in view of his positive identification by
the deceased's daughters. Moreover, his unexplained flight (and hiding for 18 years) was considered an indication of guilt. The CA also
found the qualifying circumstance of treachery to have attended the killing.

The dispositive portion of the assailed CA Decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the instant appeal is hereby DENIED. The assailed Decision dated August 8, 2008 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Lingayen, Pangasinan, Branch 38, is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.14

Hence, this appeal. In a Resolution15 dated October 10, 2012, we required the parties to submit their Supplemental Briefs. However,
both parties opted not to file their briefs.

The appeal lacks merit.

The courts below correctly found appellant guilty of murder. It has been sufficiently established that appellant, in conspiracy with his co-
accused, treacherously shot and killed the victim, Jesus Ylarde. The Court, in G.R. No. 95951 and G.R. No. 125280 had already found
his co-accused -Alvaro and Wilson - guilty of murder. Appellant was thus properly sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Moreover, appellant is not eligible for parole pursuant to Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9346, An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death
Penalty in the Philippines.

Anent the damages awarded, we find the award of moral damages in the amount of P50, 000.00 correct. However, the award of civil
indemnity must be increased from P50, 000.00 to P75, 000.00 in line with prevailing jurisprudence. Moreover, the heirs of the deceased
are entitled to an award of exemplary damages in the amount of P30, 000.00. As regards the award of actual damages in the amount of
P11, 575.00, the same must be modified. As we held in People vs. Villanueva,16 "when actual damages proven by receipts during the
trial amount to less than P25,000.00, as in this case, the award of temperate damages of P25,000.00 is justified in lieu of actual
damages of a lesser amount." Thus, we delete the award of P11, 575.00 as actual damages; in lieu thereof, we grant temperate
damages in the amount of P25, 000.00. In addition, all damages awarded shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from date of
finality of this judgment until fully paid.

Page 42 of 53
However, the RTC and the CA erred in the award of loss of earning capacity. Records show that the widow of the deceased testified
that her husband "has a net income of P16, 000.00 a year as farmer, sari-sari store owner, driver and operator of two tricycles and
caretaker of Hacienda Bancod."17 Thus, lost earnings in the amount of P320, 000.00 was awarded computed as follows: "2/3 x (80-49)
=life expectancy of 20 years . . . multiplied by the annual net income of the deceased (PI 6,000.00), equivalent to P320,
000.00."18 However, it is also on record that the widow of the deceased subsequently testified that "before his death, her husband earns
P50.00 a day as tricycle driver and P150.00 from their sari-sari store and had a net income of P4, 000.00 a month. As a farmer her
husband produces 270 cavans of palay a year with a price of P135.00 a cavan weighing 50 kilos." 19

Preliminarily, we note that the indemnity for lost earnings was erroneously computed. It is already settled jurisprudence that "the
formula that has gained acceptance over time has limited recovery to net earning capacity; x x x [meaning], less the necessary expense
for his own living."20 Here, the computation for lost income of P16, 000.00 did not take into consideration the deceased's necessary
expenses.

Moreover, it was explained in Da Jose v. Angeles21 that –

Under Article 2206 of the Civil Code, the heirs of the victim are entitled to indemnity for loss of earning capacity. Compensation of this
nature is awarded not for loss of earnings, but for loss of capacity to earn. The indemnification for loss of earning capacity partakes of
the nature of actual damages which must be duly proven by competent proof and the best obtainable evidence thereof. Thus, as a rule,
documentary evidence should be presented to substantiate the claim for damages for loss of earning capacity. By way of exception,
damages for loss of earning capacity may be awarded despite the absence of documentary evidence when (1) the deceased is self-
employed and earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws, in which case, judicial notice may be taken of the fact that
in the deceased's line of work no documentary evidence is available; or (2) the deceased is employed as a daily wage worker earning
less than the minimum wage under current labor laws.

Corollarily, we also held in OMC Carriers, Inc. v. Nabua22 that –

For one to be entitled to actual damages, it is necessary to prove the actual amount of loss with a reasonable degree of certainty,
premised upon competent proof and the best evidence obtainable by the injured party. Actual damages are such compensation or
damages for an injury that will put the injured party in the position in which he had been before he was injured. They pertain to such
injuries or losses that are actually sustained and susceptible of measurement. To justify an award for actual damages, there must be
competent proof of the actual amount of loss. Credence can be given only to claims which are duly supported by receipts.

Finally, in People v. Gonza,23 we declared that –

Finally, the trial court was correct in not awarding damages for lost earnings. The prosecution merely relied on Zenaida Mortega's self-
serving statement, that her husband was earning P5, 000 per month as a farmhand. Compensation for lost income is in the nature of
damages and requires due proof of the amount of the damages suffered. For loss of income due to death, there must be unbiased
proof of the deceased's average income. Also, the award for lost income refers to the net income of the deceased, that is, his total
income less average expenses. In this case, Zenaida merely gave a self-serving testimony of her husband's income. No proof of the
victim's expenses was adduced; thus, there can be no reliable estimate of his lost income.

In fine, it is settled that the indemnity for loss of earning capacity is in the form of actual damages; as such, it must be proved by
competent proof, "not merely by the self-serving testimony of the widow."24By way of exception, damages for loss of earning capacity
may be awarded in two instances: 1) the victim was self-employed and receiving less than the minimum wage under the current laws25
and no documentary evidence available in the decedent's line of business; and, 2) the deceased was employed as a daily wage worker
and receiving less than the minimum wage. 26 Here, the award for loss of earning capacity lacks basis. For one, the widow of the
deceased gave conflicting testimonies. At first, she testified that her husband "has a net income of P16, 000.00 a year as farmer, sari-
sari store owner, driver and operator of two tricycles and caretaker of Hacienda Bancod." 27 Next, she claimed that "before his death, her
husband earns P50.00 a day as tricycle driver and P150.00 from their sari-sari store and had a net income of P4, 000.00 a month. As a
farmer her husband produces 270 cavans of palay a year with a price of P135.00 a cavan weighing 50 kilos." 28 Aside from giving
inconsistent statements, the amounts mentioned were arbitrary and were not proved to be below the prescribed minimum wage.
Plainly, this case does not fall under any of the exceptions exempting the submission of documentary proof. To reiterate, "[actual
damages, to be recoverable, must not only be capable of proof, but must actually be proved with a reasonable degree of certainty.
Courts cannot simply rely on speculation, conjecture or guesswork in determining the fact and amount of damages. To justify an award
of actual damages, there must be competent proof of the actual amount of loss, credence can be given only to claims which are duly
supported by receipts."29 In fine, the award of loss of earning capacity must be deleted for lack of basis.

ACCORDINGLY, we ADOPT the findings of the trial court as affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The assailed January 31, 2012 Decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR H.C. No. 03517 finding appellant Victoriano Villar @ Boy GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of murder is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS that appellant is not eligible for parole pursuant to Section 3 of Republic Act
No. 9346, An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines; the award for loss of earning capacity is deleted for lack
of basis; the award of civil indemnity is increased to P75,000.00; appellant is ordered to pay exemplary damages in the amount of
P30,000.00; the award of actual damages is deleted; in lieu thereof, temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.00 is awarded; and
all damages awarded shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-27191 February 28, 1967

ADELAIDA TANEGA, petitioner, vs.HON. HONORATO B. MASAKAYAN, in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance
of Rizal, Branch V, and the CHIEF OF POLICE OF QUEZON CITY, respondents.

Pressed upon us in this, an original petition for certiorari and prohibition, is the problem of when prescription of penalty should start to
run. The controlling facts are:

Convicted of slander by the City Court of Quezon City petitioner appealed. Found guilty once again by the Court of First Instance,1 she
was sentenced to 20 days of arresto menor, to indemnify the offended party, Pilar B. Julio, in the sum of P100.00, with the
corresponding subsidiary imprisonment, and to pay the costs. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 2 We declined to review
on certiorari.3 Back to the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, said court, on January 11, 1965, directed that execution of the
sentence be set for January 27, 1965. On petitioner's motion, execution was deferred to February 12, 1965, at 8:30 a.m. At the

Page 43 of 53
appointed day and hour, petitioner failed to show up. This prompted the respondent judge, on February 15, 1965, to issue a warrant for
her arrest, and on March 23, 1965 an alias warrant of arrest. Petitioner was never arrested.

Then, on December 10, 1966, petitioner, by counsel, moved to quash the warrants of arrest of February 15, 1965 and March 23, 1965.
Petitioner's ground: Penalty has prescribed.

On December 19, 1966, the respondent judge ruled that "the penalty imposed upon the accused has to be served", rejected the plea of
prescription of penalty and, instead, directed the issuance of another alias warrant of arrest. Hence, the present petition.

Arresto menor and a fine of P100.00 constitute a light penalty. 4 By Article 92 of the Revised Penal Code, light penalties "imposed by
final sentence" prescribe in one year. The period of prescription of penalties — so the succeeding Article 93 provides — "shall
commence to run from the date when the culprit should evade the service of his sentence".5

What then is the concept of evasion of service of sentence Article 157 of the Revised Penal Code furnishes the ready answer. Says
Article 157:

ART. 157. Evasion of service of sentence. — The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods shall be
imposed upon any convict who shall evade service of his sentence by escaping during the term of his imprisonment 6 by
reason of final judgment. However, if such evasion or escape shall have taken place by means of unlawful entry, by breaking
doors, windows, gates, walls, roofs or floors, or by using picklocks, false keys, disguise, deceit, violence or intimidation, or
through connivance with other convicts or employees of the penal institution, the penalty shall be prision correccional in its
maximum period.

Elements of evasion of service of sentence are: (1) the offender is a convict by final judgment; (2) he "is serving his sentence which
consists in deprivation of liberty"; and (3) he evades service of sentence by escaping during the term of his sentence.7 This must be so.
For, by the express terms of the statute, a convict evades "service of his sentence", by "escaping during the term of his imprisonment
by reason of final judgment." That escape should take place while serving sentence, is emphasized by the provisions of the second
sentence of Article 157 which provides for a higher penalty if such "evasion or escape shall have taken by means of unlawful entry, by
breaking doors, windows, gates, walls, roofs, or floors or by using picklocks, false keys, disguise, deceit, violence or intimidation, or
through connivance with other convicts or employees of the penal institution, ... "8 Indeed, evasion of sentence is but another
expression of the term "jail breaking".9

A dig into legal history confirms the views just expressed. The Penal Code of Spain of 1870 in its Article 134 — from whence Articles 92
and 93 of the present Review Penal Code originated — reads:

Las penas impuestas por sentencia firme prescriben:

Las de muerte y cadena perpetua, a los veinte años.
xxx xxx xxx
Las leves, al año.
El tiempo de esta prescripcion comenzara a correr desde el dia en que se notifique personalmente al reo la sentencia firme, o
desde el quebrantamiento de la condena si hubiera esta comenzado a cumplirse. x x x

Note that in the present Article 93 the words "desde el dia en que se notifique personalmente al reo la sentencia firme", written in the
old code, were deleted. The omission is significant. What remains reproduced in Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code is solely
"quebrantamiento de la condena". And, "quebrantamiento" or evasion means escape.10 Reason dictates that one can escape only after
he has started service of sentence.

Even under the old law, Viada emphasizes, where the penalty consists of imprisonment, prescription shall only begin to run when he
escapes from confinement. Says Viada:

El tiempo de la prescripcion empieza a contarse desde el dia en que ha tenido lugar la notificacion personal de la sentencia
firme al reo: el Codigo de 1850 no expresaba que la notificacion hubiese de ser personal, pues en su art. 126 se consigna que
el termino de la prescripcion se cuenta desde que se notifique la sentencia, causa de la ejecutoria en que se imponga la pena
respectiva. Luego ausente el reo ya no podra prescribir hoy la pena, pues que la notificacion personal no puede ser suplida
por la notificacion hecha en estrados. Dada la imprescindible necesidad del requisito de la notificacion personal, es obvio que
en las penas que consisten en privacion de libertad solo porda existir la prescripcion quebrantando el reo la condena pues
que si no se hallare ya preso preventivamente, debera siempre procederse a su encerramiento en el acto de serle notifirada
personalmente la sentencia.11

We, therefore, rule that for prescription of penalty of imprisonment imposed by final sentence to commence to run, the culprit should
escape during the term of such imprisonment.

Adverting to the facts, we have here the case of a convict who — sentenced to imprisonment by final judgment — was thereafter never
placed in confinement. Prescription of penalty, then, does not run in her favor.

For the reasons given, the Court resolved to dismiss the petition for certiorari and prohibition. No costs. So ordered.

G.R. No. 207949, September 09, 2015

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ARMANDO DIONALDO Y EBRON, RENATO DIONALDO Y EBRON,
MARIANO GARIGUEZ, JR. Y RAMOS, AND RODOLFO LARIDO Y EBRON, Accused-Appellants.

On July 23, 2014, the Court rendered its Resolution 1 in this case finding accused-appellants Armando Dionaldo y Ebron, Renato
Dionaldo y Ebron (Renato), Mariano Gariguez, Jr. y Ramos, and Rodolfo Larido y Ebron (accused-appellants) guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the special complex crime of Kidnapping for Ransom with Homicide, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated February 15, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
02888 is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that all the accused-appellants herein are equally found GUILTY of the special
complex crime of Kidnapping for Ransom with Homicide, and are sentenced to each suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without
eligibility for parole, and to pay, jointly and severally, the family of the kidnap victim Edwin Navarro the following amounts: (1)
P100,00.00 as civil indemnity; (2) P100,000.00 as moral damages; and (3) P100,000.00 as exemplary damages, all with interest at the
rate of six percent (61Yo) per annum from the date of finality of judgment until fully paid.

Page 44 of 53
SO ORDERED.

Accused-appellants collectively moved for reconsideration2 thereof, which the Court denied with finality in its Resolution 3 dated
September 24, 2014.

On even date, the Court received a letter 4 from the Bureau of Corrections dated September 16, 2014 informing Us of the death of one
of the accused-appellants in this case, Renato, on June 10, 2014, as evidenced by the Certificate of Death 5 attached thereto. As
Renato's death transpired before the promulgation of the Court's July 23, 2014 Resolution in this case, i.e., when his appeal before the
Court was still pending resolution, his criminal liability is totally extinguished in view of the provisions of Article 89 of the Revised Penal
Code which states:

Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. -Criminal liability is totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only
when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment;

xxxx

In People v. Amistoso,6 the Court explained that the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal
liability, as well as his civil liability ex delicto.7 Consequently, Renato's death on June 10, 2014 renders the Court's July 23, 2014
Resolution irrelevant and ineffectual as to him, and is therefore set aside. Accordingly, the criminal case against Renato is dismissed.

WHEREFORE, the Resolutions dated July 23, 2014 and September 24, 2014 of the Court are hereby SET ASIDE and Criminal Case
No. C-68329 before the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 129 is DISMISSED insofar as accused-appellant RENATO
DIONALDO y EBRON is concerned, in view of his demise.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 214865, August 19, 2015

ROSVEE C. CELESTIAL, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

Nature of the Case

This treats of the Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the April 28, 2014, July
17, 20142 and October 10, 20143 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R CR No. 35962, which dismissed petitioner's
appeal for her failure to file the required appellant's brief. Said dismissal effectively affirmed her conviction by the trial court of six counts
of qualified theft through falsification of commercial documents.

The Facts

Petitioner Rosvee Celestial was employed by Glory Philippines as its "Accounting-in-Charge." As such, she handles the company's
bank transactions and accounting ledgers. She was terminated in 2006 when it was discovered that she made anomalous withdrawals
from the company's dollar account.

According to Akihiro Harada, the president of Glory Philippines, petitioner's modus was to prepare and ask him to sign withdrawal slips
allegedly to pay for company expenses. Afterwards, petitioner would photocopy the signed slips and submit the said copies for the
company's documentation. Later, she would insert additional figures in the originally signed forms to be able to withdraw an amount
higher than what was intended, keeping for herself the excess amount and the duplicate original of the form. It was only when Harada
noticed the discrepancies between the photocopied slips and the actual amounts withdrawn that he discovered petitioner's criminal
acts. As extrapolated from the records, the amounts stated in the withdrawal slips are as follows: 4

Date of Withdrawal June 1, 2006 June 9, 2006 June 26, 2006 June 30, 2006 June 30, 2006 July 11, 2006
Photocopy of the Withdrawal Slip $39.40 $511.00 $345.20 $8,800.00 $103.61 $483.00
Duplicate of the Withdrawal Slip $10,039.40 $5,511.00 8,345.20 $18,800.00 $3,103.61 $15,483.00
Discrepancy $10,000.00 $5,000.00 $8,000.00 $10,000.00 $3,000.00 $15,000.00

Thereafter, Glory Philippines lodged a criminal complaint against petitioner for qualified theft. Finding probable cause to file charges
against petitioner, the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Cavite City then filed six (6) Informations with the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Cavite City, Branch 16, indicting her with six (6) counts of qualified theft through falsification of commercial documents, docketed as
Criminal Case Nos. 94-07 up to 99-07.

On June 25, 2013, the RTC rendered a Decision5 convicting petitioner, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused ROSVEE CELESTIAL y CALDEJON guilty beyond reasonable doubt
in Criminal Case Nos. 94-07 to 99-07 of the crime of six (6) counts of Qualified Theft through Falsification of Commercial Documents
and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment consisting of TWENTY (20) years of Reclusion Temporal for Each Count.

SO ORDERED.

Aggrieved, petitioner elevated the case to the CA via notice of appeal.

On November 28, 2013, petitioner received a copy of the CA Notice dated November 20, 2013,6 directing her to file an appellant's brief
within thirty (30) days from receipt thereof. On December 27, 2013, petitioner's former counsel, Atty. Bernard Paredes, moved for a
thirty-day extension, or until January 26, 2014, within which to comply. Counsel would later on inform petitioner that he prayed for
another extension of until February 26, 014 to file the appellant's brief. 7

Allegedly unknown to petitioner, the CA, on April 28, 2014, issued a Resolution, which considered petitioner's appeal abandoned and
dismissed for failure to file her appellant's brief. The fallo of the Resolution reads:

It appearing from the CMIS Verification Report dated April 14, 2014 that accused-appellant and her counsel de parte failed to file the

Page 45 of 53
required appellant's brief despite a total extension of 60 days or until February 26, 2014 granted, by the Court, pursuant to Section 8 of
Rule 124 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, the instant appeal is considered ABANDONED and accordingly DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.8

Petitioner then claimed that she was surprised to have received, on August 6, 2014, a copy of the CA Resolution dated July 17,
20149 with attached Notice of Entry of Judgment.10 The Resolution, in part, reads:

Considering the CMIS Verification dated My 11, 2014 that NO Motion for Reconsideration or Supreme Court petition was filed, the
Resolution dated April 28, 2014 has attained finality on May 28, 2014. Let said Resolution now be ENTERED in the Book of Entries of
Judgments.

This prompted petitioner to file, on August 22, 2014, an Omnibus Motion, 11 moving for (1) reconsideration of the July 17, 2014
Resolution, and (2) leave of court for the attached appellant's brief to be admitted. Petitioner averred that she never personally received
a copy of the April 28, 2014 Resolution that considered her appeal abandoned and dismissed; that her former counsel, Atty. Paredes,
was grossly and inexcusably negligent in handling her case; that the reviewing court may still allow for an extension of time since no
motion to dismiss had been filed; that substantial justice demands that she be given another opportunity to file her brief.

Unfortunately for petitioner, the CA, unswayed by her arguments, dismissed the Omnibus Motion through the assailed October 10,
2014 Resolution. Hence, the instant recourse.

The Issue

Petitioner prays that the rulings of the CA be reversed on the following grounds:
I. IT IS RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THAT PETITIONER SHOULD NOT BE BOUND BY THE GROSS AND INEXCUSABLE
NEGLIGENCE OF HER COUNSEL. THE ENDS OF JUSTICE WILL BE BEST SERVED IF PETITIONER'S APPEAL BEFORE
THE COURT OF APPEALS BE REOPENED AND PETITIONER BE GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY TO VENTILATE HER
ARGUMENTS AND EVIDENCE THEREIN, CONSIDERING THAT HER FAILURE TO FILE HER APPELLANT'S BRIEF WAS
DUE TO REASONS BEYOND HER CONTROL. TO OUTRIGHT DENY PETITIONER HER RIGHT TO APPEAL WILL
RESULT IN THE DEPRIVATION OF PETITIONER'S LIFE AND LIBERTY; AND
II. PETITIONER HAS MERITORIOUS GROUNDS IN FIER APPEAL BEFORE THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT SHOULD
[HAVE BEEN VENTILATED] AND HEARD DURING THE APPELLATE PROCEEDINGS12

Verily, the main issue for consideration herein boils down to whether not the CA erred in dismissing the case for petitioner's failure to
file her appellant's brief.

In its Comment,13 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), for the People, countered that the right to appeal is a statutory privilege that
may be lost if the party who seeks to avail the same does not comply with the requirements of the rules. Citing Section 8, Rule 124 of
the Rules of Court, the OSG further argued that the CA is granted the discretion to dismiss an appeal for failure to prosecute, such as
when the appellant fails to file the required brief. 14 Finally, the OSG invoked the doctrine of immutability of judgments and averred that
the dismissal of petitioner's appeal had already attained finality and may no longer be recalled or modified. 15

The Court's Ruling

The petition is unmeritorious.

The CA's dismissal of the appeal for failure to prosecute was in order

Section 8, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court pertinently provides:

SEC. 8. Dismissal of appeal for abandonment or failure to prosecute. - The Court of Appeals may, upon motion of the appellee or motu
proprio and with notice to the appellant in either case, dismiss the appeal if the appellant fails to file his brief within the time prescribed
by this Rule, except where the appellant is represented by a counsel de officio.

As aptly observed by the CA, petitioner's claim that she was not personally informed of the dismissal of the appeal deserves scant
consideration. Fundamental is the rule that notice to counsel is notice to the client. 16 When a party is represented by a counsel in an
action in court, notices of all kinds, including motions and pleadings of all parties and all orders of the court must be served on his
counsel.17

In the case at bar, it cannot be disputed that Atty. Paredes represented petitioner in the proceedings before the CA. And based on the
registry return receipt, counsel received a copy of the April 28, 2014 Resolution on May 12, 2014.18 Thus, the CA complied with the
procedural requirement under Section 8, Rule 124 and no violation of petitioner's right to notice of the dismissal can be attributed to the
appellate court.

Furthermore, the oft-cited doctrine is that the negligence of counsel binds his client. 19 This is based on the rule that any act performed
by a counsel within the scope of his general or implied authority is regarded as an act of his client. While, truly, there are situations
where the Court can relax procedural rules, such exceptions do not obtain in the extant case.

Under the factual backdrop of this case, We find the failure to file the appeal brief inexcusable. First, the handling lawyer, Atty. Paredes,
was undoubtedly at fault. Even with the benefit of two (2) thirty-day (30-day) extensions, counsel, nevertheless, still failed to comply
with the CA's directive. Second, petitioner herself was likewise negligent since, as she admitted, Atty. Paredes informed her that the
deadline for the second extension was until February 26, 2014. 20 It is then baffling why petitioner took no action to ensure compliance
with the CA Notice to file her appellant's brief from the time she followed up the case to the date of the deadline, and even thereafter
until the April 28, 2014 Resolution was promulgated. Absolutely nothing appeared to have been done in the interim, not even in terms of
noting that no appeal brief had been filed. Thus, the petitioner simply took too long to rectify its mistake; by the time that she acted, it
was simply too late.21 From these circumstances, the CA cannot in any way be said to have erred in dismissing the appeal.

The proper penalty

Notwithstanding the denial of the petition, We find cogent reason to lift the Entry of Judgment issued by the CA and modify the penalty
imposed by the trial court. The demand of substantive justice calls for this approach. Pertinently, Arts. 309 and 310 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC) provide:

Page 46 of 53
Article 309. Penalties. - Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:

1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the thing stolen is more than 12,000 pesos but does
not exceed 22,000 pesos, but if the value of the thing stolen exceeds the latter amount the penalty shall be the maximum period of
the one prescribed in this paragraph, and one year for each additional ten thousand pesos, but the total of the penalty which
may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be
imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as
the case may be.

2. The penalty of prision correctional in its medium and maximum periods, if the value of the thing stolen is more than 6,000 pesos but
does not exceed 12,000 pesos.

3. The penalty of prision correctional in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the property stolen is more than 200 pesos but
does not exceed 6,000 pesos.

4. Arresto mayor in its medium period to prision correctional in its minimum period, if the value of the property stolen is over 50 pesos
but does not exceed 200 pesos.

5. Arresto mayor to its full extent, if such value is over 5 pesos but does not exceed 50 pesos.

6. Arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if such value does not exceed 5 pesos.

7. Arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos, if the theft is committed under the circumstances enumerated in paragraph 3 of the
next preceding article and the value of the thing stolen does not exceed 5 pesos. If such value exceeds said amount, the provision of
any of the five preceding subdivisions shall be made applicable.

8. Arresto menor in its minimum period or a fine not exceeding 50 pesos, when the value of the thing stolen is not over 5 pesos, and the
offender shall have acted under the impulse of hunger, poverty, or the difficulty of earning a livelihood for the support of himself or his
family.

Article 310. Qualified theft. - The crime of theft shall be punished by the penalties next higher by two degrees than those
respectively specified in the next preceding article, if committed by a domestic servant, or with grave abuse of confidence, or if the
property stolen is motor vehicle, mail matter or large cattle or consists of coconuts taken from the premises of the plantation or fish
taken from a fishpond or fishery, or if property is taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any other
calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance, (emphasis added)

In ascertaining the proper penalty, We are guided by Our pronouncement in People v. Mercado:22

First, We get the value of the property stolen as determined by the tr al court, to wit:

Crim. Case No. 99-07 98-07 95-07 97-07 94-07 96-07

Withdrawal Date June 1, 2006 June 9, 2006 June 26, 2006 June 30, 2006 June 30, 2006 July 11, 2006
Stolen Amount $10,000.00 $5,000.00 $8,000.00 $10,000.00 $3,000.00 $15,000.00
Amount in Pesos23 P 531,570.00 P265,785.00 P425,256.00 P531,570.00 P159,471.00 P785,970.00

Second, We determine the imposable base penalty under Art. 309 of the RPC. Here, since the totality of the stolen amounts for each
case exceeds P22, 000.00, the imposable base penalty for each count, as per Art. 309 (1), is prision mayor in its minimum and medium
periods to be imposed in the maximum period, which is eight (8) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to ten (10) years of prision
mayor, had the crime charged been simple theft. 24redarclaw

Third, since the value of the stolen goods exceeds P22, 000.00, We compute for the additional years of maximum imprisonment under
Art. 309 (1) by deducting P22, 000.00 from each case, and by subsequently dividing each difference by P10, 000.00, disregarding any
remainder amount. This would yield the following results:

Grim. Case No. 99-07 98-07 95-07 97-07 94-07 96-07

Stolen Amount in Pesos P531,570.00 P265,785.00 P425,256.00 P531,570.00 P159,471.00 P785,970.00
Less P22,000.00 509,570.00 243,785.00 403,256.00 509,570.00 137,471.00 763,970.00
Divided By P10,000.00 50 24 40 50 13 76

Fourth, We add the maximum of the base penalty to the above-determined quotient to arrive at the maximum imprisonment term
imposable had the crime committed been simple theft:

Grim. Case No. 99-07 98-07 95-07 97-07 94-07 96-07

Maximum of 10 years 10 years 10 years 10 years 10 years 10 years
Base Penalty
Additional 50 24 40 50 13 76
Years to the
Maximum
Penalty
Maximum 60 years 34 years 50 years 60 years 23 years 86 years
Penalty

Fifth, the maximum imprisonment term should not exceed the 20-year cap under Art. 309 (1), and any imprisonment term in excess of
the cap should be disregarded. In this case, since all sums exceeded 20 years, the proper penalty - the maximum period adverted to in
Art. 309 (1) - would have been 20 years of reclusion temporal, before the application of the indeterminate sentence law, for each count,
had petitioner been convicted of simple theft.

Sixth, the penalty for qualified theft is two degrees higher than that for simple theft. Under Art. 25 of the RPC, two (2) degrees higher
than reclusion temporal- the penalty following reclusion perpetua - is death.25 Be that as it may. Art. 74 of the RPC, provides:

Page 47 of 53
ART. 74. Penalty higher than reclusion perpetua in certain cases. –

In cases in which the law prescribes a penalty higher than another given penalty, without specifically designating the name of the
former, if such higher penalty should be that of death, the same penalty and the accessory penalties of Article 40, shall be
considered as the next higher penalty.

Applying the aforequoted provision, the penalty of death cannot be :ted on herein petitioner, regardless of whether or not the imposition
of capital punishment has been suspended. This is so because the penalty of death was not specifically prescribed as an imposable
penalty under Art. 309 (1) of the RPC. Two degrees higher than reclusion temporal, the next higher penalty than reclusion perpetua,
would then still be reclusion perpetua, with the accessory penalties of death under Art. 40 of the RPC.26

Jurisprudence, moreover, teaches that when the penalty of death cannot be imposed pursuant to Art. 74, the period of imprisonment
should be fixed at forty (40) years of reclusion perpetua. Otherwise, there would be no difference at all between reclusion
perpetua imposed as the penalty next higher in degree and reclusion perpetua imposed as the penalty fixed by law.27 The proper
penalty to be imposed in this case, therefore, is forty (40) years of reclusion perpetua, with the accessory penalties of death, for each
count of qualified theft.28

Lastly, since petitioner is convicted of six (6) counts of qualified theft through falsification of commercial documents with corresponding
six (6) penalties of forty (40) years of reclusion perpetua, Art. 70 of the RPC on successive service of sentences shall apply. As
provided:

Article 70. Successive service of sentence. –

xxx

Notwithstanding the provisions of the rule next preceding, the maximum duration of the convict's sentence shall not be more than three-
fold the length of time corresponding to the most severe of the penalties imposed upon him. No other penalty to which he may be liable
shall be inflicted after the sum total of those imposed equals the same maximum period.

Such maximum period shall in no case exceed forty years.

Therefore, in spite of the six (6) penalties of forty (40) years of reclusion perpetua, petitioner shall only suffer imprisonment for a period
not exceeding 40 years. A downward modification of the penalty imposed by the RTC is then in order.

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the Court rules as follows:

a. The instant petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit, and;
b. The Entry of Judgment in CA-G.R CR No. 35962 is LIFTED. The June 25, 2013 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Cavite
City, Branch 16 in Criminal Case Nos. 94-07 up to 99-07, as effectively confirmed by the Court of Appeals, is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION to read as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused ROSVEE CELESTIAL y CALDEJON guilty beyond
reasonable doubt in Criminal Case Nos. 94-07 to 99-07 of the crime of six (6) counts of Qualified Theft through Falsification of
Commercial Documents and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment consisting of six (6) penalties
of reclusion perpetua, with the accessory penalties provided in Art. 40 of the RPC. But with the application of Art. 70
of the RPC, accused-appellant shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment for a period not exceeding 40 years.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 126575. December 11, 1998

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. OMAR MEDINA y LUMBERIO, Accused-Appellant.

Accused-appellant Omar L. Medina was convicted of having raped the 13-year old daughter of his common-law spouse four
(4) times in 1995, and was sentenced to suffer the death penalty for each of the four (4) counts of rape, with all its accessory
penalties. Omar Medina was likewise ordered to pay the victim, Lodalyn Flores, for each count the sum of P50, 000.00 as
indemnity, P50, 000.00 as moral damages and another P50, 000.00 as exemplary damages. The judgment of conviction was
rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Paranaque, Metro Manila, Branch 259, in a consolidated Decision 1 dated September
23, 1996, in Criminal Cases No. 95-710 to 713.

The judgment of the trial court is now before us for automatic review pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Section 22 of Republic Act No. 7659,2 and Sections 3 (e) and 10, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Court.

These four (4) cases of rape were commenced on the basis of four (4) separate complaints signed by complainant Lodalyn
Flores and, upon prior authority by the Provincial Prosecutor, the same were filed with the trial court on November 24, 1995,
docketed as Criminal Cases No. 95-710, 95-711, 95-712, and 95-713.

The crime was allegedly perpetrated by Omar Medina on four (4) occasions as set forth in each of the four (4) complaints
which are similarly worded (except with reference to the dates the crime was allegedly committed), thus:

The undersigned complainant accuses Omar Lumberio Medina of the crime of Rape, committed as follows:
"That on or about (July 25, 1995,3 August of 1995,4 September of 19955 and October of 19956), in the Municipality of Paraaque,
Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force
and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the complainant LODALYN
FLORES, a minor, 13 years old, against her will.

"CONTRARY TO LAW."7 (dates in parenthesis supplied)

Upon arraignment on the four (4) complaints, Omar Medina entered a plea of not guilty.

Based on the testimonies of complainant Lodalyn Flores and Dr. Floresto Arizala, Jr., the evidence for the prosecution runs
as follows:

Page 48 of 53
Lodalyn Flores is the stepdaughter of Omar Medina, he being the common-law husband of her mother, Lolita Flores. Having
been born on March 26, 1982, Lodalyn was thirteen (13) years of age and a grade four student at the time she was raped by
Omar. She has a younger brother, Rizaldy, nine years of age, and a four-year old half-sister, Aileen, who is Omars daughter
with Lolita.8

On July 25, 1995, at about 1:00 o clock in the afternoon, Lodalyn was awakened from her nap at their bedroom in Champaca
St., UPS IV, Paraaque, when Omar covered her mouth and tied her hands. Omar threatened Lodalyn with a knife which he
placed at her side and forcibly removed Lodalyn’s T-shirt and shorts, including her undershirt and panty. He then removed
his shorts and brief and placed himself on top of Lodalyn. He boxed her thighs and succeeded in sexually penetrating her.
Afterwards, Lodalyn noticed some blood and slimy discharge in her vagina. At the time Lodalyn was sexually abused by
Omar, there was no one else inside the house as her brother and sister were playing outside. 9

Lodalyn kept mum about the unfortunate incident as she was afraid of Omar’s threat to kill her and her mother.

Sometime in August of 1995, Omar again raped Lodalyn when her mother was away from their house and while her younger
brother and sister were asleep as it was already 7:00 o clock in the evening. This happened after Omar asked Lodalyn to
prepare her mother’s food and to get his T-shirt from the cabinet in the bedroom. While already inside the bedroom, Lodalyn
noticed that Omar was at her back. He then gagged her mouth with a piece of cloth he was holding. Lodalyn struggled to free
herself, but Omar boxed her stomach to submission and succeeded in sexually ravishing her. Again, Omar threatened to kill
her and her mother if she would tell anyone about the incident. 10

The third time Lodalyn was raped by Omar occurred in September of 1995 while her mother was not home yet and her brother
and sister were at school. Omar asked Lodalyn to get the P20.00 under the pillow. She complied but as she turned around,
Omar was already in front of her. Lodalyn boxed Omar in the chest but he slapped her and placed her on the bed. Omar raised
her skirt, removed her panty, then his clothes and sexually assaulted Lodalyn. 11

The fourth and last time Omar ravished Lodalyn took place in October of 1995. This time it was more violent. Omar repeatedly
boxed Lodalyn in different parts of her body until she lost consciousness. When she regained consciousness, she felt pain in
her vagina and noticed something sticky on the bedsheet where she was lying. 12

On November 17, 1995, after Lodalyn and her mother quarreled when she confronted her mother about Omar’s having hurt
her brother by hitting the latter at the nape, Lodalyn confided to Consuelo Bofete, a neighbor, what she had suffered in the
hands of Omar. In turn, Consuelo relayed to Fely Bofete what Lodalyn told her. Fely then informed Lolita Flores what Omar
did to Lodalyn. Lolita was enraged over the report that he ordered Lodalyn, her brother and sister to leave the house. 13

Lodalyn and Fely Bofete sought the assistance of Kagawad Fernando Beltran and the three then went to the National Bureau
of Investigation (NBI). Dr. Floresto Arizala, Jr., a medico-legal officer of the NBI, conducted a medical examination on Lodalyn
on November 23, 1995. In his medical report, the doctor found, among others, that Lodalyns hymen has an old healed deep
laceration at 6:00 oclock position and admits a tube 2.5 cm. in diameter. 14 Thereafter, Lodalyn lodged a complaint at the police
station which eventually led to the filing of the four (4) charges of rape against Omar.

In his defense, Omar Medina admits that Lodalyn Flores, who is about 13 to 14 years of age, is his stepdaughter, he being a
common-law husband of Lolita Flores (Lodalyn's mother). He testified that he has never been charged of any crime, except
the present four (4) cases of rape. He denied, however, that he sexually abused or raped Lodalyn whom he treats as his very
own daughter. During those dates of the alleged rape incidents, he was busy tending his household chores and was then
cleaning their pigpens, fetching water and washing their clothes. He believes that the reason why he was charged by Lodalyn
is that he used to scold her for entertaining her suitors.15

Lodalyn's brother, Rizaldy Flores, nine (9) years of age, also testified that Lodalyn seems to dislike Omar since the latter has
been telling her not to be too friendly with boys. Lodalyn has a boyfriend by the name of Singcol. Omar washes clothes,
cleans the house, takes care of the pigs, fetches water everyday and also cooks for them. He never saw Omar kiss Lodalyn
nor did he see them in any intimate situation. It is not true that Omar raped Lodalyn because before he leaves for school and
when he comes home, his mother is at their house.16

After trial, the court a quo rendered judgment finding Omar Medina guilty beyond reasonable doubt of four (4) counts of rape
based on the testimony of the victim, Lodalyn, whose version was considered "highly credible." 17 He was sentenced to the
maximum penalty of death for each count pursuant to Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659 on account of his relationship with
the victim.

In his brief, Omar claims that "it is unlikely" for him to rape Lodalyn since he treats her as his very own daughter. 18

We do not think so.

The bestiality in man whose conscience has been seared by his insatiable greed for lust shows no respect for blood or close
kinship with his victim. The blood relationship between a father and a daughter does not by itself discount the probability of
the father committing rape against his own daughter. More so in this case, considering that Omar is merely the common-law
spouse of the victim's mother. In fact, this Court, in the recent case of People v. Gallo,19 has made the following factual
observation:

"It is disturbing enough to see that there has been a noticeable increase in the incidents of rape but one is left completely
appalled that this still growing number includes cases of the bestial act being perpetrated on the young and innocent and, no
longer too infrequently it seems, compounded by the close kinship of the offender and the victim.
"In People vs. Malgar (238 SCRA 512), the Court has had occasion to state that –

`A father is looked up to as the protector and as the guardian of his family, remaining ever wary of even the slightest harm
that might befall it. It is difficult to thus imagine that any such man could instead stand as the predator of his own flesh and
blood. Yet, we occasionally would find ourselves so regrettably contending with it as a fact.'20 (at p. 513) [underscoring
supplied]

In rape cases, the accused may be convicted solely on the testimony of the victim, provided that such testimony is credible,
natural, convincing and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things.21 This is so because by its very

Page 49 of 53
nature, rape is committed with the least possibility of being seen by the public.22 In fact, the presence of eyewitnesses could
even raise serious doubts of its commission.23

The court a quo gave credence to the testimony of Lodalyn. And rightly so. Lodalyn was thirteen (13) years old at the time she
was raped by Omar four times in 1995. As correctly observed by the trial court, no young and decent Filipina would publicly
admit that she was ravished and her honor tainted unless such was true, for it is instinctive of her to protect her honor. 24 It is
highly inconceivable for a lass of tender age to concoct a tale of defloration, allow the examination of her private parts, and
undergo the expense, trouble, inconvenience, not to mention the trauma of a public trial, unless she was in fact raped.25

Lodalyns failure to immediately report the rape after its initial occurrence does not cast grave doubts on her credibility. Such
delay is understandable. It is not uncommon for a young innocent girl to conceal for some time the assaults on her virtue
because of the rapist's threat on her life, more so when the rapist is living with her. 26 Omar is Lodalyn's stepfather and he
lived with her. She was in constant fear of Omar who threatened to kill her and her mother. Being the stepfather, Omar also
exercised moral ascendancy and influence over her, who is thus expected to yield to his threats and intimidation. In People v.
Casil,27 we held:

". . . in rape committed by a father against his own daughter, the father's moral ascendancy and influence over the latter
substitutes for violence and intimidation. The foregoing principle applies in the case of a sexual assault of a stepdaughter by
her stepfather and of a goddaughter by a godfather in the sacrament of confirmation.

"In the present recourse, appellant being in fact, if not in law, the stepfather of the victim, who was at the tender age of
thirteen years when the first defilement was perpetrated, definitely enjoyed moral and physical ascendancy over complainant.
The latter could thus be expected to yield to the threats and intimidation of appellant with less resistance by reason of his
dominance over her."

Lodalyns story was full of details that it could not be a product of fabrication. At her age, she could not have narrated in such
a straight-forward and convincing manner her defloration, if it were not true. Note her pertinent testimony:

"Q - At around 1:00 p.m. of July 25, 1995, where were you?
"A - I was at home, in the bedroom.
"Q - What were you doing then?
"A - I was playing with my brother and sister.
"Q - After playing with your brother and sister, what did you do next?
"A - After playing, I was able to sleep at about 1:00 p.m.
"Q - After you woke up, what did you see or what did you notice, if any?
"A - My mouth was gagged and my hands were tied.
xxx
"Q - When you woke up and saw yourself gagged by the mouth and your hands were tied, where was accused Omar Medina?
"A - He was on top of my thigh.
xxx
"Q - So, while Omar Medina was on top of you, did you notice if Omar Medina was armed or not at that time?
"A - He was armed, sir.
"Q - What kind of arm did he have?
"A - A big knife.
"Q - And what was he doing with that knife?
"A - He place the knife on my side.
"Q - While Omar Medina was on top of you, what was he doing to you?
"A - He forcibly removed my panty and shorts and then my t-shirt and sando.
xxx
"Q - After Omar Medina removed your panty as well as your shorts and tore off your t-shirt, what did he do next, if any?
"A - He removed his shorts and brief up to his knees.
"Q - After that, what did he do next?
"A - `Pinatungan niya ang dalawa kong hita.'
"Q - What was his purpose in laying on top of your legs?
"A - To rape me.
"Q - Madam witness, how did Omar Medina manage to separate your legs?
"A - He boxed my thighs.
"Q - After you were boxed, you already spread your legs, is that correct?
"A - Yes, sir.
"Q - What did you feel when you were boxed by Omar Medina on both thigh?
"A - 'Nanlambot po ako.'
"Q - After you have already spread your legs, what did Omar Medina do after that?
"A - He was forcing to insert his penis inside my private organ.
"Q - Going back in the stage wherein the accused Omar Medina was already inserting his penis inside your private organ, did
he succeed in inserting his penis inside your vagina?
"A - Yes, sir.
xxx
FISCAL RAMOLET:
While Omar Medina, the accused in this case, was inserting his penis inside your vagina, what did you do, if any?
"A - I was trying to struggle.
"Q - While you were struggling, what did Omar Medina do, if any, on you?
"A - 'Dinaganan niya ang dalawa kong hita' so that I cannot move.
"Q -You claimed that Omar Medina, the accused in this case, succeeded in inserting his penis to your private part, why did
you say that he succeeded in inserting his penis to your private organ?
"A - I felt his penis getting in and out of my private organ.
xxx
"Q - Madam witness, in August 1995, were you raped again by accused Omar Medina?
"A - Yes, sir.
xxx
"Q - So, you were gagged by accused Omar Medina?
"A - Yes, sir.
"Q - After you were gagged, what happened next?
"A - I tried to run away.

Page 50 of 53
"Q - And what happened?
"A - I was not able to go out.
"Q - Why?
"A - Because he pulled me and then when he pulled me, I tried to struggle but he boxed me.
"Q - What part of your body did the accused box you?
"A - In my stomach.
"Q - What did you feel when you were boxed by the accused in your abdomen?
"A - It was painful, sir.
"Q - After that, what did he do?
"A - After that he carried me and brought me to bed.
"Q - After you were brought to bed, what did he do, if any?
"A - He kneeled on my palms.
"Q - So, he knelt on your palms when you were already lying down on the bed?
"A - Yes, sir.
"Q - And after the accused knelt on your palms, what did you do next, if any?
"A - None, because I could not struggle. I could not do anything.
"Q - After that, what happened next, if any?
"A - He removed my shorts and panty.
"Q - Which hand did he use in removing your panty and shorts?
"A - His right hand.
"Q - What about the left hand, what was he doing with his left hand when he was removing your shorts and panty with his
right hand?
"A - 'Nakatukod po uli.'
"Q - Where was that left hand pointed to?
"A - On the side of my body.
"Q - Up to what extent was the accused managed to remove your underwear and shorts?
"A - Below my knees.
xxx
"Q - And after the accused lowered your shorts and panty, what did he do, if any?
"A - He removed his shorts and brief up to his legs.
xxx
"Q - After the accused lowered already his shorts and brief, what happened next, if any?
"A - After that, he held his penis and inserted it on my private organ.
xxx
"Q - Was he able to make a penetration in your private part?
"A - Yes, sir.
xxx
"Q - Did he succeed in inserting his penis on your private part?
"A - Yes, sir.
"Q - Where did the accused rape you in September 1995?
"A - Also in their bedroom.
xxx
"Q - And will you tell this Honorable Court how were you raped by the accused Omar Medina in September 1995 inside their
bedroom?
"A - He asked me to get the P20.00 under the pillow as my additional baon.
"Q - Did you get it?
"A - There was no money under the table.
"Q - When you found out that there was no money, what happened next?
"A - 'Pagharap ko,' he was already in front of me.
"Q - When he was already in front of you, what did he do, if any, at you?
"A - He gagged my mouth with the piece of cloth he was holding.
xxx
"Q - And after you were gagged by the accused, what did you do, if any?
"A - After he gagged my mouth, I was able to run but he caught me by holding my t-shirt.
xxx
"Q - Madam witness, when you were caught by the accused, what did you do?
"A - When he pulled me, I boxed him on the chest.
"Q - While you were boxing him, what happened next?
"A - He slapped me.
"Q - When you were slapped by him, what happened next?
"A - I cried.
"Q - After that, what did the accused do, if any?
"A - He pushed me on the bed.
"Q - Then after that, what happened, if any?
"A - When I was already on the bed, he placed himself on top of me.
"Q - While he was on top of you, what was he then doing?
"A - He raised my skirt and removed my panty.
"Q - What about his clothes, what did the accused do with his clothes?
"A - He also removed his clothes.
xxx
"Q - When the accused already removed his clothes, what happened next, if any?
"A - He spread my legs.
"Q - And how did he spread your legs?
"A - 'Pinatungan ng dalawang paa niya' and he spread my legs with his feet.
"Q - After your legs were already spread by the accused, what happened next, if any?
"A - I saw him held his penis.
"Q - And then?
"A - He forcibly inserted his penis inside my private organ.
xxx
"Q - In October 1995, did the accused rape you again?
"A - Yes, sir.
xxx
"Q - How did the accused manage to rape you again for the fourth time?

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"A - He kept on boxing me.
xxx
"Q - After you were boxed by Omar Medina, what happened to you?
"A - I lost consciousness.
xxx
"Q - You said you became unconscious because you were repeatedly boxed by accused Omar Medina, when you regained
consciousness, what did you see or notice, if any, about yourself?
"A - My shirts was up and my t-shirt also.
"Q - What about your underwear, where was your panty when you regained consciousness?
"A - I was still wearing it.
"Q - Did you happen to see your private part after you regained consciousness?
"A - No, sir.
"Q - Did you notice anything when you woke up of bed?
"A - Yes, sir.
"Q - What was that?
"A - When I woke up, I noticed something wet on the bedsheet and I touched it and found it to be a sticky substance.
xxx
"Q - But immediately after regaining consciousness, did you feel any body pain?
"A - Yes, sir.
"Q - What about your vagina, did you feel anything at all?
"A - It was painful."28

In contrast, the denials interposed by Omar are shallow and incredible. Obviously, the trial court rejected them. Omar claims
that at the time the incidents of rape took place, he was busy doing the household chores and the cleaning of the pigpen.

But this assertion is puerile, especially so in the absence of any showing that the pigpen was located at a far distance from
their house that it was impossible for him to be at home at those times that the rape occurred.

Omar also ascribes to Lodalyn ill-motive for filing the rape charges against him. He maintains that his having scolded her
many times for entertaining her suitors has impelled her to get even with him. The motive ascribed is too trivial as to cause
Lodalyn to charge appellant with such a serious crime that she had to expose herself to shame and scandal of a public trial.
Moreover, the physical evidence of her defloration was corroborated by the medico-legal findings which showed that her
hymen has an "old healed deep laceration at 6:00 o'clock position." 29

While we agree with the trial court that the charge of rape against Omar was proven beyond reasonable doubt, we however
cannot subscribe to the penalty of death imposed against him as this is contrary to the law and jurisprudence.

Although the matter of the proper imposition of the penalty is not assigned as an error by the appellant, nevertheless, it is a
well-established rule in criminal procedure that an appeal in a criminal proceeding throws the whole case open for review and
it becomes the duty of the appellate court to correct an error as may be found in the appealed judgment, whether it is made
the subject of assignment of errors or not.30

The four (4) separate complaints for rape filed against Omar merely charged him with the simple crime of rape under Article
335 of the Revised Penal Code which warrants the imposition of the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The basis for the
imposition of the death penalty by the trial court was the existence of the attendant circumstance of relationship between the
offender and the victim pursuant to Republic Act No. 7659 which amended Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. Section 11
of R.A. 7659 reads:

ART. 335. When and how rape is committed. Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances.
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.

The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.

Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall
be reclusion perpetua to death.

When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become insane, the penalty shall be death.

When the rape is attempted or frustrated and a homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion thereof, the penalty shall
be reclusion perpetua to death.

When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death.

The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative
by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.
2. When the victim is under the custody of the police or military authorities.
3. When the rape is committed in full view of the husband, parent, any of the children or other relatives within the third degree
of consanguinity.
4. When the victim is a religious or a child below seven (7) years old.
5. When the offender know that he is afflicted with Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) disease.
6. When committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the Philippine National Police or any law
enforcement agency.
7. When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has suffered permanent physical mutilation. [underscoring
supplied]

In the recent cases of People v. Garcia31 and People v. Ramos,32 this Court en banc, speaking through the learned Justice
Florenz D. Regalado,33 declared that these seven new attendant circumstances introduced in Section 11 of R.A. No. 7659
partake of the nature of qualifying circumstances and not merely aggravating circumstances, since the said qualifying
circumstances are punishable by the single indivisible penalty of death and not by reclusion perpetua to death. A qualifying

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circumstance increases the penalty by degree, while an aggravating circumstance affects only the period of the penalty but
does not increase it to a higher degree.34

In the aforecited case of People v. Ramos, we further explained that:

"While Republic Act No. 7659 did not give a legal designation to the crime of rape attended by any of the seven new
circumstances introduced in Article 335 on December 31, 1993, this Court has referred to such crime as qualified rape in a
number of its decisions. However, with or without a name for this kind of rape, the concurrence of the minority of the victim
and her relationship with the offender give a different character to the rape defined in the first part of Article 335. They raise
the imposable penalty upon a person accused of rape from reclusion perpetua to the higher and supreme penalty of death.
Such an effect conjointly puts relationship and minority of the offended party into the nature of a special qualifying
circumstance."

In the present case, we note that the qualifying circumstance of relationship was not alleged in the four (4) complaints of rape
and, therefore, the said charges are not in its qualified form to fall under the circumstances stated in Section 11 of R.A. 7659.
Thus, the penalty of death prescribed in R.A. 7659 should not have been imposed against appellant Omar. In the aforecited
case of People v. Garcia, we ruled:

x x x, it has long been the rule that qualifying circumstances must be properly pleaded in the indictment. If the same are not
pleaded but proved, they shall be considered only as aggravating circumstances (People v. Collado, 60 Phil. [1934]; People v.
Jovellano, et al., 56 SCRA 156 [1974]; People v. Fuertes, 229 SCRA 289 [1994]; People v. Rodico, et al., 249 SCRA 309 [1995] ),
since the later admit of proof even if not pleaded (U.S. v. Campo, 23 Phil. 368 [1912]; People v. Domondon, 60 Phil. 729 [1934];
People v. de Guzman, 164 SCRA 215 [1988]). Indeed, it would be a denial of the right of the accused to be informed of the
charges against him and, consequently, a denial of due process, if he is charged with simple rape and be convicted of its
qualified form punishable with death, although the attendant circumstance qualifying the offense and resulting in the capital
punishment was not alleged in the indictment on which he was arraigned.

Recapitulating, the information filed against the appellant charged only the felony of simple rape and no attendant qualifying
circumstance, specifically that of his being supposedly a guardian of the victim, was alleged. On this additional
consideration, he cannot, therefore, be punished with the penalty of death even assuming arguendo that he is such a
guardian. Neither can that fact be considered to aggravate his liability as the penalty for simple rape is the single indivisible
penalty of reclusion perpetua (Article 63, Revised Penal Code).

x x x. He must, x x x, be further held liable for the corresponding indemnity to the victim, as well as exemplary damages for
each count of rape (People v. Villanueva, 254 SCRA 202 [1996]). (underscoring supplied)

Since the qualifying circumstance of relationship was not alleged in the subject complaints for rape against Omar, he cannot
be convicted of qualified rape as he was not properly informed that he is being accused of qualified rape.35 Omar's conviction
of qualified rape violates his constitutional right to be properly informed of the nature and cause of accusation against
him.36 In a criminal prosecution, it is the fundamental rule that every element of the crime charged must be alleged in the
complaint or information. The main purpose of this requirement is to enable the accused to properly prepare his defense. He
is presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense. 37

The non-allegation of the relationship between the appellant and the victim in the complaints for rape is a bar to the
imposition of death penalty. Having been informed only of the elements of simple rape, the appellant can only be convicted of
such crime and accordingly be punished with reclusion perpetua.38

As regards the indemnity, moral and exemplary damages awarded by the trial court, we find the same to be proper. In the
recent case of People v. Prades,39 it was ruled that the award of moral damages to the victim is proper even if there was no
proof presented during the trial as basis therefor. The circumstance of relationship between the offender and the victim as an
aggravating circumstance becomes necessary in the matter of awarding civil damages.40 The award of exemplary damages by
the trial court is correct since the complainant has been correctly granted compensatory damages. Exemplary damages may
be awarded in criminal cases when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances after proof that the
offended party is entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages. 41

WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction against accused-appellant Omar L. Medina rendered by the Regional Trial Court of
Paranaque, Metro Manila, Branch 259, in Criminal Cases Nos. 95-710 to 713, is hereby MODIFIED only relative to the death
penalty for each of the four (4) counts of rape and is hereby REDUCED to RECLUSION PERPETUA.

SO ORDERED.

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